GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PAGE
- Diplomatic Notes...................................... 1001
- Naval Notes............................................. 1023
- Miscellaneous Notes ................................ 1046
(Details of Land Operations are not included.)
[Events of international significance will be briefly chronicled in large type. Notes and comments bearing upon these events will be interspersed in smaller type. Addenda will be published in future issues to correct and complete this compilation.]
DIPLOMATIC NOTES
(Prepared by A. F. Westcott, Ph. D., Instructor, U. S. Naval Academy)
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
On April 10 Germany sent to the United States the following note giving details of submarine attacks on the Sussex and other merchant vessels:
Berlin, April 12.
The undersigned has the honor to inform your Excellency, Ambassador Gerard, in response to communications of the 29th and 30th ultimo and the 3d instant regarding the steamers Sussex, Manchester Engineer, Englishman, Berwindvale and Eagle Point that the mentioned cases, in accordance with our notes of the 30th and 31st ultimo and the 4th and 5th instant, have been subjected to careful investigation by the admiral staff of the navy, which has led to he following results:
First.—The English Steamer Berwindvale.—A steamer, which was possibly the Berwindvale, was encountered on the evening of March 16 in sight of the Bull Rock Light, on the Irish coast, by a German submarine. The steamer, as soon as she noticed the submarine, which was running unsubmerged, turned and steamed away. She was ordered to halt by a warning shot. She paid no attention, however, to this warning, but extinguished all lights and attempted to escape. The vessel was then fired upon until halted, and without further orders lowered several boats. After the crew entered the boats and received enough time to row away the ship was sunk.
The name of this steamer was not established; it cannot stated with assurance, even with the help of the details which were furnished by the American Embassy, that the above described incident concerns the steamer Berwindvale. Since, however, the steamer sunk was a tank steamer like the Berwindvale, the identity of the ships may be assumed. In this case, however, the statement made that the Berwindvale was torpedoed without warning would conflict with the fact.
Second.—The British Steamer Englishman.—This steamer on March 24 was called upon to halt by a German submarine, through two warning shots, about 20 sea miles west of Islay (Hebrides). The vessel proceeded, however, without heeding the warning, and was therefore forced by the submarine by artillery fire to halt after an extended chase, whereupon she lowered boats without further orders.
After the German commandant had convinced himself that the crew had taken to the boats and rowed from the ship, he sank the steamer.
Third.—The British Steamer Manchester Engineer.—It is impossible to establish through the investigation up to the present whether the attack on this steamer, which, according to the given description, occurred on March 27, in the latitude of Waterford, is attributable to a German submarine. The statement regarding the time and place of the incident gives no sufficient basis for investigation. It would therefore be desirable to have more exact statements of the place, time and attendant circumstances of the attack reported by the American Government in order that the investigation might thereupon be brought to a conclusion.
Fourth.—The British Steamer Eagle Point.—This steamer in the forenoon of March 28 was called upon to halt by a German submarine through signal and shot about 100—not 130—sea miles from the southwest coast of Ireland, but proceeded. She was thereupon fired upon until halted, and, without further orders, lowered two boats, in which the crew took their places. After the commandant convinced himself that the boats, which had hoisted sails, had gotten clear of the steamer, he sank the steamer.
At the time of the sinking a north-northwest wind of the strength of two, not “a storm wind,” and a light swell, not “a heavy sea,” as stated in the given description, prevailed. The boats, therefore, had every prospect of being picked up very quickly because the place of the sinking lay on a much- used steamer path.
If the crew of the steamer used only two small boats for saving themselves the responsibility falls upon themselves, since there were still upon the steamer, as the submarine could establish, at least four big collapsible boats.
Fifth.—The French Steamer Sussex.—Ascertainment of the fact whether the channel steamer Sussex was damaged by a German submarine was rendered extremely difficult because no exact details of time, place, and attendant circumstances of the sinking were known, and also because it was impossible to obtain a picture of the ship before April 6. Consequently the investigation had to be extended to all actions undertaken on the day in question—March 24—in the channel in the general region between Folkestone and Dieppe.
“In that region, on March 24, a long, black craft without a flag, having a gray funnel, small gray forward works and two high masts, was encountered about the middle of the English Channel by a German submarine. The German commander reached the definite conclusion that it was a war vessel, and, indeed, a mine-layer of the recently built English Arabic class, lie was led to that conviction by the following facts: First, by the plain, unbroken deck of the ship; second, the form of the stern, sloping downward and backward like a war vessel; third, she was painted like a war vessel; fourth, the high speed developed, about 18 knots; fifth, the circumstance that the vessel did not keep a course northward of the light buoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head, which, according to the frequent and unvarying observations of German submarines, is about the course of commercial vessels, but kept in the middle of the channel, on a course about in the direction of Le Havre.
“Consequently, he attacked the vessel at 3.55 in the afternoon, middle European time, one and one-half sea miles southeast of Bull Rock (Bullock?) Bank, the submarine being submerged. The torpedo struck and caused such a violent explosion in the forward part of the ship that the entire forward part was torn away to the bridge.”
The particularly violent explosion warrants the certain conclusion that great amounts of munitions were aboard.
The German commander made a sketch of the vessel attacked by him, two drawings of which are inclosed. The picture of the steamer Sussex, two copies of which are also inclosed, is reproduced photographically from the English paper, The Daily Graphic of the 27th ultimo.
A comparison of the sketch and the picture shows that the craft attacked is not identical with the Sussex. The difference in the position of the stack and shape of the stern is particularly striking.
No other attack whatever by German submarines at the time in question for the Sussex upon the route between Folkestone and Dieppe occurred. The German Government must therefore assume that the injury to the Sussex is attributable to another cause than an attack by a German submarine.
For an explanation of the case the fact may perhaps be serviceable that no less than 26 English mines were exploded by shots by German naval forces in the channel on the 1st and 2d of April alone. The entire sea in that vicinity is, in fact, endangered by floating mines and by torpedoes that have not sunk. Off the English coast it is further endangered in an increasing degree through German mines which have been laid against enemy naval forces.
Should the American Government have at its disposal further material for a conclusion upon the case of the Sussex, the German Government would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material also to an investigation.
In the event that differences of opinion should develop hereby between the two governments, the German Government now declares itself ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed commissions of investigation, in accordance with the third title of The Hague agreement, for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, November 18. 1907.
The undersigned, while requesting that you communicate the above to the government of the United States, takes occasion to renew to the Ambassador the assurance of his distinguished esteem. Jagow.
The Sussex, a British channel steamer, Folkestone to Dieppe, with about 325 passengers, including 25 Americans and 53 drew, was sunk on March 24 at 2.50 p. m. (3.50 mid-European time). According to the report of Admiral Grassct, of the French Navy, the vessel left Folkestone at 1.25 at a speed of 16 knots, and was headed south 3° east from Dungeness, in mid-channel, at the time of the disaster. The captain saw a torpedo on the port beam, some 150 meters away, and ordered the helm hard aport, stopping the starboard engine. Fight seconds later, as the ship was beginning to swing off, a terrific explosion cut the ship in two. On deck several passengers saw the torpedo when quite close to the ship.
The Torpedoing of the “Sussex."—Captain Persius discusses in the Berliner Tageblatt the German note to America on the torpedoing of the Sussex. lie remarks that the explanation given admirably illustrates the extraordinary difficult situation in which German submarine commanders now often find themselves.
It is not easy (he goes on) for a layman to put himself in a corresponding situation, but by pondering the five points which are given as grounds for the belief that the submarine was in the presence of a hostile warship lie can form a slight idea of the anxious service of a submarine commander. The question: “Is it, or is it not, a warship?” can often in the darkness of night not be answered with certainty. Naturally the commandant will exercise the utmost care in his scrutiny, and will only give the order to fire a torpedo if quite sure on the point, but the time to make observations is frequently only to be measured by a few seconds. The promptest decision is essential if a hostile warship is not to escape destruction. It is frequently announced that a vessel has been torpedoed without warning. As again appears from the government note, this news is only in the rarest cases subsequently confirmed. Should it, however, occasionally happen that an innocent ship is damaged, it should be taken into consideration that it is matter of an unfortunate accident, which cannot be avoided in peace, much less in war. It is easy with brow anxiously contracted to pass judgment at a green table on “unjustified torpedoing.” Actually it is far more difficult to torpedo a ship at all, and to carry out torpedoing entirely free from objection in the existing difficult circumstances one must be almost a superman.—London Times, 15/4.
On April 20 President Wilson despatched the following note to Germany, requiring that “unless the German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.”
The note is addressed to Ambassador Gerard, at Berlin, and instructs him to “deliver to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs a communication reading as follows”:
I did not fail to transmit immediately, by telegraph, to my government your Excellency’s note of the 10th instant in regard to certain attacks by German submarines, and particularly in regard to the disastrous explosion which, on March 24 last, wrecked the French steamship Sussex in the English Channel. I have now the honor to deliver, under instructions from my government, the following reply to your Excellency:
Information now in the possession of the government of the United States fully establishes the facts in the case of the Sussex, and the inferences which my government has drawn from that information it regards as confirmed by the circumstances set forth in your Excellency’s note of the 10th instant.
On March 24, 1916, at about 2.50 o’clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The Sussex had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel, and was not following the route taken by troop ships or supply ships. About 80 of her passengers, non-combatants of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United Slates, were killed or injured.
A careful, detailed and scrupulously impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. In the view of the government of the United States these facts from the first made the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a German submarine unavoidable. Il now considers that conclusion substantiated by the statements of your Excellency’s note. A full statement of the facts upon which the government of the United States has based its conclusion is inclosed.
The government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past 12 months and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations.
If the sinking of the Sussex had been an isolated case, the government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had wilfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might he satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the Sussex was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.
On the contrary, the government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.
The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus prescribed or to enter them at their peril, the government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of non-combatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks; and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the government of the United States based that protest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations.
The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy announced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the commanders of its submarines, and assuring the government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of non-combatants.
In pursuance of Ibis policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries thus announced and thus entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government’s undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus at least by implication pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed, and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.
Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership hound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship’s boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship’s boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the Lusitania and Arabic and mere passenger boats like the Sussex have been attacked without a moment’s warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of the non-combatants, passengers and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the government of the United States cannot but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds.
The government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as, of course, given in entire sincerity and good faith and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until tbc facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.
It owes it to its just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy’s commerce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment, of course, involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non- combatants.
If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that thebe is but one course it can pursue.
Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.
On April 27 Secretary Lansing issued a memorandum, prepared in March, defining the position of the United States regarding armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas. In general, the memorandum states that a neutral government “may proceed on the assumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is armed for aggression,” sufficient proof being given by a commission or orders requiring it to conduct aggressive operations, or by evidence that it has carried on such operations. On the other hand, “a belligerent on the high seas should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection only.”
Department of State, Washington, March 25, 1916.
I
The status of an armed merchant vessel of a belligerent is to he considered from two points of view : First, from that of a neutral when the vessel enters its port, and second, from that of an enemy when the vessel is on the high seas.
First.—An armed merchant vessel in neutral ports.
- It is necessary for a neutral government to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality which enters its jurisdiction, in order that the government may protect itself front responsibility for the destruction of life and property by permitting its ports to he used as bases of hostile operations by belligerent warships.
- If the vessel carries a commission or orders issued by a belligerent government and directing it under penalty to conduct aggressive operations, or if it is conclusively shown to have conducted such operations, it should be regarded and treated as a warship.
- If sufficient evidence is wanting a neutral government, in order to safeguard itself from liability for failure to preserve its neutrality, may reasonably presume from these facts the status of an armed merchant vessel which frequents its waters. There is no settled rule of international law as to the sufficiency of evidence to establish such a presumption. As a result a neutral government must decide for itself the sufficiency of the evidence which it requires to determine the character of the vessel. For the guidance of its port officers and other officials a neutral government may therefore declare a standard of evidence, but such standard may be changed on account of the general conditions of naval warfare or modified on account of the circumstances of a particular case. These changes and modifications may be made at any time during the progress of the war, since the determination of the status of an armed merchant vessel in neutral waters may affect the liability of a neutral government.
Second.—An armed merchant vessel on the high seas.
- It is necessary for a belligerent warship to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of an enemy encountered on the high seas, since the rights of life and property of belligerents and neutrals on board the vessel may be impaired if its status is that of an enemy warship.
