"Termination of War and Treaties of Peace." By Coleman Phillipson. 486 pages. ?6.oo net. (New York: F.P. Dutton and Co.)
This work fills a gap existing in the various specific treatises upon subjects connected with international law.
All wars inevitably end by one way or another, even by exhaustion, or undesirable continuance. The present war cannot be continued without limit and an end may be nearer than generally supposed.
Hence the volume before us may become timely at any moment, and a study of its contents made now will become useful to those who may take part in its closing treaties, and it also has a wider range of usefulness in informing advanced students and those who take the interest of intelligent and well educated men in a war so epochal in its nature and so exceptional in its size and prosecution. In fact, to all of the classes mentioned, the discussion of the questions of conquest, subjugation and annexation, with the allied questions of interposition of neutral powers, of indemnities and peace negotiation make this book a matter of great present and future interest.
How wide reaching the effect accompanying the close of this war will be can only be surmised, as questions may arise, of syndicates of nations, surrender in part of absolute sovereignty of states, as well as matters incidental to the close of great wars such as were developed by the formation of the Holy Alliance and the close of the Napoleonic wars.
The author from his previous writings upon international and municipal law should be well fitted and capable in his dealings with the subjects included in this book both as a lawyer and a publicist. The book under review appears to be very comprehensive, if not exhaustive, in its treatment of its subject.
In its preliminary discussion of the termination of wars, Mr. Phillipson gives three general ways of terminating hostilities between belligerent states as follows:
1. By a mere cessation of hostilities on both sides without any definite understanding supervening; (2) by the conquest and subjugation of one of the contending parties by the other, so that the former is reduced to impotence and submission; (3) by a mutual arrangement embodied in a treaty of peace, whether the honors of war be equal or unequal.
The last two methods are the usual methods of terminating war between civilized states and we can look forward to these two methods as those likely to be called into play at the expiration of the present great war.
The first method however, is not without its historical examples of wars in which hostilities ended as a matter of fact, and peace began without treaty or legal beginning.
In 1716, for example, the war between Sweden and Poland was ended by an armistice suspending actual fighting, but the state of legal war remained for ten years until its close was recognized by an exchange of letters between the respective monarchs of the contending forces and the war closed de jure also.
The best known instance, however, in contemporary modern times was the close of the war between Spain and her South American colonies in the war of the latter for independence. This war began in 1810 and hostilities faded away about 1825; but legal peace was not established in the case of Venezuela until 1850, and it was only after varying intervals of at least twenty years that the independence of the other South American states was recognized indirectly by Spain by the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is hardly necessary to say that this method of concluding war is unsatisfactory not only to the states concerned and their subjects or citizens, but also to other countries who hold the dubious position as neutrals. The author discussed various conditions which may arise under such circumstances.
Dr. Phillipson proceeds in a very lucid way to discuss the second method of terminating war, that is, by conquest and subjugation. To a complete conquest or subjugation he adds annexation, when the territorial possession of a state, or the state as an entity, becomes permanently a part of the conquering state. In this case the entire absorption causes a final amalgamation and the limited rights of military occupation are followed by the unlimited rights of annexation. The writer argues with much force against premature annexations. As to forcible annexation he is obliged to admit that it is not a violation of international law, though condemning it as in contravention to international morality.
The author then discusses the question of the option of change of individual nationality after conquest and annexation, the succession of state property, of public and private debts, and of contracts and concessions. He is liberal in his views certainly beyond the practice of the past. He hopes, and we cannot but agree with him that he is not too ideal, when he looks forward to an agreement by the states of the world, reinforced by really effective sanctions, that conquests of civilized countries shall no longer be permitted.
The author reaches more familiar ground to the readers when he discusses the termination of war by treaties of peace. In this part of the book he discusses armistice, convention, interposition by third powers, preliminaries of peace, peace conferences, peace negotiations, treaty making powers and the various details and topics found in a treaty of peace. He also discusses the question of succession of rights and obligations under treaties as distinguished from succession by conquest alone and the dissertation upon the subject of indemnities is bound to be both of interest and value. In the appendix is found the texts of no less than twenty-six treaties of peace.
