AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. Prize Essay. (See No. 113.)
Captain J. C. WILSON, U. S. Navy.—The "Essay" on "American Naval Policy" by Commander Fiske covers a large field, and in so doing the writer could not treat any one subject exhaustively in the space at his disposal; but he has selected vital points and discussed them sufficiently to show pretty conclusively that the service has much to do and even more to undo, as regards the conclusions mentioned in the opening note to the essay. It is no new idea in the service that our navy of fine modern ships has been constructed without any regard to a policy or program. This has not been the fault of naval officers, but the fault of the method of administration in the Navy Department, which has gone along in a hap-hazard way practically without direction until of late years, when the General Board has exercised a supervision, and a most beneficial influence over the administration. But the constitution and powers of this General Board are not now sufficient to make them a responsible "Board of Directors," and until this is remedied we may expect but little improvement in results, despite such able essays as the one under discussion. Bureau officers have neither the time nor information requisite to study out and formulate a naval policy, either of building, or administration, nor has the Secretary of the Navy the requisite technical knowledge, or time to spare from his more legitimate duties to do this work, and there remains nobody but the General Board to do it.
While all officers are eager and willing to give their best services to the government, the conditions under which such services are given should be such as to obtain the best results.
A commanding officer can carry on his duties successfully only by virtue of the laws and regulations which have been carefully framed to give him all the authority and prestige necessary for his position.
A Board of Directors (General Staff) in the Navy Department should exist by virtue of a law of Congress, and their duties defined so that while subject to the approval of the Secretary, their recommendations would have weight with the Secretary and Congress. Such a body to be effective must be more than a "Board" ordered by the Secretary of the Navy for his convenience. It must have the power of the government behind it, as when performing its proper duties it will be the most important "Bureau" of the Department, and without it the administration of the Department will never get beyond its hap-hazard, unsystematic methods of so-called progress.
In a recent discussion of an "essay" by Rear-Admiral Luce, entitled "The Department of the Navy," I have given my views on this question at such a length that it is unnecessary to dwell longer on this subject, excepting to say that while I have stated that the "General Staff of the Navy" should be incorporated for advisory duties only, I advocate this because of the opposition to the incorporation of such a body for any purpose whatever, and not because I believe that such a body should not have as much authority in its duties as a Chief of Bureau has in his. Without touching upon what should be the proper strength of our navy, I wish to emphasize the essayist's statement concerning large battleships and the homogeneity of ships in fleets and squadrons. I think he has made it clear that the larger heavy battleship has preponderance of advantages over the smaller and so-called handier one; and I believe that the size of our battleships should only be limited by the depth of the channels leading to our principal naval stations.
Another very important point is the construction of vessels of a homogeneous type, so that battery power, speed, maneuvering qualities, ability to stand hard knocks, etc., of vessels in the same group should be about the same. All vessels not intended for special purposes should be built in groups of four. Assuming that the navy should be increased annually by two battleships, two scouts, and two torpedo vessels, besides auxiliaries, four of each of these class of vessels should be laid down every two years. This would simplify designing, greatly cheapen and distribute the work of construction, and lessen the time of building, as well as give designers time to catch up with advanced improvements before a new group was designed. Any changes made in a vessel under construction would be made in the whole group, and absolutely homogeneous vessels would be turned out at the same time, to go into commission together and make one squadron or division of a fleet.
The question of the composition of a fleet for fighting purposes has been very imperfectly worked out. As the essayist remarks, "Battleships, armored cruisers, torpedo-boats, scouts, etc., have been constructed because other nations were building such crafts, without any policy as to the needs of our own government as distinct from that of other nations."
I can see no place in the fighting line for "armored cruisers," and if they cannot keep in the fighting line, what service can they perform in time of war or peace that cannot be done by a much smaller, cheaper, and more serviceable vessel? The armored cruiser has no place in our service to-day, and it is a great pity that the time and money spent in them had not been spent on battleships. The only thing now is to build no more of them. What we want is a fighting fleet with the auxiliaries. And it should be easy to say now of which type of ships a fleet should consist. It should consist of battleships, torpedo vessels, and scouts, with such auxiliaries as colliers, ammunition, supply, cable, repair, and hospital ships as may be necessary. Armored cruisers, protected cruisers, gunboats, etc., should be dropped from all consideration as fighting ships and used for cruising and auxiliary purposes only.
Torpedo vessels should be large enough to keep the sea at all times and for long periods of time. Their tonage should be increased in order that their sea-going qualities, coal endurance, carrying capacity, and comfort to officers and crew might be increased. The ideal torpedo vessel and the "scout" class approach very close to each other, and it is a question whether a design could not be adopted which would answer for both.
The essayist's idea about keeping the fleets near a home base, going out for drills and in for frequent overhaulings, seem to meet the requirements better than the plan now in operation of cruising about for months and then laying up for repairs for several months. Practically all the time of the fighting fleet should be taken up in drills and torpedo work. There would necessarily be time enough between for rest and recreation.
The question of the position of the admiral of a fleet and the kind of ship he should be in, is an important one and opens up a question which requires much consideration. The arguments brought forth by the essayist for placing him in a smaller vessel outside the fighting line are very strong and I am much inclined to agree with him; and here if anywhere would be a place for an armored cruiser. She has speed, and considerable power of offense and defense, all of which would seem to be requisite qualities for the flagship of a commander-in-chief.
In a short discussion it is impracticable to touch upon all the points so clearly discussed by the essayist. I have only touched upon a few of the important ones, though I consider the essay as a whole a most valuable addition from every point of view to the naval literature of our country, and I hope it may be productive of practical results, and improvements in the methods of the administration of our navy both ashore and afloat.
Lieut.-Comdr. A. P. NIBLACK, U. S. Navy.—The motto of the essay suggests the thought: What if you are not right and then go ahead? That seems to me to be a good deal like what has happened in this case. The essayist states three "important conclusions" as the basis of his argument. I should have stated them quite differently:
(1) The ships of our battle fleet are correctly designed from a military standpoint, but some of them need to be changed as to gun protection and ammunition supply.