- The determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption hut upon conclusive evidence, because the responsibility for the destruction of life and property depends on the actual facts of the ease and cannot be avoided or lessened by a standard of evidence which a belligerent may announce as creating a presumption of hostile character. On the other hand, to safeguard himself from possible liability for unwarranted destruction of life and property the belligerent should, in the absence of conclusive evidence, act on the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful character.
- A presumption based solely on the presence of an armament on a merchant vessel of an enemy is not a sufficient reason for a belligerent to declare it to be a warship and proceed to attack it without regard to the rights of the persons on board. Conclusive evidence of a purpose to use the armament for aggression is essential. Consequently an armament which a neutral government, seeking to perform its neutral duties, may presume to be intended for aggression, might in fact on the high seas he used solely for protection. A neutral government has no opportunity to determine the purpose of an armament on a merchant vessel unless there is evidence in the ship’s papers or other proof as to its previous use, so that the government is justified in substituting an arbitrary rule of presumption in arriving at the status of the merchant vessel. On the other hand, a belligerent warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an enemy merchant vessel, and so determine by direct evidence the status of the vessel.
Summary.—The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances of the case.
The status of such vessel as a warship on the high seas must be determined only upon conclusive evidence of aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.
In brief, a neutral government may proceed upon the presumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is armed for aggression, while a belligerent should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection. Both of these presumptions may be overcome by evidence—the first by secondary or collateral evidence, since the fact to be established is negative in character; the second by primary and direct evidence, since the fact to be established is positive in character.
II
The character of the evidence upon which the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is to be determined when visiting neutral waters and when traversing the high seas having been stated, it is important to consider the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas.
First.—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports.
- It appears to be the established rule of international law that warships of a belligerent may enter neutral ports and accept, limited hospitality there upon condition that they leave, as a rule, within 24 hours after their arrival.
- Belligerent warships are also entitled to take on fuel once in three months in ports of a neutral country.
- As a mode of enforcing these rules, a neutral has the right to cause belligerent warships failing to comply with them, together with their officers and crews, to be interned during the remainder of the war.
- Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for purposes of protection against the enemy, are entitled to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance in the course of legitimate trade.
- Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality under a commission or orders of their government to use, under penalty, their armament for aggressive purposes, or merchantmen which, without such commission or orders, have used their armaments for aggressive purposes, are not entitled to the same hospitality in neutral ports as peaceable armed merchantmen.
Second.—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels on the high seas.
- Innocent neutral property on the high seas cannot legally he confiscated, but is subject to inspection by a belligerent. Resistance to inspection removes this immunity and subjects the property to condemnation by a prize court, which is charged with the preservation of the legal rights of the owners of neutral property.
- Neutral property engaged in contraband trade, breach of blockade, or unneutral service obtains the character of enemy property and is subject to seizure by a belligerent and condemnation by a prize court.
- When hostile and innocent property is mixed, as in the case of a neutral ship carrying a cargo which is entirely or partly contraband, this fact can only he determined by inspection. Such innocent property may he of uncertain character, as it has been frequently held that it is more or less contaminated by association with hostile property. For example, under the Declaration of London (which, so far as the provisions covering this subject, are concerned, has been adopted by all the belligerents), the presence of a cargo which in bulk or value consists of 50 per cent contraband articles impresses the ship with enemy character and subjects it to seizure and condemnation by a prize court.
- Enemy property, including ships and cargoes, is always subject to seizure and condemnation. Any enemy property taken by a belligerent on the high seas is a total loss to the owners. There is no redress in a prize court. The only means of avoiding loss is by flight or successful resistance. Enemy merchant ships have, therefore, the right to arm for the purpose of self-protection.
- A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or offensive force are immaterial.
- A belligerent warship has, incidental to the right of seizure, the right to visit and search all vessels on the high seas for the purpose of determining the hostile or innocent character of the vessels and their cargoes. If the hostile character of the property is known, however, the belligerent warship may seize the property without exercising the right of visit and search which is solely for the purpose of obtaining knowledge as to the character of the property. The attacking vessel must display its colors before exercising belligerent rights.
- When a belligerent warship meets a merchantman on the high seas which is known to he enemy owned and attempts to capture the vessel, the latter may exercise its right of self-protection either by flight or by resistance. The right to capture and the right to prevent capture are recognized as equally justifiable.
- The exercise of the right of capture is limited, nevertheless, by certain accepted tides of conduct based on the principles of humanity and regard for innocent property, even if there is definite knowledge that some of the property, cargo, as well as the vessel, is of enemy character. As a character of these limitations, it has become the established practice for warships to give merchant vessels an opportunity to surrender or submit to visit and search before attempting to seize them by force. The observance of this rule of naval warfare tends to prevent the loss of life of non-combatants and the destruction of innocent neutral property which would result from sudden attack.
- If, however, before a summons to surrender is given, a merchantman of belligerent nationality, aware of the approach of an enemy warship, uses its armament to keep the enemy at a distance, or after it has been summoned to surrender it resists or flees, the warship may properly exercise force to compel surrender.
- If the merchantman finally surrender’s, the belligerent warship may release it or take it into custody. In the case of an enemy merchantman it may he sunk, but only if it is impossible to take it into port, and provided always that the persons on board are put in a place of safety. In the case of a neutral merchantman, the right to sink it in any circumstance is doubtful.
- A merchantman entitled to exercise the right of self-protection may do so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted as to render it ineffectual. There is a distinct difference, however, between the exercise of the right of self- protection and the act of cruising the seas in an armed vessel for the purpose of attacking enemy naval vessels.
- In the event that merchant ships of belligerent nationality are armed and under commission or orders to attack in all circumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the purpose of destroying them, and are entitled to receive prize money for such service from their government, or are liable to a penalty for failure to obey the orders given, such merchant ships lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their government, even though it is not their sole occupation to conduct hostile operations.
- A vessel engaged intermittently in commerce and under a commission or orders of its government imposing a penalty, in pursuing and attacking enemy naval craft, possesses a status tainted with a hostile purpose which it cannot throw aside or assume at will. It should, therefore, be considered as an armed public vessel and receive the treatment of a warship by an enemy and by neutrals. Any person taking passage on such a vessel cannot expect immunity other than that accorded persons who are on board a warship. A private vessel, engaged in seeking enemy naval craft, without such a commission or orders from its government, stands in a relation to the enemy similar to that of a civilian who fires upon the organized military forces of a belligerent, and is entitled to no more considerate treatment.—N. Y. Times, 27/4.
On May 5 Germany replied to the United States note of April 20. The reply asserts that German “submarine warfare has been in accordance with the general principles of visit and search” except “in the war zone surrounding Great Britain,” and has been employed “in self-defence against the illegal conduct of British warfare.” In conclusion it states that German naval forces have received the order that “vessels both within and without the area declared a naval war zone shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.” If, however, the United States fails to secure “freedom of the seas” from Great Britain, “the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.”
The undersigned, on behalf of the Imperial German Government, has the honor to present to his Excellency the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. James W. Gerard, the following reply to the note of April 20 regarding the conduct of German submarine warfare.
The German Government handed over to the proper naval authorities for early investigation the evidence concerning the Sussex, as communicated by the Government of the United States. Judging by the results that the investigation has hitherto yielded, the German Government is alive to the possibility that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10 as having been torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the Sussex.
The German Government begs to reserve further communication on the matter until certain points are ascertained, which are of decisive importance for establishing the facts of the case. Should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to he a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to draw the consequence resulting therefrom.
In connection with the case of the the Government of the United States made a series of statements, the gist of which is the assertion that the incident is to be considered hut one instance of a deliberate method of indiscriminate destruction of vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations by German submarine commanders.
The German Government must emphatically repudiate the assertion. The German Government, however, thinks it of little avail to enter into details in the present stage of affairs, more particularly as the government of the United States omitted to substantiate the assertion by reference to concrete facts.
The German Government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutrals’ interests, in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany’s enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.
The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain. With regard to these, no assurances have ever been given to the Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in the declaration of February 8, 1916.
The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were given or are executed in good faith. Errors actually occurred. They can in no kind of warfare he avoided altogether. Allowances must be made in the conduct of naval warfare against an enemy resorting to all kinds of ruses, whether permissible or illicit.
But apart from the possibility of errors, naval warfare, just like warfare on land, implies unavoidable dangers for neutral persons and goods entering the fighting zone. Even in cases where the naval action is confined to ordinary forms of cruiser warfare, neutral persons and goods repeatedly come to grief.
The German Government has repeatedly and explicitly pointed out the dangers from mines that have led to the loss of numerous ships.
The German Government has made several proposals to the government of the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare. Unfortunately the government of the United States decided not to accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the government of the United States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.
The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines.
As the German Government repeatedly declared, it cannot dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German Government, however, has now decided to make a further concession, adapting methods of submarine war to the interests of neutrals. In reaching its decision the German Government is actuated by considerations which are above the level of the disputed question.
The German Government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the government of the United States. It again fully takes into account that both governments for many years cooperated in developing international law in conformity with these principles, the ultimate object of which has always been to coniine warfare on sea and land to armed forces of belligerents and safeguard as far as possible non-combatants against the horrors of war.
But although these considerations are of great weight, they alone would not under present circumstances have determined the attitude of the German Government, l'or in answer to the appeal by the government of the United States on behalf of the sacred principles of humanity and international law, the German Government must repeat once more, with all emphasis, that it was not the German, but the British Government which ignored all accepted rules of international law and extended this terrible war to the lives and property of non-combatants, having no regard whatever for the interests and rights of neutrals and non-combatants that through this method of warfare have been severely injured.
In self-defence against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare.
As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret that the sentiments of humanity, which the government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into ignominious capitulation.
The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt the conduct of warfare to these rules.
Several attempts made by the government of the United States to prevail upon the British Government to act accordingly failed because of flat refusal on the part of the British Government. Moreover, Great Britain again and again has violated international law, surpassing all hounds in outraging neutral rights. The latest measure adopted by Great Britain, declaring German bunker coal contraband and establishing conditions under which English bunker coal alone is supplied to neutrals, is nothing but an unheard-of attempt by way of exaction to force neutral tonnage into the service of British trade war.
The German people knows that the government of the United States has the power to coniine the war to armed forces of the belligerent countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of international law. The government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist, against Great Britain, on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against illegal methods adopted by Germany’s enemies. Moreover, the German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.
It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal otherwise always is certain to find here. If the German Government, nevertheless, is resolved to go to the utmost limit of concessions, it has been guided not alone by the friendship connecting the two great nations for over too years, but also by the thought of the great doom which threatens the entire civilized world should the cruel and sanguinary war he extended and prolonged.
The German Government, conscious of Germany’s strength, twice within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany’s vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany’s fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe The German Government feels all the more justified in declaring that responsibility could not he borne before the forum of mankind and in history if after 21 months of the war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the German Government and the government of the United States, were to take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two nations.
As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement with the government of the United States.
The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following order:
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.
Hut neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon, if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.
Accordingly, the German Government is confident that in consequence of the new orders issued to the naval forces the government of the United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual co-operation toward restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July 23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of the international law universally recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by the government of the United States to the British Government December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915.
Should steps taken by the government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.
The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the American Ambassador assurances of highest consideration. Von Jagow.
On May 8 President Wilson despatched the following brief note stating that the United States would “rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy.”
Washington, May 8.
The American Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to-day by cable to deliver the following note to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs:
The note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4, 1916, has received careful consideration by the government of the United States. It is especially noted, as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future, that it “is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents” and that it is determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the government of the United States has insisted.
Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced, on February 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government’s declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.
The government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial Government docs not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the government of the United States and any other belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government’s note of the fourth instant might appear to he susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint: absolute, not relative. Lansing.
Methods of U-Boats—Vessels Must Stop
Washington, May 16.
Count von Bernstorff, has delivered to Secretary Lansing, under last Friday’s date, a note verbalc from the Imperial German Government suggesting that a neutral vessel may be attacked by a German submarine if, when challenged to halt, the vessel fails to obey and turns her bow toward the submarine. The text of the communication, dated May 12 and signed by Count von Bernstorff, is as follows:
“A German submarine in January last signaled with flags from a distance the Dutch steamer Bandoeng to stop. Instead of immediately complying with that summons, permissible under international law, the Dutch steamer turned at higher speed on the submarine, whose commander, on the assumption, warranted by the circumstances, that he had to do with an English ship in disguise, bent on attacking him, then opened fire on her.
“The steamer Bandoeng then stopped and sent over a boat for the examination of the ship’s papers. On being asked about his captain’s proceeding, the Dutch officer in command of the boat explained that he wanted to come nearer the submarine, so as to shorten the visitation formalities.