This book can be strongly recommended to the advanced student in international law and especially to those in the diplomatic service who are, or may be, from one reason or other, identified with the questions involved.
Charles H. Stockton
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"Steam Turbines." By Lieut. Comdr. G. J. Meyers. U. S. Navy. 246 pages text, 165 illustrations, 9 plates. $4.50 prepaid. (U. S. Naval Institute. Annapolis.)
This book will undoubtedly fill the long-felt need of a treatise embracing all the principal types of turbines found in marine practice.
There are many excellent text-books on turbines, but all of them with a leaning toward one type or another, so that not one of them alone has proved entirely adequate for the purposes of instruction at the United States Naval Academy. The engineering education of midshipmen must include preparation for work with the great variety of installations encountered in naval vessels. Moreover, another obstacle has recently arisen in that the more nearly suitable books dealing with the subject were the work of English writers, and war-imposed conditions rendered it difficult to insure the supply. It was decided to produce a treatise to meet the need and Lieutenant Commander Meyers, U. S. Navy, an instructor in the Department of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction and an engineering graduate of the Post Graduate School at Annapolis, undertook the work.
The author states, in his preface, that the time for the course is limited and that American Naval practice only was to be covered. The fact that naval turbine practice generally has gone well ahead of all other because of much experimentation and consequent development in recent years, and that this is especially true of the United States Naval Service, makes the book valuable in other ways than as a text-book. The fact that it has the sanction of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, Washington, renders it an authoritative presentation. The resources of this Bureau were, in fact, placed at the disposal of the author.
The scope is comprehensive and the arrangement of the subject matter is a natural one for both student and reader.
In Chapters II and III, thermodynamics and the properties of steam are treated of only to the extent of the principles involved in their application to the design of nozzles and the construction of the turbines themselves.
In addition to the description of recent examples of turbine design, Chapter XIII, on installations, is especially interesting and useful as it includes operative combinations of turbines necessary to deliver varying powers and thus perform different classes of work.
Chapter XIV, Turbines of Auxiliary Machinery, is of particular interest to the general student and is timely as well for shipboard use where turbines of different classes are employed for many purposes. No such grouping is to be found in other text- books.
In Chapter XV typical systems of lubrication for battleship and destroyer installations are described.
The final chapters, dealing with the care and operation of the two most familiar examples, standardize a subject upon which there has been much haphazard procedure and which at once will stamp the book as a practical manual.
The text appears in plain and readable form with subjects accented in leaded type; the diagrammatic drawings are on large scale and susceptible of easy reproduction by the student; the plates are so arranged as to be conveniently referred to in conjunction with the context.
This new book should find a ready reception in the extensive field it enters, for it will be useful not only in classroom and library ashore, but will prove of positive value afloat.
W. T. Cluverius,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Head of Department of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction,
United States Naval Academy.
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"The Psychology of the Great War." By Gustave le Bon. Translated by E. Andrews. (New York, 1916: The Macmillan Company.)
M. le Bon, in this logically organized and brilliantly developed book of 471 pages, analyzes a mass of material so far-reaching that the reviewer may well forego any attempt to indicate more than the general outlines of the study and a few rigidly selected details which may serve to suggest the value of this unique contribution to an understanding of the Great War.
It should not be thought that the size of the book need dismay the reader, for the type is large and well spaced. Nor does the term "Psychology," from which the average man backs away, throwing up his hands, foreshadow, as one might suspect, the abstruse philosophizing which the reader perhaps fears. In fact, the author's psychological studies become as clear as crystal when we read the result of his thinking. The clarity which is at once characteristic of the French language and of French thought seems to have lost but little in Mr. Andrews' translation, which gives evidence of no obscurity whatever to one who has not seen the original. There is not a hard paragraph to read from cover to cover. One is apt to "shy" at first at "affective, collective, and mystic forces," but these are at once denned in masterly fashion, so that they seem like household words. In short, if the book has faults, they consist of repetitions which are either paraphrases for the sake of clearness, or corroborations for the sake of arraying complete evidence. Life is too short to cavil at these doubtful shortcomings in the presence of a masterpiece of reasoning and interpretation.
