A very short acquaintance with any navy yard will convince an observant man that there are many unchecked wastes in operation, that little if any of the work is done at minimum cost, and that the field for earnest, effective duty is as extensive as the area of the navy yard. As most navy yard duty is performed earnestly it follows, since it is generally admitted there are large wastes in these yards, that is must, for some reason or other, lack effectiveness.
It is my opinion that minimum costs can be approximated to in a navy yard. The objects of this article are:
To suggest a method for securing approximations to minimum costs.
To indicate how a minimum cost when secured may be recognized.
To describe the probable results of the systematic and general introduction of the suggested method.
In this attempt to indicate certain fundamentals of correct manufacturing methods I shall, I think, show that our present methods are incomplete since they do not generally employ these fundamentals.
It should be understood at the outset that I am not advocating any especial form of organization, or even of interior shop management, and the correctness of this discussion is, in my opinion, not affected by these divisions of the science of management. This discussion has to do solely with work methods which are applicable under any form of management.
The fundamental weakness of the work methods of all navy yards is that too little is known of and too little attention paid to the individual. Efficiency is basically and fundamentally dependent upon the individual and only in a minor degree upon organization. The efficiency of a poorly equipped plant, in which the organization is not well defined, and lies along illogical lines, but where the spirit is good, and every man is striving honestly to do the greatest amount of satisfactory work, will be much greater than that of the plant in which, though the equipment may be good, and the organization theoretically perfect, the spirit is bad, and each man is trying to do as little as possible. Develop a system for navy yards which will permit, with fair accuracy, the assignment to each individual at the yard, from the manager down to the newest apprentice, the daily percentage of the standard efficiency to which he is entitled and use the information gotten by it in the proper manner, and efficiency will automatically follow. As an accompaniment the form of management best fitted to produce this efficiency, whatever that form may be, will be inevitable. I hope to indicate the fundamentals of this perfectly possible achievement.
As I infer in the preceding paragraph, my discussion has largely to do with the effect of the proper handling of the individual member of the manufacturing force. It would, in fact, be possible to indicate what this discussion will be by stating as its hypothesis:
Efficient manufacturing requires the efficiency record, carefully and correctly kept up to date, of each member of the manufacturing force; and as its conclusion:
This record can be obtained with the perfection required only as a result of the employment of the fundamentals to be outlined.
It is not improbable that the costs of certain definite manufactured articles made in considerable quantities in navy yards, such as hammocks, bags, boats, paint drums, ditty boxes, etc., are reasonable. It is, however, quite certain that they could be further reduced and will be further reduced. At this yard, for example, the labor costs for 10-gallon paint drums, clothes bags, ditty boxes, a number of types of boats, and various other things, are lower than those yet reported by any other navy yard. There is not one of these, however, which could not be still further lowered. An examination conducted at all the navy yards would, I feel sure, disclose the fact that in the production of these reasonable costs for the general classes of articles I have named, the fundamentals of the methods I am suggesting for general use have been employed.
The proportion borne by the cost of work of the character mentioned above to that of the total work done in navy yards is very small, and minimum costs are of little value there if the great mass of work is done inefficiently.
In the consideration of any question the fundamentals of the question should be clearly outlined and the consideration then based upon them. 1 his I shall attempt to do in such a way as to leave, I hope, no doubt that I have really chosen fundamentals. 1 wo prime fundamentals, for example, are involved in efficient manufacturing, that is, the doing of good work at the lowest cost.
First: Carefully planned Work.
Second: The execution of the plan.
These two fundamentals comprise all the elements and may be divided into a number of groups. Mr. Harrington Emerson’s Twelve Principles of Efficiency ” illustrates one way of dividing them. familiarity is presumed with all of the elements of which these two fundamentals are the integrals, as I do not expect to advance any ideas considered new, but hope merely to emphasize and to illustrate the application, actual and proposed, of some distinctly old ones. It will probably be admitted that the statement above, as to the two fundamentals involved in manufacturing work, is correct, and that they not only include everything, and are of equal importance, but that they are fundamentally different, in that the first involves a knowledge of the mechanisms of the subject, while the second is concerned with human nature and psychology.
