FORECASTS AND REALITY IN THE NAVAL WAR
By Romeo Bernotti, Capitano di Fregata, Italian Navy
Translated by Allan Westcott, Instructor, U. S. N. A.
I. Naval Delusions
The War of the Nations gives the outward impression of a revolution rather than an evolution in methods of naval warfare. To speak frankly, the impression seems widely current among people of intelligence that the war has quite discredited the science of naval warfare as propounded prior to 1914; while a large part of the general public are persuaded that it has demonstrated the failure of navies. One of the advantages supposedly inherent in sea power was the ability to transport troops to strike the enemy at his most vulnerable points. If the Dardanelles campaign had succeeded it would indeed have constituted a most obvious proof of the direct influence of sea power upon the course of the war; on the other hand, a superficial examination of the actual situation might appear to justify the opinion expressed several years ago by one of our army writers in confuting the well-known book by Callwell: "Sea power, while often useful, may sometimes be harmful, leading to erroneous diversion and useless scattering of land forces." Notwithstanding the enormous superiority of the Allied fleets over those of our adversaries, the former cannot count to their credit any striking and conspicuous achievements, which may be confidently proclaimed as notable contributions toward the attainment of our objectives in the war. If the inability of Germany to hold her colonies must be conceded as due to naval power, still it is always possible to apply the words of Napoleon in an analogous situation: "Pondicherry may be reconquered on the banks of the Vistula."
Two fundamental advantages accruing to the Allies from preponderance of sea power are the absolute interdiction of enemy trade and the maintenance of our own maritime communications, making it possible to continue the struggle as long as necessary, with land forces steadily augmented, and to carry supplies wherever needed, until in the end we may impose our will on the enemy.
The skeptic will suggest, however, that while the first of these advantages undoubtedly bears heavily upon our adversary, its ultimate efficacy must not be exaggerated. Mahan, in the introduction of his classic work on The Influence of Sea Power, in order to demonstrate the effect of cutting off the sea trade of a country in which it is intensively developed, cites, as a typical example, Holland in the disastrous 18 months' war with England in 1653-54; the Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts, the land was reduced to dire misery, and Holland was constrained to a ruinous peace. But it will not do to compare Holland with the great Central Powers, rich in resources of all kinds, and strengthened, moreover, in their capacity for resistance by the occupation of important territories and by their Balkan alliances, creating, in spite of the efforts of Allied forces to break the cordon, a complex of peoples stretching from the North Sea and the Baltic to Mesopotamia.
Skepticism is evidently less justified in regard to the second advantage, that conferred upon the Allies by the maintenance of sea communications, which is for us a factor of absolutely vital importance; but it may be asserted that the means employed to protect sea trade have not measured up to the needs. Clearing the seas of isolated German cruisers and destroying at the Falklands the squadron victorious at Coronel, were indeed tangible proofs of naval superiority; but it will doubtless be said that Germany's failure here was due to the fact that in the initial phase of the war she clung to old principles, and did not, during the first seven months, have recourse to the submarine in commerce warfare.
At all events, note the way the submarine scythe has cut into the line of transports. Recent losses are indeed somewhat less than at the opening of the unrestricted U-boat campaign; transportation is now controlled to secure maximum efficiency; measures and systems of protection are steadily becoming more logical and effective; the munitions output is constantly increasing; the United States has entered the field; admitting, as we have reason to presume, that the combined effects of these measures will assure to the Entente the tonnage necessary to make up for future losses and guarantee the prosecution of war to victory—nevertheless, judging from appearances, it would be foolish to say that in taking measures of the kind noted above the navy has played the part of protagonist in the war. The antidote for the submarine has not yet been found; protection of sea routes against the insidious foe is secured essentially by grouping in convoys, arming of merchant vessels, and escort. And, as regards this last point, it will be said that escort of merchant vessels by torpedo craft, however numerous, has a practical value somewhat like that of moral character in human affairs; while the submarine is forced to submerge, it will be asserted that it is seldom seen in time to prevent effective maneuvering for torpedo attack.
Submarine attack on communications appears, among the various kinds of naval activity, the only one that has had a direct effect upon the course of the war; and, in contrast with the very tangible way in which its work is manifested, it is difficult to appreciate the effectiveness of counter-measures.
People in the Allied countries note that the maintenance of an immense patrol force of all types requires unceasing labor, extremely fatiguing and dangerous, treachery thwarted, enemy attacks warded off, mines destroyed, unremitting vigils in home and enemy waters, difficulties hampering all these activities—and the actual accomplishments often unknown and their value unappreciated.
