ROBERT SMITH, 1801-1809
The administration of Thomas Jefferson, which came into power on March 4, 1801, differed definitely on naval questions from that of John Adams. The one wished to reduce the naval expenditures to the lowest terms; the other to appropriate most generously for officers, seamen, ships, docks, and navy-yards. The one favored a defensive navy; the other, an offensive navy. The one would build, if vessels must be built, sloops of war, gunboats, and barges, for the defence of the coasts and harbors; the other would add to the existing fleet of ships of the line and stout frigates, equal or superior to the best seagoing vessels of the European navies. In 1799 Jefferson had written to Elbridge Gerry that he was "for such a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbors from such depredations as we have experienced." But he was not "for a navy, which, by its own expenses and the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them." In 1800 he declared that the country was running "navy 'mad." 1
Jefferson's secretary of the treasury, Albert Gallatin, who in Congress in past years had vigorously opposed every measure for the increase or encouragement of the navy, now outdid his chief in proposals for retrenchment in naval expenditures. In 1802 he recommended that the cost of the navy for that year be reduced to $600,000. He considered one frigate and two or three small vessels "amply sufficient." 2 All the members of the Re-
1 Ford, Jefferson, VII, 328, 406.
2 Adams, History of the United States, II, 136.
publican party were not as strongly opposed to naval expenditures as Jefferson and Gallatin. On the other hand, the opposition of a few members went even farther. In 1802 Michael Leib, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, moved in the House for a committee to consider the question of abolishing the navy. 2 In i805 John Randolph said that he should not be surprised to see the Navy Department abolished, or, in more appropriate phrase, swept by the board, at the next session of Congress." 4
Randolph's wish may have been father to his expectation, for it is well known that he bore a lively antipathy to Jefferson's secretary of the navy, not a man of national note when chosen to the headship of the department. That Jefferson's chief naval adviser was of importance on account of his kin rather than on account of his weight in the public counsels, was not the fault of the President, for he made numerous attempts to obtain a national character to manage the navy. As early as December, 1800, before he knew certainly that he and not Aaron Burr was to be president, he offered the naval portfolio to Robert R. Livingston, of New York. Jefferson had the notion, which was common during the early history of the department, that a secretary of the navy should have some knowledge of maritime, naval, and commercial affairs. He keenly felt his need of a secretary of this sort, for he confessed that he knew less of the Navy Department than of any other branch of the government. Few Republicans, however, who had been bred to the sea or to commerce, possessed at the same time all the political and intellectual qualifications that were considered essential to a member of the cabinet. Livingston fell short in his knowledge of seafaring pursuits. When urging him to accept the secretaryship, Jefferson wrote to him as follows: " Tho 5 you are not nautical by profession, yet your residence and your mechanical science qualify you as well as gentlemen can possibly be, and sufficiently to enable you to choose under-agents perfectly qualified, and to superintend their conduct." Livingston refused the tender.
In February, 1801, Jefferson offered the position to General Samuel Smith, a Baltimore merchant, and one of the most influential men in the Republican party. When Smith declined to
3 Adams, History of the United States, I, 296-99.
4 Adams, Randolph, 160-61.
5 Ford, Jefferson, VII, 465.
abandon his business for the service of the government, the President decided on John Langdon, of New Hampshire, a Republican of national fame. On Langdon's refusal, he again turned to Smith, but without success. William Jones, a Republican member of Congress from Philadelphia, was now given an opportunity to decline the secretaryship. Meanwhile, Adams's secretary of the navy, Benjamin Stoddert, who in February had tendered his resignation to take effect in March, became tired of waiting. A temporary arrangement was therefore effected. Samuel Dearborn was made acting secretary of the navy; and Samuel Smith agreed to perform, nominally under Dearborn, the actual duties of the office. 6 The Republicans took possession of the Navy Department on April 1, 1801.
In May Jefferson wrote jestingly to Gouverneur Morris that he believed that he would have to advertise for a secretary of the navy. In June he once more offered the position to John Langdon, and for a time it was thought in Washington that Langdon would accept. In the same month General Smith returned to Baltimore and left the department in charge of Dearborn and Abishai Thomas, the chief clerk of the department. 7 On Langdon's second refusal Jefferson became discouraged in his search for national characters, and accepted Robert Smith, the brother of General Samuel Smith. It has been said that Robert's chief recommendations were the advice and aid which his brother Samuel was expected to give him. In its political aspect the appointment was a good one, for the family of the Smiths was well connected and influential in Maryland and Virginia. Robert Smith was a "Baltimore gentleman, easy and cordial, glad to oblige and fond of power and show, popular in the navy, yielding in the Cabinet, but as little fitted as Jefferson himself for the task of administering with severe economy an unpopular service." 8 After graduating from Princeton, Smith had practised law, and had served several terms in the Maryland legislature. In 1789 he was one of the presidential electors. He became the last survivor of the first electoral college, dying in 1842. For a time he
6 Ford, Jefferson, VII, 484; VIII, 13-14, 28; Adams, History of the United States, I, 219-20.
7 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 49; General Letters, Navy Department Archives, IV, 409-10.
8 Adams, History of the United States, I, 222.
was secretary of state under Madison. While Smith lacked the driving power of the statesman, he possessed in considerable measure the lubricating qualities of the politician, which by reducing the friction may greatly accelerate the speed of the administrative machine.
On July 15, 1801, Smith received a temporary commission, as the Senate was not then in session. He was confirmed by the Senate and recommissioned on January 26, 1802. On July 27, 1801, he relieved Dearborn and Thomas, and took charge of the department. He served continuously as secretary of the navy until March 7, 1809. Only two other rival secretaries, Gideon Welles, 1861-1869, and George M. Robeson, 1869-1877, have had longer terms of office. During Jefferson's second administration the official status of Robert Smith was an anomalous one. In January, 1805, Smith asked to be transferred from the Navy Department to the Department of Justice. Jefferson consented, and selected Jacob Crowninshield, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, to take the place of Smith in the Navy Department. Crowninshield declined the offer, as his wife did not wish to leave her kin and friends in Massachusetts and live in Washington. Nevertheless, on March 2, the President sent the nomination of Crowninshield to the Senate, along with that of Robert Smith, "now Secretary of the Navy to be Attorney-General of the United States " ; and on the same day the two nominations were confirmed. Crowninshield still persisted in declining the secretaryship, and Smith continued to fill it throughout Jefferson's second term. According to the records of the State Department, Crowninshield during this period was secretary of the navy, although he died on April 15, 1808. From March 3, i805, until March 7, 1809, Smith acted by no known authority except the verbal request or permission of the President. 9
On July 31, 1801, two days after entering upon the duties of his office, Smith dismissed Thomas French, one of the clerks of the secretary's office, and appointed Thomas T. Anderson to the place made vacant. This appointment bears the ear-marks of a personal or political one, and seems to be the first application of the spoils system to the Navy Department proper—several Federalist navy agents had been removed before this. The two letters of Smith,
9 Adams, History of the United States, III, 10-12.
one dismissing French, and the other appointing Anderson, are interesting; both were written on the same day. In one letter Smith denies the responsibility that he assumes in the other. To French he wrote: "An arrangement having been made and a Gentleman appointed to succeed you as a Clerk in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, previous to my taking upon myself the functions of that office, it remains for me only to notify you of the Circumstance, and to assure you that since my arrival at this place I have observed with Satisfaction your prompt and cheerful Attention to your official Duties." The letter to Anderson read as follows: "Confiding in your Capacity and Integrity from the very respectable Manner in which you have been recommended to me, I have appointed you a Clerk in the Navy Office. You will therefore be pleased to come to this place as early as conveniently may be. Your Services are immediately necessary." 10
A more important change in the force of the secretary's office was made on April I, 1802, when Charles W. Goldsborough succeeded Abishai Thomas as chief clerk of the department. Goldsborough was promoted from the position of a subordinate clerk, which he had held since 1798. Some of his duties were prescribed in his letter of appointment: As chief clerk he was to have "under the superintending control of the Secretary, the custody and charge of all the Books, Papers, and Documents of every description belonging to the Department." He was to be responsible for the accuracy of the records of the department. "He must see that the Business of each day be brought up during that day, and that all the books and papers of the Office are arranged in the most regular order." He was to apportion the duties of the subordinate clerks, and to have charge of the appropriation for the contingent expenses of the secretary's office. In the future the secretary of the navy was to communicate only with the chief clerk, who was expected to "be duly prepared at all times when called upon." 11
Goldsborough was one of the most important officials of the Navy Department during the first half-century of its existence. With the exception of a period of some two years during the War of 1812, he was connected with the department from 1798 to 1843.
10 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., IV, 476-77.
11 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., V, 273-74.
Although not a profound man, yet his knowledge of naval affairs, by virtue of his long service, was large and accurate. He was thus able to be of great assistance to the secretaries of the navy and to the board of navy commissioners, of which he was for a long time secretary. Students of the American navy are under many obligations to him for his Naval Chronicle, published in 1824, 'a narrative and documentary history of the early navy. He came of good Maryland stock. One of his sons was Rear-Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough, who rendered gallant service to the Union during the Civil War, and the other, Commodore John Rodgers Goldsborough, also a naval officer of this war.