Whether any two readers will agree with the general conclusions of M. le Bon is another question. Agreement will depend in part upon those very " affective, collective, and mystic influences" in the reader's mind, which the author subjects to such searching tests as he reveals the springs of national hatreds and prejudices aroused by tradition and hearsay.
The author first considers the psychological principles which are "necessary for the interpretation of the present work." As he here suggests, it would be a mistake to "skip" this first part. Book I, if the reader intends to comprehend the rest of the volume.
Book II is an analysis of Germany's evolution in modern times—the rise and development of German power; the "State," according to the conceptions of German philosophers; the economic evolution; modern German mentality, and its lack of personality. "The mental unification of a nation," says le Bon, "has never been carried to such an extent," and he agrees with another thinker that "there is something about it which makes one ask whether it is admirable or deplorable. One would say that a single brain thinks inside all those thousands of heads. Their personality seems to have vanished. There are no longer any individuals in Germany—but a social organism, whose brain is the all-powerful state."
Book III takes up the remote causes of the war—economic and political; nice hatreds, a rich field for the psychologist of which the author takes full advantage, without apparent partisanship; Germany's aggressive attitude ; and the part played by psychological influences in the genesis of the war. In this investigation, the two following conclusions are reached: (1) That Sir Kdward Grey, had he been more of a psychologist, would have promised aid to France and Russia at all hazards. He would not thereby have prevented the present war, but would merely have postponed it (2) That no nation and no ruler wanted war to the extent to which it spread, or even to any extent beyond a war between Austria and Serbia, which was desired by both Austria and Germany. Germany thought that Kussia would, at the last moment, stand aside, thus keeping out France and Great Britain.
Book V is a study of the psychological forces involved in the conduct of war—the emergence of new personalities in the belligerent nations; the nature of military courage; consequences due to psychological errors in the French, German and Russian campaigns; strategical errors resulting from psychological errors. Of special interest to naval officers are the pages devoted to "Psychological Errors in Naval Warfare." At the outset, says le Bon, "the efforts of the Allies" (on the sea) "were paralyzed by that great psychological dominant, timidity, whose consequences have proved disastrous indeed. There has never been a better instance of the degree to which physical strength may be reduced to naught by moral influences. Courageous men were, of course, not wanting, but of resolute and enterprising characters there was a great lack. "When the Gocbcn and the Brcslau entered the Dardanelles—if the numerous battleships belonging to the Allies' Mediterranean fleet had followed them, we should have been at Constantinople long ago." "The admirals in command could easily have passed through the Straits, but they did not dare to do so." The author then assigns to "the irresolution of the British Cabinet," however, rather than to British admirals, the failure to cripple the German navy when war became inevitable. "At this very time, on the 25th and 26th of July, the German fleet was maneuvering off the coast of Bergen, far from its natural base of operations. While to crown this misfortune, the British fleet was at the same time much more powerful than it ordinarily was." This point, quoted from an essay by Admiral Degouy, is further developed to prove that "It was a case in which the passive defensive was systematically employed by the stronger against the weaker."
One of the most interesting portions of the book is part VI: "Psychological Elements in German Methods of Warfare." After discussing the methods of terrorization and their effects, the author concludes: "Terror is never effective unless its action is very brief, and its prolongation makes it disastrous rather than advantageous." He then discusses the psychological effect of "ruthlessness" upon neutral feeling, to which he assigns much military importance.
The last book deals with "Unknown Quantities in Warfare." Among other considerations here treated, the author studies the effects of psychological factors in creating so many conflicting statements about military operations. Recognizing the obvious motives for misstatement for military reasons, he believes that these motives have less of a share in conflicting reports of battles than is generally supposed, and that more weight should be given to the unconscious " coloring " of dispatches, to the point of distorting the truth, simply as the result of psychological influences.
The book is singularly impartial, considering the fact of the writer's nationality. It would seem that a student of psychology is peculiarly fitted to rise above the ordinary human limitations fixed by national prejudice. M. le Bon writes, apparently, without fear or favor, and with enthusiasm for the truth at any cost. He does not pretend to neglect his possible natural bias, and therefore quotes neutral and German opinion frequently, often to the damaging of his side. No visitor from Mars could have less hesitation in criticizing the French and the Allies generally. For example, after dissecting without mercy the psychological errors of the Germans, he says: "The Germans have certainly not committed such gross psychological errors as have their enemies."
