VIII.
The New Navy, 1881-1897.
Before the beginning of Garfield’s administration on March 4, 1881, a strong sentiment in favor of a new navy was manifested in Congress. The naval appropriation bill of 1877, as it passed the House, provided for a commission of nine members to formulate a progressive naval policy and to decide upon a shipbuilding program, but this provision was struck out by the Senate. In 1878 the House Committee on Naval Affairs under the able leadership of Benjamin W. Harris, of Massachusetts, pointed out with much detail the lamentable weakness of the American fleet in comparison with European fleets, and recommended that “ immediate and adequate measures be taken for the formation of a new and formidable navy.” In 1880 the same committee fully set forth the inefficiency of the several units composing the American fleet, and recommended the disposal of the old ships and obsolete materials and the establishment of a permanent construction fund for the building of new ships. Early in 1881 a measure which made provision for such a fund passed the House, but failed in the Senate for want of time for its proper consideration. During Hayes’s administration some of the leading members of the two principal political parties warmly advocated the improvement of the navy.
Shortly after his inauguration President Garfield showed considerable interest in the building of a fleet of modern war vessels. He believed that in this work his naval Secretary would find a great opportunity to distinguish himself. The act which has come to be regarded as the first step in the construction of the new navy was taken by Secretary Hunt on June 29, 1881, when he appointed the “ First Naval Advisory Board,” the chief purpose of which was to advise the Secretary of the Navy upon the technical problems involved in the building of new ships. It was to report upon the “ number of vessels that should now be built,” their class, size and displacement, the materials and methods of their construction, and their engines, armament and equipment. Upon these and similar technical questions a wide difference of opinion existed at this time among naval officers. Hunt wished to resolve these differences, to determine upon a specific shipbuilding program, and to fortify his recommendations to Congress by a unanimity of naval advice.
The “ First Naval Advisory Board ” was composed of one rear- admiral, one commodore, one captain, three commanders, three lieutenants, three engineers and three naval constructors. Of its fifteen members, nine were of the line, and six of the staff of the navy. A majority of its members had not reached the higher ranks of the service. Hunt believed that those officers who were to command and manage the new ships, and perhaps fight them, should have the largest share in determining their character. He probably feared that the recommendations of older men might prove too conservative, or possibly reactionary. According to Hunt all the members of the board were officers of “ recognized ability, experience and attainments.” Its president, Rear Admiral John Rodgers, was one of the best-equipped officers in the service. Commanders R. D. Evans and A. S. Crowninshield, whose names are now familiar, were also members. The engineers were represented by Isherwood, Loring and Manning; and the naval constructors, by Lenthall, Wilson and Hichborn. Isherwood and Len- thall were veteran members of their corps, and had rendered conspicuous service as chiefs of bureaus during the Civil War.
The board held its sessions in Washington from July 11 to November 7, 1881, on which latter date it reported to Secretary Hunt. As its members failed to agree at all points, majority and minority reports were submitted. These showed the usual cleavage of opinion between the line and the staff. The majority report was signed by all the officers of the line and two of the staff. The
minority report was signed by the four remaining officers of the staff—the three naval constructors and Chief Engineer Isher- wood. The majority of the board recommended the construction of 68 vessels at a total cost of $29,607,000—the value of some four or five battleships of recent date. In respect to types of construction, the 68 ships were to be distributed as follows: 18 steel unarmored cruisers, 20 wooden unarmored cruisers, 5 steel rams, 5 torpedo gunboats and 20 torpedo boats. The largest and fastest vessels were the steel unarmored cruisers. Two of these were to be first-rate steel, double-decked, unarmored cruisers, each having a displacement of about 5873 tons, an average sea-speed of 15 knots, and a battery of 5 8-inch and 21 6-inch guns; the cost of each was to be $1,780,000. Of the remaining 16 steel unarmored cruisers, six were to have a speed of 14 knots, and ten a speed of 13 knots. The majority did not recommend the construction of ironclads, although it recognized that such vessels would be needed in time of war. It recommended that all the ships should have full sdl power, and that the “ fifteen-, fourteen-, and thirteen- knot classes of vessels should be ship-rigged, and the ten-knot class of vessels barquentine-rigged.” It proposed to build the ten-knot vessels of live-oak and yellow pine, and all the larger vessels of steel. The proposal in respect to steel was so radical that the majority felt called upon to give their reasons for favoring the use of this material.
The minority disagreed with the majority upon various minor technicalities of naval construction. Some more important differences related to the construction of ironclads and the use of steel for the larger ships. The minority expressed the decided opinion that a “ modern navy must consist essentially of powerful ironclads; and the constant tendency in their design has been to approximate them more and more to machines, and to depart farther and farther from ships of the unarmored types.” On this subject it was more progressive than the majority. The report of the minority respecting the use of steel, however, exhibited it in a less favorable light. It dissented from the views of the majority on this subject on the grounds that steel would cost more than iron, that for shipbuilding it was but little better than iron, and that it could not be made in the United States until a manufactory was erected. These reports show very clearly the backwardness and rudimentary state of naval construction in this
country in 1881. From them one can reckon how far we have advanced in this art during the last thirty years. The differences in construction between the best ship recommended by the board and a battleship of recent date are truly remarkable.1,3
Secretary Hunt made the report of the First Naval Advisory Board a part of his annual report for 1881, and he recommended the views of the majority as being “ entitled to the entire approbation of Congress.” For the first time the subject of the new navy was assigned a place in the annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy. Hunt gave it precedence over all other subjects. In the opening paragraph of his report, he vigorously set forth the naval needs of the country: “ The condition of the navy imperatively demands the prompt and earnest attention of Congress. Unless some action be had in its behalf it must soon dwindle into insignificance. From such a state it would be difficult to revive it into efficiency without dangerous delay and enormous expense. Emergencies may at any moment arise which would render its aid indispensable to the protection of the lives and property of our citizens abroad and at home, and even to our existence as a nation.”
Hunt closed a glowing appeal to Congress to come to the rescue of a languishing and neglected navy in the following words: “ Whether it be as a means of self-protection to the long line of cities and harbors upon our coasts, or to guard our commerce on the high seas ; or to insure our citizens sojourning in foreign lands and their property and persons against outrage; or to take and keep our proper place among nations; or to maintain the sentiment of patriotism connected with our navy, and with the memories of its departed heroes; or to reap the advantages of the researches and labors of its officers in the further progress of advanced science; it becomes the duty of Congress to see to it that the navy of the United States should not be left to perish through inanition, but should be restored to a condition of usefulness in which it may upon occasion be so expanded as to become the ready means of protection at home or of active and aggressive warfare
in the ports and waters of an enemy.”
With these words of Hunt, President Arthur was in complete agreement. In his first annual message, that of December, 1881,
he strongly urged upon Congress his “ conviction that every consideration of national safety, economy and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation of our navy and he recommended liberal appropriations for the reconstruction of the fleet. Arthur s emphatic words are in striking contrast to the perfunctory references to the navy of President Hayes.1”
In January, 1882, the House Committee on Naval Affairs, having before it for its instruction its own previous reports on the state of the navy and the recommendations of Secretary Hunt and the hirst Naval Advisory Board, again took up the subject of building a modern fleet. It called before it the leading officers of the navy and certain manufacturers of iron and steel, and obtained their advice upon the best modes of constructing ships of war and the kinds of materials and armament best adapted for naval purposes. On February 15 a conference, which was held in the office of Secretary Hunt, discussed the same subjects. The Secretary of the Navy, members of the two naval committees, members of the hirst Naval Advisory Board, and some of the leading naval officers were present. Hunt presided and the greatest interest and harmony prevailed.1,4 Important addresses were made by Chairman Harris of the House Naval Committee, Admiral Porter, Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, and Chief Engineer Isherwood.
()n March 8 Harris reported a bill to the House, which provided for the construction of fifteen of the vessels recommended by the First Naval Advisory Board: Two 15-knot ships, four 14- knot ships, one steel ram, and eight torpedo boats. The total cost of the fifteen vessels was estimated at $10,000,000. The House Naval Committee, “ without hesitation or doubt,” recommended the use of steel in their construction. The bill further provided for a temporary board of advice and survey, which was to advise the Secretary of the Navy in regard to all technical matters relating to the construction of the new ships.1”
Harris was unable to bring his measure to a discussion or a vote, and he therefore dropped it. His next move was to graft some of its features on the naval appropriation bill. On July 1
' Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1881, 3-6; Richardson, Messages and Papers VIII, 51. BP,
IT4 House Rept., 47 C. 1 S., No. 653.
m Congressional Record. Xlli, 1719; House Rept., 47 C. 1 S., No. 653.
he proposed to amend the latter by inserting in it a provision for the construction of five new ships. After consulting with the leaders of his party and more accurately ascertaining the sentiment of the House respecting the improvement of the navy, he reduced his proposal to two new ships. An amendment to this effect was accordingly inserted in the bill. The provision of his measure of March 8 providing for a board of advice and survey was also included in it. The naval appropriation bill, containing these provisions, became a law on August 5, 1882.
