At a time when the United States Navy appears to stand on the threshold of a great enlargement, and problems of the general constitution of the fleet, as well as the choice of types of vessels most suitable to the service, press for immediate solution, it may not be without interest to make a speculative study of the strategic conditions under which the navy is likely to be used in time of war. Essays on strategy are mostly of a general nature, and rarely embody the consideration of concrete cases, except as required to illustrate principles. It may perhaps by some be considered inappropriate to assume and discuss a state of war between countries actually at peace and unlikely to enter into conflict, but it is obviously impossible to form a clear idea of the problems that the navy of a given country has to solve without making definite assumptions as to the enemies with whom the country may be involved in war. All cases that are reasonably possible must be considered, and too much weight must not be attached to the political conditions existing at the moment. In these days, where kaleidoscopic changes are apt to take place in international relations, the naval defences can be safely planned only on the broad basis of past history. This is the more necessary as naval development, in order to be economic and sound, must follow a well-matured programme, extending over a number of years, during which political relations may undergo great changes.
Strategic problems based on concrete cases of warfare are indeed worked out by admiralty staffs or other similar institutions in all navies, but the result of such studies must for obvious reasons remain buried in the archives. Yet if the general public of a country is to judge intelligently of the requirements of the navy and the coast defences, it must be informed as to the probable course of events in wartime. Many fictitious war stories have appeared in the press and in the literature, but they are almost invariably of a popular nature, and often so exaggerated that they fail to impress serious people with the importance of the questions involved. In the present article it is attempted to give a sober although brief and sketchy presentation of the subject, which may serve as a suggestion for a more complete and detailed study.
It may be argued that the European War gives the best and most positive information on which to base a naval programme, but the strategic conditions of the European belligerents differ so much from those that would exist in a war between the United States and other countries, that the experiences of the European War cannot be applied directly. A study must first be made of the form which naval wars are likely to take when this country is involved.
The assumption as to the state of war must comprise the most typical and important of possible contingencies—not necessarily those that are most probable. They should be simple, unessential complications being avoided, but they must cover both defensive and offensive cases of warfare. On these general principles the assumed conditions are selected in the following. Other and more complex cases could be easily conceived and the courses of events might differ considerably from those here assumed, but the requirements to the navy would remain the same or would fall within those determined on the basis of the most important cases of warfare.
The pictures here drawn of the events are necessarily incomplete, since it is futile to carry the speculation beyond the first stages of the war, when numerous possibilities, largely of an accidental nature, present themselves and increase the complexity of the problem. The present study, however, in virtue of its concrete nature, brings out sharply the principal requirements of the United States Navy, and it gives indications as to the relative importance of the various types of warships as well as their general features. It also shows the urgent necessity of reinforcing the mobile defences of all outlying possessions, in particular those of the Panama Canal.
We shall assume the status of the naval and military defences of the United States and of the other supposed belligerents to be essentially as at the present time, disregarding the actually existing state of war.
1. The United States at War with England
The issue of such a war would probably be determined on shore; namely, on the North American Continent. Presumably the English main attack would take the form of an invasion across the Canadian border, and perhaps landing expeditions would be attempted at points of the East Coast. The primary duty of the British Navy would be to protect the lines of communication across the Atlantic. At the same time the British maritime trade would have to be safeguarded and that of the United States hindered or paralyzed. All these objects would be attained by clearing the sea of raiding vessels, and by an effective blockade of the American coasts; but these tasks present peculiar difficulties which it is necessary to consider in detail.
The coast-line of the United States is not only very extensive, but is divided into three distinct sections, the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific coasts, facing strategic areas, each of which would have to be kept under separate surveillance. Numerous naval stations, navy yards, and commercial harbors are found scattered along these coasts, and the problem of blockading is further complicated by the existence of insular possessions and the Panama Canal. England possesses, indeed, several advanced bases relative to these coast-lines, and two of them, Halifax and Bermuda, have an ideal location in front of the most important section of the Atlantic Coast; but other stations are less favorably situated as bases for a blockading fleet (Jamaica, Vancouver), while some are too weak or too limited in harbor facilities and resources (Nassau).
