Honorable Mention, 1914
Motto: Given to strong delusion, wholly believing a lie,
Ye saw that the land lay fenceless, and ye let the months go by Waiting some easy wonder: hoping some saving sign—
Military preparedness and the direction of arms are difficult enough in every country but nowhere in the world are they more difficult than in the United States. Our geographical position and freedom from entangling alliances have placed us in a position of such "splendid isolation" that the masses of this peace-loving and peace-professing nation refuse to realize the necessity for preparedness or the vastness of the effort entailed in waging war.
1AUTHOR'S NOTE.—The writer wishes to acknowledge here his indebtedness to Commander F. H. Schofield, U. S. N., to Commander C. T. Vogelgesang, U. S. N., and to Pay Inspector S. McGowan, U. S. N., for their many valuable suggestions and for their frank and painstaking criticism of this paper while in process of preparation. The war plan is very largely the work of Commander Schofield.
The spirit dominating our republic has not listened to so farsighted a policy as organized preparation for definite military tasks, and has been guided by prestige rather than by sound reasoning. Then, too, we have not been at war with a power of the first-rate for over a century; and having never known unsuccessful war, industrialism and internal affairs have occupied our days and thrown up about us iron walls of indifference against which the teachings of history have hammered almost in vain.
Nevertheless other nations and the majority of thinking men of our own country have so far been unable to explain away the part that physical force must necessarily play in any political community. They are not yet prepared to believe that all questions of race and religion, honor and pride can be settled either by arbitration or by conference between certain bankers holding the purse-strings of the world.
They see that for all the red-blooded nations of the earth just as for individuals life is a search after power; that in this search comes a time when each nation must take its stand among the others and, whether through force of circumstance or of its own volition, must give answer to certain fundamental questions affecting its welfare and comfort, and indeed its very existence. The answers thus given are called its policies.
These are not mere lifeless idols never changing with the progress of the years; but rather the living embodiments of the will of a people, changing like other living things with new conditions. We ourselves are positively bristling with a set of policies that give us contact with many other states along virtual frontiers approached in extent by those of England alone. To put into effect the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door in the Far East, Asiatic exclusion, and the control and protection of the Panama Canal, and to maintain them against the clashing ambitions of other nations in their search for life-power there is necessary a certain force. War is simply the most potent instrumentality of this force that man in his progress from the predatory to the polite has yet devised.
In this age it is fundamental that before beginning a war there must be a clearly defined objective, toward the attainment of which all plans and efforts must be aimed. (With Spain, for example, our object was not to conquer Spain but to change her status in Cuba. The Japanese had no intention of forcing Russia from Siberia; they wanted merely to change her Far Eastern status and gain for themselves a foothold on the Liaotung peninsula.) Behind this objective must be the whole people, for war has long since ceased to be an affair between sovereigns and statesmen. It has become one of nations—bitter, merciless and crushing.
Failure to plan and prepare for the use of military force to attain a national objective has sometimes caused the nation to pay the price with her very life's-blood. Always the pity of it is that she should have to pay in so many ways and so many times for a single fault, but, in her account with fallen states, Destiny never closes her books.
Intelligent preparation must embrace a complete survey of all our own forces, finances and resources, and those of the enemy as well. Departments and bureaus, armies and fleets, and guns, and torpedoes, and personnel are all but parts, as indeed are all questions of "Morale," "Principles of Command," or even "The Proper Organization and Administration of the National Fleet for the Conduct of a Great Campaign."
It may be inquired whether these problems are not each being solved at least in part by different men; but the answer is "No, not all." And sad to relate an even more unqualified negative must be the answer to the broader question:
"Are we prepared for war?"
If one unacquainted with mechanics chances to be on board a battleship in the midst of target practice his first impression is probably one of surprise that any hits can result from the apparent confusion he sees before him. Gradually, however, he comes to understand that the rate at which each wheel turns is regulated to a nicety, that the pistons cannot give a stroke by one hair's-breadth shorter or longer than intended, that the force of the powder behind the shell is capable of the most accurate adjustment, that checks and counter-checks exist as a sufficient guarantee against accident, and that in general each portion of the machinery is adapted to perform a certain specified bit of work and is under such perfect control that it cannot interfere with the functions of any other part. He will then no longer be surprised that with proper care of the matériel and training of the personnel the target is literally shot to pieces at 10,000 yards.