If we turn to consider the work of the navies as manifested in fleet actions, no one will deny that in size Jutland was the greatest naval battle in history. But the objective of the German fleet in putting to sea is still wrapped in mystery, and both sides claim tactical victory, while the ultimate effect of the sanguinary conflict upon the course of the war does not readily appear.
We have now touched upon the principal aspects of the present naval war.
Many valuable ships have been lost, through treachery, through defeat, and sometimes as a result of actions that have worked little harm to the enemy. Great is the activity of patrol boats, torpedo craft, and scouts; yet the submarine still scores frequent victims.
The submarine and the mine, if they have not paralyzed the main fleets, have still forced them to remain normally in ports well protected by nets and barriers, so that in this war their characteristic employment seems to be inaction; the naval engagements have been most sanguinary, but seemingly sterile.
How can we compare this warfare with what we imagined before 1914? The logical answer seems to be that of a German writer after the first few months of war: "If we consider what has happened on the sea, we cannot suppress an ironic smile at the predictions of naval strategy; fundamental principles are overthrown, every theoretical forecast is vanity, and the totally unforeseen has become reality."
The more justified seems this irony when we reflect that while Germany herself, in her miraculous preparation for war, gave considerable attention to the development of the submarine, this development was slight as compared with what has taken place during hostilities, whether in respect to numbers, scope, or field of action. The vast submarine campaign is itself one of the improvisations of the war.
After having devoted to the fleet so large a part of our national revenues, we discover it to be a veritable delusion, or we are forced to acknowledge that means which are relatively more effective are far cheaper, i.e., submarines, mines, swift torpedo craft and airplanes. Battle squadrons, in fact, might almost seem organisms tolerated merely because they exist; though in reality it is always easy to see the matter in a very different light simply by reflecting that, held in a potential state at opportune strategic points, these squadrons serve, if in no other way, to paralyze those of the enemy, which, without the equilibrium thus established, would presumably not rest innocuous.
While recognizing the validity of this fundamental axiom, if for no other reason than to exclude the paradoxical concept that battleships are useless, there are those who would employ it in order to draw therefrom an apparently brilliant corollary for "after the war."
Their idea is as follows: Admitting that battle fleets are necessary to offset each other, it will be seen that if no battle fleets existed, precisely the present equilibrium would still obtain. Thus, for the future, there rises the mirage of an international convention, forbidding the construction of ships-of-the-line, while leaving nations free to provide for their naval defence by other means. The mirage is most seductive, since it seems to lead by a reasonable step toward the Utopia of complete disarmament.
Let us see if this idea is acceptable.
I have sought to present as logically and impartially as possible the arguments suggested by this delusion in regard to naval power; these arguments should be discussed; if their fallacy is demonstrated, they should be cast aside, lest they lead us into evil.
I shall limit myself to a few general considerations, which seem sufficient to prove that the actual effects of naval superiority are greater than appearances indicate, and sufficient also for a summary examination of the changes brought about by the war in the light of prior predictions.
II. The Character of the War
What is the opinion of well-informed critics as to the naval action of Germany at the outbreak of war? Were the German naval objectives realized?
The First Lord of the British Admiralty stated in the House of Commons, in November, 1914, that at the opening of hostilities, England was in grave peril; "and the greatest danger was that of being surprised unprepared, with the fleet not disposed in readiness for war." Once the fleet was mobilized and properly stationed, the danger was over.
These words were not exaggerated.
At the beginning of the war (as to-day) the German fleet was considerably inferior to the British fleet in home waters; but it should not be forgotten that the quota of forces held in complete readiness in time of peace modified this difference in a sense favorable to Germany. In other words, Germany held a larger part of her fleet in permanent preparation for war; and a war opened by a surprise naval attack on her part offered better prospect of success than could be expected later on.
It is beyond question that this surprise action, the possibility of which constituted the chief preoccupation of the British, might have had serious results; aside from other considerations, now that we are in a position to appreciate the unforeseen and extraordinary contribution of England to the land war, who will lightheartedly affirm that nothing would be different in this respect if a great naval battle had at the start transposed the relative strength of the two chief fleets?