As respects naval legislation, this epoch-making act is the dividing-line between the old steam navy and the new navy. It is a turning-point in the history of American naval construction. It provided for two new steam cruising vessels of war of the highest attainable speed. The larger of the two cruisers was to have a displacement of from 5000 1° 6°°° tons; and the smaller from 4300 to 4700 tons. They were to be built of steel of domestic manufacture, and were to be equiped with “ full sail power and full steam power.” The Secretary of the Navy was authorized to appoint a Naval Advisory Board consisting of seven members— five naval officers and two civilians—to advise and assist the Secretary in building and arming the new ships. In case the board deemed it advisable, the Secretary was to use “ interior deflective steel armor.” The board was authorized to report on the wisdom and expediency of completing the construction of the five monitors
_ Miantonomoh, Monadnock, Puritati, Amphitrite and Terror—
which had been commenced by Secretary Robeson and had been stopped in 1877. For the building of the new ships and the “ repairing ” of the old the act appropriated $3,350,000. It also contained most noteworthy provisions in respect to a limitation of the cost of repairs, and in respect to the navy yards and the personnel of the navy. These will be considered in their appropriate connections."7
Soon after the passage of the act of August 5, 1882, Secretary Chandler advertised for plans for the two cruisers, and in the fall of 1882 he selected the members of the “ Second Naval Advisory Board.” Only one of the members chosen, Lieutenant Edward W. Very, had served on the advisory board appointed by Hunt. Commodore R. W. Shufeldt was the president of the new
1,5 Congressional Record, XIII, 5569, 5^47-
177 U. S. Statutes at Large, XXII, 291-293.
board. Chandler with difficulty found two civilians of “ established reputation and standing as experts in naval or marine construction,” such was the low state of these arts in this country. He finally chose Mr. Henry Steers, a ship architect, and Mr. Miers Coryell, a marine engineer. The board was organized on November 13, 1882. Its secretary was Assistant Naval Constructor Francis T. Bowles, who had recently returned from the Royal Naval College in England, where he had received advanced instruction in naval architecture. It at once took up the work of providing a shipbuilding program for 1883. On November 21 it recommended that two 13-knot ships, one steel ram, and one dispatch boat be constructed, and that the five monitors be completed. It was opposed to the building of as large a vessel as the first cruiser authorized by the act of August 5. Chandler agreed with the conclusions of the board, and Congress decided to follow most of them.178
On March 3, 1883, Congress appropriated $1,300,000 towards the construction of four new vessels: the smaller steel cruiser authorized by the act of August 5, 1882, two additional steel cruisers of from 2500 to 3000 tons displacement, and one dispatch boat. The building of the larger cruiser authorized at the previous session of Congress was abandoned. One million dollars was appropriated for the completion of the five monitors. On July 3, 1883, contracts for the construction of the four new vessels were awarded to John Roach, of New York City, a noted shipbuilder in his day, and he soon commenced work upon the vessels. The first keel of the new navy, that of the dispatch boat Dolphin, was laid on October 15, 1883, at Chester, Pennsylvania, and this ship was launched on April 12, 1884. She was designed for a displacement of 1500 tons, a sea-speed of 15 knots, and an armament of one 6-inch breech-loading rifled gun and of secondary batteries. The largest of the four vessels was the Chicago. She was to have a displacement of 4500 tons and a speed of 14 knots. Each of the two other cruisers, the Atlanta and Boston, were to have a displacement of 3000 tons, and a sea-speed of 13 knots. When completed the total cost of these four vessels was $4,269,000, considerably less than the present cost of a first-class battleship.179
178 Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1882, pp. 22-23, 154-155; House Ex. Doc., 47 C. 2 S., No. 28.
™ U. S. Statutes at Large, XXII, 476-477.
Measured by recent achievements in naval construction, these first vessels of the new navy appear small, weak, slow-moving and ineffective. At the time, they represented three main types of unarmored warships. It was recognized that they were not adapted for heavy offensive warfare, but chiefly for “ general national service upon the high seas.” Naturally, in the unsettled state of naval science then existing, a considerable difference of opinion arose as to whether the best types had been chosen. After the work of construction was begun the ships were severely criticised. Admiral Porter maintained that they were too small, and were deficient in sail power. Much fault was found with their sheathing, machinery, speed, and construction. These censures so unsettled the public confidence in the new vessels and in the judgment of the Navy Department, that Secretary Chandler felt called upon to reply to them, and the Senate Naval Committee made a special investigation of the designs of the new ships. The committee approved of the work of the Secretary and his subordinates, and reported that “ nothing has appeared to show that the confidence of the Navy Department and of the Advisory Board in the success of these vessels is misplaced.”1M
Secretary Whitney’s sharp criticism of the designs and construction of the new ships was not calculated to restore public confidence. He declared that the Dolphin was a pleasure boat rather than a ship of war, and he considered the other three vessels defective in construction and deficient in speed. He said that the Department had acted hastily in preparing the designs and in making the contracts. On the completion of the Dolphin early in 1885, Whitney at first refused to accept her because of defects in her construction and her failure to develop the stipulated steam- power. Long negotiations between the Department and her builder, John Roach, ensued. Finally Whitney accepted the Dolphin conditionally. While involved in his dispute with the Secretary of the Navy, Roach failed in business and made an assignment. The Department thereupon took over the construction of the ships Chicago, Boston, and Atlanta, and after long delays completed them. While Whitney’s criticisms were based upon obvious defects, they nevertheless seem quite excessive in the light of the excellent services the first four vessels of the new navy have rendered, both in peace and in war. The friends of
Roach blamed the Secretary of the Navy for the shipbuilder’s failure in business.181
The shipbuilding program for 1884, according to the recommendations of Secretary Chandler and the Second Naval Advisory Board, called for the construction of seven additional unarmored cruisers at a cost of about $7,450,000. The Senate passed a bill authorizing the construction of several new ships, but the House, under the leadership of Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, opposed this measure and all others increasing the fleet. No additions to the navy were made in 1884. With this exception, new ships were authorized every year from 1882 to 1897. An act passed on March 3, 1885, provided for the construction of four additional vessels. The new heading, “ Increase of the Navy,” became a regular feature of the annual naval appropriation bill.
The amount of new tonnage authorized each year varied considerably. The new tonnage provided for under Chandler amounted to 23,076 tons; under Whitney, to 67,183 tons; under Tracy, to 70,831 tons; and under Herbert, to 67,984 tons. Under Chandler, 1882-1885, the authorizations consisted of five unarmored cruisers and three gunboats ; under Whitney, 1885-1889, of two battleships of the second class, one armored cruiser, one armored harbor-defense vessel, nine unarmored cruisers, four gunboats, one practice vessel, one ram, one dynamite-gun cruiser, and one torpedo boat; under Tracy, 1889-1893, of four first-class battleships, one armored cruiser, two unarmored cruisers, one torpedo boat, one submarine torpedo boat, and three gunboats; and under Herbert, 1893-1897, of five first-class battleships, 19 torpedo boats, one submarine boat, six gunboats, and one training ship. After much discussion of the merits of the monitors, the five ships of this class, whose construction had been commenced by Robeson, were in 1886 and 1887 ordered to be completed. Counting these five monitors, the total number of ships in the new navy on March 4, 1897, completed, under construction, or authorized, was 78.
A study of the types of these vessels reveals some well-marked developments in naval construction during the years 1882-1897. The first armored vessels were authorized under Whitney in 1886. These were the second-class battleships, Maine and Texas, and the
armored cruiser New York. The displacement of the Texas was 6315 tons. Under Tracy in 1889 the first first-class battleships, the Indiana, Massachusetts and Oregon, were ordered. The displacement of each of these ships was 10,288 tons. The largest battleship of the date of 1896, the Wisconsin, had a displacement of 11,653 tons. The displacement of the Chicago, the largest vessel authorized in 1883, was 5000 tons. The speed of the unarmored cruisers of the date of 1883 was from 15 to 18 knots; and of 1889-1890, from 19 to 23 knots. Under Herbert the construction of torpedo boats was for the first time commenced in earnest. Some of these attained a speed of 30 knots. The first submarine was ordered in 1893. In 1895 a submarine of the Holland type was contracted for. Armored harbor-defense vessels, or monitors and gunboats, types dating from the period of the Civil War, maintained a place in the new navy. The developments in naval construction from 1883 to 1897 in the United States were from small to large ships, from unarmored to armored vessels, and from ships of moderate to ships of high speed. The number of types of vessels increased. As the ships became larger, their armament became more powerful, and their cost of construction greater. The cost of the Massachusetts, including her armament, was $6,047,000.1,2
The general policy of the Department was to build the new vessels at private shipyards. Of the 73 new vessels authorized from 1882 to 1897, only four were constructed at the navy yards. These were the second-class battleships Maine and Texas and the two protected cruisers Cincinnati and Raleigh. Each of the two methods of construction has its advantages and disadvantages. The evidence seems to show that vessels can be built cheaper at the private yards, but that better vessels are constructed at the government yards. The policy of employing private builders encourages the shipbuilding industry and tends to increase and strengthen the mercantile marine. On the other hand, it weakens the navy yards, and renders them less able to perform their work in time of war.
The next contracts after the first ones, those of 1883, were not let until 1887. Whitney insisted that ample time should be allowed for fully preparing all the plans and specifications. Among the new contractors were William Cramp and Sons, of Philadelphia, and the Union Iron Works of San Francisco, two of the 183
183 Sen. Doc., 58 C. 2 S., No. 100, 439-441.
most famous and efficient builders of the new navy. Of the three first battleships, the Cramps built the Indiana and Massachusetts, and the Union Iron Works the Oregon. These three vessels, together with the battleship Iowa authorized in 1892, were the nucleus of the “ battleship fleet,” and were the chief reliance of the navy during the war of 1898. They especially distinguished themselves at the battle of Santiago. The memorable cruise of the Oregon from the Pacific around Cape Horn to the Atlantic coast will not soon be forgotten.
