The recent sinking of the Empress of Ireland by the Storstad with its appalling loss of one thousand and thirty-two lives, followed so closely by other collisions such as that between the New York and the Pretoria, must have impressed all seafaring men and the public in general with the urgent necessity for adopting some means for preventing such accidents from occurring in the future.
Such a disaster under the conditions existing at the time can only be due to criminal negligence and inefficiency somewhere, not necessarily on the part of the officers of the ships concerned, let it be understood, but this accident was primarily owing to the faulty system of navigation in practice which allows two ships bound in opposite directions to pass so close to each other as to involve danger when there are miles of open water available so that a "safety zone" of sufficient width might be laid down on the chart which would render such a collision as that between the Empress of Ireland and the Storstad, or between the New York and the Pretoria, a physical impossibility.
The blame should not rest entirely on the officers of the ships involved so long as a practice in the navigation of vessels is permitted to exist which places the safety of two ships and hundreds of lives with millions of dollars worth of property wholly on the correct sending, receiving, proper interpretation and execution of signals made by steam whistles in an emergency. This extremely dangerous way of navigating ships must be changed or else it is only a question of time before similar accidents are bound to occur.
The details of the proposed method as shown on the chart and explained herein are sufficiently clear, it is believed, to prove that with the aid of such charts and a low power wireless outfit on each ship, or submarine signals, in addition to the ordinary high power outfit, it will be easy to navigate vessels safely along the coast, as well as in deep water, on the "double track" rather than on the "single track" system.
The low power wireless outfit, which it is understood vessels are now required to carry, will enable the proper signals to be made, with a previously established simple code, to enable ships to give one another their positions, courses and speeds when sufficiently far apart to make collisions next to impossible even in thick weather, for by these means the positions of the ships may be readily plotted and their positions at any future time anticipated.
It will thus be possible, if thought advisable, to establish a kind of "block system" so that a vessel overhauling another on the same track will be compelled to keep a certain number of miles astern of the latter until the positions of the ships are accurately fixed so that they may pass with safety.
On the chart the tracks are shown with a "safety zone" of five miles between the nearest opposite tracks, though when practicable this zone should be much wider and sometimes it may have to be narrower. Each ship should be required to keep as near as possible to the track as laid down on the chart.
The "danger spaces" are shown by cross lines where the tracks intersect and will serve as warnings to ships approaching these "crossings" to "Stop, look and listen." The unexpected danger is the one most to be feared, and by requiring all steamers to cross the tracks of others at the points laid down on the chart will cause each ship on approaching and traversing a "danger space" to use the utmost caution.
The different routes have code letters as shown. It shall be the duty of all ships in thick weather to signal their "track letters." On receiving a "track letter" from another vessel each ship will repeat her "track letter" followed by her latitude when her course has more northing or southing, or by her longitude when it has more easting or westing. The latitude and longitude will be given in degrees and minutes and may be followed by N, S, E, or W, as the case may be, if necessary. The speed will follow to the nearest knot. Thus we see that this short message, consisting of one letter and as a rule not more than six figures, will in all cases give sufficient data to accurately locate all ships within reach of the low power sets. If considered preferable a simple code consisting of letters alone might be arranged and printed on the chart.
By adding one or at most two more digits to the code signal we may expand this system from the “double track" to a multitrack" system and locate each ship on her proper speed line and require all ships on that line to maintain the standard speed of that line.
Vessels whose speed is ten knots or less will keep on the boundary line of the zone as close as possible and when necessary to pass the passing vessel will do so by turning into the zone and return to her track ahead of the other vessel as soon as possible.
What is said above applies to merchant steamers only. Public vessels when cruising and sailing ships are free to go into the neutral territory and it will be their duty to keep clear of the regular tracks of steamers at all times. A public vessel bound from one port to another directly will be governed by the same rules as other steamers, and vessels making a port will take the nearest track for inward bound vessels in case they find themselves off their own tracks.
The laws governing our coastwise shipping, and all other shipping, should be modified as soon as possible so as to require a ship upon entering a "danger space" to go at such a moderate rate of speed that she shall be able to stop her headway within "the range of visibility ahead of the ship." If it be so thick that a ship cannot see ahead any distance, then this rule would require the ship to stop until she can locate all vessels in the vicinity. She may then proceed cautiously through the "danger space," provided she hears no other steamer's whistle.
When by the foregoing rule a steamer has been compelled to stop and hears the fog whistle of another steamer, both ships will remain stationary and exchange "track letters" by whistle. If these belong to the same zone but are not the same letter it shows that one or both ships are out of position and are near each other bound in opposite directions, and they will remain stationary or anchor if on soundings until they can see sufficiently far ahead to proceed with safety.
