At the present time, while there is a decided increase of public interest in favor of aviation, it is hardly out of place to consider the form and manner in which it can be adapted to the needs of the navy.
It is true that the question does not present itself to many people. The air is essentially the domain of aviation. It is therefore of little importance whether the aeroplane flies over the sea or the land; in both cases it remains in its element and there is no difference between maritime aviation and terrestrial aviation.
This reasoning might be correct if the "avions" never came in contact with our terrestrial envelope, but in reality the time they are actually in the air is relatively short; their employment does not extend beyond flights of short periods; the means at their disposal for taking flight and landing have primary importance, because they are the means which determine their employment.
The proof of this is that the apparatus of the Wright Brothers did not have, in its primitive form, more than an ephemeral existence, in spite of its excellent performances. In order to take flight the apparatus needed the assistance of a tower, a car and launching ways. It could not, therefore, make anything but round trips and if unforeseen circumstances forced it to land during its flight it was not capable of resuming its flight.
To emancipate the aeroplane we continue to fit it with wheels, and it is only thus that we can pretend to use it in a military or sporting enterprise.
While aviation over the sea was dreamed of, it seemed that our first concern would be to adapt the aeroplane to its field, which immediately led us to consider hydro-aeroplanes. Such was not the case and maritime aviation with aeroplanes used on shore was at once considered. In fact, that is one of the peculiarities of our natures, that we do not seek to adapt the means to .the end; we have rather a tendency to use a means with which we are familiar and alter the nature of the end.
Maritime aviation was therefore imagined in the following conditions:
The aeroplane leaves the earth, flies over the sea, and, its mission ended, returns to the shore. The same apparatus could likewise be embarked on board ship; the ship need only be fitted with a platform of sufficient dimensions to permit the departure and return by ordinary means.
The problem of maritime aviation thus presented itself in a very simple form and was susceptible to immediate application; but these indisputable advantages were not without serious inconveniences, which we shall try to set forth.
Aeroplanes—whether they fly over the land or over the sea— are subject to the same casualties. Statistics show that they are very frequently obliged, while in flight, to make forced landings. These stops can be caused by infinite diverse causes, of which there are too many to enumerate here; but the fact remains that they must be endured. In a case of this kind the pilot is forced to find a convenient landing place; he may succeed fairly well and finally, if he is skillful, he generally lands without too much damage.
Over the sea an apparatus fitted with wheels, which is forced to descend on account of an accident, cannot rest on the surface of the water if it is not constructed to float; it is therefore obliged to drop into the water, and the fall can have serious consequences. The frame striking the water acts as a powerful brake and the apparatus capsizes. Now, capsizing has never been considered a natural function of the aeroplane; it is favorable to neither the apparatus nor to the pilot; at sea it can be fatal to the latter if he is imprisoned in the wreckage.
With or without capsizing, the ordinary apparatus always ends its run when the motor fills with water. It was hoped that placing a float in the frame would suffice to keep it on the surface; but the tragic flight of Lieutenant Bague and Cecil Grace has proved that this means is insufficient.
If, on the other hand, one limits himself to preventing the sinking of the aeroplane by means of a makeshift, it will be so damaged after a sojourn in the water that it will be of no further use. Therefore, it is necessary to the navy that hydro-aeroplanes be specially constructed so as to rest on the water like sea-gulls; and it would be just as illogical to wish to fly over the sea with wheeled apparatus as to fly over the land with apparatus fitted with floats.
It has been feared that the equilibrium is disturbed by the floats and that unstable equilibrium in the air results; it has been feared, likewise, that the landing on the water presents the same dangers to an apparatus with floats as to the others in respect to capsizing. These apprehensions faded away at the Monaco meet, where the success was such that it was regretted that aviation had not first started over the water where it has found guarantees of security which the land does not offer.
The reasons which we have pointed out above are not the only ones coming up to prohibit the use of ordinary apparatus in the navy. We can not dream of developing maritime aviation without considering the embarkation of aeroplanes on board ships. We have seen that, to adapt the processes which have been tested on shore to use on board ship, it has been advocated to construct a platform for the departure and landing of the aeroplane on ships specially designed for aviation. The Americans have made an experiment of this nature, and the success of the venture has given rise to the belief that the problem has been solved.