In considering the first fundamental, planning, I shall presume familiarity with the subject of planning in general and not go into any of its details, but shall confine myself to a description of certain broad essentials. Later I shall illustrate my remarks by a few mechanisms and forms developed as necessities in the Puget Sound Navy Yard, which, wherever used, have resulted in reduced costs. Mechanisms or forms are only of value as they aid in producing results, and it is probable those used as illustrations for this article are no better than others which could be or have been developed. It happens, however, that they have been developed for specific purposes and have served these purposes very well.
Before planning can be placed on a satisfactory basis the terms in which the planning is to be done must be definitely established. These should be fundamental, as applicable to the work of any plant doing similar work as to a navy yard. At the Puget Sound Navy Yard, planning in a number of instances is being done with this fundamental consideration in view, and for this purpose it has been necessary to develop what are here referred to as schedules. A schedule, in essence, is a statement of an elementary operation, or of one complete in itself, in simple, direct, and universally understood terms. A schedule might also be defined, but less accurately, as a standard operation. One of these schedules, if as perfect as it should be, will mean the same thing to every man, and, provided the same materials are used, and the same operations are practiced, will be as readily understood a hundred years from now as to-day.
To illustrate: The following are (without attempting absolute accuracy) the elementary operations involved in the shipfitter trade:
Assemble. | Drill. | Paint. | Shore. |
Bend. | File. | Plane. | Thread. |
Bolt up. | Fair. | Pack. | Tap. |
Countersink | . Grind. | Press. | Transport |
Cut. | Lay out. | Punch. | Set dies. |
Calk. | Line in. | Ream. |
|
Clean. | Template. | Roll. |
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Dismantle. | Straighten. | Rivet. |
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By putting each one of these elementary operations through all of the variations of materials, dimensions, and conditions which can be met with in this trade, all of the schedules of the trade will have been encountered, and there is no shipfitting job, however complex, which could not be built up of the schedules in question. The same general remarks will apply to any trade.
The provision of schedules for every conceivable variation of the sort mentioned above, even if possible, would be of doubtful practical value. It is, however, quite easy to establish certain limits and to prepare the schedules within those limits. Each schedule will then be an accurate statement of the absolute bit of work to which it refers, and will become one of more and more approximation until it impinges upon the territory occupied by the schedules on every side of it.
It is quite obvious that the theoretical in many instances must give way to the practical. Just as it is impracticable to classify every possible schedule of the shipfitter trade, so in other trades the schedule finally determined upon as best from practical considerations may not be the best theoretically. For example: In the shipsmith trade the elementary operations are the following:
Assemble. | Dismantle. | Lay out. | Temper. |
Anneal. | Draw out. | Rivet. | Twist. |
Bend. | Dress. | Punch. | Transport. |
Bevel. | Drill. | Scarf. | Upset. |
Block out. | Finish. | Shrink. | Weld. |
Case harden. | Form. | Set dies. |
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Cut. | Heat. | Shingle. |
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In navy yard work, however, there is so little repeated shipsmith work that the scheduling of this work in variations of these elementary operations would result in endless trouble and an amount of detail in no way compensated for by the advantage obtained. A careful consideration of this subject indicates that for navy yard shipsmith work, the simplest element to base our schedules upon would be weight. This immediately reduces the classes of work performed in the shipsmith department to a grouping basis similar to good foundry practice, and places the work in such a condition that the operation of the various schedules, when prepared, can be easily observed. Furthermore, the description of these schedules can be made sufficiently simple, universal, and direct to come within the definition of a schedule given above.