(2) The art and science of naval tactics are being developed by the Naval War College but not by the fleet.
(3) The administration of the navy needs some sort of a general staff arrangement to handle details.
The difference in the statements is largely that between destructive criticism and construction. The essayist takes a fall out of everybody and everything, and on page 79, just in sight of an exhausting finish, declares that "To formulate a policy that will be the best, will clearly need the closest study, the most original suggestions, the most careful thought, and the most logical decision of a special body of officers." This is as much as to say that he gives it up as to the American Naval Policy. The "most original suggestions" are plentiful in the essay but I find that the "most logical decision" is not always forthcoming.
Let us follow up some of the reasoning. The first eight pages of "General Principles" is summed up in the sentence, "Therefore, in order to whip, in order to be strong enough to go to war, our navy must be stronger at the start than the navy of the enemy." Not at all, my dear Fiske. In order to win, it must merely be stronger at the end of the war. Strategy and tactics arrange this. Page 10: "We need a navy even larger than Great Britain's, because our policy is more provocative of war than hers, especially with monarchies." We can never get such a navy, and are lucky to get what we have. If "American Naval Policy" depends on such general principles, then the "Folly of Ineffectual Resistance" will be our fate, and we had better accept it,—and eat, drink, and be merry.
As to "The Battle Fleet." On page 24 we find: "A consideration of these tables has brought out very clearly to the writer's mind the fact that, in every fighting ship the thing most to be desired is a maximum offensive power and a minimum of liability to having this offensive power destroyed." Certainly our ships, of all others, have the maximum of offensive power, now that we have taken up underwater discharge for torpedoes, but it is true that there are serious doubts in many minds as to the protection to guns and ammunition supply in some of our ships, but why on page 14 does the essayist say: "We may take it as a principle, then, that the first quality in our fleet to be demanded in a fleet fight will be speed." If you emphasize offensive power, you can proceed about your business, and let the enemy use his superior speed to hover around the horizon and screw up his courage. Speed is desirable but it does not come first and offensive power does. The essayist says "manageability" is the second quality. Now with draught of water in our ships restricted to 27 feet, quick handling cannot be had, as compared with ships in which there is no restriction in this respect. Restricted draught must, therefore, be wrong policy, for on page 36 it is stated that, "We should make our battleships as large as the state of the engineering arts permits." The fact is, of course, that all the questions of ship's qualities are questions of compromises, and no two people agree on these.
The tables are admirable, original, and valuable, and if the essayist had merely published these he would have rendered conspicuous service. The reasoning as to big guns is in line with the most advanced thought, and the "Protection of the Directing Personnel" is sound. In the prize essay of 1896 it was held that "Protecting shields and armored fighting stations at several points should be provided for the admiral, the captain, the signalmen, and the immediate officers liable to succeed to the command, in case of accident to the commanding officer." It was also stated that, "The flagship in a large fleet should be an armored cruiser of considerable speed. Her position need not be in the line of battle except when it is to her advantage . . . that others may easily see the admiral's signals and to enable him to see as much of the action as possible." This is practically the position taken by the essayist. He also emphasizes another statement in the prize essay of 1896, viz.: "The highest development of the scout would therefore be the improved St. Louis merchant type of high speed, great coal capacity, and armored and coal protection to boilers and engines." The essayist's comments on scouting are excellent.
The discussion of naval tactics shows that the essayist is pretty well in accord with prevailing ideas, except in the statement that our ships "do not have much fire ahead." Excepting in the Alabama and Maine classes, that is just what they have in a marked degree. If there are any battleships in the world with their "ahead fire" superior to the New Jersey class and subsequent ships, or to the Oregon, Massachusetts, Indiana, and Iowa, their plans are secret. Seven reasons are given in the essay for the present undeveloped state of naval tactics. Part of the sixth reason is stated": "The changes in ships and mechanisms have been so rapid and tremendous that officers, especially of flag rank, and command rank, whose professional education was almost wholly confined to sails and spars, have had all they could do to learn to manage the ships and their mechanisms, and have had to leave the larger, but less urgent, questions of naval tactics to those who should come after." I am very glad that the class I graduated in is just about on the fence between the "has beens" and the coming giants, otherwise I should regard the statement as being about the blackest eye ever given the long-suffering naval personnel. As it is I shall feel encouraged to study naval tactics.
Just one more comment and I am through. The third reason, given on page 73, for our navy being so slow in taking up new inventions, is as follows: "(3) The fact that, saving the case of deeds of extraordinary heroism in life-saving, the special rewards given by the Department to officers have been given only in war. The wisdom of giving special rewards in war is evident. But almost all the officers who have ever been in the American Navy have gone through their entire careers without seeing any war. Therefore, our system has so arranged matters that nearly every officer who has ever been in the navy has gone through his entire career without that special and powerful stimulus which the hope of reward unfailingly gives, and which most men urgently need." Therefore, if this means anything, our system should so arrange matters that we should have a war now and then as a stimulus. Let us analyze this paragraph in detail. There are four sentences. The first sentence is not true because the Department is continually and specially rewarding good officers by giving them important commands and details. The second sentence implies that we have a wise system of giving special rewards in war, whereas I personally think that our system in that respect is open to just criticism. The third sentence is the exact reverse of the truth because, prior to the Japanese-Russian war, in no navy in the world have the officers had as much war experience as ours have. The fourth sentence hints at selection or some other powerful stimulus which the hope of reward holds out. I am pleased to go on record as opposed to any other form of selection than that which we now have. Officers are selected every day for their fitness for certain desirable billets, and in war the highest form of selection is legalized by existing statutes. It is a pretty poor officer that gets discouraged on slow promotion, or allows himself to go to seed.
Commander E. B. BARRY, U. S. Navy. It was with mingled feelings of pride and sorrow that I read the first part of Commander Fiske's essay on American Naval Policy. Pride that so logical a deduction is made from known truths; but sorrow that it has had a naval officer for its author.
This essay will fall on deaf ears; it will not affect, in the slightest degree, the workings of what may well be called our historical policy.
