GREAT BRITAIN’S BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
On July 23 Great Britain despatched a note in general defence of her blockade methods employed against Germany. The note contends, (1) that since blockade is an allowable expedient of war, it is allowable to make it effective; (2) that extension of the blockade to German commerce through neutral ports, though an innovation, is essential to effective blockade; (3) that this extension can be justified, not only by the exigencies of the case, but by the example of the United States during the Civil War; (4) that it is consistent with the spirit and principles of the rules of war, and is enforced with due regard for legitimate commerce between neutrals. The text follows:
American Embassy, London, July 24, 1915.
Following note, dated July 23, received from Sir Edward Grey this morning:
“On the 2d of April your Excellency handed to me a copy of a communication containing the criticisms of the United States Government on the measures we have been constrained to take on account of the menace to peaceful commerce resulting from the German submarine policy. This communication has received the most careful consideration of his Majesty’s government.
"2. I fully appreciate the friendly spirit and the candor which are shown in the communication, and, replying in the same spirit, I trust that I may be
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able to convince your Excellency and also the Administration at Washington that the measures we have announced are not only reasonable and necessary in themselves, but constitute no more than an adaptation of the old principles of blockade to the peculiar circumstances with which we are confronted.”
Must Take Every Step.—“3. I need scarcely dwell on the obligation incumbent upon the Allies to take every step in their power to overcome their common enemy in view of the shocking violation of the recognized rules and principles of civilized warfare of which he has been guilty during the present struggle. Your Excellency’s attention has already been drawn to some of these proceedings in the memorandum which I handed to you on the 19th of February. Since that time Lord Bryce’s report, based on evidence carefully sifted by legal experts, describing the atrocities committed in Belgium, the poisoning of wells in German Southwest Africa, the use of poisonous gases against the troops in Flanders and finally the sinking of the Lusitania without any opportunity to passengers and non- combatants to save their lives, has shown how indispensable it is that we should leave unused no justifiable method of defending ourselves.
“4. Your Excellency will remember that in my notes of the 13th and 15th of March I explained that the Allied governments intended to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or entering British or French ports by themselves intercepting goods going to or from Germany. I read the communication from your Excellency’s government not as questioning the necessity for our taking all the steps open to us to cripple the enemy’s trade, but as directed solely to the question of the legitimacy of the particular measures adopted.”
Question of Blockade.—
“5. In the various notes which I have received from your Excellency the right of a belligerent to establish a blockade of the enemy ports is admitted, a right which has obviously no value save in so far as it gives power to a belligerent to cut off the sea borne exports and imports of the enemy. The contention which I understand the United States Government now puts forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere and must restrict his measures of blockade in such a manner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary.
“This is a contention which his Majesty’s government feel unable to accept and which seems to them unsustainable either in point of law or upon principles of international equity. They are unable to admit that a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut out the enemy’s commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective.
“The Government of the United States indeed intimates its readiness to take into account ‘the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated ’and recognizes that ‘ the form of close blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defence by the use of submarines, mines and aircraft.’”
Conforming to the Spirit.—“6. The only question then which can arise in regard to the measures resorted to for the purpose of carrying out a blockade upon these extended lines is whether, to use your Excellency’s words, they ‘conform to the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war’; and we shall be content to apply this test to the action which we have taken in so far as it has necessitated interference with neutral commerce.
“7. It may be noted in this connection that at the time of the Civil War the United States found themselves under the necessity of declaring a blockade of some 3000 miles of coast line, a military operation for which the number of vessels available was at first very small. It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great struggle that they should be able to cut off the trade of the southern states. The Confederate armies were dependent on supplies from overseas, and those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the cotton wherewith to pay for them.
“To cut off this trade the United States could only rely upon a blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in part due to the fact that neighboring neutral territory afforded convenient centers from which contraband could be introduced into the territory of their enemies and from which blockade running could be facilitated.”
Old Doctrine Applied.—“Your Excellency will no doubt remember how, in order to meet this new difficulty, the old principles relating to contraband and blockade were developed and the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods destined for the enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports from which they were to be re-exported.
“8. The difficulties which imposed upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old rules are somewhat akin to those with which the Allies are now faced in dealing with the trade of their enemy. Adjacent to Germany are various neutral countries which afford her convenient opportunities for carrying on her trade with foreign countries. Her own territories are covered by a network of railways and waterways, which enable her commerce to pass as conveniently through ports in such neutral countries as through her own. A blockade limited to enemy ports would leave open routes by which every kind of German commerce could pass almost as easily as through the ports in her own territory. Rotterdam is indeed the nearest outlet for some of the industrial districts of Germany.
“9. As a counterpoise to the freedom with which one belligerent may send his commerce across a neutral country without compromising its neutrality, the other belligerent may fairly claim to intercept such commerce before it has reached, or after it has left, the neutral state, provided of course that he can establish that the commerce with which he interferes is the commerce of his enemy and not commerce which is bona fide destined for or proceeding from the neutral state.”
Extension is Defensible.—“It seems, accordingly, that if it be recognized that blockade is in certain cases the appropriate method of intercepting the trade of an enemy country, and if the blockade can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension is defensible and in accordance with principles which have met with general acceptance.
“10. To the contention that such action is not directly supported by written authority, it may be replied that it is the business of writers on international law to formulate existing rules rather than to offer suggestions for their adaptation to altered circumstances, and your Excellency will remember the unmeasured terms in which a group of prominent international lawyers of all nations condemned the doctrine which had been laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Springbok, a doctrine upheld by the claims committee at Washington in 1873.
“But the United States and the British governments took a broader view and looked below the surface at the underlying principles, and the government of this country, whose nationals were the sufferers by the extension and development of the old methods of blockade made by the United States during the Civil War, abstained from all protest against the decisions by which the ships and their cargoes were condemned.
“11. What is really important in the general interest is that adoptions of the old rules should not be made unless they are consistent with the general principles upon which an admitted belligerent right is based. It is also essential that all unnecessary injury to neutrals should be avoided.
With these conditions, it may be safely affirmed that the steps we are taking to intercept commodities on their way to and from Germany fully comply.”
Playing the Game Fairly.—“We are interfering with no goods with which we should not be entitled to interfere by blockade if the geographical position and the conditions of Germany at present were such that her commerce passed through her own ports. We are taking the utmost possible care not to interfere with commerce genuinely destined for or proceeding from neutral countries. Furthermore, we have tempered the severity with which our measures might press upon neutrals by not applying the rule which was invariable in the old form of blockade, that ships and goods on their way to or from the blockaded are liable to condemnation.
“12. The communication made by the United States Embassy on the 2d of April describes as a novel and quite unprecedented feature of the blockade that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts and has the effect of barring access to them. It does not appear that our measures can be properly so described. If we are successful in the efforts we are making to distinguish between the commerce of neutral and enemy countries, there will be no substantial interference with the trade of neutral ports except in so far as they constitute ports of access to and exit from the enemy territory. There are at this moment many neutral ports which it would be mere affectation to regard as offering facilities only for the commerce of the neutral country in which they are situated, and the only commerce with which we propose to interfere is that of the enemy who seeks to make use of such ports for the purpose of transit to or from his own country.
“13 One of the earlier passages in your Excellency’s memorandum was to the effect that the sovereignty of neutral nations in time of war suffers no diminution except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it ‘by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights’ which it is considered may be exercised by nations at war; and these it defines as the right of capture and condemnation for unneutral service, for the carriage of contraband and for breach of blockade. I may, however, be permitted to point out that the practice of nations on each of the three subjects mentioned has not at any time been uniform or clearly determined, nor has the practice of any maritime nation always been consistent.”
Methods have Varied.—“14. There are various particulars in which the exact method of carrying a blockade into effect has from time to time varied. The need of a public notification, the requisite standard of effectiveness, the locality of the blockading squadrons, the right of the individual ship to a preliminary warning that the blockade is in force and the penalty to be inflicted on a captured blockade runner are all subjects on which different views have prevailed in different countries and in which the practice of particular countries has been altered from time to time. The one principle which is fundamental and has obtained universal recognition is that by means of blockade a belligerent is entitled to cut off by effective means the sea borne commerce of his enemy.
“15. It is the same with contraband. The underlying principle is well established, but as to the details there has been a wide variety of views. As for unneutral service, the very term is of such recent introduction that many writers of repute on international law do not even mention it. It is impossible in the view of his Majesty’s Government in these circumstances to maintain that the right of a belligerent to intercept the commerce of his enemy is limited in the way suggested in your Excellency’s communication.
“16. There are certain subsidiary matters dealt with in your Excellency’s communication to which I think it well to refer. Among these may be mentioned your citation of the declaration of Paris, due no doubt to the words which occur in the memorandum sent to me by your Excellency on the 1st of March, wherein it was stated that the allied governments would hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin, and to our announcement that vessels might be required to discharge goods of enemy ownership as well as those of enemy origin or destination.”
Might do Worse.—“17. It is not necessary to discuss the extent to which the second rule of the Declaration of Paris is affected by these measures or whether it could be held to apply at all as between Great Britain and the United States. In actual practice, however, we are not detaining goods on the sole ground that they are the property of an enemy. The purpose of the measures we are taking is to intercept commerce on its way from and to the enemy country. There are many cases in which proof that the goods were enemy property would afford strong evidence that they were of enemy origin or enemy destination, and it is only in such cases that we are detaining them. Where proof of enemy ownership affords no evidence of such origin or destination we are not in practice detaining the goods.
“18. His Majesty’s Government have been gratified to observe that the measures which they are enforcing have had no detrimental effect on the commerce of the United States. Figures of recent months show that the increased opportunities afforded by the war for American commerce have more than compensated for the loss of the German and Austrian markets.”
Try to Make it Easy.—“19. I trust that in the light of the above explanations it will be realized that the measures to which we have resorted have been not only justified by the exigencies of the case, but can be defended as in accordance with general principles which have commended themselves to the governments of both countries. I am glad to be able to assure your Excellency that we shall continue to apply these measures with every desire to occasion the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate commerce.
E. Grey.”
Decisions of British Prize Courts.—On July 14 the United States filed a caveat, reserving the right not to accept British prize court decisions governed by British municipal law in conflict with international law. The British reply of July 31 insisted that the principles and practice of American and British prize courts were similar, and that, while the British prize courts were bound to enforce the King’s Orders in Council, these might he assumed to be in accord with international law. If the Orders should not be in such accord, an American citizen might make an appeal, through his government, to an international tribunal.
“Neches” Case.—On July 15 the United States protested against the detention and unlading of the American steamship Neches, bound from Rotterdam to the United States with a cargo of goods originating from Belgian territory in the hands of Germany. The note maintained “ the right of the citizens of one neutral to trade with those of another, as well as with those of belligerents except in contraband or in violation of a legal blockade of an enemy seaport.”
The British reply, dated July 31, referred to the general note of July 23, and called attention further to the alleged German practice of sinking neutral as well as British merchant vessels without regard to the destination of the vessel, the origin of the cargo, or the safety of passengers and crews.
British Criticism of British Policy.—“The Washington note makes a firm declaration that it takes its stand on the hitherto established principles governing neutral trade in war-time, and cannot recognize the modifications introduced by our Orders in Council, or the decisions of prize courts based upon them. The concrete case which it argues is that of the American ship Neches, carrying a general cargo from Rotterdam, which was arrested and made to discharge the cargo, the property of American citizens, on the ground that the goods came originally from a port of Belgium under the German occupation. There was here no question of contraband, and Washington, when we speak of blockade, retorts with the hitherto accepted view that a blockade is of an enemy’s ports and coasts.
“The argument of the British note is that a blockade of a country situated geographically as Germany is can be made effective only if we can also cut off her commerce through neutral ports. This is quite conclusive from the standpoint of our necessities, but it hardly meets the neutral case. The parallel with the application by the North in the Civil War of the doctrine of ‘continuous voyage ’to stop trade with the South by way of Mexican ports is good, we think, only when applied to trade in contraband goods. The Foreign Office is doing its best to defend the Admiralty’s innovations in law, but it is fairly clear that a wrong way was adopted of achieving a proper end. It is better to stretch the doctrine of contraband than to blockade neutrals. We have absolute command of the seas, and materially we can do as we please, but we are bound in morals and in political prudence to try and do nothing which would justify neutral complaints against an abuse of our power. The protagonists of a war against militarism must guard themselves against complaints of ‘ navalism.’”— London Nation.
A formal declaration was issued by the British Foreign Office on August 2i, designating cotton as absolute contraband of war. Accompanying the announcement a proposal was made to initiate measures to relieve the depression of the cotton market.
The following explanation of the British policy regarding cotton was made by Lord Robert Cecil, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
“Cotton is a very important, an essential ingredient, in fact, of propulsion explosives. Copper is contraband by all the laws of the nations, and yet in the present war cotton has been shown to be more important than copper. There may be a substitute for copper in making munitions of war. For cotton there is no known substitute. If American cotton goes through to Germany the Germans use it to kill Allied soldiers. Therefore cotton must not go to Germany.”
Legal to Make it Contraband.—“Making cotton contraband would be a distinctly legal action and can be internationally justified beyond protest. So far as American cotton is concerned, however, the problem of marketing cotton on this side would undergo little change. American cotton destined for Germany is now stopped. If the product were made contraband it would be stopped in the same manner. The principal difference would be that if cotton were contraband shipments from America which were suspected of being for Germany would be seized and would be liable to confiscation by prize court procedure if proof were obtainable of German destination, whereas now the cotton is seized but not necessarily confiscated.
“In any case, whether cotton is contraband or not, the Allies must permit neutral trading in this product. American growers must be given their market in neutral countries, even if they are adjacent to Germany, and the industries of those countries must have the cotton required for their own needs. How to permit this supply to move forward and yet safeguard the Allies’ interests by making sure that none of it will go to the enemy constitutes a complicated problem of great dimensions.
“We are interested only in keeping cotton out of Germany. We not only do not object to its going to neutral countries, but we, in fact, are anxious that it should go in order that there shall be minimum inconveniences to the neutrals concerned.
“It is obvious what the loss of German and Austrian markets will mean to American cotton growers. We fully realize that if there is no German and Austrian outlet prices may go down and that Americans will suffer unless some means are devised for compensation. Proposals in that direction have been made and are receiving careful consideration. What will come of them I cannot say at this time. Certainly I am not at liberty to imply that favorable action will be taken, nor will I say that it will not.— N. Y. Herald, 8/14.