Some information contained in an address of the great shipbuilder, Charles H. Cramp, shows plainly the wonderful advance in naval construction made between the war of 1861-1865 and that of 1898. The first vessel that the Cramps built for the navy was the Nezu Ironsides, completed in 1862; and the last before the Spanish-American War was the battleship Iowa. Each ship represented'the most advanced type of its day. The New Ironsides had one machine—her main engine—involving two steam cylinders; the Iowa had 71 machines involving 137 steam cylinders. The guns of the New Ironsides were worked, the ammunition hoisted, the ship steered, the engines started and reversed, and the boats lowered, by hand. The ship was lighted by oil lamps, and ventilated, when at all, by natural air currents. In the Iowa it “ may almost be said that nothing is done by hand except the opening and closing of throttles and pressing of electric buttons. Her guns are loaded, trained, and fired, her ammunition hoisted, her turrets turned, her torpedoes—mechanisms in themselves—are tubed and ejected, the ship steered, her boats hoisted out and in, the interior lighted and ventilated, the great searchlight operated, and even orders transmitted from bridge or conning-tower to all parts, by mechanical appliances.” 183
In building the first vessels of the new navy, not a few difficulties and embarrassments were encountered in obtaining suitable materials. During the Civil War the United States had constructed her own ships, armor and guns, and they were of the most-approved types of that period. Since 1865 great advances had been made in the construction of ships and armament, and with these this country had not kept pace, since she had permitted her navy to decay. Among the most important improvements, were the substitution of steel for wrought-iron armor, and
1,s C. H. Cramp, Necessity of Experience to Efficiency, 3-5.
of steel, built-up, breech-loading rifles for cast-iron, muzzleloading, smooth-bore guns. In 1883 steel forgings for the engine shafts and large guns, modern armor-plate, and the best machine and rapid-fire guns were not manufactured in the United States. The fabrication of high-grade mild-steel plates was a new and undeveloped industry in this country.
At the very beginning of the work of rebuilding the fleet, it was recognized that the United States must not be dependent upon foreign countries for any of the materials of naval construction, and most especially for gun-forgings and armor-plate. Secretary Chandler early recommended that steps be taken to domesticate the manufacture of forgings and armor. In April, 1883, the Gun Foundry Board, consisting of army and navy officers, was appointed. Its president was Rear-Admiral Edward Simpson. It thoroughly investigated the manufacture of heavy ordnance for the army and the navy, and made an elaborate repoft in February, 1884. It visited the factories of arms in England, France and Russia, and would have inspected Krupp’s establishment in Germany, could it have obtained permission. The board recommended that the government of the United States should encourage domestic manufacturers to establish foundries for the making of steel gun-forgings, and that the government itself should establish two gun factories, one for the army and the other for the navy. The private foundries were to supply the public factories with the required gun-forgings. The board further recommended that the naval factory should be located at the Washington navy yard. Meantime, while these questions were being agitated and decided, Secretary Chandler imported from England both gun-forgings and armor-plate.1*4
Soon after entering the Department, Secretary Whitney took up the subject of domesticating the manufacture of these essential articles, and as a preliminary step he stopped their importation. In 1886 the subject was reported upon by the Endicott Board on Fortifications and Other Defences composed of army and navy officers, and by two special committees of Congress, one of the House and the other of the Senate. The board and the committees made reports which greatly elucidated the problems involved. They agreed that substantial encouragement should be given to
domestic manufacturers. This was to take the form of binding the government to purchase large quantities of gun-forgings and armor-plate—some $35,000,000 worth. Congress naturally hesitated to authorize so large an expenditure of money. Meanwhile, Whitney undertook to interest the steel manufacturers in the subject. In the summer of 1886 he consolidated in one advertisement all the requirements for gun-forgings and armor-plate for the ships of war then authorized, stipulating that these articles should be of domestic manufacture and should be delivered within two and one-half years, a time deemed sufficient to erect the necessary manufactories and to fabricate the articles. He opened up correspondence with the principal steel-makers of the United States. As a result of his efforts, he received bids from four companies to supply all or a part of the required forgings and armor; and in April, 1887, he contracted with the Bethlehem Iron Company, of South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, to furnish all the requirements of the vessels then authorized, for the sum of $4,462,000. Congress had already, on March 3, seconded Whitney’s efforts by appropriating $4,000,000 for armor-plate and gun- steel of domestic manufacture. The fabrication of the articles in the United States was thus assured.185
During this same period Whitney effected the establishment of a naval gun factory under the management of the Navy Department. For this purpose Congress, on August 3, 1886, appropriated $1,000,000. In the same year Whitney transferred the Washington navy yard, the site chosen for the factory, to the Bureau of Ordnance, which was to have charge of the new establishment. In the spring of 1887 the conversion of the old forge and anchor shop of this yard into a gun shop for the manufacture of 6-inch and 8-inch guns was begun. The construction of a large new gun shop was soon undertaken, and modern tools and machinery were installed. Year by year the Naval Gun Factory has added to its facilities until it has become one of the best and largest manufactories of heavy naval guns in the world. Within five years after its establishment it was making cannon with calibers varying from 4 to 13 inches. In 1882 there was not one high-powered gun in the navy, and only 87 guns that were worth retaining. In December, 1896, Secretary Herbert reported
• that 196 cannon were under construction, and that during the past four years 213 cannon had been completed. The guns which were being built were rifled, built-up, forged-steel guns. They consisted of several parts, which were assembled and machined into one solid mass of steel.188
The domestication of the manufacture of gun-forgings and armor-plate and the founding of the Naval Gun Factory were among the most noteworthy achievements of Whitney’s administration. A third event of a similar sort was the establishment in the United States of a manufactory of Hotchkiss arms. The Hotchkiss Ordnance Company of Paris made machine and rapid-fire guns of the most-approved types. The Navy Department had been importing these guns for the secondary batteries of its ships. On Whitney’s refusing to buy them unless they were made in the United States, the Hotchkiss company saw fit to erect a branch manufactory in this country.187 The only foreign articles which the Secretary of the Navy was willing to import were drawings and designs of the latest ships and machinery. He resisted a strong influence in Congress to give to English builders a part of the work of constructing our marine engines. For his domestication of these various naval industries he deserves unstinted praise.
Whitney’s contract with the Bethlehem Iron Company called for the first delivery of armor by February, 1890. The work of installing the necessary machinery proved more difficult than was anticipated, and the first substantial deliveries were not made until 1892. Embarrassed by these delays, Secretary Tracy made efforts to obtain a second source of supply, and in November, 1890, he entered into a contract with Carnegie, Phipps and Company, steel manufacturers of Pittsburgh, for 5900 tons of armor-plate. The second company pushed its work most vigorously, and by December, 1891, it had delivered 150 tons of nickel-steel armor. Meantime, a second source of gun-forgings, the Midvale Steel Company of Philadelphia, had been established. It made its first delivery in September, 1890.188
During Tracy’s administration the Navy Department exhibited much enterprise in testing various kinds of armor. In the history
of the development of this article, some of these tests are justly famous. In 1890, at the Annapolis proving-grounds, three kinds of armor were tried, the English compound armor, Le Creusot allsteel armor, and a sample of nickel-steel armor of French manufacture. The superiority of the plates made of nickel-steel was most conclusively demonstrated, and the Department at once decided to use this armor in preference to all other kinds. Congress rose to the occasion and immediately appropriated $1,000,000 for the purchase of steel. “ The Annapolis trials of 1890,” according to Secretary Tracy, “ may be said to have stripped off, in five shots, half the protection of the armored fleet of Great Britain, and pf most of the fleets of the world.™
In the same year, 1890, some other interesting tests of armor were made at Annapolis. These showed that a surface-hardened steel-plate possessed a remarkable resistance to perforation. The process of hardening the surface of the steel was named from its inventor the “ Harvey process,” and armor so treated came to be known as “ Harveyed ” armor. From 1890 to 1892 the Department was testing and improving this armor, and by the end of 1892 it had demonstrated that the Harveyed nickel-steel plates were superior to all others. The Harvey process, or one similar thereto, was adopted by all the great naval powers. The trials and developments of armor-plate made by the Department from 1889 to 1893 were among the signal events of Tracy’s administration, and in respect to the science of armor, they placed the United States in the foremost ranks among the naval powers.180
In 1889 the navy had no automobile torpedoes. Tracy introduced them by contracting for 100 18-inch Whitehead automobile torpedoes, the most successful torpedoes in use, and he domesticated their manufacture. Tracy also introduced into the navy heavy rapid-fire guns of 4-inch, 5-inch and 6-inch calibers. During his administration the Department began the manufacture of a smokeless gunpowder of a better variety than any hitherto made, and also of certain high explosives which could be safely used in shells fired from high-powered guns. These improved articles were developed at the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport. Tracy also began the fabrication of gun-cotton in large quantities, and he
domesticated the manufacture of armor-piercing projectiles, a most important industry.181
The Department’s manufactories of guns, ammunition, explosives and projectiles were in charge of the Bureau of Ordance. This bureau also inspected articles of a similar sort made by private firms—torpedoes, rapid-fire and machine guns, gun-carriages, gunpowder, shot, shells and projectiles. The principal private manufactories of these articles were located in the New England and Middle States. The principal public establishments were the gun factory at Washington, the torpedo station and the torpedo school at Newport, and the naval proving-grounds at Annapolis and Indianhead. In 1890 and 1891 the bureau purchased new proving-grounds, which were at once ample in area and convenient to the Naval Gun Factory at Washington. They were situated 26 miles below Washington, on the Potomac, at Indianhead, Maryland, and contained 881 acres. The new grounds were rapidly improved, and were made ready for the testing of guns, fuses, projectiles and gunpowders. In 1892 the old proving- grounds at Annapolis were abandoned for the new site. During the same year the Bureau of Ordnance acquired 315 acres of land at Lake Denmark, New Jersey, for a naval gunpowder depot. In 1896 a tract of land was obtained near Portsmouth, Virginia, for the Saint Julien naval magazine, and 25 acres were added to the site of the naval magazine at Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania. 182 The work of the Bureau of Ordance was greatly increased by the rebuilding of the fleet and by the remarkable improvements being made in the science of naval ordnance. Since its establishment this has been one of the most efficient of the naval bureaus, and has been served by most able and expert officers.
