*Reprinted from the United States Naval Medical Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 2, April, 1912, by permission of the Navy Department and of the author.
Losses in personnel, incident to war, fall naturally into various broad but well-defined groups, and these again may be subdivided and classified according to the particular purpose in view. Thus in reports and statistics distinction is commonly made between losses by sickness and casualties in battle, and the latter may be included under such subheads as "Killed," "Wounded," "Drowned," etc.
Under certain circumstances, however, particularly those following a disastrous defeat, details are often wanting, either through actual lack of precise information on the part of the belligerent concerned or disinclination to publish the same. Furthermore, it makes little difference from a military point of view whether a man is killed, captured, or runs away. For these and similar reasons the total loss may be expressed in one item, such as "Killed and Missing," or "Killed and Drowned." Under such circumstances it is not only subsequently impracticable to determine with accuracy the percentage of casualties in any one class, but the actual loss of life as a whole may be largely a matter of conjecture. As will be shown later, the particular class of damage referred to in this paper is especially difficult to estimate with accuracy, and we must rely to a great extent upon methods of approximation.
It will also be obvious that the character, extent, and relative importance of the various losses sustained by belligerents must be vastly modified by a great variety of circumstances, such as the field of war, nature and extent of the campaigns conducted, size, resources, discipline, and experience of the combatant forces, arms and methods of warfare employed, and, especially, the success or failure of the military operations themselves. Not only do such conditions influence the damage rates and their distribution during different wars, battles, and minor operations, but they cause great differences from time to time with the same forces in a single campaign. Finally, if we attempt to compare the losses sustained by dissimilar corps or branches of the forces engaged, the above statements apply with additional force.
Thus, in extensive operations on land—particularly if the intervals between battles are prolonged—more men, by far, are lost through sickness than by the direct efforts of the enemy.2 But as the destructive effects of modern weapons, as actually employed, have not kept pace with the development of medical science and the application of sanitary measures, there is a tendency for this disparity to become less marked. Very recent progress along these lines is indicated by such well-known examples as anti-typhoid inoculation and the salvarsan treatment of syphilis; one tending to prevent disease, the other lessening its duration and severity.
With respect to casualties, we find that of wounds received by troops in battle a large majority—usually some 75 per cent of the whole number—are inflicted by small-arm projectiles.3
Rifle Per cent Shrapnel Per cent Shell Per cent
Officers 71 11 18
Men 79 13 8
As might be anticipated, naval statistics differ from the above in degree somewhat comparable to the dissimilarity, between warlike operations afloat and ashore. On shipboard, exposure to morbific influences is not greatly increased by war, while, in general, sanitary measures are quite readily and successfully enforced, so that the damage from illness is relatively less in the navy than among troops ashore.4 Our casualty lists also differ widely from those of the army: Wounds from small arms are practically nil, shrapnel—which is generally more fatal to troops than shell—is seldom used, and we find that nearly all wounds on shipboard are due to great-gun fire, inflicted directly or indirectly by explosive shell.
2”The losses of the Federal Armies in the Civil War in the two years (June, 1861, to June 1863) amounted to 53.2 deaths in the thousand, of which only 8.6 were caused by wounds and 44.6 by sickness.” In the short Franco-Prussian War, on the other hand, the relative losses from wounds and sickness were as 34 to 30. (See Bloch: Modern Weapons and Modern Wars.)
3Russian statistics from the recent war (Havard and Hoff: Reports of Military Observers. MiL Inf. Div. Gen. Staff, No. 8, Part II, Russo-Japanese War) are as follows:
4In former times sickness on shipboard was, of course, enormously more prevalent, both actually and as compared with other losses, than it has been for many decades.
In these brief generalities I have touched upon only a few of the many conditions which, however much they may differ in character and degree, are nevertheless common to warfare as a whole, affecting more or less all the forces actually engaged. There remains, however, a hazard of war which is peculiar to the conduct of warlike operations afloat, namely, drowning. It thus affects almost exclusively the naval forces, the only material exceptions occurring infrequently in connection with over-sea military expeditions, during the transportation or disembarkation of troops; as examples, we have the sinking of the transports Kowshing and Kinshu Maru.5
"Immediately after the defeat of the Armada, for example, disease and great mortality broke out in English ships and rendered them unfit for action; of a crew of 500 men in a certain ship 200 were swept off within three or four weeks."
"On the occasion of Anson's voyage round the world, there were left at the end of the first year (1740-41), on board the three surviving ships of the squadron, only 335 men out of his total complement of 961; that is to say, two-thirds of his men had perished.
"Blockading squadrons outside of Brest had more than once been put hors de combat by disease and had to return home. In the Seven Years' War the navy lost only 1512 seamen and marines in battle, but 133,708 men—that is, 90 times as many—by death from disease and desertions." (A. Steuzel: The British Navy.)
Such records seem almost incredible when we compare conditions of to-day. During 1898 (year of the Spanish-American War) the death rate in our navy from disease was only 4.92, and the percentage of sick (excluding injuries) about 2.44. (See Gatewood: Naval Hygiene, 1909.)
5The Kowshing was a British steamer chartered by the Chinese in July, 1894, to carry troops to Korea. On the 25th of that month, with 1100 men on board, she encountered four Japanese cruisers. She was hove to and boarded by an officer from the Naniwa, commanded by Captain Togo (afterwards commander-in-chief during the Russo-Japanese War). Demand was made that the Kowshing surrender, though the vessel flew the British flag and had sailed in peace. The Chinese absolutely refused compliance, though urged to accede by European officers on board. The Japanese returned to their ship, and a few minutes later the Naniwa opened fire at a distance of only 200 to 300 yards; she also fired a torpedo.
In peace we ordinarily associate the word "drowning" with accidents involving the death of one or a few individuals, since great naval disasters like the ramming of the Victoria—when 358 lives were lost—are exceedingly rare.6 Even in the merchant marine, such occurrences are exceptional, with the safeguards to navigation in use to-day. When occurring, they are almost always due to collision on the high seas, and appalling loss of life may be aggravated by the horrors of panic among passengers.
To the navy, however, drowning in warfare has a far broader significance, implying possibilities of wholesale loss of personnel, which often embraces an entire ship's complement and is invariably incident to total destruction of the vessel itself. As so construed, it has been generally recognized that the questions presented are of grave importance, which has often been expressed in rather loose generalities, and perhaps exaggerations, regarding the extent of the damage so sustained. It seems desirable, therefore, to indicate what this damage has been and to form some estimate of what may reasonably be anticipated in a naval war of the immediate future. To these ends it becomes necessary to examine, briefly, records of the past, and to inquire particularly into the circumstances attending the sinking of vessels of war, since as already indicated these will determine practically all the major losses due to submersion. Developments in naval warfare have been so radical within recent years that to obtain data based upon conditions which in any degree approximate those of to-day we must confine our investigation to the era subsequent to our Civil War, which marked the change from wood to steel, from sail to steam. Furthermore, since naval operations tend more and more toward concentration of forces, so that actions between individual ships or small units are now relatively unlikely and of lessening importance, it would seem that our attention could be most profitably directed to battles involving squadrons and fleets. While this is true as a general proposition, it will nevertheless appear that there have been a number of individual catastrophes, the records of which are informing, because the attendant circumstances are better perceived than is possible in the case of great fleet engagements, where it is always difficult to form an accurate mental picture of any particular incident in the kaleidoscopic movement.7
The Kowshing remained afloat for nearly an hour under a pitiless fire, when she slowly sank. At least 700 lives appear to have been lost in this affair.
