Control of the Sea: Its Relation to the Russo-Japanese War.
By Midshipman George C. Manning, Class of 1914, U. S. N. A.
Motto: "All depends on the command of the sea."
In spite of the tremendous impression which Admiral Mahan's works about the influence of sea power on history have made upon the minds of the thinking public, many people look upon the late war between Russia and Japan as a war in which the navy counted for little. Although this noted tactician has shown that every war of consequence has been won by that nation which secured control of the sea, and that this victory was the direct result of control of the sea, few see the application of this law in the Russo-Japanese war. Notwithstanding the fact that eminent military and naval critics have expressed an opinion to the contrary, many of us lay the blame of Russia's defeat upon General Kuropatkin. The facts of the matter are that, although the Russian general was undoubtedly a greater strategist than his opponents, he was defeated because of a lack of assistance on the part of the navy.
General Kuropatkin said in a letter to his sovereign that he would gladly assume all the responsibility for his country's defeat, but that this would be historically untrue. In an article in McClure's he made the following statement which throws some light on the previous assertion:
In the war with Japan the chief place belonged to operations on the sea; not to those on the land. If we had smashed the Japanese fleet, the war on Chinese territory would have become an impossibility for the Japanese. As a matter of fact, our fleet helped the land forces very little indeed. Our fleet did nothing to hinder the Japanese from bringing up all sorts of stores, guns, ammunition, and materials.
These are the facts of the case in a nutshell, but they may not be self-evident. We are not willing to grant this importance to the navy without proof. We demand that we be shown. To say that without control of the sea at the beginning of the war Japan would not have been able to attack Russia in Manchuria, is well enough. To maintain that without control of the sea throughout the war Japan would not have been able to prosecute a war, is all right, too. We want proof.
Let us begin with facts that are axiomatic, indisputable. In the first place, Japan is an island, or rather a series of islands. She is separated from China by bodies of water too wide to jump and too deep to wade, across which there are no bridges. If men and munitions of war are to be transferred from Japan to the mainland of Asia, they must be sent on ships. Now, let us assume for the time being that Japan has not unquestioned control of the sea, but that the opposing forces are about evenly matched and that the control has not yet been decided. Vessels conveying soldiers and stores are not armed. Every time one of these ventures out of a Japanese port, unless escorted by the entire fleet, she stands a good chance of being captured by the enemy. Had Russia's fleet in Asiatic waters been able to dispute the control of the sea with Japan, the latter nation would have found it extremely difficult (if not altogether impossible) to transport the men and supplies necessary to maintain such a gigantic struggle as the war between Russia and Japan.
But, of course, such a condition of affairs could not continue long. Let us suppose that in the battle settling the supremacy on the deep the Russian fleet had defeated her antagonist. In other words, let us assume that Russia had had control of the sea and the Japanese war vessels were driven to fortified harbors. Would Japan then have been able to reinforce her armies and furnish them with the necessary munitions of war? If Russia had control of the sea her fleet would be able to blockade the Japanese ports. The only supply vessels that could reach Japan's struggling legions in Manchuria would be such as managed to slip past the blockading squadron. If she had no army in China, it is evident that with her ports blockaded she would not be able to send one there. If she did have an army in Manchuria, she would be unable to send it supplies or reinforcements. This army, unable to retreat and cut off by sea from its base, would be in a very embarrassing position, and compelled to surrender without being able to strike a blow at the enemy, for without cartridges and food men cannot fight.
But this imaginary state of affairs did not prevail in the east when Japan attacked Russia, or at any time during the war. From February 8, 1904, when Japan struck the first blow until hostilities were closed by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan's control of the sea was perfect and complete. There never was a time when there was any doubt who was master of the Japan Sea. It is to this and to this alone that the yellow man owes his tremendous victory over the Russian bear.