By the latter part of Tracy’s administration most of the embarrassments caused by the inexperience of the United States in modern naval construction and by the necessity of establishing new naval industries had been removed, and the reconstruction of the navy was greatly accelerated. The slowness with which the work at first proceeded is plainly shown by the dates of the commissioning of the first four vessels, authorized in 1882 and 1883.
The Dolphin was commissioned in December, 1885, Atlanta in 1886, Boston in 1887, and Chicago in April, 1889. Under Chand-
m Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1891, p. 15; 1892, p. 6.
192 Miscl. data, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 35, 46, 52, 83.
ler, no new vessels were commissioned. Under Whitney three vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 7863 tons were commissioned, under Tracy 19 vessels of 54,832 tons, and under Herbert 22 vessels of 177484 tons.
As the new ships were added to the navy, the old ones disappeared from it. A very important provision of the act of August 5, 1882, forbade the repairing of any ship, the expense of which exceeded 30 per cent of the cost of a new ship of the same size and of like materials. The permissible cost of repairs was shortly reduced to 20, and later to 10 per cent. The act of 1882 also provided that a board of naval officers should regularly inspect the ships of the navy and condemn those that were unfit for service. This act put an end to the expensive policy of repairing or rebuilding old and worthless vessels of obsolete types. In 1882 two inspection boards condemned 44 ships, almost one-third of the entire number borne upon the Navy List at that time, and recommended that they should be broken up or sold. In 1893, of the old wooden ships, only nine remained in active service. Secretary Herbert believed that all of these would be retired within the next three years, except the Hartford and Kearsarge, which were specially exempted for sentimental or patriotic reasons from the operation of the clause limiting the cost of repairs. In 1896 several of the old vessels were still used as training, school, or receiving ships, or by the naval militia.
An occasion illustrative of the disposition of the worn-out hulks of the navy, was the opening of bids at the Navy Department in Washington on September 24, 1883, received in response to an advertisement for the sale of 21 old ships. The total cost of these relics of a bygone age was $15,380,000. They sold for $308,273. Most of them antedated the Civil War. One of them was the 74- gun ship New Orleans, whose construction had been commenced at Sacketts Harbor during the War of 1812. For many years she had remained upon the stocks, and was now rotten and almost worthless for any purpose. She was sheltered by a ship-house, which, having been injured by a gale of wind, was, in 1879, pronounced valueless. In anticipation of a possible war with Great Britain, in which neither the New Orleans nor the ship-house could have been of any appreciable service, they were carefully guarded for 68 years at a cost to the Department of some $50,000— a fine illustration of the inertia and waste of governments. The
New Orleans sold for $427. Another of these old ships was the Ohio, built in 1820. We are informed that on the occasion of the opening of the bids, the Secretary’s office had the “ appearance of an auction shop. The majority of those present were the bidders themselves, though a naval officer occasionally strolled in to see what some favorite old hulk was selling for, and a dozen or so newspaper men loitered around on the desks and window-sills, taking notes as each bid was opened and read aloud by Chief Clerk Hogg. Fully two hours was occupied in opening and recording the proposals. The prices offered exceeded what was expected. Mr. Chandler stood behind his desk apparently occupied with business, but when a bid was read that reached much above the appraised value, he would glance around at the bidders, and by a nod of the head signify his assent.” m
The building of the new navy had no large effect upon the annual naval appropriations until 1888, when they reached their high-water mark during Whitney’s administration, $26,000,000. For 1881, when no'new vessels were being built, the sum appropriated was $14,000,000. By 1887 it had advanced to $16,000,000. From 1889 to 1891, it varied from $20,000,000 to $24,000,000. In 1892, it reached its highest point during the periods 1881-1897, $32,000,000. The financial depression may in part account for the fall to $22,000,000 in 1894. In 1897 it had risen to $31,000,000. The average sum carried by the naval appropriation bills from 1881 to 1897 was $21,000,000, a strikingly small figure when one recollects that the annual naval expenditures during Robeson’s administration, 1869-1877, exceeded itm
Under Secretary Tracy the fixing of a shipbuilding program for a term of years assumed importance. According to one of his recommendations the future navy should consist of 100 vessels— 20 battleships, 20 coast-defense vessels, and 60 cruisers. To bring the fleet up to this point would necessitate the annual expenditure of $9,000,000 for fifteen years. The McCann Policy Board which Tracy appointed in July, 1889, recommended the expenditure of more than twice that amount. Its program called for 18 first-class, 12 second-class, and 5 third-class battleships, 10 rams, 9 thin- armored cruisers, 15 protected cruisers, 15 torpedo cruisers, 8 minor vessels, and 100 torpedo boats. It estimated that these 193
193 Army and Navy Journal, XXI, 177.
1M Congressional Record, XXVIII, 4567.
192 vessels would cost $282,000,000. Its recommendations were regarded as extravagant by both the Secretary of the Navy and Congress.1"
IX.
Naval Establishments, Officers and Seamen, 1881-1897.
The noteworthy act of August 5, 1882, contained some important legislation respecting navy yards.1*1 It provided that, in case the money which it appropriated should prove insufficient for the maintenance of all the yards, the Secretary of the Navy should close those which could be best dispensed with; and it authorized the appointment of a commission of three men—one line officer, one staff officer, and one civilian—to report upon the navy yards and determine whether any of them should be sold. At this time the United States owned nine navy yards situated at the following places on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts: Portsmouth, Boston, New London, New York, League Island, Washington, Norfolk, Pensacola and Mare Island. Naval stations were maintained at Newport, Annapolis, Port Royal, Key West, New Orleans and Sacketts Harbor. The total cost of the improvements, repairs and sites of the nine navy yards from 1798 to 1882 was $54,000,000. About the year 1882 the annual expenditures of the navy yards were $4,500,000. On November 16, 1882, the total number of officers employed at them (excluding the New London yard which at this time was wholly undeveloped) was 326; enlisted men and marines, 2501; civilian employees, 4462; total number of men of all classes, 7289. At this time no vessels were being constructed, and only seven were being repaired. Secretary Chandler firmly believed that more capital was invested in the yards, more money was annually spent for their maintenance, and more men were employed in them than were required by the existing or prospective wants of the naval service. He therefore determined to make such reductions in their number and the cost of their maintenance as the circumstances seemed to warrant.11"
On October 9, Chandler appointed the commission authorized by the act of August 5, 1882. Its members were Commodore S. B.
103 Sen. Ex. Doc., 51 C. 1 S., No. 43.
1M U. S. Statutes at Large, XXII, 289-290. ?
,B Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1882, 10-12.
Luce, president, Chief Engineer C. H. Coring, and A. B. Mullett, sometime supervising architect of the treasury. The report of this commission laid the foundations for the policy respecting navy yards that was pursued for the next fifteen years. It visited the chief establishments of the navy, and made a thorough investigation of their condition. It recommended that the establishments at New York, Norfolk and Mare Island be retained as first-class yards; that those at Pensacola, League Island and New London should be closed, and that the Washington yard should be used for manufacturing purposes only. The members of the commission differed as to the proper disposition to be made of the establishments at Portsmouth and Boston. Two members recommended the closing of the Portsmouth yard. Only one member was in favor of continuing the Boston yard in full operation.
In 1883 Chandler put in force many of the recommendations of the commission. He doubtless would have gone farther than he did, had he had the support of his chiefs of bureaus. He closed the Pensacola, League Island and New London yards. At the Boston yard, he discontinued the construction and repair of ships, but continued the ropewalk and manufactory of sails. He reduced considerably the operations of the Portsmouth yard, but permitted there the repairing of wooden ships. He decreased the total number of men employed at the several yards by about 1000.