In protest against the British order declaring cotton contraband, Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, makes the following points:
- Cotton is used in explosives only as a last resort, when cheaper materials cannot be obtained, and not as a common thing.
- At the conference of the nine great naval powers at London in 1908- 1909, the representatives there assembled adopted the resolution that raw cotton should be free and under no circumstances to be declared contraband.
- The one exception to the rule that cotton should be on the free list was when Russia in 1905 declared cotton contraband.
Great Britain and the United States protested the legality of this order. Great Britain put her protest on the ground that British India was by far the largest exporter of raw cotton to Japan, and officially advised Russia as follows:
“The quantity of raw cotton that might be utilized for explosives would be infinitesimal in comparison with the bulk of the cotton exports from India to Japan for peaceful purposes, and to treat harmless cargoes of this latter description as unconditional contraband will be to subject a branch of innocent commerce to a most unwarranted interference.”
Great Britain protected her citizens and Russia allowed their cotton shipments to go to Japan.—N. Y. Sun, 9/10.
Meat Cargoes Condemned.—The long-delayed decision of the British Prize Court in regard to various American cargoes, principally of meat, shipped, for the most part, by the great American packing companies, was delivered on September 16, the British court condemning the greater part of the American products. Leave to appeal was given. Comment on this decision will be found in our editorial columns. The action of the British Prize Court will not, it is understood, materially affect or modify the tenor of the forthcoming note to Great Britain, dealing with interference with American trade and the operation of the Order in Council. Secretary Lansing announced on September 17 that this note was finally completed and was ready for dispatch to Ambassador Page in London.
Final Decision in “Dacia” Case.—The decision of the French prize court in the case of the American steamship Dacia, formerly owned by the Hamburg-American Line, which was seized by a French cruiser in February while bound with a cotton cargo for Bremen, has been made public. The decision covers 20 pages. It says the prize court finds no proof that the transfer of registry was not made to save the ship from risk of capture in accordance with the laws of war, but that, on the contrary, the ship under her new flag was making a voyage for which she had been loaded while still under an enemy flag. Therefore, the court finds the transfer “tainted with fraud and against the rights of belligerents” and orders the steamship seized as a prize. The American-owned cotton cargo of the Dacia has been partly paid for by the French Government through the French Ambassador at Washington. The Dacia has now been renamed Yser.— Shipping Illustrated, 8/21.
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
In a note on the Frye case, dated July 30, Germany held to her previous contention that the destruction of the vessel did not constitute a violation of the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799. The note proposed further that the amount of the indemnity he settled by two experts designated respectively by Germany and the United States, and that the interpretation of existing treaties be submitted to the Hague tribunal. To this the American State Department acceded in a note dated August 13, requesting information, however, as to what Germany’s practice would be while the matter was under adjudication. The final German reply of September 19 gave the promise that American vessels carrying conditional contraband would be permitted to continue their voyage if it were impossible to take them into port. With regard to vessels carrying absolute contraband, Germany reserved the right to destroy whenever permissible under the provisions of the Declaration of London. The text of the September 19 note follows:
Berlin, September 19, 1915.
With regard first to the ascertainment of the damage by experts, the German Government believes that it should dispense with the nomination of an umpire. In the cases of the ascertainment of damages hitherto arranged between the German Government and a neutral government from similar causes the experts named by the two parties have always reached an agreement as to the amount of the damage without difficulty; should it not be possible, however, to reach an agreement on some point it could probably be settled by diplomatic negotiations. Assuming that the American Government agrees to this, the German Government names as its expert Dr. Kepny, of Bremen, director of the North German Lloyds; it begs to await the designation of the American expert.
The German Government declares that it agrees to the proposal of the American Government to separate the question of indemnity from the question of the interpretation of the Prussian-American treaties of 1785, 1799 and 1828. It therefore again expressly states that in making payment it does not acknowledge the violations of the treaty as contended by the American side, but it will admit that the settlement of the question of indemnity does not prejudice the arrangement of the differences of opinion concerning the interpretation of the treaty rights and that this dispute is left to be decided by The Hague Tribunal of Arbitration.
The negotiations relative to the signing of the compromise provided by Article 52 of The Hague Arbitration Convention would best be conducted between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy at Berlin in view of the difficulties in the way of instructing the Imperial Ambassador at Washington. In case the American Government agrees the Foreign Office is prepared to submit to the embassy a draft of such a compromise.
The American Government’s inquiry whether the German Government will govern its naval operations in accordance with the German or the American interpretation of the treaty stipulations in question, pending the arbitral proceedings, has been carefully considered by the German Government. From the standpoint of law and equity it is not prevented in its opinion from proceeding against American ships carrying contraband, according to its interpretation, until the question is settled by arbitration.
For the German Government does not need to depart from the application of generally recognized rules of the law of maritime war, as the Declaration of London, unless and in so far as an exception based on a treaty is established beyond all doubt. In the case of the present difference of opinion between the German and the American Government such an exception could not be taken to be established except on the ground of the arbitral award. Moreover, the disadvantages to Germany which would ensue from the American interpretation of the treaty stipulations would be so much greater as to be out of proportion to those which the German interpretation would entail for the United States. For whereas the American interpretation would materially impede Germany in her conduct of warfare hardly any particular disadvantage to American citizens would result from the German interpretation, since they receive full reparation for any property damage sustained.
Nevertheless, the German Government, in order to furnish to the American Government evidence of its conciliatory attitude, has issued orders to the German naval forces not to destroy American merchantmen which have loaded conditional contraband even when the conditions of international law are present, but to permit them to continue their voyage unhindered if it is not possible to take them into port. On the other hand, it must reserve to itself the right to destroy vessels carrying absolute contraband wherever such destruction is permissible according to the provisions of the Declaration of London.
“Leelanaw” Sunk by Submarine.—The American steamship Leelanaw, commanded by Captain D. B. Delk and owned by the Harby Steamship Company of New York City, was sunk by a German submarine on July 25 off the northeast coast of Scotland. All the members of the crew reached Kirkwall in their boats. The Leelanaw was carrying a cargo of flax, which is contraband of war, from Archangel to Belfast. Although the first accounts of the vessel’s destruction were meager, it was apparent that the submarine commander had observed the recognized rules of warfare and had given the crew ample time to leave the Leelanaw. Inasmuch as the United States has insisted that a ship may not be destroyed even when the capturing vessel cannot take her to port, the government at Washington is expected to demand reparation from Germany for the loss of the Leelanaw, as was done in the case of the William P. Frye. The Leelanaw was built in Newcastle in 1886 and registered 1377 tons.— Nautical Gazette, 8/5.
Captain’s Statement
Aberdeen (via London), Wednesday.
“They could not have treated us more courteously than they did,” was the verdict of Captain Eugene Delk and the crew of the American steamship Leelanaw when questioned last night regarding their encounter with a German submarine. They travelled about 60 miles on the deck of the submarine and became well acquainted with its crew, several of whom had been in America.
“There is no story in it,” Captain Delk said. “We stopped when a shot was fired behind us and then we had to leave. Our ship was shelled, bombed and torpedoed, but it took an hour and a half to sink her. The Germans took us aboard the submarine, carried us about 60 miles and then gave us directions for getting to Kirkwall, which we reached safely in about 12 hours.”
The crew, of whom there are 32 besides the captain, explained that the German commander apologized for the necessity of sinking the ship, but said it was forced upon him by the fact that the Leelanaw was carrying contraband, and he was not in the habit of throwing overboard contraband cargoes.—N. Y. Sun, 7/29.
Claim for Indemnity
Washington, July 30. The Washington Government expects Germany to pay for the American steamer Leelanaw, sunk by a German submarine off the Orkney Islands last Sunday, and the State Department transmitted instructions to Ambassador Gerard yesterday for proper presentation of the claim. Officials here say the case is exactly similar to that of the American ship William P. Frye, sunk in the South Atlantic by the German auxiliary cruiser Prim Eitel Friedrich last February. The claim for indemnity in both cases rests upon the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, which, the State Department contends, specifically prohibits destruction of ships under such circumstances. —Boston Transcript, 7/30.
At 9.15 a. m., on August 19, the White Star liner Arabic was torpedoed by a German submarine off the south coast of Ireland. According to reports of officers and passengers, the submarine was not observed, but only the wake of the torpedo, which struck about 100 feet from the ship’s stern. Of 423 persons on board, 32 were lost. All of the 26 American passengers were saved.
German Statement of August 25.—The following statement concerning the German Government’s attitude in regard to the Arabic was given out by Count von Bernstorff yesterday in this city:
The German Ambassador received the following instructions from Berlin, which he communicated to the Department of State:
So far no official information available concerning the sinking of the Arabic.
The German Government trusts that the American Government will not take a definite stand at hearing only the reports of one side, which, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, cannot correspond with the facts, but that a chance will be given to Germany to be heard equally.
Although the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the newspapers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these statements are naturally made under excitement which might easily produce wrong impressions.
If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact, and begs to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Government.—N. Y. Times, 8/25.
Final German Report on “Arabic” Disaster
Berlin, Thursday, via London, Friday, 2.36 a. m.
Germany’s note to the United States bearing on the sinking of the White Star line steamship Arabic on August 19, which was communicated to the American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, for transmission to Washington, is in the form of a memorandum, under date of September 7, the text of which follows:
“On August 19 a German submarine stopped the English steamer Duns- ley about 16 nautical miles south of Kinsale and was on the point of sinking the prize by gun-fire after the crew had left the vessel. At this moment the commander saw a large steamer making directly toward him. This steamer, as developed later, was the Arabic. She was recognized as an enemy vessel, as she did not fly any flag and bore no neutral markings.
“When she approached she altered her original course, but then again pointed directly toward the submarine. From this, the commander became convinced that the steamer had the intention of attacking and ramming him._ In order to anticipate this attack he gave orders for the submarine to dive and fired a torpedo at the steamer. After firing, he convinced himself that the people on board were being rescued in 15 boats.
“According to his instructions, the commander was not allowed to attack the Arabic without warning and without saving the lives unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance. He was forced, however, to conclude from the attendant circumstances that the Arabic planned a violent attack on the submarine.
“This conclusion is all the more obvious, as he had been fired upon at a great distance in the Irish Sea on August 14—that is, a few days before— by a large passenger steamer, apparently belonging to the British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which he had neither attacked nor stopped.
“The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens.
“The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the Arabic.
“If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the German and American governments to reach a harmonious opinion on this point the German Government would be prepared to submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of international law, to The Hague tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The Hague convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.
“In so doing, it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbitral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a general decision on the permissibility or the converse under international law of German submarine warfare.”—N. Y. Herald, 9/10.
At 8.30 p. m., September 4, the Allan liner Hesperian was sunk off the south coast of Ireland, about 80 miles west of Fastnet. Thirty-two of the passengers and crew were lost, but none of American citizenship.
Affidavit of Four Officers of the “Hesperian”
Washington, D. C., September 7.
An affidavit signed by four officers of the vessel, was cabled to the State Department to-day by Consul Frost at Queenstown. The affidavit was not given out in full but this paraphrase was issued:
The Hesperian left Liverpool at 7 p. m. on Friday, September 3, and by 8.30 p. m. on September 4 had reached latitude 50 north, longitude 10 west, about 80 miles southwest of Fastnet.
Dusk was closing in rapidly at the time specified when an explosion took place against the starboard bow No. 2 bulkhead, admitting water into compartments 1 and 2. The vessel sank about 10 feet within four hours.
The explosion occurred within about eight feet of the surface, throwing a mass of water and steel fragments on the deck. From the steel fragments preserved it is indubitable that the explosion was caused by a torpedo and not by a mine. The characteristic odor of high explosive was noticeable.
No warning of any kind was received by the Hesperian. The track of a torpedo approaching the vessel was not observed by any of the ship’s officers. They thought that on account of a failing light it may not have been possible to have seen it. No submarine was sighted before or after the explosion.
A 6-inch gun mounted on the stern of the Hesperian was painted a service gray, and would not have been conspicuous even at a short distance, and the officers think it could not have been observed at all through a periscope.
On board the Hesperian were 40 Canadian soldiers, including officers, all either invalided or in attendance upon those invalided. These soldiers were all from various Canadian organizations, but were not organized or traveling as a unit.
No American citizens were among the passengers so far as known. One cabin steward, N. J. Dallas, was an American citizen.
Very slight panic or confusion existed, and the boats and lifesaving apparatus were in readiness and worked well.
Wireless signals, siren, and rockets brought a British warship on the scene by 9.30, and two other Admiralty vessels before 10.30, but the Hesperian was not under convoy, and had not spoken to an Admiralty ship prior to the torpedoing.—N. Y. Times, 9/7.
Statement from Berlin
Amsterdam, via London, September 14.
The following semi-official statement has been issued in Berlin, according to despatches from that city:
It appears from the news available up to the present, taken in conjunction with facts known in official quarters, to be practically impossible that a German submarine can at all be made responsible for the sinking of the Hesperian.
This assumption is warranted, firstly, because, according to the war plans, no German submarine on September 4 was in the locality where the Hesperian was sunk; secondly, according to the descriptions at hand from an English source, the explosion was of such a kind and its effects were such that it must be inferred it was. caused by a mine rather than by a torpedo.
This is supported by the fact that, from the descriptions at hand, the ship was hit close to the stem and the two foremost compartments were filled with water.—N. Y. Sun, 9/15.
British Statement
London, September 20.
“According to information in the press, a semi-official statement has been issued at Berlin that it was practically impossible that a German submarine could have sunk the Hesperian, since, according to the war plans, no German submarine was on September 4 in the locality where the Hesperian was sunk; also, because, according to a description from English sources, the explosion was of such a kind that it must be inferred that it was caused by a mine rather than a torpedo.
“Undoubted proof exists that a German submarine was actually in the locality where the Hesperian was attacked, and ships were sunk both to the north and south of this spot on September 4 and 5. The explosion was of the type caused by a torpedo. This is conclusively proved by a fair-sized fragment of a torpedo now in the possession of the Admiralty, which was picked up on board the ship before she sank.”—N. Y. Times, 9/21.
On September 2 Ambassador von Bernstorff informed Secretary Lansing that the German answer to the American Lusitania note would contain the following passage: “Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.” The German note has since been delivered but not published in full. It is understood that Count von Bernstorff has been granted more ample powers to handle the matter by informal conversations, rather than by further exchange of notes.