It will be remarked that Ely's experiment was not an every-day occurrence. Perhaps it is not rash to conclude that the feat accomplished by the brilliant American pilot has not been considered susceptible of continued application. If it had been otherwise the attempts to accomplish these tests would certainly have been made by different pilots.
We could not, on the other hand, draw positive conclusions from that remarkable experiment, because it. did not simulate practical conditions; the arrival and the departure took place on a vessel at anchor. Has the test been made in the open sea on a vessel subjected to rolling and pitching? We doubt it.
Without doubt favorable times will always be sought for the departure of the apparatus; a calm of several seconds during the rolling and pitching will suffice. The departure, therefore, has not appeared to present insurmountable difficulties, even in a rough sea-way, at least on a ship of large tonnage; but such will not be the case for the return under the same conditions. The landing is always a delicate operation, and the best pilot cannot flatter himself with being able to land in an infallible manner under all circumstances; now, in the particular case which we are considering, the aeroplane, before touching the landing platform of the ship, will fall into the eddies caused by the hot gases from the funnels, while the smoke will mask the view of the pilot at the very moment when he must execute a precise maneuver. To these causes of difficulties are further added the rolling and pitching, which, however gentle they may be, will swerve the apparatus which commences to roll on the platform. It will require a truly fortunate series of circumstances to accomplish it; a bad landing could have very grave consequences. It evokes in our mind a tragic spectacle; the aeroplane crashing against the superstructure, the punctured fuel tank allowing the inflammable liquid to flow on the platform, the pilot struggling in the midst of the flames, the fire gaining hold on the ship.
Without doubt, one will hesitate before risking the dangers to the ships and to the aviators. That is why it seems that the aeroplane on board ship must be an apparatus with floats which takes its flight with the aid of a mechanical contrivance and which, after having accomplished its mission, returns and rests on the water alongside the ship; it will then be hoisted on board like a ship's boat.
For the departure, therefore, we must return to a system similar in principle to that employed by the Wright Brothers; this system of launching, while of no assistance to shore aeroplanes, satisfies, on the contrary, the conditions of maritime aviation quite well, since the apparatus on board ship must always return, not to the point of its departure, but to its ship.
The apparatus should be easily dismountable in such a manner that, with its wings folded alongside its frame, it will not take up more space than a boat. It will then be possible to take one or two aeroplanes of this type on board each ship of large tonnage without their being an encumbrance.
All that we have said of maritime aviation has established a distinction between the apparatus on board ship and the apparatus on shore. The latter, especially applicable to the defense of the coast, is easier to conceive, because it is not required to satisfy as rigorous conditions as the apparatus on board ship. In fact, all hydro-aeroplanes can be classed as coastal apparatus; many of the different types have already been seen to function satisfactorily at Monaco. It should be mentioned that the navy will not be able to use apparatus which will take flight from the surface of the water only, because the departure should not depend upon the state of the sea.
Further on, when we take up the question of definite organization of aviation, we will discuss whether the navy ought not to be content with one special type. In the meantime it is better to test the apparatus immediately at hand, because the results obtained with these will facilitate the study and development of the model aeroplane. For this reason the coastal apparatus and the others must still actually take part in the program.
Having apparatus suitable to the needs of the navy is not sufficient; we must know also what we want to do. In short, the military utilization of aviation does not present itself to the navy in as simple a form as to the army. Some urge confidently the necessity for introducing aviation into the navy, but they fail to specify—for reasons—how one could utilize it. Others confine themselves to pointing out a vague objective, such as reconnaissance, without describing the manner of performing it. Still others set up a program on so fragile a foundation that it does not survive a simple examination. All of them limit themselves thus to presenting the problem, leaving the work of solving it to the navy.
