Motto: Let each one bring a candle that we may have more light.
In submitting this article the writer desires to state that little claim is laid to originality of ideas in the method of treating the various subjects. He merely hopes that the different point of view may give more matter for argument.
Commander Niblack has discussed many of these same formations with regard to advance and lateral transfer and the advantage of position upon completion of the movement. The writer has gone a step further by a comparison of the time necessary for the performance, and the consideration of the interference with gun fire, due to swinging of the ships, during the evolution.
In the diagrams ships are placed 400 yards apart, and are considered as having a standard speed of 15 knots and a reserve speed of 1 8 knots. The turning curves are for a tactical diameter of 600 yards and a final diameter of 540 yards.
The study of modern naval tactics has led officers of the United States and Royal Navies to the general conclusion that single line tactics will be more effectual in a modern battle than either the double line or group formations.
Only "single line tactics" will be discussed in this article, though Plate I shows the mean ranges for each squadron when two formations, commonly used in European navies, are compared to column formation, fire being distributed as shown. Dashes, fire from ships of the group formation; dots, fire from ships of the column formation.
It is evident from this comparison that shortening the formation increases its depth. In the group formation the ships nearest the enemy are at a shorter mean range than the mean range of any ship in the column formation to the ships of the group formation.
Flexibility is claimed for each of these formations, but a change of the direction of the group, in either of the group formations, demands a change of speed in several ships. This does not apply to a change of course, but to a change in the lines of bearing of the parts of the group. Each change of speed is detrimental to gun fire efficiency and single line tactics offer the best solution for change of direction and formation without change of speed.
The above remark can only be applied to the speed when regarded as a change due to difference in the throttle opening, for it is well known that a ship slows when making a turn, and also that the number of revolutions of the engines will vary during the turn, the inner engine slowing and the outer engine speeding up, even though the throttle opening remains the same during the turn.
SINGLE LINE TACTICS.
Single line tactics comprise evolutions in three formations, namely:
"Exact column," "Line," and "Line of bearing." Exact Column. When ships of a squadron are at a given distance apart, on the same course, and the line of bearing is the same as the course, they are in exact column.
This formation is known as exact column, but, for brevity, the word column will be used to denote it hereafter in this article.
Column formation is the most flexible, that is, it permits of changes of course, speed, or formation, with the least chance of confusion; other formations may be quickly taken, and the course may be changed by the head of column without signal, each ship following in the wake of the preceding ship without change of speed.
No disorder is caused by a ship dropping out of formation, for even if her engines are suddenly stopped, she can sheer to one side and be clear of the column by the time the next ship overtakes her. In case of a steering gear becoming disabled, with the helm jammed in either direction, the ship will gradually sheer out of the column without causing any other ship to leave the formation. The distance between ships will be increased by a ship leaving the formation, but this distance can be closed up, by the use of reserve speed, in several minutes.
Column is the best formation for maximum gun fire if the target can be kept on the proper bearing. The fulfillment of this condition is one of the primary aims of naval tactics. Column allows a broader variation of bearing of the target for maximum gun fire than any other formation. It will be seen from Plate II that with 45 arcs of train forward of, and abaft, the beam, the area at any point of which full broadside fire from all ships may be delivered is limited by a 90 angle at a point abreast the middle of the column, at a perpendicular distance of one-half the length of the column, the limiting lines of the angle being continuations of the lines connecting the ends of the column with the abovementioned point. This angle is shown in the diagram as DFE.
Between the parallel lines CG and DH some ships will have broadside fire and some ships bow fire, the volume of fire diminishing as the line CG is approached.
Within the angle BKC all ships can bring their bow fire to bear. The angle LGA represents the half angle through which only one ship can fire, the ships in the column astern of the leader being blanketed. It is not necessary to show the lines of bearing on the other side or at the other end of the column, as they are similar to those in the diagram. The greatest efficiency of gun fire, considering the range, will be at the point F.
Column is the best formation during the action, but the poorest for approach or retreat.
Line. When ships of a squadron are at a given distance apart, on the same course, and on a line of bearing at right angles to the course, they are in line.
Line is not as flexible as column. All changes of course or formation must be signaled. In the event of a steering gear being disabled, the formation may be badly broken in attempting to avoid collision. The maximum gun fire can only be brought to bear through an angle equal and opposite to GCK, Plate III. This fire is delivered at a disadvantage, for unless the enemy is in a formation equally bad, his mean range to the end ship will be much smaller than the mean range of the ships in "line" to any enemy ship. From the diagram it will be seen that all ships bring their bow fire to bear on a target lying within the angle DHE. It will be noticed that this is the same angle as the maximum fire angle from column formation. Within the angle DGC part of the ships have bow fire and part broadside fire, the volume of fire increasing as the line GC is approached. Between the parallel lines BI and CG some ships will have their fire blanketed, the volume of fire diminishing as the line BI is approached. The angle BIA represents the half angle at that end through which only one ship can fire.
Line is a Good Formation for Approach or Retreat. The bearing of the line should be, as nearly as possible, perpendicular to the direction of the enemy.
Line of Bearing. When ships of a squadron are at a given distance apart, on the same course, with the guide on a line of bearing other than the course or 90 from the course, they are in "line of bearing."
As has been said, when the line of bearing is the same as the course the formation is column, and when 90 from the course the formation is "line." "Line of bearing" thus varies between "column" and "line." The case considered is "line of bearing" at 45 from the course.
The disadvantages of this formation are the same as have been given for line, though it will be seen that as the line of bearing approaches the course the gun fire value will be much increased until practically the same as for column.
Considering the line of bearing at four points from the course we refer to Plate IV. It will be seen that the broadside fire for all ships is limited by the position of the next ship. As the "line of bearing" approaches column, the angle DFE approaches 90, and as the line of bearing approaches "line" the angle decreases. Between the parallel lines CG and DK fire diminishes as the line CG is approached. Within the angle CLB all ships bring their bow fire to bear. Between the parallel lines BK and AH, fire diminishes rapidly as one ship after another becomes blanketed. Within the angle AHM only one ship can fire.
"Line of bearing" is a good formation for approach or retreat, the line of bearing being perpendicular to the direction of the enemy. This formation will be seldom used during the engagement at medium ranges, on account of its inflexibility, except as an intermediate formation in swinging from line into column.
From a comparison of these diagrams we may note the most advantageous and disadvantageous positions of the target for each formation. The advantages for maximum gun fire are indisputably with column formation. Approaching the enemy on approximately opposite courses, enemy bearing ahead, "line" has the advantage. If the courses converge other than as above mentioned "line of bearing," with the line of bearing perpendicular to the direction of the enemy, has the advantage.