If, on the other hand, he finds after examination that the confusion is even worse than at first sight appeared, that the movement of each wheel is eccentric to a high degree, that the pistons are liable to stop, that no one has previously calculated the strength of the powder, that safety valves are wanting, that the work to be performed by each separate portion is uncertain and variable, that a strong centrifugal force is constantly at work impelling the different parts of the machinery to fly from their orbits, he will then no longer look for holes in the target. Indeed he will be surprised that the mechanical chaos before him should admit of any hits at all.
The present condition as to military preparedness of our country bears to the ideal condition almost exactly the same relation that the second battleship described above bears to the first.
Strong men are striving to perfect administration and organization. Progress is undoubtedly being made, but there is no common concrete objective, no point of concentration for all these earnest efforts. In a word, we have no war plans!
"A war plan?" you say, "What is a "war plan? I have never heard of one. Surely someone somewhere has laid out a plan of action in the event of war, or if they have not, some such scheme could readily be devised from the mass of data on hand." The pity of it is that you are partly right. Such a plan has been made—on paper! But, although the most important single contribution to the science of war in this country, it has seen but little of the light of day. Its mere existence is not known to those in the highest quarters.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STATESMAN
War of to-day cannot be improvised and can be successfully waged only after the most intensive preparation and planning. It can be entered into by an act of government only, and its higher direction therefore lies in the hands of statesmen. No single art of empire requires more unremitting labor and more diligent apprenticeship. The statesman who might conceivably fill the place of a War Lord should have an intimate personal knowledge of his own country and of her territories, their resources and their needs. He should have personal experience in the business of administration. He must keep in touch with foreign countries and know the motives of their rulers and their people and he must know the numerical and actual military strength of all important states in the world, their resources and the relative effects of their possible combinations.
Having acquired this he must still learn the art of directing the other two great forces under his control, the army and the navy. The lessons of history will guide him, his knowledge of existing conditions will help him, and both must be applied in accordance with the most advanced practice of the day.
When he knew all this he would still have to be in a position of absolute authority from which to issue the necessary orders to carry it into effect, and the form of our government is such that there is no place provided for this prodigy. We have made no provision for a Napoleon, or an elder Pitt; and, if we had, long before he had proved his kingship to ability, we would most probably have crucified him on the cross of our misunderstanding. Common laws and common authority were not made for men such as these.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY
In our country the question of peace or war is fixed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress, exactly where it belongs. The functions of the military man are supposed to be confined, in the first place, to advising on the purely military phases of the issues involved, and, in the second place, to putting into effect the decisions of the government. This is now the theory of all civilized governments. With us the line between the statesman and the general has always remained distinct and well understood, at least until the war had ceased. Then, but not until then, our people have so idealized the character of their military leaders whose actions had excited their sympathy or admiration that they have often elevated them to the chair of the presidency. Indeed so frequently have they done this that our democracy seems to develop rather than discourage hero-worship.
In foreign countries they have not always waited until hostilities were over, and the practice has differed from the theory. The soldier who is generally prone to advocate vigorous action is inclined to abrogate some of the powers of the statesman; the former is often masterful and the latter sometimes weak, too easily dazzled by the glitter of gold lace, or too readily lured beyond his depth by the siren song of some strategist to acquire a numerous set of what, in technical language, are called "keys" to some position. When this happens, there is a tendency for the military element, itself perhaps unconsciously influenced by a laudable desire for personal distinction, to dictate the policy of the nation without taking a sufficiently comprehensive view of national considerations. Cases of this kind abroad are numerous. Earl Cromer, England's Governor-General of Egypt for many years and one of the foremost statesmen of our day, says:
My own experience in such matters leads me to the conclusion that in most semi-military, semi-political affairs, there is generally an early stage when the statesman, if he chooses to do so, can exercise complete and effective control over the action of the soldier, but that when once that control has been even slightly relaxed, it cannot be regained until, by the course of subsequent events, some fresh development occurs bringing with it a favorable opportunity for the re-assertion of civil and political authority.
The dual role of the military man of this nation, first as the military adviser for statecraft, and second as the chosen instrument to put into execution the vast forces of war when once declared, comprises a career amply large enough to satisfy the cravings of the most exalted ambition. In either role the knowledge of human affairs and of human nature; the grasp of technical military matters, the mastery of that maze of principles and variables included under the names of strategy and tactics, the preparation of long-considered plans based on these that will enable him to do the work assigned by statecraft—surely the unstinted labor of a lifetime is not too long for the acquirement and assimilation of this knowledge. There is no .royal road to the place of a commander-in-chief and few have ever been foolish enough to even think so.
THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Both the scope of the problems involved and the nature of our government thus render it impossible for us ever to have a single man who shall direct at once our diplomacy and our arms. In default then of the man we must substitute a set of men, or a system, since no single department of government, even with the most expert advisers in the world, should be permitted to plan for or to conduct war on its own account. The first step toward establishing such a system is now being considered by Congress in the bill providing for a council of national defence. The council is to consist in effect of the Cabinet and the Congress, strengthened by expert military advisers. It is primarily responsible for the preparation of adequate forces in both branches of the service to insure the protection necessary to maintain in effect the national policies.
Heretofore the army and the navy have asked for their separate increases, each with its own ends in view, and with but scant consideration for the aims of each other. Not only has there been no strong silver thread of diplomatic and military purpose running through the fabric of our military policy, but it can be said without fear of contradiction that we have had no fabric through which it could run. The bill is admirably drawn to correct these faults. Section two provides:
That said council shall determine a general policy of national defence and shall recommend to the President for transmission to Congress such measures relating to the national defence as it shall deem necessary and expedient.
Thus it first determines a national military policy continuous in its action, and then recommends the provision of forces adequate for the purpose.
The broad and general recommendations of this body must form the basis of any real military preparedness. It has however neither executive nor administrative authority, but is essentially advisory. Unless we fully understand the significance of this and provide against it by accurately defining it in the law we will build for ourselves an Aulic Council.2 Again the bill seems to adequately cover this essential. Section two continues:
Provided, that in time of war said council shall meet only upon the request of the President of the United States.
2In 1804 this Council in Vienna, composed of many statesmen and senior Austrian generals, dominated all military affairs even to the extent of dictating details to the commander-in-chief in the field, the Archduke Charles. The memoirs of this great general, second in Europe at that time only to Napoleon, show how intimately he knew the needs of his army, and with what care and thoroughness with only opposition from the Council he was proceeding to meet them. All this he carefully explained to the King and the Council, asking for at least two years of preparation before declaring war against France. The Council removed him and the following year the Austrian Army was shattered at Ulm and at Austerlitz. He was again given the command but the Council continued to practically command the army, and in 1808 he again protested against a new conflict with France. This time he retained the command and inflicted on Napoleon at Aspern his first decisive defeat. Harassed and heckled at every move by the Council he conducted his masterly retreat from Wagram, and then gave up the command. Here was perhaps the one man in Europe who could have stayed the conqueror of Austerlitz. We must have no Aulic Council!
And section three adds:
That said council shall meet at least once in each calendar year on such date or dates as it shall fix: Provided, that special meetings may be called by the president of the council except in time of war.
THE JOINT PLAN-MAKING BODY
The next step is that from the broad national character of the preparation thus provided down to the more detailed and particular preparation for actual war. For this purpose there should be a joint plan-making body composed of military men representing the two great services.
The clear need of such a co-ordinating body has been plainly felt and freely admitted by every one of our war presidents. Its absolute necessity is further manifested by the convincing logic of actual events, for in all our wars some such council has been literally thrown together, precipitately and instinctively, to fill the breach that in a war of the first magnitude will certainly be the most fruitful cause of disaster.
Already other nations have provided such a body and from the hand of responsible officers in our own service come such recent evidences of our need as these:
Some power has to decide as to which shall receive recognition when interests conflict in war. Each interest seems of supreme importance in its own eye and only the eye that sees all interests and can focus itself to see the result of each military move in the game of major strategy should be consulted when rival claims present themselves. The command of either of two seas may offer advantages; two lines of communication may be available when only one can be held; the security of one thing may be secured by the loss of another; a backward step may have to be taken that two forward steps may result. Some power must decide, and, other things being equal, that power will give the better decision that has fortified itself with long study and deliberation, with, careful weighing of military factors and with training to give decisions promptly and fearlessly. . . . . Some directing power is necessary, that the burdens of the user of the great war instrument be lightened as far as may be by planning general features in anticipation, by indicating where the releasing of energy will return the largest national reward and by considering and weighing in advance the many factors that enter into war. Whether this directing power be called general staff, general board, strategy board or division of operation of the fleet, is of no concern so long as it properly directs, for certain it is that the perfect instrument, the skilled user and the prepared directing Power are alike necessary if naval efficiency is to be rewarded with that which is indispensable in war—command of the necessary sea.
