Again I open my professional note-book, in the hope, rather than the expectation, of extracting from it something which may help my colleagues in solving some one of the many problems with which the present generation of naval officers is confronted. In so doing, my mind is carried back to the early days of my course at the Naval Academy, when I studied text-books differing as much from those of the present day as the ships of now differ from those of my youth.
One manual, in particular, always gave me pleasure with a large admixture of amusement. I refer to Hardee's Infantry Tactics. This code for the instruction of soldiers, brought over from France in the fifties by Captain Hardee as the result of an inquiry into French methods, was the basis of all the movements in our own army up to the outbreak of the Civil War. A revision was then issued, bearing the name of Lieutenant-General Winfield S. Scott, the commander-in-chief at that time. It was first Hardee, and afterwards Scott, from whom we midshipmen gathered an idea of the way in which war was waged, and insensibly we acquired the habit of regarding precision as the most important of all the elements entering into drill. I have forgotten how many "times" were required for loading the rifles of those days. I do recall the fact that a great advance was considered to have been made when this number was reduced to nine and the order changed to read "Load in nine times!" "Load!" "Handle cartridge!" "Tear cartridge!" "Charge cartridge!", etc. Of course any "time" might again be subdivided into a number of "motions"; for example, "Draw rammer!" could not legitimately be done in less than three "motions," as any reader will admit. Now-a-days rammers are things of the past and, instead of tearing the cartridge between the teeth and pouring the contents down the muzzle, we open the breech by a turn of the wrist and shove the cartridge in. None the less, it is clear to me that the respect and admiration which all felt for this manual of arms may serve a worthy purpose and hold out a valuable lesson even at this late date. Were not these very injunctions as to precision of great use at that time, since in them began the school of the soldier, followed by the schools of the squad, the company and the battalion and ending in the schools of the regiment and the brigade? Battles were conducted in the most formal manner then and regularity was incumbent on all who played the splendid game. For my part, I am sure that a great deal worth while was secured in this way, even if much chaff was mixed with the grain. It is always possible to winnow out the former and keep the latter. There also remains the appreciation of the necessity of drill, even though the drill fashions of the moment differ toto coelo from those of my boyhood.
It was never believed, even in those days, that between the covers of Scott's Tactics was to be found everything relating to the conduct of a campaign—quite the contrary. That the manual of arms and the movements which Scott elaborated and taught, fitted the troops in the field to carry out the wishes and plans of the commander-in-chief was strongly held, even to the point of regarding them as essential. As to this, doubts were entertained then which have since ripened into certainty.
The question has often arisen in my mind whether a manual, so to speak, is not needed to-day by the navy. I do not mean the instruction of the individual sailor, for his education is already extremely well cared for, through a number of schools in which we prepare recruits to fill the exact place on board ship they are destined to occupy, and through the team work which has brought our divisions up to such a marvellous pitch of dexterity and efficiency. We do this through no sentimental fondness for the individual, but because the special talent which we desire can only be obtained by enlisting promising and intelligent young men and then moulding them to fit the special requirements of our own necessities. In many ways the educational methods of our service are the admiration and despair of others; and they leave little to be desired, whether they relate to the junior officer or to the men. Has it ever struck my colleagues that, having gone thus far and having fitted those of lower positions for as satisfactory a performance of their duties as it is possible to obtain, we have halted at the final step and have failed to crown our scheme by the establishment of schools for the captain and the admiral? Every other man in the navy is taught to perform, and to perform well, his particular task, but the captain, going on board to take command of a battle-ship, a craft the like of which he may never have served on before, is at once deemed competent de facto to carry his vessel into the line of battle and hold her there. Yet, speaking generally, he is denied the opportunity to develop the ability to manage his vessel as she should be managed; and, except through a vague undercurrent of opinion running through the fleet, nothing positive and tangible is really known of his fitness for his responsibility. It is hardly necessary to add that the captain, notoriously "ship-shy," is not referred to, while, even with him, clean-cut facts are quite lacking.
Is this lack of perspective and this misapprehension of a crying need in the navy due to an unwillingness on our part to admit that there is something for us to learn, or is it because no Hardee or Scott has come to the front, bearing in his hand a system by which this important—indeed, one might well say, this most important— branch of the naval art may be inculcated? Should this be the case, then it is incumbent upon some one to provide what is lacking.