"The Imperial Government finds in the incident occasion to suggest to the neutral governments that the masters of their merchant ships he given to understand that in the event of their being stopped by German public vessels the provisions of international law must be observed to the letter, and that their special attention be called to the dangers incurred by turning their ships on a submarine.
“Thus alone can incidents of the foregoing description be avoided, the responsibility for which would exclusively lie upon the neutral shipmasters.” —N. Y. Times 17/5.
“Tubantia” Torpedoed.—Germany now admits that the Dutch steamship Tubantia was torpedoed and not sunk by a mine and will give to the owners of the steamer a larger vessel from the Hamburg-American fleet, according to an official announcement made at The Hague May 2. The owners of the Tubantia will have to pay to Germany the difference in cost of the two vessels.—Shipping Illustrated, 6/5.
Brazil Begins U-Boat Inquiry.—The Brazilian Government has ordered an urgent inquiry into the sinking of the Brazilian steamship Rio Branco (556 tons). The vessel was sunk in the channel on May 2, and her crew landed at Blyth on the English coast.—N. Y. Times, 5/5.
Bethmann-Hollweg’s Speech.—On April 5 the German Chancellor in a speech to the Reichstag gave interesting hints as to German war aims and peace wishes. The speech was in part as follows:
At the outbreak of the war I recalled Moltke’s saving that we should have once more to defend in a bloody fight what we had won in 1870. We went out to battle for the protection of our unity and freedom-the whole nation united like one man. It is this united and free Germany that our enemies desire to destroy. Germany is again to become impotent as in former centuries, exposed to every lust for power on the part of its neighbors, the whipping boy of Europe, bound in fetters still after the war as regard the development of its economic strength. That is what our enemies mean by the destruction of their military power of Prussia. They will smash their beads. (Loud cheers.)
The Salvation of Europe.—And what, on the other hand, do we desire? The meaning and purpose of this war is for us a Germany so firmly built and so strongly protected that nobody again will fall into the temptation of desiring to destroy us, and that everybody in the wide world must recognize our right to the free exercise of our peaceful strength. It is at this Germany and not at the destruction of foreign peoples that we aim. It is the permanent salvation of the European Continent, which is to-day shaken in its deepest foundations.
What has the enemy coalition to offer to Europe? Russia offers the fate of Poland and Finland; France the pretension to that hegemony which was our misery; and England the state of division and permanent friction which she likes to call the balance of power on the continent, and which is the inmost cause of the untold misery which this war has brought upon Europe. (Hear, hear.) If the three powers had not united against us, and had not attempted to reverse the wheels of history to times which have passed away for ever, the peace of Europe would gradually have been fortified by the strength of quiet development. To achieve this was the purpose of German policy before the war. We could have by peaceful labor what we wanted. Our enemies chose war. (Dr. Liebknecht: "It was you who chose war.” Uproar, and cries of “scoundrel,” “ruffian,” and “out with him.”)
The President called Dr. Liebknecht to order, and the Chancellor continued :
And so the peace of Europe must rise again out of a sea of blood and tears —out of the grave of millions.
We went out, then, gentlemen, in our defence, hut what was before is no longer to-day. History has advanced with iron step, and there is no going back. Germany and Austria-Hungary had not the intention to open the Polish question. The fortune of battles has opened it, and now it is there and awaits its solution. Germany and Austria-Hungary must and will solve it. (Cheers.) After such shocks history does not recognize the status quo ante. (Hear, hear.) Poland after the war will be a new Poland. The Poland which was left by the Russian police officials, hastily pocketing their bribes, and by the Russian Cossack, burning and plundering, exists no more. Even members of the Duma have openly said that they cannot imagine the return of the chinovnik to the place where a German, an Austrian, and a Pole have meanwhile labored honestly for the unhappy country.
Herr Asquith speaks of the principle of nationalities. When he does that, and if he can put himself in the place of his unconquered and invincible enemy—can he really suppose that Germany would even again of her free will surrender to the rule of reactionary Russia the peoples that have been liberated by Germany and her allies between the Baltic Sea and the Volhynian swamps, be they Poles, Lithuanians, Balts, or Letts? No, gentlemen, not a second time shall Russia be allowed to mobilize her armies on the unprotected frontier of East and West Prussia. (Storm of applause.) Not again shall Russia with the help of French gold use the land of the Vistula as a gate of invasion, and fall upon unprotected Germany.
The Future of Belgium.—Just as little can anybody suppose that in the west we shall, without complete security for our future, give up (freigeben) the occupied territories in which the blood of our people has flowed. We shall create for ourselves real guarantees that Belgium shall not be made into an Anglo-French vassal state and into military and economic bulwark against Germany. (Cheers.) Here also there is no status quo ante. Here also fate does not retrace its steps. Here also Germany cannot again give over to Latinization the long-oppressed Flemish race. (Loud cheers, Dr. Liebknccht, “hypocrisy !”) Germany will secure for the Flemish race a healthy development in accordance with its rich qualities and upon the basis of its lowland (niederlandisch) language and pecularities. We desire to have neighbors who will not again unite against us to throttle us, but who will work with us, as we with them, for our mutual profit. (Dr. Liebknecht: “And then you will fall upon them. Invasion of Belgium !” A member of the center party shouted to Dr. Liebknecht, “Get away to Russia!”) Were we before the war Belgium's enemies? Did not peaceful German work and peaceful German industry co-operate at Antwerp, for all far and wide to sec, in the welfare of the country? are we not even now during the war starving to restore the life of the country as far as the war allows? The memory of the war will continue for long in the country that has had so grievous a visitation hut—in our mutual interests—we cannot allow fresh wars to arise from that.
One other question I should like to touch upon. Since the beginning of the war the Russian Government has done all it can to rob and to drive away Germans of both German and Russian nationality. It is our right and our duty to demand of the Russian Government that it shall make good the wrong thus done to all human rights, and that it shall open the door out of Russian bondage for our persecuted and tortured countrymen. (Cheers.)
Gentlemen, the Europe which will arise out of this most tremendous of all crises will in many respects be unlike the old Europe. The blood that has been shed and the property that has been wasted can be restored hut slowly. In any case, Europe must be for all the peoples that inhabit it a Europe of peaceful labor. The peace which ends this war must be a lasting peace. It must not contain in it the seeds of new wars, but the seeds of a final peaceful regulation of European affairs. (Dr. Liebknecht: "Begin by making the German people free!” Great disturbance in the House.)
During our long association in war we have grown closer and closer to our allies. The comradeship in war must and will he followed in peace by association in labor—in the service of the economic and cultural welfare of ever more firmly united peoples.
The Trade War.—Here also we walk other ways than our enemies. Even after the conclusion of peace England desires not to let the war cease, but rather to continue against us with redoubled strength the trade war.
First militarily, and then economically are we to he destroyed. Everywhere there is brutal rage to destroy and to annihilate, and the calculated desire in unbridled lust of domination to cripple a people of 70 millions. These menaces also will come to nothing, lint let the enemy statesmen who use such words remember this: the more violent their words, the sharper our blows.
And what when we look away beyond Europe? Cut off from all connections with the home country, our troops and our fellow countrymen have stubbornly defended our colonies, and in East Africa they are still heroically disputing every foot of soil. But the final fate of our colonies will not be decided there, but, as Bismarck said, here on the continent, and our victories on the continent will once more secure to us colonial possessions, and open the way in the wide world for new and fruitful activity of the indestructible German spirit of enterprise.—London Times, 10/4.
Asquith’s Reply.—On April 9 Premier Asquith, in a speech given at a dinner to French senators and deputies, replied to Bethmann-Hollweg’s address.
The following are the chief points in Mr. Asquith's statement defining the policy of the Allies:
The German Chancellor has suggested that if there are to be peace discussions England must assume the attitude of a defeated to a victorious enemy. But we are not defeated; and we are not going to be defeated.
Our peace terms are the accomplishment of the purposes for which we took up arms. England and France were both driven to that course in order to prevent Germany (i. c., Prussia) from establishing a position of military menace and dominance over her neighbors.
The Allies’ purpose is to defeat Germany’s attempt to secure ascendancy by tearing up the treaty basis of European policy, and so to pave the way for an international system which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilized states.
We intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples, unhampered by overmastering Prussian military dictation.
We are the champions not only of treaty rights, but of the independent status and free development, of the weaker countries.
The German Chancellor talks of giving the various races “the chance of free evolution along the lines of their mother tongue and of national individuality.” The attempt to Germanize Prussian Poland for 20 years, with the flogging of Polish children who refused to say their prayers in German, forms a black chapter even in the annals of Prussian culture.
The Chancellor says there must be a new Belgium, between which and her pillagers in this war there is to be the "collaboration of neighbors.” The Allies are determined to restore the old Belgium.—London Times, 11/4.
Dutch Mobilization.—The extensive mobilization of the Dutch Army, early in April, has been variously attributed to fear of a British invasion on the one hand, or on the other, to fear of a German plan to forestall such invasion by methods similar to those employed in Belgium. In the Reichstag, on April 5, a member referred to the matter as follows:
Neutrals are in no comfortable position. The pressure on Holland has reached a point at which it is no longer a matter affecting Holland alone. She sees herself obliged to protect her coasts, not against the Central Powers, but against the Entente. Holland had been warned by tile example of Greece’s tragic fate. We must make it plain here that we feel ourselves not only to be of the same race as Holland, hut feel most keenly that Holland is also suffering for our sake, Their attitude against Holland aims at cutting off the breath of Germany. I have deep respect for the great strength of the Dutch people which, loyal to its history, has stood up for independence and freedom.—London Times, 8/4.
Decision in “Appam” Case.—On May 16 Secretary Lansing made public the text of the note of March 2 stating the decision of the U. S. Government regarding the British steamship Appam, captured by the Moewe and sent to Hampton Roads as a prize. The German Government had requested that the Appam be permitted to remain in American waters until further notice, under Art. XIX of the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799, which reads as follows:
“The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties shall carry (conduire) freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and effects taken (pris) from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of Admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes (prises) be arrested, searched, or put under legal process when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried (conduces) out again at any time by their captors (le vaisscau preneur) to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel (le dit vaisseau) shall be obliged to show. But conformably to the treaties existing between the United States and Great Britain, no vessel (vaisscau) that shall have made a prize (prise) upon British subjects shall have a right to shelter in the ports of the United States, but if (il est) forced therein by tempests, or any other danger or accident of the sea, they (il sera) shall be obliged to depart as soon as possible.”
In interpreting this Article, Secretary Lansing's note states that it is applicable only to prizes brought into port by vessels of war. The Appam was not so accompanied. Hence the Appam is entitled only to the ordinary privileges of temporary refuge granted to prizes by maritime nations, and not to the privilege of “indefinite asylum.” The question of the jurisdiction of the United States court in the libel proceedings brought by the British owners, is left to the decision of the court.
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
Britain Defends Blockade.—In a 13,000-word note, summarized in the press of April 25, Great Britain, with the concurrence of the French Government, again justifies the effectiveness of her blockade of Germany and reiterates the military necessity of regulating commerce to neutrals contiguous to Germany. The note makes the following points:
- It justifies sending ships to port for search by pointing to the danger of submarine attack, the ingenious devices for the concealment of contraband, and the German practice of misusing United States passports to procure safe conduct for military agents.
- Regarding prise court procedure, it declares that the prize court has power to decide that an act under orders in council is illegal if it violates international law, and cites the Zamora case which secures the right to invoke international law before the prize court.
- Regarding ultimate destination, it quotes U. S. figures showing that exports to Holland and Scandinavian countries increased from $97,000,000 in 1913 to $235,000,000 in 1915; it cites evidence of false consignments to dock laborers, bakers, etc.; and it calls attention to the U. S. Supreme Court’s doctrine of “continuous voyage.”
- Regarding the effectiveness of the blockade, it asserts that passage of goods across a land frontier or inland sea has never been held to invalidate a blockade. “It is doubtful whether there has ever been a blockade where -the ships that slipped through bore so small a proportion to those which were intercepted.”
Trading With the Enemy Act.—On April 13 the State Department made public its correspondence with the British Foreign Office regarding the British Enemy Trading Act of December 23. The object of this act, as interpreted by Secretary Lansing in a note dated January 19, was apparently “to prevent any persons doing business in the United Kingdom from trading with enemies of Great Britain or with persons having enemy association in any other part of the world.” This, in the view of the Secretary, might interfere with the right of traders domiciled in the United States to do business with belligerents.