Hence, although the enormous extent of the littoral of the United States renders coast defence in a complete form practically impossible, it, on the other hand, presents the compensating advantage that an effective blockade is equally difficult to carry out. The Atlantic Coast is in this respect much more favorably situated than the German North Sea Coast in the present war. In the North Sea the British Islands, dotted with excellent harbors and provided with all the resources needed by a navy, extend as a barrier for about five hundred miles in front of and relatively close to the German naval bases, which are penned up in a corner of this narrow sea, easy to watch and to blockade. In the war here contemplated the conditions are practically the reverse, since the blockading fleet must concentrate at one or two known points confronting a coast-line extending for about fourteen hundred miles. The blockading fleet, moreover, must depend for its continued efficiency largely on supplies from the mother country.
We assume that at or before the outbreak of the war a screen of American light cruisers and destroyers, assisted by submarines and aircraft and supported by armored cruisers in the rear, would be thrown out in front of the Atlantic Coast; but with the existing outfit of cruisers, which are limited in number and most of them of relatively slow speed, the screen would be incomplete and weak, and could not safely be advanced to any great distance from the coast. It would probably, soon after the opening of hostilities, have to withdraw before the vastly superior forces of the English screen. After that the English would presumably attempt to establish a blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, as well as of the Panama Canal, light vessels being stationed off the shore outside harbors and estuaries, while battle cruisers would patrol the sea at a greater distance from the coast and the battle fleet would remain concentrated at Bermuda and Halifax. The blockade would have a mixed character, being partly "close" but essentially "open," and the American battle fleet would have considerable freedom of action even if debarred from operating at great distances from the coast. Probably it would be preferred to maintain the fleet "in being" rather than to risk a decisive action against superior forces. In fact, a vigorous offensive defensive, based on sporadic action, would appear very promising under the circumstances. Were such a policy adopted, the American main fleet might with advantage be distributed between important naval stations on the Atlantic Coast, while independent squadrons might be detailed to the defence of the Gulf and the Pacific, since by such scattering of the forces, the difficulties of maintaining an effective blockade would be immensely increased for the English. Under these circumstances complete concentration of the main fleet might not always be possible, and would be, in general, unnecessary, since a decisive fleet action would be the one thing to avoid; but partial condensation of the forces for the purpose of overwhelming minor portions of the enemy fleet might frequently be effected, and thus good opportunities of inflicting serious losses on the enemy might occur.
The service of the blockading light vessels would probably be exceedingly strenuous, since they would be exposed to incessant and vigorous attacks from all classes of warships of the widely scattered American fleet. Raiding vessels would have frequent opportunities of breaking the blockade, being eventually supported in this act by the battleships, and when at large they could prey upon British commerce and threaten the communication between England and Canada, but the American Navy in its present condition would not be able to make proper use of these opportunities on account of its weakness in scouting cruisers and its total lack of battle cruisers. These deficiencies, in fact, would greatly simplify the task of the enemy.
The American submarines would force the British battle fleet to operate with caution and normally to remain in port in the Bermudas and Halifax. If the United States were in possession of a number of larger sea-going submarines, which could be sent as far as the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the summer routes through Cabot Strait and the Strait of Belle Isle might be threatened.
Probably a belt near the Atlantic Coast would remain under the control of American submarines and torpedo-craft, aided by mine fields; but it seems doubtful whether the coastwise trade could be maintained. Waterways like the Cape Cod Canal would be of extreme value under these circumstances.