If at any time when outside of a "danger space" a steamer hears the fog whistle of another both shall slow so as to be able to stop "within the range of visibility ahead" and exchange "track letters" by whistle in order to determine whether they are bound in the same or opposite directions or crossing and if very thick this means "stop." It is evident that this is the only way that such collisions as that between the New York and the Pretoria may be prevented, if the report is correct that the Pretoria was very much out of her reckoning. When this is the case the reports by wireless will be very misleading and in all cases they must be verified by the whistles when vessels approach each other in a fog.
In this case only one letter sounded on the whistle is necessary to give the required information. If they are bound in the same direction they may proceed safely at the speed of the slower until the weather clears.
More buoys of the most improved type should be used where-ever possible so as to give separate routes for incoming and outgoing steamers. In thick weather traffic through narrow, dangerous channels should alternate in direction, allowing no ships to pass in opposite directions at the same time. When the channel is very narrow and very deep this should apply in clear weather also, for no one can tell at what moment the steering gear of one ship or the other may suddenly become deranged. Unless conditions are such that a ship may be immediately grounded to prevent her sinking it is evidently very reckless to take such chances, particularly with passenger steamers.
The chart shows the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and the vicinity of Father Point, near which place, at A, the fatal collision between the Empress of Ireland and the collier Storstad occurred at about 2 a. m. on the morning of May 29, 1914.
The Empress of Ireland was outward bound and had discharged her pilot at the station off Father Point, and the Storstad was standing in for the same station to pick up a pilot. This happened to bring the two ships very close in passing and headed in nearly opposite directions, making the conditions somewhat similar to those obtaining in the collision between the Monroe and the Nantucket off Cape Charles, Virginia, about 2 a. m., January 30, 1914.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry1 states that there was no dense fog for any appreciable length of time, that the vessels were in sight about six miles apart, and further that a fog-bank obscured the lights at a critical moment, requiring an exchange of emergency signals.
The evidence shows that had the weather remained clear and had each ship held her course, no collision would have occurred. The chief officer of the Storstad was at fault in assuming that the ships would pass red to red, and in putting his helm to port in order to increase the distance between the ships, which were as a matter of fact, passing green to green, and this error caused the disaster.
The important question to examine at present is why should vessels bound in opposite directions ever be allowed to pass close enough to each other to involve risk of collision when there is ample sea-room for a "safety zone"?
With what has already been said it is hardly necessary to explain the accompanying pilot chart in detail and a few additional words will suffice.
This chart requires all inward bound steamers to keep north of the zone EW, and all outward bound steamers to keep south of this zone, which is five miles wide. Now it is evident that had each of these steamers had one of these charts and followed it this collision would have been impossible. Further, the use of this chart would fix absolutely the responsibility for an accident in all cases. In the present instance the Storstad would have been at fault, as she was on the wrong side of the zone and in the territory of the other ship.
So much for this case in comparatively clear weather, if the present reports are correct. What more concerns us is the utility of these charts in thick weather.
1See Appendix.
Suppose the weather thick and when the Empress of Ireland was at V the following message was received on the wireless or submarine signal apparatus:
1W 68 12, which means, "speed line W1; longitude 68° 12' W; making 11 knots; west bound; position T." Ordinarily the numerical portion of the message consists of six figures following the "zone letter," W in this case. The first four stand for the latitude or longitude in degrees and minutes and these may be followed by N, S, E, or W, as the case may be, and the last two figures, when there are six following the zone letter, indicate the speed of the ship in knots. When no speed is given it means that the ship is making the speed required on her speed line, thus: W = 10 knots, 1W=11 knots, etc.
The Empress answers: 6E 68 33 12, which means, "east bound; speed line E6; longitude 68° 33'; speed 12 knots; position V." The Empress having discharged her pilot, should change course to port to gain the line E2.
There is nothing in these messages to cause anxiety to either captain; in fact, the single letter "W" was all the captain of the Empress need receive to know that the ship sending it was west bound and would pass at least 11 miles north of him when abeam, position U. The captain of the Storstad would know when he received the letter "E" that the ship sending it was east bound and would pass at least six miles south of him when abeam, position A.
Zone NS is for an imaginary ferry across the river to show the "danger spaces" and how crossing steamers signal to keep clear as they would have to do if crossing at sea. Small local steamers would not have wireless and submarine signals and should be given the right of way. Suppose when at G the Storstad received the signal by Morse Code on steam whistle NW. This would indicate a ferry boat north bound at F, and she has the right of way.