In joiner work, also, the necessity, for practical reasons, for departing from the exclusive consideration of elementary operations is obvious. In fact, in the case of the great portion of work done in a navy yard, due to its non-repetitive character, this condition of affairs will exist. As an illustration of the fact that the approximation proposed throughout navy yards is not a departure from the basic character desired for the schedule, it will, it is believed, suffice to take one of the elementary operations of the shipfitter trade, drilling, and to invite attention to the fact that it is itself composed of numerous elementary operations, which are themselves in their turn composed of elementary operations, and so on ad infinitum.
The extent, therefore, to which it might be desirable eventually to define elements of an operation would be for the future to decide. It would simply remain for us to choose the elementary operations, the variations of which produce schedules, which for the present day and for the classes of work in contemplation would generally be the most satisfactory. When, due to specialization, more elementary schedules were needed, the ones with which we had been working would be abondoned. This would not represent labor wasted, however, as they would have served their purposes and would, furthermore, as will be indicated later, serve for obtaining the approximations to the times required for the accomplishment of the new. and more elementary schedules. The summation of the actual times taken to complete a number of these new, more elementary schedules should never be greater than that taken for the old schedule of which they were the differentials. As we advanced, therefore, step by step toward absolute specialization and perfection, we could check each step by previous experience, and make impossible any undetected retrogression.
In the case of certain classes of work, notably boat building, building of furniture, ditty boxes, etc., there are certain natural groups into which the work may be divided, which although far from being elementary, even in the sense of being elementary operations, are still simple and direct enough to come within the purview of the above definition of a schedule. For example, as long as the design of a 30-foot cutter remains as at present, a schedule which included the complete bending of the framing might be accurate enough for our needs, although, theoretically, such a schedule would be quite imperfect.
In order also that the use of these schedules might be of practical value, they should be in terms of operations readily understood. Furthermore, since (as will be brought out later) the recording of the time required for accomplishing a schedule would be of equal importance with the schedule, they should be designed with the ease of recording directly in mind, and this, more than anything else, would force a departure from a strictly theoretical schedule to a schedule which, while still theoretical, would be practical. The experience at the Puget Sound Navy Yard in connection with these schedules has indicated that the following bases for schedules give good practical results, and at the same time permit the preparation of schedules which, it is believed, will represent universally the work in question: Shipfitter shop and sheet metal shop, in terms of elementary operations of trade; sail loft, in terms of feet of stitching and numbers of eyelets, or of elementary operations; boat shop, in terms of related groups or of elementary operations; joiner shop, in terms of elementary operations of trade, or of related groups; shipsmith shop, in terms of weight; paint shop, in terms of square feet, of elementary operations, and of weight.
Variations from the above will immediately suggest themselves, but what is attempted is a general statement of the subject and not one which will apply to every specific instance. A consideration of these bases of schedule preparation will indicate, it is thought, that all except a very small portion of the work of the shops in question will fall within the limits outlined.
It will also be seen that differences of opinion as to the terms of these schedules must arise. In fact, in manufacturing work outside of navy yards where schedules have already to some extent been put in operation, these differences of opinion are already apparent. On the Santa Fe Railway system, for example, all rolling stock is separated into its component parts, and the manufacturing and repairing is based on the handling of these parts in accordance with a schedule prepared for each, either as the result of experience or of a time study. In other places, notably in some of the shops using the extreme of the Taylor system, the schedules are so minute that they extend even to the motions used in the accomplishment of a fairly elementary operation. Obviously neither one of these methods is at present desirable for a navy yard: the first, as the number of parts in the various vessels of the naval service is so much greater than that in the different types of cars and engines on a railway system that the attempt to schedule work on this basis would be a hopeless one; the second, as its elementary character is certainly beyond that which should be attempted at a navy yard. In fact, the work in a navy yard or in any repair plant dealing with such complexities as ships, is of such a nature that it is hardly considered necessary to deduce argument as to why too great detail would, at present in any event, be involved by either method. Common sense should therefore dictate the first schedules, and such of them as proved unsatisfactory in operation could be replaced as the result of experience. If all navy yards worked along similar lines and toward the attainment of the same ends, there would, it is thought, be quite shortly developed in every case a form of schedule which could be generally applied.