Count von Bernstorff’s Note
My Dear Secretary.—With reference to our conversation of this morning I inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last Lusitania note contain the following passage:
“Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.”
Although I know you do not wish to discuss the Lusitania question till the Arabic incident has been definitely and satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the above because this policy of my government was decided on before the Arabic incident occurred.
I have no objections to your making any use you may please of the above information. I remain, my dear Mr. Lansing, very sincerely yours,
J. Bernstorff.
In commenting on this statement Secretary Lansing said: “In view of the clearness of the foregoing statement, it seems needless to make any comment in regard to it other than to say that it appears to be a recognition of the fundamental principles for which we have contended.”—N. Y. Sun, 9/2.
Further Negotiations Through Ambassadors
Berlin via London, September 17.
Mr. James W. Gerard, the American Ambassador to Germany, to-day at noon called on Dr. Gottlieb von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, presumably in connection with the situation surrounding the sinking of the White Star line steamship Arabic by a German submarine and the opening of negotiations on the submarine problem. No definite information is obtainable, however, concerning the subjects dealt with.
Nothing can be learned here which goes to confirm the statement made in a Washington despatch that it was the intention to open conversations between the two countries on the submarine situation, but officials generally assume that the news is correct and express the belief that the difficulties between the United States and Germany would be on a better way toward settlement by such a method.
Differences in viewpoints which are only stiffened when laid down in formal notes, it is generally believed by the officials, can be more easily adjusted in informal conversations, and all the more so, they say, because the fundamental differences of policy have largely disappeared under the new instructions regarding attacks on passenger steamships.
The United States and Germany, it is declared, appear to be now in substantial agreement on the principle involved, and it is now largely a question of adjusting cases like the Arabic in conformity with that principle.
Germany, it is believed here, will be ready to consider testimony bearing on the point of how far the captain of the submarine was justified in his belief that the Arabic was bent on attacking the submarine, and that in conversations she will have the opportunity to satisfy the American Government that her policy and practice under present conditions will harmonize in the future.
*The reports that President Wilson will make no formal reply to the government’s communication concerning the sinking of the Arabic, but will confer confidentially with Count von Bernstorff, are acclaimed by the Germania as “a new indication of the good will of the American Government and its intent to come to an understanding with us.”
Previous diplomatic interchanges, says the Germania, have been made in disadvantageous circumstances because protests to Berlin have been reported in advance in British despatches.
“We believe friendly mouth to mouth negotiations will serve the purpose desired by both sides far better than the earlier interchanges,” this newspaper adds.
Commenting on the conflicting reports from Washington concerning the Arabic case and its reference to The Hague, the National Zeitung says it understands negotiations are in progress in Washington looking to a removal of all misunderstandings. These negotiations are confidential for the present, it says, but there is definite reason for the hope that they will lead to a favorable result.
The present situation seems to have resulted from the supposed conflict between Count von Bernstorff’s declarations and the Arabic note, the National Zeitung continues. In reality they were two separate and distinct pronouncements, notwithstanding their seemingly close connection, inasmuch as Count von Bernstorff could not possibly have known that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine which sank her.—N. Y. Herald, 9/18.
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA
In a note dated August 12, Secretary Lansing replied to a previous Austrian protest against the shipment of munitions to belligerent nations. The reply justified the practice by pointing out: (1) That it would be unneutral for the United States to “sit in judgment on the progress of the war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy”; (2) during the Crimean, South African, and Balkan wars, both Germany and Austria traded in war supplies with belligerents; (3) restriction of munitions trade in war time would require all nations to maintain vast stores of arms, and would tempt a nation so prepared to “ employ force in asserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice.” The text of the note follows:
The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield
Department of State, Washington, D. C, August 12, 1915. Please present a note to the Royal Foreign Office in reply to its note of June 29 in the following sense:
The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government in regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction the recognition by the Imperial and Royal Government of the undoubted fact that its attitude with regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States is prompted by its intention to “maintain the strictest neutrality and to conform to the letter of the provisions of international treaties,” but is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying that the 'observance of the strict principles of the law under the conditions which have developed in the present war is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go beyond the long-recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to “maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties.”
To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions, the Government of the United States cannot accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government appears to be that the advantages gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by the establishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor. The Imperial and Royal Government confines its comments to arms and ammunition, but, if the principle for which it contends is sound, it should apply with equal force to all articles of contraband. A belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample supply of arms and ammunition, but be in want of food and clothing. On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral nations would be obligated to place an embargo on such articles because one of the belligerents could not obtain them through commercial intercourse.
But if this principle, so strongly urged by the Imperial and Royal Government, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to contend successfully on land ought to be permitted to purchase them from neutrals, while a belligerent with an abundance of war stores or with the power to produce them should be debarred from such traffic.
Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government, would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of international obligation, produce economic confusion, and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restriction of war.
German Trade in Arms.—In this connection it is pertinent to direct the attention pf the Imperial and Royal Government to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany, particularly the latter, have during the years preceding the present European War produced a great surplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world, and especially to belligerents. Never during that period did either of them suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government.
During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African republics the patrol of the coasts of neighboring neutral colonies by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The Allied republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain, the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, and weapons; and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in smaller quantities. While, as compared with the present war, the quantities sold were small (a table of the sales is appended) the principle of neutrality involved was the same. If at that time Austria-Hungary and her present ally had refused to sell arms and ammunition to Great Britain on the ground that to do so would violate the spirit of strict neutrality, the Imperial and Royal Government might with greater consistency and greater force urge its present contention.
It might be further so pointed out that during the Crimean War large quantities of arms and military stores were furnished to Russia by Prussian manufacturers; that during the recent war between Turkey and Italy, as this Government is advised, arms and ammunition were furnished to the Ottoman Government by Germany; and that during the Balkan wars the belligerents were supplied with munitions by both Austria-Hungary and Germany. While these latter cases are not analogous, as is the case of the South African War, to the situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany in the present war they nevertheless clearly indicate the long-established practice of the two empires in the matter of trade in war supplies.
In view of the foregoing statements, this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial and Royal Government will ascribe to the United States a lack of impartial neutrality in continuing its legitimate trade in all kinds of supplies used to render the armed forces of a belligerent efficient, even though the circumstances of the present war prevent Austria-Hungary from obtaining such supplies from the markets of the United States, which have been and remain, so far as the action and policy of this Government are concerned, open to all belligerents alike.
American Safety Involved.—But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the republic to the present time advocated and practised unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well-equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defence. The United States has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others.
A nation whose principle and policy it is to rely upon international obligations and international justice to preserve its political and territorial integrity might become the prey of an aggressive nation whose policy and practice it is to increase its military strength during times of peace with the design of conquest, unless the nation attacked can, after war had been declared, go into the markets of the world and purchase the means to defend itself against the aggressor.
The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any emergency which might arise, and to erect and maintain establishments for the manufacture of arms and ammunition sufficient to supply the needs of its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. Manifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming an armed camp, ready to resist aggression and tempted to employ force in asserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice for the settlement of international disputes.
Means World Militarism.—Perceiving, as it does, that the adoption of the principle that it is the duty of a neutral to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to a belligerent during the progress of a war would inevitably give the advantage to the belligerent which had encouraged the manufacture of munitions in time of peace, and which had laid in vast stores of arms and ammunition in anticipation of war, the Government of the United States is convinced that the adoption of the theory would force militarism on the world and work against the universal peace which is the desire and purpose of all nations with one another.
The Government of the United States in the foregoing discussion of the practical reason why it has advocated and practised trade in munitions of war, wishes to be understood as speaking with no thought of expressing or implying any judgment with regard to the circumstances of the present war, but as merely putting very frankly the argument in this matter which has been conclusive in determining the policy of the United States.
While the practice of, nations, so well illustrated by the practice of Austria-Hungary and Germany during the South African War, and the manifest evil which would result from a change of the practice, render compliance with the suggestions of the Imperial and Royal Government out of the question, certain assertions appearing in the Austro-Hungarian statement as grounds for its contentions cannot be passed over without comment. These assertions are substantially as follows:
- That the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to belligerents contravenes the preamble of The Hague convention, No. 13 of 1907;
- That it is consistent with the refusal of this Government to allow delivery of supplies to vessels of war on the high seas;
- That “ according to all authorities on international law, who concern themselves more properly with the question,” exportation should be prevented “ when this traffic assumes such a form or such dimensions that the neutrality of a nation becomes involved thereby.”
Hague Requirements Clear—As to the assertion that the exportation of arms and ammunition contravenes the preamble of The Hague convention, No. 13 of 1907, this Government presumes that reference is made to the last paragraph of the preamble, which is as follows:
“Seeing that in this category of ideas these rules should not in principle be altered in the course of the war by a neutral power except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that power.”
Manifestly the only ground to change the rules laid down by the convention, one of which, it should be noted, explicitly declares that a neutral is not bound to prohibit the exportation of contraband of war, is the necessity of a neutral power to do so in order to protect its own rights. The right and duty to determine when this necessity exists rests with the neutral, not with a belligerent. It is discretionary, not mandatory. If a neutral power does not avail itself of the right, a belligerent is not privileged to complain, for in doing so it would be in the position of declaring to the neutral power what is necessary to protect that power's own rights. The Imperial and Royal Government cannot but perceive that a complaint of this nature would invite just rebuke.
With reference to the asserted inconsistency of the course adopted by this Government in relation to the exportation of arms and ammunition and that followed in not allowing supplies to be taken from its ports to ships-of-war on the high seas, it is only necessary to point out that the prohibition of supplies to ships-of-war rests upon the principle that a neutral power must not permit its territory to become a naval base for either belligerent. A warship may, under certain restrictions, obtain fuel and supplies in a neutral port once in three months. To permit merchant vessels acting as tenders to' carry supplies more often than three months and in unlimited amount would defeat the purpose of the rule and might constitute the neutral territory a naval base. Furthermore, this Government is unaware that any Austro-Hungarian ship-of-war has sought to obtain supplies from a port in the United States, either directly or indirectly. The subject has, however, already been discussed with the Imperial German Government, to which the position of this Government was fully set forth December 24, 1914.
Quotes German Authority.—In view of the positive assertion in the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government as to the unanimity of the opinions of text writers as to the exportation of contraband being unneutral, this Government has caused a careful examination of the principal authorities on international law to be made. As a result of this examination it has come to the conclusion that the Imperial and Royal Government has been misled and has inadvertently made an erroneous assertion. Less than one-fifth of the authorities consulted advocate unreservedly the prohibition of the export of contraband. Several of those who constitute this minority admit that the practice of nations has been otherwise. It may not be inopportune to direct particular attention to the declaration of the German authority, Paul Einicke, who states that, at the beginning of a war, belligerents have never remonstrated against the enactment of prohibitions on trade in contraband, but adds “that such prohibitions may be considered as violation of neutrality, or at least as unfriendly acts, if they are enacted during a war with the purpose to close unexpectedly the sources of supply to a party which heretofore had relied on them.”
The Government of the United States deems it unnecessary to extend further at the present time a consideration of the statement of the Austro- Hungarian Government. The principles of international law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and, finally, neutrality itself are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the exportation of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war to belligerent powers during the progress of the war.
Lansing.
—N. Y. Times, 8/15.
On September 10 the American Government requested the recall of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington. Its action is explained in the following note:
Mr. Constantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, has admitted that he proposed to his government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in the production of munitions of war. The information reached this government through a copy of a letter of the ambassador to his government. The bearer was an American citizen, named Archibald, who was travelling under an American passport. The ambassador has admitted that he employed Archibald to bear official despatches from him to his government.
By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty at Washington.
Believing that the Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government of the United States has no alternative but to request the recall of Mr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that this course has become necessary, and assures the Imperial and Royal Government that it sincerely desires to continue the cordial and friendly relations which exist between the United States and Austria-Hungary.—N. Y. Herald, 9/10.
Dr. Dumba’s Letter.—This issue was precipitated by the detection by English authorities of a letter to his government written by Dr. Dumba and entrusted to the care of James F. Archibald, who was travelling under the protection of an American passport. In this letter Dr. Dumba stated: “I am under the impression that we could, if not entirely prevent the production of war material in Bethlehem and in the Middle West, at any rate strongly disorganize it and hold it up for months, which, according to the statement of the German Military Attache, is of great importance, and which amply outweighs the relatively small sacrifice of money.” Mr. Archibald, meanwhile, has been forced to return to this country, and will, it is understood, be arrested by federal authorities when he reaches New York. To what extent the Military Attache to the German Embassy, Capt. von Papen, is involved in this plot to interrupt the American production of munitions of war is not generally known, but his sudden departure for the Yellowstone is taken to mean that his usefulness at Washington is at an end. —N. Y. Nation, 9/16.
THE BALKAN STATES
Early in September Bulgaria received from Turkey the rights of the Dedeaghatch Railway to the Aegean and a strip of territory along the left bank of the Maritza River. Servia, through the influence of the Entente powers, at the same time offered to Bulgaria the greater part of the territory demanded by the latter power in Macedonia. At the close of the week ending September 18, the Entente powers delivered to Bulgaria a request for a clear definition of her attitude at the earliest possible date. This was followed, September 21, by general mobilization of Bulgaria’s military forces, including about 50,000 from the territory offered but not ceded by Servia. Greece, who is bound by treaty to assist Servia in the event of Bulgarian attack, has responded by calling the classes of 1892-1911 to the colors.
Paris, September 20.
Despatches from Sofia announcing the mobilization there of troops made up of residents of Macedonia have caused another complication to be introduced in the Balkan situation, which already was tense, through the presentation by the Entente Allies of the joint note requiring Bulgaria to define her attitude.
The mobilization of Macedonians has caused surprise and indignation in official and diplomatic circles here, as it is declared the whole purpose of the present negotiations between the Allies and Bulgaria, and Serbia is to determine whether Macedonia belongs to Bulgaria or to Serbia. That Bulgaria should mobilize Macedonians while the future of Macedonia was still at issue is declared in the highest Serbo-Greek quarters to be an affront to the Allies and the other Balkan States. One of the legations that is taking part in the negotiations outlined the situation to-day as follows:
Bulgaria demanded from Serbia the recession of Macedonia as an essential condition to Bulgaria’s joining the other Balkan states and cooperating with the Entente Allies. The latter took up Bulgaria’s demands and presented them to Serbia in joint notes. Serbia, after mature consideration, yielded to the desires of the Allies and conceded virtually nine- tenths of the territory in Macedonia demanded by Bulgaria. The only portion of Macedonia not conceded was a small section which was considered essential to Serbia’s military defences, but these concessions of Macedonian territory were made in order that Bulgaria give something in return; namely, her co-operation with the Balkan states and the Allies. The Allies therefore handed Bulgaria a joint note last week reciting Serbia’s concessions of nine-tenths of the disputed Macedonian territory, and in effect asking Bulgaria what she purposed doing as a result of the concessions.