As stated above, the blockade would probably from the beginning of the war be extended to the ports on the Gulf Coast and in the Caribbean Sea. Guantanamo and the other American stations on the West Indian Islands, being practically without defences, would fall in the hands of the enemy, but the most important objective in this region would be the Panama Canal. Among all the detached strategic points belonging to the United States, the canal stands supreme in importance as the connecting link or bridge between the eastern and western strategic areas. The defences of both terminals of the canal against attack from the sea appear to be well provided for by coast fortifications, mines, and submarines, but against serious land attack the mobile garrison of the Canal Zone is entirely inadequate, consisting of a few infantry regiments and a company of engineers. Being without connection with the United States by land and having no independent technical military resources, the canal must depend for its tenure entirely on the navy. In the war here under consideration the English, being in command of the sea, could without difficulty dispatch a strong expeditionary force to the Isthmus. Landings might be effected in the vicinity of the Canal Zone on the Caribbean side beyond the region that is under direct control of the defences. Difficulties in the terrain might delay the operations, but the fall of the position would only be a question of time, since the English could bring a practically unlimited pressure to bear on it. A British squadron in the Pacific could prevent reinforcements from reaching the Canal Zone by way of Panama. If the canal fell into the hands of the enemy in unimpaired condition, the operations of the British fleet in the Pacific would be immensely facilitated and the blockade would be at once extended to the West Coast of the United States, if this step had not already been taken. The canal would thus become a positive disadvantage and a source of danger to the United States in the same measure as it would be of strategic value to the enemy; but it seems likely that the garrison, before surrendering, would wreck the canal for the probable duration of the war. This could be accomplished, for instance, by demolishing the Gatun Dam, or by simply letting out the water of the Gatun Lake, whereby the canal would be rendered useless for one or perhaps two years. It might be found wise even to make the canal inoperative and to evacuate the zone at once on the outbreak of hostilities, a procedure that would be analogous to the destruction of important bridges and the abandonment of untenable positions in land warfare.
Whether the English were able to make use of the canal or not, it would be necessary for them ultimately to blockade the Pacific Coast of the United States in order to protect their commerce: but this blockade would be difficult to maintain, especially as long as Pearl Harbor and other stations in the Pacific were still in the hands of the Americans, since the blockading vessels would then be exposed to attack from the rear. For this reason and so as to deprive raiders of all footholds; England would have to seize or blockade all these stations, none of which, with the exception of Pearl Harbor, could offer any serious resistance. In fact, the outlying possessions would in this, as in all wars against a power superior at sea, be a source of anxiety and weakness.
We need not for our purpose pursue the study further. It is clear that the American battleships, distributed in different ports on the extensive coast-lines and employed for energetic sporadic action, would greatly complicate the task of the British Navy. It seems evident, also, that in a war against an enemy, vulnerable in his commerce and under the necessity of transporting great armies across the ocean, battle cruisers, light cruisers, and seagoing submarines would be of the highest value. Bearing in mind the concern and embarrassment, which the small German East Asiatic cruiser squadron caused to the British Admiralty in the beginning of the present war, we can imagine what the result would be in the war here contemplated, if the United States were provided with even a moderate outfit of raiding and scouting vessels of the above mentioned classes.
2. The United States at War with Germany
We shall assume that the strength of the German fleet, after deduction of the forces required for home defence, would be somewhat superior to the American in battleships and overwhelmingly stronger in cruisers and destroyers.
Since Germany does not possess any naval stations in the Atlantic that could be used as advanced bases in operations on the coast of America, we suppose that the first preliminary objective of the German Navy would be the seizure of one or more points suitable for this purpose. The West Indies appear to offer the best and perhaps the only opportunities for the acquisition of such bases. Several excellent harbors and anchorages are found on the islands such as St. Thomas, Samana Bay in Haiti, and others, which the Germans apart from opposition of the American fleet, could seize without encountering serious resistance.
We shall assume first that the Americans would seek a decision before the German fleet had succeeded in establishing itself at a base, and that the main battle would take place in the vicinity of the West Indian waters after the American screen were driven back in a series of minor actions. The result would depend first, on the relative qualities and efficiency of the personnel in the two fleets, which, in a theoretical study like the present, must be assumed to be equal; second, it would depend on the forces which the Germans could spare for the undertaking and on the condition of the fleet on its arrival in the West Indies, but apart from these uncertain elements the Americans would have a decided advantage in the individual superiority of their battleships. Comparing ships of the same date, and excepting the most recent of the German ships, the data of which have not been published, the American ships are throughout of more rational design. They carry more powerful guns, the batteries are better arranged, and they possess, moreover, all the advantages that follow inherently from larger displacement.