The great naval surprise was not attempted by Germany, not certainly because of unwillingness (for it would have accorded perfectly with her spirit and interests) but because of its impossibility, owing to the fact that on the very day of Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia the British Navy had carried out a complete practice mobilization, and could equip her reserve and dispose her squadrons before the outbreak of war. The weight of British naval superiority thus thrown on the scales of war, Germany was forced to avoid risking her main fleet under adverse conditions, and must await the outcome of events, seeking in the meanwhile to weaken her opponent by vigorous attacks on her navy and sea communications—"neglecting nothing," as Bernhardi wrote in 1913 (Germany and the Next War), "which might in any wise injure the enemy, accompanying the most ardent initiative by the boldest offensive." And this period of waiting, according to the author just cited, would continue until "at last we shall be able to challenge Great Britain on the high seas." (We shall take up later the prospect of a great naval engagement in the course of the war.)
The consequences, as we have just outlined them, which followed the prevention of aggressive naval action on the part of Germany, are in harmony with the rapid decision sought by the German armies on the western front. The battle of the Marne stopped the German invasion; but, contributing to this result, an event of not less importance was the establishment of British naval superiority in its complete efficiency, it being clear that without an initial naval situation favorable to England "the transport of troops to the Continent," according to the statement of the First Lord in the speech already cited, "would have been prevented or at least retarded"—and every one knows there was no time to lose.
From a naval standpoint, the situation of the Central Powers is exceptional; their coasts, of slight extent, are by nature and art invulnerable. For a war of attrition, the conditions presented were ideal; the German and Austro-Hungarian fleets had a freedom of action which it would be folly to assume in similar cases for nations very differently exposed to naval attack. Whatever their inferiority to the enemy, the problems presented to these fleets were of a purely aggressive character—it was possible for them to run no risks and remain safely passive until the opportune moment for action. It is essential to take account of this special situation in order to appreciate the labor of the Allied fleets in the war, and to avoid generalizations that would he completely absurd.
The moment past when, prior to or at the outbreak of war, the German fleet might have attempted a surprise, it remained for the Allied navies to blockade the enemy fleets in the North Sea and Adriatic, capture isolated enemy vessels elsewhere, and profit by the liberty of action thus secured.
Upon the failure of the German plan for a quick decision on land, the war became long and severe; and as an effect of its increased length, the influence of naval superiority took on a value it would not otherwise have had.
In ante-bellum discussions of the effect of sea power in a possible war between the Entente Powers and the Triple Alliance, naval writers as a rule spoke too abstractly of the advantages to be derived from control of the sea; military critics correctly pointed out that these advantages would be felt only in a long war. What importance could be attributed to the isolation of the enemy from the rest of the world in a war of from two to six months?
At the maximum, the war was not expected to last more than a year. "Opinions as to the duration of the war," I find in an important work by a French writer (Captain Sorb, La doctrine de defense nationale, 1912), "are divided; some say the campaign cannot be ended in less than six months; other say a year; but we believe that a period of about a month will bring a decisive action, with irremediable consequences, and two months will see the situation definitely under control."
The above is cited, not from a desire to demonstrate the error of those who anticipated a short war, but simply to bring out in striking relief the discrepancy between expectations and reality as to the duration of the conflict. And what is the explanation?
Preventing the effort to separate the Entente armies at the opening of the war, sea power has enabled the Allies to increase their forces steadily, and to put in the field armies still untrained or in process of creation. To sea power also is due the fact that what Germany regarded as "the centrifugal tendencies of the heterogeneous British Empire" have been transmuted into fraternal co-operation on the battlefields of Europe; and that to-day four-fifths of the world are at war with the German Empire; and finally we owe it also to the same cause that defeated armies have been saved and placed again in the field, that grave errors have been remedied, and that to-day, in spite of the tremendous upheaval in Russia, we are keeping up the war as energetically as possible, with firmest faith in the victory of our armies, and with new cards of the highest value still to put in play.
All this has been accomplished in the face of enemy efforts to thwart our free use of the sea.
In the first months of the war the destruction of commerce was kept quite within foreseen limits, in spite of the desperate assaults of enemy cruisers. "We had assumed," said Mr. Churchill, "a loss of 5 per cent of our merchant marine in the first two or three months; instead I am glad to be able to state that the losses have reached only 1.9 per cent."
When her ships designed for commerce warfare were destroyed, Germany had recourse to submarines.
In harmony with this method of attack on British commerce was the vigorous offensive toward Calais undertaken by the right wing of the German army (Oct. 17-Nov. 9, 1914), the failure of which, incidentally, was greatly assisted by British monitors hindering the movement of enemy troops along the coast and supporting the left flank of the Belgian army. Thwarted in its effort to control the southern side of the Channel, Germany made effective use of her strip of Belgian coast by establishing naval bases at Bruges and Seebrugge, the importance of which is fully recognized.