The average American with a legal fight to settle usually employs a lawyer and accepts his advice as that of an expert; so also the American when he gets sick calls in his doctor for the same reason; but the naval officer knows nothing of his profession; how can he when he thinks only of war and slaughter and how he can deplete the public purse? Alas, poor Charles of England, your ghost yet stalks through this land!
If Commander Fiske had sent the first part of this essay to Silas P. Corntossel of Podunk, a gentleman noted throughout the land for turning the straightest furrow, and although "nigh onto seventy year" he never had been outside the village limits. If the good old man had published it under his own name, there is no knowing what good might have come from it. At least, it would have been granted a hearing and an attention that will not now be granted it. Surely it is unfortunate and pregnant with possible future disaster that this condition exists. President Cleveland once said we are confronted with a condition and not a theory. The only hope that such essays will not fall entirely upon deaf ears lies among the few men of national minds whose horizon is not limited by the village, the county, the state, or the party.
I think the general principles governing navies, their purpose and strength as deduced, cannot be controverted. The importance of a proper signal system is brought clearly before the mind, while the value of offensive power as set forth in the tables and in their explanations presents certain facts in a way that even the dullest can understand.
I am glad to see how easily the author disposes of the "volume of fire school," a fad not long ago among certain so-called artillerists. The ideas of offensive and defensive power are along the lines laid down by Lieut.- Comdr. Poundstone and shown in the armor and battery arrangement of battleships designed by him and submitted to the Department. From the essayist's close reasoning along these lines there seems to be no escape. Equally true seem to me his remarks on large ships and small ships. This recalls to mind a famous debate that took place since 1865 over a question of additional tonnage to be allowed the navy. A gentleman, who must have been an expert because he was not a naval officer, said he could see no reason for building vessels even as large as one thousand tons, armed with numbers of guns; what the United States needed was ten or twelve vessels, each of one hundred tons and each armed with one onehundred ton gun! Shades of Jefferson's gunboats; hide yourselves in shame! Although at school every midshipman knew what nonsense this was.
What difference does it make in her fighting qualities if a certain battleship be too large to enter a certain harbor? Unless that harbor possesses strategic value it would be a crime against the nation to build battleships of inferior offensive and defensive power, disregarding naval considerations because forsooth the larger ships could not be built there or could not go there. Thanks to sound strategical teaching, it is becoming known that the defense of a coast is not in its harbors but outside of them.
As for homogeneity and progress, there is in the author's remarks much to be remembered. Since the beginning of our modern navy, in spite of all that has been written and preached, it would seem as though the effort always had been made to make each appropriation group of fleet ships as different in battle essentials as possible from all other groups of fleet ships. Hence homogeneity always seemed wanting, for a unit group cannot consist of less than four, properly of eight. This carries back to the author's note at the beginning of the essay to which I shall refer later.
The remarks on scouts are apt and timely; personally I am opposed to man-of-war scouts unless they are armored cruisers. A scout's duty is to find out something; some movement of the enemy, the composition and strength of his fleet, its speed, etc. To accomplish this the scout must have both offensive and defensive power, since, naturally, the enemy will try to screen his movements. How will a 3000-ton torpedo-boat avoid destruction except by keeping out of the enemy's range? What can she find out if she cannot penetrate the outer screen; By all means let us have fast vessels that carry little else than motive power and fuel to run errands and to convey the information their big sisters have won.
Turning now to the second part and entering what may be called the field of speculation and politics, I must confess to a feeling of disappointment. To me the first bright promise is not fulfilled.
Under naval tactics, if I understand the author correctly, he has confused the relations of the "longest lines." If a fleet will have the advantage of position when its longest line is nearest to being perpendicular to the direction of the middle of the other fleet; then a fleet in column heading north, whose line prolonged passes through the center of a fleet in line east and west heading south, will have the advantage of position when it is well known the opposite is the case and the second fleet has attained the position now awkwardly designated a "capping." Later, this again is referred to, but neither exposition seems clear. I should be loath to see the old term "line of bearing" die out.
The reasons why the "fighting admiral" should be done away with seem clear. The modern admiral should be posted in his special flagship reasonably removed from the fighting line after the engagement begins and able to direct operations. The historical growth of the two positions of commanding general and commanding admiral during battle would be curious were it not true. The very reasons that separated the general more and more from the fighting line as the necessity to direct became greater seem to have forced the admiral into a sort of "post of honor," the head of the line where the enemy would be sure to concentrate his greatest efforts at destruction. In other words, on the water the directing fore was exposed to the earliest destruction. While this might answer in the "good old sailing days" it is a method to-day best adapted to produce in the shortest possible time the destruction, or at least the defeat, of the fighting admiral's fleet
I must disagree, however, with many of the author's reasons for the undeveloped state of naval tactics. I much doubt if the changes of conditions of warfare have been greater on the water than on the land. If by weapons the author means guns and their projectiles, these have advanced side by side afloat and ashore; if he means facility of transportation or translation, steam and electricity again have developed side by side. Before the sail period we had the oar period, the precursor of steam and steam tactics. It is always well not to hide your light under a bushel, but it is not always best to blow your own horn. I doubt if many will agree with the essayist that, as contrasted with navy officers, the mental work required of army officers in the exercise of their ordinary duties is so vastly inferior to that required of navy officers.
As for interest in naval tactics, I doubt if any navy officer can go through a tour of duty at the War College and not develop some interest in naval tactics. Incidentally, I would remark that it was the War College that developed Captain Mahan.
It ill becomes an officer to charge the navy with any responsibility for the shameful conditions existing during the period just after the close of the Civil War. That these conditions do not exist to-day is due more to the struggles and efforts of officers than to the help of so-called friends of the navy.
From a purely professional point of view the greatest calamity that ever befell our navy was the Civil War. What the navy had done was not recognized. That it had developed only to meet peculiar conditions largely non-naval, was not recognized. That it had not been opposed to a navy, or on the water to forces approaching equality, was not recognized. Finally, that the army could not have accomplished what it did without the aid of the navy was not recognized. When you add to this the "spread eagle" buncombe of the "whip creation" type that exclaimed so often one had but to stamp his foot (presumably on United States soil) and a million men would spring to arms! It was thought that the same method would create a navy.