Just previous to the opening of hostilities, Russia seemed to be indifferent, careless. Her head men thought it impossible that Japan should declare war against her. Therefore, instead of concentrating the larger part of her naval forces in Asiatic waters, she was content to leave there only her regular Asiatic squadron. It seems impossible, looking at the war to-day, that Russia could have been as blind to the prospects of war as she was. The Japanese were ready for war, looking forward to it. On the 9th of February, 1904, the protected cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Coreetz saw transports under escort of a powerful squadron of Japanese war vessels unload the nucleus of an army, and a large amount of supplies. These surely were sufficiently warlike preparations to warn them that it was no time for listlessness. Still Captain Togo says of them: "The Russian ships behaved with the utmost unconcern; their washing was hanging out to dry, and their swinging booms out as if they were wholly indifferent to the great drama about to be enacted. What must have been their amazement when they found we were prepared for action, our gunners coming up on deck with their gloves for loading. Perhaps, however, they did not know what to make of this." Even if the Russian fleet in the Asiatic waters had been equal to that of the Japanese, it would have been defeated just as surely if the officers had made no more preparation for the struggle than they did. To bring a war to a successful termination needs, above everything else, preparation, readiness.
It must be remembered, moreover, that in discussing the relative strength of the Russian and Japanese naval forces in the east, several things must be taken into account which cannot be set down in figures, but which in reality often count for more in winning battles than guns and armor. Any armor is sufficient to protect a ship from shots that never hit. A 6-inch shell that hits does more damage to the enemy than a million 12-inch shells that merely splash the water. Having' practically no outlet to the sea the Russians are not sea-going, as are the Japanese, for their life is intimately connected with the sea. The ability of the Japanese sailors was greater than that of the Russian seamen. In all their engagements the little yellow men proved themselves much better marksmen than their opponents. In a word, "the man behind the gun" on the Japanese vessels, was both naturally, and on account of his better training, superior to his adversary on the Russian ships of war. Moreover, the Japanese seemed moved by a consuming love of country, which we cannot help admiring. On the other hand, in too many instances the Russian sailors were not only highly indifferent, but actually anxious to keep out of the fight. Men who fight in a war simply because the czar says so, feeling no personal interest in the matter one way or the other, do not have the same interest, the same eagerness to win that men have who feel that they are fighting their own cause, for their own homes and loved ones. Then, again, the Russians were so over-confident that they did not think it worth while to make tremendous preparations and sacrifices for this conflict. They thought they could win without much trouble if Japan was so foolish as to declare war. "Why, therefore, inconvenience ourselves?" they asked.
All these conditions contributed to give Japan absolute control of the sea. A comparison of forces at the seat of war shortly before February 8, 1904, will show, moreover, that had the Russian bluejackets been as good men as their opponents, and had they been animated by as consuming an enthusiasm, the victory would most likely have been to the Japanese. In battleships, the squadrons were about equal with a slight advantage to the Japanese. The eight Japanese battleships had an aggregate tonnage 95,517, and armament of twenty-eight 12-inch and eighty-eight 6-inch guns. The tonnage of Russia's eight battleships was 92,048, and their armament twenty 12-inch, twelve lo-inch and eighty-nine 6-inch guns.
In cruisers, however, both armored and protected, the Japanese had an enormous advantage. The tonnage of the three Russian armored cruisers was 35,540, and their armament twelve 8-inch, forty-eight 6-inch, and six 47-inch guns. Japan had nine armored cruisers with a tonnage of 76,022, and an armament of thirty-two 8-inch, one hundred and eight 6-inch, and ten 47-inch guns. The Russian protected cruisers, six in number, had an aggregate tonnage of 35,390, and were equipped with fifty-four 6-inch, and six 4.7-inch guns. This squadron looks little beside Japan's squadron of seventeen protected cruisers armed with three 12.6-inch, four lo-inch, eight 8-inch, forty-one 6-inch, and one hundred and seven 4.7-inch guns, and having a total tonnage of 61,843. But whether these facts are sufficient to show that the Japanese naval forces in the vicinity of Korea were stronger than the Russian forces, it is indisputable that the Russian vessels made not a single movement to prevent the Japanese from transporting to the mainland of Korea a large number of troops and an enormous amount of supplies.