For several years Smith employed but one other clerk in addition to Goldsborough and Anderson, but in 1806 a fourth clerk was added. The pay of the clerks were considerably higher under Smith than under Stoddert. The salary of the chief clerk was raised from $1200 to $1800 a year. In 1806 Congress limited the total compensation of the clerks of the secretary's office to $4900, and of the accountant's office to $8000. The office hours of the department began at nine o'clock in the morning, as at present, and closed at three in the afternoon, an hour and a half earlier than is now the rule. In 1803 Smith informed Congress that his clerks were frequently compelled to work over-time. 12
The eccentric John Randolph, who was a most unfriendly critic of the Secretary of the Navy, has described an interview which he had with Smith and Goldsborough in 1807 at the Navy Office in Washington. There is plainly much caricature, as well as some truth, in Randolph's amusing picture. He had called to ask Smith for an explanation of certain items in the navy estimate for 1807:
The Secretary called up his chief clerk, who knew very little more of the business than his master. I propounded a question to the head of the department; he turned to the clerk like a boy who cannot say his lesson, and with imploring countenance beseeches aid; the clerk with much assurance gabbled out some commonplace jargon, which I would not take for sterling; an explanation was required, and both were dumb. This pantomime was repeated at every item, until, disgusted, and ashamed for the degraded situation of the principal, I took leave without pursuing
12 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 396; Congress Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., I, 134-35.
the subject, seeing that my subject [object] could not be attained. There was not one single question relating to the department that the Secretary could answer. 13
On April 1, 1801, the day upon which the Republicans took charge of the Navy Department, the official axe fell promptly and the official lives of Higginson & Co., navy agents at Boston; and of James and Ebenezer Watson, navy agents at New York, came to an end. Exactly one month later, the Federalist navy agent at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was removed; and Woodbury Langdon, a prominent Republican, was appointed to fill the vacancy. Within less than a year after Smith became secretary of the navy, all the chief naval agencies in the United States, except the one at Philadelphia, had been filled with Republicans. At first Jefferson was disposed to get along with fewer agencies, and several of the smaller ones necessitated by the war with France were discontinued. The destroying of offices, however, proved to be an unpopular and little appreciated work and the Republicans soon found themselves creating new agencies. In 1804 a detachment of marines was ordered to New Orleans, as this city was now in possession of the Americans. A naval station under the command of a naval officer was soon located here, and a naval agent for New Orleans was appointed. In 1805 Captain Henry Carbery was sent to Cincinnati to act as a navy agent for the construction of gunboats on 'the Western Waters. In 1807 a navy agent for Cuba was appointed, and in 1808 one was chosen for Madeira. In February, 1809, a naval agency was created for Portland, Maine.
During the Tripolitan war of 1801-1807 it was necessary to provide the fleet in the Mediterranean with money, provisions, and naval stores. At first the American consul at Gibraltar and the firm of Degen and Purviance at Leghorn, who acted as navy agents, were thought sufficient for the work of attending to the needs of the fleet. But later naval agencies were established at Naples, Syracuse, Malta, and one for the two cities of Marseilles and Toulon. In 1804 William Eaton was appointed navy agent for the "Barbary Regencies." The firm of McKenzie and Glennie, of London, was the financial agent of the Navy Department, and supplied the commanders of the vessels and the agents in the Mediterranean with money. Supply ships were regularly sent
13 Adams, Randolph, 211.
out from America to these agents. They were loaded with provisions of all sorts, and with candles, cordage, canvas, twine, and slops. The naval vessels that were sent to relieve the vessels in the Mediterranean of course always carried supplies for that station. The maintenance of a fleet at so great a distance from home was very expensive. Towards the end of the war Smith came to suspect that some of the supplies were diverted from their proper uses. He concluded that the division of the business of purveying among so many navy agents was not economical, and in 1807 he decided to concentrate their work at Port Mahon on the island of Minorca. 14
During the first year of their administration, the Republicans were quite suspicious and critical of the transactions of their predecessors. When the Messrs. Watson, navy agents at New York, delayed the turning over of the public property to their successors, Samuel Smith, who was then in charge of the Navy Department, declared that they feared an investigation of their accounts. A contract for making hemp into cordage entered into by Messrs. Higginson, navy agents at Boston, appeared to Smith "to be a job." The purchase price of the navy-yard on Long Island seemed to him to be “extravagantly high." In July, 1801, Dearborn, while acting secretary of the navy, appointed a commission of seven men to reconsider the locating of the Philadelphia navy yard. The commission, two of whose members were Captains Barry and Decatur, reported in favor of another site, but Smith decided against its purchase since the sale of the old yard would cause delays and embarrassments. He also decided against removing the New York yard from its site on Wallabout Bay, when the propriety of its location was questioned. 15
Could Gallatin have had his way, the number of navy-yards would have been reduced. Jefferson also was inclined to favor a reduction. In his first annual message to Congress, after expressing a doubt whether the Federalists had been authorized to purchase and improve the several yards, he said: I have in certain cases suspended or slackened these expenditures that the legislature might determine whether so many yards are necessary as
14 Barbary Powers Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1-44; General Letters, VIII. 299.
15 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., IV, 321, 362, 400, 458, 516, 518, 524.
have been contemplated." 16 Congress and the Secretary of the Navy investigated and reported upon the subject, but in the end the Federalist purchases were allowed to stand and no reduction in the number of yards was made.
The Republicans were able to effect important economies in the management of the navy-yards by reducing the forces employed in them and by refusing to improve them after the manner contemplated by Adams and Stoddert, who before March 4, 1801, had begun the construction of wharves, shops, and sheds. In October, 1801, the duties of Marbury, the navy agent at Georgetown, District of Columbia, who had been dismissed in July, were vested in Captain Thomas Tingey of the navy, and he was made both navy agent for the district and superintendent of the Washington navyyard. At Portsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk the naval constructors, clerks of the yard, and naval storekeepers were dismissed, and the yards were placed in the hands of the navy agents, each of whom was permitted to employ an assistant at a salary of $600 a year. Only at Boston were there left in service both a superintendent and a navy agent. Captain Samuel Nicholson, of the navy, who filled the former position, was probably considered too incapacitated by sickness and age to competently act as navy agent; and his gallant Revolutionary services plead too eloquently for him to admit of his removal from the superintendency. In 1804 the four civilian navy agents who were also superintendents received, in addition to their commissions on their purchases, $1200 a year, and were allowed an assistant and a porter. 17
One of the last naval acts of the Federalist Congress, passed March 3, 1801, appropriated $500,000 to continue the construction of the six 74-gun ships and to complete the navy-yards, docks, and wharves; and $20,000 for the erection of marine barracks. These were the first specific appropriations for navy-yards, docks, and barracks, made by Congress. 18 A considerable part of the $500, 000, the Republicans returned to the treasury unexpended, and but a very small part was devoted to the improvement of the yards. As early as June, 1801, Jefferson, however, ordered $4000 of the sum appropriated for barracks to be paid for "square No. 927 in Washington for the purpose of erecting thereon Barracks
16 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 122.
17 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., V, 49, 53-58; VII, 19-23.
18 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 122-23.
for the Marine Corps." This lot, which constitutes a part of the present site of the Washington Marine Barracks, is situated near the navy-yard. It was purchased, and the construction of buildings was at once commenced." 19 The making of this expenditure accorded well with Jefferson's desire to promote the improvement of the capital city, and it therefore met his favor.
The navy-yard at Washington was the only one in which Jefferson manifested any particular interest. The seven ships, which the act of March 3, 1801, providing for a naval peace establishment, authorized to be laid up in ordinary, he directed to be brought to the Washington yard and to be laid up in the Eastern Branch, where they would require "but one set of plunderers to take care of them." He made this yard the chief depot of supplies and the repair shop of the navy. By February, 1806, the improvements in it made since its purchase had cost $177,000, a little more than had been spent on all the other yards. The Federalists in New England, and even in Virginia, raised the hue and cry over this diverting of the naval expenditures from home ports and the concentrating of them at a point so inconvenient to the sea as Washington. Jefferson defended his course on the ground that the navy and the naval establishment, which he thought would bear watching, were thus placed under the eye of the government. The inaccessibility and poverty of Washington and its lack of artisans, seamen, and ample naval resources, afforded an excellent opportunity for Randolph's stinging criticism. He declared that ship timbers and naval stores were repeatedly brought from Norfolk and were worked up by men obtained in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other ports, in order that when worked up they might be returned to Norfolk. The mail coach, he said, carried to Washington for the navy-yard, workmen, live stock, "copper bolts, and such light articles." 20
Jefferson's plan of erecting a "dry dock" at Washington for the preservation of ships formed a part of his policy of concentrating the navy at the capital. Among other characteristics of this singular and remarkable man was a taste for mechanical inventions, and especially those that promised to effect by a short cut some novel and striking economies or improvements. He
19 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., IV, 343, 410, 425.