After peace was made the war with Spain was a God send to the navy, lifting it to the crest of a wave of popularity which has given it already half the battleship force required to assure the strong man armed that he keepeth his court in peace.
I confess I can see no connection in the reasoning that because obsolete types of ships and guns are no longer used we have broken away from "traditions of the service." Did we break away from the traditions of the service when we first used horizontal fire with spherical fuzed shell, when we substituted locks for loggerheads? I fear the New School does not always consult history.
"Old times" surely will resent the author's reasons for the existence of an improved morale. One would infer that in the indefinite past nobody ever wanted to do his duty or even tried to do it, that there never was any pride taken in ships or guns, and that all the wonderful changes in ships, guns, gunnery, and "morale" were brought about by "Sims." I think, perhaps, it would be well if the essayist had enlightened us how the "new navy" came into being. If, as the essayist states, it was begun in 1881, and a "Sims" was graduated in 1882, what forces were at work at that time lifting the navy out of the slough? Who were the "we" that "had a hard time to breathe into its nostrils the breath of life"?
Granting a battle fleet is formed approaching as near homogeneity as our various and varied vessels will permit, it seems as though the proposed method of evolving a system of naval tactics is a good one. What we need most urgently is the separation of the battle fleet from the peace fleet and to keep the separation complete. If there be any so-called cruisers and transports in home waters keep them away from the fighting ships—follow the essayist's scheme of organization for strong navy and weak navy.
It goes without saying that we want a well drilled commander-in-chief, but we should guard against the specious reasoning by which the exception is substituted for the general. It is possible for a worthless division or squadron commander or a worthless captain to be a perfect commanderin- chief, so also is it possible for the admirable captain to be the worthless commander-in-chief. History, however, rarely bears this out; all or nearly all the great naval and military men of history were noted for their excellence in the lower grades.
Under administration, it seems to me the essayist confuses the ships on the navy list with the ships of the battle fleet. Neither the Intrepid, the Cumberland, nor the Boxer were intended, even in the wildest flights of the most archaic "old timer's" imagination to form part either of the battle force or of the cruising force.
The reasons why the navy fails to adopt every invention the minute, so to speak, it is on the market, are based on proper conservatism. Chasing the igmis fatuus is wrong more times than it is right, and the essayist here is looking into the past with the eyes of to-day. The Yankee at King Arthur's Court has an undercurrent of philosophy strong and silent beneath the bubbling brook of its sparkling fun.
I must deprecate the wise question of the ancient and sapient sailmaker. Judging by my experience with the "old sailmaker " when I first entered the navy, I think it would have been rather difficult for one of those old gentlemen to determine what constituted "eminent men" and "master minds." Perhaps the essayist has mixed politician and naval officer. If the words "master mind" are to be taken literally, this country has produced but one master mind and its possessor was never in the army. If the essayist will separate political influence or vote-getting power from excellence in profession I think he can find a better explanation of the little influence exerted by naval officers on public life. Except the occasional "man with a pull," who usually works for himself alone, our officers seem to be trying to attend solely to their profession. Some of them are away from home and cannot build up a following or a "weight." This kind of building it is well they should not do. It will be a sad day for the navy when its officers are political factors. I think the essayist fails entirely to judge conditions in this country as they existed at the close of the Civil War. It was a volunteer's war. After the first battle of Bull Run the regular army, as such, was not heard of. Although all the great military leaders were West Pointers, many of the second grade were from civil life, so the generals, colonels, and majors went back to their former occupations, carrying their titles with them, only to become (I was about to say heroes, but heroes did not exist from B. C. 2000 to A. D. 1898) prominent, usually through their talents, but aided nevertheless by their military prestige.
Out of sight out of mind. Has the essayist failed to discover in the history of the United States the unfailing regularity with which every war was preceded by a period of naval neglect and was followed by a short-lived period of popularity and attention? The author must seek in the peculiar construction of our national mind the causes for the situation he deplores but in which many of us glory. I hope I shall never live to see the day when naval officers are searching for votes, straightening their fences, spell-binding and—neglecting their profession. What Lord Charles Beresford can do in England neither he nor any other navy officer could do in the United States. Such proceedings are fundamentally at variance with our nation's ideas.
The plea for a general staff is well made but, to me, not convincing. I think the essayist misses an essential point. The directors of a big business concern have power to direct something. Why did not the essayist tell us who directs the navy. If he can organize any government service in this country on a business basis he can do more than ever was done, or ever will be done. Our people do not want it, never did, and never will. All government service is looked upon as a thing apart, and particular care is taken to see that any particular branch is not conducted in the same way as a corresponding industry in commercial life.
Efforts unceasing have been made to establish some sort of naval policy; it has been shown over and over again that we waste thousands, nay, millions of dollars for want of some faint symptoms of consistent policy; but every effort has failed and they will fail—until after the next war.
Perhaps then naval officers will be listened to for a very little while, longer than in the past, and they may succeed in having established a naval policy—not a political naval policy as might be inferred from some of the essayist's remarks, but a consistent, thought-out policy of construction—number, size, armament, personnel, and strategic distribution.
With these it is the function of naval officers to deal.
Lieutenant T. S. WILSON, U. S. Navy.—In "American Naval Policy" the essayist gives so many excellent reasons why our battleships should be built on the "all turret plan" that there seems to be nothing more to be said on the subject.
Everyone who has been on board a battleship when a number of guns have been firing has seen how much the turret guns in ships of the Alabama type interfere with the broadside battery. In this type the forward pair of 6-inch guns are almost useless for any really efficient work, while the forward 13-inch guns are firing abeam or abaft the beam, and the after pair of 6-inch guns are the same on account of the after turret while the four 6-inch guns on the upper deck are not very much better. Not only does the smoke interfere but the blast of a heavy gun coming into a broadside gun port is enough to seriously handicap the pointer and trainer as well as all the other men about the gun. In an arrangement of turrets such as we have on the Indiana class practically no inconvenience is felt in the 8-inch turrets with the 13-inch turrets firing in any direction.