Possibly my note-book may be drawn upon for a slight contribution towards the composition of what seems to me to be a much needed work. It is in this spirit that I offer to my fellow officers a few suggestions under this head, hoping to induce wiser and abler men to expand them into a code which may easily prove the deciding factor in time of battle.
The discipline and routine of the man-of-war, fixed as they are by the laws, regulations and traditions of the service, are assimilated pari passu with the performance of duty. That part of his responsibility the new captain is quite ready to discharge faithfully and well, but for the actual handling of his ship he must trust to experience gained in smaller and more nimble craft. This is very good so far as it goes but it is not enough. The skilled chauffeur or yacht skipper is a development, not a creation. To get expert battle-ship skippers we must train the aspirants systematically and uniformly, we must introduce the invaluable feature of competition, and we must weed out remorselessly the man who, after a fair trial, is found to be constitutionally deficient in nerve, in quickness of perception or in that indefinable something which is imperatively demanded on a ship's bridge on occasions of emergency.
I take it that this matter, while delicate in its nature, presents no real, inherent difficulties. To my mind, it implies a scrupulous regard for the rights of the individual and a no less scrupulous regard for the rights of the government, now almost habitually ignored.
Summarily to whip a captain out of his ship for a cause not based on his physical or professional incapacity, or on his misconduct, is to work injustice with unreasoning hand. To replace him by a worse man, while screamingly funny, works equal injustice to the government as does the retention in command of a captain deficient in those faculties upon which success in action may, indeed must, hinge. In other words, it is the undoubted moral right of the most capable, of eligible rank, to have the best duty assignments, and it is the undoubted right of the government to have its most capable men in those best assignments. What I am seeking is an automatic and impersonal method of determining the real, and not the fancied, worth of each and every battle-ship captain.
I hold it to be a sine qua non, that the final proof of an officer's merits should rest on ascertained and recorded facts and not at all upon the opinions of any person or persons.
It is far from my intention to lay down a complete scheme. If the general plan meets with the favor of the service at large, the details can be filled in with the greatest ease. What I propose resembles, if faintly, the old methods of Hardee and Scott. "Progressive instruction" is the key-note. Let me run hastily over the steps I believe to be necessary.
As soon after the new captain assumes command as the ship is able to move, let him take her alone to Gardiner's, Cape Cod or Magdalena Bay, or some equally favorable and isolated locality, there to spend a fortnight or a month in learning her ways and in doing practically those things which, in the fleet, give a vessel the reputation of being "smart." Getting under way quickly, coming promptly and accurately to anchor on prescribed bearings, picking up moorings, evolutions: these reflect the skill and energy of the man on the bridge. In lesser degree may be cited running lines, rapid signalling, suddenly calling away a boat and getting her off from the ship in less than three minutes, etc. These latter are useful exercises; but while they add their mite to the whole, since they involve others as well, they are not such intimate reflections of the captain's own individual capacity as is what he does when alone on the bridge itself.
Our skipper has now had his undisturbed chance to find out how to drive his team. He joins the fleet, takes his place in the line and acquires, or fails to acquire, the knack of holding his position and of maneuvering along the turning arc which the commander- in-chief has adopted for all. In the mean while his crew, through competition, is striving to excel in those things common to all and performed in sight of all.
After three months spent in the fleet, of which not less than twenty days under way, the captain is "inspected." The inspection which I advocate is not that of the ship, with which we are familiar, but a keen, careful and practical examination of the officer in command. It should be repeated once every six months. Upon it will be largely based the semi-annual "Report on Fitness." For the sake of brevity and clarity, I will use the present tense.
A board is appointed of three officers senior to the captain to be examined. Preferably they should be flag officers from other fleet-divisions than his. They are provided with observers in plenty. The latter have stop-watches and record-blanks.
Ample notice of the board's coming having been given, the ship has steam up and everything in readiness.
Out of the many appropriate tests which will occur to any reader, I give a few to illustrate my idea. In every case (except specially noted) the captain must be the only officer on the bridge.
1. UNMOOR SHIP! Time is taken from the instant the order is given to
a. The mooring swivel off.
b. The designated lee anchor on the bill-board, or hove in and housed.
c. The riding chain shortened in to the original scope.