20 State Papers, Naval Affairs, I, 150; Annals of Congress, XIV, 1009; XV, 324; XXI, 1971; Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 338.
doubtless derived the greatest satisfaction in conceiving and maturing the details and principles of his "dry dock." The primary purpose of his invention was not to facilitate the building or repairing of ships, although it was supposed that the dock would prove useful in these respects, but to preserve vessels during long periods of peace by preventing their decay from the action of a water, sun, and weather. During peace Jefferson proposed to lay up nearly all the ships of the navy in the "dry dock," and discharge almost the whole force of officers and seamen. By November, 1802, he had worked out his plan with considerable detail. It provided for a lower basin, into which the vessels were to be floated by the tide. Adjoining this and twenty-four feet higher was an upper basin, 800 feet long and 175 feet wide; and large enough to contain twelve frigates. These were to be raised from the lower to the upper basin by a lock or locks. On discharging the water in the upper basin, the frigates would be left high and dry. They were to be covered by a roof "like that of the Halle du blé at Paris, which, needing no Underworks to support it will permit the Basin to be entirely open and free for the movements of the vessels." Jefferson thought that the water for the locks could be obtained either from the Potomac or from one of the three branches of that river in Washington, the Eastern Branch, Tiber Creek, or Rock Creek. If this dock proved to be successful, a second one was to be built. 21
Jefferson obtained the services of Benjamin H. Latrobe, who later became one 'of the architects of the capitol, to make the preliminary surveys and to estimate the cost of the first "dry dock." Latrobe considered Jefferson's plan feasible, and recommended that the dock be constructed on the Eastern Branch. According to his estimate two such docks would cost nearly a million dollars. Beautiful and appropriate drawings, with estimates, which Latrobe prepared, were laid before Congress by the President. When these were considered in January, 1803, various objections were raised. Some members of Congress believed that the dock could not be economically constructed on the Eastern Branch; others thought that the ships would be strained and “wracked “by leaving them out of the water for a long time; and still others doubted whether they could be really preserved
21 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., VI, 70-72.
in the dock. It was said that even under shelter, "septic vapors, with moisture, would exert their disorganizing powers" on the older vessels. It was asserted in favor of the dock that Sweden and Venice had constructed similar ones. Although the President considered his project one of great importance to the country and urged upon Congress its adoption, that body refused to follow him, and doubtless exhibited wisdom in its decision. 22
In deciding all questions of naval policy, the views of Jefferson and Gallatin prevailed. When Robert Smith in the summer of 1801 entered upon the duties of his office, he showed a disposition to make considerable improvements in the navy-yards, somewhat after the manner of the Federalists, but he soon learned in this as well as in all larger naval problems readily to yield to the opinions of the President and his brilliant secretary of the treasury. In the routine work of purchasing naval supplies and of making minor naval appointments, he was given a freer hand. The secretary of the navy at this time attended to many minor details such as are now never brought to his attention, engrossed as he is in the more general and more important duties of his position.
Each winter Smith laid in for his fleet a supply of salt beef and pork. In order to distribute the profits, these provisions were purchased in different states of the 'Union. In the winter of 1801-1802 Connecticut, New York, Maryland, and North Carolina furnished them. In later years the states on the Western Waters provided some of the meats for the navy. Smith gave his agents in this business the following specific directions in regard to packing the beef: "All the Legs, shins, necks, shoulders, clods, and Leg-rounds must be excluded—the rest of the Beef must be cut in pieces of 10-lb. each, so that 20 pieces will make a barrel— there must be a sufficient quantity of salt petre and it must be inspected and branded agreeably to law. The barrels must be made of white oak heart, and well bound." 22
A letter of Smith to E. Williams, Hagerstown, Washington County, Maryland, dated May 31, 1806, illustrates still better the petty details upon which the first secretaries of the navy spent their time. It is hardly necessary to say that the “Spirit" to which Smith refers is West India rum.
21State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 104-08; Annals of Congress, XII, 401-410;
22 Ford, Jefferson, VIII, 188. "General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch. V, 96.
"We require for the use of the Navy Yard here and for our Ships in, commission, considerable Supplies of beans or peas and butter, and we have heretofore very often experienced considerable difficulties in procuring them. Our present annual consumption is about 1600 bushels of beans or peas, and about 12,500 lbs. of butter. Cannot Washington County supply us? If she can, inform me on what terms. There is, I have understood, a process of putting up butter, known in Washington County, to last for one year, without becoming ranced. If so, I would engage to receive in the month of Novr. or Decr. the whole quantity wanted for the ensuing year. "
The articles of Whiskey and Linseed oil I should suppose Washn. [County] might supply of good qualities and upon reasonable terms. The Sailors are by law allowed Spirit, but being persuaded that Whiskey is a more wholesome drink as well as a much more economical one, I am anxious to introduce the use of it into our Navy generally; but this cannot be immediately effected. I have therefore made experiment to introduce it, and the result has satisfied me that in time the Sailors will become perfectly reconciled to it, and probably prefer it to Spirit. Our annual consumption of Spirit is about 45,000 Gallons. I would for the ensuing year engage 20,000 Gallons of Whiskey, but it must be pure rye whiskey of 3rd or 2nd proof, and one year old, if to be had. This Whiskey I would receive early in the ensuing year. 24
One of Smith's duties related to the appointment and promotion of midshipmen. This position was exceedingly attractive to ambitious and adventurous youths, who longed for the thrill and romance of a seafaring life, but who knew nothing of its monotonies, its hardships, and its tragedies. Many of the applicants for a midshipman's berth were disappointed in their struggles to attain it. The usual brief formula of the secretary of the navy by which he deferred their hopes read as follows: "Your application for an appointment as midshipman in the navy has been received and filed on the roll of applicants. When vacancies occur in the corps of midshipmen your application shall be considered." Smith insisted that all applications should be accompanied with recommendations from men of worth and note who were personally acquainted with the young men. He once
24 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., VIII, 172.
wrote to the Right Reverend Bishop Carroll of Baltimore, who had presented the claims of an applicant, that respectable connections, good education, and unexceptionable character, and especially the latter, were essential qualifications for the position. In a letter to DeWitt Clinton, who had written in behalf of a youth, and had enclosed a certificate stating that he had a " Good natural temper," Smith explained that this possession might recommend the applicant "in private life, but is not sufficient for a military one." A young man, he said, may be "extremely amiable and Respectable, yet unqualified for the Navy Service, which requires a strong Constitution of Body and mind, a high love of Character, and passion for Glory." In appointing midshipmen Smith tried to attend to the respective claims of the different states, and in 1808 he wrote that Virginia had her full proportion. In promoting midshipmen he had regard not so much to the seniority of the appointment, as to fitness, which he determined from the communications of the commanding officers." 25
When the Republicans took charge of the navy, the most congenial duty of reducing it to the numbers fixed by the act of March 3, 1801, providing for a naval peace establishment, fell to them. In December, Smith reported the sale of sixteen vessels for $276,000, a sum scarcely sufficient for the purchase of one first-class frigate. In July, 1801, Jefferson ordered the privates of the marine corps to be reduced to 400 men. After the reduction, the number of commissioned officers of the corps was 31. In the navy, the rank of master commandant was discontinued. The captains were reduced from 28 to 15; the lieutenants, from 1 10 to 56; and the midshipmen, from 354 to 150. At times the whole number of officers and men did not greatly exceed moo. In April, 18°6, the number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys was fixed by law at 925. In 1801 the Republicans expended $925,000 less than the Federalists had appropriated for that year. In 1802 the navy cost but $946,000. Never again were the expenditures of the United States navy to fall below the million-dollar mark. In 1800 the Federalists had spent on the navy $3,385,000." 26
25 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., VII, 136, 359; VIII, 72; IX, 156.
26 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., IV, 449; State Papers, Nay. Aff.,
I, 82, 149; U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 390; Goldsborough, Naval Chronicle, 375-92.
It was the irony of fate that a President devoted to peace and to retrenchment in naval expenditures should have had to conduct one naval war and to face the probability that others might break out at any time. The war with Tripoli lasted from 1801 to 1806. Its picturesque events, notably Decatur's burning of the Philadelphia and Preble's spirited attacks against Tripoli are familiar to all students of American naval history. During Jefferson's second administration a war with Spain was a possibility; and early in 1809 it was thought that a war with Great Britain could not longer be deferred. These circumstances forced the President after 1802 to gradually increase the naval expenditures. Early in his second administration he began to consider the advisability of building ships of the line, and Gallatin recommended the spending for this purpose of a million dollars a year for several years. To meet the needs of the Tripolitan war seven small vessels, mounting 14 or 16 guns, were built or purchased. In 1806, the rank of master commandant was restored; 9 officers of this rank were authorized, and the number of lieutenants was increased to 72. In December, 1807, the total number of officers and seamen in the navy was 2304. Early in 1809 when a war with Great Britain seemed imminent Congress authorized the President to increase the navy by the addition of 300 midshipmen and 3600 seamen and boys, and to add to the marine corps 784 officers and privates. The appropriations for the navy for 1809 were $2,917,000, but the actual expenditures were considerable less. Since the war clouds soon disappeared, only a small part of the contemplated naval increase was made. Randolph, who was not above juggling with figures to suit his own argument, declared that Jefferson's navy cost in 1808 for each seaman almost twice as much as Adams's. It is true that Jefferson's navy cost for each seaman much more than did that of Adams, but manifestly this is an unfair basis of comparison, for the fixed expenses of the naval establishment vary little with the enlisting or discharging of additional seamen. 27
The largest naval increase made by Jefferson was at the same time the most useless. The “gunboat policy" was another of his naval inventions. As would the "dry docks," so would the gunboats save the country vast sums of money. These vessels cost
27 Gallatin's Writings, L 232; Annals of Congress, XXI, 1979, 1993;
U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 390, 314, 344, 346; State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 171.
little to build, and during periods of peace could be hauled up on shore and placed under shelter safe from the ravages of wind, wave, and weather. He found sanction for their use and proof of their value in the naval experiences of Algiers, England, and Russia. The opinions of Generals Horatio Gates and James Wilkinson and Commodores Samuel Barron and Thomas Tingey as to the efficacy of these vessels fortified his own. 28 In 1803 Congress authorized the construction of 15 gunboats; in 1805, 25; in 1806, 50; and in 1807, 188. In 1807 Smith estimated that the defence of the Atlantic coast and of New Orleans would require 257 gunboats. 29 The number of these vessels actually built was 176. The cost of their construction was $1,584,000; the cost of maintaining 24 gunboats in service at New Orleans for one year was $250,000. Gunboats were built at various ports on the Atlantic coast between Charleston, South Carolina, and Portland, Maine; on Lake Ontario; Lake Champlain; and the Western Waters; and at New Orleans. The first fifteen of them were authorized for the purposes of the Tripolitan war. All the later authorizations were for the protection of the harbors, coasts, and commerce of the United States. 30
The construction of the first two gunboats was commenced in January, 1804. They were constructed "by way of Experiment and as models." One was built at the Washington navy-yard under the superintendence of Captain John Rodgers; and the other, at Hampton, Virginia, under the direction of Captain James Barron. In conducting their experiments in naval architecture, the two captains had the use of a plan of the gunboats of Messina and of a model of those of Naples. 31 To what extent the vessels that were later constructed followed the two experimental ones is not known. The gunboats varied in size; one of average dimensions was 60 feet long, 17 feet wide and 6 feet deep. They were manned with twenty-five to forty-five men. They carried one or two large guns, 24-pounders or 36-pounders. They were not at all adapted to deep-sea navigation; nevertheless several of those first built actually made the trip across the Atlantic and took part in the Tripolitan war.