I agree most heartily with the essayist in limiting the guns on battle ships to two calibers, 12-inch and 3-inch, and it seems to me that the best place for a 3-inch gun's crew in battle would be below the protective deck. The secondary guns' crews should be relief crews for the turrets and handling room crews and should be trained as such.
The plugman of a 13-inch gun can open and close the breech from five to six times at top speed and then he begins to slow down. If a rammer or lift man gets sick his relief, a green man, drags down the time of loading from 15 to zo seconds and the turret officer is in luck if nothing is broken, because in a properly trained crew each man is part of a machine and does his part mechanically, and every man should have an understudy.
Lieutenant EDWARD MCCAULEY, JR., U. S. Navy.—Commander Fiske's essay is so thorough and exhaustive; it shows such a large and worthwhile employment of time, thought, and study; the principles, reasoning, and conclusions are of such great importance and so evident, that there is little or no room for criticism. He has covered his subjects very fully and, without careful and painstaking searching, there is left little opportunity for discussion. One has simply to agree and approve, and to congratulate the essayist on such a splendid and complete paper.
In speaking of the proper size of our fleet, he says that "there is not a single reason to give, or to imagine, why the American people should not go through the same wars that all other nations have gone through." I can imagine but one reason, and that is, that if our naval and military power is of sufficient strength other nations will fear to go to war with us. We can only avoid some of these wars if we profit by the lessons to be learned from the histories of other and much older nations.
All authorities on naval matters, and students of naval history and tactics, seem to agree that too much accent cannot possibly be laid on the importance 3f high speed in our battle fleet, but if the maneuvering speed of our present fleet be compared with that of the fleet of some of our possible enemies, the comparison is not to our advantage. Nor do we know very much of what our fleet can do at the speed of which it is capable. Our fleet now exercises at tactics at a comparatively low speed. Is that speed to be used in actual battle? If not, then are we to wait until wartime to learn to maneuver in fleet formation at a higher speed? The great expenditure of coal is offered as a reason for keeping the speed at a low figure in our tactical exercises and maneuvers in peacetime. The wear and tear on the machinery and boilers and the dangers attendant on maneuvering in formations at high speeds are other reasons offered. Surely an increased expenditure of coal would be judicious. The tests to ships, machinery, boilers, and personnel, and the faults discovered and remedied would make such increased expense very reasonable. The danger of collision or accident can be somewhat avoided, by increasing the tactical distance between vessels, and maneuvering constantly at that distance until we are sufficiently expert to make it safe to resume the shorter distance and closer formations. Our ships are in most cases capable of high speed, but such speed is seldom used except for the required semi-annual trials. Superior speed is necessary for the initiative of which the essayist writes, the use of high speed for tactical drills and maneuvers is necessary to bring out and perfect "manageability," the importance of which he emphasizes.
I am glad to see that Commander Fiske places so much importance on the great value of fast and efficient signalling. If we can but sufficiently improve our system of signalling, properly increase the ability and celerity of our signal force, and give them the facilities and necessary protection in action, the change in the " manageability " of our fleet will be as great as the change from the hand steering gear of our old sailing ships to the steam steering gear of our modern vessels, and of equal consequence.
The importance of rapid and efficient signalling is one of the things which does not count in the war game as played upon a table. The interval between the time when an enemy's fleet commences a maneuver, and the time our admiral is able to decide what the enemy is about, make a signal, and commence our opposition or counter maneuver, has not, I believe, been included in any of the rules for, or in the practice of, the games. This interval will be of great importance in an actual war game played on the sea. Speed, signalling, and all else that goes to make up "manageability" will tend to lessen this interval.
If our fleet and ships are to be fought to their best advantage some "Protection of the Directing Personnel" must be invented and installed. Protection for the admiral, the captain, the signal force, and others. The use of vertical telescopes in connection with this should certainly be tried, studied, and improved upon. An "all around periscope" has been invented for submarines. Could not this be enlarged, improved upon, and adapted for use in connection with an armed tower or shield for the "Protection of the Directing Personnel "?
In regard to "Specially Designed Flagships," the disadvantages of having our flagship at the head of the line are readily seen. But it is difficult to see clearly, if she is to leeward of the line, as suggested, at one time, and then that side of the line becomes the windward or engaged side, how she is to cross through our fleet and get on the other flank without confusion. Or, if by some chance our fleet pierces the enemy's line (this may not be entirely in accord with everyone's ideas of modern tactics, but it is certainly a possible, if not probable, event), or if our fleet is engaged on both sides by the enemy, what then becomes of our flagship? Certainly it is not decided that a fleet will be engaged always on the same side throughout a battle. If our flagship is at a distance from the battle line, the enemy may maneuver to cut her off, and she may become isolated or driven away from the fleet, or perhaps captured or destroyed. If she is lightly armed, one or more of the enemy's heavy ships could be detached and sent to attack and, if possible, destroy her. It may be said that one of our heavy ships would immediately be sent to support our flagship. Even if this be done without confusion, our flagship would then be engaged in a small fight of her own, unable to maneuver with the other vessels, the admiral unable to direct his fleet.
It seems better to have our flagship one of the heaviest of the armored ships, able to take and hold her place in the fighting line whenever necessary or desirable. Let a place be reserved for her in the line of battle always. Say between two divisions or between two squadrons. This will give her sufficient space to pass from one flank to the other to take her place in the line of battle according to necessity or desirability.
One has but to look at the date of publication of our Tactical Signal Book to decide that the naval battle tactics, as practiced in our fleet, have hardly kept pace with the world's naval progress. Our vessels have changed greatly in kind, number, and efficiency, and, in addition, it seems that many valuable lessons should have been learned from fleet maneuvers and even actual naval battles, since that book was published, and the actual battle tactics are but a small part of "Naval Tactics" as a whole.
I believe that there is no more instructive, no more interesting, and no more effectual way to train our officers and men, and to test and drill our fleet and squadrons, than in sham battles—one squadron against another; if practicable, one fleet against another. From what I have seen of it, every man on board ship, from commander-in-chief down, is keenly and enthusiastically interested, and learning things which can be learned in no other way.