In respect to the reformation of the administration of the yards, Chandler was less successful in enforcing the views of the Luce commission, which recommended a “ reorganization and concentration of the mechanical departments in every navy yard, so that there shall be but one shop in each for the performance of the same class of work.' It is recollected that the shops, property and employees of the yards had been divided among the naval bureaus. Each bureau at Washington had in each yard its own representatives, employees and storehouses, and even its own power-station. A navy yard was described at this time as consisting of a “ number of separate and comparatively independent establishments, little principalities as it were, each owing allegiance to its own sovereign, the chief of the bureau to which it belongs." Chandler said that the principal defects in the administration of the yards arose from the excessive division of labor, responsibility
and executive power, and from the combination under one management of a manufactory of ships and naval supplies and a “ military post.” These could be remedied by concentrating the construction, repair and equipment of ships under one technical head, and by separating this work from that of the “ military post.” The changes recommended by the Luce commission had his hearty support, and he issued orders putting them into operation, but the opposition of his bureau chiefs and other persons interested in the maintenance of the old system prevented his orders from being carried out. Convinced that he could not reform the yards without the assistance of Congress, he asked that body to pass the needed legislation, but failed to obtain it. The yards continued to suffer from an excessive decentralization of their administration.1"’
In concentrating the work and management of the yards, Whitney was a little more successful than Chandler. He introduced or reintroduced the system of general storekeepers, to which reference has already been made in a previous chapter. This went far towards centralizing the making of purchases, the keeping of accounts, and the care and preservation of stores. Whitney continued this policy of concentration by making the Boston yard a manufactory of articles of equipment, and the Washington yard a naval gun factory.
The reforms of the navy yards effected by Tracy and Herbert were along different lines from those of Chandler and Whitney. The influence of politics and favoritism in the selection of the employees of the yards had been the bane of their administration since the days of Andrew Jackson. At times these sinister powers were extraordinarily potent, as for instance, under Toucey in 1857-1861 and Robeson in 1869-1877. At other times they appeared to subside somewhat, but they were always in no small degree operative. During the presidential campaign of 1888 more than 1000 men were temporarily employed at the New York navy yard for political purposes.200 Under Tracy the repair and construction of the ships of the new navy assumed much importance. Since these vessels were complicated mechanisms, intelligent and skilful artisans were needed even to repair
'"Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1883, pp. 17, 107; 1884, pp. 16-19; Congressional Record, XVII, 5833-5834.
=0° Fourteenth Rept. of U. S. Civil Service Commission, 180.
them. In the days of the old navy, a political appointee, who could perchance bore and mortise in wood, might be of some service. But under the new conditions some technical skill was required of the workmen. Political bosses could no longer be permitted to name the employees of the yards.
As a preliminary to the introduction of a system of selection based upon merit, Tracy in April, 1891, dismissed all the foremen of the yards. To assist him in filling the vacancies he had thus created, he appointed a board of practical men for each yard. These boards chose for foremen the very best mechanics, after they had proved their abilities by practical tests. Next, Tracy established in each yard an employment board composed of the heads of departments and their assistants. Its duty was to classify all applicants for positions according to their trades. When the head of one of the mechanical departments of a yard desired to fill vacancies, he made a requisition on the employment board, which sent him a list of names taken in the order in which the men had applied. On receiving these names, the head of the department gave the men a trial, and selected for permanent employment those who proved capable.201
Tracy put the new system into operation in the face of much opposition from the politicians, and from others who were interested in maintaining the old system. The presidential campaign of 1892 was the first in many years, in which the navy yards had not been manipulated for partisan purposes. It is said that no workmen were employed during this year otherwise than in accordance with Tracy’s rules. The commandant at New York was of the opinion that the new system of appointment effected a reduction of 25 per cent in the cost of the work of his yard. Secretary Herbert continued Tracy’s system and improved it. Plausible complaints, however, were made from time to time that Herbert did not operate it fairly. He maintained that these were groundless. Herbert, however, conceived that an equal division of the employees of the yards between the Democrats and the Republicans would be advantageous, and he permitted Tracy’s rules to be operated so as to bring about gradually a rough equalization between the two parties. Probably under both Tracy and Herbert politics and favoritism played some part in manipulating the rules.
The spirit of the old system still survived. A long step towards the establishment of a fair and just system, however, had been taken. Another extension of the principles of civil service was made by President Cleveland, when on May 6, 1896, he placed all the clerks, messengers and watchmen of the navy yards within the classified service, and directed that in the future all appointments to these offices should be made through the Civil Service Commission.202
The improvement of the navy yards and dry docks from 1881 to 1897 by no means kept pace with the construction of new ships. The condition of those yards which Chandler closed inevitably became worse. During Whitney and Tracy’s administration modern tools and machinery adapted to the construction and repair of the new ships were installed at Norfolk, New York and Mare Island. Much pressure was brought to bear to obtain the fitting out of other yards in the same manner, but it was successfully resisted. Under Tracy and Herbert the expenditures for yards and docks were considerably increased, and in view of the large number of modern vessels of war that were being placed in commission a still more liberal policy could have been followed with advantage to the navy. In 1889 a navy board recommended a scheme of development for the League Island yard involving the expenditure of $14,000,000, and about the same time another board proposed to expend $8,000,000 in improving the New York yard. The Navy Department, although favorable to the adoption of a more liberal policy in respect to these establishments, did not accept the extensive plans of the boards.203
Between 1889 and 1897 several new docks, considerably larger than the old ones, were completed. The new docks, however, were generally too small to accommodate the larger battleships, and in 1897 the docking facilities for these vessels were entirely inadequate. Two new graving docks, one of concrete and the other of wood, were constructed at the New York yard; the former was completed in 1890, and the latter in 1897. The dimensions of the wood dock were as follows: Length, 669 feet; breadth, 151 feet; and depth over sill, 29 feet. At the time of its completion it was the largest dock in the United States. In 1889
“Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N„ 1892, pp. 49-53; 1893, pp. 51-52; 1894, pp. 3839; 1896, pp. 45-48.
? ** Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1889, p. 28.
a wood graving dock for the Norfolk yard was completed, and in 1891 a new wood and concrete dock was ready for use at League Island. The granite dock which was begun at Mare Island in 1872 was not finished until 1891. Its cost was $2,772,000. In 1883 37 acres of land was purchased for $3000 for the naval station at Port Royal, South Carolina, and a large timber dry dock was completed there in 1895. It was, however, barely commodious enough to admit the new battleship Indiana, which was repaired at Port Royal in March, 1896, the first vessel of her class to be docked in the United States.2"4
With the development of the commerce of the United States in the Pacific Ocean and with the growth of Washington and Oregon, the sentiment in Congress in favor of the establishment of a dry dock and navy yard on the Northwest Coast increased. The Pacific squadron had considerable need for a repair shop in this region, the most northerly ports of which are some 1000 miles from the Mare Island navy yard near San Francisco. In 1888 Congress authorized the appointment of a commission to select a site for a navy yard and docks on the Northwest Coast. It was duly organized, with Captain A. T. Mahan, the well-known naval historian and strategist, as its president. It visited various sites on the coast of Washington and Oregon, and in September, 1889, made an elaborate report, in which it decided in favor of Port Turner on Puget Sound. The commission said, however, that a suitable site might be found on Lake Washington, a body of water lying back of Seattle, provided a navigable canal could be constructed connecting the lake with the sound.”
The Department was not satisfied with this report. Moreover, those who were interested in other sites wished to reopen the subject. Congress therefore authorized the appointment of a second commission. This was chosen by President Harrison on September 6, 1890. It was composed, according to law, of two naval officers, two army officers, and two civilians. Its president was Captain T. O. Selfridge, and its two civilian members were Ex-Senator T. C. Platt, of New York, and Ex-Secretary of the Navy R. W. Thompson, of Indiana. After paying a visit to the Northwest Coast, this commission came to the same conclusion 204
204 Congressional Record, XXVIII, 3254; XXXIX, 3497.
203 Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1889, pp. 30-31.
as the former one, and recommended that the proposed dockyard be located at Point Turner in the estuary of Port Orchard on Puget Sound. In March, 1891, the Department detailed Lieutenant A. B. Wyckoff to select and purchase a body of land on Port Orchard, not exceeding 200 acres. Wyckoff chose a tract consisting of 191 acres, which he bought for $10,312. He was made the first commandant of the “ Puget Sound Naval Station.” In 1892 the construction of a large dry dock of wood and masonry, 650 feet in length, was commenced, and in 1896 it was completed at a cost of $633,000.“"
The closing of the Pensacola yard by Chandler in 1883 again opened the question as to the proper site of a navy yard on the Gulf coast. New Orleans was not slow to present her claims and qualifications. At various times since the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, the Navy Department had maintained a naval station at or near that city. Some years before the Civil War, the Department had come into the possession of a naval reservation, containing 23 acres, and located at Algiers opposite New Orleans on the Mississippi. In the eighties it maintained here a small naval station. In 1888 Congress authorized the appointment of a commission to report “ as to the most desirable location on or near the coast of the Gulf of Mexico and the south Atlantic coast for navy yards and dry docks.” The president of the commission was Commodore W. P. McCann. After visiting Key West, Tampa, Pensacola, Mount Vernon, Mobile and New Orleans, it made a report in the fall of 1889, in which it recommended the establishment of a navy yard at Algiers. The claims of this location were now pressed unremittingly on Congress by New Orleans and Louisiana. The people of Florida, and especially of Pensacola, were naturally much dissatisfied with this report.201
Congress, doubtless glad of an opportunity to postpone its final decision, concluded to reopen the question of locating a yard in the South, and authorized the appointment of a second commission. This was selected by President Harrison on November 22, 1890. Its president was Captain F. M. Bunce. After going over the same ground the Bunce commission came to the same conclusions as its predecessor, and recommended Algiers. Congress appar- 204
204 Sen. Ex. Doc., 51 C. 2 S., No. 24; Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1890, p. 36; 1892, p. 105.
207 Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1889, p. 29.