A thorough understanding of time and effect of changes of course or formation must be the foundation of naval tactics. We should therefore study the various movements and methods of performing various evolutions.
Passing from one formation to another is accomplished by successive movements, simultaneous movements, or both. A successive movement is one in which all ships perform the same evolution successively, or at the beginning of the movement perform the same or different evolutions arriving at their station in the new formation successively. A simultaneous movement is one in which all ships perform the same evolution at the same time, and arrive simultaneously at their station in the new formation.
As an example. "Being in column, to form column to the rear." The change by successive movement would require a countermarch, while the simultaneous movement would be "ships right about." Several considerations govern the choice of methods. The simultaneous movement reverses the order, changes the guide, and requires approximately 3 minutes and 45 seconds. The successive movement retains the order and guide, and requires approximately 9 minutes and 25 seconds. These times are for a speed of 15 knots. It will also be noticed that, if within gun range, the successive movement has the disadvantage of blanketing the fire of several ships during the movement. See Plate V.
In the more complicated changes of formation we will find it necessary to use both successive and simultaneous movements during one change. We will also find that the new formation may be taken by several different methods. These several methods have been defined by Commander Niblack as follows:
The Rectangular Method. By the rectangular method a fleet goes from one formation into another by a series of simultaneous and successive movements, in which each ship performs the same evolution at undiminished speed, and in which the course and distance passed over are ultimately the same for each vessel.
The Direct Method. By the direct method the guide or leader slows after the movement is begun, or the other ships use reserve speed, and the obliquing ships change course a certain number of points, reaching their new position by prescribed rules as to variations in helm and speed.
Special Methods. By special methods the aim is to reach the new formation quickly.
It is now necessary to consider several evolutions performed by the three methods when all three are practicable. A speed of 15 knots is used as a basis for comparison.
Referring to Plate VI. Being in "line," to form "column" to the front.
1st. By the Direct Method. The left ship advances on the original course at full speed, all other ships oblique three points to the left simultaneously at such speed as will retain their line of bearing until in rear of the leader; upon reaching this point each changes course to the original course forming column.
Time: 13 minutes and 20 seconds. Distance gained to front, 8000 yards. To flank, same as left ship in previous formation. Gun fire of 7 ships interfered with for 3 minutes each.
Advantages: Gun fire less disturbed than by other methods.
Disadvantages: Time to perform. Length of time and great change of position of the squadron without any fixed formation. 2d. By the Rectangular Method. "Ships right, column left."
Time: 9 minutes and 30 seconds. Distance gained to front, 3730 yards. To the flank, 870 yards to right of position of right ship in "line." Gun fire interfered with for 3 ½ minutes for each ship.
Advantages: Distance gained to flank. Less distance gained to front. Interference with gun fire less than with special method.
Disadvantages: Swinging of ships interferes with fire efficiency.
3d. By a Special Method. The fifth ship from the right turns through four points to the left and then back to the original course. Nos. 4, 3, 2, 1, execute ships left and column right in time to follow in wake of No. 5. Nos. 6, 7, and 8, using reserve speed, execute ships 24 points left and column left in time to form column in rear of No. 1.
Advantage: Less time than other methods.
Disadvantages: Same as previous method and change of order and guide.
From these comparisons we see "time," "distance to the front and to the Hank," and "interference with gun fire" are the three points for consideration in the adoption of the method best fitted to obtain the desired result.
We will now consider an evolution from column formation. "Being in column, to form column at right angles." Plate VII.
1st. The direct method is here replaced by a successive movement. "Column right." The leader changes course 8 points to the new course, each succeeding ship changing course in wake of the preceding one.
Time: 7 minutes and 20 seconds. Distance gained to front, 540 yards. Distance gained to flank 3130 yards. Gun fire interfered with 1 ¾ minutes for each ship.
Advantages: Least time required. Interference with gun fire least. Can be performed without signal if senior ship is leading.
2d. Special Method. The Second Division performs column right at slightly reduced speed. The First Division, using reserve speed, ships left about, then column left forming in wake of No. 1.
Time: 8 minutes. Distance to rear, 1060 yards. Distance to flank, 3130 yards. Gun fire interfered with for 4 ships, 1 ¾ minutes each, and 4 ships, 6 minutes each.
Advantage: Distance gained to rear.
Disadvantages: Interference with gun fire, change of guide and order of ships.
3d. Rectangular Method.—“Ships right about, column left.”
Time: 10 minutes and 30 seconds. Distance to rear, 3070 yards. To flank, 3730 yards. Gun fire interfered with about 5 minutes for each ship.
Advantages: Distance gained to rear.
Disadvantages: Time. Interference with gun fire. Change of guide.
One more example. Plate VIII.
"Being in column, to form line of bearing 2 points from the course."
1st. By a Special Method. The leader slows to half speed, the rear ships take reserve speed. Each ship, except the leader, obliques to the right and regulates her speed and helm to reach the new position as soon as possible and to remain in position after it is reached. The leader resumes standard speed as the rear ship starts to swing to the left.
Time: 4 minutes and 20 seconds. Gun fire of 6 ships interfered with from 2 to 4 minutes.
Advantage: Least time.
Disadvantages: Interference with gun fire due to changes of speed and rapid changes of course.
2d. Rectangular Method. " Column 2 points left," "ships 2 points right."
Time: 7 minutes and 15 seconds. Gun fire of all ships interfered with very slightly, if at all.
Advantages: No change of speed and small change of course. Interference with gun fire slight.
Disadvantages: Time.
3d. Direct Method. The leader slows to three-quarters speed, the rear ships take reserve speed. All ships, except the leader, oblique three points to the right, changing course to the original course when they have gained the desired distance to the flank. The leader resumes standard speed as the rear ship is about to turn to the left.
Time: 5 minutes. Gun fire of 7 ships interfered with for 3 minutes each.
Advantage: More distance gained to the front than by the special method. Less time than the rectangular method.
Disadvantage: Swinging of ships interferes with gun fire.
If within range of the enemy, the method which interferes least with gun fire should generally be adopted. There may, however, be other considerations which make one of the other methods preferable. All movements possible should be studied in order to know the result of such movement as regards: "Time necessary to perform it," "change of position to front or rear and to the flank," and "interference with gun fire." A complete understanding of these results will aid materially in the choice of a maneuver under various conditions.
Having discussed the formations comprised in "single line tactics," and some of the various movements in changing course or formation, we turn to the consideration of various formations when opposed one to the other or the same formations opposed under various conditions of course and bearing.
Before proceeding further it may be well to state two laws which govern the maneuvers of two squadrons within fighting range.
1st. The most advantageous position is in "line of bearing" with broadside fire bearing, with the line of bearing perpendicular to the direction of the enemy.