Now, however, the diplomatic outline continued, before returning an answer Bulgaria assumes that she is master of Macedonia and begins the mobilization of Macedonian residents—that is, she assumes control of Macedonia before stating what she is willing to do for the Allies in return for such control. This, the diplomatic authority says, gives to the situation a new phase which may call for another note from the Allies in addition to that of last week, asking an explanation of the Macedonian mobilization at the moment when the Allies are negotiating terms by which Bulgaria may obtain the recession of Macedonia.
It is understood the Allies’ joint note of last week was accompanied by a verbal request to Mr. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Premier, for a reply “at the earliest possible date.”
Bulgaria’s Territorial Demands
The black portions of the map (which is based on one printed in the New York Sun) show the territorial concessions demanded by Bulgaria: namely, Adrianople and the surrounding territory, now Turkish; the Servian possessions south of Uskub; and the portion of Greece on the Aegean Sea including Kavala. Bulgaria would also like to regain the region north of Varna recently ceded to Rumania, also in black, but is not so insistent on this as she is regarding the other regions.
Changes in Grecian Ministry.—On August 18 a new Grecian cabinet under former Premier Eleutheros Venizelos succeeded the Gounaris Ministry which resigned August 17 on the opening of Parliament. The policy of M. Venizelos is at present one of continued neutrality, opposed to concessions to Bulgaria or other measures which would definitely commit Greece to one side or the other in the war. The Greek Parliament adjourned September 4, to re-assemble October 14.
ITALY
Italy Declares War Against Turkey.—Italy declared war against Turkey on August 21. The Marquis di Garroni, the Italian Ambassador to Constantinople, presented his government’s declaration of a state of war to the Turkish Foreign Office, demanded his passports, and immediately left the capital. Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador, assumed charge of Italian interests.
The note presented by the Ambassador to the Turkish Government stated as the reason for the Italian action the support by Turkey of the revolt in Libya and the situation which has obtained in Ottoman territory for two months inimical to Italian subjects. This has particular reference to the prevention by Turkish authorities of Italians leaving Syria.— N. Y. Evening Post, 8/23.
NAVAL NOTES
Naval developments in the following strategic areas will be considered separately and in turn:
PAGE
- North Sea ........................................... 1728
- Baltic Sea ............................................. 1730
- Adriatic Sea ........................................... 1734
- Black Sea and................................ Dardanelles 1735
- Far East, Pacific and........................... Atlantic 1757
BELLIGERENTS’ WAR LOSSES
(On the left margin of this table of losses is a page reference to the Naval Institute War Notes.)
Losses of Britain and her Allies.
BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES
British Warships Shell Zeebrugge
London, Tuesday, August 24.
A naval movement of some consequence is apparently in progress in the North Sea, but only meager details have been received here. British ships have bombarded the German submarine base at Zeebrugge and neighboring points on the Belgian coast.
Berlin asserts that 40 British ships were engaged in it, but the British Admiralty as yet has made no statement.
The firing lasted several hours, the German heavy artillery answering the ship fire.
This is the first report of any serious naval activity in the North Sea since January 24, when the German cruiser Blucher was sunk in the battle with the squadron under Admiral Beatty.
A dispatch from Flushing, Holland, gives this version of the affair:
“Several British warships appeared to-day (Monday) off Knocke, Belgium, and bombarded the coast. A press dispatch says that shells burst over a factory between Zeebrugge and Lisseweghe.
“The Germans replied with their coast defence guns, but their fire finally ceased.
“Heavy clouds of smoke appeared over Zeebrugge, but no fires were visible.
“Two large British warships were still off Knocke at 9 o’clock this morning.”
The Berlin official report says of the attack:
“Early this morning an enemy fleet, consisting of about 40 ships, appeared before Zeebrugge and steamed away again in a northwesterly direction, after having been bombarbed by our coastal artillery.”—New York Times, 8/24.
Amsterdam, August 26.
Concerning the recent bombardment of Zeebrugge by a British fleet the Tijd says it has learned that a large number of soldiers were killed by the fire of the fleet and that go severely wounded men were brought to Ghent.
The material damage done, it adds, was apparently very great, as a shed built for submarines was completely destroyed and with it some submarines. —New York Times, 8/27.
Germans Lost Destroyer
Amsterdam, August 24.
A telegram from the German Admiralty staff states:
“On the night of August 22-23 a German outpost boat was attacked off Zeebrugge by two hostile destroyers. After a brave resistance the boat was sunk. Part of the crew were rescued.”—Reuter, Naval and Military Record, 8/25.
“Outpost Vessel” a Destroyer.—Within a month of the torpedoing of a German destroyer of the G 196 type by a British submarine, another destroyer of the enemy has been sunk by French torpedo craft. On August 23, the Ministry of Marine announced that “two French torpedo-boats belonging to the second light squadron encountered a German destroyer off Ostend last night, which they sank after a fight. Our torpedo-boats only sustained insignificant damage to their hulls.” Next day (August 24) the loss was admitted by the German Admiralty in the following statement: “On the night of August 22-23 a German outpost vessel was attacked off Zeebrugge by two enemy destroyers and sunk after a brave defence, Part of the crew were saved.” The term outpost vessel (vorposten boot) has been favored by the Germans of late to apply to their destroyers in the North Sea, and was used in relation to the two vessels sunk near the North Hinder Lightship on May 1.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/28.
German Submarine Bombards Coast.—The press bureau issued last night the following account of the incident:
“A German submarine fired several shells at Parton, Harrington and Whitehaven between 4.30 a. m. and 5.20 a. m. to-day.
“No material damage was caused.
“A few shells hit the railway embankment north of Parton, but the train service was only slightly delayed.
“Fires were caused at Whitehaven and at Harrington, which were soon extinguished.
“No casualties have been reported.”—United Service Gazette, 8/19.
“E 13 ” Torpedoed and Shelled in Danish Waters
London, August 20.
The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:
“The British submarine E 13, on its way to the Baltic, grounded yesterday morning on the Danish island of Saltholm, in the Sound.
“Fifteen officers and men are reported to have been saved, while 15 are missing.”
London, August 21.
The Secretary of the Admiralty announces:
“Lieut. Commander Layton reports that the submarine grounded in the early morning of August 19, and that all efforts failed to refloat her.
“At 5 a. m. a Danish torpedo-boat appeared on the scene and communicated to E 13 that she would be allowed 24 hours to try to get oil. At the same time a German torpedo-boat destroyer arrived and remained close to the submarine until two more Danish torpedo-boats came up, when she withdrew.
“At 9 a. m., while three Danish torpedo-boats were anchored close to the submarine, two German torpedo-boat destroyers approached from the south. When about half a mile away one of these destroyers hoisted a commercial flag signal, but before the commanding officer of E 13 had time to read it the German destroyer fired a torpedo at her from a distance of about 300 yards, which exploded on hitting the bottom close to her.
“At the same moment the German destroyer fired with all her guns, and Lieut. Commander Layton, seeing that his submarine was on fire fore and aft, and unable to defend himself owing to being aground, gave orders for the crew to abandon her.
“While the men were in the water they were fired on by the machine guns and with shrapnel,
“One of the Danish torpedo-boats immediately lowered her boats and steamed between the submarine and the German destroyers, who therefore had to cease fire and withdraw.”
Danish Warships Intervene
Copenhagen, Friday (Delayed).
At 10.35 a.m. yesterday, when a Danish squadron was off the shallow Kraare banks in the Drogden passage, on its way to the wreck of the E 13, and about five miles distant from it, an explosion was observed near a vessel coming from the south towards the submarine. The commander of the Danish torpedo-boat Soeulven, which, with the torpedo-boat Stoeren, was near the E 13, reports that about 10.30 a. m. he observed two German torpedo vessels going towards the northeast in the Flintraennen Channel, whereupon the Soeulven immediately started to meet them and protest against a possible violation of neutrality.
The northernmost of the German vessels was observed flying the following signal: “ Leaving vessel as soon as possible.” Suddenly the German torpedo-boat discharged some shots against the submarine, which almost instantly took fire. The Soeulven immediately went towards the German vessel to stop the attack, upon which the German boat ceased fire and hurried southwards at great speed. As early as 8.45 a. m. a German torpedo- boat had passed by the E 13 without attempting to attack her. The British flag was hoisted on the E 13 during the whole cannonade.
Another version of the incident says that a torpedo discharged at the E 13 missed, but that the German destroyer then fired two shells, which did great damage to the submarine. Two men who were wounded were taken to the naval hospital at Copenhagen.
The affair has stirred public feeling here to its depths. The press is studiously guarded on the matter, but there is an undertone of bitter resentment. emphasis being laid on the point that there is no excuse or explanation possible in face of the fact that the first German torpedo-boat thoroughly investigated the locality before returning with the other. Thus it was a deliberate violation of Danish territory.
The Hooedstaden published a rumor that one Danish torpedo-boat had its wireless apparatus damaged and one man wounded.
The Kjoebenhavn writes: “We receive with deep pain the news that 14 sailors of a friendly nation have lost their lives not even in unequal combat, but without the faintest chance of defending themselves. There will be public expressions of indignation.”
The entire press commends the government for its prompt protest to Berlin, and assures it of the whole nation’s support.—Reuter, Naval and Military Record, 8/25.
In reply to Danish representations, Germany on August 23 expressed sincere regrets and apologies for the violation of neutrality committed by the German destroyer in firing on the E 13.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/28.
NORTH SEA
“Lynx” Mined in North Sea.—The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:
“H. M. S. Lynx (destroyer) struck a mine in the North Sea and sank on August 9. Four officers and 22 men were saved.”
The Lynx, which was completed last year, belonged to the K class—not, as her name might suggest, to the L class, like the Lance, and other destroyers with the same initial which have figured in more than one exploit during the war. She carried three 4-inch guns and was fitted with four 21-inch torpedo-tubes. Her displacement was 935 tons, and she carried normally a crew of about 100.—New York Times, 8/11.
“India” Torpedoed.—The Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement on August 12: “ H. M. auxiliary cruiser India, whilst engaged on patrol duty in the North Sea on August 8, was torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk; 22 officers and 119 men have been saved.” The India was formerly in the P. and O. service, and was of 7900 tons gross, with a speed of 18 knots, built in 1896. Eighty survivors were saved in two of her boats, and others by the British armed trawler Saxon and by merchant vessels which came on the scene. On August 12 the Norwegian Government informed Germany that the India was torpedoed in what has always been maintained to be Norwegian territorial waters. It was officially announced that just as the Norwegian Government previously insisted in face of the contrary contention of the British Government, that the West Fiord in its entirety was a Norwegian territorial water, the Norwegian Government now, on the occasion of the torpedoing of the India, has informed the German Government that the West Fiord has from time immemorial been regarded as belonging to Norwegian sea territory. This is specifically the fact with the part of the Fiord where the India was attacked. The Norwegian Government on August 17 announced its decision to intern the survivors rescued by the Saxon, but not those saved by neutral vessels.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/21.
As announced by the British Admiralty, the British patrol boat Ramsey, Lieutenant S. Raby, R. N. R., a small armed patrol vessel, was sunk by the German armed auxiliary steamer Meteor on August 8 in the North Sea. Four officers and 39 men were saved. The Meteor subsequently sighted a squadron of British cruisers, and her commanding officer, realizing that escape was impossible, ordered the crew to abandon the ship and then blew her up. The Admiralty said that five officers were lost in the taking of the Ramsey. The Meteor was formerly owned by the Hamburg-American Steamship Company and was of 3613 gross tons. The Ramsey was a merchant vessel which went into commission in the British Navy in November last. An official German report of the affair issued August 13, states the Meteor, which had slipped through the British patrol, was blown up by her commander to avoid capture by four British warships, which had cut off her escape to her home base. She had previously destroyed the British auxiliary cruiser Ramsey, the report says, saving four officers and 40 of her crew. These prisoners and the crew of a sailing ship sunk as a prize, and also the officers and crew of the Meteor, all reached a German port safely, the report states. The Meteor, it is said, was used as a mine layer.—Army and Navy Journal, 8/14.
“U 27” Lost.—The German Admiralty on September 7 made the following announcement: “According to a report of one of our submarines, it met the U 27 on the high seas after the latter, about August 10, had sunk a small British cruiser of an old type west of the Hebrides Islands (off the coast of Scotland). The U 27 has not since returned and must be regarded as lost.” The U 27 was built in 1912-13, at the same time as the U 19, these craft displacing about 800 tons, and was one of the speediest of the U boats constructed up to 1914. Her supposed speed was 18 knots above water and seven submerged, but the exact figures are not known. She was equipped with four torpedo-tubes.”—Army and Navy Journal, 9/11.
Report British Cruiser and Destroyer Sunk
Berlin, August 19 via wireless to Tuckerton, N. J.
German torpedo-boat destroyers have sunk a small British cruiser and a British destroyer by torpedoing them in an engagement off the west coast of Jutland, the German Admiralty announced to-day. The statement says:
“On August 17 at 2 o’clock five boats of one of our torpedo-boat flotillas attacked a small modern British cruiser and eight torpedo-boat destroyers near Hornsriff Lightship on the west coast of Jutland, and sank the cruiser and one destroyer with torpedoes. Our forces had no losses.—New York Times, 8/20.
German Destroyer Sunk.—The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:
“A British submarine has returned and reports sinking a German destroyer, believed to be of the G 196 class, on July 26, near the German coast.”—New York Times, 8/3.