The land and sea strategy of the enemy are thus seen to have been in close correlation, such as can scarcely be said to have existed on the side of the Allies. For instance, it would have been a good example of the decisive influence of sea power on the course of the war if the Allies had found it possible, before the conquest of Serbia, to move an army from the east coast of the Adriatic to block the way to Turkey. But at that time the Allies were still far from the concept of a united front, of one war whether by sea or land, and of utilizing sea communications to checkmate the advantage of central position. The example cited is purely hypothetical, presenting obstacles which prevented its adoption; but it may serve to fix the idea of the importance of naval supremacy as a means of carrying the attack into favorable fields; nor is it logical to depreciate this importance on the basis of the failure at the Dardanelles and the inactivity at Saloniki.
The fact remains that, in spite of the work of the submarines, an immense number of troops have been, and undoubtedly will be, transported by sea with minimum losses. Convoys with units of fair speed and adequate escort have comparatively little to fear. The heavy losses have been among the cargo carriers, making the problem here more difficult.
It is true there are reassuring signs. The losses are diminishing, in spite of the increased number of ships engaged in European traffic owing to the American alliance. The severe losses at the opening of the unrestricted campaign are not likely to be repeated, since they corresponded to a different control of traffic from that now in force, and to the combined action of all enemy submarines, the units of which must now take turns in port for supplies and refitting. The counter-measures of various kinds now employed indicate that the day is still far distant when the submarine may be said to have rendered powerless the Allied armies. The final adoption of the logical system of convoys has enabled the navies to increase their direct protection. And this will be still further increased with the application, even fuller than hitherto, of the principle of a united front and absolute community of interests.
Nevertheless, I repeat it would be absurd to deny the serious menace of the submarine; and the question may be logically asked whether, viewing the whole situation, this system of warfare has produced the results expected by the Central Empires.
In undertaking the submarine campaign, and pushing it to its extreme limit, the Central Powers virtually declared war on neutrals. While thus likely to increase the number of enemies, the measure would still be useful from a military standpoint if it operated to hasten the defeat of the Allied armies, so as to prevent the intervention of new belligerents on the battlefields of Europe. It was thus a question of time; and on the strength of the present situation it is possible to affirm that the German calculations failed.
The Entente has suffered severely from the submarine; but the offensive preparations on the western and Italian fronts have nevertheless developed with increasing vigor, and as for the
Russian front, it is impossible to attribute anarchy to submarines.
"It was planned last year," Lloyd George recently stated, "to carry out a grand concerted attack. Russia was ready as never before: the jaws began to close, but, to speak frankly, one of the parties found itself for the moment handicapped, and as a result it was impossible to secure the convergent pressure hoped for. Whatever our difficulties, we find ourselves strong and steadfast at the end of three years of war. We may say with all assurance that we would not exchange our military situation to-day for the enemy's. Let us look at the facts. What could Germany accomplish in a year in which one of her enemies, deemed the most dangerous at the outbreak of war, was virtually paralyzed by internal difficulties? We should at least expect her to defeat all assaults on other fronts. On the contrary, she has been beaten in every important battle—and these indications are not misleading.''
As regards the effect of the submarine campaign on land warfare, there are evidently but two possible hypotheses. One is that the submarine has exerted no appreciable influence on the military situation. In other words, that if there had been no such campaign, the situation on the land fronts would still be practically what it is to-day. The other hypothesis is that, but for the submarine, Germany would now be conquered.
In view of the assured participation of American forces on the western front, it follows that, if on the basis of the first hypothesis the submarine has not improved the military situation, then the count is heavily against it, since it has been the cause of a powerful reinforcement to the Allies. On the basis of the second hypothesis the submarine campaign appears at best a cruel remedy, which has served to prolong the conflict, postponing an outcome the character of which was indicated when the Germans were halted on the western front.
The intensive "attrition" warfare carried on against Allied commerce has been accompanied by a similar campaign against the Allied navies, a campaign which in the North Sea has been prosecuted by every means at the enemy's disposal, including fleet actions, whereas in the Adriatic the Austrians have consistently avoided risking their main units.
Notwithstanding the losses incurred, the situation after three years of war still proves the overwhelming superiority of the Allied fleets, without regard to naval reinforcements from the United States.
Submarines, mines and aircraft have excluded the possibility (a moot point before the war) of a blockade maintained normally by a strong cruising force in enemy waters; instead, as was foreseen, the blockade is maintained by a fleet in force at its bases.