2d. As stated by Lieutenant A.C. Dewar, R.N., "Fleets within gun range, endeavoring to exert their maximum power of offence, tend to turn on to approximately parallel courses."
The offensive squadron will be constantly attempting to occupy positions fulfilling the first law, while the defensive squadron will be continually following the second law.
Considering the first law, it is evident that for the advantageous position to be of any great value, the courses of the two squadrons must be in the same general direction. The squadron having the advantage being in the lead, the courses must be parallel or converging. If in the rear, parallel or diverging.
The limiting case, with the squadron having the advantage in the lead, is represented by the original positions of the squadrons in Plate IX. It will be seen that both squadrons are in column, "A" crossing ahead of "B." "B" is T'd. How shall he maneuver to equalize the positions in the least time? The solution given is but the opinion of the writer based upon results with the game board. The T'd squadron should make a column half right (in the direction of the T'ing squadron's rear). The reason for selecting four points is as follows: If "A" performs "ships right about" as soon as his signal can be made and answered after "B" begins the turn, he can just meet "B" on equal terms. As shown by the diagram, if the lines representing the new courses be continued, it will be found that the two leaders are at approximately the same distance from the intersection. If "B" had made a smaller change, "A" would still have had an advantage, also "B's" broadside fire would not so soon have been brought to bear. If "A" proceeds on the same course, "B" will cap his rear. If "A" makes a column half left the advantage is equalized. If "A" makes a column left "B's" leader must keep "A's" rear ship four points forward of the beam. If "A's" leader does the same this will end in "chasing tails," or, as Lieut. Dewar has called it, "counter circling," shown by Plate IX. If "B" changes more than four points he loses any chance of taking advantage of any mistake that "A" might make, and also makes it necessary to swing through a greater angle to begin the counter circle in case "A" makes a column left.
The "Lock," as termed by Commander Niblack, consists of two positions, as shown by the following examples. Two squadrons, both in column, on converging courses, the course of one being nearly perpendicular to the bearing of the other. Fig. I, Plate X. Two squadrons, one in column and the other in "line of bearing" with the line of bearing approximately perpendicular to the bearing of the column, on approximately the same course and slightly ahead. It is evident that for the instant this "lock" will be approximately the same if the locking squadron is on the quarter. The law of parallel courses gives the solution for the best method of breaking the "lock." Change the course of the head of the column to the course of the enemy or, if he is in "line of bearing" to his line of bearing. If the enemy was in column, he retains a lead, which case will be treated later. If he was in "line of bearing," he must parallel your course, or remain at a disadvantage, thus losing distance and equalizing the advantage. Fig. 2, of Plate X, ended with two squadrons in column on parallel courses, the leaders abreast. There can be no advantage to either in this position, and with equal speeds the squadron making a change of course or formation will do so at a sacrifice. If one squadron is faster it will gradually draw ahead. The leading ship of the slow squadron should always keep the leader of the fast squadron abeam, thus preventing any possibility of a cap and maintaining almost an equal advantage with the fast squadron. Referring to Plate XI, it will be seen that unless the fast squadron changes course he will soon be at a disadvantage if he is attempting to concentrate his fire on the leader of the slow squadron. It is probable that the fire would not be distributed in this manner, but considering "A's" first division concentrating on "B's" leader, the other ships firing at the nearest ship and vice versa, "B's" second division concentrating on "A's" rear, the mean ranges are still changed almost in the same proportion given in the diagram. "A," upon seeing that "B" is easing off, may keep the range as it then is by taking "line of bearing" on a course parallel to "B's." This is a disadvantage, as the advantage of range lies with "B," until "A" again draws ahead. The same considerations apply to the case of two squadrons of equal speed on parallel courses one slightly ahead of the other, except that once having lost the advantage it cannot be regained unless the enemy makes a mistake.
Plate XII shows two columns approaching on converging courses approximately opposite. "B" sees that if he continues on this course "A" will cap him, he therefore changes course away from "A" to such course as will pass ahead of "A" if "A" continues his present course. Each one will make a change of course time after time until they are on approximately parallel courses. If "B" should see that he could not pass ahead of "A," he might change course to 180 from "A's" course, the columns would then pass on opposite courses. As each leader would keep the rear ship of the other column abeam, or, if desiring to close the range, four points forward of the beam, this would end in counter circling. There should be no advantage of position if the speeds are equal.
The foregoing examples have been those that will be most frequently met with during the engagement at medium ranges. We must now consider the approach and the retreat. As has been said, column is the best formation for the engagement at medium ranges and "line" and "line of bearing" for the approach and the retreat.
Approaching in column is at variance with our first law of position. It is an inferior position for approach, as some ships may be blanketed, and if the enemy is in "line" or "line of bearing," the mean range of the ships in column to any ship of the "line" or "line of bearing" formation is greater than their mean range to the leader of the column.
In obeying the first law we must approach in "line" or "line of bearing" with the line of bearing perpendicular to the direction of the enemy. When the desired range is reached, column formation should be taken in the direction that will give an advantage of position. Following the law of parallel courses, the enemy must swing onto a course approximately parallel or remain at a disadvantage. We must bear in mind that if the enemy changes course or formation first we must not delay paralleling his course unless we have the advantage of position. In the retreat we must take "line" or "line of bearing" on a course that will bring us first to a protecting harbor or superior force. In pursuit the formation should be "line of bearing" or "double line of bearing," as shown by the arrangement of stars below.
Following directly astern of the enemy must be avoided on account of the danger from floating mines. The range must also be frequently compared with the torpedo range card (mentioned below) to make sure that with the enemy on the known bearing we are not within torpedo range.
THE ENGAGEMENT.
In this plan of an imaginary engagement, the writer does not contend that each move he has made the contestants make is the best one under the circumstances, although as long as these moves can be conceived to have been made, we may discuss it as an example.
The squadron "B" is supposed to be attempting to force a passage between the islands shown in the diagram. Upon entering the passage an enemy's squadron is seen at the opposite end of the passage. "A" squadron is soon seen changing course away from "B." "B" changes course four points to the left to gain position for forming line of bearing. "A" forms line perpendicular to the bearing of "B." "B" forms line of bearing on course west, attempting to pass "A's" right flank.
When the range is reduced to 7500 yards, "B" swings into column, ships half left and the head of column immediately changes course to west. Upon seeing "B's" change of formation, "A" swings into column showing our first example of the law of parallel courses. "A" could not afford to approach "B" with only bow fire bearing while "B" was using broadside fire. "A" realizing that he cannot cross ahead of "B," changes course to west, in order to cap "B," should "B" change course to the northward.