Somewhat similar circumstances arose when the Russians sank the Japanese transports Kinshu Maru (Apr. 25, 1904), and the Hitachi, Sado, and Izumi (June 15). The total number killed or drowned on the Hitachi Maru alone is belived to have been about 1000; reliable statistics for the other vessels are not available, but the loss was much less heavy. In considering the strictures expressed regarding the sacrifice of life in these operations, the refusal of the troops to surrender when granted the opportunity should be borne in mind.
6Even in peace, drowning is usually responsible each year for more deaths in the naval service than any other one cause.
Within the limitations so imposed there have been several wars, each of which was marked by one or more great naval actions, the more important of these being known as the Battles of Lissa, the Yalu, Manila Bay, Santiago, and the Sea of Japan, more commonly called Tsushima.
The battle of Lissa (June 27, 1866) was fought during the transition period of naval armaments, each belligerent having a heterogeneous fleet, consisting of both wooden and armored vessels. Of the former we need give little account. On the Italian side they took no active part in the battle, but the Austrians handled their old unprotected ships most gallantly, the Kaiser, flagship of Commodore Petz, particularly distinguishing herself. She succeeded in ramming the armored Portogallo (sister ship of the Re d'Italia), delivering a glancing blow fairly amidship, but inflicting less damage than she received herself.8
7”Le bataille...est, comme toutes les batailles navales, assez difficile a reconstituer, par suit de la disparition des temoins importants ou de l'impossibilité pour une partie des survivants de donner des reseignements precis. Une bataille terrestre s'accroche a certains episodes faciles a ressaisir grace au terrain." (L. G. Laur: Tsushima.)
8The casualties on this ship were more than half the entire number suffered by the Austrians, viz., 24 killed and 75 wounded from a total of 38 killed, 176 wounded.
It will be remembered that the Austrian admiral, Tegethoff, engaged (at 1 a. m.) in a V formation, with his armoured ships in the van, his tactics throughout the battle being admirably summed up in his celebrated order "Ram everything gray." If the Italians had any plan at all they soon lost sight of it when their admiral, Persano, at the very last moment threw his formation into confusion by stopping the Re d'Italia and transferring his flag, unknown to his subordinates, to another vessel. A long gap was thus formed between the first and second divisions, through which, in the smoke and confusion, the Austrians blundered, to their own surprise and great good fortune of the enemy. The battle now became a mêlée. Tegethoff, true to his principles, made several ineffectual attempts to ram with his flagship, the Ferdinand Max, a vessel of some 5000 tons, carrying 5-inch armor. Suddenly, about 11.20 a. m., through the thick cloud of smoke, he saw a great gray mass stationary in the water. The order "full speed ahead" was given, and a moment later the prow of the Max was driven, without severe shock, through the collapsing decks, frames, and armor of the Re d'Italia. “The Italia was careened far over to starboard by the impact. Then, as the Maxmillian withdrew her ram from the deadly wound, the great Italian ship rolled back almost on her beam ends and sank, without righting, bow first beneath the waves, leaving the water strewn with struggling human beings."9 All accounts of this incident agree in stating that the stricken ship, a vessel of 5700 tons, carrying 7 inches of armor, gave but one roll, sinking as she listed to port—a destruction almost unparalleled in its rapidity.10
The Ferdinand Max and some Austrian gunboats immediately attempted to lower boats to rescue the drowning crew, but were prevented from so doing by the fire of several Italian ships, probably because in the smoke the latter did not appreciate just what had occurred. The victims of disaster were thus left to their fate, but an extraordinary circumstance, thus recorded by Wilson, prevented their complete annihilation:
"The survivors of the Re d'Italia's men were on the point of drowning, when suddenly there came an upward rush of water, caused perhaps by the explosion of her boilers, which carried to the surface timber and fragments to which the survivors clung.11"
This wreckage was not discovered until the action was over, probably more than an hour after the ship sank, when 166 survivors were picked up by the Italians, 400 persons having drowned in the meantime.
9Naval Battles in the Nineteenth Century, Rear Admiral F. J. Higginson, U. S. Navy.
10The Victoria remained afloat 10½ minutes, though many of her watertight doors were open.
11Ironclads in Action, H. W. Wilson.
The only other vessel destroyed during this battle was the Italian armored gunboat Palestro, 2000 tons. She was set on fire and severely punished early in the action. The flames spread beyond control, and though her magazines were flooded an emergency store of ammunition was overlooked. At 2.30 p. m. she blew up, only 19 of her complement of 230 surviving. In this and many similar instances it is obviously impossible to positively determine the relative numbers of the killed and drowned. Since the destruction of the ship was known to be inevitable—though the explosion was not anticipated—it is reasonable to assume that most of the crew were on deck; and if so, that not more than half the crew were killed outright. In other words, the loss of life was probably twice as great as it would have been had the explosion occurred on land. This difficulty, however, is not insurmountable and will be referred to later.
In reading the records of earlier sea fights one is struck by the relative frequency of occurrences like the above. It might almost be said that the natural end of the old ship of line was due to fire, not water.12
From a consideration of all the data available, the following estimate of the Italian losses in this battle appears to be approximately correct:
Killed (by gunfire) 5
Drowned (or killed with sinking vessels) 615
12No vessels were actually sunk during the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar, but on each occasion one or more ships exploded. At Copenhagen most of the Danish ships were taken or burnt. "The Dannebrog (flagship) caught fire and blew up after the action." (Wilmot: Our Navy for a Thousand Years.) At Navarino (1825), one of the fiercest naval battles ever fought, the Turks and Egyptians "stood by their vessels till they were wrapped in flames, and they could be seen rushing from point to point about their decks and climbing into the rigging to escape death by fire. But there was no escape; ship after ship blew up and blazed fiercely, making the bay a mass of charred wreckage illuminated by burning hulks." (Higginson.)
As an exception, the Vengeur was sunk (Battle of the First of June, 1794), 400 of her crew being rescued by boats from the English fleet.
At the Yula13 all the ships engaged were armored, or at least "protected," vessels of iron or steel, and this battle is said to have been "in a way the most important sea fight since the time of Nelson.” (Higginson.) It will be unnecessary to go into tactical details of the action in general. The Chinese, under Admiral Ting, approached in line, with their heavier ships in the center, but as the wings consisted of slower vessels the formation was actually crescentic. The Japanese advanced in column, with a fast squadron in the van which swept around the weak Chinese right and attacked from the rear, while the main squadron concentrated on the same position from the front. As has so often happened before and since, the losing side soon became a confused "mob of ships." In addition to their initial tactical advantage, the Japanese fire was far more effective than their enemy's. The latter fired slowly and at random, but their heavier guns caused great execution when a shot did take effect on the unarmored ships of the Japanese.
13See Acciones Navales Modernas, por J. de Salas, Teniente de Navio.