If Commander Fiske's scheme for forming and drilling our battle fleet should be adopted, our service would indeed be a happy, contented, interested, and most efficient one. The strength of our fleet would be increased tremendously in every way.
The naval life is not always attractive in the present day, and, as we are all human and have but one life to lead, the life on board ship must be sometimes considered apart from professional things. His scheme would go a great distance towards making the naval life the best life, as is the naval profession, in our minds, the best profession in the world.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. (See No. 113.)
Rear-Admiral CASPAR F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy.—Whatever is written by Admiral Luce commands respectful attention, not alone because he is a man whom we all unite to honor, but because his views are the outcome of speculations based on rare professional knowledge.
His diagnosis of the trouble in our body politic naval is keenly drawn and quite convincing. I am not sure, however, that I can agree with him in all his prescriptions, for the latter may be influenced either by unwillingness or unconscious failure to grasp the whole situation. For example, he appears to assume that economy is a desiratum in the administration of our navy yards. To the naval officer this is indeed axiomatic, but—I lisp the question with bated breath—is it true to those who control such matters? If it were true in the eyes of our legislators, how easy to close up and abandon a lot of yards and stations which are not needed by the navy and to expend the funds thus saved in extending and improving those which are actually required! How easy to organize them on business lines! Yet Admiral Luce and I both know that these things, in all probability, will never be done for reasons which neither he nor I care to define.
As we both think that the yards should be industrial plants of the highest type, we are positive that the carrying of the bureau systems into them is detrimental and therefore inexcusable. For my part, I have already suggested officially that no bureau should be permitted to employ any workman or laborer at a yard; that a yard, under the commandant, should be organized as manufacturing establishment with a skilled and competent mechanical engineer as superintendent; that the bureaus' representatives should merely serve as planners and inspectors of work done by some one else, etc. In my letter I pointed out the fact that to-day there is practically no check upon poor or extravagant work, as each officer finds satisfactory that which he has done himself. I cannot flatter myself that my suggestions were welcome. To return to my original hint, once our legislators really demand economy, economy will be forthcoming, not one day sooner; since it may be suspected that our navy yards serve other purposes besides the repairing of the fleet, and that this fact stands in the path of their betterment, notwithstanding all the discussions in the Naval Institute.
As to the necessity of giving to the General Board a status in law, we should not forget that, as Admiral Luce shows, the Secretary of the Navy executes the President's orders; also that he may depute to others as much or as little of his powers as he pleases; that under no circumstances can he (or would he) shirk the responsibility of his actions, whether individual or deputed; that the General Board, in spite of conspicuous and inconspicuous mistakes, has proved its usefulness beyond peradventure as an advisory body! and that its wisdom, inhering as it does in the excellent men who comprise it, can neither be added to nor subtracted from by any measure of law. That the legislative action recommended by Admiral Luce is necessary does not appear to many as demonstrated; that it may be desirable is another question. On these points I find myself among the doubters.
Naval Constructor T. G. ROBERTS, U. S. Navy.—It is now perhaps evident to anyone who knows as much of our naval history as the distinguished author of this paper that no reorganization of the Navy Department is possible which does not take into account all branches of the service, which does not allot to each its proper importance, and which does not permit each branch to be represented on an equal footing, if not in equal force, before the Secretary of the Navy. That much is established by sufficient proof.
The Navy Department will be reorganized one day, but it will be because of industrial considerations fresh from the industrial shops on shore. The Navy Department is the only department of the great government of ours which is engaged in spending millions of dollars in civil industry under its own management The flaws in naval administration have been definitely located in the navy yards. The Navy Department has always been dominated by naval officers, and its policy, as a continuous performance, has been determined by the navy itself—far more so than in any other department of the government; and we have thus arrived at where we are to-day. Industrial administration has been sliced and piece-mealed to suit the purposes of those inside the Navy Department, and its glaring defects are the most visible reasons for reform.
Admiral Luce has found the point—the multiplication of independent shipyards within a navy yard. That is the whole question—consolidation.
We have this much proved: Cause—several independent shipyards within a navy yard, red tape within red tape, wheels within wheels; remedy: "consolidation" (board of 1883-84). That is to say, segregation and consolidation; the shipyard to become a single industrial unit, separated from the military units.
Now what remedy does the author reach. "Legalize the General Board."
What kind of consolidation would you call that? The jump is so broad that I fail to make the connection.
Another thought deserves attention at this point. We are greatly indebted to the author for publishing the report of the board of 1883-4 relating to navy yard industry, and I wish to call special attention to it. It shows that the conditions "about twenty years ago" were exactly the same as now. The date of that board places it near the end of the administration of President Arthur. Now what was the effect of that great exposure of navy yard methods? Admiral Luce tells us on page 85 that, in November, 1885, the date of Secretary Whitney, the "purchases of the several bureaus were placed under the Paymaster General." That was the first consolidation that I have ever heard about—consolidation of the power to purchase from all bureaus to a single one. I happen to know that this was not all that was done towards the consolidation recommended by the board. A year later, on December 4, 1886, Secretary Whitney issued an order creating a general storehouse in each navy yard, and this consolidated the stores and supplies from all departments to the one. This was done also without legislation, but within the Secretary's administrative authority. There consolidation ended, a drop in the bucket. Such were the results of that navy yard exposure.
We hear nothing more of consolidation until near the close of a recent Secretary's administration, three or four years ago. He, from his own observation, determined that some consolidation was desirable, and besides mentioning it in his reports, he issued an order consolidating the electric lighting throughout navy yards from all departments to the one. That .much consolidation we got as the result of another Secretary's accumulated convictions.
Shortly after that, about two years ago, when the labor unions invaded Congress and secured the building of the Connecticut in a navy yard, there was another exposure of the same old navy yard methods, the result of which was to prove what was known before. Incidentally congressmen noticed navy yards, and seeing several power plants decided to consolidate from all departments to a single one, and we are at the beginning of that transition now. That is the history of consolidation up to date, the result of twenty years. Bye and bye, we will have another exposure, and some one will consolidate the machine shops; then several years afterwards, the foundries; then several years afterwards, something else; until finally each department will end up with a different kind of shop each; and in about one hundred and fifty years the six offices will be consolidated and will still be receiving orders from all the same old bureaus.
