The completion of the Panama Canal is so nearly at hand that the time has seemed appropriate to the Board of Control to publish in the PROCEEDINGS a discussion of the effect of the canal upon the navy. In responding to their invitation to submit a paper on this subject the writer wishes at the outset to make plain that what follows represents his personal conclusions, and that he neither desires nor is authorized to speak for anybody but himself.
Because it has the widest appeal the question of how the canal will affect the strength of the navy will be considered first and at most length. To those outside of professional circles it has a more direct and personal application than any other, because upon the answer will depend the appropriations that the taxpayer must provide. The canal has been an expensive undertaking for the United States, and the people of the country, in thinking of its bearing upon the navy, naturally anticipate that its completion may considerably modify the appropriations for the upkeep of the naval establishment. Everybody is familiar in a general way with the shortening of sea routes via the Panama Canal from our Atlantic to our Pacific coast; for instance, that the direct distance from New York or Philadelphia to San Francisco is reduced from about 13,000 miles via Magellan to about 5000 miles via Panama, or that the distance from New Orleans to San Francisco is about goo° miles less via the canal than via Magellan. From such general and obvious knowledge it is an easy step to the conclusion that the strength of the navy with the canal may be much less than it would necessarily be without the canal; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the appropriations for the navy may be greatly reduced as soon as the canal is opened. Twice recently within a week the writer has heard members of Congress refer to this very matter, one of them saying, in effect, that the canal would increase the effectiveness of the navy two- or three-fold, while the other thought its effectiveness would be doubled. The writer, while prepared to admit that these remarks were rather an after-dinner facon de parler than the expression of a deliberately formed opinion, yet believes they indicate a somewhat general impression that careful study of the situation will not justify.
A prerequisite to the formation of any intelligent conclusion on this question is an understanding of the conditions that govern the strength of the navy. The ultimate, dynamic, use of the navy is to beat the enemy in war; the every-day political use of the navy in peace is to avert war by reason of its existence ready for war. Neither purpose will be served unless the navy be adequately strong in material and personnel, and unless the personnel be trained and efficient; the navy itself is responsible for trained efficiency, but the country at large, through Congress, is responsible that adequate strength be provided.
Wars do not merely happen; they usually result from the clash of some definite policies. In an attempt to fix the strength of our navy the national policies of our government that affect other countries are a prime factor to-be considered. The United States has the following definite policies in its external relations: 1st, the avoidance of entangling alliances; 2d, the Monroe Doctrine; 3d, the Open Door in the Far East; 4th, Asiatic exclusion; 5th, the control and protection of the Panama Canal itself. Where any of these policies affect adversely the interests of other nations there is the possibility of friction, and where friction arises there is always the possibility of war.
The first of the policies mentioned above may be dismissed with a word, for it is distinctly one of abstention, and so is not apt to be the cause of diverse interests. Its effect is, however, that we must play a lone hand, and that is not without a bearing on the strength of the navy. The second policy was recognized in a manner by England in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 185o, and to a greater degree in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901. But other nations do not accept it as international law, and it is not infrequently the subject of unfriendly comment. The Monroe Doctrine may be the occasion of friction, and so of war, with European nations, and there is a possibility that it may be with Japan, or at a later day with China. The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the navy was pointedly indicated by Mr. Secretary Meyer, when he said in effect, for his words are not before the writer, that the Monroe Doctrine is just as strong as the navy, and no stronger. The third policy is one that may cause friction with both European and Asiatic nations. The fourth concerns our relations with Asiatic nations only. The fifth Policy is a result of a duty we have assumed single-handed for manifest reasons of advantage, and we consulted no nation about it except Great Britain. It has a very direct bearing upon the strength of the navy, upon which it throws an added responsibility.
The extension of our foreign trade that is now being so urgently advocated in connection with the change of our tariff laws cannot be placed, perhaps, under the same head as the policies just mentioned. But foreign trade certainly does involve relations with foreign nations; and, as a matter of fact, commercial and trade rivalries are most fruitful causes of misunderstanding between nations.