At sea all vessels approaching crossings in thick weather will keep a lookout for messages from other vessels bound for the same crossing and, as shown above, the short message consisting of one letter and seven figures will give the position, course and speed of any vessel within the radius of the low power outfits in ample time to allow the positions of the ships to be plotted and to avoid collisions.
The neutral water within the different "safety zones" could be utilized by tows and small low power vessels with a secondary "safety zone," say one mile wide between the opposite tracks.
The following are the chief advantages that may be claimed for the proposed system:
1. It will be observed that these coast-wise pilot charts merely systematize the present practice. There are no hard and fast rules in regard to speed to hamper the movements of individual ships and restrict traffic, with the exceptions of reducing speed when in a "danger space" and when overtaking another ship, and this is already required by the present rules for preventing collisions at sea. All that is demanded is that ships going in certain directions shall keep on certain tracks, while those going in opposite directions shall keep on other tracks laid down on the chart. The use of these charts in no way conflicts with the present international rules for preventing collisions at sea.
2. By requiring ships to keep as near as possible in given tracks when the weather is clear, their positions may be more accurately determined and transmitted by wireless or submarine signal when the weather becomes thick.
3. The establishment of the "danger spaces" will enable ships to know where and when to expect to meet others and by requiring them to go at such a speed that they must be able to stop their headway within "the range of visibility ahead of the ship" the danger of collision will be prevented to a very great extent. It must be remembered that no one can maintain for hours at a time a maximum efficiency in watchfulness any more than a runner can make his best speed for hours but which he might easily maintain for, half an hour.
4. Though ships are required to proceed more slowly than at present through the "danger spaces" yet the "safety zones" will enable ships going in opposite directions to proceed faster along the safe portions of the track when clear of the "danger spaces."
5. The "speed lines" will prevent rear-end collisions between ships going in the same direction. For though a ship making 15 knots might due to errors in her reckoning be on the 13 or 17 speed line yet it is not likely that she would be much further out, and consequently whether she were overtaking another vessel or being overtaken by her the rate of approach would be so slow that there would be no danger of collision even in thick weather. Each vessel would have ample time to get the speed and position of the other.
6. As no ship is allowed under the rules to pass on any speed line except those bounding the "safety zone," a ship finding herself astern of a slower vessel must reduce her speed to that of the latter, thus establishing a "block." If she desires to increase her speed she must, if out of position, port her helm and take her proper speed line, or else the slower vessel, if out of position, must starboard her helm and take her proper speed line. If both are out of position the slower vessel ahead will change course to port and the faster ship, astern, will change course to starboard until both are on their proper "speed lines."
Charts have in the past been used for navigation purposes only, to a very great extent, for piloting vessels on the high seas and along the coasts in order to insure the safety of vessels from shipwreck. Up to date no really systematic attempt has been made to use charts and modern methods of signalling to prevent collisions between vessels and obstructions to navigation, such as icebergs and derelicts, except in the case of the "steamship lanes" proposed by Lieutenant M. F. Maury, U. S. Navy, in about 1855, and which was not adopted until many years later, and the pilot charts issued by the hydrographic offices, which, as valuable as they are, cannot be made to fill the place of the charts here proposed. With these charts in universal use the only danger from collision is from one vessel overtaking another in thick weather. Now if ships plot their positions when 100 miles apart and replot at intervals, their rate of approach being known, errors of position will soon be detected and each will verify and check up her position, therefore:
8. The use of these charts will demand better navigation on the part of the officers of all steamers and sailing ships, both in the way of taking sights and in the intelligent use of the sounding machine; about which more will be said later, for in case of a collision that ship which is out of her track will have the burden of proof on her to show good reason why she did not know her position.
9. When sailing ships are clear of the tracks of steamers laid down on the chart they will know that they are safe from steamers at least, and when they are in those tracks they will know that they are in danger and being fully warned they will see to it that their lights are burning brightly, properly trimmed and if the weather is thick they will be prompted to keep their fog horns going in a way that will make a real noise.
10. To promote the safety of life and property at sea all large sailing vessels should be required to carry:
(a) An efficient fog horn operated by compressed air.
(b) A small gun to be used as an emergency fog signal when a steamer is discovered close aboard.
(c) An efficient sounding machine.
(d) A low power wireless outfit operated by a gasoline or oil motor for use in thick weather when near steamer tracks or in other times of danger.
(e) As a safeguard against one ship overtaking and ramming another, ships should be required to carry fog buoys, to be towed astern when a fog whistle is heard in that direction.
Let not the sailing ship be despised. A steamer filled with passengers will sink just as quickly when struck amidships by a sailing ship loaded with pig-iron or coal going 10 knots as though this vessel were propelled by some kind of machinery.