"B," seeing that it is impossible to cross "A's" bow, tries to pass astern of "A" by forming column at right angles by a special method. "A" is on the alert, and as soon as his column is straightened out, performs ships right about. Again, we find both sides changing course for a chance of capping with the usual result that they end by taking parallel courses.
A lucky shot puts "B's" No. 5 out of action, and he is forced to leave the column, sheering out of formation away from the enemy in order to avoid blanketing the ships astern of him in the column while passing him. This decreases "B's" lead 400 yards.
"B's" No. 6 finds the enemy concentrating their fire on him, and, in order to increase the range, eases away a point. "A's" No. 8 is disabled, and soon after "B's" No. 1 is forced to leave the formation. As the eastern shore is approached, "A" now having a superiority, swings into line to close the range. "B," however, decides to withdraw. He assumes line of bearing on the course that will bring him most quickly to a sheltering port. "A" continues line until astern of "B" when he assumes line of bearing on the same course as "B."
The object of this sketch is not so much to show what should be done in each case, as to show the conditions which may make such movement seem best, and also the method of performing the various evolutions.
The Approach. In the plan we have shown two methods of approach "line" and "line of bearing." Both are good formations for approach. "Line" is the most valuable when the courses of the approaching squadrons are nearly 180 apart, and "line of bearing" when the angle between the courses is other than as above. It will be seen that when fire is opened all ships of "B" squadron can bring broadside fire to bear, while "A" is forced to use bow fire until he swings into column. "Line of bearing" must be used discreetly and left at the proper moment, or it may prove a detriment instead of an advantage.
"B's" adoption of the special method is due to his desire to gain distance to the right and rear, in order to pass astern of "A." "A," however, is too quick, and "B" is forced to parallel "A."
The retreat and considerations have been mentioned above.
THE WEATHER VANTAGE.
The weather gauge was considered of great value in the days of sailing ships, but until recently has lacked consideration regarding its application to modern conditions.
Let us consider the effect of wind on modern gunnery efficiency. In firing to windward the gases and fumes from the burning smokeless powder are blown back into the turrets and gun ports for the broadside battery. These gases not only tend to obscure the target, but interfere seriously with the pointer. The writer has seen on a single run, firing a turret to windward, the fumes so dense in the turret that at the end of the run the pointer's eyes were so affected that they were filled with tears, and his eyesight dimmed so that he could not have continued longer at his station. If there is any sea running, spray will be blown against the lenses of the telescopic sights, especially of the broadside battery. It is also harder on the observer's eyes to look to windward than to leeward.
In firing to leeward no spray will strike the lenses, and although the effect of the gases in obscuring the target may be as great, the gases will be driven from the ship instead of into it.
The effect of the gases in obscuring the target will mostly be dependent upon whether the wind is forward of, or abaft the beam. In case the wind is forward of the beam, the gases will pass in front of all guns abaft the one firing, but with a velocity equal to the sum of the speed and the component of wind velocity opposite to the course. If the wind is abaft the beam, the gases will remain longer in front of the guns, for the speed of passing will then be the difference between the speed of the ship and the component of wind velocity in the direction of the course. It is evident that when this component of wind velocity is greater than the speed the gases will move forward.
So much for the wind. Now for the sea. With modern methods of aiming, it is well known that the rolling of the ship seriously interferes with the accuracy of gun fire. The best position for the sea, then, must be the position in which the ship will roll the least. This is ahead. As the sea draws abeam the rolling increases. As the sea approaches the quarter or stern the rolling decreases, but causes the ship to yaw more or less, which motion, being very irregular, is worse than either rolling or pitching alone.
Considering the direction of the wind and sea to be approximately the same, as under general conditions it is, what conclusion can we reach regarding the best position for the wind and sea. From the consideration of the effects of wind and sea, as mentioned above, the writer concludes that the best position for wind and sea, considering them together, is slightly on the bow away from the enemy. If this is true, we find the weather gauge, or weather vantage has changed materially from its old meaning. It is also evident that two squadrons steaming on converging courses may both have the wind in its most favorable position. While this position is the best, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is better to fire to leeward than to windward, and better to have the wind forward of the beam than abaft it.
With sailing ships the weather gauge was equally as great with a light breeze as with a strong breeze, but with modern ships the advantage will be proportional to the strength of the breeze and height of the sea. A light breeze abaft the beam, however, may be very detrimental to rapid shooting, as the gases will hang over the ship interfering with the visibility of the target.
The Sun Gauge. The glare of the rising or setting sun upon the water is so strong that few eyes can look continuously at the horizon, within several points of the bearing of the sun, for several hours before sunset or after sunrise. If the bearing of the enemy approximates to that of the sun, the value of gun fire and spotting is greatly reduced. Colored shade glasses will no doubt be of great assistance, but even then the burden of proof will be with the squadron that is obliged to use them.
It should, therefore, be the object of a squadron to keep the enemy on a bearing 180 from the azimuth of the sun. This applies especially when the sun is near the horizon. This may necessitate giving up the weather vantage, but, except in case of a heavy sea, the writer is of the opinion that the sun gauge is preferable. An excess of speed is necessary to retain this advantage for any length of time.
When in range of the enemy there are several other points relating to gun fire efficiency that must be considered before deciding upon a change of course or formation, and, after the decision is made, in determining the method to be adopted in performing the evolution. These may be enumerated as follows: 1st. Change of target. 2d. Change of speed. 3d. Change of range. 4th. Interference with gun fire.
The first is, perhaps, the most important. Having found the range for one ship, it will be possible to approximate very closely to the range at any other instant as long as fire is continued at the same ship. If we change our formation so that our fire must be directed at another target, we are obliged to start all over and determine the range and change of range. It should, therefore, be understood that the target selected, unless otherwise ordered by signal, should be some ship in the enemy's squadron, whose mean range will be the least, not at just the instant, but just as long as there is no change of course or formation. The same target should be used continually, unless a change of formation makes it impossible, or a difference in speed or course makes the difference in range between the one being used and a nearer one very material. Frequent changes of target will have a serious effect upon accuracy and efficiency of gun fire.
2d. Changes in speed should be avoided, for a change of speed requires a change of the sliding leaf, and it is impossible to tell the exact speed of a ship while slowing down or increasing speed. The effect of this, however, will be very small as compared to changes in course or formation which change the rate of passing the enemy. As the scale on the sliding leaf indicates the deflection for a target passing perpendicular to the line of fire, the deflection necessary will change greatly during an evolution or change of course, which requires a change of more than two points. Consider two squadrons on parallel courses, leaders abreast, speeds equal, 15 knots. The sliding leafs will be set at 0. If, now, one squadron performs ships right, the sliding leafs will have to be changed from o to approximately 15 knots, during the minute and 45 seconds it requires for that change of course. It is evident that with such rapid changes the accuracy will be greatly reduced.