What has just been said does not exhaust all sources of possible wars by any means, as it does not exhaust all of our external relations. Enough has been said, however, to show reasons why war is not an improbability—certainly it is a possibility—with nations in Europe and Asia. European nations will hardly attack us in force in the Pacific, nor will any nation fronting on the Pacific be apt to attack us in force in the Atlantic. We have, therefore, to anticipate the possibility of war in the Atlantic with a European nation, and in the Pacific with an Asiatic nation.
This leads us to the formulation of a policy for the strength of the navy. It should be strong enough to safeguard our interests and meet any probable attack in either ocean and not leave our interests unguarded in the other. In explanation of the last clause it may be said that a full consideration of the subject should not stop short of the possibility of a simultaneous attack in both oceans, however improbable; a war with allied nations in the Atlantic and Pacific is not impossible. It is especially the duty of men. in the military branches of the government to have their eyes open to every contingency.
In considering possible antagonists in the Atlantic Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration. In the first place it would take us many years to catch up with her in material strength if we tried, and would entail an enormous expense; in the second, war would be a blow to her commercial interests and interests of supply that she can ill afford to suffer; and, in the third, we have a hostage in Canada worth many battleships. There are, moreover, powerful interests of a more sentimental nature that are yet very real. No such strong reasons exist for eliminating any other European nation from the list of possible antagonists and the formula therefore becomes, in its final and definite statement, that our navy should be strong enough to meet in the Atlantic the maritime nation of Europe next strongest to Great Britain, and in the Pacific the strongest nation in that ocean.
As affecting the strength of the navy it is well to keep in mind also the position of the United States in the two oceans. In the Atlantic, aside from the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, we have a great material interest in Porto Rico, which is our own territory; and toward Cuba and Panama we have a duty in the protection of their independence. Then there is the canal itself. All of these interests are comparatively near to us, and very much nearer than is any European adversary. In the Pacific we are in a very different case. There we have Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, the Philippines, and Tutuila, the nearest 2000 miles and the most distant 7000 miles from our coast, and some much nearer possible adversaries in that ocean than ourselves. The distance of our outlying Atlantic interests has vastly less bearing on the strength of our fleet in that ocean than has the distance of our outlying Pacific interests on the strength of the fleet in the Pacific.
If the Atlantic and Pacific were closed oceans the formula reached above for the strength of the navy would mean that in each there should be maintained a force (that may be called the Standard Atlantic Fleet and the Standard Pacific Fleet, for brevity) sufficient for the duty in that ocean, which is the Two- Ocean Standard, pure and simple.
Neither here nor elsewhere in this paper will a concrete estimate be undertaken of the strength in numbers of ships of the "standard" fleets. Such an estimate is not reached by a simple matching of ship by ship, but is influenced also by such considerations as the probable situation of the theater of war, the possibility that the assumed antagonist may not be able to have his entire strength present in that theater for political or other reasons, and the morale of the antagonist. This may not impossibly result in the conclusion that our own necessary strength in ships is less than that of some possible antagonists and greater than that of others. For the present purpose no such concrete estimate is necessary and it is enough to say that the strength should be "sufficient for the duty."
Without the canal the requirements are practically the same as if the Atlantic and Pacific were closed oceans. For, though the possibility exists of reinforcement in one ocean from the other, yet the long distance to be traversed by the reinforcement by whatever route, the difficulties about fueling en route, and the danger, especially to a force coming from the Pacific, of finding the enemy between the reinforcement and the body it is attempting to join, all militate so greatly against a successful issue that it would be imprudent to count upon it.