If it is merely a question of imagination, it is easy to see vaguely a whole series of applications of aviation to the navy; we will not reproduce here the enumeration frequently made. On trial it is seen that it may be necessary to set aside the first expectations; it is quite possible that the solution will come from a direction in which we had least dreamed that aviation would render the greater service. But we can state now that aviation Will in no way modify the character of naval warfare; it will introduce a new element which will add to the means already at hand; nothing more. Those who imagine too extravagantly that the aeroplane could annihilate the fleets should go into mourning. Actually aviation is not an arm; it is a means which, under certain circumstances, facilitates the employment of the arms, and thus increases their efficiency. The designation "fourth arm" given to military aviation is therefore improper and can give rise to fantastic hopes.
The question with which the navy is burdened at the present time consists partly of perfecting the hydro-aeroplane in such a manner as to create a type especially adapted to the conditions of maritime aviation; in addition, it is to determine the nature and the extent of the services which aviation can render to the navy from a military point of view.
With a view of attaining this double objective a decree and a ministerial notice were promulgated, "containing the organization of maritime aviation." This provides for an aerodrome, a central ship and, eventually, flotilla ships.
The aerodrome will be established on the shores of Provence, in Saint Raphaels Bay.
We are amazed to see aviation established at this point when we have been led to believe that it had better be located in a fortified port. It has been generally believed that aviation had entered unceremoniously into the period of utility. This makes no difference, for aviation will not take a definite form until it has been thoroughly developed. The preliminary studies cannot be made except on an experimental field, that is, an aerodrome. Now, an aerodrome does not exist—and cannot exist—in the interior of a fortified enclosure. On account of their dimensions and the conditions with which they must comply, all aviation fields are located on open fields; we are lucky if we can find a field which extends at least six kilometers from the center. The naval aerodrome is subject to the same requirements as a shore aerodrome; it is further necessary that it be on the seacoast, in a sheltered bay that is sufficiently deserted so that the hydro-aeroplanes will not be hampered in their evolutions. It was therefore placed where it was possible to place it and not where it was desired to place it.
The central ship and the flotilla ships will permit the experimental field to be extended and maritime aviation will then have a sufficient field of action for solving the problems brought up by the application of aerial navigation to the navy.
There is no need of a large number of aviators for the solution of these problems. The execution of an experimental program is impossible except with a chosen personnel, and the quality is more important than the quantity. If the navy should develop too many pilots at the present time, or if they should accept inexperienced aviators, it would be difficult to keep them busy and they would be limited to circling round and round the aerodrome. This should be avoided at any price, because there is nothing more depressing than flying in a circle.
The actual organization has, therefore, no definite character. Meanwhile, the plan does not consist of transitory measures in a sense that the development which aviation could subsequently undergo will not modify the actual state of things; the new organs will merely replace those now existing without overthrowing the latter.
What will aviation then be—or, above all, what can it be—when the navy has in its possession apparatus adapted to its needs, and when it knows their applications? That is what we now wish to investigate.
It is generally considered that the organization of aviation consists essentially of the development of pilots and the acquisition of apparatus. This is a serious mistake. The instruction of flying officers and the purchase of aeroplanes is merely a question of funds, which can be solved quickly with the means at hand in France. The difficulty is, after we have apparatus and pilots, to know how and to what end to employ them.
Organizing aviation is familiarizing the pilots with the military duties which they will have to perform in time of war; it is placing the apparatus at the disposal of the different units with which they are to serve in such a way that the corps commanders know what they can require of them and under what circumstances they can be made use of. In a word, it is to incorporate aviation in our military organization in order that it may render the services expected of it from day to day.
If after two years the army has done nothing further along this line, if no further permanent disposition has been made, it is because the thing is more difficult than it was thought to be. Many plans have been proposed; not one has been adopted, and the new military aeronautics law has left the question in suspense.