The third consideration is partly included in the second. Changes of course or formation which change the range have also the disadvantage of requiring a new change of range to be found. This will interfere with the accuracy of fire during the time it takes to determine the new change of range.
4th. Interference with gun fire due to swinging. It is evident from the discussion of the second consideration, that the sliding leaf must be rapidly changed, also the guns must be trained at nearly the maximum speed, interfering with accuracy. The heel accompanying the swinging of a ship also tends to interfere with the accuracy of fire.
CONCENTRATION.
The word concentration has been extensively used in recent writings on naval tactics, to mean that all ships of a squadron were concentrating their fire on one ship of the enemy's squadron. The word has been used several times in this article with the above meaning. It must be said, however, that this concentration of fire does not seem logical to the writer except under special circumstances.
Napoleon's greatest victories were due to concentration, but concentration of forces, and not of fire when equal forces were opposed. No one will doubt the advantage of concentration of forces, but concentration of fire, when equal forces are opposed, does not seem logical. If two ships are opposed to one the advantage is evident, but if two are opposed to two would we still fire at only one?
Let us consider two armies drawn up in line of battle. Can we for an instant suppose that the fire of one line would be concentrated upon one portion of the enemy's line, leaving the greater portion of the enemy's line undisturbed to maneuver and fire without being under fire. Admiral Farragut said the best protection against gun fire was a rapid and well-directed fire. Does not the same thing apply to-day?
Consider two equal squadrons, both in column, on parallel courses, leaders abreast. One squadron concentrating their fire on the enemy's leader, the other squadron with each ship firing at the corresponding ship in the other column. Where will the greatest efficiency of fire lie? Will it be with the squadron, every ship of which is under fire, or with the squadron only one or two ships of which are under fire? It does not seem that any one will say with the squadron all ships of which are under fire. This, then, is one point against concentration. The fire efficiency of a squadron is reduced proportionately to the number of ships of the squadron actually under fire.
Now we must consider the effect. Is our first object to disable or to sink the enemy's ships? The surest chance of victory is to speedily disable the enemy's ships, later returning to sink or destroy them.
Does the chance of disabling a squadron seem better by concentrating on one ship and then on another, or by firing at each ship or as many as possible?
On the game board the damage is proportional to the amount of fire received, but will this always be true in actual battle? There is no doubt that a ship will receive more damage the longer she is shot at, but in all probability the same result, as to her efficiency, might have been obtained by less fire. With range finding stations, turrets and conning-towers as vital spots for disabling shots, is it not better to be firing at several on each ship than several on one ship only? The lucky shot is just as apt to be first as last, when only one shot is considered. Even considering that the damage done to one ship, by concentration, reduces the value of the squadron as much as the smaller amount of damage done to several when not concentrating, we still have the point previously mentioned in favor of not concentrating. There are still other conditions to examine.
Will the commander-in-chief have time to direct the fire of each ship? Would not the number of signals be excessive? An unexpected change of formation by the enemy would, in many instances, make it impossible to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief, or in order to do so, we would fire at a ship at a much greater range than that to the nearest enemy.
How, then, can we approach to a method under which concentration will only be used when the conditions are favorable, and make the ship concentrated upon the best target for the ships concentrating.
The three important points to consider in selecting a target are: The range, the change of range, and the probable length of time the target will remain favorable.
Who is the best judge of the above conditions? It is the writer's opinion that the fire control officer of each ship should be the best judge of these conditions for the ship he is on, and on him should be placed the responsibility of picking the target that will best satisfy these conditions. If one target can be used for some time, the change of range will be more accurate, hence the range will be more accurate. The target should, therefore, be picked with this in view. Though it may not be the nearest ship at the time, it may be so soon and remain so longer.
In order to do this the fire control officer must be thoroughly familiar with the tactics of the commander-in-chief, and must duly consider the chances of a change of course or formation. If this is done concentration can only occur when one enemy ship appears as the best target for several ships, which will only be when the concentrating squadron is in a superior position or on parallel courses with the enemy in the lead, in which case the rear ship of the enemy's column will be the best target for several ships at the rear of the column. This approaches to a concentration of forces, though less so in the last mentioned case than in any other. If each ship is firing at the best target it is a logical distribution of fire.
Now let us turn to the Battle of Tsushima. We find it reported that the Osliaba was the first ship to suffer severely, the reason given being, that she was stopped. Does it seem reasonable that it was easier to hit a target that was stopped than one proceeding on a parallel course at a few knots less speed? When the Japanese countermarched, what ships of the Russian column were the logical targets? It would seem that, knowing their superiority of speed and the chance of drawing ahead, the Japanese First Division would take the Russian leader as their target, while the other Japanese ships would take a ship in the Russian column about four nearer the head than their own corresponding number in the column.
Theory usually considers all ships as equal, whereas the Osliaba was probably the strongest ship after those of the Russian First Division. It is therefore possible, in fact probable, that the Japanese First Division took the Suvaroff, and the other ships the Osliaba as a target. As the Japanese squadron drew ahead they all concentrated on the Russian leader. But why? The Russians in failing to parallel the course of the Japanese ships gave the Japanese a position of great advantage, and the range to the Russian leader was the smallest for every Japanese ship, and continued to be so until the Russians turned away.
At 2.30 P.M., the Russians turned away, the head of column changing course to the eastward, and we are told that the Japanese concentrated on each ship as it turned the knuckle. If they did they certainly wasted some good ammunition, for by the time the fifth ship reached the knuckle the range of the Mikasa to the knuckle was 1500 yards greater than her range to the Russian leader, the Alexander III.
Is it not more probable that the Japanese First Division continued to fire at the leader while the other Japanese ships, having lost the superior position, due to the Russians having changed course, picked up another ship as its best target. If these ships confined their fire to the first five ships, it might well have seemed to each of these Russian ships that she was receiving the fire from the entire Japanese squadron.
The inefficient handling of the Russian squadron and still more inefficient handling of their guns, has given us little to consider regarding the result of the concentration of gun fire. We are told that the Russian commander-in-chief ordered fire to be concentrated on the Mikasa. If this was obeyed it is little wonder that no further damage was done to the Japanese ships.
In the foregoing consideration of various positions of advantage only gun fire has been considered as effectual. There are, however, several other instruments of offense and defense which we must consider before reaching a final conclusion; namely, the automobile torpedo and the floating mine.
We may consider the automobile torpedo as having a maximum range of 3000 yards. Floating mines discharge upon contact. The Hague conference voted that floating mines must be so constructed as to be innocuous one hour after control over them is lost. This, however, has not yet been agreed to.