With the canal in operation, however, a different situation arises. The route of the reinforcements will be shortened from 8000 to 10,000 miles by the canal, and that route will lie on interior lines. Fuel can be taken at stations under our own flag, separated by distances less than those representing the sea endurance of the fleet; the embarrassment arising from the necessity of avoiding any semblance of violating neutrality in fueling will thus be avoided. Junction is possible from 40 to 60 days sooner, and the enemy need not be passed to effect it. Put in another way: Guantanamo is at practically the same distance from the English Channel that it is from San Francisco via the canal; or again, the nearest Asiatic port to Honolulu is only about 1250 miles nearer than Panama, but is about 8700 miles nearer to Honolulu than our nearest Caribbean port by way of Magellan. In the face of such facts it would be difficult to maintain that the canal will have no effect on the strength of the navy, for that would be tantamount to the claim that the canal has no military value to the United States.
On the other hand, the claim that the canal will double the effectiveness of the navy or more is a great exaggeration. Though such statements probably result from loose use of language rather than a careful study of the situation, they are dangerous, for they are apt to be taken literally by the layman, and the navy cannot afford to have such an impression gain ground. To show their fallacy it is only necessary to consider the matter of distances. It is quite true that the canal will enable the fleet to be transferred from one ocean to the other in a few hours, but that is only the beginning of the problem. The added strength that the canal will give to the navy must be measured by the facility the canal affords in enabling reinforcements to arrive in time to be of use tactically; that is, as a part of the entire force in battle with the enemy. The canal will be of little use if the reinforcements arrive so late that the battle has already been won by the enemy. The Atlantic terminal is about 700 miles from Guantanamo, 1200 miles front the most distant part of the Caribbean, and 2000 miles from New York, no inconsiderable distances in themselves. On the Pacific side the condition is very much less favorable, for the Pacific terminal is about 3250 miles from San Francisco, 4700 from Honolulu, 8000 from Guam, and 9350 from Manila. Merely to be able to get the fleet rapidly from one ocean to another is a great gain, a very great gain; but it is not by any means the whole problem. Allowing the fleet an average speed of 12 knots from departure to destination, which is high, considering the time necessary to coal and effect repairs and the necessity that all the fighting components arrive together and ready for action, this means that, from the time of leaving the canal until it arrived where it would probably be needed, the shortest interval is about 58 hours to Guantanamo, and the longest is about 33 days to Manila, during which the enemy will not have been idle. The canal will be a great military asset in war, and an equally great one in anticipation of war; but it is quite beside the mark to say it will double the effectiveness of the navy, or do anything approach ink that.
The truth, as usual, lies between these two extreme views just examined, and the writer believes that the former is much nearer the truth than the latter. By its very nature the problem of determining just what will be the effect of the canal upon the strength of the navy cannot be mathematically demonstrated. The solution is largely one of opinion, and will be modified as greater or less weight is given to the several considerations on which it is based. If the general formula advanced above for fixing the strength of the navy be accepted, then manifestly, canal or no canal, the minimum permissible strength of the navy is that which will enable us to meet, with our entire force, our strongest probable enemy, wherever situated. Under the same conditions the maximum strength that can be claimed as necessary is the sum of that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus that of the Standard Pacific Fleet (Great Britain being excluded for reasons above given). This amounts to saying that the maximum strength that can be claimed as necessary is that which will enable us to conduct a war with prospect of success in both oceans at once, which is the Two-Ocean Standard again. If the possible antagonists in the two oceans, in relation to whom our formula for strength is founded, were equally strong, our minimum permissible navy would be half as strong as the maximum navy that will ever be necessary. They are not equally strong, however, and our Standard Atlantic Fleet should now, and the condition is probably permanent, be stronger than the Standard Pacific Fleet need be. The Standard Atlantic Fleet, therefore, is the measure of our minimum permissible strength; and, to avoid any misunderstanding, the words "minimum permissible strength" are used in the narrow sense of indicating the very least strength that can logically be believed allowable by anybody who believes in a navy at all for well-founded reasons. The quoted words do not represent the writer's views of what our minimum naval strength should be.
Our total naval strength at this minute is not equal to that of what is called above the Standard Atlantic Fleet. Hence the completion of the canal should have no immediate effect upon our building. It remains to find an answer to the question what effect will it have upon our building policy for the future?