In the meantime the present state of affairs cannot continue, because aviation does not suffice to occupy its personnel, and there is much leisure time in the life at the aerodrome, especially in winter. After an officer has qualified for a military brevet he has nothing more to do in the field of aviation. In qualifying pilots the army and navy had nothing but their utilization in military work in view. That utilization is not encountered in civil aerodromes, where aviation can have only a sporting character. It cannot be found anywhere outside of a corps of troops. The flying officer, once qualified, should therefore participate in military exercises with his apparatus; but since the maneuvers which include the employment of aeroplanes cannot, on account of their nature, take place except at irregular intervals, the flying officer should, during the intervals, lead the same life as his comrades.
If, their instruction completed, the flying officers remain attached to an aviation field, their occupation would have nothing of a military nature and the surroundings in which they live might cause them to lose sight of the exclusively military objective which aviation should pursue. This is a reef from which our officers should be saved.
It is necessary to definitely place the flying officers in a position analogous with that of officers of the cavalry. If these did not preoccupy themselves with anything but equitation, they might be "horsemen," but they surely would not be cavalry officers. While it is said of LaSalle that he was a brilliant cavalryman, it is not recalled that this general handled his mount in a particularly brilliant manner; this, more than everything else, indicates that he understood the role of the cavalry and knew how to use it. Later, it will be said also of certain flying officers that they were "wonders," that with their "cou cou" they knew how to render immense services to the army. They who imagine that all that is needed to be a flying officer it to become a pilot understand nothing about aviation in war.
It seems that the navy will find more facilities than the army when, having taken count of the services aviation can render it, it wishes to proceed to a definite organization. In reality, the marine apparatus will always be followed in all its uses by its hangar, its accessories, its spare parts, since all these things will be found on board the ship on which it is embarked. One can therefore have a glimpse of the functioning of maritime aviation in a very simple form; the flying officers, their instruction finished, would be embarked on the ships destined to receive aeroplanes, In the proportion of one officer to each unit. On board they would contribute to the general service and carry out the duties of their specialty, like gunnery and torpedo officers. When the aeroplanes are to take part in squadron exercises, these officers Will be relieved from watch standing in order to man their apparatus. Between times, in order to keep in form, they should make flights under conditions that will keep them abreast of the service. As the gunners exercise regularly between firing practices, so ought the aviators assure themselves periodically of the proper functioning of their apparatus.
These flying officers would not be in excess of complement, because they would replace officers who have no specialty. Each of them would be accompanied by two mechanics and would have two apparatus at his disposal.
The naval aerodromes would continue to perform the work of qualifying pilots and mechanics, making acceptance trials, developing new apparatus for service, and making major repairs which the ships cannot make with the means on board. The aviation center would then be the base at which the ships are fitted out with personnel and materiel. Its permanent staff should consist of not more than four or five officers, including the chief of the center. Regarding the central ship, which will have served for the studying and employment of aeroplanes, it will have no further reasons for existing, and would disappear, because further research into the uses of aviation would not be necessary; its role would be precisely defined, and there would remain nothing further than to get as near as possible to practical conditions. All our naval forces will be used in this work.
In this way the definite organization of maritime aviation, that which we should be able to substitute later for the existing conditions, would appear to us to necessarily include: on the one hand, flying officers and mechanics embarked with their apparatus on board battleships and armored cruisers; on the other hand, a naval aerodrome as a base of supplies for aeronautical material.
It may then be necessary to have a central administrative organ at Paris, centralizing the requests of the different naval forces for materiel and personnel, and making purchases. But that central authority should have a distinctly administrative character, because one of the serious mistakes of our administrative system is the delegation of power of management, often the same as military power, to irresponsible and incompetent bureaus, to the detriment of commanders-in-chief, who are the only ones detailed by the minister and are alone directly responsible to the state.
In the preceding it has not been a question of assigning a ship specially constructed for transporting aeroplanes to the fleets; on the contrary, we have urged the embarking of two apparatus on each ship of large tonnage, because the first solution would be too onerous (since it involves the expenditure of 15 millions to provide for several aeroplanes of about 30,000 francs value), and, above all, because it would confine aviation to too narrow limits. It is evident that if all the apparatus are assembled on the same ship their field of action will be around their ship only. Superfluous means would then be centered in a single point: It seems more military to extend the field of action of aeroplanes as much as possible by embarking them on all ships large enough to receive them without its being necessary to sensibly modify their construction.