2. GET UNDERWAY! Time taken as before to
a. Anchor housed or on bill-board.
b. (If headed up stream) Ship winded and headed down stream.
c. Making 15 knots.
3. Two buoys having been planted, say 500 yards apart and directly in the line of the course, approach at the rate of 15 knots, make a figure 8, the loops being about the buoys and the course crossing between them, and steam out again.
a. Time taken and a marking buoy dropped when the helm is first moved to swing the ship out of her course:
b. Time taken and a buoy dropped at the instant of first altering speed of either or both engines.
c. Outside observers angle on the ship every minute and plot her route afterwards on tracing cloth and to a standard scale.
d. Time taken when ship is back on her original course, third marking buoy.
e. And when steaming again 15 knots, fourth marking buoy.
A comparison of the times and routes of various captains in this connection will quickly show which is the most and which the least competent. A composite blue-print would be particularly instructive. This remark will apply to other cases as well.
4. Plant four buoys in a rectangle 6o x 400 yards—the length of the rectangle along the course. Approach at 15 knots; steam through this lane; turn around beyond (in any way the captain pleases), and steam out again.
a. Take time and drop a marking buoy when the engine-room telegraph is first touched.
b. Plot the ship's track as in 3 by outside observers.
c. Take time and drop a marking buoy when completely turned around and steaming back over original route at 15 knots.
5. Come to anchor.
a. Plant a marking buoy at the spot where the anchor is to be' dropped.
b. Approach at the rate of 15 knots.
c. Take time and drop a marking buoy at the first change of speed.
d. Outside observers plot the track of the ship.
e. Take time when anchor is dropped, outside observers noting the distance of anchor splash from buoy indicating place where anchor should have been dropped.
6. A similar test with the exception that the spot is indicated solely by cross bearings or by a bearing and a distance. In this instance officers may be on the bridge to take bearings and angle for distance.
7. Moor to a buoy. Plant a stout mooring carried by a wooden float, say 10 feet square.
a. Approaching at the rate of 15 knots, drop a marking buoy at the instant of touching the engine-room telegraphs.
b. Outside observers plot the track of the ship.
c. No boat to be lowered. Take time of a man's jumping on the buoy (a member of the inspecting board to be at the ship's bow and permit the jump when in his judgment not unsafe).
d. Time taken when reeving line is passed through ring of buoy and end back on board.
e. Time taken when ring rope (strong enough to hold the ship) is rove, end back on board and made fast.
f. Time taken when chain is shackled to buoy.
g. Time taken when all men working on the buoy are back on board. (They may be taken off by a boat.)
To these exercises others can readily be added. The crux of the matter is that each captain makes his own record, for the sheet reporting his performance gives bare statements of fact and quotes no opinion. By that record he must stand or fall. It will then suffice for a commander-in-chief to write to the Navy Department somewhat as follows:
"As the record of practical examination of Captain Blank clearly shows his professional inaptitude, I have the honor to request that he be detached and another officer sent in his place."
If these tests be found satisfactory and valuable in the case of captains, the next move will be to bring out "the school of the admiral" on similar lines. Like the other it is, in my judgment, sorely needed.
I need not dwell upon the bracing-up our captains would thus experience, nor tell how the skilful among them would welcome such an opportunity to establish their own capacity beyond peradventure. The temperamentally unfit, on the other hand, would write their own condemnation. Officers would soon realize that their future lay mainly in their own hands and but little in the wholly adventitious and frequently mistaken favor of superiors on shore. The majority of our captains are eminently worthy of their commissions and commands, but our traditions have put them on the same dead level of mediocrity with (if not below) others who are better known to the service by their desk work than by their real knowledge of the profession, with which some may be said to have only a bowing acquaintance.
It is a matter of poignant regret to many that so much time in the past few years has been wasted by our fleet in neglect of that actual work of the service which it alone can perform and through which a juster estimation could have been formed of the professional attainments of its commanding officers. For guesswork and individual conceptions, it is time to substitute the demonstrated fact and impersonal judgment; for the rule of thumb, the procedure of modern science, timing, measuring and recording with no interest in the result other than to secure absolute truth.
For the incompetent I offer the "knife of honorable despatch" with which to commit official hara-kiri, and to the competent the chance to write their names on the roll of efficiency just as high as their technical stature will permit—and no higher.