The writer's personal opinion is that, when the canal is finished, our policy should be to have eventually, and as soon as possible, a total strength not less than that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus three-quarters that of the Standard Pacific Fleet. These so-called "standard" fleets are not fixed quantities, but will vary from year to year as foreign nations increase their own naval strength. The policy itself can, however, be fixed, and some policy should be established.
The reasons that have appealed to the writer in reaching this conclusion are as follows:
(a) With no canal our total strength should be the sum of both the Standard Atlantic Fleet and the Standard Pacific Fleet.
(b) The canal so greatly shortens distances between the two oceans that some reduction of strength below that of (a) is justifiable when it shall be finished, in view of the great financial burden imposed by a great navy, and the rather remote possibility of simultaneous war in both oceans.
(c) This reduction should not be sufficient to leave the nation in a hopeless case in either ocean if war broke out there while war was being waged in the other.
(d) As the strength of the Standard Atlantic Fleet must be maintained in any event, the Pacific Fleet is the one in which to make the reduction in strength.
(e) Our interests are so great, and are scattered over such immense distances in the Pacific, that anything less than three-quarters of the Standard Pacific Fleet would make even a defensive war in that ocean hopeless.
(f) With three-quarters of the Standard Pacific Fleet a defensive war, a containing war so to speak, would not be hopeless while waging a war on equal term's in the Atlantic.
(g) If there were no prospect of war in the Pacific at a time when engaged in war in the Atlantic, then one-half of the Standard Pacific Fleet, and perhaps less, would suffice to guard our interests in the Pacific, leaving the rest of the fleet in that ocean free to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet and give in the Atlantic a marked superiority of force.
(h) If at war in the Pacific with no prospect of war in the Atlantic, a great superiority of force could be maintained in the Pacific that would be the more valuable, owing to the distances over which the navy would have to operate in that ocean.
The composition of the fleet will be little affected by the existence of the finished canal. All classes of fighting ships will be as much needed after the canal as before, and their numbers and proportions deemed requisite for the duty in either ocean will be necessary, canal or no canal. It is not improbable that the defense of the canal itself may demand a limited number of certain classes of vessels that would not otherwise be necessary. But in its large aspect the composition of the fighting fleet can hardly be affected by the completion of the canal. Even in the matter of auxiliaries the same thing appears to be true. If the navy depended upon its own auxiliaries for the transfer of supplies and fuel from one ocean to the other, the canal would naturally serve to diminish the number of supply and fuel ships; but such cargoes are practically all sent by contract. Other auxiliaries are based in number on the fighting ships they have to serve, and distance has little to do with the question. Speaking in a broad way, then, the existence of the canal will have no effect on the composition of the fleet.
It is more than probable that the completion of the canal will effect some changes in the disposition of the fleet in time of peace. It has already been pointed out that the navy is not now as strong as is theoretically necessary in the Atlantic alone; so that for a considerable time to come, whatever building program may be adopted, it will be necessary to concentrate our entire fighting fleet in time of war, trusting to Providence that the part sent to the threatened ocean will not be needed during the war in the ocean from which it is withdrawn. In effecting this concentration the canal will be a very great military advantage to us. In time of peace, however, the completion of the canal will enable some changes to be made in the present disposition of the fleet. The disposition now, while dictated by reasons of convenience under present-day conditions, is yet not very logical considered in the light of all-round preparedness for war. A very possible outcome will be the maintenance of a force of fixed strength in each ocean, with a shifting squadron that will go first into one and then into the other. This can be so managed as to keep in both oceans a force better balanced in all its components of fighting strength than is now the case with either. There will be other advantages also, one being the appearance on the Pacific coast of parts of the navy that cannot now be seen there. The people on the Pacific coast are as vitally interested in the navy as are those in the East; yet they habitually see the least powerful and least modern of our ships. It is natural and, indeed, commendable, that they should wish to have in their own waters at one time or another the flower of the navy. The completion of the canal will enable this to be done; and it will, further, be good policy for the navy to do it, and so stimulate the friendly interest in the navy that is always in evidence on the Pacific coast.