ently was not particularly desirous of establishing a dockyard at this point. It did, however, appropriate some money to enlarge the site of the naval reservation. In October, 1894, the Department' purchased 47 acres of land adjoining its holdings at Algiers. In 1895 the chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks asked for an appropriation of $100,000 with which to commence the construction of a dry dock at the New Orleans naval station, estimated to cost $1,250,000, but nothing more was done at this time towards making the proposed improvement.208
Secretary Chandler manifested considerable interest in the establishment of foreign coaling stations, but neither he nor his immediate successors were able to increase their number. In 1883 the navy had coaling stations at Honolulu, Tutuila in the Samoan Islands, and Pichilingue in Lower California, and the Mononga- hela, which had a capacity for 1000 tons of coal, was being fitted as a storeship for Callao, Peru. Chandler recommended that these coaling stations be placed upon a firm basis, and that additional stations be established in Hayti, Curasao, Brazil, the Straits of Magellan, Central America, the Isthmus of Panama, Madagascar, Liberia, the island of Fernando Po and Korea, but nothing came of his recommendation. In 1889, however, Congress appropriated $100,000 to establish permanently a naval station on the shores of the bay of Pago Pago, Tutuila. In the summer of that year Rear-Admiral L. A. Kimberly, in pursuance of orders from the Department, made a careful survey of the harbor of Pago Pago, and selected a tract containing 121 acres as a site for a naval station. In 1891 and 1892 the Department, aided by the American consul at Apia, purchased the land. The negotiations were quite tedious, since the titles to the land were held, in accordance with the customs of Samoa, by families and not by individuals.2"
Until after the Spanish-American War of 1898, the naval establishments outside of the States were few and unimportant. As we have seen, there were but few foreign coaling stations. Marine barracks were established at Sitka, Alaska, in 1891-1892, and a naval hospital at Yokohama in 1872.
During the period of naval decadence following the Civil War the naval hospital service suffered exceedingly. Its buildings,
which were of an antiquated style, became worn and dilapidated. Their appliances and interior fittings were not adapted to the needs of modern surgery and sanitary science. In 1874 Congress appropriated only $5000 for their repair and improvement. This had to suffice for seven large hospitals, two smaller ones, a large building at New York used for a naval laboratory, and the various grounds connected with these establishments. With the revival of interest in the navy, the condition of the naval medical service slowly improved. Some of the larger hospitals were thoroughly renovated, and fitted out in accordance with the latest improvements in medical science. New surgical appliances were introduced. In 1896 all the hospitals were supplied with complete outfits of bacteriological and chemical supplies and with aseptic operating rooms and furniture. In 1887 a hospital was erected at Widow’s Island, Maine, for the treatment of infectious diseases. Before it was ready for use improvements in the treatment of this class of diseases and in the construction of ships rendered it obsolete. In 1894 the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery recommended that it be sold.210
In 1883 the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery founded in Washington the Museum of Hygiene. Its primary purpose was to collect information relating to the “ hygiene of civil life, private life, and naval life.’ It made a large collection of articles, plans and appliances illustrative of hygiene and sanitation, and brought together in its library many books dealing with these and kindred subjects. Soon after it was founded it established an important experimental laboratory for the investigation of chemical, physiological, biological and bacteriological problems, and it has made some valuable investigations for the Navy Department. In 1894 the museum was removed to permanent quarters in the Old Naval Observatory, in northwest Washington.
In 1893 Secretary Herbert established at the naval laboratory in New York a department of medical and professional instruction for the assistant surgeons of the navy. Its purpose was to familiarize these young men with their new duties immediately after their entrance into the service. The instructors of the school were drawn from the surgeons of the naval hospital, naval laboratory and medical examining board at New York. The course of instruction, which was to continue for a period of not less
than three months, embraced various subjects relating to the physical, medical and surgical sciences, and to the routine and professional duties of naval surgeons. The establishment of this school was in keeping with the general movement which was now in progress to .provide the navy with a more highly trained and efficient personnel.211
A most noteworthy event in naval education was the founding of the Naval War College in 1884. Some years previous, the establishment of a post-graduate school for naval officers had been advocated in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, a high-class professional and technical quarterly published by the officers of the American navy, by Lieutenant-Commander C. F. Goodrich who had presented in its pages an outline of the studies which he thought ought to be pursued at the proposed school. Secretary Chandler became interested in the subject, and on May 3, 1884, he directed a naval board, consisting of Commodore S. B. Luce, Commander W. T. Sampson, and Lieutenant- Commander C. F. Goodrich, to prepare an advanced course of studies for naval officers. On June 13 the board made a report in which it recommended in most emphatic terms the establishment of a post-graduate school of the navy. It also outlined a course of instruction in the science and art of naval warfare and in international law and history. After a consideration of the advantages offered by Washington, Annapolis, New York, Newport and Boston as a site for the school, it recommended Newport, chiefly for the reason that the torpedo school was located there, but also because the Department possessed at Newport proper
buildings and grounds. _
On October 6, 1884, Chandler, by a general order, established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. He placed the school under the general direction of the Bureau of Navigation, and assigned for its use the principal building on Coasters Harbor Island. According to Chandler’s order, the president of the college was to be a naval officer not below the grade of commander, who was to be assisted in the performance of his duties by a faculty. The president and the members of the faculty were to constitute an academic board, over which the president was to preside. The board was to meet regularly once a month, and also
on the call of the president, and it was to prepare a course of instruction. Commodore Stephen B. Luce was designated as the first president of the new college.2'2
Soon after the college was established Captain A. T. Mahan was ordered to prepare to give instruction in naval history and naval tactics, and Professor J. R. Soley was selected to conduct the courses in international law, and Paymaster R. W. Allen those in naval law and administration. The first session of the school was held in September, 1885, but it was not a complete success. Of the three instructors above mentioned, Professor Soley only was able to be present. President Luce invited several other naval officers to deliver courses of lectures, but they could not comply with his request, since the Department neglected to assign them to duty at the school. The only regular instructors at the first session were Professor Soley and Lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss, of the army.213 For some years a strong opposition or indifference to the college was manifested among the naval officers, many of whom did not sympathize with its aims and purposes, believing that the only necessary post-graduate school of the navy was the quarterdeck of a ship. Congress was not inclined to favor an institution founded without its consent by executive decree. In 1886 the House Naval Committee made a report adverse to the school. The first years of the Naval War College were unpropitious, and not until Secretary Herbert’s administration was its future assured.
During its critical period the college was ably served by Presidents S. B. Luce, A. T. Mahan and H. C. Taylor, and Professor J. R. Soley. Its sessions were held in the summer or fall. Instruction was given largely by lectures. In January, 1889, the college was united with the torpedo station on Goat Island, and its management became somewhat complicated. In 1894 the war college, naval training station, torpedo school and torpedo station, all located at Newport, were consolidated under one command. In 1890 and 1891 the school was closed. In September, 1892, chiefly through the efforts of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Soley, it was reopened. It now occupied a part of a new building, which had been erected for the war college and the torpedo school
!''1 Proceedings of U. S. Naval Inst., V, 316, 323-344; Sen. Ex. Doc., 48 C. 2 S., No. 68; General Orders of Navy Dept., No. 325.
™ Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1885, pp. 96-103.
on Coasters Harbor Island at a cost of $100,000. This was a handsome structure of granite, 210 feet long and 48 feet broad.
Under Herbert the scope of the college’s work was considerably broadened. In 1894 a permanent staff of officers began the study of problems relating to coast defense, naval strategy and international law. Previous to this time the assignment of the members of the faculty to duty at Newport had been temporary. The college now came to emphasize the solution of war problems. It began to perform some of the duties of a “ general staff ” of the navy. It prepared war plans, war charts and other data relating to the solution of strategical and tactical questions. This valuable information was either filed at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, or in the archives of the college at Newport. For the elucidation of various disputed points in naval science, war games or exercises were employed. The work of the college was favorably commented upon by foreign naval experts.1'4
During the period 1881-1897 the naval personnel underwent no transformation or improvement similar to that of the fleet. The stagnation which began soon after the Civil War continued to exist. Many circumstances rendered the service discouraging to the officers. Their pay and emoluments remained stationary. The age at which they reached the higher ranks advanced. The rate of promotion decreased. In regard to these subjects, every corps in the navy was dissatisfied. Bills of all sorts in behalf of this or that corps were introduced in Congress. Organizations of officers were formed to further desired legislation. The differences between the line and the staff, and especially between the line and the engineers, became more acute. Since it was a period of peace, few opportunities for important service at sea were presented to the officers. The paucity of ships in commission relating to the number of officers in the navy tended to lower the importance of sea-service, and to elevate shore-duty at its expense. The allabsorbing work of rebuilding the fleet had the same tendency. Service on board the obsolete and antiquated hulks of the old navy was not attractive. The junior line officers had especial causes for discouragement. Their promotions were few. Their duties aboard ship were often petty and irksome, and, according to their notion, degrading. This condition resulted by reason of
the excessive number of line officers assigned to ships at this time. On shore the junior officers were often given mere routine, clerical and nominal duties, better fitted for school-boys than for ambitious, energetic sailor-men. They complained without avail of the smothering, stunting processes to which their intellects were subjected.211’
There was, however, a brighter side to the naval service during these years. The reconstruction of the fleet afforded many interesting tasks to an ever-increasing number of officers. There were materials of all sorts to be inspected, questions of naval construction and naval policy to be determined, and new administrative duties in the Department and the navy yards to be performed. From 1890 to 1897 many new ships were placed in commission, and service on board of them was most desirable and attractive. These well-equipped vessels, perfect in every detail, the equal of the ships of European navies, aroused the pride of officers and seamen and renewed their professional zeal. They were the harbingers of promised improvements in the naval personnel. Under the regime of the new navy, the officers took additional interest in the literature of their profession, which was now rapidly growing. This was fostered by the work or publications of the Naval Intelligence Office, Naval War Records Office, Naval War College and Library of the Navy Department. The circulation of service periodicals was expanding. The officers of the navy contributed many valuable and highly creditable articles to their professional organ, the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute. Their desire to prepare themselves for the increasing and more exacting demands of their profession may be seen in their founding of the Naval War College. In the eighties fleet drills were inaugurated, and under Secretary Tracy the Squadron of Evolution was organized. This latter carried out programs of fleet exercises and maneuvers, of target and small-arms practice, of landing drills and engagements and of torpedo attacks.