The preparation of the schedules outlined above would involve a clearing house. If the general proposition were stated to each yard, and each yard were instructed to proceed with the preparation of schedules, much confusion would result, much delay, and the greatest amount of duplication. The proper way to handle the subject would be to designate one yard at which all schedules were to be prepared, and to appoint a committee, with adequate service and civilian assistants, to do the job. Upon the completion of these schedules they should be distributed to all the yards through the clearing house, to be used in accordance with certain definite plans. As the result of this use they should be criticized and improved upon. Criticisms should be collected by the clearing house, schedules improved on the basis of these criticisms, and immediately distributed to all of the yards, supplanting the ones in previous use. This improving and supplanting process would continue as long as the use of schedules continued, due partly to changed conditions and materials, occasionally, perhaps, to the introduction of a new elementary operation into a trade, but mainly to the greater specialization of work, and the desire, as familiarity with schedules grew and the advantage of breaking work into still smaller elements appeared, to make increasingly elementary divisions of operations.
With all these schedules which we have been discussing prepared, planning of a job would consist in breaking it into its various operations or schedules, and then determining the most efficient way of obtaining the performance of these operations or schedules. This involves a consideration of the thousand and one things which enter into manufacturing work in general, such as speed of tools, movement between machines, provision of materials, light, heat, etc., details into which I do not intend going in this article. There still remains, then, the necessity of describing in what way the use of schedules is to result in reduced cost, and it is necessary to pass to the second fundamental outlined above—the execution of the plan.
In securing the execution of a plan, the individual workman is the important factor to consider, and some fundamentals of human nature are introduced. Among the motives which actuate a workman and induce him to turn out the greatest amount of satisfactory work are the following: Hope of reward; fear of punishment; interest in the work in hand; desire to excel his fellow workmen; esprit de corps. There are other minor ones but these are the chief ones. Any system which can be devised which will bring to bear all of these principles of human nature in the greatest possible degree will, therefore, be the system from which the best results in the direction of output and satisfactory work may be expected, and a brief examination of the part schedules would play in such a system is desirable.
For the sake of simplicity, and in order to approximate most nearly to the conditions existing in navy yards, it will be presumed that day work obtains generally. The rewards which can be granted will be those due to promotion or to continued employment at the highest pay, while the only punishments will be those of reduction in pay or discharge.
In order to be of efficacy the operation of these rewards or punishments must be so definite and just that the workmen themselves cannot question it. The present system of depending, as is done almost generally, upon the foremen for recommendations of promotion, reduction, and discharge, is far removed from the necessary perfection. The only way in which this perfection can be approximated to is by withdrawing the power this has given foremen entirely from their hands and concentrating it entirely in the central office, directly upon the officers under whom control of the men in question comes. This requires absolute knowledge of a man’s qualifications. In no navy yard at present is this absolute knowledge available. This knowledge can be obtained only as a result of specific records, kept constantly up to date, of each individual workman. This, in reality, involves a daily record of a workman’s performance on each job on which he has been engaged, balanced up against the amount of work he should have done in each specific instance in order to have accomplished a fair amount of work.' For this positive and definite knowledge, not at present generally available in any navy yard, is required and must be obtainable. This requires a system for recording each workman’s performance which will be simple, direct, and universal, and in generally understood terms. These records, compared to what a man should do, would give the man’s efficiency, and from them it could be determined not only who is the best shipfitter, say, of any one of the navy yards, but who is the best shipfitter of all the navy yards.