Why piece-meal the long-drawn-out agony?
On page 83 the board's report shows each department a little shipyard in itself. Why not consolidate all the little shipyards into a single shipyard—but not leave several bureaus to fight over it, as the board said, in Admiral Luce's italics on page 84, "it is absolutely necessary to begin within the Navy Department itself." That is, consolidate industrial bureaus, and all the rest is bound to follow.
Captain J. C. WILSON, U. S. Navy.—The importance of the subject which Rear-Admiral Luce treats in such a convincing manner seems to have been recognized by the several Secretaries of the Navy, and naval officers of high rank, belonging to what might be termed the military part of the service. It has always been recognized that a civilian Secretary of the Navy was not equipped with the necessary technical knowledge to carry on his duties without expert advice and assistance. Such expert advice and assistance has for many years come from the chiefs of the various Bureaus of the Department and more especially from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. This has never been an efficient or satisfactory method and has always been productive of confusion, lack of system, and even antagonism between the various bureaus until neither the Secretary, Congress, nor the service knew where to turn to gain an unprejudiced, well-considered plan for anything affecting the administration or development of the service. The results of such a system have been deplorable from every point of view, and as the naval establishment increased, and the questions affecting construction and administration grew more and more difficult of solving, the bureau system of advisory duties became more and more confusing, and hopeless of good results.
Out of the Board of Experts gathered to advise the Secretary during the late war with Spain, grew the present "General Board," and it has been practically impossible ever since its establishment to do without the services of such a board. This is acknowledged by every one who is in any way interested in the administration of the Navy Department, the only point of difference being that while the present Secretary (as well as his predecessors), and a majority of officers whose opinions have been publicly expressed on the subject, are in favor of making this "Board" permanent, and giving it a legal status under the name of "The General Staff of the Navy," there are a strong minority who are opposed to it, and have thus far been able to prevent its establishment by legislation. This minority do not object to the constitution or duties of the present "General Board," but object to such a board being given a legal status: first, because in their opinion this would have the effect of making the Secretary of the Navy an ornamental figure-head; second, that the measure savors too much of militarism; third, that the military element of the Navy Department has all the power and all the influence that it ought to have, and additionally that there is a fear that such a board once legally incorporated by Congress would usurp the functions and duties now provided by law as belonging to the several bureaus.
Throughout all these mentioned objections (which were made before the House Naval Committee) is to be seen the spirit of deep-seated objection to recognizing the navy as a military establishment. It is a military establishment and cannot be made anything else without practically destroying its usefulness, and to these efforts to reduce it to a civil establishment may be attributed the lack of system of central policy of administration and construction which has always characterized our navy. And, in addition, one may look no further to seek the cause of the large percentage of desertions from the service.
The American people, as a whole, are non-essentially military, and opposed to all military control and power, and only submitting to so much of it as has been found to be absolutely necessary for the maintenance of an army and navy. The accessories of military control, which are accepted without question by other nations as being necessary for the efficient administration of affairs, are either accepted by our people with suspicion and a spirit of antagonism or, as in the present case, openly objected to "as savoring too much of military control."
Keeping this point in view, it is not difficult to establish a General Naval Staff whose duties and the constitution of which would be so provided for in the act of incorporation as to remove all such fear, and with this object in view I some time ago drew up a bill which, from my point of view, meets the requirements of the service, while providing that the "General Staff" does not assume undue military control, nor interfere with the duties delegated by law to the several bureaus of the Department. I herewith enclose a copy of this proposed bill and request that it be printed in connection with this discussion.
It is true that such assistance as the Secretary of the Navy may require in the administration of the duties of his office can be obtained from the General Board as now constituted, but the trouble is that a new Secretary may not wish any advise on any subject whatever and may decide to do without a General Board, or may change its functions or composition in such a way as to make its advice useless, and the mere fact that such a "Board" has no legal status and has no duties prescribed by law, but is the creation of the Secretary and subject to changes in every respect (including dissolution) at his will, makes it a body of little or much importance, according to the attitude of the Secretary respecting it, and places it in a position secondary to all the bureaus of the Department constituted by law, whereas from its composition and importance of its legitimate duties it should be the body of highest position under the Secretary in the Department. The necessity of an advisory board or staff in the administration of naval affairs is, I believe, practically unquestioned, the only question being, shall such a board or staff be convened and dissolved at the pleasure of any Secretary, or is its importance of such a nature as to make its permanent status a necessity both for the assistance it may be to the Secretary as well as the influence its opinions and recommendations may have upon Congress and the people.
There is no question in my mind that a General Staff for the navy is a military as well as a civil necessity for the successful administration of the Navy Department, but especially so, that: First, our navy may be constructed according to a well considered expert policy; second, that the rules and regulations governing the personnel of the service may be controlled under the advice of a legally constituted and properly equipped expert staff; third, that the fleets may be disposed of and drilled to the best advantage in times of peace; fourth, that the information gained by the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence may be brought together and discussed, and from such information strategic war measures may be decided upon, so that we will not be found in a condition of unpreparedness on the breaking out of hostilities; fifth, to advise the Secretary of the Navy at all times in matters pertaining to the military administration of the navy. These duties are surely of sufficient importance to give a legal status to a General Staff and make their duties second to those of no other body of officers under the Secretary, and thanks are due to the author of the article under discussion for so clearly tracing the history of naval administration as to show the preponderating weight of opinions as to the necessity of the establishment of "A General Staff" legally incorporated by Congress to assist the Secretary of the Navy in the administration of the duties of his office.