. . . . how much better it would be to have a number of officers previously trained by study of other wars, by strategical and tactical games and by constant thought inspired by these on the various problems presented, to be able to answer the questions as they arise.
The best personnel in the world, the most accurate marksmanship, the finest vessels, and the country, may all be sacrificed by a failure to grasp the possibilities brought about by the information that an enemy fleet has sailed from a given port bound in a given direction.
Those who have previously studied such a problem will at once be able to say, with authority, "He is bound there, or here, or there, and we must do this, or that, or this!" Others may guess right, but the stake is too high to be won (or lost) by guesswork.
It were tedious to quote further upon this general principle with which all military minds agree, but it is pertinent to observe that these careful writers speak only from the point of view of the navy. How much more necessary then is such a co-ordinating body when we consider also the army and the intricate and complicated questions that arise in the case of joint operations.
The present so-called joint board is quite inadequate, chiefly because its members have so many other duties than the single one of preparing plans for war which should occupy the entire time of all members of the joint plan-making body. Also the State Department now has no representative on this board as it should have on account of the large amount of data that will be required from that department. Only military men should be voting members however, and they should be in the closest possible touch and intercourse with the practical activity of the forces in their areas, men who have had all the experience at sea and in the field that it is possible to give them. Otherwise the body would become merely,
a military chancery in which men learned desk work and where they would in time lose all touch of the realities of war.
It is of the utmost importance to specify clearly and accurately the duties, responsibilities and prerogatives of this joint plan-making body. To establish it without at the same time strictly defining its scope would be to invite the very irresponsibility from which we are now suffering. It should be clearly stated that, while combining power and knowledge from which emanate initiative in war, it has executive authority only through the President. If he approved of its decisions his orders would be issued in accordance with its advice and be obeyed without question by any department of the government, whereby a centralized control of events would be absolutely, uninterruptedly, and efficiently maintained.
It is in no sense an administrative body. Unless administration is kept distinctly a separate feature the whole purpose will be both misunderstood and defeated. The administrative field must be thoroughly covered as at present by the secretaries and bureau chiefs each in his respective area. Therefore it should not interfere with the administration of the army or navy or with the details of the operations of armies or fleets, and above all it should not attempt to diminish by one iota the initiative and independence of leaders but should leave to commanders unfettered liberty of action within the limits of their particular missions and to departments the express duty of supporting these commanders with all the resources at their disposal.
SINGLENESS OF RESPONSIBILITY
In the arbitrament of arms the fundamental requisite of efficient military organization is singleness of responsibility and hence of control. One need not be very far-sighted to prophesy that we will eventually have a single executive head responsible to each secretary for all matters relative to preparedness for war and to the proper conduct of war. This responsibility cannot and must not be any longer divided, for where there is division of responsibility the invariable result in a military sense is that there is, in effect, no responsibility. For the present it is sufficient to say that there is no single act of a civilian secretary so pregnant in its consequences as the choice of a commander-in-chief. It may be stated with the force of a military axiom that regardless of authority, the best general only should be placed in charge of the army, the best admiral only should be placed in charge of the navy, and both should be appointed in time of peace to serve during war. Napoleon declares, "A la guerre, les hommes ne sont rien, c'est un homme qui est tout."
Having chosen our supreme commander, it is again essential to give him the widest latitude within the limits of his clearly defined mission; he must be left to the untrammeled execution of his orders, the details and method of this execution to rest completely and absolutely with his genius. To fail in this is not only to reflect small confidence in the ability and discretion of the man but in the patriotism of the entire force under his command.
How well was this understood by the elder Pitt, and how unlimited were the possibilities had the sun of his power shone a half century later in the days of Nelson. "The King," wrote Pitt on one occasion, "judges it highly prejudicial to the good of his service to give particular orders and directions with regard to possible contingent cases that may arise." Conceive for yourself the feelings inspired in an admiral who received from him orders beginning with such a personal touch, such a reliance on his loyalty and ability as, "His Majesty trusts to your well-known zeal and activity," or "anticipates action of the utmost vigor." Is there a better example of order writing and trust in a commander-in-chief than his order to Amherst: "It is his majesty's pleasure that you do attempt an invasion of Canada by way of Crown Point or La Galette, or both, according as you shall judge practicable, and proceed if practicable to attack Montreal or Quebec, or both of such places successively with such of the forces as shall remain under your immediate direction, in one body, or by a division of the said forces into separate and distinct operations, according as you shall from your knowledge of the countries through which the war is to be carried or from emergent circumstances, not to be known here, judge all or any of such attempts to be practicable."