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The organization of which we have given the main outline contains a void, a serious void; it does not consider the participation of aeroplanes in the defense of the coast. That omission results from the inward conviction that, confining it to the limits outlined, aviation satisfies all the needs, answers all the requirements. To establish coast stations would, in our opinion, be to waste money uselessly, to create useless and encumbering organs, to multiply useless employments.
That assertion will undoubtedly appear quite bold to those who have impelled the navy toward aviation; because most of them saw above all else, in maritime aviation, a means of increasing the security of the sea coast.
Therefore it remains for us to defend our opinion and to justify it if possible.
For many people naval warfare resolves itself into a struggle between the shore and ships. Such a false conception was without doubt born as a sequel of the three last maritime wars—the Chinese-Japanese, Spanish-American, and Russo-Japanese wars. The fleets are seen prowling around the enemy's port: Wei-Hai-Wei, Santiago, Port Arthur. But if the cause of this fact is shown it is ascertained that each time these fleets have been drawn by the presence in each of these ports of the naval forces of the adversary. The ships did not seek to enter into an engagement with the shore; they came to attack the enemy afloat. To force the enemy to come out or destroy himself in his lair, it was necessary to disembark entire army corps, besiege the shore fortifications, deliver assaults, and at Port Arthur to sacrifice 100,000 men. This evidence proves that ships are powerless against the shore, and that in naval warfare all the interest of the war is centered on the destruction of the enemy afloat.
This established, what service do you claim for aviation from a coastal point of view?
Do you pretend, to establish a continuous surveillance with aeroplanes all along the coast, with the idea of discerning the presence of an enemy who will probably never appear? The realization of such an intention would produce fantastic results; we must then count aeroplanes by thousands instead of by hundreds. Furthermore by increasing the number of apparatus infinitely, the surveillance will never be real or efficacious.
It will not be real because the ships generally take pains to arrive in sight of the coast in the early morning, and the aeroplanes will not discern them until the same moment that the semaphores signal their presence. Furthermore, as the assailant can select his own time and as our new battleships of more that 20,000 tons can disregard the state of the sea, it will always be Possible for him to select weather which will paralyze the torpedo boats and aircraft. Meanwhile, the navy need not imitate the monkey of the fable in this question and forget to light its lantern.
The surveillance will not be efficacious. In reality, the signaling of the presence of the enemy does not prevent the coming attack; the sole benefit is a delay of security which, when it is sufficient, allows an organization of the defense. Now, the zone of action of a coastal aeroplane cannot be very extended; so that under the most favorable circumstances the delay of security will be too short or too long. It will be too long if it is merely a question of the personnel manning the batteries for action; the spyglass of the signalman suffices for this. If, on the contrary, it is necessary to move troops to repulse a landing, then, in the latter case, the aeroplane is totally insufficient.
Moreover, this discussion is idle. It is not by the aid of a feebly carried-out surveillance that one can prepare against attack on the coasts. From the beginning of hostilities contact with the enemy's forces is sought and his movements are followed. This duty is assigned to the naval forces. It is they who must also protect the coast from bombardment and from the landing of hostile troops by keeping the enemy in check and attacking it if it can be done with a chance of success. Thus, by removing from us the preoccupation of giving a role in the defense of the coasts to aviation at any cost, the true conception of war can be grasped. We do not count on saving the country by describing small circles tangent to the seashore with aeroplanes, surrounding it with an aerial chain. That conception of war is childish. If France never tries to realize it, the disillusion will lead unjust opinion against the aviators; when one sees the enemy showing itself in spite of the aeroplanes, one will accuse them of treachery.
Suppose, on the contrary, that an inferior naval force has been obliged to take refuge in a port, as was done by the Chinese fleet at Wei-Hai-Wei, the Spanish division at Santiago, the First Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur. They will be fatally followed by the enemy, which will establish itself on guard in the offing, ready to sink them if they come out.