The British reply, dated February 16, admits “the right of persons of any nationality, resident in the United States to engage in legitimate commercial transactions with any other persons,” but insists on the “right of other governments to restrict the commercial activities of their nationals —by the imposition of prohibitions and penalties which are operative solely upon persons under their jurisdiction.”—N. Y. Times, 14/4.
The Allies and the Mails.—The Allied Governments announce that whereas both the “Letter Post” and the “Parcel Post” have been abused by the enemy for the transmission of contraband packages, and whereas Convention Xl of The Hague Conference in 1907 relating to the immunity of the mails cannot he held to apply to other than bona fide postal correspondence :
- As regards the right of search, and eventually of arrest and seizure, goods dispatched as postal packages cannot and will hot be treated otherwise than goods dispatched in any other form;
- The immunity of postal correspondence, as stipulated by the 11th Hague Convention of 1907, in no wise affects the right of the Allied Governments to examine, and if necessary to arrest and to seize, goods concealed in wrappers, envelopes, or letters contained in the mail-bags;
- The Allied Governments, faithful to their engagements and duly respectful of genuine “correspondence,” will continue, for the moment, to abstain from seizing on the high seas and confiscating such communications, letters, or dispatches, and will ensure their transmission with all possible expedition, as soon as their genuine character has been established. —Loudon Times, 3/4.
“China” Prisoners Released.—O11 May 5 .the British Foreign Office announced its decision to release immediately the 38 Germans and Austrians seized from the American steamer China on February 19. The prisoners were taken off by the British auxiliary cruiser Laurentic on the high seas. According to the British statement they were on their way from Shanghai to Manila to make that place a base for the perpetration of unneutral acts against the Allies. A protest was made by the United States on February 23.
New Contraband List.—On April 19 the British Government issued a new contraband list. The prefatory announcement states that “for practical purposes the distinction between the two classes of contraband [conditional and absolute] has ceased to have any value” in view of the fact that the enemy country has taken control of practically all the articles in the list of conditional contraband.
Irish Revolt.—An insurrection in Ireland began on April 24 when the Sinn Feiners seized the post office, city hall, and whole districts in Dublin, and cut off telegraph communication with England. The authorities obtained troops front England and proclaimed martial law throughout Ireland. On April 29 the rebel leaders agreed to unconditional surrender and a proclamation was issued by “Provisional President” Pearce, calling on his followers to lay down their arms. Eleven of the leaders have been executed, and 38 who were condemned to death have had their sentences commuted. Mr. Birrell, chief secretary for Ireland, resigned on May 4.
“Zamora ’’ Case.—The copper cargo of the Swedish steamer Zamora, New York to Stockholm, was held for the prize court last June, and was later requisitioned by the British Government. The president of the prize court granted to the owners of the copper the right of appeal. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to whom the case was taken, granted the right of appeal and also reversed the decision of the prize court in holding the copper (April 8).
Little attention has been given to the decision of the Judiciary Committee of the British Privy Council to permit an appeal from the findings of a prize court, but one of the American counsel interested declares that it is a “milestone in prize court procedure in the present war.” The point is that it puts international law above English law. In the case in question—relating to the seizure of a cargo of copper—the judge, Sir Samuel Evans, had held, in effect, that an Order in Council was certain to he enforced by a prize court. But that really depends upon the order conforming to the law of nations. This is the position firmly taken in the American note to the British Government; and now we have that government itself assenting to it in principle. A way is provided to test an Order in Council by the higher standard of international law. It is a gratifying indication that the best English and American precedents are to he followed.—Nation, 13/4.
BALKAN STATES
The Fate of Macedonia.—Both Greece and Bulgaria are concerned over the prospect of making good their conflicting claims to territory in Macedonia. General Jekolt, Bulgarian commander-in-chief, makes the following statement in an interview published in the N. Y. World (April 7):
We have conquered Macedonia, but as long as the English and French remain at Salonika our position is dangerous. We want to attack them before they get stronger, and besides, we are not sure what Greek policy will he and what the Rumanians will do in the spring. But the Germans are not willing to make an offensive against Salonika. They are satisfied now that communications between Berlin and Constantinople are open, and moreover they consider it to their interests to have as large English and French forces as possible at Salonika inactive. If they are driven from the Balkans they may go to another front, and the Germans fear they may land on the Asiatic shore and cut communications between Constantinople and Bagdad and Egypt. As for us, we are anxious that the Entente forces should he driven away, so that we may be free to watch the Rumanians.—N. Y. World, 7/4.
On the other hand, cx-Premier Venizelos, in article in the Athens Kirix of April 2, after condemning the “chronic peaceful war through purposeless mobilization which has brought Greece to the verge of economic and moral bankruptcy,” proceeds to criticise King Constantine’s foreign policy.
M. Venizelos lays great stress on the Bulgarian peril for Greece, pointing out that the utmost to be gained from the present policy would he to leave Greece the same size, while Bulgaria, flushed with victory, trained by war, enlarged by the addition of Serbia and Macedonia, and allied with the Turks, would not wait long before falling upon its southern neighbor.
“Who thinks,” he declared, “that under those conditions Greece could unaided drive the Bulgars from Macedonia once they have seized it is a fool. The politicians who do not now see this inevitable danger are blind, and unfortunate are the kings following such politicians, and more unfortunate still the lands whose sovereigns fall their victims.”
With reference to the royal thesis that Germany guarantees that the Bulgars will evacuate Greek Macedonia, M. Venizelos impales the government on the horns of the dilemma that if Germany’s assurances are formal and binding Greek mobilization was never necessary, while if the assurances are not trustworthy mere passive, armed watching Bulgaria increase in size and resources would he wholly insufficient to save Greece from the Bulgar peril.—N. Y. Times, 3/4.
Rumania’s New Treaties.—According to press despatches of April 14, a commercial agreement was signed on April 7 between Rumania and the Central Powers. The agreement is said to provide for the sale to Germany of Rumanian surplus cereals, without the exchange of German or Austrian products, and to permit the transit of traffic to and from Constantinople
FAR EAST
Chinese Republic Restored
Washington, March 24.
The Chinese Legation to-day received from the Peking Government the official text of the mandate issued on March 21 by Yuan Shih-kai, who for a brief period was designated as Emperor of China, and by which the restoration of the republic was ordered with Yuan Shih-kai as the president.
“I have myself to blame for my lack of virtue,” says President Yuan, and he then asserts that "I hope to imitate the example of the sincerity of ancients by shouldering all the blame so that my action will fall in line with the spirit of humanity which is the expression of the will of heaven.” The mandate concludes with the statement by President Yuan Shih-kai that he cannot remain idle while the country is racing to perdition, and appeals to all generals and others to rally around the republic.
Military governors of various provinces were responsible for Yuan Shih-kai’s sudden decision. General Lung Chi-kuang, military governor of Canton, who has been unable to leave his bomb-proof home since January because of the strained conditions there, advised Yuan Shih-kai that he was doing all in his power to keep Kwang-Tung Province in submission, but did not feel that he would he able to hold the rebels in check much longer, unless relief were afforded by the cancellation of the monarchy.
Five of the other Military Governors of China communicated with neighboring provinces in an effort to frame an unanimous appeal to Yuan Shih-kai for the abandonment of the monarchy. However, the Emperor- elect heard of this move, and his sudden renunciation of the throne came about before any joint appeal from the military governors reached him.— N. Y. Times, 1/5.
Russo-Japanese Entente
Petrograd, April 28, (via London, April 30).
Regarding the lately circulated rumors about an approaching agreement or understanding between Russia and Japan looking toward the future control of China to the exclusion of other nations and a defiance of the “open door,” {lie Foreign Ministry informs me that Japan and Russia, as allies, are constantly exchanging their views on questions of mutual importance, hut that no formal agreement harmful to foreign interests is under consideration.—N. Y. Times, 30/4.
The Chinese Revolution:—The Chinese embroglio will cause us no disquiet unless it threatens to have an affect on the war by sowing dissention between Russia and Japan. The diplomatic evolution of the last 10 years has led these adversaries of 1904-05, not toward a second conflict, but toward mutual co-operation more and more definitely recognized and likely to become a dominant factor in the Far East.—Journal des Débats, 9/4.
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
Washington, May 4.
President Wilson to-day approved the tentative agreement reached between Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, and General Alvaro Obregon, the Carranza Minister of War, in their Juarez-El Paso conferences relative to plans for co-operation between the American and Mexican forces in the case of Francisco Villa and his bandits.
President Wilson issued a formal statement at 10 o’clock to-night as follows:
I have examined, with the Secretary of War, the report made by General Hugh L. Scott of the conference between him and General Obregon, Secretary of War of the Republic of Mexico.
The report includes a tentative agreement regarding the future operations of both the American and Mexican military forces, and evidences cordial cooperation between the two governments in their common purpose.
As this agreement is being submitted to the dc facto government of Mexico, it would not be proper for me to permit its publication until that government has had an opportunity to examine and consider its provisions. The full text of the proposed agreement will be given out immediately upon its acceptance by both governments. In general, I may say that it provides a basis of co-operation which promises to prevent misunderstanding and strengthens the cordial relations of the two republics. —N. Y. Times, 5/5.
General Scott’s Report.—The net result of General Scott’s conferences with General Alvaro Obregon, the Carranza Minister of War, is as follows:
First—General Scott is convinced that the Carranza de facto Government understands that the purpose of the United States in sending troops into Mexico is not aggression or armed intervention.
Second—General Obregon has agreed to send 10,000 picked troops into the Big Bend and Parral regions of Mexico to stamp out bandits.
Third General Obregon has given orders to General Trevino to endeavor to head off the bandits who raided Glenn Springs and Boquillas.
Fourth—The United States troops will remain in Mexico until the Carranza Government demonstrates that it has power to control the situation in Northern Mexico and where the United States Government has no troops.
Fifth—General Obregon also gives assurances that the Carranza forces will not move from Sonora through Pulpito Pass to operate in the rear of General Pershing’s column and will not attack American troops.
Sixth—Every effort shall be made by Carranzistas to free Jesse Deemer, the American whom the Big Bend bandits kidnapped.—N. Y. Times, 17/5.
Acuteness was added to the situation in Mexico by the announcement that on May 5 a band of Mexicans had raided the American settlements of Glen Springs and Boquillas, looting and burning the places, and killing American soldiers and civilians. Gen. Funston has organized forces for the pursuit of the raiders, and Secretary Baker on Tuesday announced that President Wilson had called out the militia of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Two additional regiments of regular infantry have also been ordered to the border.—N. Y. Nation, 11/5.
Costa Rica Objects.—It was reported last week that Costa Rica had protested against the ratification of the Nicaragua treaty recently by the U. S. Senate and had begun suit before the Central American Court of Justice against Nicaragua. Costa Rica bases her claims to be consulted, before any treaty is entered into disposing of Nicaragua Canal rights, on the geographic fact that the San Juan River forms the boundary line between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. According to the old Nicaragua Canal route plans, this river for about 25 miles was to have been canalized. In ratifying this treaty recently the Senate adopted a resolution that provided that nothing in said convention is intended to affect any existing right of any of the states of Costa Rica, Salvador or Honduras, guaranteeing that so far as the U. S. Government was concerned, the former should lose no valid right through our negotiations with Nicaragua.
Costa Rica has another ground for protest, found in the text of a protocol still in force executed in 1900 and which agrees that when the President of the United States is authorized by law to acquire control of such portion of the territory belonging to Costa Rica on which to construct and protect a canal, these two governments would naturally enter into negotiations with each other to settle the plans and agreements in detail found necessary to accomplish the construction and provide for the ownership and control of the proposed waterway. Protests from Honduras and Salvador have also been recorded on the right of the Nicaragua Canal to concede to the United States a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca upon which Salvador and Honduras have frontage as well as Nicaragua.—Marine Journal, 15/4.
NAVAL NOTES
Naval developments in the following strategic areas will be considered separately and in turn:
PAGE
- Table of Naval Losses.............................. 1024
- North Sea .............................................. 1034
- Baltic Sea .............................................. 1043
- Adriatic Sea ........................................... 1043
- Mediterranean ........................................ 1044
- Black Sea .............................................. 1045
TABLE OF NAVAL LOSSES OF THE VARIOUS BELLIGERENTS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
The following table is compiled from various articles appearing in the press of the several belligerent nations. These reports are so contradictory that it is impossible to furnish an absolutely correct list of vessels lost to date. In many cases the belligerent powers have failed to acknowledge the losses of all the vessels. No attempt has been made to include herein a list of the various trawlers, mine-sweepers and such odd small craft which may have been destroyed while mine-sweeping or on submarine patrol duty.