BALTIC
Gulf of Riga Naval Operations
The German movements by sea and land in connection with the invasion of the province of Courland are developing into an attack upon Riga. Libau and Windau have already fallen into German hands, but at both places all the naval and military stores had been previously removed, and at the latter place the docks and ships were destroyed to prevent them being made use of by the enemy. No doubt if Riga can be occupied it will be a heavy blow to Russia, and the German soldiers are already at Tukkum, about 40 miles west of the place. That the Russians will with all the means at their disposal endeavor to defeat any naval operation having for its object the assistance of a land assault on Riga is certain. The Gulf is heavily mined. The Russian fleet under Vice Admiral Kanin should be fully equal to meeting the older vessels of the German navy, and if dreadnought cruisers and battleships are brought into the Gulf the British submarines may have a further opportunity of showing their enterprise and daring. It has now been officially admitted that it was Commander Max Horton who torpedoed the Pommern on July 2 off Dantzic, and who has been decorated by the Tsar with the Cross of Saint George. Hitherto the Germans have been singularly unsuccessful in their operations in the Baltic, but it remains to be seen whether they can prove themselves equal to the bigger task they are now attempting.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/24.
A German Baltic fleet has occupied Libau, Russia, as a naval base, says the Copenhagen correspondent of the London Daily Mail. A large force of experts is working repairing, adapting and fortifying the harbor works. Libau, in the Province of Courland, was occupied some time ago by German forces. It is about 60 miles by water from the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and about 140 miles by water from the city of Riga.—Army and Navy Journal, 8/14.
Actions of August 8 and 10.—Official Russian advices this week, dealing with naval operations in the Gulf of Riga, state on August 10 that three attempts, directed by a German fleet of 9 battleships, 12 cruisers and a large number of torpedo-boat destroyers, to break the mine barrier protecting the Gulf of Riga have been repulsed by the Russian fleet. Operating behind the mine field, the main Russian war fleet, with the aid of seaplanes, put out of action, it is declared, one cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroyers of the Germans, which were badly damaged. While some of the Russian vessels are believed to have been struck, the official report stated that “competent circles affirm categorically that none of our ships were lost.” An official explanation of the attack as given out follows: “The Gulf of Riga would allow the Germans to give powerful aid to their army now occupying the western coast of the gulf. With the object of penetrating the gulf, the fleet appeared August 8 off Rirben Channel, which is the only practicable way for large ships to enter. The enemy made three attacks with the object of breaking the mine barrier protected by our fleet, but did not succeed. Our seaplanes and warships co-operated to repel the enemy.”
Referring to the naval operations in the Baltic, a German official report of August 12 says: “Our Baltic naval forces on August 10 attacked Russian ships lying in the archipelago near the Schaeren Islands and by their fire forced the Russians to withdraw, among them an armored cruiser of the Makaroff class. We also silenced the coastal batteries. On the same day other German cruisers drove off Russian torpedo-boats which appeared near the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, and an enemy destroyer was seen to be on fire. Our ships repeatedly were attacked by enemy submarines, but all their torpedoes missed their mark. Our ships suffered neither damage nor losses.”—Army and Navy Journal, 8/14.
Gulf of Riga Naval Activity August 15 to 21
Petrograd, August 23.
The following statement was issued by the Russian Naval staff to-day: On August 16 the German fleet renewed with heavy forces its attacks on our positions in the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
During that day and the 17th our vessels repulsed the attacks of the enemy, whose secret preparations for entry into the gulf have been singularly favored by misty weather.
Taking advantage of the thick fog, considerable enemy forces had penetrated into the gulf. Our vessels fell back, while continuing to resist the enemy, without losing touch with him.
From August 19 to August 20 engagements with our vessels continued. As a result the enemy suffered considerable losses among his torpedo craft.
On our side we lost the gunboat Sivoutch, which perished gloriously in an unequal action with an enemy cruiser. The Sivoutch, wrapped in flame and on fire fore and aft, continued to answer shot for shot until she went down, having previously sunk an enemy torpedo-boat.
[The Sivoutch, built at Petrograd 1906-8, was a gunboat displacing 87s tons (length 215 feet, beam 36 feet, draft 9 feet). Her speed was 12 knots, and with a complement of 170, she carried two 4.7-inch guns, four 12- pounders, and three machine guns.]
On August 21 the enemy, in view of the losses he had sustained, and considering the barrenness of his efforts, apparently evacuated the gulf.
From August 15 to 21 two cruisers and not less than eight torpedo vessels belonging to the enemy were either put out of action or sunk.
At the same time our gallant Allies torpedoed, in the Baltic, one of the most powerful dreadnoughts of the German fleet.
[This probably refers to the battle cruiser Moltke, the loss of which is reported below.]
Moltke and Ten Other Warships Reported Sunk.—The President of the Duma has made the following announcement:
In the Riga battle the Germans lost one super-dreadnought (the Moltke), three cruisers, and seven torpedo-boats.
The German fleet has withdrawn from Riga Bay.
The Germans tried to make a descent near Pernau, in which four barges of enormous dimensions, crammed with soldiers, took part. The descent was repulsed by the Russian troops without the cooperation of artillery, the Germans being exterminated and the barges captured.—Central News.
The sinking of the Moltke (assuming that the above apparently authoritative report is correct) is the most serious blow yet sustained by the German Navy. The Moltke was one of the enemy’s largest and latest battle cruisers, and with her displacement of 22,640 tons is the biggest warship yet lost by any of tne belligerents.
Built at Hamburg in 1910-11, this super-dreadnought had a length of 610 feet, 96 feet beam, and a draft of 27 feet, and she carried ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch and twelve 3.4-inch guns, with four submerged torpedo- tubes. She was capable of a speed of 28 1/2 knots, and had a complement of more than 1000.
Pernau, where a disastrous landing was made by German troops, is in the north of the Gulf of Riga, and some 240 miles southwest of Petrograd.— Naval and Military Record, 8/25.
Petrograd, Tuesday, August 24.
Details from a reliable source are now available regarding the operations of the German fleet in the Gulf of Riga.
The old battleship Slava put up a fine fight against the enemy’s dreadnoughts. The importance of the engagement lay in the fact that for some time it prevented the enemy from forcing the Russian positions. The calm and misty weather favored the enemy, who, under cover of the fog, was able to evade our patrols and destroy our mines with greater ease. Nevertheless, this work cost the Germans some vessels, including a cruiser, which was blown up by one of the mines.
On the night of August 17 the enemy sent into the gulf two of his best destroyers to attack the Slava, which was impeding the operations. At dawn the destroyers, having failed to discover the Slava, were rejoining the enemy fleet, when they met the destroyer Novik (one of the fastest vessels afloat), which immediately gave battle. After 20 minutes’ desperate fighting the leading enemy destroyer had one of her funnels carried away, and she suffered other serious damage, which obliged her to take to flight. The other destroyer went to the assistance of her consort, and also gave up the fight. Soon afterwards the more seriously damaged of the two German vessels apparently went down.
It is also stated that, in addition to the ships already reported, the Germans lost an auxiliary cruiser.—Reuter, Naval and Military Record, 8/25.
The German Version
Amsterdam, August 21.
An official communique issued in Berlin to-day by the German Naval Staff says:
“Our Baltic naval forces penetrated the Gulf of Riga, after several days’ difficult mine sweeping and clearing away net obstructions had opened a way into the gulf.
“In outpost engagements which developed upon our entrance into the gulf a Russian torpedo-boat of the Emir Bucharsky class was destroyed. Other torpedo-boats, among them the Novik, and also a large vessel, were heavily damaged.
“In the course of a retreat, on the evening of August 19, in Moon Sund, the Russian gunboats Sivutch and Koreets were sunk, after brave fighting, by artillery fire and attacks by torpedo-boats. Forty men of the crews, among them two officers, severely wounded, were rescued by our torpedo- boats.
“Three of our torpedo-boats were damaged by mines. One of them sank, one was able to run ashore, and one was escorted to port. Our loss of life was small.”—Reuter, London Times, 8/23.
Gulf of Riga not Easily Forced.—That the German fleet will have a most difficult task in attempting to force a passage into the Gulf of Riga is the opinion expressed in military circles. Riga is recognized as essential to any German scheme involving an advance on Petrograd. By reason of its geographical location Riga is directly athwart the main trunk line leading from Warsaw through Vilna to Petrograd, and Riga has an independent connection of its own with the Russian capital.
Before the German fleet can hope to enter the Gulf of Riga it must force a passage through the waters between Dal Grand, the shoal waters off the southern end of Oscelo Island, and the Courland coast at Point Lyser Ort. In the center of the passageway is the Michael Bank. The usual route is to pass between Michael Bank and Lyser Ort. The distance from the Dal Grund to the nearest point on the Courland coast, which is in the vicinity of Launtseem, is ten miles, but this distance is shortened for navigation purposes by the four-fathom curve which off Launtseem extends at one point two miles off the beach.
It is this eight-mile stretch between the Dal Grund and the Courland coast which the Russians have blocked with mines. Only one other route is open to enter the Gulf of Riga, and that one is by way of Mohn Sound. This is a very dangerous passage and one which is also capable of being easily defended. The Russians through a number of years have conducted naval maneuvers having for their object the working out of war problems based on the loss of the Gulf of Riga. It would seem as if the Russians have always reckoned on the possibility of Riga falling before a strong naval force and have therefore based their defence of Petrograd on holding the Gulf of Finland. Assuming that Riga is taken, the Russian naval maneuvers were worked out on the assumption that the port of Reval would be the next point of attack. Reval is directly connected with Petrograd by rail and is the natural base for operations of a land force having Petrograd as its immediate objective.
Riga as a rule is frozen in after the first of November and continues so until the last of February or early in March. When the ice comes on the city front it is still possible for vessels to discharge and load for a few weeks longer at Millegraf. The latter place is about five miles below Riga on the Dvina River. Hapsal, Port Baltic and Reval close about November or December and open in February or early March. During the winter months the Gulf of Riga is covered with ice a considerable distance from shore. It is the practice of the Russian Government to employ ice breakers to prolong the open season at the Riga Gulf and Finland ports.
The success of the Russians in holding back the German fleet from the Gulf of Riga is ascribed in naval circles largely to the Russian naval maneuver experience of recent years, which has to do almost wholly with the problem of holding the Riga Gulf entrance as a preliminary to the defence of the Gulf of Finland. The Russians have the advantage that they can reinforce by way of the Mohn Sound, the passage between Orel and the Hapsal shore, any containing force defending the entrance to Riga. The Gulf of Finland is reported as safe so long as the Gulf of Riga remains in Russian possession.
The Gulf of Finland on its northern side is fringed with reefs. A well- defined passage exists behind these reefs and Russian naval defence of the Finland Gulf largely counts on using this inside passageway. The depth of water is sufficient for large vessels.
Aside from the Finnish reef passage the waters of the Gulf of Finland are open, and there is no block before Petrograd short of Cronstadt. The latter place has long been regarded as possessing one of the most elaborate torpedo-defence schemes of any port in the world. Cronstadt was wrested from the Swedes by Peter the Great in 1703.—N. Y. Herald, 8/14.
Commander Horton, D. S. O.—It is now revealed that the German battleship recently sunk in the Baltic was the Pommern, and that she was destroyed by the submarine under the command of Commander Max K. Horton. Early in the war Commodore Keyes in his despatch referred to Lieut. Commander Horton, as he then was, as a “most enterprising submarine officer,” and he has certainly justified this encomium. He now has to his credit the following ships:
Pommern, battleship, sunk in Baltic, July 2, 1915.
Hela, light cruiser, sunk off Heligoland, September 13, 1914.
S 116 destroyer, sunk off Borkum, October 6, 1914.—Naval and Military Record, 7/28.
German Transport Sunk in Baltic—A Russian official communique of Monday states that a British submarine has sunk a large German transport in the Baltic.—Naval and Military Record, 8/4.
“Albatross” Interned.—The German minelayer Albatross, which in the battle of July 2 ran ashore at Ostergarn, was reported salved on July 24 by the Neptune, one of the steamers of a Stockholm salvage company. The cruiser will be interned at Farosound, a Swedish seaport between Gothland and Faroe.—Army and Navy Gazette, 7/31.
ADRIATIC
French Destroyer Sank Austria’s “U 3”
Paris, August 15.
The Austrian submarine U 3 which was sunk in the Adriatic on August 13, was sent to the bottom by the accurate fire of the guns of the French torpedo-boat destroyer Bisson, according to a Havas dispatch from Rome, which gives the details of the activities of the U 3.
The Austrian submersible attacked an Italian auxiliary cruiser in the lower Adriatic on August 12, but the larger craft, by the clever maneuvering of her commander, escaped two torpedoes aimed at her. She then rammed the submarine but failed to sink it. A squadron of destroyers immediately set out to chase the submarine, which evidently had been damaged in the encounter with the cruiser. The Austrian vessel was sighted the following morning by the Bisson and sunk.
The French official version of the sinking of the Austrian submarine U 3 was given out by the Ministry of Marine here to-night and reads as follows:
“The Austrian submarine U 3 after attacking in the Adriatic without success an Italian auxiliary cruiser was pursued during the whole of the afternoon of August 12 by Italian and French torpedo-boat destroyers. The U 3 was discovered and sunk by gun-fire on the morning of August 13 by the French torpedo-boat destroyer Bisson, which made prisoner of one officer and 11 sailors.”—N. Y. Times, 8/16.
Submarine Base Destroyed
Toulon, Sunday.
A navy order issued here announces that the French destroyer Bisson has just carried out a brilliant operation by destroying the Austrian submarine and aeroplane supply station at Fagosta Island, cutting the cable and killing several Austrians. The French had one bluejacket killed.— Reuter, Naval and Military Record, 7/28.
“U 12” Sunk.—The U 3 is the second Austrian submarine sunk last week by the Italians, who thus have the satisfaction of avenging the torpedoing of the Amalfi and the Giuseppe Garibaldi. The U 3 was one of a pair of vessels launched at the Germania Yard, Kiel, in 1908. She had a length of 142 feet and 12 1/2 feet beam. The surface displacement was 255 tons, and the submerged displacement 295 tons. The vessel had two torpedo-tubes, and carried 17 officers and men.
The submarine sunk earlier in the week was the U 12, one of the newest Austrian underwater craft. She had the worst of a duel with an Italian submarine in the Upper Adriatic, and was sunk with all hands. In a similar duel last June the Italian submarine Medusa was torpedoed and sunk, and from the reports of divers afterwards it appeared that the Austrian craft also perished, so that at least three of Austria’s small band of U boats have been accounted for. It will be recalled that last March two German submarines were sunk in one week by British war vessels.—Naval and Military Record, 8/18.
The U 12, of which type there are three boats, was completed at Pola since the war began. Her displacement was 1000 tons submerged, her speed was supposed to be 18 knots on the surface and 10 knots submerged, and she was armed with five 21-inch torpedo-tubes. Her officers and men probably numbered from 25 to 30.—N. Y. Times, 8/18.