28 State Papers, Nay. Aff., I, 163.
29 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 206, 330, 402, 451.
30 State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 194-200.
31 Gunboat Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1-8.
Some of the gunboats were constructed of green timber and soon rotted. Others decayed through disuse and neglect. It took much money to keep them in repair. They could be built in time of war without much difficulty, and whole fleets of them have been so constructed in a few weeks; on the other hand, frigates and ships of the line could be built during a war only at the cost of much time, money, and effort. The service on board these vessels was very unpopular with both officers and seamen, nor did it fit them for duty at sea. It is true that many of Jefferson's gunboats were used in the War of 1812, and that other craft of this type were then built. But the actual protection that they afforded was small. All things considered, the construction of these vessels during 1804-1807 was a blunder and a misdirection of the national resources. As usual, Randolph was the most pungent critic of the administration. "Children must have toys and baubles," he said, "and we must indulge ourselves in an expense of many millions on this ridiculous plaything.” 32 Jefferson was loth to learn that his versatile mind was not competent to master naval problems, whose solution belonged to men versed in the naval profession. It is fortunate for his fame that it does not depend upon his work as a naval administrator. In this capacity the only lustre that he acquired sprang from the successful prosecution of the war with Tripoli.
PAUL HAMILTON, 1809-1812, AND WILLIAM JONES, 1813-1814.
On March 4, 1809, James Madison, member of the Virginia line of Republican presidents, and heir to the policy and principles of Jefferson, entered upon his eight years of office. Three days later Paul Hamilton was nominated, confirmed, and commissioned as secretary of the navy. Why Madison should have chosen Hamilton for this position rather than a man of national renown is not known. Hamilton's public service had been confined largely to his own state. Before he was of age he took part in the Revolutionary war. From 1799 to 1806 he served his State first as comptroller and later as governor. This South Carolina gentleman and planter naturally brought to his task in the Navy Department no special knowledge of naval affairs. At this time such a deficiency, was regarded as a considerable disqualification, although later it came to be not so considered.
32 Annals of Congress, XXI, 1972.
The limited and provincial experiences of Hamilton made his outlook upon naval affairs somewhat narrow. Many of his standards, which had been established by a life of great simplicity and integrity, had, however, a wholesome influence upon the navy. The habits of thought, the customs, and the economies, which obtained upon a South Carolina plantation, were far from being amiss when applied to the administration of naval affairs. As secretary of the navy, Hamilton naturally insisted upon economy in naval expenditures, a scrupulous regard for the letter of the law, a conscientious attention to duty on the part of the higher naval officers, and correct habits for the midshipmen. This sober and dignified gentleman took a paternal interest in the young men of the navy. His praiseworthy attempts to form, or reform, their characters must have been often unsuccessful. Once he ordered Captain Tingey to tell several midshipmen, who frequented a public house in Washington and engaged in drinking spirits and playing billiards, "that the eye of the Department is upon them—that such practices will not be permitted—that a perseverance in them will make it my duty to dismiss them and that I shall not fail to perform my duty on the occasion."33
The kindly heart, high sense of duty, and honesty of purpose, of Hamilton are well shown in the following communication, addressed to "Charles W. Goldsborough, First and confidential Clerk." The latter part of the letter is interesting for the light that it throws upon the current work of the department. The letter was dated August 12, 1809, about three months after Hamilton took charge of the Naval Office. The occasion of its writing appears from the context.
"In leaving only for a short time, as I contemplate, my office, I confess that I am not entirely easy, for certainly there are duties and trusts which can consistently with law be under the performance and guidance only of the Head of the Departments. In indulgences similar to that which I mean to take, I am informed have been usual, but they are not the less wrong—the prevalence of error, even universally, cannot constitute it as right.
"Under the influence of these Sentiments, in transferring duties, which properly I alone ought to perform, I am to be excused only by the necessity, which exists of my going to Carolina, for
33 Navy-yard Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., I, 298.
PHOTOGRAPH:
PAUL HAMILTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 1809-1812.
the purpose of conducting my family to Washington, without whose presence I cannot longer consent to serve the United States; and while I think myself thus to be excused, my mind derives consolation only from the belief that in leaving my responsibility in your hands, I am safe.
"I have not long had the Satisfaction of knowledge of you, but it has been sufficient to convince me that we are alike actuated by a desire to promote our Country's good, and the honor and dignity of the Department in which we act. This belief is strengthened by not only your faithful cooperations with me in official duties, but by the reputation which has been ascribed to you as a gentleman on whom every reliance may be placed. You know well my ideas as to the grand outlines of our duty, and as the first of these you are apprized that a wholesome oeconomy is to be observed as to disbursements and that in no instance is an appropriation to be exceeded unless under Sanction of the President, who by Law is authorized to supply the deficiency of one fund from the Surplusage of another. . . . You know my Sentiments as to the equipment for Service of our Ships of War; refuse nothing which may conduce to their efficiency, and watch well the behaviour of our officers; attend also to the Navy Yard at Washington; 'tis a sink of all that needs correction, and if God spares me it shall be rectified; make advances according to your best judgment for a Steam Engine in the Navy Yard here, for a Shed in front of the Blockmaker's Shop, and a Coal oven in this yard; attend to the erection of a Magazine or Powder House here and at Gosport on Latrobe's plan; attend to the Subjects required by Congress at its annual Session, of which are reports of all the Contracts which we have made, and beyond which, but not the less to be attended to, is the requisiton of Mr. Randolph, as the Chairman of the Committee of Enquiry, I have only to add my firm persuasion that you will do your duty for your own sake and our Country's, and that thus you will gratify your mind, and effectually serve and oblige your friend—Paul Hamilton.” 34
In time of peace, with a president who looked at the naval affairs through Jefferson's spectacles, and with a Republican Congress in power that threatened to reduce the fleet to six small ships, Hamilton did not prove unequal to his post. But when the
34 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., X 71.
War of 1812 began, and there was demanded of the naval secretary decision, initiative, activity, expert knowledge, and skill in the handling of details, Hamilton fell short of the requirements of his position. Certain members of his own party were among his severest critics. In the summer of 1812 James Monroe, Madison's secretary of state, and Ex-president Jefferson agreed that, while the secretary of the navy possessed some merits, a change in the headship of the Navy Department was indispensable.35 Nathaniel Macon, a Congressman from North Carolina, and a prominent Republican, considered Hamilton "about as fit for his place as the Indian Prophet would be for Emperor of Europe”; and William H. Crawford, a Senator from Georgia, declared that the secretary of the navy was incompetent, and complained that he diverted the naval officers from their proper duties in order to supply the heads of the departments with pineapples and other tropical fruits.36 One must, however, properly discount criticism of a member of the cabinet, which is made during the heat of a war, when sentiment and self-interest are often more influential than calm reason and unbiased judgment. Nor must it be forgotten that in the winter of 1812-1813 Madison's discredited administration sorely needed some scapegoats in order to appease the clamorous public and to shift the burden of blame. It still remains true that Hamilton did not measure up to the high stature of a successful war secretary.
Hamilton, who contemplated retiring from the cabinet at the end of Madison's first administration, or sooner if peace should be declared, was towards the close of 1812 urged to hasten his departure; and accordingly on December 31 he resigned. 37 On January 8, 1813, Madison nominated William Jones of Philadelphia to the vacant secretaryship. On the 12th Jones was confirmed by the Senate, and on the 25th he entered upon the duties of his office. It is recollected that Jones had been offered the same position by Jefferson in 1801, and had declined it. His appointment was probably as good as his party could supply. Niles' Register in announcing his choice referred to him as Captain William Jones, "an old and experienced seaman." 38 He had had
35 S. M. Hamilton, Monroe, V, 260.
36 Adams, History of the United States, VI, 290, 395.
37 National Intelligencer, January 11, 1813.
38 Niles' Register, III (1813), 320.
PHOTOGRAPH (Page 23)
WILLIAM JONES, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 1813-1814
considerable experience at sea, first during the American Revolution on board a privateer with Truxtun, and later in the merchant service. His career for many years as a merchant in Philadelphia was calculated to prepare him for his duties in the Navy Department. He was credited with having a considerable knowledge of gunboats and the arts of naval defence. He possessed information on the subject of shipbuilding, and regarded himself competent to criticise Robert Fulton's plans for a steam frigate. In 1814 he wrote to Fulton that the "principles and practice of Naval Architecture, having been a favourite study and pursuit, may apologize for these criticisms upon a subject on which you have bestowed so much thought." " Jones was a member of the American Philosophical Society. He was the author of a pamphlet on the Winter Navigation of the Delaware. Upon resigning from the Navy Department he served without distinction as the first president of the Second National Bank.