Considering the damage inflicted on both sides, it seems somewhat surprising to find that only two ships, both Chinese, were actually sunk in action,14 viz., the unarmored Chih Yuen, 2300 tons, and the King Yuen, 2850 tons, with 9.4 inches of armor. The Chih Yuen was hotly engaged early in the action; after being hit repeatedly she listed heavily to starboard and slowly sank by the bow, going down with all hands. She was destroyed by gunfire alone (a 12-inch shell is said to have finished her career), but a violent explosion occurred as she sank, either due to her boilers or to a torpedo on board (3.30 p. m.).
About 20 minutes after this catastrophe the King Yuen, already on fire, received the concentrated fire of the Yoshino and Takachio and also withstood a hail of projectiles from one ship after another of the flying squadron. She was subsequently seen to be rolling heavily, and at 4.50 p. m. sank, stern first. "Her end is veiled in mystery. All the Chinese who saw her go down attributed her loss to a torpedo, but the Japanese fired none. There was a very thick cloud of smoke and an explosion just before she vanished, like the Victoria capsizing and showing her bottom. Of a crew of 270 men only 7 escaped." (Wilson.)
14Of course this does not represent all the Chinese ships that were lost. Many suffered greatly from fires, and one, the Lai Yuen, literally burned out. The Yang Wei is sometimes referred to as having been sunk; she was set on lire and withdrew, later being in collision with the Tsi Yuen, and appears then to have been run aground and abandoned. She was torpedoed next day by the Japanese.
The destruction of these two Chinese ships is thus curiously alike. It has been suggested that one or both struck live torpedoes, fired by the Chinese, which may have been floating about in the water, but it is much more probable that in each case sinking was due to gunfire alone.
The Japanese casualties in this fight were, all told, 90 killed and 204 wounded. On the Chinese side the percentage of injuries from gunfire was much smaller (on seven surviving vessels, 36 killed and 88 wounded), owing to their armor protection, but on the ships which were sunk the loss of life is estimated to have been from 600 to 800. The total force on each side was about 3000; as there were only 10 Chinese ships seriously engaged it thus appears that 20 per cent of these vessels were sunk in action and that the loss of life from drowning was proportionately heavy.
Four years after this conflict the two naval battles of our late war were fought, the Spanish ships engaged being captured or destroyed. Although of such peculiar interest to us, there appears to be little data obtainable therefrom which is pertinent to the subject of this paper. This is owing in great part to the very completeness of our success in each engagement. The Spanish fought their ships bravely, but the disparity in strength of the fleets led them to discount disaster beforehand. Thus each battle was fought close inshore, and the ships were grounded or partly sunk in shoal water when their destruction became inevitable. Those in Manila Bay were apparently abandoned without serious difficulty, though precise information is lacking. With the punishment received it would seem that their own boats would have been unserviceable, even for the short trip required. The total loss, as reported by Admiral Montojo, was 381 killed and wounded, probably an underestimate, but this does not appear to include any material loss by drowning, and it seems likely that very little occurred.
At Santiago the situation differed in details. Although all the larger vessels and the destroyer Furor were actually beached,15 all except the Colon were blazing furiously, and it seems inevitable that many men were drowned as they were forced overboard by fire. Our own ships were prompt and active in the work of rescue and undoubtedly saved many who would otherwise have lost their lives in attempting to reach the shore. Rear Admiral Higginson, in his description of this battle, accounts for the entire Spanish force as follows: "Thus four beautiful Spanish ships and two destroyers had gone to their death before the overwhelming fire of the American vessels, and of the 2300 Spaniards who entered the conflict, 350 were killed, 200 wounded, 150 escaped by swimming ashore, and 1600 surrendered." Judging from the small proportion of wounded it seems that the "killed" may here include all not otherwise accounted for and that the number drowned will never be known. But in any event, one lesson seems clear: Had these battles been fought on the high seas they must have resulted in early surrender of the Spanish ships or an appalling loss of life, probably proportionately greater than that of any sea fight of modern times.
15The destroyer Pluton was sunk, but I am unable to find any estimate of her casualties. Probably our vessels rescued many of the crew.
Coming now to the most recent and greatest of modern wars, we will find in the Russo-Japanese conflict a mass of data which should be particularly informing. Owing to the extent of the naval operations even reference to them all would be quite impracticable within the limits of this paper, but the briefest outlines will serve to connect the following incidents more or less consecutively:
The first vessel sunk with great loss of life was the Russian minelayer Yenesei. On February 11, 1904, while engaged in her special work in Tahin Bay, she struck a mine which had just been planted, sinking in less than 20 minutes with 4 officers and 89 men.16 About a month later the destroyer Steregushchi was cut off, disabled and surrounded by the Japanese as she was attempting to re-enter Port Arthur. Although she was in a sinking condition, an effort was made by her captors to tow the boat out, but the line parted. Attempts were then made to rescue the crew, but she sank with all hands except 4 men.
16The moral effect of such sudden loss by drowning is well illustrated by an incident which occurred shortly afterwards. When news of the Yenesei's destruction reached Port Arthur, the Boyarin, with four destroyers, was dispatched to Ta-lien Bay. As she was about to anchor she struck a mine. "All boats were immediately lowered, the ship was abandoned, and the crew was transshipped to the destroyers, which had approached directly the explosion had occurred." The destroyers steamed back to Port Authur, but instead of sinking, the Boyarin drifted about the bay for two days, finally going down during a violent gale and snowstorm.
After having made several unsuccessful attempts to bottle up the Russian ships in Port Arthur, Admiral Togo decided to harass this force by dropping mines within the area commonly chosen by the Russians in their maneuvers outside the harbor. This operation, one of the first of the kind ever attempted, was secretly accomplished on the night of April 12, and its extraordinary success resulted in one of the most dramatic incidents of the war. Early the following morning the destroyer Strashni, after a 15-minute engagement with two Japanese boats, was sunk off the harbor, 5 men only being saved. Thereupon the Russian ships steamed out, the battleship Petropavlosk, flying the flag of Admiral Makaroff, in the lead, and proceeded on their usual course under the batteries. "Suddenly at 9.40 a. m., a loud report was heard, and the eyes of everyone in both fleets were turned on the Russian flagship. She had struck a mine. The first explosion was followed by a second, and that again by a third, a vast cloud of smoke and steam hung over the water, and when it lifted the Petropavlosk has disappeared. Of her whole crew only 7 officers and 73 men were picked up, and with her perished the celebrated painter Vereshchagin.17 " lt is stated that all spectators of the disaster . . . . are agreed that the second explosion occurred in the magazine and the third in the boilers.”18
So far, the damage had been chiefly on the Russian side, but the Japanese did not escape their contributions. In sweeping for mines in Kerr Bay (near Port Arthur) two torpedo-boats were sunk and 8 lives lost. On May 15 a much more serious misfortune occurred, due to the Russians having adopted the methods which had proved so effective against themselves a month earlier; that is, they strewed mines on the high seas off Port Arthur.19
17British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Vol. 1.
18The Russian troubles on this occasion did not end with this diaster. At 10.15 the Pobyeda also struck a mine; though badly injured, she managed to remain afloat and regained the harbor.