The remarkable improvements in the naval arts and sciences, and more specifically the important advances in naval construction and armament, gave a decided impetus to the development of specialties in the naval profession. For many years the division
515 Proceedings of U. S. Naval Inst., V, 349! IX, 155 I XVI, 482; Army and Navy Journal, XXVII, 813, XXVIII, 326-327*
of naval officers into line officers, naval constructors, surgeons, paymasters, chaplains, civil engineers and steam engineers had existed. The tendency of the new conditions was to specialize the work of the line officers. To the general professional knowledge required of an executive on shipboard, they added the special knowledge of some small department of naval science. Among the officers of the line there now arose torpedoists, artillerists, strategists, naval administrators, electrical experts, steam engineers, ordnance experts of various kinds, compass experts, nautical surveyors and hydrographers. Of course not all the officers acquired a specialty, but the tendency was to do so. Most of these specialties are of a mechanical or engineering character. Indeed, naval science tends to become, in large part, a branch of applied mechanics and engineering. The modern vessel of war is a floating machine, and requires a new type of officer and seaman.
The act of August 5, 1882, was by far the most important measure relating to naval officers that was passed by Congress during the period 1881-1897. When Chandler became Secretary of the Navy in 1882, the disproportion between the number of ships in commission, 31, and the number of officers in the navy, 1817, was absurdly great. That is, there were 59 officers to each ship, or one to every five seamen. Almost one-half of the officers were assigned to duties on shore. Since the number of graduates of the Naval Academy was in excess of the number of vacancies in the service, the number of line officers was gradually increasing. The act of August 5, 1882, both reduced the number of officers in the navy and limited the number of appointments that could be made from the graduates of the academy. It provided that no promotions should be made in the principal staff corps until the medical corps should be reduced 10, the pay corps 30, and the engineer corps 100 numbers ; and that only one-half the vacancies above the grade of midshipman should be filled by promotion until there was effected a reduction of 4 rear-admirals, 15 commodores, 5 captains, 5 commanders, 6 lieutenant-commanders, 30 lieutenants, 25 masters and 25 ensigns. This law effected, by a gradual process, a total reduction of 255 officers. It further provided that no appointments to the navy of graduates of the Naval Academy should be made, except to fill vacancies.21'
118 Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1882, pp. 7-9; Proceedings of U. S. Naval Inst., V, 360; IX, 155; Army and Navy Journal, XX, 192; U. S. Statutes at Large, XXII, 283-287.
The enactment of this measure was vigorously opposed by the officers of the navy. It, however, had the cordial support of Secretary Chandler and Ex-Secretary Robeson, the latter having charge of it in the House, where it elicited a lengthy and heated discussion. The Senate made but few changes in it, although several senators tried to have it modified in the interest of the officers adversely affected. While the measure reduced somewhat the expenditures for the naval personnel, whether upon the whole it was salutary is doubtful. For several years it lowered the rate of promotion, and it increased the age at which the line officers arrived at command rank. It also worked an injustice to those cadets who, having finished their studies at the academy, were serving their two years at sea when the measure was passed; in respect to these young men it was retroactive. The error had been made, long before 1882, in admitting students to the Naval Academy in excess of the navy’s needs.
The act of August 5, 1882, also attempted to remedy the abuses connected with the assignment of officers to shore-duty. Not one of the least of the evils that accompanied the decline of the navy was the impetus that it gave to the production of “ landgoing ” officers. To these sailor-men of the desk and office, as Captain Mahan has pointed out, the revolving-chair becomes more attractive than the quarter-deck.
From 1883 to 1897 various bills were introduced in Congress with a view to bettering the condition of the naval personnel. These dealt chiefly with the pay, rank, number and promotion of the officers of the several corps. Some of them attempted to reconcile differences and remove inequalities existing between the corps. The engineers especially were dissatisfied, and various bills designed to increase their number or to grant them positive rank were urged upon the attention of Congress. The most important measures, however, were those whose purpose was to increase the number of promotions of the line officers and to bring them to command ranks at earlier ages. In 1891 Secretary Tracy appointed a board of naval officers to “ examine into and report upon the present condition of stagnation in the promotion of line officers, and to recommend such measures as it might deem desirable on the subject with a view to the increased efficiency of the navy.” Captain R. L. Pythian was the president of this board. Its report was especially valuable for its discussion of the causes
of the existing stagnation in naval promotions. The remedies which it proposed aroused much opposition. Under Secretary Herbert the growing evils in the condition of the naval personnel received increased attention, and he gave them much consideration. In 1894 a joint commission composed of the members of the two naval committees of Congress considered the complaints of the officers of the navy. All these efforts largely failed because of the lack of unanimity of opinion among the naval officers, and of the jealousy and strife between the different corps. Not until after the Spanish-American War was any important remedial legislation passed.117
At sea the period 1881-1897 afforded the naval officers but few opportunities to achieve distinction. In the affair with Chile of 1891-1892, caused by an attack of the Chilean rabble upon some seamen of the U. S. S. Baltimore, who went ashore at Valparaiso, Captain W. S. Schley and Commander Robley D. Evans attained considerable prominence. The preparations of the Navy Department for a war with this South American republic were much greater than were generally known. Emergency orders for extra work were given to the various navy yards, the merchant steamer Ohio was chartered for use as a floating machine shop, orders for materials of war were placed with private establishments, plans of operations in the South Pacific Ocean were mapped out, and an informal “ Naval Strategy Board ” composed of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Captain A. T. Mahan and the officers of the Office of Naval Intelligence began the consideration of strategical problems.2" After this affair had been peacefully settled, Commander R. D. Evans was placed in command of a small fleet, and was ordered to cruise in and about Bering Sea for the purpose of carrying out the convention of a modus vivcndi with Great Britain respecting the capture of seals. From 1892 to 1894 this undertaking was a rather important one.
During the administration of President Arthur, several Arctic expeditions of the navy once more exhibited the enterprise, fortitude and heroism of the American naval officer. On March 3, 1881, Congress appropriated $175,000 for the prosecution of a search for the ship Jeannette, which had sailed for the Arctic
regions in the summer of 1879 under the command of Lieutenant- Commander George W. DeLong, and which was reported to be lost. On March 14 Secretary Hunt organized the Search Expedition Board, of which Rear-Admiral John Rodgers was president. It was instrumental in fitting out two relief expeditions, which sailed during the summer of 1881. One of these, under the command of Lieutenant Robert M. Berry, searched for the Jeannette in the region of Siberia, Alaska and the Bering Sea; and the other, commanded by Commander George H. Wadleigh, visited Greenland, Iceland and the northern coasts of Norway. Wadleigh obtained no information concerning the missing ship, since it had never been within the region of his search. Berry, however, after losing his vessel and undergoing considerable hardships, effected a union with a part of the survivors of the Jeannette under Chief Engineer Melville. In 1882 a search for the missing officers and men of the Jeannette was prosecuted by Lieutenants Giles B. Har- ber and W. H. Schuetze, and in 1883-1884 these officers recovered the bodies of DeLong and his companions. In the spring of 1884 a relief expedition, under the command of Commander W. S. Schley, was sent to the Arctic regions to search for Lieutenant A. W. Greeley and his party of the ill-fated Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, and Schley succeeded in rescuing Greeley and several surviving companions. Such was their great extremity when found that they could have lived but a few hours longer. The dramatic success of Schley’s expedition has made it memorable in the annals of Arctic exploration.21’
. During the administration of Tracy and Herbert, when many new ships were placed in commission, the need of seamen became urgent. Congress, however, was slow to increase their number, and the Department found it difficult to fully man the fleet. The authorized number of enlisted men and boys in the navy from 1881 to March 3, 1893, was 8250; and for the next three years, 9000. On June 10, 1896, the number was increased to 10,000; and on March 3, 1897, to ii,75O.M0 The marine corps increased from about 1900 men in 1883 to about 2600 men in 1896.
In 1891 a school of application for the marine corps was established at the Washington Marine Barracks. It gave professional
2,0 Ann. Rept. of Sec. of N., 1881, pp. 6-10; 1882, pp. 18-19; 1883, p. 22; 1884, pp. 21-26.
“ Congressional Record, XXXVIII, 2721.
instruction to the commissioned and uncommissioned officers and the enlisted men of the corps. Its establishment was in line with the general policy of the Navy Department of developing a more highly-trained and efficient personnel.