It is all the more convincing, then, after such coolly scientific exposition, to find the judicial conclusion that the war need never have occurred if the Germans had but understood the psychology of other nations, or if they had not been obsessed by errors about their own mission in the world.
Perhaps the most important pronouncement is to be found in the following paragraphs:
"Whatever success Europe may win in the end over Germany's attempt at hegemony, there is no hope that it will be lasting, for the ideal of domination is one of those mystic beliefs whose duration is never brief. A nation which has been ' chosen by God' to conquer and regenerate the world does not readily abandon such a mission, and Germany will not relinquish it until she has been defeated many times.
"The civilized nations are now exposed to far more formidable perils than the loss of their wealth and the vanishing of the best elements among their populations; for they are really threatened with the disappearance of certain virtues which have been acquired gradually, and which have hitherto been the glory and the delight of civilization, but which have now become a danger to those who possess them, and hence seem doomed to pass away." H. C. W.
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"International Realities." By Philip Marshall Brown, Professor of International Law at Princeton University. (Scribner's, N. Y., 233 pages. $1.40 net.)
This is a sane and stimulating book. As such, it will not be entirely satisfactory to extreme radicals of either the "pacifist" or "militarist" type; but it is welcome evidence that not all our professorial advisers have gone in for sensation mongering in "journalese" style.
By the title International Realities the author means that he applies the point of view of Realpolitik to international problems; and by Realpolitik, in spite of its unpleasant Bismarckian flavor, he means a common-sense, practical attitude—the attitude, for instance, which assumes that national policy should be guided by enlightened self-interest, rather than sentiment, emotions or altruistic ideals.
That this attitude is a helpful one appears clearly from the author's criticism of the American Institute of International Law's recent declaration of the right of nations to existence, independence, sovereignty, and equality, in accordance with "the laws of nature and of nature's God." As shown by the example of Persia, Turkey, Morocco, etc., the right of states to exist is sharply limited by their ability to maintain good behavior and manage their own affairs. Nor can the "right to exist" be used to perpetuate "an iniquitous status quo, created, after the manner of the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, in flagrant disregard of the legitimate aspirations of whole nations." The right of states to independence is also subject to all sorts of limitations, as for example the limitations imposed on Cuba and Panama by the paramount interests of this country; on Switzerland as a neutralized state; on Canada and Australia by their connection with the British Empire, though these self-governing dominions are assuming a quasi-international status. Similarly, the sovereignty of states is frequently impaired; and their equality is a matter of etiquette rather than reality. "Liberia and Hayti might well be cautioned not to stress too urgently their claims to the ' separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them.'"
This is but another way of saying that the problems raised by small nations, backward nations, and the growth and decay of nations, are not easily settled by appeal to eighteenth century doctrines of natural rights; and that there is no short and easy method for eliminating the deep-lying, imponderable causes of war.
It must not be inferred that the author would sweep aside or depreciate the law of nations. Its sanction and enforcement, however, he would trust, not to an international tribunal or police force, but, as at present, to the nations themselves, guided by recognition of mutual interests, rights, and obligations—" the anticipated advantages of reciprocity as well as the tear of retaliation."
There are interesting chapters on "The Limitations of Arbitration," "The Dangers of Pacifism," and "The Substitution of Law for War." In the chapter on "Ignominious Neutrality," the author reaches the conclusion that it is the duty of neutrals, following enlightened self-interest and a regard for international law and justice, to "become both a judge and a party in a world war." A. F. W.
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"The Basis of Durable Peace." Written at the invitation of the New York Times. By "Cosmos." 30 cents net. (Scribner's. N. Y. 1917.)
This is a collection of a series of notable articles that appeared in the New York Times between November 20 and December 18, 1916, together with subsequent published correspondence between "Cosmos" and Hall Caine. Anticipating, as they did, the President's "Peace Note" of December 18, and in some measure preparing the way for it. the articles did a timely and valuable service, even though productive of no immediate tangible result. They were worth collecting as a clear and well-informed study of international problems and of the conditions which, in the view of most neutrals, will be the only satisfactory outcome of the war.