19These were floating, contact mines, left to drift indefinitely, far and wide. They became a serious menace to neutral vessels, the Chinese being the greatest sufferers. Their delegates at The Hague Conference of 1907 said that: "their Government was still obliged (two years after the war) to furnish its coasting vessels with special instruments to remove and destroy the floating mines which encumber not only the high seas but also its own territorial waters...and from five to six hundred Chinese citizens. . . have suffered a cruel death from these dangerous engines of warfare." (See The Two Peace Conferences, W. H. Hull.) The question as to the use of such mines was the subject of much discussion at this conference, and the rule finally adopted forbids the use of unanchored mines unless so constructed as to become harmless within one hour after their control has been lost. (Article I, Eighth Convention, Second Hague Conference.)
About 10 a. m. the Japanese battleships traversed this field, with disastrous consequences. The Hatsuse promptly struck a mine which disabled her helm, "and a few minutes later the Yashima also struck a mine, or possibly two mines together. When the first explosion occurred preparations were made for taking the Hatsuse in tow, but before they could be completed she struck a second mine, which . . . . seems to have exploded one of her magazines. The effect was similar to that on the Petropavlosk. An enormous cloud of steam arose and the Hatsuse disappeared in about a minute and a half." (British Official History.) Four hundred and ninety-four20 lives were lost in this catastrophe. The Yashima also sank some hours later, after being abandoned, however, by her crew. The loss of this vessel was successfully concealed by the Japanese until some months later.
20Unless otherwise noted, Japanese statistics are from the Report on the Naval Medical and Sanitary Features of the Russo-Japanese war to the Surgeon General, United States Navy, by Surgeon W. C. Braisted, U. S. Navy.
On the 25th of May the Japanese sustained still further loss, the cruiser Yoshino being rammed and sunk by the Kasuga. The accident occurred in a dense fog, which prevented the other vessels from rendering much assistance. She sank as some of her boats were being lowered and they were swamped. From a crew of about 400, all told, 335 were drowned. To complete this series of disasters, the destroyer Akatsuki was sunk by a mine, with the loss, it is said, of all her officers and 16 men; the rest of the crew were picked up by other boats in the flotilla.
Other Japanese vessels destroyed by mines during 1904 included the coast guard ships Kaimon and Saiyen and the destroyer Hayatori. While the loss of life amounted, in all, to about 90 officers and men, these were minor events, and the list may be concluded with the following serious disasters: On September 18 the gunboat Haiyen was engaged in guard duty in Pigeon Bay and about dusk she struck a mine. She sank at once, her boats being swamped by a heavy sea then running. In spite of assistance from another ship close at hand, only 4 were saved from her completement of 201 officers and men. About three months later the cruiser Takasago was lost under somewhat similar circumstances off Port Arthur, 298 lives being lost.21
The first great sea fight of the war occurred on August 10, when the Port Arthur fleet endeavored to force a way to Vladivostok. Although this action resulted in the practical elimination of the Russian ships as a fighting force, none were sunk. Six of the larger vessels, badly crippled, returned to Port Arthur, where they were eventually blown up and sunk by the Russians; the rest were beached and abandoned or reached neutral ports, to be interned during the remainder of the war.
Four days later the Vladivostok squadron, consisting of the cruisers Rossia, Rurik, and Gromoboi, made a sortie, and, meeting the Japanese under Kamimura, a running fight ensued, lasting five hours. The Rurik, being too slow to keep up with the others, received the severest punishment and, having been pierced below the water line aft, finally sank by the stern, her whole crew being thrown into the water, as she had no boats intact. The Japanese ships' boats and torpedo-boats promptly came to the rescue and picked up over 600 men, many of whom were badly wounded.22 This incident is most exceptional, and it is of particular interest as demonstrating the possibility of rescuing practically an entire crew under battle conditions.
With these events naval operations of importance inevitably ceased for the time being, to be resumed with the arrival of Admiral Rodjestvensky's fleet and the Battle of Tsushima, May 27-28, 1905.
21Arch. de Med. et Phar. Navales, August, 1911.
22T. Cowan: The Russo-Japanese War.
The great number of ships engaged in this battle, its extent and duration, and the eventual dispersion of its component units—resulting in several more or less independent secondary engagements—preclude any attempt to give a concise, yet clear and connected, account of the whole series of events. The general details, however, are so familiar that it seems only necessary to summarize the circumstances attending the destruction of certain Russian ships, bearing in mind that no Japanese vessel (except torpedo craft) was lost or even seriously damaged.
BATTLESHIPS23
Osliabia.—Head of second division. "Was set on fire and sunk by gunfire. Driven out of line in less than 30 minutes after battle began; floated 30 minutes longer."
This vessel was struck by three large projectiles about the water-line. She listed more and more to port, capsizing as she sank. The stability of many of the Russian vessels is said to have been impaired by the excessive amount of coal stowed in every available space, including some of the officers' staterooms; little of this extra supply was used, as that in the bunkers was first drawn upon. Unless a ship capsizes suddenly, it would seem that this event does not necessarily lead to increased loss of life. On the contrary, if the preliminary list is slow and extreme, it might serve to relieve the men below, who would otherwise inevitably be drowned. Some 200 survivors were picked up in this instance by two Russian destroyers, a greater number than is recorded for any other battleship sunk under similar circumstances.
Suvaroff.—Head of first division; flagship of Admiral Rodjestvensky. "Was set on fire before 2.45 p. m. Driven out of line in less than 40 minutes after battle began,24 floated 4 hours and 40 minutes longer." She was attacked three different times by destroyers and sank at 7.20 p. m.
This ship was naturally selected for concentrated attack and suffered terribly from gunfire before and after she left the line. Semenoff estimated her casualties to be greater than those of the entire Japanese fleet. While this may be an exaggeration, it seems altogether probable that not more than half her complement—over 900—were living at the moment the ship sank. Most, if not all, of these must have drowned. The Admiral and his staff left the ship, and a destroyer was sent to search for her and take off her crew, but she could not be found. If any of her crew were picked up, there seems to be no record thereof.
23See Wainwright, Richard, Captain, U. S. Navy, PROCEEDINGS United States Naval Institute, December, 1905. Also Journal Royal United Service Institution, September, 1906. Many of the following details are from the article on this battle translated from the Marine Rundschau by Captain R. H. Anstruther, Royal Navy.
24The Russians opened fire at about 2.08 p. m.
Alexander.—Second of first division. "Set on fire and sunk by gunfire. Driven out of line in less than 40 minutes after battle began." According to Semenoff, she sank at 3.30 p. m.
The Alexander, like the Borodino, was a sister ship to the Suvaroff and received similar punishment. I can find no reference to the fate of her crew. Doubtless there were a number of individual survivors, but no general rescue.
Borodino.—Third of first division. "Set on fire at 6.40 p. m. At 7.23 a serious explosion, probably magazines, took place and she sank instantly. Driven out of line in 4 hours and 30 minutes after battle began; floated 43 minutes longer."
Semenoff was on a destroyer near at hand when she sank. He says: “'Look—the Borodino!’' was shouted on all sides. I raised myself as quickly as possible on my arms, but where the Borodino had been nothing was visible save a patch of white foam." He makes no mention of any attempts at rescue, but the Japanese cruiser Kasuga is known to have picked up 40 of her crew.25 There is no doubt but that these were practically the only survivors.