No general criticism of navy yard foremen is intended. Any foreman naturally prefers the best men and will, as a rule, recommend them for promotion and retention. A foreman’s limitations are, however, quite the same as those of other men, and he cannot fail to be biased in his estimate of men by friendship or the intimacy with which he knows them. Also we would substitute, as far as possible, facts for estimates, and if we had the facts as to a man we would no longer be dependent upon the foreman’s estimate. Furthermore, what is desired is a system where the foreman directs and the only driving is done by the workman himself. Under such a system a “ stand in ” with the foreman is of no value, and his recommendation for or against a man cannot increase or decrease the man’s known output.
The solution of this problem seems to lie in one direction only, that is in the schedule, which, it has been seen, must not only be simple, direct and universal, but of such a nature that the performance of it would be simple to follow up and easy to record.
Before we were entirely able to deal with the subject of the individual workman, positive information would be required as to the time in which each schedule unit should be accomplished. Due to the lack of information which exists on this subject in all navy yards, the use of schedules would at first involve estimates for the great majority of them. The elementary nature of the schedule is very desirable when this necessity is taken into consideration, as it is so much easier to estimate with some accuracy an elementary operation of this nature than it is to estimate a complex operation involving a number of elementary ones. Time studies are, of course, the best method for the determination of times required, and, though they are at present in disfavor, may again come into use, to be employed in ways which the workmen will not find objectionable. Furthermore as, under the spur of the desire for reward or the fear of punishment, men perform the various schedules. there will be obtained from the records the times in which the best workmen can perform each, and by these times the performances of the others can be measured. Here again the advantage of keeping the schedules elementary may be seen.
Anyone who has attempted to secure increased output in a navy yard knows the extent to which his efforts have been hampered by several workmen accomplishing equal amounts per day, or by similar jobs done by different workmen requiring the same amounts of time. With the schedules elementary this would be impossible, since no workman could possibly know in the case of all or even a considerable number of these schedules what lengths of time had been required by other workmen for the same ones. When once fear were introduced into a man that he was falling behind and therefore liable to reduction or discharge, or the hope that he was forging ahead and might be retained or promoted were instilled into him, the attempt to conform to a limited output would die a natural death.
Considering still only the question of fear, punishment, and hope of reward, it would seem apparent that on this basis alone the effect of the schedules, if judiciously applied, would be to produce increased output. Every man, presumably, desires to hold his job and to get as much as possible out of it, and in this desire will make every effort which does not involve over-work to prevent his competitors from securing a better record than himself and a position of preference on the central office lists. The realization of the fact that he is not affected favorably or unfavorably by any favoritism, or by the small political influences which obtain in navy yards, will act directly in this direction.
Any manufacturing plant, however, which depended for its successful operation upon these two motives only would, even in the almost impossible attainment of efficiency, be a very undesirable place to work. There can be no question that the efficiency of a plant is directly added to if the workmen are interested in their work, if they have the desire to excel, and if they are actuated by an esprit de corps, and in the consideration of the attainment of these desirable features, a schedule again comes to the front. The game of golf, for example, never loses its interest once a person has caught its fever, due to the fact that the invisible adversary, Col. Bogey, is always on the links, and so it would be with a workman who had constantly in mind his previous record or the best record of all yards and the desire to beat it. This would require the elementary divisions of the schedule, since one loses interest in a competition which is stretched over a number of days. Even aside from a consideration of the retention of a job, and presuming the competition to hold only between men of such excellence that they are practically certain to hold their jobs, the desire to excel one’s fellow worker is a very human one and will assert itself once the artificial restraints are removed.
Since schedules would be general, and as much in use at one navy yard as at another, the comparison of the accomplishment of schedules at one navy yard with that at others would inevitably develop a navy yard esprit de corps, advantageous from the viewpoint of reduced cost, and of the greatest advantage in producing interest in the work in hand and therefore contentment. An attempt is made at present to secure competition among the various yards in a number of instances, but the divisions of work are so large, and the contribution of any one individual to the result becomes so uncertain, that personal competition is not secured, and here again, and almost finally, may be seen the reason for making schedules as elementary as possible. In order that interest may he sustained it must he individual; in order that pride of a proper sort may be engendered it must be personal.