The automobile torpedo must be considered from two points. Those fired from the ships of the battle line and those fired from torpedo boats, or destroyers, accompanying the squadron.
We will first consider those fired from the ships in the battle-line. It is assumed that an automobile torpedo of the latest type can average 28 knots for a run of 3000 yards. Two equal squadrons will, in all probability, never close to a range of 3000 yards, but under certain conditions we find that the actual distance between the ship firing the torpedo and the target ship may be much greater and still make a hit. This range may be as great as 4600 yards if the target ship is making 15 knots, and as great as 5050 yards if she is making 20 knots.
Plate XIII shows what may be termed a torpedo range card. This one is constructed for a speed of target of 15 knots, and speed of torpedo 28 knots average for 3000 yards.
It is evident that the course of the firing ship need not be considered, as with modern torpedoes the direction of run can be set no matter what the direction of the tube at the time of firing. The use of this card will be to find the least range to which you can close without any chance of being torpedoed.
If the firing ship is directly ahead of the target ship and the target ship continues her course, the torpedo and target are moving toward each other, and, as the torpedo runs 3000 yards in 3 ¼ minutes, and in the same time the target advances 1625 yards, it is evident that, although, at the instant of firing, the range was 4625 yards, a torpedo having a 3000-yard radius of action will be able to make a hit if properly adjusted and aimed.
Let us consider one more case. The bearing of the enemy is four points from our course. The range at which it is possible that we may be torpedoed is the distance on this bearing to a point such that, a line equal in length to the run of the target during 3 ¼ minutes, laid in the direction of the course, just touches the circle drawn, with a 3000-yard radius, with the position of the firing ship at the time the torpedo was fired, as a center. In this case we find, from the torpedo range card, 3920 yards.
From the cards it is seen that the range, speed, and difference between the bearing of the enemy and our course, are the points to be considered in determining the possibility of being torpedoed. It may be stated here that it is much easier to tell when there is any chance of being torpedoed than when there is a chance of torpedoing an enemy. In the first case you know your own course which is a determining factor, while in the second case the enemy's course can only be approximately known.
The maximum range is 4625 yards, when the target is moving directly toward the firing ship at the instant the torpedo is fired, and does not change course. The minimum range is when the target ship is moving directly away from the firing ship, this range is but 1375 yards. As shown by the torpedo cards the range varies, decreasing as the bearing of the firing ship and the course of the target ship become further and further apart, when the difference is 180 the range is a minimum. Plates XIII and XIV show two methods of constructing these cards. Plate XIII considers the target in various positions, and Plate XIV, the firing ship in various positions.
It will be noticed that two ships abeam of each other must be nearer than 3000 yards for torpedoes to be effective.
What new idea does this comparison of ranges for different bearings bring forth? Referring to Plate XV, we see a squadron in column, and on the bow and quarter of this column two squadrons in "line of bearing." The position of either squadron in "line of bearing" is preferable to the column if only gun fire is considered. Considering torpedoes, however, we find that it is possible for two ships of the column to torpedo either of the two left ships of the "line of bearing" on the quarter. As none of the ships of the line of bearing on the quarter can torpedo any ship of the column, they are at a disadvantage. How can they avoid this disadvantage? By the use of the torpedo card knowing her course and bearing of the enemy, the minimum range to which she may approach, without a chance of being torpedoed, may be found by each ship. The speed or course must be changed until the range, corresponding to the maximum torpedo range for that bearing, is exceeded.
Considering the "line of bearing" in the lead we find that it is possible for five ships of this "line of bearing" to torpedo some ship in the column, while none of the ships of the column can torpedo any ship in this "line of bearing." These examples show the great advantage in keeping ahead of the enemy. The consideration of torpedoes augments the value of all superior positions except the "T" and the "lock" on the rear of a column. It seriously decreases their value at ranges less than 4500 yards. The shorter the range the greater the decrease in value.
So far we have considered only torpedoes fired from ships of the battle line. It is becoming a recognized fact that the best protection for a battleship squadron against torpedo attack is a flotilla of destroyers. This flotilla having become an appendage to the battle fleet, what are we going to do with them in an engagement?
If we should meet an equal or inferior squadron with no destroyers, we would no doubt order our destroyers to remain out of range until some enemy ship having become disabled they could finish the work by a concentrated attack. Suppose, however, that the enemy is superior in destroyers. If we order our destroyers out of range they will be attacked by a superior force.
How then can we keep them out of danger and ready for use? The German Navy seems to have adopted a plan of protecting them by using the battleships as screens. Plate XVI, Fig. I, shows a column of eight ships with six destroyers under fire of a column of eight ships. The dotted lines represent the limits of fire passing each battleship. From this we see that a battleship 500 feet long can protect a destroyer 275 feet long, provided that the destroyer keeps within 100 yards of the battleship. This is only true of such projectiles as have so flat a trajectory that the danger space of the battleship is as great or greater than 100 yards. As the chances of hitting a torpedo-boat-destroyer at ranges over 5000 yards are small, it might be well to keep them at 1000 yards' distance from the battleships until a range of 5000 yards is approached, when they would take position 100 yards from their protecting battleship.
That destroyers may augment the advantage of the superior position is shown by Fig. 2, Plate XVI. The destroyers are shown protected by battleships Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, Destroyers Nos. 1 and 2 are ordered to shift to battleships Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. In so doing they are in sight of the enemy during approximately 1 ¾ minutes, supposing their speed to be 20 knots. During this change they can fire a torpedo from each tube and, having been informed of the enemy's course and speed, should make good shots.
It is evident that, with destroyers to protect, our course should never be more than four points from the bearing of the enemy, for with other courses insufficient protection will be given.
Floating Mines. Floating mines seem to have played an important part in the destruction of ships during the Russian-Japanese war and although it is quite true that peaceful merchantmen suffered most this does not detract from a recognition of their efficiency. Their value in an engagement is slight unless by maneuvers the enemy can be drawn over an area previously strewn with mines. It is evident that the principal use of floating mines will be to keep the enemy from following directly astern in pursuit, and the principal disadvantages, the small chance of damage to an enemy and the chance of being forced over the mine field by a superior force. The position of the mines must be well plotted and accurate allowance made for drift in order to make sure the mine field is not recrossed.
From accounts of the battle of August 10, 1904, we learn that the Russians suspected the Japanese of placing floating mines in their path. These mines were supposed to have been placed from torpedo-boats. This has not, to my knowledge at least, been confirmed by the Japanese, but, nevertheless, the Russians avoided that part of the ocean showing great respect for the efficiency of the floating mine.
DISCUSSION.