Sissoi Veliki.—Second in second division. Torpedoed during night of 27th and sank about 10.30 next morning. After working all night to keep her afloat, attempts to construct rafts were being made in the morning "when the Monomach, with a heavy list to port, and the destroyer Iromki were seen approaching. The Monomach would not take the crew on board, as she was expected to go down herself any minute. The destroyer could only take a few, so the captain of the Sissoi Veliki refused her help. An hour later three Japanese transports came on the scene and saved 570 men."26
25Brassey's Annual, 1906.
Vice Admiral De Cuverville states (Les Leçons de la Guerre) that during "the 28th and 29th of May, more than 2000 Russians, officers and sailors, came aboard (the Japanese ships) in boats or were picked up at various places on the coast. Some of them succeeded in going as far as Hamada, a hundred miles from the scene of the action."
26The auxiliary ships Shimano Maru, Tainau, Maru, Yanata Maru, Sado Maru, also a certain number of destroyers, had been directed to scour over the field of battle to collect the survivors." (See La Lutte pour l'empire de la mer, par Rene Daveluy, capitaine de frigate.)
This procedure accords with the provisions afterwards incorporated in Article 16, Tenth Convention, Second Hague Conference, 1907, which provides that: "After each engagement the two belligerents shall, so far as military interests permit, take steps to search for the shipwrecked, sick, or wounded, and to insure them, as also the dead, against maltreatment." This article is not found in the convention of 1899, but similar measures are enjoined upon belligerents after battles on land by the Geneva Convention. In view of the inevitably wide dispersion of the units during a great fleet action, the importance of this humanitarian measure is likely to become increasingly obvious.
Navarin.—Ship received little damage during daylight of 27th. Torpedoed twice during night and twice next day; sank at 2 p. m. of 28th. "The crew remained at their stations until the pipe 'All hands on deck.' The attempt to get the undamaged boats in the water failed . . . . Of the whole crew only three men were saved, two of whom were picked up by a British steamer the following afternoon."
As the casualties on this ship had been comparatively few, practically her entire crew were drowned, the most extreme case of the kind on record.
Admiral Nakimoff.—Fourth in second division. "Torpedoed night of 27th. Sank at 10 a. m., 28th."
The crews of this ship and the Monomach were taken aboard the Sado Maru and destroyer Shirani about 10 minutes before they sank. (De Cuverville.)
COAST-DEFENSE SHIP
Admiral Ouchakoff.—Second in third division. Leaking from hits in action, 27th. Surrounded next day, a Japanese ship flying signal: "We advise you to surrender. Admiral Nebogatoff has given himself up." In answer the Ouchakoff opened fire, a council of officers (called by the captain) having unanimously decided to fight to the end. After an hour's fight, began to sink, and captain ordered her valves to be opened and crew to save themselves. Eighty were drowned.
ARMORED CRUISERS
Dmitri Donskoi.—Under heavy fire, 28th, losing in two hours 60 killed and 120 wounded. After this action valves were opened and ship sank in deep water. Crew reached shore or were rescued by Kasuga.
Vladimir Monomach.—"Torpedoed in the night of 27th. Sank at 10 a. m., 28th." Her crew were taken off with the Nakimoff's.
CRUISERS
Svietlana.—Fought to the last, morning of 28th. After an hour's action, with heavy casualties, captain ordered the sea-cocks opened. "He remained on the bridge as the crew jumped overboard; the second in command was killed as he was trying to rescue the wounded. The ship went down in deep water about 11.35, and the Japanese steamed away to chase the Donskoi. About 5.30 p. m., 10 officers and 100 men (out of 440) were picked up by the America Maru, of whom 22 were wounded men lashed up in their hammocks." These evidences of care and rescue of the wounded are of particular interest.
AUXILIARIES, TRANSPORTS, ETC.
Ural.—Sunk after being abandoned. Crew taken aboard Anadir.
Kamtchatka.—Sunk in action about 7 p. m., 27th. Fate of crew uncertain.
Iltis.—Sunk in action, 27th. Fate of crew uncertain.
Angier.—Sunk in action, 27th. Fate of crew uncertain.
Russe.—Sunk in action, 27th. Fate of crew uncertain.
Irtish.—Sunk in action, 27th. Fate of crew uncertain.
Details regarding these ships are not available. Some were sunk quite early, when opportunities for rescue were seldom at hand; so altogether they probably contributed their quota to the list of drowned.
In addition to the above, five destroyers were sunk.27
27To complete the list of Russian ships the following is appended for reference:
Nicholas.—Surrendered; Nebogatoff's division.
Argol.—Surrendered with Nebogatoff's division. (Fourth ship, first division.)
Seniavine.—Surrendered; Nebogatoff's division.
Apraxine.—Surrendered; Nebogatoff's division.
lzumrud.—Escaped, but sunk on rock in Vladimir Bay.
Almaz.—Escaped to Vladivostok.
Anadir.—Escaped to Diego Suarez.
Korea.—Escaped to Woosung.
Svir.—Escaped to Woosung.
Oleg.—Escaped to Manila; Enquist's division.
Aurora.—Escaped to Manila; Enquist's division.
Jemtchug.—Escaped to Manila; Enquist's division.
Kostroma (hospital ship).—Captured, but released.
Orel (hospital ship).—Captured and condemned.
In proceeding now to an analysis of the above data, it will be expedient to consider first the statistics on the Japanese side, as these are much more complete and accurate.
The total number of fatal casualties in the Japanese Navy during the entire war, including the drowned, killed, and deaths from wounds, was 1991. Of these, no less than 139928—over 70 per cent—occurred on ships known to have been sunk, three vessels alone (Hatsuse, Yoshino, and Heiyen) accounting for more than half the whole number. Undoubtedly cases of drowning occurred on other ships, while, on the other hand, many men were killed outright in the explosions following contact with mines. The proportionate number of the latter can never be determined, but from a practical point of view it does not greatly minimize the relative importance of drowning as a damage factor to admit that on a ship going with all hands some lives were snuffed out a moment before her disappearance. Therefore from all facts at present available, I believe it may be reasonably concluded that in the Japanese Navy drowning caused many more deaths than gunfire and its fatalities exceeded in number those from all other casualties.
28These figures are from the Official Report on the Organization and Operations of the Medical Department of the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War. Extracts from the above have been translated into French by M. le Dr. Chemin, medicin de premiere classe, but unfortunately had not been published when this paper was originally written. See Arch. de Med. et Phar. Navales, August, 1911.
Any estimate of the Russian losses must necessarily be more or less tentative, subject to revision when, if ever, more exact statistics are published. It should be noted, however, that for our present purpose we are less concerned with the actual loss of life than with a determination of the relative importance of the various factors causing the same, and from this point of view the subject is somewhat more approachable. With the data available, there appears to be no satisfactory means of directly determining the number or proportion of deaths from drowning at Tsushima, for instance, but it seems possible to arrive at some definite results by a process of elimination; that is, by estimating, first, the damage from gunfire and other causes.