BLACK SEA AND DARDANELLES
Allied Fleet at Dardanelles
BRITISH BATTLESHIPS
1 Signifies ships lost by mine or torpedo.
Sir Ian Hamilton on the Operations
The General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force has sent the following despatch to the Secretary of State for War:
General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
May 20, 1915.
Immediately on arrival on March 17 I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; General d’Amade, commanding the French Corps Expeditionnaire; and Contre Admiral Guepratte, in command of the French squadron. At this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land-fortresses took place next day, March 18. I witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your lordship my reluctant deduction that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be required to enable the fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.
By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the northwestern shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Flelles, at its extreme point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a southwesterly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its center a breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva. The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Kaba Tebe and Kalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr, while the toe is that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-ul-Bahr.
The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be:
- Saribair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.
- Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Tegean.
- Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field-gun range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.
A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features.
Generally speaking, the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles further up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-ul-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply- rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort.
By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing-places on either side of Kaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.
Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or
Anglo-British Forces Made Their Historic Landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25—at the Beaches Indicated on the Map
The Turks, aided by the rugged nature of the ground, had made the southern spit of the peninsula into a fortress culminating in the height of Achi Baba. The difficulties of landing were followed by equal difficulties of advance. The troops are now athwart the peninsula about four miles from Cape Helles, the French holding the line of the Keveres Dere, and the British carrying on the line in front of Achi Baba and Krithia to the western coast. Australian and New Zealand troops, who landed separately, occupy a strip of coast on the cliffs of Sari Bair. Achi Baba has so far proved impregnable, and our losses have been severe in the several battles which have been fought.
piecemeal program was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theater of operations I have described—a theater strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns, or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable, if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force. The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened, the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.
Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that they should be launched.
Owing to the lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbor was out of the question. With your lordship’s approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry Brigade, and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On March 24 I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until April 7, working out the allocation of the troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkations. General d’Amade did likewise.
On April 1 the remainder of the general headquarters, which had not been mobilized when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.
Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with the G. O. C., Egypt, and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was to be my privilege to command.
By April 7 my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the vice-admiral commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.
The covering force of the 29th division left Mudros harbor on the evening of April 23 for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of these V, W and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a. m., after half an hour’s bombardment from the fleet.
The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables, and, escorted by the third squadron of the fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the third squadron at once took up the positions allotted to them, and at 5 a. m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy’s defences was begun. Meanwhile the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the straits the guns of the fleet remained unanswered.
The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of the 2d South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieutenant Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current, but by 7.30 a. m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some 50 casualties, and Lieutenant Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained himself until the general advance on the 27th brought him into touch with the main body.
The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the 29th division for this task, the whole under command of Lieutenant Colonel Koe. The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.
A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, were awaiting an attempt, which could hardly have made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavor was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy’s strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.
Later in the day a large force of Turks was seen to be advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favored by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine gun on its back over the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted. The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority, and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded during the incessant fighting was very heavy.
By 7 a. m. on the 26th only about half of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchments made for four times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to His Majesty’s ships Goliath, Dublin, Amethyst, and Sapphire, thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet. taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch- and-go struggle.
The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by eight yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from His Majesty’s ship Implacable in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a. m. His Majesty’s ship Implacable, with a boldness much admired by the army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear.
Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round this landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been wounded during the day’s fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.
The landing on V beach was planned to take on the following lines (See page 1381 of July-August Proceedings):
Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The brigadier and his brigade major had been killed; Lieutenant Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed, and the adjutant had been wounded. The adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant Colonel Doughty- Wylie and Lieutenant Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the River Clyde, had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for_ danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.
Now that it was daylight one more, Lieutenant Colonels Doughty- Wylie and Williams set to work to organize an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavored to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear Admiral Wemyss about this same time a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the old fort, Sedd-el-Bahr village, the old castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach.
Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, Brigade Major, R. A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a. m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gun-fire, they pushed forward, and soon after mid-day they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in position to attack the old castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit, and occupied the old castle and Hill 141 before 2 p. m.
W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand, some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but in the center a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing place into a death trap. Close to the water’s edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows.
Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches, to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine guns were also cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the northwest and southeast, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near Point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet broad, and could be approached only by a glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.
So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25.
The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a. m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship’s cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached the tows were cast off, and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach, and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu.
Brigadier General Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross-fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.
While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy’s trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left and center, commenced hacking their way through the wire.
A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly reformed, and set forth to storm the enemy’s entrenchments wherever they could find them.
In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114, whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.
Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a. m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.
About 9.30 a. m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach.
On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff, 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organize a further advance.
At 2 p. m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p. m. the hill and redoubt were captured.
An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day’s fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.
When night fell the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the 2d London Field Company R. E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.
During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.
The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24, escorted by the 2d squadron of the fleet, under Rear Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1500 men who had been placed on board His Majesty’s ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats.
This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a. m. His Majesty’s ships, together with the tows and the destroyers proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, His Majesty’s ship Queen (flying Rear Admiral Thursby’s flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a. m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a. m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.
All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favorable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.
A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction, the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.
The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a northeasterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the northwestern side of the ravine.
From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes gives access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Saribair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run northwest, west, southwest, and south to the coast.
The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy’s fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians’ turn had come.
Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.
This attack was carried out by the 3d Australian Brigade under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D. S. O. The 1st and 2d Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p. m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy’s heavy guns opened on the anchorage, and forced the transports which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand further out to sea.
The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valor of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far farther into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units.
Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position, with its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman’s Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).
From 11 a. m. to 3 p. m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the 3d Brigade and the left of the 2d Brigade. This counterattack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of His Majesty’s ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p. m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the 3d Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm.
The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th-2Sth, they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.
It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.
The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th, owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the army corps on April 28 and 29.
On the night of May 2 a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the center of the line. The enemy’s enfilading machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4 an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief.
But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station, the strengthening of entrenchments, the reorganization of units, and the perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.
The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby’s hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand army corps.
Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale, under the guns of the French fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked. Five hundred prisoners were captured by the French on this day.
This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings.
On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.
The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.
By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the nullah, 3200 yards northeast of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point, the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the left and in the center, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right. Owing to casualties this' line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commence at 8 a. m. next day.
The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.
The advance commenced at 8 a. m. on the 28th, and was carried out with commendable vigor, despite the fact that from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.
The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a. m. had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to concentrate and make disposition to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun-fire from H. M. S. Queen Elizabeth they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning.
The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile southwest of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.
The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a. m. when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia.
The movement commenced at about 1 p. m., but though small reconnoitering parties got to within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground.
By 2 p. m. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing-places.
Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 p. m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the center and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually, a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 p. m. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with our Allies.
In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely. Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided. ,
Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.
For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles northwest of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French southeast to the coast.
Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day’s fighting, and there was a dangerous re-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to reorganize.
April 29 was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.
Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held by the French being somewhat increased.
Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into a reserve.
This reserve was increased on May 1 by the addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expeditionnaire d’Orient had disembarked the whole of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by the same evening.
At 10 p. m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition, to make them rely upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with colored Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range; white that our front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had been carried.
The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed von Zowenstern, and addressed to the Turkish rank and file, who were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the sea.
“Attack the enemy with the bayonet, and utterly destroy him!
“We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish!
“Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!”
The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex Regiment, detached for the purpose by the officer commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve.
The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artillery brigades and a Howitzer battery. After several charges and countercharges the Senegalese began to give ground, and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then maintained for the remainder of the night, although, about 2 a. m., it was found necessary to despatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.
About 5 a. m. a counter-offensive was ordered, and the whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a. m. the British left had gained some 500 yards, and the center had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As the British center and left were now subjected to heavy cross-fire from concealed machine guns, it was found impossible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 a. m., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.
The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed-wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.
On the 2d, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 p. m., however, they made another attack against the whole Allied line, their chief effort being made against the French front, where the ground favored their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss.
During the night 3d-4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my general reserve.
The day of the 4th was spent in reorganization, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2d Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.
During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.
Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these and the three days’ battle which ensued will be dealt with in my next despatch.
The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this despatch, were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering:
177 officers and 1990 other ranks killed.
412 officers and 7807 other ranks wounded.
13 officers and 3580 other ranks missing.
From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborative work involved by these landings was put through by my General Staff, working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Keyes, C. B., M. V. O., and the Naval Transport officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and army carried out these combined duties with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.
Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realizes how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.
Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le General d’Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed by the commander of the Corps Expeditionnaire de l’Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-ul-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le General d’Amade.
Ian Hamilton, General, Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
—United Service Gazette, 7/15.
Admiral de Robeck’s Despatch
Triad, July 1.
Sir.—I have the honor to forward herewith an account of the operations carried out on April 25 and 26, 1915, during which period the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in the Gallipoli Peninsula.
The landing commenced at 4.20 a. m. on 25th. The general scheme was as follows:
Two main landings were to take place, the first at a point just north of Gaba Tepe, the second on the southern end of the peninsula. In addition, a landing was to be made at Kum Kale, and a demonstration in force to be carried out in the Gulf of Xeros, near Bulair.
The night of the 24th-25th was calm and very clear, with a brilliant moon, which set at 3 a. m.
The first landing, north of Gaba Tepe, was carried out under the orders of Rear Admiral C. F. Thursby, C. M. G. His squadron consisted of the following ships:
Battleships: Queen, London, Prince of Wales, Triumph, Majestic.
Cruiser: Bacchante.
Destroyers: Beagle, Bulldog, Foxhound, Scourge, Colne, Usk, Chelmer, Ribble.
Seaplane Carrier: Ark Royal.
Balloon Ship: Monica.
And 15 trawlers.
To Queen, London and Prince of Wales was delegated the duty of actually landing the troops. To Triumph, Majestic and Bacchante the duty of covering the landing by gun-fire.
In this landing a surprise was attempted. The first troops to be landed were embarked in the battleships Queen, London and Prince of Wales.
The squadron then approached the land at 2.58 a. m. at a speed of five knots. When within a short distance of the beach selected for landing the boats were sent ahead. At 4.20 a. m. the boats reached the beach and a landing was effected. The remainder of the infantry of the covering force were embarked at 10 p. m., 24th. The troops were landed in two trips, the operation occupying about half an hour, this in spite of the fact that the landing was vigorously opposed, the surprise being only partially effected.
The disembarkation of the main body was at once proceeded with. The operations were somewhat delayed owing to the transports having to remain a considerable distance from the shore in order to avoid the howitzer and field guns’ fire brought to bear on them, and also the fire from warships stationed in the Narrows, Chanak.
The beach here was very narrow and continuously under shell fire. The difficulties of disembarkation were accentuated by the necessity of evacuating the wounded; both operations proceeded simultaneously. The service was one which called for great determination and coolness under fire, and the success achieved indicates the spirit animating all concerned. In this respect I would specially mention the extraordinary gallantry and dash shown by the 3d Australian Infantry Brigade (Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D. S. O.), who formed the covering force. Many individual acts of devotion to duty were performed by the personnel of the navy; these are dealt with helow. Here I should like to place on record the good service performed by the vessels employed in landing the second part of the covering force; the seamanship displayed and the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach are deserving of the highest praise.
On the 26th the landing of troops, guns and stores continued throughout the day; this was a most trying service, as the enemy kept up an incessant shrapnel fire, and it was extremely difficult to locate the well-concealed guns of the enemy. Occasional bursts of fire from the ships in the Narrows delayed operations somewhat, but these bursts of fire did not last long, and the fire from our ships always drove the enemy's ships away.
The enemy heavily counter-attacked, and though supported by a very heavy shrapnel fire, he could make no impression on our line, which was every minute becoming stronger. By nightfall on April 26 our position north of Gaba Tepe was secure.
The landing at the southern extremity of the Gallipoli Peninsula was carried out under the orders of Rear Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C. M. G., M. V. O., his squadron consisting of the following ships:
Battleships: Swiftsure, Implacable, Cornwallis, Albion, Vengeance, Lord Nelson, Prince George.
Cruisers: Euryalus, Talbot, Minerva, Dublin.
Meet Sweepers: Six.
Trawlers: Fourteen.
Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places; the conditions at each landing varied considerably. The position of beaches is given below.
Position of Beach.—Y beach, a point about 700 yards northeast of Cape Tekeh. X beach, 1000 yards northeast of Cape Tekeh. W beach, Cape Tekeh-Cape Helles. V beach. Cape Helles-Sedd-ul-Bahr. Camber, Sedd-ul- Bahr. S beach, Eski-Hissarlik Point.
Taking these landings in the above order:
Y Beach.—The troops to the first landed, the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, embarked on the 24th in the Amethyst and Sapphire, and proceeded with the transports Southland and Braemar Castle to a position off Cape Tekeh. At 4 a. m. the boats proceeded to Y beach, timing their arrival there at 5 a. m., and pulled ashore covered by fire from His Majesty’s ship Goliath. The landing was most successfully and expeditiously carried out, the troops gaining the top of the high cliffs overlooking this beach without being opposed; this result I consider due to the rapidity with which the disembarkation was carried out and the well- placed covering fire from ships.
The Scottish Borderers were landed in two trips, followed at once by the Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines. These troops met with severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships was of little assistance, and, after heavy fighting, were forced to re-embark on the 26th.
The re-embarkation was carried out by the following ships: Goliath,
Talbot, Dublin, Sapphire, and Amethyst. It was most ably conducted by the beach personnel and covered by the fire of the warships, who prevented the enemy reaching the edge of the cliff, except for a few snipers.
X Beach.—The 2d Battalion Royal Fusiliers (two companies and M. G. Section) embarked in Implacable on 24th, which ship proceeded to a position off the landing-place, where the disembarkation of the troops commenced at 4.30 a. m., and was completed at 5.15 a. m.
A heavy fire was opened on the cliffs on both sides. The Implacable approached the beach, and the troops were ordered to land, fire being continued until the boats were close in to the beach. The troops on board the Implacable were all landed by 7 a. m., without any casualties. The nature of the beach was very favorable for the covering fire from ships, but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model.