Another advantage that will accrue in connection with the transfer of ships from one ocean to another is the possibility of making between our own ports, and without taxing the hospitality of foreign nations, the long voyages in fleet that we believe in our service to be so advantageous as a means of fleet discipline and fleet preparedness. The entire battle fleet could easily go from New York to Seattle, stay ten days at San Francisco and ten in Puget Sound, and be back in New York in a little more than three months. As a long-distance cruise this would have many advantages over a cruise to Europe and back, not the least of which would be the experience gained in logistics over a route that the fleet may have to make some day in one direction or the other when the errand is not peaceful.
The completion of the canal will be advantageous to the navy in still another way connected with the disposition of the ships of the fleet. Corinto, Nicaragua, is less than mo miles further distant from New York via Panama than it is from San Francisco. All the Pacific coast of Central America outside of Mexico is moomiles or more nearer Panama than it is to San Francisco. It will therefore be possible generally to send ships more quickly from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast of Central America in times of disturbance there than it will be to send them from San Francisco.
The preponderance of our naval strength will probably continue to be in the future, as it has been in the past, habitually kept in the Atlantic. That ocean is the better one for the upkeep, drill and administration of the battle fleet for many reasons. But the canal will permit of many changes of disposition, some of them permanent and some temporary, that will be advantageous and that are impracticable under present conditions.
The completion of the canal should serve to bring home to every one the importance of our naval bases in the West Indies and the Pacific. That their importance has not been adequately realized is evidenced by the lack of funds provided to put them in an efficient condition. The Monroe Doctrine was an old story before the war of 1898; but few people realized that it extended our military frontier beyond the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, for it is a mental conception and not a tangible thing appealing to the senses. After 1898 and the acquisition of Porto Rico there was a visible projection of our frontier into the Caribbean; and after the Hay-Pauncefote treaty in 1901, which gave the United States undivided responsibility for the canal, another visible and material interest appeared still further to the front. It has always been clear to the naval mind that our military frontier extends far beyond our continental borders, and now, irrespective of the Monroe Doctrine, it extends from the Atlantic coast around Porto Rico to the canal; and it has been equally clear that, for the security of that frontier, a naval base somewhere on the outer edge of the Caribbean is a necessity. After careful consideration Guantanamo was selected as the site for such a base as being the suitable harbor situated furthest to the front on the edge of the Caribbean. Congress has not yet recognized its appreciation of the necessity for Guantanamo by the provision of an adequate program for its defense and equipment, though there are some signs of such an appreciation. Nor do the people of some of the gulf states realize that the frontier has advanced more than a thousand miles from their coast, and that the New Orleans and Pensacola naval stations no longer serve any useful military purpose, if one may judge by their arguments against the action of the Navy Department in closing them during the last administration. When the canal becomes a great utility in regular operation instead of an interesting engineering work, when trade has settled into the new routes the canal will make possible and when business men have occasion to think of it daily as a vital link in their transportation problems, a juster appreciation will arise of the necessity of a naval base at Guantanamo for the protection of the canal and of the trade routes converging toward it, as well as for the maintenance of our general interests in the Caribbean, that will doubtless find expression in a complete scheme for its defense and equipment.