The organization of the Navy Department underwent no change under Secretaries Hamilton and Jones. The department still consisted of only two administrative divisions, the secretary's office and the accountant's office. The extra work necessitated by the war caused the force of clerks in the secretary's office to be increased to nine, and in the accountant's office to eleven. Hamilton continued Goldsborough as chief clerk; but Jones soon after entering upon his duties early in 1813 appointed Benjamin Homans, of Massachusetts, to this position. Goldsborough was not connected with the department for the next two years. Thomas Turner, who had been appointed accountant in 1800, continued in service under both secretaries.
The simplicity of the organization and work of the secretary's office is well shown by the duties of Hamilton's four clerks in 1810. The following information is derived from a statement of the secretary of the navy for the use of Congress. C. W. Goldsborough, who was paid a salary of $1900 a year, prepared, from minutes and under the immediate direction of the secretary of the navy, answers to letters received by the department; he made out the exhibits and estimates of the department for the use and information of Congress; and he performed various miscellaneous duties not within the regular routine of the office. Nathaniel
General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., XII, 158.
G. Maxwell, who was paid an annual salary of $1300, was the "office of detail." He kept the roll of officers, and prepared for signatures and recorded all the naval commissions and warrants of appointments; he also kept a record of all the letters of the department to the officers of the navy; and he endorsed and filed all the letters received, except those relating to the expenditure of money. These latter were in charge of Samuel P. Todd, who for an annual salary of $1300, served as a sort of "bureau of supplies and accounts." He prepared for signature and recorded all warrants for money, endorsed and filed all requisitions, and recorded the estimates and financial statements of the department. The fourth clerk, Conrad Schwartz, for the sum of $800 a year, did numerous odd jobs after copying the letters of the department into the "general letter books." He made copies, drafts, and charts; and translated foreign letters written in German or other European language into English. Hamilton said that the duties of these clerks were at times "extremely arduous and. oppressive."40
Hamilton is to be credited with obtaining the passage of a most important law relating to the establishment of naval hospitals. In 1799 a law had been enacted authorizing the secretary of the navy to deduct twenty cents a month from the pay of each officer, seaman, and marine of the navy, and to pay the money thus received to the secretary of the treasury. In accordance with an act passed in 1798 a like deduction was made from the wages of each seaman in the merchant service. The whole fund thus realized was applicable to the relief of the sick and disabled officers, seamen, and marines of the navy, and the seamen of the merchant service. The money was expended under the direction of the secretary of the treasury. The navy and the merchant service received the benefits of the fund without discrimination. Their seamen were treated in the same hospitals, by the same doctors, and under the same regulations. The naval hospital service was not at this time separated from the marine hospital service.
In 1810 sick and disabled seamen were relieved at twenty-four of the chief seaports of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Only at Norfolk and Boston had marine hospitals been erected. In New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and New Orleans provision was
40 Congress Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., I, Dec. 17, 1810
made for seamen at the city hospitals. At several ports they were boarded at private houses at the expense of the government. At Baltimore the seamen were supplied "under contract with doctor Tobias Watkins with every necessary thing, except cloathing and funeral expenses, at the rate of 55 cents a day for each seaman." At Alexandria, Virginia, they were in part cared for at the almshouse at the rate of $5 a week for each patient.41
With such inadequate facilities, no naval officer, and comparatively few seamen and marines of the navy, took advantage of their right to free medical service. In 1810 at the Marine Hospital at Boston the number of inmates during the year averaged twenty-four, one-fifth of whom were seamen of the navy; at Norfolk only one-ninth of the inmates were from the navy. Where the enlisted men did avail themselves of their rights, inconveniences and embarrassments arose from placing them, subject as they were to naval law and discipline, in institutions where no such law and discipline were enforced. It was difficult for the department to obtain reports from the officials and doctors of the hospitals, and when the seamen became convalescent they usually deserted. In order better to meet the needs of the navy, the department had permitted the use of several temporary naval hospitals. The one at New York was a rude structure situated in the navy-yard. It was proof against neither wind nor water, and was ill-adapted to even the needs of the well. "To give you some faint idea of what is called the hospital on this station," Captain Isaac Chauncey wrote in 181o, "imagine to yourself an old mill, situated upon the margin of a mill pond, where every high tide flows from twelve to fifteen inches upon the lower floor, and there deposits a quantity of mud and sediment, and which has no other covering to protect the sick from the inclemency of the season than a common clap-board outside, without lining or ceiling on the inside. If, sir, you can figure to yourself such a place, you will have some idea of the situation of the sick on this station." 42
Such was the provision made for the relief of the sick and disabled of the American navy when Hamilton in February, 181o, recommended to Congress the separation of the naval and marine hospital services. On February 26, 1811, Congress passed an act
41 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 12th Congress, 1st Session,
Statement of Expenditures for Sick and Disabled Seamen
42 State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 227-28, 233-34
establishing naval hospitals. The money raised by deducting twenty cents from the monthly pay of the officers, seamen, and marines of the navy was now to be separated from the money similarly obtained from the seamen of the merchant service, and was to constitute the Naval Hospital Fund. This fund was to be controlled by a board of commissioners composed of the secretary of the navy, secretary of the treasury, and secretary of war. This board was authorized to purchase sites and erect buildings thereon. The secretary of the navy was directed to draft rules and regulations for the government of the naval hospitals. 43 These were in due time prepared by a commission of four naval surgeons, of which Dr. Edward Cutbush was the head. More than twenty years, however, elapsed before any naval hospitals were erected. In the meantime the temporary facilities within or near the navy-yards were extended.
Until early in 1812, when a war with Great Britain became imminent, Hamilton's administration of the navy was more or less uneventful. With the exception of the act establishing naval hospitals, no important naval legislation was enacted. In the spring of 1810 a significant bill was introduced into the House. In April of that year the House voted by a large majority to reduce the naval establishment—yeas 60, nays 31. Accordingly, a bill was reported by John Randolph to reduce the number of vessels in the navy to three frigates and three small craft; to discharge all the officers and seamen except such number as was necessary to man these six vessels; to discontinue the Portsmouth, Philadelphia, and Washington navy-yards, and to decrease the marine corps to two companies. The House spent much time in debating the provisions of this bill, but in the end it was unable to agree upon the reductions, which it had in the beginning voted to make; and the bill was dropped. The fact that a measure of this sort was seriously considered by the House on the eve of a war, and so soon after it had in 1809 voted to increase the navy considerably, convicts that body of marked incapacity of government. 44
It was in the debate on the above measure that the management of the Washington navy-yard was attacked. Macon of North Carolina wished to continue the yard in order that Congress might
43 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 650-51
44 Annals of Congress, XXI, 1933
have in plain sight an object lesson of the evils of a navy. "Sir," exclaimed John Randolph, "as long as a single chip remains in that navy-yard, you will never see anything like reform; as long as you have a chip of public property—one chip of live oak belonging to the United States—you will have a man riding in his carriage, with a long retinue and deputies and clerks to take care of it."45 Randolph called the marine barracks in Washington the "Praetorian Camp." So unpopular was the Washington navyyard, that even Hamilton declared that it was "a sink of all that needs correction, and if God spares me it shall be rectified." As a part of his work of reform, he considerably reduced the force of men employed there, which had at times been as large as 225 men. He established a naval school at this yard under the esteemed Doctor Andrew Hunter, a chaplain in the navy. He permitted the commandant to employ "twenty good Slaves belonging to the Neighbourhood." 46
During the War of 1812, not only the six navy-yards which had been purchased by the Federalists, but also several naval stations, were used for the building and repairing of ships, the recruiting of seamen, and the storage of naval supplies. At New Orleans the Government had erected an armory, marine barracks, and some storehouses; and it maintained there a flotilla of gunboats and small armed craft. At Charleston, South Carolina, the department had been renting, for several years prior to the war, certain grounds, which it used for a naval station. In 1813 Secretary Jones was drawn into a considerable altercation over an alleged contract to buy this land. Its owner, Charles B. Cochran, maintained that Hamilton had in 1812 agreed to purchase it for a navyyard. Jones refused to carry out the alleged contract on the ground that it was unauthorized by law, that the site was utterly unfit for a navy-yard, and that the price stated was at least four times the value of the land. 47 During the war the department had a naval station at Baltimore. From 1798 to 1816 when many naval vessels were built by contract, it is said that Baltimore constructed more ships for the navy than any other city in the Union. In 1810 Hamilton replied favorably to a memorial from the officials
45 Annals of Congress, XXI, 1953, 1970
46 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., X, 72, 301; Navy-yard Letters, 1, 98
47 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., XI, 269.
of Annapolis in behalf of a navy-yard for that city, but he explained that nothing could be done at present since the navy was unpopular with Congress. 48
The naval war on the Lakes during 1812-14 caused the Navy Department to obtain building yards and naval depots on Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Champlain. The most important of these were the grounds at or near Sacketts Harbor on Lake Ontario, consisting of three small lots. They were purchased for the government by Commodore Isaac Chauncey at a cost of $4425. 49 Sacketts Harbor was an exceedingly important naval station throughout the war. It was the rendezvous and headquarters of the American fleet on Lake Ontario. A naval hospital, naval school, and ropewalk were located there. Ten vessels, mounting from 16 to 74 guns, were built at Sacketts Harbor by Chauncey. Here, late in the war, the New Orleans, pierced for 100 guns, was placed upon the stocks, but she was never launched. Large quantities of naval supplies were sent to this station from New York city. The construction, manning, and equipping of the fleets on Lakes Ontario and Erie were quite the most brilliant work of its kind performed during the War of 1812. This work fell largely to Chauncey, one of the most efficient officers of the navy. His energy and activity is well shown by the following extract taken from a letter which he wrote to Hamilton from New York. It was dated September 26, 1812, twenty-three days after he received his appointment to the command of the fleet on the Lakes. He gives an account of the artisans, seamen, and naval stores, that were being sent from New York to Sacketts Harbor: "I have sent from this place 140 carpenters, about 700 sailors and marines (every man of which I am proud to say are volunteers), and more than 100 pieces of Cannon, the greater part of which are of a large calibre, with muskets, shot, carriages, etc., etc., and the carriages have nearly all been made and the shot cast since that time [ September 3] ; nay, I may say that nearly every article that has been sent forward has been made." 50
The ship-yard for Lake Erie was early in the war located at Black Rock, on the Niagara river; but Chauncey soon removed it to Erie, on Lake Erie. Many ship carpenters, seamen, and naval
48 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., X 328-29
49 Congress Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., IV, 249
50 Captains' Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1812, III, 79
supplies were sent from Philadelphia to Erie. Naval stores of all sorts were also purchased in Pittsburg. George Harrison, the navy agent at Philadelphia, who had general charge of the forwarding of men and supplies to Erie, employed a sub-agent at Pittsburg. Commodore Perry's two famous vessels, the Niagara and Lawrence, were built at the ship-yard at Erie. The building yard on Lake Champlain was situated at Vergennes, Vermont.