The new sailless ships of the navy, with their complicated steam and electrical machinery and their modern high-powered guns, demanded a new type of seaman—the sailor-mechanic. While a first-class seaman must now know the duties of the old-time sailor, he is also required to be, according to his position on shipboard, a mechanic, an artillerist, a torpedoist, an electrician, or a signalman. He must have not only the habit of the sea, but also the habit of the ship’s machinery. He must understand battleship- seamanship.” The intricate and complicated mechanisms of the new ships require a higher grade of intelligence in the crew than did the simple sails and guns of the old navy. Better morals and a better education, a more careful and a more highly specialized training are demanded. An admiral of the English navy is the authority for the statement that a “ seaman of to-day must know as much as a lieutenant of forty years ago."
Under the new conditions the training of seamen became a subject of great importance. It was much discussed in the professional periodicals and service journals, was treated of in prize essays, and was thoroughly considered by the Navy Department. In regard to the proper methods of training seamen, a difference of opinion among naval officers naturally arose. The principal point at issue was the relative amount of time and attention that should he paid to the seamanship of sailing ships and the seamanship of battleships, to the handling of sails and the handling of machinery. The older and more conservative officers were likely to insist, as one of them did, that “ as a mere method of training, nothing has yet been devised so good as cruising on board a sailing ship. It quickens the observation, stimulates the mind to the solution of new problems, and produces a habit of self-reliance in a well-developed physique. To pass a weather reef-earing in a gale of wind, with the topsail shaking and tugging and the ship rolling deeply, is an experience from which one emerges, for the first time, with a confidence in his powers that makes him practically twice the man he was before.” Rear-Admiral Luce, one of the ablest of the older officers, said that the loss of the school of the topman,” consequent upon the want of a square-rig, would breed
a force of deckhands ” instead of “ sailors ” ; and Admiral Porter agreed with him.22'
On the other hand the younger officers of the navy were inclined to emphasize the importance of changing the training of man-of-war s men to meet the new conditions resulting from the transformation of the wooden sailing ship into a sailless floating battery of iron and steel. Lieutenant Richard Wainwright, one of the most brilliant and progressive of the younger men, conceived that Rear-Admiral Luce’s “ school of the topman ” was not the only means to enure a sailor to danger. “ He may confront it m boats under oars and sail, in bad weather and through surf. 1 he ship of war must be allowed to follow out its lines of highest development, and the seamen must be trained to suit the development of the machine.” Ensign A. P. Niblack said that the “ handling and fighting of a ship’s armament is the true modern bases of the education and training of our men. We give too much importance to the paint-pot, holy-stone, active-topman type of man.” ^ 1 his issue in the navy over the proper training of sea
men reminds one of the discussions in civil life over the proper college cirriculum, in which the conservatives insist upon making Greek, Latin, mathematics and philosophy the backbone of the course, and the liberals maintain that these studies must yield a prominent place to the modern languages and literatures and physical sciences. From the standpoint of the liberals, the question involved in both controversies is whether modern education should be adapted to modern needs.
The system of training for apprentices that was developed in the navy during the 20 years following its establishment in 1875, was, in the main, based on the ideas of the conservative officers. It provided for: (1) A preliminary course at the Naval Training Station at Newport in the rudiments of the sailor’s calling; (2) one year’s service in a cruising training ship; (3) service on board a man-of-war in the general duties of his calling, until the apprentice reached his majority ; and (4) technical and special courses for enlisted seamen at the Naval Gun Factory at Washington and the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport. Boys upon entrance into 221 222
221 American Journal of Social Science, XXXIII, 33; Proceedings of U. S. Naval Inst., XVI, 370-377. 410-411; Army and Navy Journal, XXVIII, 124.
222 Army and Navy Journal, XXVIII, 124-125; Proceedings of U. S. Naval Inst., XVII, 32.
the naval service were to be between the ages of 14 and *7> and sound frame and robust constitution. At Newport they were instructed in reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and history, and more especially in the arts of the sailor, such as knotting and splicing, heaving the log and the lead, reading the compass, reefing and furling sails, steering, rowing, sailing and signaling I hey were also trained in the use of small arms, swords, pistols, rifles and great guns. After a six months’ preliminary course, they were drafted into the cruising training ships and sent to sea to learn the usages of sea-life and the practical duties of a sailor. At the end of this course, which lasted for a year, they were shipped upon regular men-of-war. Upon becoming of age, then apprenticeship came to an end, and they were permitted to enlist as seamen. The most skilful of those who re-enlisted were sent to the Naval Gun Factory, where they were given a 17 weeks course in the elementary use of tools and in the work of the carpenter’s shop, coppersmithery, erecting-shop for guns, blacksmit; 1 shop, machine shop and laboratory. On the completion of then- instruction here the most proficient seamen were sent to the Naval Torpedo Station for a second course of 17 weeks, and were taught the art of diving, the elementary principles of electricity and the
manufacture and use of torpedoes.
One of the drawbacks of the apprentice system was its failure to instil in the apprentices a love of the sea or of the naval service Upon reaching their majority, considerably more than one-half of the young men refused to re-enlist. Lieutenant W. F Fullan said that 90 per cent of the apprentices left the navy. It should be said, however, that before leaving they gave the naval several years of valuable service, and that the apprentice system raised the standard of intelligence and morality of the enlisted men and increased the relative number of native Americans in the navy. In 1889, of the enlisted men of the navy, the foreign-born numbered 4278, and the native-born 3668; in 1896 the foreign-born numbered 4400, and the native-born 5i33. In the former year the enlisted force contained natives of 57 countries. More than 11 per cent were born in Ireland. Every continent and many islands of the sea, and such remote countries as Syria, Iceland Finland, Uruguay! Roumania, Tasmania, St. Helena and Turkey were
represented.22*
m American Journal of So=ial |c^nCe’ Congressional Record,
“Army and Navy Journal, XX\ 111, 320327, &
XXI, 3156-31571 Sen. Doc., 54 C. 1 S., No. 252.
During Secretary Whitney’s administration an active interest in the establishment of a naval reserve, or a naval militia, was taken by various cities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and on the Great Lakes. The idea was by no means a new one. Indeed, in 1805 President Jefferson consulted his Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith, on a “ plan of a regular naval militia to be composed of all our seafaring citizens, to enable us to man a fleet speedily by supplying voluntary enlistments by calls on the militia ”; and he drafted a bill providing for an organization of this sort.225 One of the first steps in the movement that finally resulted in the establishment of a naval militia was taken on February 17, 1887, when Senator W. C. Whitthorne of Tennessee introduced a bill in the Senate to “ create a naval reserve of auxiliary cruisers, officers and men fr«m the mercantile marine of the United States.” In 1888 Whitthorne was sponsor for other bills on the same subject. His plan, in general, followed those of foreign naval reserves. In 1887 the Navy Department prepared a scheme of organization for a naval militia, and Secretary Whitney in his annual report for that year favored the establishment of a naval militia on the plan of the land militia or national guard.
The states now took up the subject, and acted more promptly than the national government. On May 17, 1888, the governor of Massachusetts approved an act establishing a naval battalion to be attached to the volunteer militia of that state. This was the pioneer measure. One of the leaders of the movement in Massachusetts was Lieutenant John C. Soley, a retired officer of the navy and a resident of Boston. He and several friends, a number of whom, like himself, were yachtsmen, prepared the measure that became a law. Massachusetts did not complete her organization until March 25, 1890. In 1889 New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island passed laws similar to that of Massachusetts, and in 1890 these four organizations were perfected. In that year the Massachusetts battalion was drilled on board the receiving ship Wabash, and the New York battalion on board the receiving ship Minnesota™
The year 1891 was a most important one in the growth of the movement. On March 2 Congress appropriated $25,000 for arms and equipment for the naval militia, and in June the Navy Depart-
ment issued regulations governing the disbursement of this fund. Additional naval battalions were organized in California, North Carolina and Texas; and the initial steps towards the formation of organizations in Maryland and Pennsylvania were taken. In July the naval battalions of Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island were drilled on hoard the Squadron of Evolution, under the command of Commodore J. G. Walker. On October 1, 1891, the total number of men in the naval militia of the six states that had perfected their organizations was 1149. In 1896 the number of states having organizations had increased to 14, and the total number of men to 3339. During the summer of that year, six naval militia officers attended lectures at the Naval War College, and 19 were instructed at the Naval Torpedo School. Many of the officers of the militia were ex-graduates of ex-students of the Naval Academy. On August 3, 1894, Congress passed an “ act for the encouragement of the naval militia, which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to loan to each state having an organization one of the old vessels of the navy, together with her apparel, charts, books and instruments of navigation, for the purpose of promoting drills and instruction.
Whitthorne’s bill of February 17, 1887, provided for a naval reserve of auxiliary vessels, officers and seamen. The laws of the states respecting the naval militia made no provision for auxiliary vessels. The federal government, in a fashion, now made such provision. An act of March 3, 1891, granted a subsidy for carrying the mails to such American vessels as held themselves in readiness for naval service in time of war and as had adapted their construction to the purposes of war. In 1892 an American register was granted to certain foreign-built ships, and it was stipulated that under certain conditions these vessels might be used for naval purposes. In 1896 Congress appropriated $400,000 towards providing the auxiliary cruisers with armaments. At this time the “auxiliary navy” consisted of 29 vessels. Of these the largest were the New York, Paris, St. Louis and St. Paul, ships that rendered most effective service in the Spanish-American War."
Laws and regulations relating to the naval militia; Ann. Rcpt. of Sec. of N., 1896, p. 20; U. S. Statutes at Large, XXVIII, 219.
228 U. S. Statutes at Large, XXVI, 830-832; XXVII, 27-28; XXIX, 363; Congressional Record. XXVIII, 4458-4459*