Having planned the work in terms of schedules, and placed the operation cards in terms of schedules in the hands of the workmen, the actual performances should be followed up and recorded for each schedule worked on, and the efficiency of each man determined. Not only would this place the management in absolute control of the permanent force, but when new men were taken on it would make possible the picking out of the best men among them in a very short time, and the determination of the various rates of pay to which the new workmen were entitled. At present, when new men are employed for a rush job they work during the continuance of the job in question with the knowledge, almost as definite as if they had been told by the management, that when the job is completed they will be discharged and the men working in the yard when they were hired retained. In the majority of cases it is probable that the retention of the longer-time men is correct, hut it should be dependent upon their continued efficiency. It is apparent that the management, if possessed of information indicating that some new men were more efficient than some of the longer-time ones, would, when a discharge was necessary, judiciously weed out their force, and through a constant influx of new blood discourage the idea of a vested right in a job which now is not unknown in navy yards.
So much for the influence of the schedule in planning, and on the individual workmen. Since all navy yards should work with the same schedules, comparisons of performance entirely different from the present cumbersome and almost totally useless cost comparisons would be possible. When one navy yard excelled over all others in its performance of a schedule, the description of the methods and of the facilities utilized could be prepared for the others, which, having some definite record to beat and a description of the methods whereby this record was obtained, would be in a position to work toward a definite end.
It is conceivable that by this means of using the experience of all navy yards in connection with all schedules a minimum cost for each would eventually be approximated. This would involve the use of just the proper facilities, the proper method of supplying material, a workman of just the proper ability and consequent wage, and the numerous elements of this nature entering. When on this basis, with all navy yards competing on all schedules, a point were reached after which no further reduction in the cost of the accomplishment of any particular schedule was obtained, we might safely conclude, I think, that we had reached a working minimum and that the government, whenever that minimum was approached, was getting a fair return for its money.
There is at present a tendency, and one in the direction of sound economic policy, to concentrate at such navy yards as have excelled along certain lines of manufacturing the work in which they have excelled. Under the ideas outlined above, however, this is a tendency which should not go too far. It should never extend, in fact, to the concentration at any one yard of all work covered by any schedule. There should never be less than two navy yards competing, provided the supply of work of a particular nature is sufficient to give each of the two yards a sufficient amount to permit of efficient methods of manufacture. This does not apply to the concentration of the manufacture of specific articles but to the concentration of schedules. For example, the schedules involved in the manufacture of hammocks are in some cases quite the same and are in others similar to those involved in the manufacture of awnings or of bags, and the concentration of the manufacture of hammocks at one yard would in no respect prevent a definite comparison of the efficiency with which the work is being done with the schedules of another yard where not a single hammock was being manufactured, provided bags or awnings were still made there. Efficiency could, of course, be obtained without the competition referred to, but this competition and the exchange of ideas and methods with it would be valuable aids.
The office force should not be neglected. Fundamentally there is no difference between the work done by them and that done by anyone else. It can be scheduled just as definitely, recorded just as definitely, and used to establish the individual efficiency just as accurately.
In the avoidance of waste and the securing of efficiency the mechanic and the clerk are not the only members of the manufacturing force requiring attention. It would seem not improbable, in fact, that the responsibility for inefficiencies lies in an increasing degree with the individual as the scale is ascended until the highest-price man is reached. The laborer who is paid two dollars per day sells an amount of his brawn estimated as worth that much to the purchaser, while the manager who is paid thirty dollars per day sells his brain. Any system is faulty which does not require the thirty-dollar-a-day man to justify his wages in an equal or greater degree than it does of the two-dollar-per-day man, and the development of a system which will indicate whether or not this requirement is met does not seem to be difficult. Navy yards as at present run permit of the greatest inefficiencies on the part of those responsible for their efficient conduct, without any possibility of measuring these inefficiencies or even, in fact, being definitely cognizant of their existence, and it is, in my opinion, a particularly weak point in the conduct of navy yards that not only is this the case, but there is apparently no way of judging definitely whether or not conditions are improving or the efficiency of the management is on the increase.