(On the left margin of this table of losses is a page reference to the Naval Institute War Notes.)
LOSSES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES
BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
FRENCH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
RUSSIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
JAPANESE WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
ITALIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
LOSSES OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES
GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
AUSTRIAN WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
TURKISH WARSHIP LOSSES
[TABLE]
NORTH SEA
The Dogger Bank Engagement.—The Revisla Marittima devotes 58 pages of its January issue to a review of the battle cruiser action in the North Sea, including official reports and private records, about 30 pages of discussion, illustrations of all the ships engaged, and diagrams. The article concludes as follows: The Dogger Bank engagement, in our opinion, was an indubitable victory for the British, and would have been more complete in the Nelsonian sense (“Had 10 ships been taken and the 11th escaped, we being able to get at her, I should never consider it well done”), if the flagship had not been forced to leave the formation. Admiral Beatty, who with much wisdom and energy had initiated and brought the action to a favorable stage, would certainly not have broken it off so soon, and the consequences for the enemy would surely have been more serious, for the Derfflinger was at the time in a precarious condition. The victory, in other respects, was determined by larger caliber guns and superior speed.
The numerical superiority of the British could not be made to contribute its full weight to the outcome of the engagement on account of the inferior speed of the New Zealand and Indomitable.
In simple terms, the action was a long range engagement between the Lion, Tiger, and Princess Royal on one side, and the Seydlitz, Moltke, and Derfflinger on the other. The New Zealand and Indomitable fired only on the Blücher, and here the British preponderance was brought to bear; but it was superfluous, since the Blücher was already in bad shape from the fire of the Lion and Tiger.
Comment.—The accompanying sketch is based on the last report of Admiral Beatty and should be taken as tentative and approximate, intended more than anything else to show in connection the various phases of the action up to the moment when the Lion was forced to drop out of formation —practically the termination of the engagement.
The sketch assumes an average speed of 28 knots for the faster British cruisers, over a course of about 100 miles; the speed certainly was not greater. On the basis of this reasonable assumption, and the ranges given in Admiral Beatty’s report, the average speed of the German cruisers during the chase was between 25 and 26 knots—probably due to the fact that Admiral Hipper did not at the beginning of the action decide to abandon the Blücher and hence did not at once push the other three cruisers to their highest speed. (The writer here points out that the British ships both in this and in the Falkland engagement developed better speed than in their trials, he points out further that the German battle cruisers, except the Blücher, were credited in all the naval annuals with a speed superior or equal to that of the British.)
Speed of the Two Squadrons.—It may be seen at once, from the composition of the German squadron, that the Blücher's inferior speed, aside from weaker armor and armament, made her an element of weakness, and a sure victim for the enemy. It was necessary either to reduce the speed of the squadron to hers, and thus fail to utilize the most valuable element in the type of ship of which the squadron was composed, or abandon her to the enemy. The Von der Tann (28 knots) would have figured in the line to much better advantage; and the report seems not unlikely, therefore, that in the preceding German raid of December 11 the Von der Tann was damaged by an English shore battery.
In case of retreats, this disparity of speed in the German squadron was a more serious weakness than it would have been in pursuit. Yet in view of the British naval superiority it would seem that the likelihood of being attacked by superior force might have been foreseen. Obviously it is of greatest importance, in warfare against a strongly superior navy, to form squadrons with a view of the possibility of retreat, and to make them so far as possible homogeneous. Yet the Blücher seems to have been included in all the preceding raids on the English coast.
[IMAGE: DOGGER BANK, FEBRUARY 2, 1915]
Arrangement of Guns.—When Admiral Beatty perceived the enemy on his port how steaming in column on a southeast course he turned southeast on a course parallel—says his report—to that of the enemy. The fact of their taking parallel courses has a bearing in determining the number of guns that could he brought to bear by the British. After considering the disposition of guns on the ships of the two squadrons, the writer raises the query whether the best arrangement is not to have an equal strength on how and stern, as in the case of the Dorfflinger, the most recent German battle cruiser and in all Japanese cruisers of the Kongo type.
Range—Fire Control.—After referring to the German advantage in angle of elevation of guns and reproducing diagrams from the Naval Institute, the writer turns to questions of range. It appears that the Lion succeeded in getting in a salvo at 18,000 meters. This is remarkable, even considering that atmosphere conditions and visibility were excellent. At about 17,000 meters the Germans succeeded in concentrating on the Lion.
Both these circumstances indicate the great importance attached in present day naval combat to the “director system of firing," i. e., the system by which one person, in an elevated position points and fires the guns of a ship.
In modern battle, spray, smoke, splashes, etc., make individual gun pointing and control highly difficult. . . . . The English are pleased with the results furnished by the Persey Scott system, hut it may be assumed that a similar system was employed by the Germans, or their fire would not have been, as it was, well directed.
In the Falkland fight, the firing was begun at about 15,000 meters; and the German cruisers could not get hits at that distance, due probably to the fact that the maximum elevation of their guns was not over 150. In this engagement atmospheric conditions were excellent.
Without doubt, however, this range cannot he taken as normal for opening fire, on account of difficulties of pointing and spotting. In the Falkland engagement the pointing of the British was facilitated by the fact that they were not suffering from the fire of their adversaries, and all other conditions were favorable.
Firing begun at such a distance cannot be trusted to give results, for at a range say of eight or ten miles, it is possible, for the enemy to alter course so as to avoid hits—for example, if the shots are short, a slight increase of distance will serve to avoid the next salvo. Fire at such a range would waste ammunition and weaken effectiveness at closer range. Special conditions obtained, however, in both the Falkland and Dogger Bank engagements. If Beatty had not opened fire at long range he would not have inflicted damage to the Derfflinger and Seydlitz; and if the Germans had not been able to fire at long range they would not have been able to put the Lion out of action, and the Tiger would have suffered no injury.
Relative Positions and Wind.—The British fleet in the pursuit kept the enemy to port, in order to prevent their taking a more southerly course; and in order, if circumstances permitted, to cut off their retreat.
With respect to smoke, the leeward position of the British ships, in the light wind was evidently advantageous in firing their bow guns, and the windward position of the Germans in firing astern. AH things considered, the British position was probably wisely chosen from this point of view.
Position of Commander-in-Chief.—The British admiral took the head of his column; the German admiral (not counting the Blücher) took the rear.
It is a general conviction—expressed moreover in Admiral Beatty’s first report—that a more complete victory would have resulted if he had not been forced to drop out. Does this argue that the commander-in-chief should not occupy a position so exposed to concentration of the enemy?
In our opinion, the action does not enable us to draw conclusions. For various reasons, the positions occupied by both admirals seems to have been more or less fortuitous, brought about by the exigencies of flight and pursuit at utmost speed.
Scouts and Auxiliaries.—In an engagement at high speed the scouts and destroyers could scarcely attempt offensive action—certainly not those of the pursuer. They might he used to give the coup dc grace to a ship out of action, but in the case of the Blücher, the Indomitable was employed. This was perhaps because the speed of the Indomitable was not sufficient to make her useful in the chase, or perhaps because the destroyers were needed as a protection against submarines.
The German scouts—four against six British, and weaker in armament— kept the head of the formation. The English scouts, according to the testimony of the commander-in-chief, did excellent scouting and information service, which enabled him to bring on the engagement and to take a favorable position. In the pursuit the British scouts evidently took and kept a position astern and to the left of the German line, favorable for watching the enemy and attacking units separated from the squadron.
The German destroyers, when the action was well under way, twice attempted an attack on the enemy cruisers—the first time being driven off by British destroyers and the second time by fire of Lion and Tiger. The latter ships, “however, were, it appears, not forced out of their course.
Later the Meteor, approaching to attack the Blücher, was hit, and had to be aided by the destroyer Liberty.
Submarines.—At 10.54 German submarines were reported on the star- hoard how. The Lion turned rapidly to port to avoid the attack, thus changing the range. This may have worked to the disadvantage of both sides, but, in view of the damage already sustained by the German squadron, it was probably for them a welcome respite.
End of the Engagement.—The engagement ended at a distance of from 40 to 60 miles from Heligoland. The German reports give the distance as 70 miles WNW. of that island.
The first English reports state that the reason for giving up the chase was the danger of running into mine fields and submarines. The later report of Admiral Beatty is silent on this point. It may he assumed that the order to withdraw was given by Admiral Moore, who was then in temporary command. But the silence of the commander-in-chief suggests the possibility that he did not fully approve of the order.—Revista Martttima, January, 1916.
Raid on Lowestoft.—The activity which has been observed on the part of the German Navy since the beginning of the year, as shown by the sinking of the Arabis and other incidents, was carried a stage further on Tuesday morning (April 25). On that day battle cruisers and other ships made a raid on Lowestoft, similar to those which took place on November 3 and December 16, 1914, upon Yarmouth, Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepools. The damage caused was comparatively trifling, considering the strength of the German force, and the fact that only four persons were killed compares favorably with the last assault of the kind, when over 100 people were killed in Scarborough alone. No naval losses of ships occurred, and the casualties among officers and men were slight, being unofficially reported as 25 killed and wounded. The available German battle cruisers include, probably, the Hindenburg, launched on August 1, 1915, and the Lützow, Dorffiinger, Seydlitz, and Moltke. The three last- named were in the action off the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, when the Blücher was sunk. On Wednesday it was reported from Vlieland that the German squadron had been sighted from there on the previous day, going eastward, apparently returning from England. It was stated to consist of 20 ships. Great Yarmouth was attacked at the same time as Lowestoft, hut only one building was seriously damaged there.—The Army and Navy Gazette, 29/4.
Admiralty Statements.—The official statements issued by the Admiralty were as follows:
- About 4.30 on Tuesday morning the German battle cruiser squadron, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, appeared off Lowestoft. The local naval forces engaged it, and in about 20 minutes it returned to Germany, chased by our light cruisers and destroyers. On shore two men, one woman, and a child were killed; the material damage seems to have been insignificant. So far as is known at present two British light cruisers and a destroyer were hit, hut none were sunk.
- During the operations against the German battle cruiser squadron (which appeared off the East Coast on Tuesday morning), two Zeppelins were pursued by naval land machines over 60 miles out to sea. Bombs and darts were dropped, but apparently without serious effect. An aeroplane and a seaplane attacked the German ships off Lowestoft, dropping heavy bombs. Four enemy submarines were also attacked by bombs. One seaplane came under heavy tire from the hostile fleet, but the pilot, although seriously wounded, succeeded in bringing his machine safely back to land. It is regretted that one pilot is reported missing. He ascended during the course of the Zeppelin raid earlier in the morning, and appears from reports to have attacked a Zeppelin off Lowestoft at about 1.05 a. m. He has not been heard of since.
A German communique issued on Wednesday claimed that a British destroyer and two patrol boats were sunk in the raid, one of the latter being the trawler King Stephen, the crew of which were made prisoners. A bombardment of the “fortifications and important military buildings at Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft” was said to have been carried out “with good success.”—Army and Navy Gazette, 29/4.
Zeebrugge: Bombarded.—On Monday morning numerous monitors, destroyers, and large and small craft resumed offensive operations off Zeebrugge. The German official account said the ships “were apparently looking for mines and placing buoys to indicate places for bombardment. Three German torpedo-boats which were near the Flemish coast made repeated attacks on the monitors, destroyers, and other vessels, repulsing them and hindering their action. In spite of the heavy counter-action of the enemy, our torpedo-boats were uninjured, and the English vessels afterwards left the Flemish coast.” There has been no British official account of this engagement, but Dutch reports indicate that the damage to the Zeebrugge works was “enormous,” and that three German torpedo-boats and (according to one account) a submarine were hit.—Army and Navy Gazette, 29/4.
“Penelope” Damaged.—“A despatch from Rotterdam states that the crew of the Dutch steamship Berkelstrom, which was sunk on April 23, declared on their return from England that they were in the port of Harwich when the British cruiser Penelope was towed into the harbor. The cruiser was found, after the battle of Lowestoft, to have been so badly damaged that it was impossible to repair her, members of the crew asserted.”
The British cruiser Penelope is a vessel of 3600 tons, 410 feet long, built at Barrow in 1914. Her main armament consists of two 6-inch and six 4-inch guns, with four torpedo-tubes. She is of the Arethusa class, the Arethusa herself having been sunk last February after striking a mine off the English east coast. A German Admiralty report on April 27 said a British cruiser of the Arethusa class had on the day of the Lowestoft fight been struck with a torpedo from a German submarine, and the German official account of the Lowestoft affair declared a serious fire was observed to have broken out on one of the British cruisers that had engaged the raiding German fleet.—N. Y. Herald, 4/5.