The Allied fleets are nevertheless blockading fleets in the true and proper sense of the word, since they are the means of completely cutting off the sea communications of the enemy, and preventing their fleets from undertaking a serious offensive or issuing from their bases without incurring battle against superior force.
This holds without disregard for the fact that, as a result of geographical conditions, the narrow seas where the Allies enforce the blockade are at a considerable distance from the enemy bases.
The situation of a blockading fleet, however superior, is obviously difficult, since it must be held in constant readiness to check an initiative undertaken by the enemy at his own selected time; hence arises the possibility that the enemy may occasionally gain a success in secondary actions, carrying out his policy of attrition. This advantage is increased in the present instance by the peculiar character of the enemy coasts, already noted, which prevents the blockading fleet from forcing an engagement.
In this situation, until the enemy fleet decides that the opportune moment has arrived to issue forth and take the chance of battle and possible destruction, the mission of the blockading fleet consists in maintaining the equilibrium. And whatever the inherent advantages in the supremacy thus secured over all the seas (except the Baltic and Black), this mission is still a thankless one, for it seems synonymous with an inertia and uselessness not ordinarily regarded as in keeping with the character of naval warfare.
In the land war, every battle has tangible results in the way of territory gained, maintained, or lost; in the naval war, on the other hand, if one fleet merely paralyzes another, forcing it to remain shut up in port for safety, or if in a battle in which losses are balanced, it gains a strategic victory (forcing the enemy to resume a passive attitude), or even if, finally, it succeeds in inflicting a full defeat, it still seems to have made but snail's progress toward a victorious peace. Scattered over the surface of the ocean, the wreckage of battle seems to question why all these men have died; and a tragic day's work is seemingly in vain.
But let those who are thus misled simply ask themselves what would have happened had our preponderance of strength been swept away and the enemy secured freedom of action on the seas.
Those who are very rightly preoccupied to-day with the menace of the submarine, may well reflect upon what would happen if naval preponderance should pass into the hands of the enemy. In that case, we should at least have a quick proof of what the Germans might have done at the opening of the war—our sea trade would cease to exist. And how would our armies fare then? Have we sufficient iron, coal, munitions of war?
It may therefore be taken as mathematically certain that the fleet, while, owing to the enemy, its work is silent and obscure, constitutes a vital factor on a par with our armies. Nor will it be denied in the future, considering the difficulties (perfectly manageable and tolerable) that we now endure, that this war has shown in how great a measure we depend on the sea.
This granted, especially by those who nourish certain illusions of easy accommodation with the enemy and a return to the status quo ante, let us look into the fundamental principles that have led our adversaries to bring on the tremendous conflict, principles that are reflected clearly in their views on naval warfare.
Bernhardi, in the work previously cited, already foreseeing Italy's participation with the Allies, wrote as follows:
"We shall, therefore, some day, perhaps, be faced with the possibility of standing isolated in a great war of the nations…and shall have to trust solely to our own strength and our own determination to conquer. This steadfast determination to win complete victory will make the next war one of unprecedented violence. A war fought and lost under such conditions would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the future of our nation, would throw us backward for centuries, would shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world and thus check the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war will thus be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will be its importance in history. World power or downfall will be our rallying cry. We must have the steadfast will to conquer, the iron resolution to struggle to the end, even in the event of a lost war."
The facts demonstrate that the conduct of our enemy in the war has been in complete accord with these principles.
Admiral von Tirpitz, in an interview in December, 1914, in which he first threatened the employment of the submarine against commerce, complained at the feebleness of American protests against England's closure of the North Sea, and put the question: "What objection could the United States make if Germany should declare submarine warfare against the entire enemy merchant marine?" When Tirpitz spoke thus, the threat was already in process of execution, for the sinking of merchantmen by submarines had begun during the preceding October; and on February 4 (1915) following, Admiral von Pohl, head of the German Admiralty, proclaimed as a "danger zone" all the waters around the British Isles, including the Channel, upon entering which both enemy and neutral vessels would be subject to destruction without assurance for the safety of passengers or crew.
The events that followed are familiar to all. The United States despatched note upon note, but for a long time it looked as if her protests would be confined to the diplomatic field. Meanwhile, the land war failed to give Germany the results hoped for, the decisive action attempted at Verdun failed, and so the submarine campaign was pushed to the uttermost limit, without regard to the nationality of vessels attacked, the enemy thus elevating a secondary into a principal weapon, and attributing to it an importance not less than that of her armies in the field.