In the use of the schedules would be found the method of weighing and increasing the efficiency of the members of the management personnel at navy yards. As to how the efficiencies of different navy yards could be weighed and the degree of progress noted I have already been specific. In order to obtain the best results of these schedules and to be the navy yard in which the cost of the greatest number of schedules is as nearly as possible a minimum, the officers in charge of a navy yard, and the members of the supervisory force under them, must give their personal attention to the conduct of affairs. The attainment of efficiency is a matter of brain rather than of brawn, and any let-down on the part of the brain employed will shortly advertise itself in a lowering of the product of the brawn, however willing the more humble worker may be. This would be so to such an extent that an inquiry into a poor performance on any one individual schedule could be pushed to the person responsible for it. If it were due to a poor workman this would be evident; if to a faulty carrying out of plan so far as material supply is concerned, it would be due to the shop material man; if to a faulty plan, to the shop planner man; if to the absence of material, to the material clerk, and his official superior, or to the general storekeeper and to the purchasing pay officer; if to faulty appliances, to the tool repair overseer; if to insufficient or inefficient facilities, to the works manager: and so on through a subordinate to his superior, who is of course responsible for his work.
No imagination is needed to picture the effect a spur of this nature would have upon the activities of the management personnel. As this personnel from highest to lowest is undoubtedly interested in the work, or would become interested, this spur, far from being one which would produce resentment, would, by introducing the spirit of competition among the officials of the different navy yards, result in engendering healthy ambition to excel and a most active interest in the work in hand.
I desire to illustrate here by a few examples of local practice. When one changes from a general consideration of a subject to a specific one, apparent exceptions to his conclusions often appear. If there be such in the illustrations given I shall disregard them, on the assumption that they are due to easily remedied imperfections, and shall allow the reader to answer his own criticisms.
Included herewith, exhibit “ A,” is a copy filled out of the schedule card used at this yard. Of the information shown on this card it seems necessary to explain only the following:
The unit in each case is that in terms of which the schedule is drawn, such as pounds, linear feet, square feet, etc.
The standard is the estimated or ascertained production generally possible in eight hours under all the circumstances.
It is desirable to record under each schedule the men who from time to time obtain the best performances, as they may thus specialize on work at which they excel, may be used as the standard against which the other men are competing, and in rush time's may be concentrated upon the work which they do best.
Eventually each of these schedule cards bearing a schedule requiring a machine for its accomplishment should show, on a percentage basis, the machines available for doing the specific work called for in the order of merit, as the most suitable machine will not always be available at the proper time.
Exhibit “ B ” is the standard instruction card used at this yard. Of the information shown it seems necessary to comment only on the following:
The instructions are drawn in the terms of the schedules to which they refer, as much additional information as is considered necessary or desirable being added after the statement of the schedule. One instruction card may contain two or more schedules concentrated in one operation, this being a matter determined by shop planning. The back of the card is used for purposes of recording, though it may also be made to serve for additional instructions. In case the operation comprises more than one schedule each one would be listed here. The examples included are actual instruction cards for the manufacture of ten-gallon paint drums, a fuller description of which follows under exhibit “ D.”
Exhibit “ C ” is the individual record card. It seems necessary in connection with this card only to point out that the information contained on it is gotten from or worked out from that contained on exhibits “ A ” and “ B.” A hypothetical case has been worked out to show the actual use of the card. The efficiency of a man can be arrived at, at any time by dividing the summation of the product by the summation of the number of hours worked. The pay does not enter, this being a matter for separate consideration in the case of any individual. The illustration has been based on the manufacture of paint drums, the schedules for which are given later, under exhibit “ D.”