If the American fleet were victorious, the war would come to a speedy end. If it were defeated, it would probably fall back on Guantanamo or entirely withdraw from the West Indian waters and the situation would thus be similar to that already discussed in case of a war with England.
Let us consider the case where the American fleet, instead of initially risking a decisive fleet action, followed a defensive policy and took up a position in the West Indies, while the German Fleet with its train seized a base in the Eastern Caribbean. We assume that the American fleet, so long as no defences are established on Culebra or St. Thomas, would choose Guantanamo Bay as a base, because it is singularly well situated as a flank position, whatever be the ulterior objective of the enemy. In fact, the Germans could not undertake any serious expeditions, whether against the United States, Panama, or South America, so long as the American fleet were unimpaired and free to make sorties from that station. The first task of the Germans would therefore necessarily be a close blockade of Guantanamo and attacks on the place by landing parties. At the same time the German Navy would have to prevent reinforcements from landing elsewhere on the Island of Cuba. Guantanamo, with the existing weak defences, and unless it were in time provided with a strong mobile garrison, could not make a prolonged resistance. The American fleet, in order to avoid being destroyed in port like the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, would soon be forced to come out for a decisive battle, the possibilities of which have already been discussed.
If the United States fleet were defeated and for the time being incapable of serious action, the American harbors would be blockaded and the Panama Canal attacked with the probable result that it would be rendered useless.
We shall not attempt to discuss in detail the further operations or ultimate objective of the Germans, but the sea would now be clear for the transportation of large expeditionary forces or armies across the Atlantic, whether for the purpose of securing the acquisition of new colonial possessions or for invading the United States.
Whatever the outcome of such a war, it is seen that, again, the issue would depend essentially on the battleships, while battle cruisers and fast light cruisers would be urgently needed by the United States Navy for disturbing the passage of the enemy's oversea expeditions and his communications. Battle cruisers would be useful also in fleet action, provided they are designed with this purpose in view.
3. The United States at War with Japan
The United States Navy would in this case be decidedly superior to that of the enemy in battleships, but would lack the element of speed which the Japanese Navy possesses in a squadron of battle cruisers. The Japanese Navy would be somewhat stronger also in older armored cruisers and scouts.
Strategically, such a war would differ markedly from those so far discussed in virtue of the enormous distances that separate the main bases of the two countries. The Panama Canal would again be of the utmost strategic value to the United States, and Pearl Harbor would form an excellent base in the Pacific, but, being about 3400 miles distant from Japan, it could serve only as an intermediate station in offensive operations against that country. The Philippine Islands are in this respect more favorably situated, but are yet too remote from Japan to serve as an advanced base for a blockading fleet, Manila being about 1300 miles from the southern Japanese islands. Japan, moreover, flanks the line of communication between the Philippines and Hawaii, which line is about 5000 miles in length.
Guam Island, which is about 1700 miles nearer to Hawaii and Panama than is Manila, and which is no farther from Japan, is at present merely a coaling station, practically without any defences. Yet, this little island, of form and size as the extreme half end of the Gallipoli Peninsula, is much easier to defend than stations which, like Manila, are situated on larger islands where landings are more difficult to prevent. It has a commodious natural harbor which with proper improvements can be rendered serviceable for a large fleet. If the United States is to maintain a strategic position in the East, a strong naval base at Guam appears to be indispensable. In the hands of Japan it would absolutely destroy the security of the line of communication with the Philippines.
As matters stand, the United States is without a base in the Pacific suitable for offensive operations against Japan, and it does not seem likely, therefore, that the American fleet at the opening of hostilities would be advanced beyond Hawaii. Possibly a minor squadron would be detached to the Philippines and we shall suppose these islands to be garrisoned as at present, with some 13,000 United States troops.