Fighting Merchantmen. Action Between Greif and Alcantara.—The Greif was a boat of some nine or ten thousand tons, heavily armed with disguised 6-inch guns and, apparently, torpedo-tubes. The ship adopted the dressing, even to the colors painted on her hull, of a Norwegian merchantman. She left her home port towards the end of February. On the 29th of that month she was between Scotland and the Faroe Islands. Here she was challenged by the British armed merchantman Alcantara, a Royal Mail vessel of some 16,000 tons, completed at Belfast just before the outbreak of war. An extremely stiff light ensued at very close range, so close, in fact, that at one time it appeared likely that hand-to-hand fighting on the enemy’s decks would be possible. It is said that the German gunnery was bad and did little damage to our ship. On the other hand, the British guns, although inferior in power to the enemy’s, raked the Greif from stem to stern, set her on fire aft, and reduced her to a foundering condition. Just as complete victory appeared certain, a wild shot knocked out the Alcantara's steering gear. Rendered helpless, she became an easy mark for a torpedo discharged from the sinking enemy. A British light cruiser and some destroyers were by this time rushing to the scene of action. These soon finished off the raider and rescued what remained of the crews of the combatants. Both vessels were thus lost. The German prisoners numbered 120 out of a crew believed to have contained over 300. The British losses amounted to live officers and 69 men. For nearly a month, until, in fact, the 25th of March, our Admiralty suppressed the news of this engagement, for it was not thought desirable to inform the Germans of the loss of their “raider” before they found it out for themselves. The Alcantara was commanded by Captain T. E. Wardle, R. N. Her crew consisted very largely of naval reservists, naval volunteers, and specially entered mercantile hands.—The Engineer, 7/4.
[IMAGE: BRITISH ARMED MERCHANT CRUISER "ALCANTARA," 15,831 TONS, SUNK IN THE NORTH SEA IN AN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GERMAN CRUISER "GREIF"—THE "ALCANTARA"WAS BUILT IN 1914 FOR THE RIVER PLATE SERVICE OF THE ROYAL MAIL STEAM PACKET CO.—THE "GREIF," WHICH ALSO SANK DURING THE ENGAGEMENT, WAS A CRUISER OF 2028 TONS DISPLACEMENT, BUILT IN 1886 AND DISGUISED AS A NORWEGIAN TRAMP—SHE OPENED FIRE WITH THE NORWEGIAN COLORS PAINTED ON HER SIDE—OF HER COMPLEMENT OF MORE THAN 300, FIVE OFFICERS AND 115 MEN WERE SAVED AND TAKEN PRISONERS—THE "ALCANTARA" LOST FIVE OFFICERS AND 69 MEN.]
Trawler Sinks Submarine.—The destruction of a German submarine by a British trawler off the north coast of Scotland is described by Dutch newspapers. According to the accounts, the submarine had halted two Dutch steamships when a trawler appeared and killed with its first shot four men who were standing on the deck of the submarine. The trawler then sank the submersible with a second shot. The entire action lasted less than 10 minutes. The papers say the submarine was of the latest and largest type and carried a crew of 60, all of whom were lost.—Army and Navy Journal, 29/4.
French Trap Submarine.—According to a statement made by one of the German Admiralty Staff on April 21, the newspaper story that the French captured a German submarine which had sunk the steamship Sussex is absolutely untrue. “We know which submarine the French have. It was trapped some time after the Sussex episode and had nothing to do with the Sussex. We have no confirmation of the report that the commander and crew of the submarine were saved, but hope that this is the fact.”—Army and Navy Journal, 29/4.
“E-22" Lost.—The loss of another British submarine, the eleventh recorded officially, was announced on the afternoon of April 27. This boat was E-22, a new vessel only completed since the war began. News of the loss was first communicated by the German wireless and accepted by the Admiralty., It appears that the boat was sunk on April 25 by German naval forces "in the southern waters of the North Sea.” Two men were rescued and made prisoners. It is significant that nine of the eleven British boats officially reported as lost since the war began have been of the E type. One of the others was D-5, and the identity of tile vessel which grounded off the Dutch coast on January 20 last was not revealed.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/5.
“U-35” Lost.—The Germans have also lost a submarine during the last few days, and just as the sinking of li-22 was first reported in their wireless and accepted by our Admiralty, so the loss of this boat was announced by the British authorities on April 28 and confirmed on the 30th by the Chief of the Naval Staff in Berlin. The German boat was lost off the cast coast on April 27. One officer and 17 men of the crew surrendered, and were made prisoners. The number of the boat is given unofficially as U-35, although other accounts refer to it as UC-5.—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/5.
Schleswig-Holstein Raided.'—An attack by British seaplanes was delivered yesterday morning upon the German airship sheds in Schleswig- Holstein, east of the Island of Sylt. The seaplanes were convoyed to their rendezvous close to the German coast by an escorting force of light cruisers and destroyers under Commodore Tyrwhitt. Three of the seaplanes which took part in the attack are missing.—Army and Navy Gazette.
British Lose "Medusa”; Germans Lose One Destroyer and Two Trawlers.—A supplementary statement was issued by the Admiralty on March 28, as follows:
All ships employed in the operations on the German coast have now returned to their ports, except H. M. S. Medusa, which ship, as was feared, sank, after all her crew had been taken off, in very had weather, by H. M. t. b. d. Lassoo without any casualty—a fine piece of seamanship. Our destroyers, while dealing with the enemy patrol vessels, were themselves attacked by enemy aircraft, but received no damage of any kind. The following prisoners were rescued from the enemy patrol trawlers, which were previously reported sunk by our ships—viz., four from trawler Otto Rudolf, 16 from trawler Braunschweig. On Saturday night (25th) a division of German destroyers was encountered by our light cruisers; one of these destroyers was rammed and sunk by 11. M. S. Cleopatra, none of her crew being saved.—Army and Navy Gazette, 1/4.
Sixty-five Machines in Allied Air Raid.—In the early hours of this morning a combined force of approximately 50 British, French, and Belgian aeroplanes and seaplanes, accompanied by 15 fighting machines, left and attacked the German seaplane station at Zeebrugge and (lie aerodrome at Houltade (? Houttave), near Zeebrugge. Considerable damage appears to have been done.
Machines' on an average carried 200 pounds of bombs. All machines returned safely. One Belgian officer is reported seriously wounded.
All the British machines referred to were naval.—London Times, 21/3.
Naval, Attack on Zeebrugge.—An Amsterdam despatch of April 25 reports that several British warships, accompanied by destroyers and other vessels, bombarded Zeebrugge and the German batteries at Heyst, Blankenberghe and Knocke on April 24. The bombardment was one of the heaviest since the beginning of the war, and also of the longest duration. The damage done at Zeebrugge is said to have been enormous. British aircraft, it is said, threw bombs on German batteries. In connection with the Zeebrugge operations the official British communication issued concerning the aerial raids by the British air corps, aided by Belgians, says, on April 23, in spite of most inclement weather, a bombing attack was carried out by our naval aeroplanes upon an enemy aerodrome at Mariakerke. The machines were heavily fired on, but succeeded in returning safely. As far as could be observed, good results were obtained. One British fighting machine attacked an enemy aeroplane and it was last seen close to the ground and out of control. The morning of April 24 a further attack was carried out against the same objective in co-operation with our Belgian allies. A large number of bombs were dropped. A heavy fire was encountered by all of the machines. There were no British casualties. The results obtained appear to have been very good. The same day a British aeroplane attacked an enemy seaplane about five miles off Zeebrugge. The enemy pilot was killed. The machine dropped, the enemy observer falling out while the machine was still at a height of 3000 feet. The hostile seaplane crashed into the sea and sank.—Army and Navy Journal, 29/4.
Prince Henry ok Prussia in Supreme Command.—The sea commanders have gone—Ingenohl and Pohl—and the supreme command has been given to Prince Henry of Prussia, who stands outside the ordinary naval cadre. A great student of naval policy, discussing this change, said: “Prince Henry of Prussia is no seaman; he has virtually no experience of the handling of great fleets. He has been given the chief command so that it may be under the direction of one who is not in any way associated with the policy of stagnation.” There are those, and they are not a few, who argue that Germany knows she is beaten; that site believes that one of the conditions of peace will he the surrender of the fleet, and she would rather the fleet went down with colors flying, having inflicted the maximum damage, than tamely submit at the close of the war.—United Sendee Gazette, 11/5.
New French Command.—An interesting new naval post in the channel and North Sea is reported to have been created hy the French Ministry of Marine. A naval commander-in-chief has been appointed for the northern zone of the army. This command, which will have the direction of the new defence flotillas, will ensure a closer co-operation between the naval and military forces operating in Flanders.—Army and Navy Gazelle, 1/4..
Blockade Duty Performed Largely dy Royal Naval Reserves.—The interview which Mr. Ilcnry Suydam, the London correspondent of the Brooklyn Daily liable, has had with Rear Admiral Sir Dudley dc Chair on the work of the allied blockade in the North Sea sheds light upon a little-known aspect of the navy’s duty. Sir Dudley dc Chair, who commanded the Tenth Cruiser (blockade) Squadron from August 4, 1914, to March 6, 1916, when he relinquished the command to become naval adviser to the new Minister of Blockade in matters of enemy trade, now gives the first authentic and reliable account of the machinery by which all oversea traffic between the outside world and Germany is intercepted. The two salient points brought out in his interview, it seems to us, are the increased difficulties of examining cargoes in modern vessels, and the arduous nature of the service demanded of officers and men in the patrol cruisers. Apart from ruses to elude the vigilance of examining officers, of which Sir Dudley mentions no less than eight classes, it takes from two to five days to sift the cargo to the bottom. In rough weather, it is impossible to do this at all at sea, as to open the hatches would mean wetting the cargo and shipping heavy seas. It would also be risky to begin to discharge an entire ship’s cargo upon her own decks with bad weather likely to come on at any moment, but over and above this is the submarine menace, which makes it quite impossible. Even during the brief time required for the boarding officer to conduct his preliminary examination, Admiral de Chair points out, the neutral ship is almost invariably allowed to steam ahead at halfspeed, while the patrolling cruiser slowly convoys her. Hence the necessity, recognized by neutrals, of bringing the merchantmen into port, where the inspection can proceed safely and expeditiously.
In regard to the second point we have mentioned, Admiral de Chair says very truly that blockade work is unspectacular and uninspiring, but exceedingly dangerous. He pays a glowing tribute to the officers and men under his command, whose work was consistently faithful and effective under conditions which held always the possibility, for 24 hours a day, of destruction by German mines and torpedoes. With an adequate sprinkling of Royal Navy men in command, the hulk of the blockade officers are drawn from the Royal Naval Reserve. This is a double advantage, because not only does it leave the majority of officers in the regular service free to supply the needs of the fighting fleet proper, hut the Mercantile Marine officers are peculiarly fitted for blockade work, being accustomed to manifests and ships’ papers and knowing how to make a quick, comprehensive, and judicial inspection of cargoes. Indeed, Sir Dudley de Chair declares that the basis of our blockade rests upon the ability and courage of the officers and men drawn from the Mercantile Marine. They have proved their worth under conditions of the most trying kind. The patrol ships are at sea for 50 days at a stretch before going into port for coal and provisions. They endure hazards from the weather as well as the enemy, and in mid-winter service in the North Atlantic is very severe. Like their comrades in the Grand Fleet, they are denied the inspiration of action with the enemy, and may patrol their beat for days and days on end without anything happening. The nation, indeed, owes a deep debt of gratitude to its merchant seamen.—The Army and Navy Gazette, 6/5.
Attempt to Aid Irish Revolt.—The attempt of Germans, aided by some revolutionary Irishmen, to land an expedition in Ireland to aid in stirring up a revolution there, resulted in failure. The official announcement for military reasons rocs very little into details, and briefly says: “During the period between the afternoon of April 20 and the afternoon of April 21 an attempt to land arms and ammunition in Ireland was made by a vessel under the guise of a neutral merchant ship, but which in reality was a German auxiliary, in conjunction with a German submarine. The auxiliary sank and a number of prisoners were made, among whom was Sir Roger Casement.”—Army and Navy Journal, 29/4.
Naval Co-oferation in Quelling Irish Revolt.—The navy was able to co-operate to good purpose with the army in suppressing the revolt in Dublin by the despatch of a gunboat to shell Liberty Hall from the River Liffey. This vessel had more success in its way than that which attempted to carry food supplies by river to Kut-el-Amara, but which unfortunately grounded when but a few miles from its destination.—Army and Navy Gazette.