In the first place it is clear that the Russian loss from wounds was enormously greater—both actually and relatively—than that of their enemy, due primarily to the much better gunnery of the Japanese. This has been estimated by Japanese and British observers as resulting in two hits to one—gun for gun—early in war, and as many as four to one at Tsushima, the Japanese shooting having greatly improved. Consequently some of the ships when finally sunk had been terribly punished already, and their complements may have been reduced more than half by shell, fire, and suffocation, (i. e., Suvaroff, Borodino, Alexander, Osliabia, etc.). These cases are in quite a different class from those vessels sunk with explosion, where the two factors causing death acted simultaneously and were practically inseparable. The Japanese lost no ships in action; sinking was more or less an accidental occurrence, menacing the whole crew, and of these disasters the Russians also had their full share. Up to the battle of Tsushima the record is fairly complete, the principal losses in action being as follows:
Men killed
Variag 31
Battle of Aug. 10 80
Battle of Aug. 14 320
Total 29 431
During the same period there were lost by the sinking of the—
Lives lost
Yenesei 93
Petropavlosk 625
Strashni (about) 75
Total 793
29British Official History.
Most of the latter may be fairly attributed to drowning, inevitably associated with the submersion of the ships. But making due allowance for contributory causes and adding miscellaneous casualties occurring in minor operations to the 431 noted above, there is still a heavy balance in the list of drowned.
Regarding Tsushima itself, Daveluy says: "Of the 14,200 men who manned the Russian squadron, 6142 became prisoners; 5000 had disappeared." Braisted30 states that "the number of missing is variously estimated at from 5000 to 8000," while the lowest figures available give the actual loss of life as "about 4000." It seems conservative, therefore, to assume that some 30 per cent of the entire force perished in this engagement.
30Loc cit.
It has been generally believed that about 20 per cent is an average casualty list to be anticipated from gunfire in naval battles, and that only 4 per cent will be killed outright, though I think this will prove far too low an estimate for any force which suffers defeat. On the other hand, there is probably a maximum death roll, seldom to be exceeded, beyond which it might be actually disadvantageous for the victor to inflict further penalty by gunfire. This would seem to have occurred when practically all hands above the armored deck had been killed or disabled, the guns put out of action, and the ship herself rendered incapable of escape. At this stage it will generally be more expedient to deliver the final blow by torpedo attack rather than to expend ammunition which might be indispensable elsewhere.
Such a condition of helplessness would inevitably exist on shipboard when the vessel had lost in killed alone 25 to 30 per cent of her complement; allowing at this stage only three men wounded to every two killed, we account for about all the crew outside the ammunition passages, engineering department, and other positions below decks.
The fact that the proportion of "killed" to "wounded" rises rapidly as the percentage of total casualties increases does not seem to have been generally appreciated. This is well illustrated by the following (Russian) examples:
Killed and
Wounded Killed Wounded
Per cent Per cent Per cent
Battle of Aug. 10 8 1.3 6.6
Battle of Aug. 14 (all ships) 36 13 23
Battle of Aug. 14 (Rurik only) 52 22.5 29.5
The running fight of August 14 was particularly disastrous to the Russians, but their fatalities did not reach 14 per cent. Upon this occasion the Rurik suffered much more severely than the other cruisers. Subjected, as we have seen, to terrific gunfire for several hours and finally sunk, her list of killed ran up to an exceptional figure, 22.5 per cent.
Now, there is no doubt but that on some or all the battleships sunk on the 27th this rate was exceeded, perhaps reaching 30 percent, and, on the Suvaroff, even more. But it is also evident that a large majority of the Russian ships sank, surrendered, or escaped long before they were reduced to the Rurik's plight; for example, the three large vessels of Enquist's division, which reached Manila, had only 37 killed, all told. From consideration of these circumstances and those attending the various individual ships in action I am led to believe that the average loss by gunfire for the whole fleet may have reached 12 per cent, a very high mortality indeed; it is generally assumed to have been much less.
On nearly all the Russian ships which were seriously engaged fires were frequent and severe. One of the points raised by Admiral Nebogatoff in his own defense and arraignment of Admiral Rodjestvensky referred to the large amount of woodwork which had been retained on board the vessels of the first and second divisions. Nebogatoff having had his own ships stripped before the battle. In view of the well-known experience of the Chinese ships at the Yalu and those of the Spaniards at Santiago, it is certainly remarkable that greater precautions were not observed to prevent these disasters. As a result, the fighting efficiency of the ships was not only hopelessly impaired, but there was much unnecessary loss of life from direct action of fire, exploding ammunition, and, particularly, asphyxiation. In judging the extent of the damage thus inflicted, Semenoff's graphic picture of conditions on the flagship is especially informing. Referring to the time (5.30 p. m.) Admiral Rodjestvensky was leaving this vessel, he says: "The mess deck was in darkness (the electric light had gone out) and was full of suffocating smoke. Hurrying along to find the staff, we called them by name, but received no answers. The silence of the dead reigned in that smoky darkness, and it is probable that all who were in the closed compartments under the armored deck, where the ventilators took smoke instead of air, gradually became suffocated, lost consciousness, and died. The engines had ceased to work. The electric light had given out for want of steam; and no one came up from below. Of the 900 men comprising the complement of the Suvaroff it would not be far wrong to say that, at this time, there remained alive only those few who were gathered together in the lower battery and on the windward embrasure.31
31The Battle of Tsushima, Semenoff, V., Captain, Russian Navy, translated by Lindsay.
As these conditions were reproduced more or less fully on three other battleships, an average of about 100 deaths on each—say 3 per cent of the fleet complement—has been attributed to this cause.
These approximate results may accordingly be summarized as
follows:
Per cent
Killed by gunfire 12
Killed by fire, asphyxiation, etc. 3
Drowned 15
Total 30
Drowning, therefore, appears to have caused at least half the mortality, assuming the total loss to have been somewhere near 30 per cent. The total may, in fact, have been somewhat higher, but there seems to be no definite foundation for the impression sometimes expressed that an overwhelming majority of all the deaths were attributable to the above cause. In general terms it may be accepted as certain that there has been a tendency since Lissa and the Yalu for drowning to assume a position of greater actual but less relative magnitude, due to the increased loss of life from gunfire. The exceptions to this statement, which occurred in the Spanish-American War, were due to special circumstances resulting from the availability of land, which, in some respects, removes the two principal naval engagements from the category of battles at sea.
The questions which now present themselves relate to the probability of such extensive losses occurring in future wars and the adoption of methods for their amelioration. It must be admitted that from a humanitarian standpoint the outlook is far from promising. However much naval conditions may change in the ultimate course of time, every great fleet action of the immediate future seems bound to include for the defeated side a certain sequence of events: A few ships may escape; a larger number will be destroyed during the earlier phases of battle; while for the rest, deprived of power for defense or mobility—reduced, in fact, to veritable charnel pits afloat—the alternatives must be surrender or destruction by torpedo attack. It would seem, then, that the only profitable point for discussion concerns the relative number of ships likely to fall within the second class indicated above, i. e., those which sink early in action.
There are some grounds for believing that the number of such disasters is not at present tending to increase. We may practically dismiss the ram as a weapon of offense, since opportunities for its use are now altogether remote and a repetition of the Re d'Italia's fate is most unlikely. The gun, on the other hand, has unquestionably far outstripped the development of armor, and the destructive effect of naval ordnance, as exemplified in the all-big-gun ship, is relatively much greater to-day than at the Yalu or even Tsushima. But most of its damage is above the water-line. Immensely destructive to personnel, no doubt, but not necessarily to the immediate life of the ship under fire. Even with 12-inch shells or larger it will take a great many under-water hits to sink a big ship, properly subdivided; and such hits must always form an exceedingly small percentage of the whole.