W Beach.—The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers embarked in Euryalus and Implacable on the 24th, who proceeded to positions off the landing- place, where the troops embarked in the boats at about 4 a. m. Shortly after 5 a. m. Euryalus approached W beach and Implacable X beach. At 5 a. m. the covering ships opened a heavy fire on the beach, which was continued up to the last moment before landing. Unfortunately, this fire did not have the effect on the extensive wire entanglements and trenches that had been hoped for, and the troops, on landing at 6 a. m., were met with a very heavy fire from rifles, machine-guns and pom-poms, and found the, obstructions on the beach undamaged. The formation of this beach lends itself admirably to the defence, the landing-place being commanded by sloping cliffs offering ideal positions for trenches and giving a perfect field of fire. The only weakness in the enemy’s position was on the flanks, where it was just possible to land on the rocks and thus enfilade the more important defences. This landing on the rocks was effected with great skill, and some Maxims, cleverly concealed in the cliffs, and which completely enfiladed the main beach, were rushed with the bayonet. This assisted to a great extent in the success of the landing; the troops, though losing very heavily, were not to be denied, and the beach and the approaches to it were soon in our possession.
The importance of this success cannot be overestimated; W and V beaches were the only two of any size in this area on which troops, other than infantry, could be disembarked, and failure to capture this one might have had serious consequences, as the landing at V was held up. The beach was being continuously sniped, and a fierce infantry battle was carried on round it throughout the entire day and the following night. It is impossible to exalt too highly the service rendered by the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the storming of the beach; the dash and gallantry displayed were superb. Not one whit behind in devotion to duty was the work of the beach personnel, who worked untiringly throughout the day and night, landing troops and stores under continual sniping. The losses due to rifle and machine-gun fire sustained by the boats’ crews, to which they had not the satisfaction of being able to reply, bear testimony to the arduous nature of the service.
During the night of the 25th-26th the enemy attacked continuously, and it was not till 1 p. m. on the 26th, when V beach was captured, that our position might he said to be secure.
The work of landing troops, guns, and stores continued throughout this period, and the conduct of all concerned left nothing to be desired.
V Beach.—This beach, it was anticipated, would be the most difficult to capture; it possessed all the advantages for defence which W beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by the old castle and village of Sedd-ul-Bahr on the east and perpendicular cliffs on the west; the whole foreshore was covered with barbed-wire entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.
The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats, but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering force by means of a collier, the River Clyde. This steamer had been specially prepared for the occasion under the directions of Commander Edward Unwin; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge on to the beach.
V beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to W beach, with the same result, i. e., when the first trip attempted to land they were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom and machine-gun, which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.
A landing on the flanks here was impossible, and practically all the first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some slight shelter under a bank on the beach; in several boats all were either killed or wounded; one boat entirely disappeared, and in another there were only two survivors. Immediately after the boats had reached the beach the River Clyde was run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.
As the River Clyde grounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run out ahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations, and a gap was left between two lighters, over which it was impossible for men to cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea and wading ashore; this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead, and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.
The troops in the River Clyde were protected from rifle and machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.
Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left the River Clyde, and, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the lighters into position; he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G. L. Drewry, R. N. R., of H. M. S. Hussar; Midshipman W. St. A. Malleson, R. N., of H. M. S. Cornwallis; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O. N. 186774 (R- F. R. B.3766), and Seaman R. N. R. George McKenzie Samson, O. N. 2408 A, both of H. M. S. Hussar.
The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the troops, anyone appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men in the River Clyde remained in her till nightfall.
At 9.50 a. m. Albion sent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not quite reach beach; these boats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing to heavy fire.
It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on V beach, and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to W.
The position remained unchanged on V-beach throughout the day, men-of-war and the maxims mounted in River Clyde doing their utmost to keep down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.
During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing the wounded men in the water.
During the night of the 25th-26th the troops in River Clyde were able to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the beach and in the village of Sedd-ul-Bahr, for possession of which now commenced a most stubborn fight.
The fight continued, supported ably by gun-fire from H. M. S. Albion, until 1.24 p. m., when our troops had gained a position from which they assaulted Hill 141, which dominated the situation. Albion then ceased fire and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by the troops, led by Lieutenant Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill effectively cleared the enemy from the neighborhood of the V beach, which could now be used for the disembarkation of the Allied armies. The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry and perseverance from the officers and men of both services—that they successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous.
The Camber, Sedd-ul-Bahr.—One-half company Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed here, without opposition, the Camber being “dead ground.” The advance from the Camber, however, was only possible on a narrow front and after several attempts to enter the village of Sedd-ul-Bahr this half company had to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.
De Totts, S Beach.—The 2d South Wales Borderers (less one company) and a detachment 2d London Field Company R. E. were landed in boats, convoyed by Cornwallis, and covered by that ship and Lord Nelson.
Little opposition was encountered, and the hill was soon in the possession of the South Wales Borderers. The enemy attacked this position on the evening of the 25th and during the 26th, but our troops were firmly established, and with the assistance of the covering ships all attacks were easily beaten off.
Kum Kale.—The landing here was undertaken by the French. It was most important to prevent the enemy occupying positions in this neighborhood, whence he could bring gun-fire to bear on the transports off Cape Helles. It was also hoped that by holding this position it would be possible to deal effectively with the enemy’s guns on the Asiatic shore immediately east of Kum Kale, which could fire into Sedd-ul-Bahr and De Totts. The French, after a heavy preliminary bombardment, commenced to land at about 10 a. m., and by the afternoon the whole of their force had been landed at-Kum Kale. When they attempted to advance to Yeni Shehr, their immediate objective, they were met by heavy fire from well-concealed trenches, and were held up just south of Kum Kale village. During the night of the 25th-26th the enemy made several counter-attacks, all of which were easily driven off; during one of these 400 Turks were captured, their retreat being cut off by the fire from the battleships. On the 26th, when it became apparent that no advance was possible without entailing severe losses and the landing of large reinforcements, the order was given for the French to withdraw and re-embark, which operation was carried out without serious opposition.
I now propose to make the following more general remarks on the conduct of the operations:
From the very first the co-operation between army and navy was most happy; difficulties which arose were quickly surmounted, and nothing could have exceeded the tactfulness and forethought of Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff. The loyal support which I received from Contre-Amiral E. P. A. Guepratte simplified the task of landing the Allied armies simultaneously. The Russian fleet was represented by H. I. R. M. S. Askold. which ship was attached to the French squadron. Contre-Amiral Guepratte bears testimony to the value of the support he received from Captain Ivanoff, especially during the landing and re-embarkation of the French troops at Kum Kale.
The detailed organization of the landing could not be commenced until the army headquarters returned from Egypt on April 10. The work to be done was very great, and the naval personnel and material available small.
Immediately on the arrival of the army staff at Mudros, committees, composed of officers of both services, commenced to work out the details of the landing operations, and it was due to these officers’ indefatigable efforts that the expedition was ready to land on the 22d of April. The keenness displayed by the officers and men resulted in a good standard of efficiency, especially in the case of the Australian and New Zealand corps, who appear to be natural boatmen.
Such actions as the storming of the Sedd-ul-Bahr position by the 29th Division must live in history forever; innumerable deeds of heroism and daring were performed; the gallantry and absolute contempt for death displayed alone made the operations possible.
At Gaba Tepe the landing and the dash of the Australian Brigade for the cliffs were magnificent—nothing could stop such men. The Australian and New Zealand army corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen have every reason to be proud.
In closing this despatch, I beg to bring to their lordships’ notice the names of certain officers and men who have performed meritorious service. The great traditions of His Majesty’s Navy were well maintained, and the list of names submitted of necessity lacks those of many officers and men who performed gallant deeds unobserved and therefore unnoted. This standard was high, and if I specially mention one particular action it is that of Commander Unwin and the two young officers and two seamen who assisted him in the work of establishing communication between River Clyde and the beach. Rear Admirals R. E. Wemyss, C. M. G., M. V. O., C. F. Thursby, C. M. G., and Stuart Nicholson, M. V. O., have rendered invaluable service. Throughout they have been indefatigable in their efforts to further the success of the operations, and their loyal support has much lightened my duties and responsibilities.
I have at all times received the most loyal support from the commanding officers of His Majesty’s ships during an operation which called for the display of great initiative and seamanship.
Captain R. F. Phillimore, C. B., M. V. O., A. D. C., as principal beach master, and Captain D. L. Dent, as principal naval transport officer, performed most valuable service.—United Service Gazette, 8/19.
French Mine-Layer “Casabianca” Sunk.—An official note issued at Paris, June 7, said: “During the night of June 3-4 the French minelayer Casabianca struck a mine at the entrance to the Aegean Sea. The captain, one officer, and 64 of the crew were rescued by a British destroyer. It is possible that other survivors may have succeeded in gaining the coast and are prisoners in the hands of the Turks.”—Army and Navy Gazette, 6/12.
The details that have been published of the court-martial held at Toulon over the loss of the Casabianca on June 3d last show that this 950-ton porte-mines was the victim, not of a successful hostile attack, as at first reported, but of the accidental explosion of its own mines, which blew up the after part of the ship, causing her to sink like a stone with two-thirds of her crew of 164. This is the only mishap of its kind having attended extensive mine-laying on the Allied side. It occurred in the course of a dangerous operation carried out in proximity to the enemy under cover of darkness. Commander de la Fourniere, who was saved by mere luck, was exonerated from all blame, and the whole personnel of the Casabianca have been “cites a l’ordre du jour” by Amiralissimo de Lapeyrere, for the zeal and bravery they have displayed in the accomplishment of their duty. Part of the crew owed their lives to the timely arrival of a British destroyer, which rescued them from a sinking “vedette.”—Naval and Military Record, 8/25.
Transport “Royal Edward” Lost.—The following is the text of the Admiralty announcement:
“The British transport Royal Edward was sunk by an enemy submarine in the Aegean last Saturday morning (August 14).
“According to the information at present available, the transport had on board 32 military officers and 1350 troops, in addition to the ship’s crew of 220 officers and men. The troops consisted mainly of reinforcements for the 29th Division and details of the Royal Army Medical Corps.
“Full information has not yet been received, but it is known that about 600 have been saved.”
The Royal Edward was built on the Clyde in 1908. She was a steel triple-screw steamer of 11,117 tons with a length of 545 feet, a breadth of 60 feet, and a depth of 38 feet.—London Times, 8/18.
French Submarine “Mariotte” Sunk
Paris, July 29.
The Admiralty issues the following communique:
“The French squadron in the Dardanelles is without direct news of the French submarine Mariotte. The submarine entered the Straits on the morning of July 26 in order to operate in the Sea of Marmora.
“According to Turkish telegrams the Mariotte has been sunk and 31 officers and sailors composing her crew have been taken prisoners.”
.... The Mariotte, which was built in 1911 at Cherbourg, belongs to the class known as “submersibles.” Her length is 215 normal and her tonnage is, afloat, 522 and submerged, 615. She is supplied with Diesel engines. Her surface speed is 15 knots, and below water 10. She is provided with six torpedo-tubes, and has a complement of 28.
This is the second submarine lost by the French in the Dardanelles.
Submarine Exploits.—The Secretary of the Admiralty on August 2 made the following announcement:
“The vice-admiral commanding in the eastern Mediterranean reports that one of the British submarines operating in the Sea of Marmora torpedoed a large steamer of 3000 tons off Mudania Pier, which had several sailing vessels secured alongside. The explosion was very heavy. A small steamer close to Karabogha Bay was torpedoed. A report from Constantinople states that a gunboat was torpedoed in the Sea of Marmora about this time, and possibly the report refers to this occasion. Torpedoes were fired at lighters alongside the arsenal at Constantinople. The result could not be seen, but the explosion was heavy. The Zeitunlik powder mills were fired at, but owing to the darkness the result could not be ascertained. The railway cutting one mile west of Kara Burnu was bombarded and the line blocked temporarily, so that a troop train was unable to pass, and was being fired at as it steamed back, three truckloads of ammunition being blown up.”
The special correspondent of the Times at Mytilene reported on August 1, on the authority of information from Dedeagatch, that the Galata bridge had been blown up by submarines. The bridge referred to is, no doubt, the iron bridge connecting Galata with Stambul, which was begun in 1909 and was publicly inaugurated in 1912.—Army and Navy Gazette, 8/7.
“Goeben” and “Breslau” Reported Torpedoed.—Newspaper despatches from Athens of August 12 announce that British submarines which have penetrated the Black Sea have torpedoed the former German cruiser Breslau (now Midilli) and a transport gunboat in those waters, and also state that the Goeben, a former German battle cruiser (now Sultan Yawns Selim), has been torpedoed and is now aground in the Bosphorus. The Breslau is an armored cruiser of 4550 tons, completed in 1912, and has a speed of 30 knots. The Goeben was completed in 1912 and has a speed of 28 knots. Her tonnage is 23,000. The two ships are about the best in the Turkish Navy. No details are given of the torpedoing of the Midilli, but the Goeben, it is said, after she was torpedoed was run aground in a narrow creek in the Bosphorus, where she is lying alongside shore in default of a dry or floating dock in Turkey sufficiently large to accommodate a vessel of her size. A dike has been built around her from which the Turks are pumping out water. The British Admiralty have received no confirmation of the above.—Army and Navy Journal, 8/14.
Damage to Inflexible.—A good deal has been made of the revelations in Vice Admiral de Robeck’s despatch with reference to the injuries received by the battle cruiser Inflexible on March 18, when the Bouvet, Irresistible, and Ocean were sunk. The Admiralty then announced that “the Inflexible had her forward control position hit by a heavy shell and requires repair.” According to the admiral’s despatch this was not strictly the truth. He reports that “Lieutenant Commander Acheson went down into the fore magazine and shell room of the Inflexible when the parties working in these places had been driven out by fumes, caused by the explosion of a mine under the ship; they closed valves and watertight doors, lights being out, the shell room having two feet of water in it, rising quickly, and the magazine flooding slowly.” Again it is stated that “during the time H. M. S. Inflexible was steaming to Tenedos—after having struck a mine— the engine-room being in semi-darkness and great heat, the ship in possible danger of sinking on passage, a high standard of discipline was called for in the engineer department, a call which was more than met.”