11. Steamers passing along a track will soon locate all derelicts and icebergs in the vicinity of this track and thus all shipping in the immediate vicinity may be promptly warned.
12. From the above statements it is believed that it must be conceded that the use of the proposed coastwise pilot charts will greatly decrease the number of collisions between vessels in clear weather as well as in thick weather and therefore that many valuable lives and much property must eventually be saved.
In using these coastwise pilot charts an efficient navigational sounding machine will be found to be absolutely necessary in order to verify or ascertain the positions of vessels in thick weather on soundings.
Lord Kelvin's navigational sounding machine has contributed more to safe navigation in fog than any invention ever made and all sea-going vessels should carry this or a similar machine.
The first cost of this machine and the cost of the sounding tubes used with it have prevented its more general use on board sailing ships and on some steamers. Thanks are due therefore, from the seafaring fraternity to the ingenuity of Captain John Martin for an improved sounding tube equal in accuracy to that of Lord Kelvin and possessing the advantage that it may be used over and over again any number of times.
The various parts of the tube and its attachments are shown in the sketch, and the description of this tube given below was taken from the Pilot Chart of the North Atlantic Ocean for January, 1909, published by the U. S. Hydrographic Office, Washington, D. C.
DEEP-SEA SOUNDINGS
A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE KELVIN CHROMATE OF SILVER TUBE
Captain John Martin, of the Norwegian steamship Akershus, communicates the following to the U. S. Hydrographic Office:
"Running short of Lord Kelvin's glass tubes for deep-sea soundings and finding the price charged in America, 40 cents, rather high, I tried to find some substitute for the chromate of silver (unobtainable here) and succeeded.
"I bought a one-fourth inch (inside diameter) water-gauge glass of the same length as Lord Kelvin's tubes, closed one end with a fiat piece of cork, a small rag over it, and some sealing wax. Next I got a sheet of drawing paper and cut it into narrow strips at a book-binders. (In my first trials I cut strips from the margin of Admiralty charts.) Along the middle of the paper strip I draw a line with copying-ink pencil. The paper strip is then shoved up the glass tube, forming a blank scale. The lower end of the strip is turned round the edge of the tube and tied with a piece of cotton thread to prevent the paper being displaced by the water as it forces up the tube. The glass tube must be perfectly dry inside, and the paper strip should not be ruled and put in place much before it is to be used, as the ink-pencil line may become indistinct through moisture.
"The tube is now used in the same way as Lord Kelvin's. The depth is read off from the boxwood scale. The ink-pencil line will distinctly indicate how far the water has reached. (Dip a strip of paper with an ink-pencil line on it into some water, and it will be seen how distinct the marking is.)
"The guard tube to put the gauge glass in was made from an old condenser tube.
"The only drawback with this instrument is that it lacks the impress of authority. I have used it simultaneously with some Kelvin tubes, and found it to register the same.
"The paper strips are very convenient for writing on, and when dried, after being used once, may be used a second time by ruling a new line on the other side."
The writer has two improvements to suggest in Captain Martin's sounding tube which is to substitute a brass tube of about one-fourth inch internal diameter and of the same length for the glass water-gauge tube "B." A brass tube could be so accurately bored out that there would be no variations in its inside diameter and its upper end could be threaded and fitted with a brass cap and rubber gasket or brazed on to prevent any possibility of a leak. We would thus have a cheap and indestructible sounding tube and a more reliable one than those in general use which may sometimes register falsely due to a slight leak on account of their upper ends being closed with sealing wax. The second improvement is to provide sheets of heavy paper on which the scale of soundings shown on the box-wood scale are printed, from which the strips may be cut as required. Not only will scales thus prepared prevent mistakes in reading off the soundings, but plotting the soundings will be expedited and the box-wood scale may be kept locked up for an emergency.
A dozen of these tubes could be easily provided and as each one is used it could be quickly dried again by heat.
A suitable sounding tube being thus placed within reach of all it will be a simple matter for any machinist to make a reel to carry the sounding wire. This should be of galvanized steel strand about 1/16 inch in diameter. The reel should have a brass axle and bearings and be fitted with a brake and in a box to protect it from the sea and weather.
The sounding machine here described may be provided for all steamers and all sailing ships and they should all be required to have them except the smaller coasting vessels.
The belief in an unsinkable ship has already cost many hundreds of lives and the loss of many millions of valuable property. After the tragedies of the Titanic, the Monroe, the Empress of Ireland and some others which have occurred recently it is high time for the various governments, steamship companies and the public to realize that under certain conditions attending collisions, at the present stage of the art of building ships, any ship may sink. It will therefore be wise to take prompt measures to prevent these collisions. If an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure on shore, then it is worth a ton at sea.