BALTIC SEA
British Submarine’s Prize.—A telegram from Frederikshaven states that the Norwegian steamer Kong Inge, from Christiania, arrived there this morning with an English prize crew consisting of six men on board.
On Saturday she was hailed off Falkenberg by an English submarine, which examined the ship’s papers, put a prize crew on board, and gave the steamer orders to proceed to Leith. As the supply of coal was found to be insufficient, however, the vessel put in at Frederikshaven in order to obtain a fresh supply of coal.—Reuter, London Times, 21/3.
New German Minefield.—It appears that a new German minefield is being placed along the Falsterbo reef. According to a message received from Malmo on February 19, the Falsterbo route will, after this new minefield has been sown off that place, be practically shut off from the sea, and sailing craft outside the minefield will, if there is an easterly wind, be unable to take shelter either at Falsterbo or Skanor. A Swedish paper states, however, that the new field “has no military value, because if a submarine slips through the sound the vessel’s subsequent course is not laid along the coast, and especially not towards Falsterbo.” But it has been stated that these mines will menace coastal navigation, as with a heavy sea some of them will drift into Swedish territorial waters.—Army and Navy Gazette, 26/2.
Submarine Obstructions.—The Norwegian Shipping Gazette states that the German Navy has stopped the international passage south of the Sound, not merely by the usual mine obstructions, but also by steel nets designed to entrap British submarines on their way to the Baltic. Danish torpedo- boats have been carefully watching to see that the obstructions were not placed in Danish territorial waters.—Army and Navy Gazette, 22/4.
ADRIATIC SEA
Measures Against German Submarine Bases.—The activity of the submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean has necessitated a further move on the part of the Allies. It has been considered desirable to occupy certain bases in the archipelago for the purpose of dealing with the under-water "menace in that region. An Italian paper stated not long since that a vast organization had been discovered at Corfu for supplying information and necessaries to the submarines. The best way of dealing with these pests is to stop their holes. Some of the islands, therefore, have been blockaded, a general search is being made, and Cephalonia has been occupied. The harbor of Argostoli will provide a central point at the entrance to the Adriatic, and Mitylene will no doubt provide another for a similar purpose in the Ægean. Only by taking steps of this nature will it be possible to ensure a safe continuance of the traffic made necessary by our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The shelling of Smyrna, on the coast of Asia Minor, is probably connected with the same energetic measures which are now being taken to suppress the submarines in this part of the world.—Army and Navy Gazette, 15/4.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Battleship “Russell” Sunk.—It was officially announced on the afternoon of April 27 that the battleship Russell had struck a mine on the previous day in the Mediterranean and sunk. The admiral, captain, commander, and 23 officers, with 676 men, were saved, and there were about 124 officers and men missing. On Sunday, what was described as “a private German report” was cabled from Copenhagen to the effect that the general opinion was that the Russell was not blown up by a mine, but was torpedoed by a German or Austrian submarine, since there were no mine dangers at all in the Mediterranean, minclaying being very difficult on account of the depth of the water. The Russell is the tenth British battleship lost in the war, and all of them, with the exception of the Bulwark have been destroyed by torpedoes or mines. The Russell, launched at Jarrow in 1901 and completed in 1903, belonged to the Duncan class, and was of 14,000 tons and 19 knots speed, with an armament of four 12-inch and 12 6-inch guns.
Sinking of the "Carthage."— The French liner Carthage belonging to the Cie Générale Translantique, built 1910, gross tons 4981, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine on July 4, off Cape Helles. The following interesting account was sent us by an eye witness shortly after the event, but the details were not published while operations were still being conducted there. Our correspondent says: “The sinking of the Carthage could be plainly seen by the Turks at Kum Kale. I was standing at the door of my tent looking through my glasses at nothing in particular when suddenly I saw a tremendous column of smoke and water go up from the port quarter of the Cartilage, which immediately began to settle by the stern. Very shortly her stern was right under water and her bow began to rise until she was straight up with about a third of her length showing. As the water poured down her funnels there seemed to be a second explosion, but it was not the terrific bursting of boilers that one reads of in accounts of steamers sinking. Then she slid straight down into the sea. From first to last only four minutes elapsed, which makes the small loss of life—six men only—remarkable. Seventy-six men owed their lives to the rafts which were luckily lying alongside. When one considers the small loss of life and the fact that she had just finished unloading her cargo (shells, as it happened), the gain to the enemy was a very barren one.” —Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, March, 1916.
[IMAGE: THE ILLUSTRATION SHOWS THE FRENCH LINER "CARTHAGE" SINKING, AFTER BEING TORPEDOED ON JULY 4 LAST. THE VESSEL WILL BE SEEON ON THE LEFT OF THE PHOTOGRAPH GOING DOWN IN AN AMOST PERPENDICULAR POSITION]
Allied Command.—The First Lord of the Admiralty, replying to a question on February 23, said that it would be inadvisable to state in detail the organization of the allied naval commands in the Mediterranean; but the general command is in the hands of the French commander-in-chief —at present Admiral d’Artige du Fournet; the command of the Adriatic and its approaches is in the hands of the Italian commander-in-chief—his Royal Highness the Duke of the Abruzzi; and other local commands are assigned to British officers. The best general indication of the work performed by the allied fleets in the Mediterranean, added Mr. Balfour, is the successful transport of large military forces to Salonika, Valona, and Egypt; the successful evacuation of the allied expedition from the Dardanelles; and last, .but not least, the transportation of the Serbian Army from Albania—a result chiefly due to the ability and energy displayed by the Italian fleet.—Army and Navy Gazette, 4/3.
Hospital Ships at Dardanelles.—Forty-nine hospital ships were employed in handling the casualties during the attack of the Allies upon the Dardanelles, according to reports received at the Navy Department. Some of the largest passenger liners were converted into hospital ships and the work that they did exceeded that of former wars. The hospital ship Rewa in two months handled 7424 patients; of these 507 submitted to major operations. An instance was given where the hospital ship Soudan took on board between 10 a. m. and 8 p. m. 430 patients.—Shipping Illustrated, 15/4.
“Taras” Rescued.—On Monday the Secretary of the Admiralty made the welcome announcement that 91 prisoners from H. M. armed boarding steamer Tara, who were captured on November 5, 1915, had been recaptured. The prisoners, who included Captain Rupert Gwntkin-Williams, R. N., commander of the Tara, fell into the hands of the Senussi on the Cyrenaican coast after their vessel had been torpedoed, were released by the armored car force, under the direction of the Duke of Westminster, which routed the Arabs near Solium on March 14, on which day Solium itself was rcoccupied by General Peyton’s force.—Army and Navy Gazette, 25/3.
BLACK SEA
Russian Hospital Ship ‘‘Portugal” Torpedoed,—The following are extracts from the official report:
At 8 in the morning of March 30 the steamer Portugal, a Franco-Russian hospital ship, was lying near Of, in Eastern Anatolia (east of Trebizond), having been sent there for wounded, when it was attacked by a German submarine and blew up.
Two torpedoes were fired, the second striking the engine room, and the vessel sank in less than a minute. There were on board 273 persons, of whom 158 were saved.
The Turkish Government had recognized the Portugal as a hospital ship, and she was painted with the prescribed colors. The attack was made in broad daylight. The submarine steered round the vessel and fired at her point-blank.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/4.
Torpedo-Boat Sunk.—On the Black Sea on March 9, says a Petrograd communique, two Russian torpedo-boats reconnoitering the coast near Varna were attacked by enemy submarines. The torpedo boat, Lieutenant Pustchin, was blown up. Part of the crew were rescued by the other torpedo-boat.—Army and Navy Gazette, 18/4.
Russian Transport Sunk.—On April 3, Constantinople reported officially that “On March 30 our submarines sank, to the northeast of Battim, a Russian transport ship of about 1200 tons, full of soldiers and war materials. —Army and Navy Gazette, 8/4.
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES
Sea Power: Past and Present.—In the Napoleonic wars, as to-day, the vital laws of sea power dominated war on land and involved the interests of neutral nations. La Hogue and Trafalgar, putting a terminus to French naval ambitions, mark the points where France, by her unwise abandonment of the sea, gave over her long and shifting rivalry with England. After Trafalgar, England was sure of victory, for she was assured of material independence and commercial supremacy, upon which she could secure unlimited credit and confidence. And in the after-math of victory she protected France from the effects of defeat; she barred the way to Prussian ambitions.
History repeats itself. To dominate the world, one must possess the sea. By coalitions, Europe maintains its equilibrium; by blockades, it brings to bear on the land victor the might of sea power. In the drama of war, the most decisive, though not the most striking acts, are played upon the sea.—Journal des Débats, 5/4.
Cameroons Conquered.—It was announced from the Colonial Office on Saturday last that a telegram on February 18 reported the capitulation of the German garrison at Mora, which completed the conquest of the Cameroons. In this campaign the British and French navies have assisted, and the ships mentioned as having been engaged include the cruisers Cumberland, Challenger, and Bruix, with the gunboat Dwarf. An unsuccessful attempt was made to sink the last named off the Cameroon River on September 13, 1914, by the German steamer Nachtigall, which rammed the vessel with an infernal machine in her bows. Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller, R. N., appears to have been the senior naval officer at the Cameroons during at least a large part of the campaign, but no official information on this point is yet available.—Army and Navy Gazette, 26/2.
A Conjecture on Future Naval. Operations.—If the German Admiralty has anything “up its sleeve” it probably will have to do with its mining and submarine offensive. The very serious nature of the secret mine planting from submarines which Germany is now practicing, seems not to have been generally appreciated, and this form of attack, impossible of immediate detection as it is, might be used to deadly effect in the strategy and tactics of the great North Sea fight—should it ever take place. We are still of the opinion moreover that before the German fleet comes out to battle, its Admiralty will call home and assemble in the North Sea the whole of the German submarine fleet; and probably on the great day of trial the Germans will plant floating mines where the water is too deep for anchorage, and fields of anchored mines in shoal water such as obtains on the Dogger Bank, and that she will assign groups of submarines to assemble at certain definite stations in the North Sea. The main fleet, if it fails to attract the British to the mined waters off the German coast, will probably steam boldly to the English coast, draw the British fleet out, and then itself make a running fight of it to the eastward, endeavoring to draw the British fleet over the mine fields or into one or other of the waiting submarine flotillas.—Scientific .American, 25/3.
[IMAGE: THE ABOVE DIAGRAMS SHOW SHIPS ATTACKED OR STRUCK BY MINES AND SUBMARINES IN THE MONTHS OF FEBURARY AND MARCH AND THE FIRST THREE DAYS OF APRIL, 1916—Land and Water.]
Ships Lost by Allies and Neutrals.—The most reliable statement of the total losses in merchant vessels, both steam and sail, is that recently made by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge. His report gives the total losses from the beginning of the war to March 23. The Allies have lost a total of 538 ships of an aggregate tonnage of 1,668,000. Great Britain heads the list with 410 ships, of 1,339,000 tons, France being second with S3 ships, of 158,000 tons, followed by Italy with 27 ships, of 73,000 tons, Russia with 35 ships of a total of 49,000 tons, Belgium with 10 ships, of 30,000 tons, and Japan with three ships of 19,000 tons. Very surprising in their magnitude are the losses of neutrals, which total 218 ships, with a total tonnage of 393,151 tons. The British loss in steam shipping is less than 4 per cent of the total number of vessels, and n little over 6 per cent of her total tonnage. The French have lost 7 per cent, the Russians 5 per cent, and the Italians 4.5 per cent.—Scientific American.
The War and the World’s Tonnage.—According to statistics available at the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 2193 vessels have been swept from the seas by the war, with an aggregate tonnage of 3,774,219. Of this number, Great Britain has lost 485 with a total tonnage of 1,500,415, and France, Italy and Russia have together lost 167 ships with a tonnage of 282,178. The number of German ships lost is 601, Austrian, 80, Turkish, 124, and neutral ships, 736. Eighty British ships are detained in German ports and nine in Turkish. Seventy-nine German vessels are detained in United Kingdom ports, 90 in overseas ports of Great Britain, 23 have been seized in British ports, 55 captured and sunk by the British. Eighty-one are detained in Belgian ports and 95 in French and Russian. Allied submarines have sunk 20 German ships, and 31 have been captured at sea.—Marine Journal, 8/4.