Conditions with respect to mines and torpedoes are somewhat different. Undoubtedly one of the most interesting and surprising medico-military features of the last war was the great loss of life directly due to floating mines. The results of torpedo attack were, on the contrary, less destructive to life than might have been anticipated; the Japanese, in spite of dash and gallantry, made a very small percentage of hits, and it took a remarkable number of successful shots to sink or even completely disable a large ship. However, we must assume that with the development of these weapons themselves and utilization of the coming submarine of greater habitability and cruising radius, damage from these sources will inevitably increase; and as the injuries so inflicted, unlike those of the gun, affect primarily the flotation of vessels, they may very directly influence the loss by drowning.
On the whole, then, the power of offense tends so enormously to increase that it seems certain that ships will be put out of action more promptly than heretofore; but whether or not they will sink more rapidly, is another question. At this point size is likely to be the determining factor for with increased displacement there comes not only actual but relative increase in resistance, especially against sinking. Further discussion along these lines, however, would involve technical difficulties quite beyond the scope of this paper.
Before leaving the subject of mines and torpedoes it may be noted that loss of life by these weapons would not have exactly the same crippling effect upon the service generally as an equal number of deaths directly due to gunshot, since the latter are particularly limited to men in a special class, viz., those above decks, the engineer's force being practically exempt. Torpedo or mine explosion, if followed by any loss of life whatever, is likely to include nearly the whole crew, and the damage is thus more generally distributed. So far as it goes—and the point is somewhat academic—this tends to make the gun more humane than the torpedo or mine, since with a given loss of life it inflicts more damage on the enemy; obviously it would be easier to replace a whole ship's company than to fill a thousand vacancies among officers and guns' crews alone.
Measures designed to prevent loss by drowning include those provided by the ship herself and relief afforded by other vessels. Little is to be expected from the former source. If wooden boats are brought into action they will not only be useless when needed, but a source of danger from fire and splinters beforehand. The Japanese left most of their boats behind; the Russians generally kept theirs on board. It is not surprising, therefore, that Semenoff refers to a blazing heap of wood where 11 boats had been piled up amidships; they had been filled with water before the action, but this soon leaked out through shot holes and there was not one available to take the wounded admiral off his ship.
Metal boats are exempt from fire, but hoisted on deck they merely serve to explode shells which might otherwise have caused no damage. It has been suggested that they be stowed on the gun deck behind armor,32 but this certainly seems impracticable in numbers.
32Commander William Hovgaard, Royal Danish Navy: The Fate of the Russian Ships at Tsushima; Jane's Fighting Ships. 1906.
Individual apparatus—"life preservers" in some form—should be incombustible and incapable of exploding shell or causing splinters, a combination which does not appear to exist. In sufficient numbers they would also encumber the decks. The Russians used cork mattresses for this purpose and with considerable success, particularly in saving the lives of men wounded and helpless, some of whom were floating about for hours before being rescued. "Canvas bands were sewn on these mattresses in such a manner that a man can slip one of them on and be in possession of an excellent life-preserver."33 Since mattresses must be carried on board ship anyway, this procedure seems worthy of development, Particularly if some method of rendering the materials fireproof can be successfully employed. On the Russian ships they must have added materially to the conflagrations on board, as there are several references to burning hammocks and mattresses.
Turning to outside assistance we may first consider the hospital ship, but difficulties at once appear, both in practical application and under the provisions of international law. In the past they have not been conspicuous upon such occasions. At Tsushima the Russians had two of these vessels, the Orel and Kostroma. The former, an 8000-ton ship, was fitted out and maintained by the women of France and Russia; each defrayed half the total expense. The Kostroma, of 7000 tons, was bought from the North-German Lloyd Steamship Co. and transformed into a hospital ship at Shanghai. (Spear.) Before the battle one or both appear to have taken position far in the van, where they certainly had no business to be. Later, during the approach and earlier phase of the action, they were near the rear and some 1000 yards to star-board of the main column. During the entire afternoon of the 27th they seem to have hung on desperately to the rear of the transports, the safety of which was a constant source of embarrassment to the Russians, most of them being sunk. The hospital ships, therefore, were distinctly within the immediate area of operations. Eventually both were seized by the Japanese, and if they fulfilled any useful purpose in the meantime I can find no mention of the fact. The Kostroma was soon released and proceeded to Vladivostok, but the case of the Orel came before the prize court of Sasebo and she was condemned as good prize on four counts, one of which was that, as above noted, she had navigated at the head of the column "in the position usually occupied by reconnoitering ships."34
33Spear, R., Surgeon, U. S. Navy: Report to the Surgeon General, United States Navy. 1906.
34See A. Pearce Higgins: Hospital Ships and the Carriage of Passengers and Crews of Destroyed Prizes. Law Quarterly Review, October, 1910.
As for the Japanese, "their hospital ships Saiko, Maru and Kobe Maru were on the Korean coast and did not arrive in time to take an active part in the battle." (Braisted.) As they were well aware long beforehand that a battle was impending, this seems to have been in accordance with a predetermined policy not to have such ships within' the combatant area, a policy based, in part, perhaps, upon questions of neutrality.35
Upon at least one other important occasion a so-called "hospital ship," or at least a vessel more or less set aside for hospital purposes, was within reach during a naval battle, and this was as far back as Lissa.36 She remained with Admiral Albini's division, taking no part in the day's proceedings, though she seems to have received the wounded from a landing force previously sent ashore. It is of interest to note that she mounted two guns, which was of course entirely permissible, as such vessels were not then neutralized. Her presence at Lissa is worthy of note, because, as has often been stated, the "needless loss of life by drowning" which occurred during this engagement was largely responsible for the public agitation in favor of applying to naval warfare the immunities which had already, in 1864, been adopted for hospital service on land. Without in any degree minimizing the exceeding importance of these humanitarian rules (which finally became operative at The Hague in 1899), it may be suggested that their application upon this particular occasion would have made no material difference whatever. The Italia sank in the thick of the fight where no immediate rescue was possible, while the captain and crew of the Palestro gallantly refused to leave their ship, though there was ample opportunity to do so.
35See Pleadwell, F. L., Surgeon, U. S. Navy: The Tenth Convention of the Second Hague Conference of 1907 and its Relation to the Evacuation of the Wounded in Naval Warfare. War College lecture, 1910. Nav. Med. Bull., October., 1911-January., 1912. The whole question of the utilization of hospital ships during and after battle is here elaborately and most ably discussed.
36See Wilson, op. cit.. Of course, there are earlier examples, such as those in our Civil War. Most of these, however, operated with the army.