If, as it almost surely will, the canal serves to place in the Pacific Ocean, even for a part of the time only, a greater force and one of larger ships than is now kept there, the question of bases in that ocean must be considered. In the Pacific, excepting our limited plant in the Philippines, there are three bases—Mare Island, Bremerton, and Pearl Harbor. To care for any considerable force in peace, and, what is more important, to care for it in war, these are all too few. Pearl Harbor is in the making, and Bremerton is not yet a first-class base. San Francisco Bay is the place above all others on our Pacific continental coast that is suited for a naval base by reason of its strategic situation geographically and the advantages attending the proximity of a large city. But the Mare Island Navy Yard is impossibly situated for this purpose. It has neither the area nor the depth of water needed for modern capital ships and its distance from San Francisco and lack of a railway connection are handicaps in the supply of labor and in the economical handling of freight and building supplies. At the present time the available depth is 22 feet at mean lower low water, and the channels constantly and rapidly silt up. It is even difficult to keep the entrance to the new dry-dock deep enough for safe docking of ships that can enter it. The adopted departmental policy is to have 40 feet depth from the sea to our navy yards, and that depth of channel is being urged at our important commercial ports in the interests of commerce. To all except those who will not see it has been increasingly evident during the last ten years that the Mare Island Navy Yard is doomed for the service of modern capital ships, and it is equally evident that a new location, somewhere in San Francisco Bay, on deep water near the city, must eventually, be provided for their docking and repair. If the people of California desire and expect to see any considerable part of our modern fleet habitually visiting in their waters after the canal is finished, they cannot too soon bestir themselves to provide in the deep water of San Francisco Bay the naval facilities that are required for the supply, upkeep and repair of modern capital ships. Mare Island does not afford them, for the simple reason that recent capital ships cannot safely go there, if for no other. Men cannot drive rivets on a ship 20 to 30 miles away. The completion of the canal should help to force this conclusion home if the people of California are not prepared to accept it now.
Of Pearl Harbor and Bremerton there is less occasion to speak in this connection. Congress is treating Pearl Harbor in a liberal spirit, and the facilities at Bremerton are gradually increasing. The development of both should go on to provide for the increased naval shipping that may naturally be expected to follow the completion of the canal; but, above all, to provide for the greatly increased demand upon them in the event of a war in the Pacific.
The consideration that perhaps comes most naturally to mind in connection with the canal is the immense shortening of distances effected by it in most cases between points in the Atlantic and Pacific. This consideration was, of course, the reason for building it. What may be termed the commercial routes from New York to Hong Kong, those that take in ports of call, are practically the same length via Panama and Suez, the difference between them being less than 20 miles in favor of Suez; but the Panama route is the shorter from New York to Shanghai and the ports of Japan. From New York to Manila the Panama route is shorter than that by Suez unless the former go by way of Honolulu and Yokohama. The further east the point in the Pacific, the greater the gain in distance to New York by the Panama route. Valparaiso is 3750 miles nearer New York via Panama than via Magellan. Speaking generally, the distance is shortened via the canal from New York to any point in the Pacific inside of a line drawn from Magellan Strait, through Australia and the Philippines, to Hong Kong. As affecting naval movements this means more than time and fuel saved, though both economies are of prime importance. It means the possibility of sending ships from the Atlantic to almost any place where they will be needed in the Pacific by a route that has fuel stations under our flag along the entire distance, no two of which are further apart than the fuel endurance of our capital ships. This is an enormous advantage, for the problem of fueling our naval ships in time of war on a passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, would be a staggering one by either the Suez or Magellan route, and the attitude of neutrals might make it almost an unsolvable one. The canal will eliminate the question of neutrality altogether, and for that reason alone it is of incalculable benefit to the navy.
The question of economy is, however, one not to be ignored. Between New York and San Francisco, in either direction, Panama and Guantanamo would probably be ports of call for a fleet. A study of the saving of time, fuel and money effected by sending a fleet between Panama and Guantanamo through the canal instead of through Magellan gives some astonishing results. Such a study has been made, based on the movement of 25 capital ships with attendant cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries. It is too long to give more than the results, but they are sufficiently interesting.
