Four principal elements enter into warship design, viz., battery, protection, radius of action, and speed. When it is attempted to combine these on a given displacement each crowds the other for space to such an extent that the limitation in displacement has steadily given way, until many students of the subject have concluded that this tendency must be stopped, even at a sacrifice. It is possible, however, that those so concluding are becoming disheartened when almost in sight of the goal, and that only by persistently designing warships which combine the highest tactical elements of their class, on whatever displacement these demand, can we hope to excel.
The order of importance of the elements in the design differs according to the class of vessel. Thus, for battleships, we should consider-
1st. What combination of guns will produce the most efficient fighting battery?
This is not a question to be settled by the ordnance expert alone, but by the tactician as well, for the battery carried must be considered, in its distribution, weight of metal delivered and arc of fire, as one of the aggregation of batteries which by tactical movements must be concentrated upon the enemy. To arrive at a solution of this question the consideration of the weight, range, energy and rapidity of fire of modern guns should be combined with a careful study of the best arrangement of guns on shipboard for concentration of fire in fleet actions.
The correct tactical arrangement of guns in a ship's battery is that which will deliver the greatest concentrated energy of fire upon a vessel of the enemy, but where guns are mounted on shipboard, the necessarily elongated form of the ship makes such concentration possible only in a direction divergent from that of her length. The ship being mobile and dirigible, however, this concentration can be brought to bear toward any point of the compass with the aid of helm and screw. Hence, the strongest tactical arrangement of guns for a single ship's battery is that which gives the greatest possible energy of broadside fire.
A battleship is a unit of a squadron. She is, or should be, designed to fight in tactical combinations with other battleships; to add her greatest concentrated energy of fire to that of other battleships while executing with them similar movements. Being in squadron, she is no longer free to do this by means of helm and screw, for she is constrained to make only such turnings as will harmonize with those of other vessels engaged in the same tactical evolutions. Her battery itself must, then, be capable of the utmost arc of train in order to concentrate upon the same object as the batteries of other vessels. Thus the ideal tactical disposition would be one giving an all-round fire to every gun in a ship's battery and making it possible for every gun to bear in the same direction at once. There is but one way in which this is mechanically possible—to mount all the guns in turrets superposed one above the other in a single vertical column. This, of course, is practically impossible, but it shows that as far as we can superpose turrets we are following the dictates of tactics.
An evolution which brings to bear one ship's greatest energy of fire should not waste part of the energy of some other ship. In battleship design, the first effort should be to attain that assignment and arrangement of battery which will permit the greatest possible concentration of energy of fire in any one direction, then to give similar batteries to every ship of the same class built.
By superimposing 8-inch upon 13-inch turrets in our battleships Kearsarge and Kentucky, we have obtained a concentrated energy of broadside fire superior to that of any ship of their class in the world, and at the same time we have insured a better end-on-fire than seems possible with guns otherwise disposed in any battleships we have yet built. It is such a vast gain in tactical arrangement of battery that we should not recede from it because it is novel and has not had the test of battle; but should rather strive to improve upon, or add to it. The structural and mechanical difficulties in installing the superimposed turrets seem to have been successfully overcome, but there is still one defect in them, more apparent than real. That is the rigid connection between the 8-inch and 13-inch turret. It is this seeming defect which opponents of the system strive to bring out by supposing the Kearsarge attacked by a vessel on each quarter, one of these assailants needing the attention of her 8-inch guns. These guns would, it is claimed, take the 13-inch guns with them and leave the Kearsarge's other side to sustain an unequal combat. Such a divided attack, however, even upon the Kearsarge, would be a cardinal tactical error, permitting her to use all her guns; whereas a combined attack of her two assailants from one general direction would permit the heaviest concentration of both their batteries upon a portion only of the total battery of the Kearsarge. For illustration, let us suppose this ship attacked by a Kentucky and an armored cruiser. The two battleships would be matching gun for gun, and the cruiser, if concentrating on the same side as the Kentucky, would be delivering her whole broadside unopposed, whereas on the other side she would be receiving the fire of seven additional 5-inch guns. Now replace the Kentucky with another armored cruiser and we have the Kearsarge attacked by two armored cruisers of, say, fifty per cent of her battery power each. If they concentrate on one side of her they will fight her on about equal terms. If they attack on different sides the Kearsarge will be able to concentrate her whole energy of fire upon one of them while using against the other seven 5-inch guns, otherwise idle. It seems hardly necessary to carry the illustrations farther in order to prove that the divided attack proposed is tactically unsound, and should be encouraged by the Kearsarge (if caught in such an emergency) rather than avoided. Nevertheless it can always be rejected by a shift of the helm.