It seems as though the Japanese perceived more clearly than anyone else the absolute necessity of perfect control of the sea, for they made no formal declaration of war. They struck the first blow, and got in a good one too, for by it they made it absolutely certain that their fleet should be larger than that of their enemies. Their first blow was not against a land fortification, an attempt to render some stronghold untenable. It was directed against Russia's naval forces in the east. One week after the opening of hostilities that comparison of forces cited above was not still true. Japan, indeed, still possessed all that she had had at the beginning, but Russia had lost two battleships, three cruisers, and one gunboat, destroyed or injured beyond further usefulness, and the rest were afraid to leave port. On the 13th of April the battleship Probieda was hopelessly damaged and the Petropavlorsk ran upon a mine and was entirely destroyed with the loss of Admiral Makaroff. The loss of this eminent tactician was even a more serious blow to the Russian navy than the loss of the battleships. It settled it for good and all that Japan's navy was supreme in the east. Her transports and supply ships were at liberty to convey supplies and troops to the struggling armies in China, without liability to capture by their enemies.
Not only at the beginning, but throughout the entire war, Japan had absolute control of the sea. In every naval battle the Russians were outnumbered, outclassed and hopelessly defeated. In an attempt to break the blockade at Port Arthur, August 10, 1904, the Russian squadron was at first successful. Owing, however, to the death of the admiral (Withoeft) and the incompetence of his successor, the ships fell into confusion and retreated back into Port Arthur where they were so closely held that they took no further part in the war.
In an engagement off Ulsan, August 14, 1904, Russia's three armored cruisers in the Vladivostok squadron were opposed by four armored cruisers, four protected cruisers, and a torpedo-boat flotilla. This engagement was marked by the skillful maneuvering of both forces, but the Japanese vessels sank the Rurik, and put the other two, the Rossia and the Gromboi, to flight by their superior forces and more accurate shooting.
In the tremendous effort made by Russia to break Japan's control of the Asiatic waters by putting a fleet in the east practically equal to the Japanese forces, she met with a miserable failure. A comparison of the fleets engaged in the battle of the Sea of Japan will show that Russia did indeed succeed in placing a fleet in the east nominally the equal of the Japanese combined fleet. Russia had the superiority in battleships, eight with a tonnage of 94,804, and an armament of twenty-four 12-inch, seven lo-inch, four 9-inch, and seventy-seven 6-inch guns, against Japan's four with a tonnage of 57,550, and twelve 12-inch and fifty-two 6-inch guns. But in cruisers and coast defense ironclads Japan had the advantage. Russia had nine cruisers and three coast defense ironclads of 59,143 tons, and three lo-inch, eight g-inch, fifty-seven 6-inch, and forty-four 47-inch guns against Japan's eight armored cruisers and fifteen protected cruisers of 131,625 tons, and three 12.6inch, four 12-inch, four lo-inch, thirty-six 8-inch, one hundred and forty-eight 6-inch, and eighty-nine 4.7-inch guns. The entire Russian fleet was, therefore, of 153,947 tons and had an armament of twenty four 12-inch, ten lo-inch, twelve 9-inch, one hundred and thirty-four 6-inch, and forty-four 4-7-inch guns. This fleet was opposed to one of 189,175 tons, which had an armament of three 12.6-inch, sixteen 12-inch, four lo-inch, thirty-six 8-inch, two hundred and six 6-inch, and eighty-nine 4.7-inch guns.
The fleets were, therefore, not unevenly matched in point of guns and ships, although the figures do show a slight advantage in favor of the Japanese. In accuracy of fire, in the spirit which animated the crews, in the condition of ships and men, in the speed which the fleets could maintain, in knowledge of their ground, there was no such equality or anything approaching equality. It was due to these things that the yellow men accomplished such a wonderful victory at Tsushima and destroyed Russia's hopes of bringing the war to a successful issue. Russia had accomplished a remarkable feat in sending the Baltic fleet a distance of 13,000 miles to the scene of the war, and keeping it supplied with coal and other necessities in spite of the restrictions imposed by the neutrality of the ports at which the fleet stopped. The fleet arrived in such a condition, however, that it could not withstand the vigorous attack of the Japanese fleet.