Thus Germany no longer considered what the United States would do; she burned her bridges behind her, giving to her naval, as to her land warfare a character of unprecedented violence, seeking to strike terror by showing herself ready to make war on all the world, employing every means to secure world power, wishing no compromise between that and downfall.
In striking contrast, indeed, are the indefinite peace proposals Germany has repeatedly given forth. To dispel the delusion that people with purposes so fixed will easily renounce their aims, it is sufficient to record the words of Bernhardi : "Aspirations for peace contain an element of weakness, dissention, and indecision; their apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes their danger; they are in reality an unhealthy Utopia, or a cloak to cover intrigue."
Only upon a profound realization of the set purpose of our adversaries, and recognition of the fact that every show to the contrary is a device to break down our morale, are we in a position to ask what use the enemy intends to make of his main fleet.
In the North Sea, neither the prevalent foggy weather nor the multitude of units in the opposing force excludes the possibility that the Germans can secure opportunities to impose action in superior force.
Such was axiomatically the strategic principle guiding the general sortie of the German fleet before Jutland, aside from particular circumstances, as yet unknown, which may have led the Germans to leave their bases.
In the battle following, both belligerents suffered severely; but while it is needless to enter into a discussion of the tactical results, it will be agreed that the battle demonstrated the full capacity of the British fleet to execute its mission as a blockading force. After the battle the strategic situation remained unchanged—that is, the maritime supremacy of Britain was confirmed.
But it will be useful to note the proof thus afforded of the resolute purpose of Germany to pit her main fleet against her chief opponent. And in view of the fact that the guiding principle of German war policy throughout has been to utilize all forces to the extreme limit (even in case of a lost war), it seems by no means hazardous to affirm that the day will come in the course of the war when Germany will be led to undertake a desperate effort on the sea. Before resigning herself to decadence, she will play all her cards; she holds back, however, for while she is a player of extraordinary boldness, she knows that the cards corresponding to the navy are precisely the ones that must be played at the right time.
Reflection upon the importance of the naval side of the war and upon the full guaranties of success afforded by the naval predominance of the Allies, is essential to a clear vision of the certainty of our victory.
III. Changes in Naval Warfare
Only after bringing out by the preceding discussion the vital function of the main fleets, are we in a position to give a logical answer to the question put as the main theme of the present essay—as distinguished from delusions based on appearances, what are the substantial differences between the war as it is and the war as it was foreseen? Granted that, along with new weapons (submarine and aerial) the war has confirmed the present usefulness of old types, what changes for the immediate future are counseled by experience? May certain categories be at once eliminated?
As a result of the previous development of submarines and aircraft, it was realized before the war that great precautions would be necessary in carrying out a military blockade, and it was admitted not only that it would be folly to attempt a close blockade with the main fleet, as in the Spanish-American war, but that it would be impossible to keep the fleet within a cruising radius of about a hundred miles from the enemy bases, that is to say, within the distance considered safe when the defence was limited to torpedo craft. This development by no means eliminated the idea of blockade, but implied that the blockading force must possess well-located bases, though distant from the enemy, assuring a close patrol of enemy waters, and a sufficient number of units of varying sizes to maintain contact with a force trying to break through.
It was known that the British Navy, in harmony with this concept, and confronted by the threatening growth of the German fleet, had opportunely established bases in the north of Scotland and the near-by islands; and in consequence it was easy to presume that, to avoid division of strength, the approaches to the Straits of Dover would be closed chiefly by mines.
From the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the extensive use of mines was foreseen, especially in the North Sea, where strategic and hydrographic conditions are favorable.
Under these circumstances, there was nothing unexpected in the British Admiralty notification of October 3, 1914, announcing that, in view of German mine-laying and submarine activities, the government had authorized the mining of certain parts of the North Sea, and in particular an area of 4000 sq. km. between Ostend and the English coast.
It was very naturally foreseen that the countries whose communications were thus intercepted would exert every effort to keep up their trade by means of neutrals, and it was known in fact that Germany had in time of peace perfected an organization to that end. Yet in the beginning of the war England suffered this ostensibly neutral traffic beyond all tolerable limits, as shown by the rapid and enormous increase of imports to Scandinavia and Holland.
By those who took account of the necessities of modern warfare, it was recognized that, however inferior the enemy navy, it would be impossible to conform strictly to past standards as regards continuity and effectiveness of blockade in territorial waters, that the blockade would cover stretches of coast rather than specified ports, and that contraband would be given a wider application.
November 2, 1914, that is, a month after the mine-field notice, England proclaimed all of the North Sea a military area, the effect being that ships of all nationalities would incur danger in crossing a line from the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland. Thus England seriously restricted neutral commerce, which, however, could still be carried on by following prescribed routes.