The regular navy agents employed at the chief Atlantic ports and at New Orleans were of course continued in service. At the beginning of the war additional agents became necessary, and they were appointed for several of the smaller Atlantic ports, and one for Niagara, New York. In 1812 an agent was chosen for Tennessee to purchase flour, hemp, and whiskey for the New Orleans naval station. The work of the navy agents, which consisted chiefly of the purchasing of naval supplies of all sorts, was greatly increased by the war.
It is recollected that in 1801 the navy-yards at Portsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk were placed under the superintendence of the navy agents at those ports, and that the Boston and Washington yards were permitted to remain in charge of naval officers. Gradually the civilian control of the four former yards was superseded by a naval one. The head of each navyyard came to be called the "commandant," instead of the “superintendent”; and naval law and discipline was enforced in all the yards. In 1807 the New York yard received its first naval commandant in the person of Captain Isaac Chauncey. In 1810 Captain Samuel Barron took charge of the Norfolk yard, succeeding the Norfolk navy agent; and in 1813 the Portsmouth and Philadelphia yards were placed under naval captains. No civilian has served in the capacity of superintendent of a navy-yard since 1813. The New York yard greatly increased in importance during the war. The Washington yard lost its primacy among the establishments of the navy. After it was burned by the British in 1814, it never regained its former rank. The disaffection of New England towards the war and the Union rather decreased the value of the Boston and Portsmouth yards to the federal government. The relative importance of the several navy-yards is roughly indicated by the number of employees at work in them. In November, 1814, the number of officers and men employed at the Portsmouth yard was 18; at the Boston yard, 20; at the New York yard, 102; at the Philadelphia yard, 13; at the Washington yard, 36; and at the Norfolk yard, 33. 51
The imminence of a war with Great Britain naturally revived the consideration of the subject of dry docks. During peace, under the naval regime of Jefferson, dry docks could be dispensed with; but in time of war, when expedition was important and the fleet was greatly augmented, they were almost indispensable. In December, 1811, Hamilton informed Congress of the navy's deficiency. He wrote as if conveying a piece of news: "The United States do not own a dock. To repair our vessels we are compelled to heave them down—a process attended with great labor, considerable risk, and loss of time; and upon a ship thus hove down, the carpenters cannot work without much inconvenience. Hence the Department is subjected to much expense, which might be avoided by the construction of one or more suitable docks."52
Finally, on March 3, 1813, Congress appropriated $100,000 to establish a dock yard at some central and convenient place on the seaboard. 53 After making a general inquiry as to the best site, Secretary Jones decided in favor of the right bank of the Hudson above the Highlands. He said that "the motives to this decision were from considering the contemplated dock yard as the nucleus around which a great naval establishment may be formed, comprising wet and dry docks, forges, foundries, boring, rolling, saw, and block mills, blast and smelting furnaces, an armory, hydraulic engines, rope walks, manufactories of sail duck, and work shops of all kinds, which will require a copious head of water, readily commanded in this vicinity. Here also will be the main arsenal, and depot of timber and materials of all kinds, and the principal dock yard for constructing and repairing ships of war. Such an establishment in any of our seaports, accessible to ships of the line, would form so great a temptation to a powerful enemy as to render destruction certain, unless protected by forts and garrisons of the most formidable and expensive nature." 54 The blockade of the Atlantic coast, which the British had by this time effected, admonished Jones to locate his contemplated establishment at a safe distance from the coast. Occurring in the midst of a war,
51 State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 325-45
52 State Papers, Nay. aff., I, 249
53 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 821
54 State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 306.
nothing naturally came from this agitation in behalf of dry docks. It was no time to build them, to do the work that ought to have been done in time of peace. The failure of the Republicans to establish and construct dry docks during the ten years preceding the War of 1812 may be set down as another instance of their incapacity of government.
In the winter of 1811-1812 on the eve of the war with Great Britain, the Navy Department was unprepared in every essential means, instrument, and material of naval warfare. It had no dry docks. It had few ships. With the exception of the naval establishment at Washington, the navy-yards were in a state of neglect and decay. The navy had few conveniences for building, repairing, and laying up ships. In December, 181i, Secretary Hamilton informed Congress that the present stock of cannon ball, shot of every description, carronades, muskets, pistols, rifles, blunderbusses, and gunpowder was inconsiderable. The blame for this unfortunate state of affairs rests upon Presidents Jefferson and Madison and Congress, rather than upon the two Republican Secretaries of the Navy, Smith and Hamilton, who moderately favored the strengthening of the navy. Early in 1811 Hamilton had said that many measures of vast importance for the defence of the country might be effected, were the navy not unpopular with Congress. In November, 1811, he made his first preparations for war by buying a little saltpetre and sulphur. But for want of money, he could do little. He therefore appealed to Congress. On December 10 he asked for $400,000 to purchase arms and ammunition; and on January 14, 1812, Congress gave it to him. 55 Almost the only timber in the navy-yards was that which had been purchased by the department under Stoddert. On March 30 Congress therefore appropriated $200,000 annually for three years to buy timber for the repairing and building of ships. On the same day it voted $300,000 to repair and equip the frigates Chesapeake, Constellation, and Adams. On July 5 it appropriated $829,000 for purchasing and equipping vessels captured from the enemy, and for repairing vessels damaged by war. This Congress also voted to spend $1,000,000 on fortifying the maritime frontier. 56
55 Congress Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., II, 63; U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 675
56 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 675, 692, 699, 776
It is noteworthy that the war Congress, which was in session from November, 1811, until July, 1812, did not authorize the building of ships. It was not able to pass so radical a measure. Soon, however, the shock of actual war, the pressure of military necessity, the rebound of public opinion, and the patriotism aroused by glorious victories on the sea, effected a revolution in naval sentiment in and out of Congress. In the winter of 1812-13 conservative members continued to oppose energetic measures of naval defense, but they were not able to prevent the passage of the law of January 2, 1813, which appropriated $2,500,000 to build four ships of the line and six frigates. 57 From this time until the end of the war various other measures deigned to increase and strengthen the navy were passed by Congress. The last act was that of November 15, 1814, which appropriated $600,000 for the construction or purchase of twenty small vessels of from 8 to 16 guns each. 58 The war caused the expenditures of the navy to increase as follows: from $1,970,000 in 1811 to $3,960,000 in 1812; to $6,450,000 in 1813; to $7,310,000 in 1814; to $8,660,000 in airs. In 1816 the expenditures fell to $3,910,000.59
At the beginning of 1812 the navy consisted of eighteen vessels. Three of these were frigates, which had been built by the Federalists, and needed much repairing. The remaining fifteen were ready for sea. Seven of the fifteen, chiefly frigates, and mounting 254 guns, had belonged to the Federalist navy of 1798-1801; and eight, chiefly brigs, mounting 122 guns, had been built or purchased by Jefferson or Madison. The larger and the effective part of the navy of 1812 the Republicans inherited from the Federalists. In addition to the above fleet, there were 165 gunboats, which had been constructed by Jefferson. Of these, at the beginning of 1812, 63 were in commission, and 102 were in ordinary or undergoing repairs. The gunboats were stationed at the chief Atlantic ports from St. Mary's, Georgia, to Portland, Maine, and at New Orleans. Fifty-four of them were at New York, 26 at New Orleans, 20 at Philadelphia, and lesser numbers at other ports. Such was the naval force with which Madison began a war with the chief European naval power. 60