THE WAR PLAN
The need for a joint plan-making body being both logical and imperative, what, in detail, should be its precise work? None of the great authorities on military subjects have ever ventured to answer this in writing. Approached as to the details of filling the lack they have been so unanimous in decrying they remind one of a certain Mr. Rogers.
"Of what religion are you, Mr. Rogers?" said a lady once.
"What religion, madam? I am of the religion of all sensible men." "And what is that?" she asked.
"All sensible men, madam, keep that to themselves."
They generalize, and well they might when once they attempt a detailed analysis of what it means to be responsible for success in war; and yet, it is this ignorance of just what is to be done that has given us pause. The same students of war and statesmanship that have been most tireless in their efforts to bring into being a war staff have none of them hitherto provided it with an instrument to its hand, and in this lies perhaps the most potent cause of their failure. No higher incentive toward military preparedness and no more convincing argument toward the need for such a staff could be devised than a well-conceived comprehensive plan showing its functions and its relations to the administrative branches of the government. The mere fact of the existence of a real plan in a highly perfected form would not only immeasurably increase our own confidence in our forces, but would immediately induce a far greater respect for those forces on the part of foreign nations. Outward and visible signs of readiness and efficiency of military forces furnish diplomacy its strongest argument, and peace its surest advocate.
Physical force has no value where there is nothing else and it is plain that even with a war staff the individual knowledge and ability of its members is of little use unless we can have it when we want it; concentrated and capable of direction. To do this, we must first overcome the "initial friction" and the "working-load friction" of the war machine. These are so great that the time thus spent may settle the whole character of the war and its result. Time in war is more important than guns and men, and the rate of living of the world to-day is exceeded only by its rate of making war.
We must continually remind ourselves that the way of the "old navy" is not our way. The old doctrine that, given a national determination to fight and to win, the material energies will sooner or later find their way into the right channel drops naturally into the category of things unfortunate if true. Sooner or later, that is the point.
In order then to overcome in a minimum of time the resistances of the medium and material in which we are working and to insure the concentration necessary to direct all our efforts toward a single concrete objective, a plan is necessary which will comprehend:
First, a careful analysis to determine exactly what is to be accomplished before anything is undertaken.
Second, the determination of the best way to accomplish the project in the quickest time, and,……………….
Third, the employment of the best personnel, matériel, and facilities to carry out the project in the best way as previously determined.
Besides this there is the non-military conception that a war-plan comprehends all the stages of war; from its inception to its conclusion. It supposes that a plan can be outlined months in advance; that movements in the presence of the enemy can be predicted with precision; and that events can be shaped in entire accord with the wishes of him who draws the plans. It is needless to say that this conception is not received with respect by military minds.
The correct idea is less pretentious in its claims. It seeks to make positive arrangement for those phases of war which precede the first real conflict with the enemy. It covers in detail the plans for the preparation, and the plans for the movement of the forces preliminary to the opening of the campaign. Accepting this latter view, a war plan may be defined as a scheme worked out in detail for the preparation, support, and deployment in readiness for war, of the national forces.
But the scheme of such a plan has actually been devised by an officer of our own navy. It is in existence, it is logical, it is feasible. Shall we not give it life and form and development?
A casual glance at the plan is sufficient to show that here for the first time is the whole subject spread out before one in the form of a Mercator projection. Here and there earnest men have explored portions of the area of this globe but never before has a map of its whole surface been exposed to view. One has shown the relations of war and policy and the need for a council to co-ordinate them or the need for a larger fleet, or reforms in navy yards; another has made clear the improvements possible in the existing fleet, or the importance of a developing military character, but never before has the panorama of our future progress been laid out before one to be grasped in a coup d' ceil, never before has a plan covered the work to be done by both the army and navy and shown the intimate inter-relation of each.