We enter the realm of the unforeseen when we pass from the action of England to that of Germany, as a result of the employment of the submarine as a commerce destroyer operating for long periods and remote from its bases.
This new system of commerce destruction, as now applied by Germany, signifies complete disregard of the consequent attitude of neutrals—that is to say, quite aside from humanitarian considerations involved, such a course of action could be conceived only by a belligerent who would permit no interests whatever to interfere with a possible means of injuring the enemy. Such is the course Germany has seen fit to pursue; but in a general forecast of future international provisions in this matter, it would be absurd to assume submarine warfare in its present unrestricted form as the normal recourse of the weaker belligerent on the sea. The attitude of neutrals cannot be regarded as negligible; and it follows that submarine warfare will be tolerated only to the point where neutral states feel constrained to resist.
With the idea of determining the extent to which the submarine as a commerce destroyer has altered naval warfare, let us assume the utmost passivity on the part of neutrals.
Let us consider in succession the two methods of employment: unlimited "cruiser warfare," and blockade of limited areas.
It would be illogical to deny to the submarine, as to other naval vessels, the right of visit and search, the resultant situation being inevitably as follows:
Normally, the only measure the submarine can employ against enemy merchant vessels is to sink them; hence, necessarily, the merchant vessel has the right to arm for defence, to combat the enemy by any means, and to practice every stratagem to avoid destruction.
Evidently, under these conditions, the exercise of visit and search is out of the question. This was verified, in fact, by the astute German Admiralty in its notice to the United States at the opening of the unrestricted campaign: "Great Britain has armed her merchant vessels for defence against submarines, and the United States has accepted the British point of view. But under these conditions it is impossible for a submarine to approach a merchant vessel to examine her papers, since in so doing, in case the vessel is of enemy nationality, the submarine is exposed to attack by gunfire and bombs. Moreover, the enemy has advised her merchant vessels to fly neutral colors, paint out names, alter funnels, and seek by other ruses to avoid the consequences of nationality."
Neutrals being thus deprived of the guaranties inherent in visit and search, and neutral naval convoy for merchantmen being impracticable, it follows necessarily that unlimited "cruiser warfare" cannot he carried on in a manner acceptable to neutral states.
It will therefore be seen that submarine operations against commerce must be confined to blockade in the ordinary and proper sense of the word. And moreover, in view of the requirements of continuity and effectiveness (which cannot be fulfilled in case of submarine blockade), it is clear that, unless neutral rights are to be enormously sacrificed, the blockaded area must be not only clearly defined, but reasonably restricted. Otherwise we should fall back again into unrestricted cruiser warfare, as now actually practiced; for in immense areas such as those set off by Germany, including at first the waters around the British Isles and later large parts of the Atlantic and Mediterranean, a blockade can exist only in name.
Let us suppose that neutrals, on the basis of their assumed passivity, should make no objection to a blockade extending beyond territorial waters and applying not merely to a specified extent of coast but to the entire enemy coast-line. Let us assume the blockade zone to extend outward from the coast 20 or 30 miles; and within this zone, let us assume submarine and submarine mine-layer activities in every form.
Obviously neutrals would not consent that such a blockade should cut off straits which are necessary highways for trade between neutrals. But limiting the activities of the submarine in this manner, what may be said as to its effectiveness?
On the basis of present experience, it will be readily granted that, within these limits, in sectors having important ports as their centers, it would be possible to maintain safety routes by airplane and patrol activity of various kinds so intensified as to make successful enemy attacks absolutely exceptional. In fact, on the basis of this hypothesis, which assures safety to ships outside the zone, a far greater number of units would be available for the task of clearing safety routes within the zone itself.
Hence it seems logical to conclude that submarine commerce warfare loses its capacity to exert a serious effect on warfare whenever it is carried on in a manner tolerable to neutrals. In other words, it is simply a question whether the unrestricted warfare now carried on by Germany does or does not come under that classification.
To avoid falling into the absurdity of considering complete disregard of the attitude of neutrals as the general norm for the future, we are forced to recognize that the method of attack on commerce which to-day constitutes the chief change in naval warfare cannot be considered as having a substantially permanent character.
We are led to this conclusion absolutely without taking into account the anti-submarine measures that may eventually be developed. And now if we should assume submarine commerce warfare abolished, or at least reduced to an element of secondary importance, wherein lies the astounding divergence between forecasts and reality in the naval war?