57 U. S. Statutes at Large, II, 789.
58 U. S. Statutes at Large, III, 144
59 Senate Ex Does 45th Long 1st Sess., No. 3, 156
60 State Papers, Nay ME, I, 249, 250, 252
When the war ended the navy comprised about 75 armed vessels of from 10 to 74 guns each, and about 240 gunboats, barges, and other small naval craft. The additions to the navy were made by construction, purchase, or capture. Of the vessels authorized under the act of January 2, 1813, three 74's and three 44's were built at the principal navy-yards, but they were not completed in time to be of use during the war. The 74-gun ship Columbia, when almost ready to be launched, was burned, at the Washington navy-yard, to prevent its being captured by the enemy. When the treaty of peace was signed, two 74's and two 44's were on the stocks at Sackett's Harbor. Some 60 vessels, largely insignificant craft, comprised the fleet on the Lakes. More than 200 gunboats, barges, and small craft were stationed at the chief Atlantic ports and at New Orleans. 61
During the War of 1812 the repairing of vessels was an important activity of the Navy Department. Such work, in a few instances, was comparable to that of building a new vessel. One of the old frigates, which required a complete overhauling, was the Adams. Apropos of the repairing of this ship is the following account of "A Launch," which was printed in the National Intelligencer of December 29, 1812, published at Washington: "On Thursday last, about half past 11 o'clock was launched from the Navy Yard at this City, the frigate Adams, which had been hauled up, divided in the middle, lengthened fifteen feet, and almost rebuilt. She proudly swam into her destined element at the appointed time, amid the acclamations of hundreds, and under a salute of artillery. After the launch many of the ladies and gentlemen assembled in a sail-loft, which had been cleaned for the occasion, and spent a pleasant hour. The Adams is to be commanded by capt. Morris." In the above account the Intelligencer, according to present standards, omitted a valuable piece of news, the presence on this interesting occasion of the President and members of Congress. This fact is proved by the following anecdote: When the frigate Adams glided off the stocks a Federalist member of Congress opposed to the administration, abruptly said to President Madison, with whom he was standing, "What a pity it is, sir, that the vessel of state won't glide as smoothly in her course as this vessel does." "It would, sir," Madison replied, "if the crew would do their duty as well." 62
61 State Papers, Nay Aff. I, 305-09, 379-80
62 National Intelligencer, December 29, 1812; January 18, 1813
Some historians of the War of 1812 have greatly overestimated the numbers of the personnel of the American navy. The total number of officers, seamen, and marines at the close of the war was about twice the number at its commencement. In December, 1811, the number of seamen and boys in the navy was 4010; and the number of marines, exclusive of commissioned officers, was 1823. The navy was probably as large in October, 1814, as at any time during the war. Secretary Jones then estimated the total force, exclusive of a few stationary marines, at 10,617. The Navy Lists for 1812 and 1815 show the increase in the numbers of officers caused by the war. The captains increased from 12 to 30; the master’s commandant, from 9 to 17; the lieutenants, from 70 to 146; and the midshipmen, from 403 to 436. The number of commissioned officers in the marine corps in 1812 was 38; and in 1815, 59. In April, 1814, the number of marine was increased by 799. The number of seamen in the navy was throughout the war much below the needs of the service. In October, 1814, Secretary Jones estimated that 15,200 officers, seamen, and marines would be needed for the coming year. 63
There was, however, no dearth of officers. The requests for offices in the navy were so many that, in order to preserve the time of the department for more important work, Jones established the rule that no applications for office should be answered. The applicants for the position of midshipman were especially numerous, and at the end of the war the files of the department showed that upwards of one thousand youths had been disappointed. Requests for employment were sometimes made by veterans of the Revolution. These always touched the kindly heart of Secretary Hamilton. For a veteran, Hamilton once wrote an order to Captain Tingey, commandant of the Washington navyyard. The bearer, he informed Tingey, is "an old revolutionary officer for whom I wish to make some provision in the Navy Yard. He is too old to labor now, and he must not want. You will consider of some place in which his fidelity may be of use to the public, and report the same to me." 64
A disproportionate share of the appointments of officers to the navy was made from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
63 State Papers, Nay. Aff. I, 255. 265; Private Letters, Navy Dept.
Arch., 1813-11140, 196-202; U. S. Statutes at Large, 124-25.
64 Navy-yard Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1,224
Columbia. Of the 240 captains, master’s commandant, lieutenants, and marine officers, whose names are printed in the Navy Register for 1816, 38 per cent were born in the above section. Of all the states of the Union, Maryland furnished the largest number, 46; and Virginia, the next largest number, 42. 65 The location of the Navy Department and the chief navy-yard in this section of the Union accounts in part for its large representation in the navy. Doubtless, too, Secretaries Stoddert and Smith and Presidents Jefferson and Madison were disposed to favor their own states in making appointment.
Jones cordially welcomed inventors of naval appliances and improvements, and gave them such financial encouragement as the limited resources of the department warranted. His knowledge of naval architecture made him an intelligent critic of some of these real or alleged inventions. He consulted his naval officers upon such subjects as came within their special knowledge, and at times had them report on the experiments and tests of the inventors. He ordered Captain Decatur to be present at the trial of an inflammable liquid, which was to be used in destroying the enemy's ships. He authorized a "multiplied repeating swivel, and a repeating musket and pistol" to be tried on board the vessels composing the flotilla on the Delaware. Jones approved of Uriah Brown's submarine boat. He gave Robert Fulton financial aid for three different inventions, a torpedo, a steam frigate, and a "bullet proof boat." Several of Fulton's torpedoes were manufactured at the Washington navy-yard. One of his steam frigates, Fulton the First, was built at New York; and another was begun at Baltimore. The department purchased one of his "bullet proof boats." These inventions, however, owing to their imperfections and the ending of the war when they were being brought into use, were of little value to the government. 66
During the War of 1812 the Navy Department had constantly in view three main objects, the defending of the maritime frontier, the maintaining of the naval superiority on the Lakes, and the capturing of the enemy's small vessels of war and merchantmen at sea. Most American writers of the naval history of the War of 1812 have treated very briefly, or omitted altogether, the naval
65 Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, I, 55-56.
66 General Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., XI, 265; XII, 158, 183, 258;
Private Letters, 1813-1840, 39, 63; Miscellaneous Letters, 1814, VI, 72
preparations and operations in defense of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts; and have confined their attention almost exclusively to the two latter objects enumerated above. The defense of the maritime frontier possesses few attractive features, and its study at most points is not conducive to national pride. Nevertheless, the fitting out and manning of vessels at the chief Atlantic ports arid at New Orleans and the directing of their movements, for the purpose of defending the American seacoast, was a work of great importance and difficulty to the head of the Navy Department, and demanded much of his time and attention. At least one-half of the navy was employed in this way. Of the 10,617 men that constituted the entire naval force in October, 1814, 6512 were on the maritime frontier; 3260, on the Lakes; 450, at sea; and 405, in British prisons. 67
The seamen on the maritime frontier were chiefly attached to the various flotillas, composed of gunboats, barges, and other small naval craft; some of them, however, were employed on board ships of war, and, owing to the close blockade which the British maintained during 1813-14, were much to their disgust detained in port and were compelled to assist in defending the coast. A flotilla was stationed at or near each of the following ports: New Orleans, St. Mary's in Georgia, Charleston, Wilmington, Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New London, Newport, Boston, and Portsmouth. Each flotilla was under the command of a naval officer, who sometimes reported to the commander of an adjacent naval station. The nucleui of these flotillas were collections of Jefferson's gunboats.
When the British blockaded the American coast and began to ravage it, a cry for naval protection was sent forth from Maine to Georgia. The same men who opposed naval expenditures during peace now blamed the government for not supplying naval ships that it did not have and could not get. Numerous requests for armed vessels were made of the secretary of the navy. He responded to as many of them as the limited resources of the department permitted. Early in 1812 Congress appropriated $1,000,000 for the defense of the maritime frontier. It also appropriated $750,000 for the construction of barges and floating batteries to be used for the same purpose. 68 Numerous small craft
67Private Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1813-1840, 196-202
68 U. S. Statutes at Large, III, 3, 104
carrying a few heavy guns were added to the various flotillas. Each locality cooperated with the Federal government in the work of defense. This service on the seacoast was, however, unpopular with both officers and seamen, for it was not suited to their habits or comforts; nor was either glory or prizes to be obtained in it. To man the vessels was difficult, and often impossible. The logbook of a certain gunboat records the fact that after much difficulty two men only were enlisted—" from the jail, with a parenthetical memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk.69 The usefulness of the flotillas was greatly impaired owing to the want of seamen. These little fleets, however, were able to supplement the land defenses, and to check to some extent the ravages of small British ships on the coast. But they offered little resistance to strong fleets. They did not prevent the enemy from making frequent depredations. No better proof of the ineffectual character of their work is needed than that afforded by the raid of the British in August, 1814, when they destroyed Barney's flotilla and burned Washington.
The most uniformly successful work during the war of both the Navy Department and the navy was the obtaining and holding of the naval superiority on Lakes Ontario, Erie, and Champlain. The martial deeds of Commodores Perry and Macdonough have been amply celebrated. But the achievements of the Navy Department and of Commodore Chauncey in providing the instruments and sinews of war are equally noteworthy, although less dramatic. With much energy and expedition they constructed fleets from the trees standing in the forests, hastened forward artisans, armament, and naval stores of all sorts from the seaports, and enlisted seamen wherever they could be obtained. At times both the service on the maritime frontier and at sea yielded to that on the Lakes. In 1814 in order to man the fleets of Commodores Chauncey and Macdonough, heavy drafts of men were made on the flotilla service, and rendezvous for recruits were opened in various seaports. Ships which had been destined for the sea were laid up in ordinary, and their armaments and crews were sent to the Lakes. The Lake service, however, was not liked. Secretary Jones wrote that it was "one of peculiar privation, destitute of pecuniary stimulus, and unpopular both with the Officers and Men." While but 3250 sailors were employed
69 Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, 45
on the Lakes during 1814, he estimated that 7000 would be needed in 1815. Many additional seamen were required to man the new ships. The contest on Lake Ontario, Jones said in October, 1814, had become a warfare of Dockyards and Arsenals."70
The Muse of history, national pride, and popular tradition have vied with each other in perpetuating the fallacy that the American navy inflicted serious injury on the British navy in the War of 1812. During 1812-1815 the Americans captured 23 British naval vessels of from 10 to 38 guns each; and the British captured 17 American naval vessels of from 10 to 44 guns each—not including the ships burned at the Washington navy-yard. Of the 23 British ships captured by the Americans, four were taken by Perry on Lake Erie, four by Macdonough on Lake Champlain, and four were captured after the treaty of Ghent was signed. Of the eleven remaining vessels, the five principal ones were captured during the latter half of 1812. 71 In 1813 and 1814, owing to the British blockade of the American coast, the naval war on the ocean almost ceased; the little that existed was in favor of the British. No vessel captured from the enemy was so heavily armed as the Serapis, 44, the Revolutionary prize of John Paul Jones. In 1812 the Royal Navy consisted of 130 ships of the line, mounting from 60 to 120 guns, and 600 frigates and smaller vessels. The value of the twenty-three ships captured by the Americans was not equal to that of two of England's best ships of the line. Of course these figures do not depreciate the skill and courage of the American commanders, nor dim the glory and prestige that they won for the American navy. The striking success of the American ships in the engagements between the Constitution and Guerriere, the Essex and Alert, the Wasp and Frolic, the United States and Macedonian and the Constitution and Java will ever make the latter half of 1812 a memorable time in our naval history. It is also true that the moral effect of the brilliant fighting of the American navy was greatly to the advantage of the government at Washington, and to the disadvantage of that at London.