The following bill would, I think, meet the requirements of a "General Staff," and remove the present objections against it. It differs from the one referred to in the "Circular for the Information of Officers" (1904), as follows:
(a) In putting the "General Staff" on the same footing as a "Bureau" of the Navy Department, and providing that the chief of staff shall be nominated by the Secretary of the Navy, and appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This enables the Secretary to choose his own chief of staff (military adviser), requires the nomination to be ratified by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, which would seem to hedge an appointment around with sufficient safeguards to satisfy anyone. It seems to me such an appointment would give the Secretary the military adviser required, and remove objections to the bill on that score.
(b) In providing that a marine officer should be a member of the "General Staff." It seems to me that when questions affecting the disposition of the marines, or the administration of the corps, are discussed, it would be well to have a marine officer on the board, not only to meet the objections in that line, but because his advice and counsel should be particularly valuable in such cases.
(c) Increasing the limit of continuous service on the staff from three to four years, and not requiring any sea duty to intervene. The chief of staff under the bill herein proposed would be appointed for a period of four years, and it might be desirable to continue other officers as members of the "Staff" the same length of time, which of course would be in the discretion of the Secretary. Also it might not always be practicable to give a captain, who has completed his term of sea service, a change to go to sea again, and it might be desirable to utilize his services on the board again before his retirement from active service.
(d) Stipulating that the duties of the "General Staff" shall be advisory and not executive, and that its determinations and recommendations shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, and not to include such duties as are now, or may be in the future, assigned to any of the several bureaus of the Department of the Navy, as now established by law. This seems to be the intention of the Department, but I think if the duties of the "General Staff" were specified as suggested it would remove opposition in that direction.
I do not think it desirable that the admiral or ranking officer of the navy should be designated by law as the "Chief of Staff," as he could be nominated as such if desirable.
"A BILL TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF NAVAL ADMINISTRATION, ETC."
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled.
That "The General Staff of the Navy" is hereby constituted, to consist of not more than five officers of the line of the navy and one of the marine corps, now below the rank of captain in the navy, or colonel in the marine corps, for general military duties connected with the naval administration.
That the Secretary of the Navy shall nominate an officer of the line of the navy, not below the rank of captain in the navy, to serve as, and have the title of, "Chief of Staff of the Navy"; such officer to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a period of four years, and to have, if not of higher rank, while serving as such, the highest rank and pay of a rear-admiral of the navy. That the remaining members as herein provided for shall be detailed for duty as such by the Secretary of the Navy.
That no officer shall be detailed as a member of this "Staff" for a longer continuous period than four years, except by reason of a reappointment as "Chief of Staff," and also provided that no officer having served as a member of such " Staff" shall be eligible for a further detail thereon except after a service of two years on other duty.
That the duties of "The General Staff of the Navy," as herein constituted, shall be advisory, and not executive, and that its determinations and recommendations shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, and shall not include such duties as now are, or may be in the future, assigned to any of the several bureaus of the Navy Department as now constituted by law.
Captain E. B. BARRY, U. S. Navy.—The admirable essay on the Department of the Navy by Rear-Admiral Luce bristles so with facts and is so condensed an exposition of existing conditions as to excite admiration and surprise. It appears opportunely at the same time as the prize essay of the year and gives the views of a distinguished member of the modern old navy, whose mind is ever young.
I doubt if a better resume could be given of the growth of the bureau system, and through that system of the unbusinesslike methods obtaining in our navy yards. Human nature is ever the same, and the desire for independent authority is a powerful lever aiding to perpetuate such a system. Yard machinery and power plants are now under examination and a step towards consolidation, economy, and efficiency has been taken. The quotation from the report of the board of officers in reply to the query as to business methods in our navy yards reads like a prophecy. Quietly Admiral Luce comments as follows: "One copy of this report was sent to the Senate and one copy to the House of Representatives under date of January 14, 1884. . . . It does not appear, however, that it elicited any attention, or that the charges it contained have ever been refuted, or a single statement challenged."
Here I beg to refer to some of my remarks concerning Commander Fiske's essay. Had this report been made by Councellor Skinflint and Farmer Corntossel it would have received attention; coming from naval officers the pigeon hole was the only fate awaiting it.
The arraignment of the Department and the bureaus as quoted from the writings of two Secretaries is rather hard to refute. It is a melancholy fact that General Order No. 372 of 1889 created the Board on Construction as "the only plan the law admitted" trying to remedy the want of coherence and the conflict of independent authorities that extended even to the building of vessels.
I think the admiral puts his finger on the sore spot when he writes of "our peculiar methods of naval administration and the total absence from it of the military character—that very character the President saw was wanting."
Is it known that the chiefs of all our naval bureaus are civil appointees? Because they are appointed from the navy their status in nowise differs from that of any other bureau chief under any other branch of the government. Even allowing that the individual may be of the military or rather naval type, his bureau is not. It is essentially part of the civil establishment, part of the civil Navy Department. It seems then that the question to be answered is—how to provide an executive or naval branch as opposed to a civil or financial and materiel branch.
Political and religious prejudices have served to obscure the ability of James II of England, and have rendered many blind to the great services rendered by him to the English Navy. It is a curious fact and one well worth recalling in connection with our favorite anti-navy Charles I ghost, that, when James put himself in the position of generalissimo as king, in spite of the hatred with which the successful revolutionists regarded him, the official position survived, attaching itself to the throne of England and appearing in the constitution of this country framed by our monarchy-hating forefathers.
William Jones was the only Secretary of the Navy having had naval and military experience. Strange as it may seem, his recommendations regarding the appointment of Navy Commissioners were approved, but, as usual, when the commissioners were beginning to be most needed, they were abolished, as the admiral says: "Congress went to the other extreme and, while providing for the civil administration of the Department, reduced the executive branch to a minimum." This very condition, when the military needs outgrew the civil organization, as the admiral very justly says, made the General Board. "Necessity has forced the General Board into existence." It is a makeshift at best and lacks legislative status.
In spite of bureau opposition, sooner or later the military (as opposed to civil) executive branch of the Navy Department must be revived and revived under the sanction of law. Call it what one will—Advisory Board, General Board, Navy Commissioners, or General Staff, it must be revived and its erstwhile opponents will discover, to their astonishment, that the Secretary of the Navy has not been eliminated from the problem.