I believe it to be mechanically possible to so arrange the superimposed turrets in new models as to make them turn separately, and thus restore independent mobility, if it is really desirable, to the 8-inch guns.
2d. What protection must be given to the battery to make it as invulnerable as possible?
This again is a question for the tactician as well as the ordnance expert, and although fights between armored vessels have not been numerous, they point very decidedly to the value of protection and the necessity for more of it, especially protection of the personnel.
A vast weight of armor is now devoted to a water-line belt, yet in all the history of naval warfare since guns have been used, it is the rarest thing to find recorded a ship sunk by gun-fire. In the days of sails, battleships were placed hors de combat by the destruction of their motive and directive power, i. e., their sails, masts and rudders; or by the destruction of their personnel. Now, the motive and directive power can be invulnerably disposed below an armored deck. Should we not devote the further disposition of armor chiefly to the protection of the personnel, instead of so largely to insuring flotation, which history shows us has so seldom been destroyed by gun-fire under any circumstances?
3d. How far must this battery be carried to attack our most distant possible adversary:
This is a matter of geographic measurement, and coal-consumption per mile at economic speed, adding sufficient fuel capacity to sustain the ship while establishing a base on the hostile coast.
4th. At what speed must this battery be carried to insure its coping with any of its class afloat?
This is a question of boiler, engine and structural design with a view always to equal foreign models, and to excel them when it can be done on the same weight and space, for while an excess of speed in battle is unquestionably advantageous, it certainly would not be so at the sacrifice of any other offensive element in a battleship. Speed is of more value in strategy than in tactics.
The four considerations enumerated become, when settled, elements of volume and weight, and it remains to determine-
5th. What structure must be built to carry them?
The aggregate of these five items gives the size of the tactical unit of battle afloat—the battleship. The number of these units must be determined from the strategic features of our coasts and the naval force of our strongest possible adversary, and legislators must be kept fully informed as to this need.
This method does not suggest indefinite increase in size, for each item has its limit; in fact, seems to have already reached its limit in the directions of volume and weight. In these respects guns reached and passed the limit some years ago and have dropped back to lighter weights and calibers. Their improvement now is entirely in the direction of greater strength of material, better explosive propelling agents and a more economic use of them.
Armor seems to have reached its limit in thickness, and invention now turns to increasing its hardness and toughness.
The distance to which we must carry the battery has geographic limitations, while improvement in fuels and methods of coaling at sea may reduce fuel weights carried.
Speed, if increased much in large ships, seems likely to be accomplished by new designs in engines and boilers involving economic use and spacing of motive power rather than increase in volume and weight of generating and transmitting parts.
The consensus of building opinion of the present day, as illustrated by the latest battleship designs, indicates that all the best elements can be obtained on a displacement of 15,000 tons, and we may expect, in the future, to see equally good fighting units, and even better, produced on smaller displacements. Let those who shrink from war vessels of great displacement remember that they insure a special tactical advantage over smaller ones in their greater steadiness of gun platform.
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Land campaigns in the latest wars with up-to-date weapons have demonstrated that it is absolutely essential to success to have a large component of the fighting force specially equipped for mobility, swiftness and great radius of action; in other words, to have a mounted infantry. The campaign in the Philippines made no permanent progress until, with such a force, we could outstrip the ever-fleeing foe and bring him to bay. The campaign in South Africa was a deadlock until the British had a sufficient mounted infantry force to turn the enemy's positions by long and unperceived detours, sever his communications and fall upon exposed points.
Warfare afloat has ever been analogous in its principles to warfare on land. If a fleet at sea should persist in avoiding battle by Fabian Tactics, the opposing fleet, if it possessed only equal characteristics, might fail to bring on a decisive engagement until crippled for want of fuel, whereas, if it were made up in part of a class of vessels having superior speed and radius, yet retaining sufficient protection and armament to endure the shock of combat, this portion might overtake, cut off or hold the elusive enemy until the main body came up. Again, two fleets of battleships having equal tactical characteristics, might fight to a standstill without decisive advantage, and one or the other might withdraw to shelter, whereas, if one fleet possessed a division of vessels superior in speed, mobility and radius, the other fleet could be shut out of its place of refuge and possibly forced to surrender. The survival of the Chinese battleships in the battle of the Yalu after four hours' hammering, indicates that fighting to a standstill is not an improbable outcome in future naval combats where reliance is placed exclusively upon battleships.