This battle settled the control of the sea and the result of the war. It showed that when Japan took the bull by the horns and seized control of the sea before Russia woke up to the fact that war was on, the war was won. Russia might send a fleet from the west to regain control of the eastern waters, but she was sending a fleet to defeat and destruction. Many "level-headed" people considered sending our fleet around South America in time of peace a very hazardous undertaking. To send a fleet around Asia and Africa in time of war, with all the restrictions imposed upon the fleet by the neutrality of the countries through which it was passing, was practically impossible if the fleet was to arrive at the scene of war in condition for making the fight of its existence. Japan was fully assured of her control of the sea. She could continue her operations on land without fear of interruption.
But apart from the fact that the Japanese victories on land were all due indirectly to control of the sea, since without this supremacy she could never have put an army in Manchuria, control of the sea was directly responsible for several of the victories of the Japanese army. It was the work of the Japanese navy, not that of their army, in several battles which defeated the Russian army. At Turrentchen, on May 1, Japanese vessels steamed up the Yalu River and opened fire upon the Russian forces, compelling them to retreat at the moment of victory. It was the defeat of a small squadron sent from Port Arthur by a larger Japanese force that made possible the occupation of the Liotung peninsula by the Japanese and put the Russian stronghold in a state of siege.
At Kin Tcheu the Russian army was compelled to evacuate a position heretofore considered impregnable, due to the work of the Japanese navy. The rapid and accurate fire poured in upon the flank of the Russian forces rendered the position untenable.
In his final order on the dispersal of the combined fleet of Japan, Admiral Togo said: "Heaven gives the laurels of victory in war to those only who keep themselves in training in time of peace, and win the battle before it is fought." This is what Japan did in the Russo-Japanese war. When she seized control of the sea at the outset, and so injured the fleet of her enemy that it was unable to disturb her supremacy on the sea, she decided the contest. Practically nothing- could save Russia from defeat then, for it was .shown by the experience of the Baltic fleet, in the battle of the Sea of Japan, that although by stupendous efforts she might succeed in putting a fleet in the east practically equal numerically to that of her opponents, this fleet would not arrive in condition to defeat the fleet of the sunrise kingdom.
With the sea in the possession of Japan, retreat was the only alternative left to the Russian army. Should the Russian general defeat his opponent and force him to retreat to the sea coast, he could net place the Japanese army in a state of siege, since the latter would have uninterrupted communication with his base. The Japanese could, furthermore, very probably concentrate enough troops at that point to raise the siege. On the other hand the Russians would be adding more miles to the enormous distance they had to bring reinforcements and supplies. This is not the most serious part of it, for the roads along which these supplies would have to be brought were open to attack by sea. If Japan was supreme on this element, how was the Russian army to maintain its line of communications. Clearly, therefore, it was impossible for the Russian army to advance; their only hope lay in retreating, for by this they drew their wily opponents further and further from their base. General Kuropatkin's plan was to yield only as much ground to the Japanese as he had to until the Russian navy could get control of the sea. Then he could advance. But the navy failed to do its part, and on that alone the outcome of the war depended. Russia lost several battles, both on land and sea, but she was really defeated when on February 8 and 9, 1904, Japan destroyed half a dozen of her best ships in the east. Japan accomplished some remarkable victories, both in Manchuria and the Asiatic waters, but she won the victory when she broke Russia's sea power in the east and made possible a war in China. Since, therefore, Japan would have been unable to prosecute a war in Manchuria without the control of the sea, and since this control of the sea was the direct cause of her victories on land, we must add this contest to the long list of wars in which Mahan has shown that supremacy on the sea means ultimate victory.