Professor Philip R. Alger, U.S. Navy. I am glad to see that Lieutenant Pye has pricked the bubble, "concentration." The human mind is prone to be hypnotized by a phrase, and the absurd idea that concentrating the fire of several, or all, of one's ships upon a single ship of the enemy is the same kind of concentration which was practiced by the great captains of all ages, and which we recognize as one of the first principles of tactics, has found too ready acceptance in our navy. Above all, this fallacy has been spread abroad by the practice of the naval war game in accordance with our war college rules. Under those rules there is advantage in this spurious concentration, and many have not perceived that this advantage exists only on paper and that the real result on the field of battle would be disaster.
Lieut.-Commander A.B. Hoff, U.S. Navy. Lieutenant Pye has certainly brought out his points most fully, and his hints are valuable and interesting in this most absorbing of studies.
It is an entire exposition of the battle maxims generally accepted, and which were clearly impressed on the minds of all present at the winter maneuvers of 1907.
These maxims I take to be:
- Avoid changes in speed and direction.
- All movements to be simultaneous.
- Line for approach.
- Column for action.
- Enemy's rear ship four points on bow for chase.
- Leaders abeam for action.
The diagrams are splendidly illustrative of the text, although the ranges seem short for modern warfare. Also eight ships seems a smaller number than will usually form the "main line" of a first-class power.
These last two conditions modify considerably some of the evolutions described. This is principally to be noted in: (1) point of greatest "fire volume," Plates II, III, and IV; (2) time of successive maneuvers; (3) counter circling, Plate IX.
Again I note that many of the maneuvers described hardly appear to be tactical (i.e., battle) evolutions, but more in the nature of "admiral's drill." In a way, it seems hard to imagine "B" squadron (Plate IX) allowing itself to be got into such a hole without being pretty well cut up before it got to its second position.
(This is very similar to the beginning of Tsushima.)
On page 4 the essayist says: "Maximum gun fire, if target can be kept on proper bearing." "…is one of the primary aims of naval tactics." I should be rather led to say that it is the primary aim of tactics, certainly for the main line of battle. Other considerations, of course, will govern the use of destroyers, mine layers, fast armored divisions, and scouts, but maximum gun fire efficiency is what governs the main action.
The chief point, I believe, to be noted in the essay, and also in all our war games, is that "volume of fire" is not "efficiency" of fire.
Now the fire of two ships firing on one is not twice as efficient as the fire of one on one. This is plainly so because the fire cannot be controlled as well when the splash of the other ship interferes with spotting. Yet most tactics and all our war games are based on the idea that it doubles the damage.
Take two squadrons:
"A" admiral has his three best gunnery ships in the lead, and say his three next best as tail-enders. His second in command is in the last ship, so as to lead if he has to go about.
"A" fires each at his opposite in line. Each ship's fire can thus be controlled to the maximum capable of its skill, and every "B" ship is under fire. "B" on the contrary carries his "volume of fire" idea into his dispositions and places his heaviest ships in lead and rear, and concentrates as is usual in war games.
This leaves half of "A's" squadron not under fire at all and hence up to their maximum effort, while "A's" other four ships are not receiving a double damage on account of "B" not being able to control his fire up to his maximum, due to: (1) interfering splashes, and (2) to being under fire from "A."
Moreover, if there was an "about," "B" has no flag leading.
The above is the gist of my argument. If two men are fighting two men, and both on one side jump on one of the other, the unengaged man has a capital chance to get in one on the point of the jaw with the other two in succession, as no one is paying any attention to him during the mix-up. It, therefore, seems a fairer scheme to base our war games and battle tactics on "efficiency" rather than "volume" of fire.
Counter circling would not then be such a favorite in the initial stages of a war game.
Experiment should show something of this two ships firing at one target.
The essayist's summary of weather vantage and concentration are most complete. And the automatic torpedo distance card is invaluable.
Under "Concentration" (p. 32, par. 3-end), the essayist hits the nail squarely when he says: "If each ship is firing at the best target, it is the logical distribution of fire."
The admiral's fire tactics will probably be automatic, as will also be the captain's general orders to the fire-control officer. With a serviceable conning tower, skeletonized masts, absence of top hamper, and freedom from inflammable material, the communication between captain and fire control would be so improved that the question of targets and fire direction would probably be simplified to the point of practicability.
It is to be hoped for the efficiency of the fleet that these conditions will soon be obtained in both our old and new ships.
Fire efficiency is, therefore, a question of tactics and top hamper.
There yet remains the subject of destroyers, scouts, fast armored divisions, and mine layers. The latter is a new departure, and a necessary one, for it is scarcely to be supposed that battleships in action are going to get up and drop mines overboard.
The service should be greatly obliged and indebted to Lieutenant Pye for this admirable paper. I believe it is the first one that has made a serious beginning into the subject of handling destroyers in battle. There is, however, the indented line yet to consider.
Captain B.A. Fiske, U.S. Navy. Mr. Pye is much to be congratulated on his clear and painstaking discussion of one of the most obscure subjects in the world Naval Tactics.
But while one must admire the dexterity of the essayist, in reducing to geometrical form the almost countless unknown quantities of the problem, a few criticisms of a practical kind seem to demand consideration.
1. Near the bottom of page 4 occurs the statement: "Column is the best formation during the action, but the poorest for approach or retreat."
Granting the truth of the first clause, as we all do, is not the second clause a tremendous generalization, and one without any precedent to support it? Does not the best formation for approach depend on the bearing and distance of the enemy, and also on the direction in which he is going and his speed?
2. On page 6, near the middle, the essayist states: "Line is a good formation for approach or retreat. The bearing of the line should be, as nearly as possible, perpendicular to the direction of the enemy."
Remembering the criticism just attempted, one may suggest further, in criticism, that the bearing of the line should not be perpendicular to the direction of the enemy, unless the bearing of the enemy does not change; unless, that is, the enemy is coming straight. If, however, the enemy were steering, say in column, in some other direction (perpendicular to the line joining the fleets, to take an extreme case), a fleet in a line perpendicular to the direction of the enemy would certainly not approach in either the quickest or the safest way; and, furthermore, the direction would be constantly changing. Besides, line is a difficult formation to maintain, even in good weather, with plenty of help on the bridge, a compass under the eye of the officer of the deck, and no distraction. But let us remember that modern ordnance is much more deadly than it used to be, and that men are just as vulnerable as ever; so that the men directing the ships must be under cover of some kind, and, therefore, handicapped in the way of seeing. This being the case, is it probable that a line could be preserved so good that the ships could be swung into column without confusion and delay? Now, confusion and delay would be two undesirable things at the beginning of a battle.