Past experience with hospital ships in battle is thus altogether negative, but there are certain well-defined principles which, in the main, will guide their action. For a discussion of these questions in full, Surgeon Pleadwell's paper must be referred to, but certain points may be touched upon in this connection. Regarding the position of the ship, all will agree with Surgeon General Stokes in saying that "it is certain that it would be folly to sacrifice it by placing it within flag-signal distance—in fact, anywhere within the danger zone.37 When we consider how very extensive this “danger zone" may be, even before there is general dispersion of the ships and squadrons, it will be seen that this is a serious restriction. The area embraced by the guns of a modern fleet is hard to realize; 48 armored ships, in column, without necessary scouts, destroyers, and auxiliaries, could actually sweep at least 500 square miles, and it is safe to assume that with two such fleets dispersed, in action, the "danger zone" will greatly exceed ten times this area. There are, nevertheless, certain circumstances which might readily arise, as the Surgeon General has elsewhere shown,38 under which the services of a hospital ship might be utilized to save a crew from drowning, providing communication could be effected under battle conditions up to some 10 or 12 miles. The case of the Suvaroff may serve as an illustration. For some time before she sank this vessel was almost completely hors de combat, on fire, desperately battered, and at times more or less isolated. It is certainly conceivable that, with the shifting scene of battle, a hospital ship—let us say the Kostroma—could have approached and taken off the remainder of her crew, all of whom were actually drowned because the ship herself could not be located. Suppose, however, the Kostroma has successfully made such an attempt, questions relating to her neutrality, which are of great practical importance, at once suggest themselves. To be clearly within her neutral rights it must appear that she is not being used "for any military purpose," that she "in no wise hampers the movements of the combatants," and she must act at her "own risk and peril." If, under these conditions, she picks up men actually struggling in the water, the case is plain enough. The Russian program for the First Hague Conference specifically invited action looking to the "neutralization of ships and boats employed in saving drowning sailors during or after naval battles," and the phraseology actually adopted—and still in force—states that hospital ships "shall afford relief and assistance to the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked." (Italics are mine.) But at 6 p. m., for example, were the uninjured members of the Suvaroff's crew "shipwrecked" (naufragés in the original text; the translation has caused some confusion, but it is made clear in the general report)? Professor Hull defines this term as embracing "those who have been placed in danger of drowning as a result of a naval combat," and certainly no more accurate definition could be given regarding the plight of the Suvaroff's survivors at the time specified above. In any particular case it would therefore seem that the point to be determined is not so much one of principle as one of fact. Was or was not the ship actually hors de combat and sinking? If there were any doubt upon this point, the case would probably come before a prize court for decision, but to me it seems quite unnecessary to take the ground, apparently advocated in some quarters, that we must stand idly by until a ship has sunk, struck her colors, or "the battle is over"—a point difficult to determine. According to Admiral Togo, Tsushima was won in less than 40 minutes, but for some ships the real fighting had not then begun and was not over until the next day.
37See Surgeon Charles F. Stokes, U. S. Navy: The Hospital Ship as an Aid to Fleet Efficiency. The Military Surgeon, January, 1910.
38Naval Surgery in American Practice of Surgery, 1911.
To continue with our hypothetical case of the Suvaroff's crew, now safely transferred to the Kostroma: What, let us ask, may be done with them? Sick or wounded men may be retained on a hospital ship until cured—subject, of course, to capture by the enemy—and may then serve again in arms. There is no time limit whatever on their detention except that due to their own physical disability. The men on the Kostroma—some or all—are "fit for duty" Can she accordingly during the night discharge these "patients" to the Ouchakoff to fill up vacancies for her fight the next day? In such an extreme case the verdict of a prize court would doubtless be "no," as it would certainly be using the hospital ship for a very important and direct "military purpose." It is important to note that such cases are by no means improbable and that they may be on the border line where, in the absence of precedents, no hard and fast rule seems applicable. So far as I am aware this particular source of possible embarrassment has not been the subject of legal discussion.
Without going into further details regarding the function of hospital ships in action, we may safely assume that although upon occasion they may reach a ship which has fallen out of the line and so succeed in rescuing her crew, such opportunities must always be looked upon as too exceptional to answer the problem of drowning.
I therefore wish to invite particular attention to certain supplementary measures suggested to me by some observations made a few years ago in a paper by Rear Admiral Sir Charles Campbell, R. N.39 He expresses an opinion that with each squadron of six battleships there should be one hospital ship and an accompanying sea-going tender. The latter—two to each fleet—are, in action assigned to positions only one mile astern of the rear vessel in column, the hospital ships themselves being some miles farther away. The writer did not indicate the structural features of these tenders or his views as to their particular utility, but it would certainly seem that small converted yachts, such as those purchased for our navy during the Spanish War, would be admirably adapted to carry out the special work now under discussion. These small craft would require no elaborate medical equipment, and would carry only a small personnel; they should be neutralized, like their parent ship, and their special mission in battle should be to render assistance to crews "placed in danger of drowning." They should, of course, carry "wireless," have as high speed as practicable, and, in addition to life-boats, should be equipped with special life-saving apparatus designed for taking men rapidly on board directly from the water, such as two or more booms on each side, rigged with numerous ladders and foot ropes. To this end the vessels must not be too large or their freeboard too high; they must be easily handled, capable of going alongside a battleship if necessary or proceeding directly within the midst of a crew struggling in the water. Vessels of this type could be expected to take some risks. They must not, of course, embarrass the actions of either belligerent or invite inevitable destruction by wilful exposure to direct gunfire; but they need not be guarded with that assiduity which prevents the hospital ship, except on rare occasions, from rendering aid where it is often most imperatively demanded. If the hospital tender came by chance or necessity temporarily within the danger zone her small size would minimize the likelihood of a disastrous hit.
39The Organization of a Modern Fleet for War. Journal Royal United Service Institution, December, 1906.
One obvious objection to the employment of such vessels may be based on their small carrying capacity. While I have no positive data available, this question could readily be settled by direct experiment and the necessary displacement determined accordingly. I am convinced that the size should be kept at the minimum and that two vessels, say, of 500 tons each would prove much more useful than one double this displacement. Taking the Hist, 475 tons, as a type, it seems probable that some 500 men could in fair weather be crowded on board and retained simply long enough to reach the hospital ship, perhaps 10 or 15 miles away. This is far from the full complement of a battleship, it is true, but it must be remembered that the tender will not be dealing with full complements. Even this number could be taken off a sinking ship only under the most favorable circumstances, with plenty of time available. For example, the ship may be on fire, so that the tender cannot approach on the lee side, conditions which actually existed when Admiral Rodjestvensky left the Souvaroff. If the ship has already sunk, it is quite improbable that anywhere near 500 survivors will still be afloat when the hospital tender arrives on the scene, even if her approach requires but a few minutes. On the whole, I would tentatively suggest 900 tons as a maximum displacement. That such small vessels can do excellent work along these lines has been already demonstrated by the successful utilization of destroyers for just this purpose. But in general their cooperation is not to be counted upon; theirs is a different mission, and they may not be diverted to secondary aims.
Finally, if vessels of the type herein proposed prove actually capable of successful accomplishment in a humanitarian field now so barren of results, I would suggest that they should especially commend themselves to the Red Cross and other charitable associations by reason of their availability and small comparative cost.
In closing this paper the following conclusions are submitted:
1. Drowning in naval warface causes loss of life substantially equivalent to that due to gunfire, or may even exceed it.
2. Unless special means of relief are adopted there is no immediate prospect that such losses will materially decrease.
3. This loss of life is not usually necessary for military ends.
4. Life-saving devices on vessels of war must at present continue to be totally inadequate.
5. That it is desirable to investigate the possibilities of hospital tenders or such other methods as give promise of practical utility.