Battleship “Hairredin Barbarossa” and Gunboat “Berk-i-Satvet ” Torpedoed.—It was officially announced on August 9 that the Turkish battleship Hairredin (or Kheyr-ed-Din) Barbarossa was sunk by a British submarine in the Sea of Marmora on August 9. She was formerly the German battleship Kurfuerst Friedrich Wilhelm, and carried a crew of 579 men. A majority of the officers and crew are reported saved. She was a battleship of 9901 tons displacement, built in 1891 at a cost of $2,250,000. She carried six 11-inch guns, eight 4.1-inch guns, eight 15 ½ pounders, had three torpedo-tubes and a speed of 17 knots. The ship was purchased from Germany in 1910 and ranked as one of the principal units of the Turkish fleet. She had an armor belt of 15 ¾ inches amidships and 12 inches at the ends. British submarines have been active in the Sea of Marmora and even up to the bridges of Constantinople. The Turkish official statement, in admitting the sinking of the battleship, says: “The loss of the Barbarossa, which was sunk August 9, however regrettable in itself, does not affect us excessively except that it places the strength of our ships compared to that of the enemy in the ratio of one to ten.”
The British vice-admiral in the Dardanelles reports that one of the British submarines operating in these waters sank a Turkish battleship on the morning of August 8 at the entrance to the Sea of Marmora. A Turkish gunboat, the Berk-I-Satvet, and an empty transport also have been torpedoed in the Dardanelles by one of the British submarines the report said. A Turkish official communication, dated August 9, reported that the Turkish battleship Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine. The Turkish gunboat Berk-I-Satvet was built at the Krupp works in 1906. She was 262 feet long, 27 feet beam and eight feet deep. She displaced 775 tons. She was fitted with two 4.1-inch guns, six 6-pounders, two 1-pounders and three torpedo-tubes. She had a complement of 105 men. Her speed was 22 knots.—Army and Navy Journal, 8/14.
Torpedo-Boat “Yar-Hissar” Torpedoed.—The Turkish torpedo-boat Yar-Hissar, sunk by a British submarine in the Sea of Marmora September 6, was built in 1907 and had a speed of 28 knots. She was armed with one 12-pounder, six 3-pounders and had two 18-inch torpedo-tubes.—Army and Navy Journal, 9/11.
FAR EAST, PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC
Vice-Admiral Count von Spee Describes the Cruiser Battle Fought off Coronel, Chile, November 1, 1914.—At 6.07 p. m. the two lines stood nearly parallel to one another on a southerly course, a little over 14,600 yards apart. The Dresden was about one mile behind, and the Nurnberg was far to the rear. At 6.20, at a distance of 13,400 yards, I turned one point toward the enemy, and at 6.34, at a range of 11,260 yards, I opened fire.
Wind and swell were head on, and the vessels had heavy going, especially the small cruisers on both sides. Observation and distance estimation were under a heavy handicap, because of the seas which washed over the bridges. The swell was so great that it obscured the aim of the gunners at the 10.5-centimeter guns on the middle deck, who could not see the sterns of the enemy’s ships at all, and the bows but seldom.
The guns of both our armored cruisers, on the other hand, were effective, and by 6.39 already we could note the first hit on the Good Hope. I at once resumed a parallel course, instead of bearing, as before, slightly toward the enemy. The English opened their fire at this time. I assume that the heavy sea made more trouble for them than it did for us. While we ran parallel, and later, as it grew dark, when we increased the distance between us, their two armored cruisers remained covered by our fire, while they, so far as could be determined, hit the Scharnhorst only twice and the Gneisenau only four times.
At 6.53, when only 6500 yards apart, I ordered a course one point away from the opponent. They were firing more slowly at this time, while we were able to count numerous hits. We could see, among other things, that the top of the forward turret of the Monmouth had been shot away and that a violent fire was burning in the turret. The Scharnhorst, it is thought, hit the Good Hope about 35 times.
In spite of our altered course, the English changed theirs sufficiently so that the distance between us shrunk to 5300 yards. There was reason to suspect that the enemy despaired of using his artillery effectively, and was maneuvering for a torpedo attack. The position of the moon, which had risen at 6 o’clock, was favorable to this move. Accordingly I gradually opened up further distances between the squadrons by another deflection of the leading ship at 7.45.
In the meantime it had grown dark. The range finders on the Scharnhorst used the fire on the Monmouth as a guide for a time, though eventually all range finding, aiming and observations became so inexact that firing was stopped at 7.26. At 7.23 a column of fire from an explosion was noticed between the stacks of the Good Hope. From that time, as it seemed to me, that vessel fired no more. The Monmouth apparently stopped firing at 7.20.
The small cruisers, including the Nurnberg, received by wireless at 7.30 the order to follow the enemy and to attack their ships with torpedoes. Vision was somewhat influenced at this hour by a rain squall. The light cruisers were not able to find the Good Hope, but the Nurnberg encountered the Monmouth, which steamed at first ahead and then parallel with her. At 8.58 the Nurnberg was able, by shots at closest range, to capsize the Monmouth, without a shot being fired in return. Rescue work in the heavy sea was not to be thought of, especially as the Nurnberg immediately afterward believed she had sighted the smoke of another enemy ship and had to prepare for a new attack.
The Otranto turned about as soon as the first shot struck her and later apparently ran away at full speed. The Glasgow was able to keep up longest its fire, even though it was ineffective, and succeeded in escaping in the darkness. Both the Leipzig and the Dresden thought they saw several salvos of hits strike her.
The small cruisers had neither losses nor damages in the battle. On the Gneisenau there were two men slightly wounded. The crews of the ships went into the fight with enthusiasm; every one did his duty and played his part in the victory.—Army and Navy Journal, 7/31.
A British Comment.—It is pleasant to be able to acknowledge the fair nature of the report of the battle of Coronel given by Admiral von Spee, dated the 1st of November, which has recently been published. It corroborates the report of Captain Luce of the Glasgow in all respects and tells us little new. The action commenced, he tells us, at 104 hectometers (about 11,300 yards), and he mentions the difficulty of range-finding in the head sea. He states that the British ships “appeared to suffer more from the heavy seas than we did.” He says that the British ships tried to close, and that at one time the opponents were Within 49 hectometers of each other (about 5300 yards) when the German ships sheered off, as they thought that the British ships were maneuvering to get within torpedo distance. By this time, 745, it was quite dark, the Good Hope had ceased to fire some time previously, and a great explosion had occurred on board her. One thing is clear, namely, that the German ships were faster than our ships, of which Admiral von Spee took full advantage. From the tone of the despatch, as well as from a story that is told of the German admiral’s deprecating any undue exultation after the action, we must, I think, exonerate the admiral personally from the charge of having failed to save life from either of the British ships.—United Service Magazine, August.
The “Konigsberg’s” Doom.—The following account of the end of the Konigsberg is contained in a letter from an officer of the R. N. V. R. serving in one of the monitors:
July 15.
There is plenty to write about, or ought to be, as we have at last finished the most important thing we came all the way out here for. We have destroyed the Konigsberg; she is now lying up the River Rufigi, a useless wreck—burnt out.
The Severn and Mersey had a month hard at it fixing up in Tirene Bay. The men worked from sunrise to sunset, and had one afternoon free only during the whole time. The last few days were taken up practising with the aeroplanes. We anchored off shore and fired at a target the other side of the island. The aeroplane told us where the shots fell and we corrected the aim till the target was hit.
Tuesday, July 6, was the day of the first attempt, and one of the worst I ever had or am likely to have. We were at our stations from 8.45 a. m. till 4.45 p. m., and 11 hours were under fire. The engine-room people were, not relieved the whole time, and they were down there the whole time in a temperature of 132-135! It was hot up in the top, but child’s play to the engine-room.
We hit the Konigsberg six times at least, and I believe set her on fire— that was early in the day. Then we lost the target, and I doubt whether we hit her again, though we tried all day till 4 o’clock.
The Konigsberg was dropping salvos of four very close indeed. We got cheered when we finally emerged, but the job had not been completed.
After two or three days—no rest, not a bit—work tightening up the ship, we finally left about 8 o’clock on Sunday, July 11. All personal gear had been cleared out of the ship—there was not even a chair or a bed, nothing in fact but what was useful. A tug took each of us in tow and away we went. The tug was a bit of guile to deceive the Germans, if they were on the lookout, as when we neared the Kikunja mouth of the Rufigi River again we cast off the tow and headed straight for the entrance.
The Mersey’s Escape.—We went to general quarters at 10.40 a. m. and were inside the entrance by 11.40. How well we seemed to know the place!
I knew exactly where the beastly field guns at the mouth would open fire and exactly when they would cease—as we pushed in, and so if their shots went over us they would land on the opposite bank among their own troops. Very soon came the soft whistle of the shell, then again and again —but we were nearing the entrance, and they turned on the Mersey. They hit her twice, wounding two men and knocking down the after 8-inch gun crew; none were hurt, however.
We left the Mersey at the place where we anchored last time in the hope that she would draw the Konigsberg’s fire and leave us a free hand. The Konigsberg, however, fired one salvo at her and then for the rest of the day concentrated on us. She was plugging us for 17 minutes before we could return her fire. The salvos of four were dropping’ closer than ever, if possible, and afterwards almost every man in the ship found a bit of German shell on board as a souvenir. They were everywhere—on the decks, round the engine-room, but not a soul was even scratched.
We went on higher up the river than last time, and finally anchored just at the top of “our” old island. As the after 6-inch gun crew were securing the stern anchor two shells fell, one on either side, within 8 feet of the side and drenched the quarterdeck. It was a very critical time. If she hit us we were probably finished—and she Carrie as near as possible without actually touching.
We had no sooner anchored and laid the guns than the aeroplane signalled she was ready to spot. Our first four salvos, at about one minute interval, were all signalled as, “Did not observe fall of shot.” We came down 400, then another 400, and more to the left. The next was spotted as 200 yards over, and about 200 to the right. The next 150 short and 100 to the left. The necessary orders were sent to the guns, and at the seventh salvo we hit with one and were just over with the other. We hit eight times in the next 12 shots! It was frightfully exciting.
Mishap to the Aeroplane.—The Konigsberg was now firing salvos of three only. The aeroplane signalled all hits were forward—so we came a little left to get her amidships. The machine suddenly signalled, “Am hit: coming down; send a boat.” And there she was, about half way between us and the Konigsberg, planning down. As they fell they continued to signal our shots, for we, of course, kept on firing. The aeroplane fell in the water about 150 yards from the Mersey and turned a somersault; one man was thrown clear, but the other had a struggle to get free. Filially both got away and were swimming for 10 minutes before the Mersey’s motor-boat reached them—beating ours by a short head. They were uninjured and as merry as crickets!
We kept on firing steadily the whole time, as we knew we were hitting— about one salvo a minute. The Konigsberg was now firing two guns; within 17 minutes of our opening fire I noticed and logged it down that she was firing two.
In a very short time there was a big explosion from the direction of the Konigsberg, and from then on she was never free from smoke, sometimes more, sometimes less—at one moment belching out clouds of black smoke, then yellow, with dull explosions from time to time. We kept on firing regularly ourselves, one salvo to the minute—or perhaps two salvos in three minutes—but the gunlayers were told to keep cool and make sure of their aim. There was one enormous explosion which shot up twice as high as the Konigsberg’s masts, and the resulting smoke was visible even from our deck. The men sent up a huge cheer.
The Cruiser Silenced.—For some time now we had no reply from the Konigsberg. At 12.53 I fancy she fired one gun, but I was not certain. She certainly did not fire afterwards. As our guns were getting hot we increased the range, as when hot the shots are apt to fall short. Fine columns of smoke, black, white, and yellow, and occasional dull reports rewarded us, but we were making no mistake and kept at it.
Another aeroplane turned up, and we now signalled the Mersey to pass on up stream and open fire nearer. She gave us a great cheer as she passed.
We raised our topmast and had a look at the Konigsberg. She was a fine sight. One mast was leaning over, the other was broken at the maintop, and smoke was pouring out of the mast as out of a chimney. The funnels were gone, and she was a mass of smoke and flame from end to end. We had done all the firing which had destroyed her. The Mersey only started afterwards. That was part of the plan. Only one ship was to fire at a time.
The Mersey fired about 20 salvos and made several hits and then we prepared to leave the river. Before we went the gunnery lieutenant and myself went to the top of the mast to get a better view and I took a photograph of the smoke, resting the camera on the very top of the topmast! The captain came up too, and there were the three of us clinging to the lightning-conductor with one arm, glasses in the other, and our feet on the empty oil drum we had fixed up there as a crow’s nest.
Two tugs were waiting over the bar, and after giving us a cheer took us in tow to help us back quicker to Tirene. The Weymouth, with the admiral on board, came round and then, passing us at speed, all hands lined the ship and, led by the small white figure of the admiral on the bridge, gave us three splendid cheers. It was one of the finest sights I have ever seen. We answered back—and what a difference there was to our cheers of Tuesday last. We made about three times the noise.
By 8 o’clock we were back at Tirene Bay as fresh as paint. No one complained of a headache even. It took us about three hours to cross Mafia Channel. It was a beautiful evening, and hard to believe we had just left a ship (about three times our size, and which under any other conditions would have made mincemeat of us in five minutes) a flaming mass of twisted ironwork.—London Times, 8/20.
The Konigsberg, which was located in the Rufigi, and imprisoned by the sinking of a steamer at the mouth of the river in October, 1914, about the time that the Emden was destroyed, was a cruiser of 3350 tons displacement, with a speed of 23 ½ knots, and a complement of 322. Built at Kiel in 1907, she had a length of 354 feet, 43 ½ feet beam, and 15 ¾ feet draft. Her armament consisted of ten 4.1-inch and eight 2.1-inch guns and four machine-guns. It was the Konigsberg which, on September 20 last, attacked and completely disabled the British third-class cruiser Pegasus at Zanzibar.
The monitors Severn and Mersey, completed by Vickers at Barrow last year, have seen service off the Belgian coast, where they co-operated with the Allies’ land forces by shelling the German flank. They are sister ships, with a displacement of 1250 tons (length 265 feet, beam 49 feet, draft 4 ½ feet), and a speed of 11 ½ knots. Each has a complement of 100, and is armed with two 6-inch guns, two 4.7-inch howitzers, four 3-pounders, and six machine-guns.
The Weymouth is a protected second-class cruiser of 5250 tons displacement, armed with eight 6-inch and several smaller guns.
The Pioneer is a light cruiser of H. M. Australian Navy, used as a training ship for Royal Australian Naval Reserve. She was built at Chatham, where she was launched in 1899. She has a displacement of 2200 tons, and her armament consists of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounder guns.—Naval and Military Record, 7/14.
[*] Acknowledgment is made to A. F. Westcott, Ph. D., Instructor U. S. Naval Academy, for help given in making this compilation.