The gist of this whole matter is that it is our duty to guard against collisions—to make them as nearly impossible as we can—and not merely provide remedies for the results of these collisions.
APPENDIX
Extracts from the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the casualty to the British steamship Empress of Ireland, which sank after collision with the Norwegian steamer Storstad, in the St. Lawrence River, on May 29, 1914:
PAGE 10. STORY OF THE "EMPRESS OF IRELAND"
. . . . "It was a beautiful and clear night with a young moon and stars shining but before reaching Father Point, a slight fog had been met on two occasions (1) between Red Island and Bic, and (2) between Bic and Father Point, on both of which occasions speed was reduced to half and slow and the whistle was used.
"The pilot was dropped about a mile north of Father Point gas buoy at about 1.20 a. m., the weather being then fine and clear. A course of N 47 E magnetic was then set in order to obtain an offing from shore, and the vessel proceeded to sea at full speed, which the master states was between 17 and 18 knots per hour.
"After the vessel had been running on this course for a little time, the Cock Point gas buoy was sighted by the lookout in the crow's nest and reported, and shortly afterwards just before getting Cock Point on the beam, the mast head lights of a steamer, which subsequently proved to be the Storstad, were sighted between three and four points on the starboard bow, approximately six miles away, the weather at that time being fine and clear.
"Navigation from the moment of sighting the Storstad until the fog intervened.
"After running on the course N 47 E magnetic for about eighteen minutes, to a point at which Cock Point buoy was about two and a half miles away on the starboard beam, and about four and a half miles from Father Point, Captain Kendall, considering that he had made the necessary offing from the shore, altered his course to N 76 E by compass or N 73 E magnetic, with the object of proceeding down the river.
"When this change had been carried out, the masthead lights of the Storstad were still visible, about a point or a point and a half on the starboard bow, about four miles away, and it was intended to pass the vessel starboard to starboard.
"At this moment Captain Kendall, going to the higher bridge, verified the heading of the ship by the standard compass and took the bearing of the lights. He stated that he found the Storstad lights were bearing N 87 E by compass, 11 degrees on his starboard bow, and that her course would therefore take her easily to starboard of his ship.
"A little later Captain Kendall returned to the navigation bridge, sighted the green light of the Storstad off his starboard bow, and about the same time a fog bank was seen coming off the land, and dimmed the lights of the Storstad.
NAVIGATION IN FOG
"As soon as the fog began to affect the Storstad's lights the engines of the Empress of Ireland were stopped, and put full speed astern, and the whistle was blown three short blasts signifying that this had been done."
PAGE 11. THE STORY OF THE "STORSTAD"
. . . . "The vessel was under the command of Captain Thos. Anderson, who had given standing orders to the chief officer that he was to be called in case of fog, and in any case, he was to be called six miles before the ship reached Father Point to take on the pilot.
"Abreast of Metis Point, the estimated distance of the Storstad from the shore was about four miles, a course was laid of W 1/4 S magnetic and the ship ran by the patent log six knots through the water, this distance, being, however, subjects to a slight allowance in respect of the tide. The course was then changed to W 1/2 S magnetic, and the ship ran by the patent log five knots. Shortly afterwards, about 1.30 a. m., the course was changed to W by S. Just before the change was made or just after, the masthead lights of the Empress of Ireland were seen approximately two points on the port bow of the Storstad about 6 or 7 knots away. They were at that time open to starboard . . . .
"Navigation from moment of sighting Empress of Ireland till fog intervened.
"Six or seven minutes after sighting the masthead lights, the green sidelight of the Empress of Ireland was seen about a point and a half on the Storstad's port bow, apparently 3 to 5 miles away. The Empress of Ireland was showing her green light for an interval, and was then seen to change her course. Her masthead lights came into line, and she showed her red light. . . . .”
The Commission concludes its report as follows, page 30:
It has not been suggested during our inquiry that the catastrophe was in any way attributable to the arrangements made by the Canadian Government for the navigation of the St. Lawrence, nor have we any reason to suppose that these arrangements are in any way unsatisfactory, but we suggest that it might be worth while for the government to consider whether it may not be desirable and practicable to arrange for the picking up and dropping of pilots to be done at different points so that incoming and outgoing ships may, so far as is possible, be relieved of the necessity of crossing one another.
(Signed) MERSEY,
E. McLEOD, C. J.,
A. B. R0UTHIER.
We concur:
(Signed) W. F. CABONE,
L. A. DEMERS,
J. J. WELCH,
P. C. W. HOWE.