Exhibit “ D ” is known as the job schedule. This should be considered in connection with exhibits “ A,” “ B ” and “ E.” The one included herewith shows the completely analyzed and scheduled job for the manufacture of ten-gallon paint drums. This job schedule is a graphic from which the movements of the materials, and the actions of the men and machines can be seen by one familiar with the job and the shop. The use of this graphic makes possible the working out in advance, in such a way that actual visualization of the job is practicable, of jobs for which analyses are available. By its use difficulties which will occur in finding the proper machines, transporting the material, and in any number of ways, are seen in advance and may be provided for. The dependence of one schedule upon another is graphically illustrated, as well as the progress toward completion which each schedule must make at a definite time in order not to delay the job as a whole.
Exhibit “ E ” is the analysis of the above job made out in the shop planning office. It is, as seen, in terms of operations and schedules, and is the first step taken by the shop in planning the job. After this step has been completed the graphic, called the job schedule, is worked out, and from it the instruction cards shown under exhibit “ B ” are prepared. This involves no more total work than a system in which the planning and issuance of instructions is done by each workman for and to himself. In fact it involves considerably less and definitely systematizes that. Furthermore it is never necessary to plan the same job more than once, since the entire plan is recorded. Also, should the job be interrupted, the plan is not forgotten but is simply filed away for future use. Even though jobs are seldom alike, they are often similar and may be expeditiously planned by using the plans of previously scheduled ones.
The way in which the various men and machines come into play is shown, also where the numbers of men or the machines may be increased in order to shorten the time required for the job; and all information of this nature. An examination of this sheet will show that the working space is headed by both dates and days. The days are the-actual working days required for the job itself, and for the individual schedules of which the job is composed, and are estimated from the times required for the individual schedules. The dates, which can be filled in when the job is actually in progress, are those on which work is actually performed on the job.
It is believed that the advantage of having every job in a navy yard scheduled in this way must be so apparent that no detailed description of the job schedule itself, or argument to prove its value, is needed. If each job were so scheduled it would be a matter of little difficulty to schedule in a similar way the entire work ahead of a navy yard. Examination of the job schedule will indicate with how little inconvenience interruptions are handled. The job as a whole may be broken off at a certain date and recommenced one month later, and nothing is needed, so far as the job schedule sheet is concerned, except to enter the date under the appropriate working day of the discontinuance of the job, and the date under the day next to it when the job is recontinued. The individual schedules themselves can be shifted back and forth carrying with them all of those which depend upon them. The times attached on a job schedule to any operation are easily arrived at from the individual schedule standard, the total number of units involved, and the efficiency of the man to be used.
The suggested method is not regarded as a cure-all. There are a number of wasteful methods and customs which can hardly be touched by it. Before any great progress can be made in navy yards, however, the individual must be taken in hand, and the method outlined is believed to suggest the only way this can be satisfactorily and speedily accomplished. Nor is the value of an individual entirely determined by his productive efficiency. There must also be considered adaptability, regularity, health, special qualifications, etc. As a rule, however, the most efficient men will generally possess these in the greatest measure. In any event their determination is quite simple and as a result, except for this mention, they have been intentionally disregarded in this discussion.
It will probably be admitted that the Navy Department has a greater supply of actual and potential managerial talent than any other manufacturing concern in this country. There would seem also to be little doubt that the average intellectual ability of the men the Department can detail for navy yard work should be considerably above that of any collection of men a commercial manufacturing plant could afford to hire. With the brains of these men
all concentrated upon the same problem there would seem to be no reason whatsoever why the Government as a manufacturer, at least in its Navy Department, should not be abreast of the best manufacturing attainment of the country. Nothing less than this should satisfy that Department and those in charge of it.