Another feature of great importance in naval as well as land warfare is reconnaissance, and reconnaissance is not satisfactory unless pushed home until the main body and strength of the enemy is disclosed. Vessels suited to this purpose must have coal-endurance for a long search, battery enough to beat-in the enemy's outposts, high speed to dash into close touch with the main body and then to get away, and sufficient protection to stand punishment while under heavy fire.
We should, then, have a mounted infantry of the sea as well as a mounted infantry on land, and the type which will fill this requirement seems to be the armored cruiser.
Armored cruisers, therefore, ought to fulfill the following conditions:
They should be able to overtake battleships in chase within the limits of daylight. This would necessitate a superior speed of at least two knots.
They should be able to keep the sea at cruising speed at least half as long again as battleships, and, if possible, a good deal more than half.
They should have the same protection as a battleship, as nearly as other conditions will allow.
Their reduced battery should be homogeneous in calibers and tactical disposition to that of battleships.
Briefly stated, there must be a sacrifice of battery and protection to speed and endurance, and this sacrifice should be chiefly in battery. As a bare statement, this will be challenged, but it can be shown from our own recent battleship designs that on about 12,000 tons we can, by sacrificing battery alone to speed and endurance, produce an armored cruiser equal to any under construction.
Take, for example, the Kearsarge. She has a displacement of 12,300 tons with her total capacity of 1200 tons of coal. By taking away her 3-inch guns, mounts, turrets and ammunition, and reducing her 13-inch barbettes to suit the 8-inch turrets we would remove about 1400 tons. On this we can get 2000 tons coal-capacity, add 50 per cent of weight for her motive power and have 100 tons left for such increased weight of hull as would be necessary in fining her lines and increasing space for fuel, and thus produce a ship having a radius of 10,000 miles and a speed of 20 knots, which could take her place, when necessary, in the line-of-battle beside the Kearsarge with the same immunity, and with a similar battery up to and including her 8-inch guns. If we compare such a ship, element for element, with the latest armored cruisers built or building abroad, even with those of greater displacement, we will find that, although sometimes slightly inferior to them in speed or radius, she would in every instance outclass them when brought to battle.
Such is an armored cruiser, and by comparison it appears that her limit of displacement could for the present be fixed at 12,000 tons, with the expectation, as in the case of battleships, that equally good ships of the type can in the future be produced on smaller displacements.
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
The functions of armored cruisers with the fleet in time of war are too important for them to be sent to fritter away their endurance by threshing about the theater of war for those bits of superficial information and first touches with the enemy's forces, which serve, by aggregation, to shape the attack or defense, yet there must be vessels to do this, and, from the nature of the work, there should be many of them. They must be ships of greater speed and endurance than warships of any other class, and their endurance should be exceedingly great, not alone in fuel, but in seaworthiness, habitability, distilling capacity, provisions, cold-storage and self-repair. They must have battery enough to whip all improvised and auxiliary war vessels, and to fight, with at least even chances, any vessel of their own class—but it is not their duty to fight vessels of a superior class. They should be protected from such by their greater speed and by an armored deck over their motive and directive power, which would insure their escape from gun-fire before being crippled. Their ammunition hoists should be heavily protected, but gun positions need only protection from rapid-fire projectiles; the limit of thickness of such protection being that above which some sacrifice of special type characteristics of these vessels would enter in.
Such a vessel is a protected cruiser. When with the fleet, or operating for the fleet in time of war, she is a scout.
More war vessels have been built approximating to this type than to any other, yet they have seldom been designed to take their legitimate place in the war fleet. Some are merely economic structures built to "show the flag" in foreign ports in time of peace. These are always deficient in speed and some branch of endurance. Others are designed solely as "commerce-destroyers" and have insufficient battery and protection. Commerce-destroying, however, except with an otherwise impotent naval power, should only be incidental to the operations of naval warfare, and is not worth a special design. Protected cruisers designed for their legitimate war purposes as swift, enduring, well-armed seekers of information, or scouts, will also fulfill the highest requirements of commerce-destroyers, or of cruisers for the peace establishment. They are also of the type needed for commercial blockade and search and for protecting landing parties.