The exact determination of the department early in 1812 in respect to sending the vessels to sea is still involved in obscurity. It has been asserted that the cabinet sometime during the first
70 Private Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., 1813-1840, 196-202
71 Emmons, Navy of the United States, 6-11, 18-21, 56-59
half of 1812, deeming it unwise to jeopardize our small ships in a contest with the gigantic British navy, decided that the American fleet should be laid up in ordinary for the period of the war; and that Captains Bainbridge and Stewart drew up a remonstrance, which led the secretary of the navy to abandon this policy of prudence and fear. Considerable doubt has now been cast on the accuracy of this story. It is certain that on June 22, 1812, Hamilton ordered the fleet to be divided into squadrons and to cruise off the Atlantic coast for the protection of American commerce. In September the fleet was arranged in three squadrons of three vessels each and they were ordered to proceed to sea. After 1812 the ships usually cruised singly, since the close blockade, which the British maintained off the chief American ports, interfered with the sending out of squadrons. 72
The movements of the secretary of the navy and the Navy Department during the raid of the British on Washington, in August, 1814, are, in the annals of the department, wholly unique and exceptional. It is appropriate that a brief account of them should be here given. They form a part of a most interesting melodrama, whose principal characters are the President of the United States and the dignified members of his cabinet. The destruction of the Washington navy-yard is one of the thrilling features. Jones's report of his own movements, which were most numerous, varied, and rapid, will be followed. By August 22 Commodore Joshua Barney, having burned his "American Flotilla" on the Patuxent in Maryland, had retreated with his seamen and marines towards Washington. He was closely followed by a small detachment of British troops under General Ross. On the night of the 22nd Barney and General Winder, who commanded the American troops, camped at Old Fields in Maryland, seven miles from Washington. Jones writes in respect to his own movements on the 22d as follows: "In the evening of that day I accompanied the President to General Winder's Camp at the Old Fields, and passed the night in Commodore Barney's tent— the Army of the Enemy at Upper Marlborough eight miles distant—on the morning of the 23rd reviewed the Seamen and Marines, whose appearance and preparation for battle promised
72 Harris, Commodore Bainbridge. 135-36; Gallatin's writings, 611-22; Officers' Letters, Ships of War, Navy Dept. Arch., X, 66; Navy yard Letters, I, 329; John Rodgers Papers.
all that could be expected from cool intrepidity, and a high state of discipline." On the afternoon of the 23rd Jones and Madison returned to the capital. The army and the navy frightened by the advance of the British now made a sudden retreat and reached Washington not long after the arrival of the Secretary of the Navy and the President. The military and naval forces rested near the navy-yard and the adjacent bridge across the Eastern Branch of the Potomac.
On the 24th the battle of Bladensburg was fought, and the British entered the capital. Bladensburg is situated on the Eastern Branch, about five miles from Washington. Let us return again to Jones's narrative: "0n the morning of the 24th I proceeded to General Winder's quarters at Doctor Hunter's house near the Eastern Branch Bridge, where the President and Secretaries of War, State, and Treasury soon after arrived. I found Commodore Barney employed by order of the General in planting his Battery on the hill near the head of the Bridge. He was charged to defend that pass and to destroy the Bridge on the appearance of the Enemy, for which purpose Scows and Boats with combustible materials were placed under the Bridge ready to explode. At this time the Enemy was apparently advancing on the road to the Bridge; but shortly after advice was received that he had turned off on the road towards Bladensburg." General Winder with his troops now hastily marched to Bladensburg in order, if possible, to head off the British, leaving Barney and his force of seamen and marines to guard the bridge. "It was soon observed that a very efficient part of the force had been left to destroy the Eastern Branch .Bridge, which could as well be done by a half dozen men, as by five hundred. The subject was discussed by the President, Heads of Departments, and Commodore Barney, which resulted in the order for his immediate and rapid march to join the army near Bladensburg. Captain Creighton was left in charge of the Bridge to destroy it on the near approach of the Enemy." Jones now presented to the President and his cabinet the subject of the navy-yard; and it was agreed that, if the enemy should approach the city, the Secretary of the Navy should order all the buildings, naval stores, and ships in the yard, to be destroyed, rather than let them fall into the hands of the British.
At two o'clock in the afternoon Jones was to be again found at the Washington navy-yard. He ordered the commandant, Captain Tigney to prepare trains of powder, and to touch them off on the approach of the enemy. The battle of Bladensburg resulted in the complete rout of the Americans, who, with the exception of Barney's seamen and marines, made an ill-conceived and half-hearted resistance. The British now advanced upon Washington. As they entered the city, Captain Tigney at half past eight o'clock in the evening set fire to the navy-yard. The next day the British continued its destruction. The most valuable parts of the yard were destroyed. The whole loss was estimated at $418,000. The largest single item of loss was the 74- gun ship Columbia, valued at $106,000. Some days before the invasion the Secretary of the Navy had ordered the gunpowder, lighter stores, and smaller vessels to be removed to a point of safety northward of the city, but few materials were thus saved.
Soon after Jones retired from the navy-yard on the afternoon of the 24th, he heard that the enemy was moving towards Washington from Bladensburg; and a little later at the house of Charles Carroll he received a message from Madison requesting him to follow and join the party of the President, which had already crossed the Potomac at Georgetown. Jones and the Attorney- General followed the fortunes of their retreating chief. The party travelled until dark and spent the night on the Virginia side of the Potomac a few miles above the Lower Falls. The next day it reached a little Virginia tavern, situated in the midst of an apple orchard, sixteen miles from Washington, where it rested. On the evening of the 25th the British, having occupied the capital for twenty-four hours, left it. On the 28th the Secretary of the Navy returned to Washington; and his week of melodrama came to an end. The "old war office,- which had housed the Navy Department since 1801, was among the public buildings destroyed by the British. Jones rented temporary quarters for the department. 73
The movement of the Navy Department during these troublous times is best told in the words of Benjamin Homans, its chief clerk: "In obedience to instructions from the Secretary of the Navy to prepare for the removal and safety of the Public Documents and Archives of the Navy Department on Saturday, the 20th day of August, 1814, and anticipating a difficulty in procuring
73 Congress Letters Navy Dept. Arch., II. 271-80, 294-98; Cutts, Dolly Madison, 99-118; Adams, History of the United States, VIII, 120-168.
Waggons, he sanctioned the transportation by Water in Boats up the Potomac River. On Sunday three of the Clerks were employed packing up in Boxes and Trunks, all the Books of Record, Papers, Library, Maps, Charts, Plans, Stationery, Trophies, various valuable Instruments, Paintings, Prints, etc., ready for removal on the next day. And in the evening of Sunday, the 21st August, two River Boats with their Crews were engaged for the purpose at the ordinary Wages.
"On Monday, the 22nd August, two of the City Carts were engaged, and all the Boxes and Articles in the Navy Department (heavy Desks and furniture excepted) were put on board the Boat at the nearest Wharf to the Offices, and at 4 P. M. proceeded up the River as far as Georgetown. In the forenoon of Monday, the 22nd, two large Waggons with drivers presented themselves at the Department for employ, and on account of the previous arrangements, to transport by Water, they were transferred to the Accountant of the Navy Department, who loaded them with the Effects of his Office.
"On Tuesday, the 23rd August, the Chief Clerk with one of the Clerks of the Department proceeded up the River Potomac, and passed through the Locks and Canal to a place of safety. There was no difficulty in procuring more boats, and men enough to navigate them up the River above the Falls." 74
Secretary Jones found his duties arduous and confining; nor did his management of the department escape adverse criticism. By April, 1814, he had decided to retire from the cabinet, because of the indispensable attention that his private affairs required. 75 The position of secretary of the navy has always been vastly more attractive to the candidate seeking it, than to the incumbent performing its duties. Each of the first four secretaries, Stoddert, Smith, Hamilton, and Jones, longed for more congenial work. Jones would not wait until the war was ended. On September it, 1814, he tendered his resignation to take effect on December I. On the latter date he turned over the keys of the department to its chief clerk.
73 Congress Letters, Navy Dept. Arch., II, 299-300.
74 Ingersoll, History of the Second War between Great Britain and the United States, 2d ser., II, 326; Madison's Writings, ed. 1865, II, 581-82.