British Merchant Shipping Requisitioned.—Earl Curzon, Lord of the Privy Seal of Great Britain, recently stated that the British Government was now administering the whole British mercantile marine amounting to half the gross tonnage of the world. Forty-three per cent of British tonnage, he added, had been requisitioned for naval and military purposes, 14 per cent was occupied in carrying foodstuffs and raw material in behalf of the government and it allies, and the remaining 43 per cent was being operated by British shipowners under state regulations. From the same authority also comes the announcement that 450 vessels of the Central Powers have been detained, seized or captured by the allies in all parts of the world since the beginning of the war and that it was an encouraging fact and a curious coincidence that the British merchant ships lost through war operations were exactly balanced in number and tonnage by the new ships added to the register during the war.—Marine Journal, 13/5.
The Empire's Fleet.—The Rev. C. W. Gordon, D. D., LL. D., chaplain with the Canadian forces at the front, and formerly a missionary among the lumbermen and miners in the Rocky Mountains, has grasped what such a licet has meant to Canada during the century and a half in which her people have hewed their homes from the forest, built their highways, and planted cities, none daring to make them afraid. But he also goes on to speak of a feature which came to him recently as something quite startling, that the total personnel of the navy—146,000 before the war, and now, at its greatest 350,000—is so insignificant compared to the numbers required for land operations. “And yet,” be said, “this comparatively insignificant body of men has swept the enemy’s commerce from the seas, has driven his battleships and battle cruisers into hiding, and rendered his fleet (the second in the world) powerless; has scaled up his ports against all overseas traffic, has protected our trade routes, has supplied our allies with munitions and provisions, and has convoyed our troops from the other side of the world to the scene of war without the loss of gun or man. All this by a force of 350,000 men. What other like number of men at any time in the world's history has acheived results of such magnitude?” Dr. Gordon might have carried his argument further and shown that the keystone of our naval power, the Grand fleet, employs in its fighting vessels probably not more than 100,000 officers and men.—Army and Navy Gazette, 29/4.
The "Arethusa.”—In the current issue of the London Magazine, a seaman of the Arethusa named Sidney Rimington, who was in that light cruiser from August 21, 1914, until she was destroyed by a mine on February 11, 1916, describes his experiences at the affair in the Heligoland Bight, the raid on Cuxhaven, and the action off the Dogger Bank, while lie also tells us that the Arethusa was present when the German auxiliary cruiser Meteor—which he calls Mentier—was caught after sinking the patrol vessel Ramsey—here referred to as a destroyer—and blew herself up to avoid capture. The narrative shows what a narrow escape from destruction the Arethusa had in the Heligoland Bight. When all her guns but one had been put out of action, the cruiser fired two torpedoes at the Mainz, and it was lucky she did so, says Rimington, for immediately afterwards a shell from the German ship struck the tube they had just left, and would, had it been 30 seconds earlier, have exploded the torpedoes. In describing the work of patrolling the North Sea, the writer refers to two unpublished incidents, one in January, 1915, when he says that three enemy cruisers and at least a dozen destroyers were sighted leaving Heligoland, but returned when warned by submarine of the real strength of the British force; and the other when the Arethusa, off the German coast in stormy weather, was ordered to take in tow a disabled destroyer. One rope after another broke, and it took nine hours to get the thickest cable safely fastened to the destroyer. The work of dragging her stern first occupied another 36 hours.—Army and Navy Gazette, 29/4.
Prize Captured and Recaptured.—A British prize crew in charge of the Norwegian bark Pestalozzi was captured by a German submarine on April 22, while bound for Kirkwall, rite prize crew had been placed on board the bark by a British cruiser about 160 miles west of the Hebrides. The German submarine commander spotted the Pestalozzi later, and after an investigation took the British officer and four men on board the submarine and left four others of the prize crew on board the bark, which was bound from Malmo to Argentina with a cargo of cement.—Army and Navy Journal.
Visit and Search by British Warships.—The British Admiralty gives notice that to safeguard neutral, British or allied traders from German raiding cruisers it has been found necessary to institute a special boarding procedure as a measure of precaution. This procedure has been notified to all neutral and allied powers.
When it is desired to put into force the special boarding procedure, it will be as follows:
A red pendant of a specially large size will he hoisted by the man-of-war exercising the right of visit and search. The hoisting of this pendant will be accompanied by the firing of a rocket. This will signify that the merchant ship is to close the boat lowered by the man-of-war, whether the man-of-war remains in the vicinity of the boat or not.
The procedure to he followed by night will be the same as that by day, except that the two red Very’s Lights will be the signal for the merchant ship to close the boat, which where possible will he illuminated by searchlight. When weather precludes boarding, the man-of-war will lire two green Very's Lights, which will be the signal for the merchant ship to lie to until daylight.
This procedure will come into force immediately, but, pending the lapse of reasonable time for the new signals to become generally known, II. M. ships will communicate with merchant ships by visual signal in the International Code of Signals, if it is found that the meaning of the new signals is not understood.—Shipping Illustrated, 22/4.
Aircraft and the Grand Fleet.—The fact that the Zeppelins have reached Scotland raises the question whether the enemy is forming designs on our naval liases in the north. As we have seen in previous papers the probability of airships being able to injure war vessels under way is exceedingly slender. Commodore Tyrwhitt's most recent and most brilliant performances off the Island of Sylt, where he had live battle biplanes and a Zeppelin opposed to his cruisers and destroyers, confirmed the experiences of the Cuxhaven raid, and scents to be conclusive as to the capacity of well-handled ships to out-maneuver aircraft of all kinds without difficulty. The situation, however, would he very different if any considerable number of airships could he brought over a harbor in which a battle fleet was anchored. Here again the experiences of the Cuxhaven raid was instructive. The Von der Tann, which was conspicuous in the raid on Scarborough and Whitby, was absent from von Hipper’s squadron in the affair of Dogger Bank. That she was desperately injured in the air attack on Cuxhaven has been widely stated in the American press. It is not supposed that she was actually damaged by bombs dropped on that occasion, but it seems certain that the raid threw all the shipping into confusion, and that hectic efforts were made to get out of the harbor—as was recently the case at Zebrugge. It was in the consequent confusion that Von der Tann is supposed to have run foul of some other ship or stone work, and so to have put herself out of action. No doubt the probabilities of Zeppelins catching any of the Grand fleet in similar conditions are small. But that an attempt to get at the fleet from the air seems more probable than it ever has seemed, is indisputable.
Naval Expenditure.—In his budget speech on April 4, Mr. McKenna stated that the estimate of expenditure on the services had proved substantially accurate. In the previous September, he had said that he contemplated a navy costing £190,000,000, an increase on that for which his predecessor had budgeted of £44,000,000. Whether these sums included the cost of transport for the army was not made clear. In any case, the daily rate of £600,000 for the navy which the Prime Minister mentioned as the expediture in September, 1915, has not been maintained, and there was apparently a saving during the last six months of the financial year which ended on March 31 of approximately £29,000,000. When Mr. Lloyd George said that he anticipated the year’s cost of the navy to be £146,000,000, lie could not have based his calculation on the daily rate mentioned by the Prime Minister, for that would have meant an expenditure of £219,000,000. Nor is it possible either that he founded his estimate on the expenditure for the year ending March 31, 1915, which, according to the statement issued by the comptroller and auditor-general, was £103,301,862. But only eight months of that year was war time, and the daily expenditure before the war was about £150,000, so that the average rate during the first eight months of war must have been well below £400,000. Anyway, it is difficult from an examination of such official figures as has been issued to arrive at the real facts concerning naval expenditure during the war.—Army and Navy Gazette, 15/4.
Rumor ok Enormous German Submarine Losses.—Our advices from abroad are to the effect that the German submarines destroyed or captured by the British now number between 150 and 175. Among them are included seven of the latest type of submarine. These, because of their size and the disturbance they make in the water, are more easily located than the smaller vessels of the earlier type. The Allies are also learning how to deal more effectively with hostile aircraft, making use of new guns developed since the war began.—Army and Navy Journal.
Munitions and the Fleet.—The following letter has been addressed by the Minister of Munitions to Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty:
“February 22, 1916.
“Dear Sir David Beatty,—I was greatly interested to receive from you details of the splendid work which has been done by the officers and men of the battle cruiser fleet in making munitions of war.
“The extent of the output which has already been reached is very striking, and it has been of real assistance to the equipment of the army. More important, however, than the ^material results achieved has been the magnificent spirit which has prompted the officers and men of your fleet to show their sympathy with their comrades in the trenches and to devote their leisure hours to giving them such loyal and effective support. The fact, also, that this heavy work has been carried out in their limited spare time and, by their own express wish, without any kind of remuneration greatly enhances its value.
“I shall be very glad if you can find some way of communicating the warm and grateful thanks of the Ministry of Munitions to the fleet for their services in this matter, and at the same time assure them that any further work which they can do, on the same lines, will he most welcome and of real help to the army.
“Believe me, yours sincerely,
" D. Lloyd George.”
—United Service Gazette, 2/3.
Relief Ship Lost in Tigris. —Since the Mountjoy grounded in the River Foyle at the siege of Londonderry there has been no episode in British history comparable to the unhappy grounding of the relief ship in the Tigris four miles below Kut. It will be interesting to learn more about the identity of this relief ship and those in charge of her. We have as yet had only meagre information about the ships in the Mesopotamia Expedition and the doings of the sailors forming their crews.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The Evacuation oe Gallipoli.—The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir C. C. Monro,
K. C. B. It gives tbc first official account of our successful evacuation of Gallipoli. General Monro writes:
On October 20, in London, I received your Lordship’s instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean expeditionary force.
My duty on arrival was in broad outline:
- To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
- To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.
- The number of troops that would be required:
- To carry the Peninsula;
- To keep the Straits open; and
- To take Constantinople.
The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No-means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.
Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the peninsula had suffered much from various causes—exposure to shell fire, disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and “makeshifts” due to the attachment of yeomanry and mounted brigades to the territorial divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.
On November 21 the peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for 24 hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the 8th corps and the Anzac corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The 9th corps were less favorably situated, the watercourses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communications were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering, I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.
From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.
The problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy’s trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west the withdrawal of troops was not possible.
I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicions of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.
Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Ægean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or southwest was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken towards withdrawal.
Throughout the period December 10 to 18 the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of December 18 found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.
It was imperative, of course, that the front-line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment, and that the withdrawal from these trenches would be simultaneous throughout the line.
The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19-20. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.
Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1.30 a. m. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 a. m. By 5.30 a. m. the last man had quitted the trenches.
At Anzac four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, 56 mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies, which were set on fire, were also abandoned.
At Sulva every gun, vehicle and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burned.
On December 28 your Lordship’s telegram ordering the evacuation of Holies was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather prevailing, I instructed the general officer commanding Dardanelles army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6-inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules, and A. T. carts, limbered wagons, etc.
At a meeting which was attended by the vice admiral and the general officer commanding Dardanelles army, I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions.
The situation on the peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and lmbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as my opinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success; and it was decided the navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.
General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.
The evacuation, following the same system as was practised at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the peninsula were relieved on the night of January 1-2, and were embarked by the French Navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation.
Meanwhile the 8th corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On December 29 the 52d division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.
On January 7 the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the 13th division, while the Asiastic guns shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to he the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 p. m., and was intensive between 3 p. m. and 3.30.
January 8 was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south.
There was every indication of the continuance of favorable conditions, and, in the opinion of the meteorological officer, no important change was to be expected for at least 24 hours. The Turkish artillery were unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete.
About 7 p. m. the breeze freshened considerably from the southwest, the most unfavorable quarter, hut the first trip, timed for 8 p. m., was despatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 p. m., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at “W” Beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties tile second trips, which commenced at 11.30 p. m., were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the straits, and about midnight H. M. S. Prince George, which had embarked 2000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indication of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the vice admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated positions.
At 1.50 a. m. Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2.10 a. m. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be relloated. The N. T. O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime, at 2.30 a. m., it was decided to move the 160 men, who had been relanded from the grounded lighter, to “W” Beach and embark them there.
At 3.30 a. m. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on lire by time fuses after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 a. m. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy’s trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6.30 a. m.
Apart from four unserviceable 15-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the mouth, 10 worn-out 15-pounders, one 6-inch Mark VII gun. and six old heavy French guns were left on the peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.
The entire evacuation of the peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realization two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organization, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.
Lieutenant General Sir W. Birdwood and his corps commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K. C. B., Vice Admiral Wemyss, and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.—United Service Gazette, 20/4.