In respect to changes in doctrine as to the employment of sea power, that is to say, the proper objectives of battle fleets, we encounter simply an evolution rather than a revolution of ideas, whether in the field of strategy or tactics. The increased dangers arising from the development of more recent means of warfare have tended to limit operations to such as have a very definite character, and are of sufficient importance and sufficient prospect of success to warrant the risks taken and the extent of the force employed. This means simply that modern conditions have imposed a stricter regard than in the past for sound principles of warfare. It is of chief interest to note that large fleets of belligerents have put to sea when it was deemed necessary, have come in contact, and have engaged in heavy combat in a manner foreseen before the present development of submarines.
One of the most important teachings of the present war is the practical demonstration of the disputed principle that, for ships of the line as for other types, high speed is a factor of the greatest importance, whether from a strategical or a tactical standpoint; in this respect, reality has abundantly confirmed the most favorable predictions.
There was nothing unexpected in the manner in which at Jutland contact between the two forces was first established by light and battle cruisers, nor in the manner in which this led up to the engagement between the main fleets. Moreover, the decisive importance of long-range combat, as brought out by the war, has completely confirmed those principles that for the last 20 years have guided the evolution of tactics, types of ships, and methods of fire, on the basis of the axiomatic necessity of hitting at the earliest moment (i.e., at long range) and hard. War experience has likewise confirmed the foreseen importance of day attacks by destroyers during contact between main forces, as well as similar attacks on the night after battle. These, among other confirmations of theory, are cited not with the idea of extended examination, but merely to emphasize the absurdity of declaring the downfall of naval principles as set forth before the war.
While particular considerations of a more technical character would be inopportune at the present time, the observation may be made that of the two chief types of armored ship—the battle cruiser and the dreadnought—it is the former whose future place must be considered more secure. Experience has demonstrated that this type of ship, aside from its essential function when incorporated with the fleet, is well adapted to supply most expeditiously and completely the protection required for remote maritime interests, as illustrated by what happened at the Falklands. Its value has been brought out also under conditions prevailing in more restricted waters, whether for compelling the enemy to fight under adverse circumstances, or for getting within range before the enemy can withdraw to his base.
In long-range actions, owing to the sharper angle of fall of projectiles, ships are relatively more vulnerable on account of insufficient horizontal protection; hence some change is called for in the disposition of armor.
The increased risks encountered by ships render it desirable to apply so far as possible the principle (old rather than new) of dividing the strength of the line into numerous units, without lowering the total strength. This principle, however, should be applied with due regard to effective fire control, which does not permit reducing the number of heavy guns per ship beyond a certain limit, and with regard also to the extension of the line involved in the multiplication of units when in column at high speed.
Reasoning thus in summary fashion, the statement may be ventured that the ideal type of armored ship, under conditions to-day, should have about 30 knots' speed, 8 guns of large caliber, and armor protection considerably modified from present practice.
This by no means implies the abandonment of present types—simply their evolution, consisting in the fusion of the line battleship and the battle cruiser. (Note: This does not exclude the possible advantage of a new type of battle cruiser, supplementing the type just suggested, with greater speed and fewer big guns.) Further than this, it cannot be said absolutely that the experience of the war counsels the elimination of any category of ships now constituting the fleet.
We come back thus to the fanciful hypothesis that the abolishment of first-line battleships, in spite of technical counsels, will be accomplished by future international agreement. This, as already said, is based on the supposed equilibrium now existing between the opposing fleets. But, as we have shown, this equilibrium is far from existing in reality; for even if the present war had not presented and should not present a combat between the main forces, the fact would nevertheless remain that naval superiority has conferred upon one of the belligerents a freedom of maritime communications which, however contested by submarines, remains an essential decisive factor in the war.
One should also bear in mind that any war, whatever its magnitude, represents a particular case; and in drawing lessons, one should not only seek a right interpretation of what actually happened, but should also consider how it may happen differently in future. Thus, even assuming (though by no means admitting) an equilibrium in this war, that certainly is not the only possible outcome of the co-existence of two opposing fleets. As a matter of fact, for a country not invulnerable to a naval offensive to the same extent as the Central Powers, and inferior to its enemy in naval strength, the assumed equilibrium would be absolutely nonexistent.
In consideration of the disparity arising from unequal naval development and different possibilities of maritime defence among nations, and recognizing that against an enemy fleet defence by minor means (mines, aircraft, submarines, torpedo craft and scouts) is insufficient, we may conclude that the idea of abolishing battleships should be relegated to the realm of a perilous Utopia.