Again, if line be a difficult formation to maintain in approach, what shall be said of it as a formation in which to retreat, when the retreating ships will be much battered and more or less disabled?
3. On page 8, the essayist states: "Line of bearing is a good formation for approach or retreat, the line of bearing being perpendicular to the direction of the enemy." In one way line of bearing is better than simple line; it is not confined to one compass course, but permits the course to be changed very quickly, provided, of course, that signals can be made and understood.
But, except for this, line of bearing seems a much worse formation than line, for either approach or retreat, simply because it is much more difficult to maintain. We all know that this is true, even under the best conditions. But would it be even possible to maintain it, unless the enemy were so far away, and approaching so slowly that the ships could be directed from the bridges? This directing might be done; but it would seem a little risky to be within sight of the enemy, and approaching him, and not have everyone at his battle station. Besides, is the possible advantage to be gained likely to be great enough to warrant a departure from those simple formations that nearly every officer now seems to think the best?
4. On pages 10, 12, and 14, the essayist discusses the relative advantages of the rectangular method, the direct method and the special methods, largely with reference to interference with gun fire. Imagine making maneuvers under gun fire by a direct or a special method! It seems inconceivable that any commander-in-chief ever should attempt it; certainly no commander-in-chief ever has attempted it.
5. On page 16, the essayist states, speaking of the "laws governing the maneuvers of two squadrons within fighting range": "The most advantageous position is in line of bearing," etc. Let anyone who has been officer of the deck while the fleet was steaming on a line of bearing, with the compass under his eye and a stadimeter in his hand, standing on a high bridge, with a clear view, and a general condition of tranquility let him remember how difficult he found his job, and then let him imagine himself doing this from the conning tower, without any compass, and with a frightful noise all around him, his difficulty of seeing through the slits in the conning tower increased by the gun smoke and coal smoke over everything!
6. On page 19, the essayist shows a fleet in line of bearing and then changing from line of bearing to column under gun fire. The same objections to line of bearing, under gun fire, may be repeated. And let it be borne in mind that, if a maneuver is attempted in battle that cannot be well carried out, confusion and loss of gun fire cannot be prevented.
7. On page 20, last paragraph, the essayist states: "Approaching in column is at variance with our first law of position." Yet this is exactly what was done at Tsushima, our solitary model of a modern fleet battle!
8. In the "Plan of Imaginary Battle," no good reason appears for B changing from column to line of bearing and then back to column. It would have been just as effective, and much easier, to have continued in column, and changed to SW, when ready, if indeed that change were desirable. And a maneuver by special method, such as shown at the bottom of the diagram, carried out under fire, would have been so highly dangerous, so out of proportion to the hypothetical advantage hoped for (which was not, in fact, attained), that it seems incredible that any commander-in-chief would ever attempt it. Certainly no commander-in-chief ever has attempted it.
9. At the conclusion of the imaginary battle, the beaten B "assumes a line of bearing!" How could a fleet, subjected long enough, and cruelly enough, to the fire of modern ordnance to be beaten in a battle, how could it possibly steam off so geometrically?
10. The writer takes much pleasure in agreeing with the essayist's views on concentration, which Professor Alger and he have endeavored to expound in three numbers of the Institute.
11. On page 33, about the middle, the essayist speaks of "The inefficient handling of the Russian squadron, and still more inefficient handling of their guns," etc. Not in any spirit of criticism, but as a matter of professional interest, it may be pointed out here that one depends on the other. Particularly does ineffective ship and fleet handling result from inferior gunnery; for the reason that the "hail of projectiles" received in consequence affects the nerves and judgment of the personnel and the condition of the material. The fleet that is receiving the less abuse can naturally maneuver the better. This explains, in a measure, the comparative precision of the Japanese maneuvers at Tsushima, compared with those of the Russians.
This does not mean that the Japanese used any complicated maneuvers; we know they did not.
12. On pages 34, 35 and 36, the essayist shows some torpedo range cards. These are extremely ingenious, and show the signs of careful thought. But are they not constructed on the fundamental misconception that the use of a torpedo, on board a battleship, is to be fired at another ship, at the long ranges shown? This assumes an accuracy for the torpedo and its method of firing far beyond what I understand to be claimed for them. Is not the use of a battleship torpedo, to be fired at a distant fleet or a near ship?
13. On page 37, the essayist shows two squadrons carrying on gun fire and torpedo fire, while steaming on a line of bearing. This seems impracticable for reasons already given.
14. On page 39 are shown certain arrangements used in the German navy, whereby torpedo destroyers can be used to help a fleet. Doubtless, this might be done in good weather near shore. But this suggests the question, "Why do not the arguments in favor of a few big ships, as compared with many small ships why do they not apply to torpedo vessels?" What is the use in having a dozen half-seaworthy little torpedo boats, when the same money would give us, say, two big torpedo ships, that would be faster than any battleship, perfectly seaworthy, and practically invulnerable to gun fire?
Commander A.P. Niblack, U.S. Navy. There is no officer in the navy better qualified than Lieutenant Pye to discuss theoretical conditions as to naval tactics, and until there come from the fleet the actual data with regard to range and position movements we are not going to get away from the game-board because the data given in the essay must be game board data since they are not known to exist practically at least for publication. This essay frankly supplements my essay on "The Elements of Fleet Tactics," published in the Naval Institute Proceedings, which essay, under the limitations as to 50 pages, could not embrace anything more than the elementary principles, and I feel that I would be lacking in courtesy if I did not express my appreciation of the "step further" the essay has taken.
His treatment of concentration is excellent and his approval of the natural target or the common-sense target, as seen by the eye of the fire control officer, is in line with the best thought of the service. It is a curious fact that the game-board rules permit concentration on one or more ships with cumulative effect, while the rules used in our fleet maneuvers make concentration of three ships on one actually count less than that of two ships on one, on the ground of interference in the spotting. As a matter of fact it seems to be pretty well agreed that, in action, every fire-control officer will know best which ship to fire at, but will fire at a particular ship if ordered.
Without wishing to appear to detract from Lieutenant Pye's treatment of torpedo fire, which is excellent, he is probably unfamiliar with the diagrams of Lieut.-Commander G.W. Logan, U.S.N., which solve at a glance every question of torpedo range.
I am very glad that an essay on naval tactics has gotten first prize in the Naval Institute. The War College does not give its tactical findings to the officers who are not fortunate enough to attend the course, and the rest of us must work out our own salvation. This essay is a lucid and clear exposition of the current thought of the student body of younger officers in the navy. What the older officers are thinking on these questions is a matter of such profound importance, in case of war, that it seems, with my limited view, that some tangible, practicable results should be forthcoming soon, or else that we be contented with the theory.