We assume further that the Japanese, eventually using the naval station Takow, on Formosa, as an advanced base, would open the war with a surprise attack on the Philippine Islands. The American squadron would be blockaded or destroyed by a superior Japanese fleet and an army would be landed. The positions at Manila and Olongapo would fall and all important strategic points on the islands would be occupied. Guam would be captured. These operations would probably be completed before succor could be rendered, and once the Japanese were firmly established, they could not be driven out of the islands till after their fleet was defeated or closely blockaded and the sea cleared of their cruisers; but this task the American fleet, as now constituted, could hardly hope to accomplish under the given disadvantageous strategic conditions.
Having thus secured control of the western part of the Pacific, Japan would presumably follow a defensive policy, the battle fleet being kept in home waters for protection of the coasts and engagements with superior forces of the enemy being avoided. The older cruisers might be detailed for protection of commerce in Asiatic waters and the fast modern cruisers, including the battle cruisers, might carry out raiding operations in the eastern part of the Pacific, threatening in particular the communications of Hawaii. Eventually, important points in Alaska would be seized.
It is difficult to see how under these circumstances the American fleet could force the Japanese to a decision against their will. Offensive operations of importance could not be undertaken in these days of submarine dangers without the possession of an advanced base in the vicinity of the enemy's coast; but no such base is known to be available near the littoral of the Japanese islands. Even if a suitable base were secured, the weakness of the American Navy in cruisers and flotillas would render blockading operations ineffective and would jeopardize the vitality of the fleet, because it would be impossible to protect the extensive line of communications.
It is likely, therefore, that the American main fleet would remain at Hawaii, where it would be strategically in the best position for protecting the Pacific Coast and the canal, at the same time preventing the Hawaiian Islands from falling into the hands of the enemy. In fact, serious attacks by the Japanese fleet on points on the American Continent or on Hawaii would hardly be attempted, and the Japanese would probably be content to seek opportunities of overwhelming weaker divisions of the American fleet. The war would be essentially a cruiser war, in which the Japanese would have the advantage of a more modern and powerful materiel, but by using battleships as convoys the American Navy should be able to protect its lines of communication in the Eastern Pacific.
In order that the United States should be capable of carrying out an offensive war against Japan with any chance of success, it would need to possess a suitable advanced base and a fleet decidedly superior to that of the Japanese in all the various classes of warships. On account of the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, the ships of all classes must be endowed with the highest sea-going qualities and steaming capability, and since they must also possess at least the same military qualities as ships of the same class in other navies, they must be of very large size.
4. The United States at War with Germany and Japan
If Germany and Japan were acting together as allies against the United States, the balance of naval power would be strongly in their favor. Yet, their added naval strength would fall far short of that of Great Britain, and they would not, like that power, be in possession of suitable advanced bases. Their forces would be—at least initially—divided.
Let us first assume that the American fleet were concentrated in the Atlantic, leaving the Pacific Coast to depend on local defences, consisting chiefly of destroyers, submarines, mines, and fortifications. In such a case the situation in the Atlantic would be as in a war with Germany alone, but the Panama Canal would probably fall into the hands of the Japanese, since the American fleet could not be detailed to its defence without leaving the Atlantic seaboard open to attack, and a Japanese army could be landed at the Pacific end of the canal. All the outlying possessions in the Pacific, including Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, would be untenable with the present means of defence, and Pearl Harbor would be liable to suffer a fate similar to that of Kiao-chau in the present war.
If the United States fleet succeeded in defeating the German fleet, it would perhaps later, after a period of recuperation, be able to clear the Pacific Coast of the Japanese; but if it suffered a reverse, both seaboards would be open to attack and invasion.
Instead of seeking a decision in a great battle, a more cautious, defensive policy, as explained in case of a war with England, based on sporadic action with a scattered distribution of the fleet on both coasts might be preferred.
It is seen that the fleet of the United States, in order to derive full benefit from the favorable strategic situation existing at the beginning of such a war due to the division of the allied forces, must be capable of defeating each of the opponents singly with a good margin of strength, and the defences of the Panama Canal must be such as to render it absolutely secure against attack by sea or land.