This condition, due to one of the participants being inferior, which has come up in the last three wars, will undoubtedly come up again in future wars. Thus the utility of aeroplanes on the one side as well as the other is clearly conceived.
The attacker—that is to say, the blockader—will require aviation to reveal the whole system of defense of the enemy's position; to locate the position of mine fields; to report the presence of submarines; to determine the number and composition of the blockaded forces; to submit reports of the results of each engagement; finally, to give daily assurance that the enemy's ships have not escaped during the night.
The defense—that is to say, the blockaded force—will require no less important service of its aeroplanes. It also will have to be too short or too long. It will be too long if it is merely a question of the personnel manning the batteries for action; the spyglass of the signalman suffices for this. If, on the contrary, it is necessary to move troops to repulse a landing, then, in the latter case, the aeroplane is totally insufficient.
Moreover, this discussion is idle. It is not by the aid of a feebly carried-out surveillance that one can prepare against attack on the coasts. From the beginning of hostilities contact with the enemy's forces is sought and his movements are followed. This duty is assigned to the naval forces. It is they who must also protect the coast from bombardment and from the landing of hostile troops by keeping the enemy in check and attacking it if it can be done with a chance of success. Thus, by removing from us the preoccupation of giving a role in the defense of the coasts to aviation at any cost, the true conception of war can be grasped. We do not count on saving the country by describing small circles tangent to the seashore with aeroplanes, surrounding it with an aerial chain. That conception of war is childish. If France never tries to realize it, the disillusion will lead unjust opinion against the aviators; when one sees the enemy showing itself in spite of the aeroplanes, one will accuse them of treachery.
Suppose, on the contrary, that an inferior naval force has been obliged to take refuge in a port, as was done by the Chinese fleet at Wei-Hai-Wei, the Spanish division at Santiago, the First Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur. They will be fatally followed by the enemy, which will establish itself on guard in the offing, ready to sink them if they come out.
This condition, due to one of the participants being inferior, which has come up in the last three wars, will undoubtedly come up again in future wars. Thus the utility of aeroplanes on the one side as well as the other is clearly conceived.
The attacker—that is to say, the blockader—will require aviation to reveal the whole system of defense of the enemy's position; to locate the position of mine fields; to report the presence of submarines; to determine the number and composition of the blockaded forces; to submit reports of the results of each engagement; finally, to give daily assurance that the enemy's ships have not escaped during the night.
The defense—that is to say, the blockaded force—will require no less important service of its aeroplanes. It also will have to guard itself against mine-fields and submarine attacks. It must know the nature of the enemy's forces. Blockades are not generally made with other than smaller vessels and destroyers; it is therefore necessary to ascertain the position of the main forces and to determine the plan of action adopted. Thanks to this information, the blockaded force might be able to evade the other at night and gain a more favorable field of operation without attracting attention. In the meantime, it must tire the vigilance of the blockader; make frequent sorties; and, in order to have chances of success, it must be assured of the position occupied by the different forces of the enemy. The aeroplanes will thus have a vast field of action.
It is therefore incontestable that aviation will have its uses along the, coast line; but—and this is what I want to demonstrate—the creation of coastal stations is not necessary, because the operations of aeroplanes are so intimately bound with those of ships that the former ought to follow them throughout; as soon as the latter leave the coasts, coastal aviation loses its objective. Only the aeroplane on board ship is then necessary.
Besides, this is the naval view; because in the report to the President of the Republic, which accompanied the issue of the regulation of maritime aviation, it is only a question "of having the aircraft take part in offensive action of our naval forces."
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The French navy has, in the past, made a serious mistake. She has pretended to encircle all of the seacoast of France, of Algeria, and of Tunis with hundreds of torpedo boats which ought to render access to the coast impossible. She has not succeeded, alas, except to ruin herself, and she has thus dropped from the second to the fifth place.
Do not let us make the same mistake with aeroplanes. We see in aviation a new element which can, in certain cases, facilitate maritime operations, but let us not allow the desire to give it importance to lead us to create useless things in its favor.
Let us make use of aviation. Let us not allow ourselves to be reduced to servitude by it.