The time saved under the assumptions is about 6o days. This could be considerably shortened by increasing the assumed sea speed, or decreasing the days at anchor for coaling, repairs, and recuperation of the personnel, but at the expense of fuel burned, with the attendant cost and necessity of fueling oftener. The route via Magellan that the fleet would follow between Guantanamo and Panama requires nearly goo actual steaming hours at 12 knots, or 37 days. This makes no allowance for necessary time to refuel and repair, so that 6o days is not an unreasonable gain in time to allow in favor of the canal, in view of the fact that refueling on the Magellan route would have to be carried on at places outside the territorial limits of neutrals, and often under disadvantageous circumstances. This might be time enough to enable the enemy to finish the campaign in his favor, not to speak of the harassment of the personnel while making the long Sea voyage via Magellan, during which every man would know that he and his ship were needed every moment of the time, with the prospect that the fleet would not arrive after all in time to effect its purpose.
The saving in coal is about 290,000 tons, and in fuel oil about 54,000 tons. At the present market values of these fuels taken for the conditions, this means a money saving of nearly $3,000,000. Not to overestimate this saving, and assuming that an oversupply of 20 per cent has been allowed, the saving in coal would still be 240,000 tons, in oil 45,000 tons, and in money $2,500,000.
The gain in time is the all-important economy, but the saving in money is itself important. In view of our lack of a merchant marine, however, the simplification in the supply of fuel via the canal is of vastly greater moment than the money saving. The United States can furnish whatever money the circumstances of war may demand, but it cannot build over-night a merchant marine for the service of the fleet. This subject could be greatly elaborated, but enough has been said to show what a valuable military asset the canal is in its bearing on fleet logistics.
Simply for the ordinary service of the fleet in time of peace the canal will effect very large savings to the naval appropriations. A fair average price for eastern coal of a kind fit for naval use is $8.45 per ton at San Francisco, Puget Sound and Honolulu. While no exact prediction can be made, competent authorities believe that, when the canal is in operation, the price at which eastern coals can be laid down at these places will be not more than $6.20 per ton. Taking as a basis the amount of coal on naval account sent to the Pacific in the last fiscal year, 160,000 tons, the saving amounts to $360,000. Nor does the advantage end there; a collier can take a cargo via the canal to the Pacific coast, discharge and be back at Norfolk in the time she would take to make the voyage out via Magellan. This roughly divides by two the tonnage necessary for any given supply of coal at those ports. In time of war in the Pacific, this will be of inestimable advantage, considering our woeful lack of a merchant marine. With respect to other bulky naval supplies, like provisions, the same thing does not hold true, for they can be delivered equally well and at little difference in cost on either coast from their points of origin. Even ammunition and guns, which are practically all manufactured in the east, would very probably be sent by rail to the Pacific in order to save time, though the expense would be greater. But with oil fuel, again, the advantage to the navy is apparent, and this time the gain is in movement toward the Atlantic. In the last few months the price of oil has markedly increased. California produces more oil than any other state and its price is lower than eastern oils. This fact, in addition to the important fact that a large oil-producing area has been set aside for naval purposes in California, points to the possibility that the navy may soon be using California oil in the Atlantic, which would hardly be possible without the canal. The demand for oil increases every day and many of the older wells are falling off in production; the navy may not improbably have great occasion in the years to come to congratulate itself that the canal will make the Pacific coast fields available.
Modifications of trade routes that will follow the completion of the canal are sure eventually to cause a reduction in freight rates, and so act as a stimulus to trade. The increased trade will, in turn, demand a greater tonnage, though this demand will be partially met at first by the ability of the same amount of shipping to provide for a greater trade because of the shortened distances via the canal. Still it can hardly be doubted that the opening of the canal will create a demand in time for an amount of shipping considerably greater than exists now in order to provide for the increased trade. The opinion has been advanced that the United States merchant marine will be greatly stimulated by the operation of these causes. The navy earnestly hopes that this may be true, for a large merchant marine is a necessity for a strong navy only in a less degree than the auxiliary ships especially designed for its service; and anything whatever that can properly be done to increase the merchant marine should have the active support of the navy. In so far as the coasting trade is concerned there seems to be good reason to expect an increase of United States shipping, for that trade is certain to grow rapidly upon the opening of the canal, and foreigners cannot take any part in it. Moreover, the exemption of this class of shipping from the payment of canal tolls will virtually be a subsidy. Already some ships have been built for this trade in anticipation of the completion of the canal, and others are being built. But the writer has been unable to convince himself that the opening of the canal will alone serve to draw American capital into a form of investment from which it has persistently kept aloof, and under present conditions and laws he anticipates little or no resultant increase in that part of the merchant marine of the United States engaged in foreign trade. Without any close examination of the reason why, it seems to be a fact that Americans either cannot or else do not care to compete with other maritime nations in the sea carriage of foreign trade, and it is not apparent that the opening of the canal will by itself change that condition. That we should have a flourishing merchant marine is a matter of such vital interest to the navy that it will anticipate with satisfaction the increase of shipping engaged in coastwise trade due to the opening of the canal; and, as remarked above, the navy should exert its influence in favor of every proper measure tending to put American ships on the ocean in the foreign trade.