This completeness constitutes its most striking feature, but in trying to separate into its constituent parts so complex a subject it is well if at first we do not fasten our attention upon the light itself. Rather must we pass it through a prism of common sense and analyze its spectrum, taking each component ray and speculating on the union and composition of its substances. Otherwise we shall no longer have a guide, our senses will be blinded by detail and we shall grope our way more safely in conscious darkness.
The first section constitutes what may be called the information division of the plan. Here in one place are all the factors from which the council of national defence can decide as to our need for future forces, and the joint plan-making body as to the best distribution and use of present forces. This section is based primarily upon a series of exhaustive studies of our policies and those of our probable enemy. The relation of these national policies to war is so intimate and controlling that the data concerning them comes first of all in importance. To carry them into effect, the forces and resources on hand and to be supplied are then studied together with the bearing of international law on situations that are likely to arise. From an analysis of all this data flows the nature of the war and the direction of effort.
It is of interest to note the very considerable and responsible roles of the military information division and the Office of Naval Intelligence. It is our business to know at any instant exactly the number of ships each world power has in commission and building, the state of her personnel, and to question her motives in so far as they may constitute a menace to our situation in world politics. The duties of the State Department, especially before the beginning of hostilities, are also seen to extend over a wide range of matters of grave importance, and the wisdom of foreign practice in training their diplomats in a strict and progressive school of actual experience in subordinate positions is here sharply and involuntarily contrasted with our own.
The stream of authority is seen to run smoothly and consistently on from this thorough consideration of policy, enemy forces, and our own forces into a grand estimate of the situation laid before the President by the joint plan-making body. A combined letter of instructions is then issued from the supreme authority (the President) to the War and Navy Department comprehending a statement of the strategic plan as embodied in the grand decision. It also instructs them as to their duties in the execution of the general plan and finally makes the initial distribution of the financial resources necessary to enable these departments to operate.
Upon the receipt of this letter, orders are made out by the Navy Department to the commander-in-chief covering a statement of the strategic plan as embodied in the Grand Decision and the instructions of the department based upon the corresponding Naval Decision, and a corresponding set of orders is sent by the War Department to the commander-in-chief of the army.3
In pondering such a plan, we are struck with a sense of the order and sequence of it all, and there recurs to us something of the thought so well expressed by a letter in the archives of the War Department written during the Civil War by a colonel in the Union Army:
The long intolerable monotony of nights alone in my tent! It is in periods of inaction such as this that one has time to turn the war over in one's mind, to stand off, as it were, and get a perspective of the whole seething whirl, and see it in its sexless, planless hideousness.
If only we out here in the field could know that there was a real plan for us all, based on real reasons, how much easier it would be. If we could be the first nation to arrive at such a consummation how mighty we would be for all time. Unless we do someone else will be ahead of us and then we will run the usual and inevitable course.
This plan is not "the consummation," and may require some change after the first serious contact with the enemy, but at least it is the foundation of military preparedness to which we have all dedicated our lives. Unless we adopt something like it we too "will run the usual and inevitable course."
3Copies of the war plan should be in possession of both commanders-in-chief, so that in their execution the many contingencies that will arise may not cloud the real object to be gained.
Unhappily it is only the bitter experience and recorded events of its own wars on which a nation builds its science of "the game." De Thou's vivid account of the great siege of Malta or the cold-blooded prophesies of Von Moltke that all came true or the more recent accounts of eye-witnesses of the horrors in Bulgaria—they all interest us perhaps; yet, in the main, they are of no immediate concern. Since more than a quarter of a century has mercifully elapsed between our wars, perhaps we should not wonder why we have not evolved a sequence for it long ago. It is as if, instead of turning on its axis once in 24 hours, the earth had taken as many years about it. If man's life has been of the same duration and for the initial steps of astronomy we had nothing to depend upon except observations recorded in history, how many centuries would have passed before it would have occurred to anyone that in what he saw, night after night, there was any kind of order at all?
For us of the army and navy there should be nothing in the lapse of years between wars to justify this apathy of military mind in which we have been living. Ours is a definite profession that finds its culminating justification in victory swiftly won, in peace long maintained. And whether it be victory won or peace maintained the result will never flow from any inspiration that may be expected to come to the rescue of the indolent and the untrained. Whether victory or peace, we can insure it by means of one thing only—an elixir so powerful that a few drops in the blood of the nation will give it the strength of Atlas and the skill of Mars. Its name is Preparedness.