However interesting and profitable it may be to dwell upon the military advantages to the United States attending the opening of the canal, that feature is not the most vital one to the navy. The canal puts an added and very great responsibility upon the navy, and this fact is one that the navy and its friends must always keep in mind.
The canal is being built, and it will be operated and controlled, solely by the United States government. The protection of the canal, therefore, falls solely upon the United States. Moreover, in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, the neutralization rules are embodied in Article 3, in which the language is: "The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following rules. . . ." We are, therefore, the sole guarantors of the neutralization of the canal. Again Article I of the treaty of November 18, 1903, with Panama reads: "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama." Finally, the United States trade passing through the canal will be very great. Here are new and great responsibilities, all flowing from the canal, and all dependent upon the navy for their realization. The navy is the outer line of defense of the canal as it is of the country. The inner line of defense of the canal resides in the fortifications and garrison at the canal itself. If our navy is driven from the sea and made negligible, an enemy with a great army can undertake with impunity the transportation of the troops necessary to overcome the inner line of defense and complete the victory begun on the ocean. The task may not be easy for him, but its possibility must be conceded if the sea is closed to us and open to the enemy. The only possible and final assurance of safety for the canal is in a navy strong enough to meet the enemy, beat him, and prevent him from ever getting near it. The following words, quoted from Admiral Mahan, indicate the alternative: "Permanent [naval] inferiority means inevitably ultimate defeat, which fortifications can only delay." And a few lines later he uses these words: "If the United States desires peace with security, it must have a navy second to none but that of Great Britain; to rival which is inexpedient, because for many reasons unnecessary."
The United States is not a military nation. There is little consideration and less understanding among the people at large of military matters. The government has no defined military policy, using "military" in its wide sense, and it has no defined naval Policy. By this is meant that there is no soberly thought-out relation between our military strength and our situation in the world—between our declared external political policies and the only means yet found efficacious to uphold them—that manifests itself as a guiding principle in Congress, or even in the recommendations to Congress. There should be such a military policy, and it should carry on from administration to administration, from Congress to Congress, and be considered a part of our foreign affairs policy, as little open to attack from within our own household as the external policies on which it is founded. Our form of government, the immensity of our country, and our isolated position, almost insular as far as other first-class nations having great military strength are concerned, all doubtless conspire to cause the general lack of interest of our people in foreign affairs, which is the ultimate cause why there is so little appreciation of the underlying need for a strong navy. The navy is popular just now, and to that degree it is fortunate; but the roots of its existence should lie in deeper ground than popularity. It is to be hoped that the completion of the canal may serve to broaden the national outlook, and that we may be able to look back to it in coming years as the period in which a reasoned national policy, founded on national aims, shall have had its birth in the country at large.
There would be no excuse for a failure of the navy itself to have a "reason for the faith that is in us"; nor can that reproach be laid at the door of the navy, which has for years had a definite, consistent policy as expressed by the responsible advisers of the Navy Department. Moreover, the effect of the canal upon that policy has been carefully kept in mind since the day the canal was started.