A protected cruiser, therefore, should fulfill the following conditions:
1. She should be the fastest ocean-going war vessel afloat.
2. At economic speed, her fuel endurance should exceed that of all other types of war vessels.
3. She should excel all other types in her provision capacity, distilling and freezing apparatus, and workshop appliances, and she should be sheathed.
4. She should have a complete protective deck, heavy enough to keep out the largest projectiles. Her cellular subdivision of hull should be the most complete now designed. Her battery should be protected from secondary-battery fire as much as other requirements permit, while her ammunition hoists, conning-tower and helm connections should be heavily armored.
5. By comparing protected cruisers of different countries it will be found that, to equal the best armed ships of the type, the battery should be at least four 8-inch guns, ten 6-inch R.F. guns, and secondary guns in proportion.
After carefully scrutinizing the characteristics of all protected cruisers built and building the world over, there seems to be no better type on which to base modifications than our own cruiser Olympia. With all coal aboard she is a 6000-ton vessel. By increasing her displacement 2000 tons she could be made a 23-knot ship, with 16,000 miles radius of action, carrying a battery superior to that of any vessel of her class, and with protection adequate to the type. This would make the maximum displacement for a protected cruiser 8000 tons.
GUNBOATS.
Now that we have turbulent insular possessions full of intricate waterways, as well as growing interests in unstable countries accessible chiefly through long and shallow rivers, it is important that we should consider more carefully the characteristics needed in gunboats. A study of our gunboat-work in the Philippines will teach us that there is a special sphere of work for such vessels; in sweeping the shoreline ahead of advancing troops, protecting their shore flank or enfilading that of the enemy; in making reconnaissance of narrow and intricate channels and cutting out small craft, and in ascending rivers to keep open communications and convoy supplies to interior points.
They will thus be constantly exposed to small-arm and machine-gun fire, and a special feature of their construction should be adequate protection against such fire. Above-water plates should be thick enough to keep out small-arm bullets, and bulwarks should be constructed to serve like breastworks. Such protection should extend to the positions of those navigating the vessel, including the lookouts aloft. This could and should be done to gunboats and picket boats already built. If it were, we would escape such mortifying disasters as that to the Urdaneta at Orani.
Gunboats must, as we know, be of light draft, which can be determined by a study of the hydrography of their probable stations. They should carry the best rapid-fire and machine-gun battery commensurate with their size, and have as much coal and provision endurance as possible. Speed is of minor importance, and sheathing would be superfluous, for they can be hauled out almost anywhere at small expense and cleaned.
COAST DEFENSE VESSELS.
Coast defense means harbor defense. If batteries are to be mounted for the defense of a harbor, they should be mounted on shore and not afloat, for they can not only be made more invulnerable and carry greater armament, but their ever-steady platforms and the greater possibility of range finding render their fire immeasurably more accurate. There is a tendency in this country to build monitors for harbor defense, and I once thought they had their place in the composition of the fleet; but further tactical reflection, and their recent behavior off the coast of Cuba, have reversed my opinion. They are tactically useless except in smooth water. A monitor is but the first crude material shape of a tactical idea, i. e. of an invulnerable revolving battery upon an unsinkable hull. The battleship of today, especially with superposed turrets, is the evolution, the perfection of the monitor, retaining the tactical advantages of the latter in the turrets and protective deck, and remedying by a vaster structure the tactical shortcomings of unstable platform, low freeboard, limited speed and endurance and small battery. The real coast defense vessels are battleships on the high seas ready to fall upon the enemy in whatever port he strikes. There may be some harbors whose configuration calls for defenses at points where there is no land, but they are few in number, and can be definitely picked out by local tactical examination. In these, monitors would be useful; perhaps necessary, but I suspect that we already have plenty for that purpose. To my mind the only special type of vessel needed for harbor defense is the torpedo-boat, and torpedo-boats will never figure largely in any war of ours except as harbor defense vessels. For this purpose we should continue building them until we have a flotilla for every important harbor in the country, and should thereafter maintain them in number and efficiency.
NAVAL AUXILIARIES.
If all naval auxiliaries were to be specially designed and built by the government it might, perhaps, be ideal, but their care and maintenance in peace times would be an expense out of all proportion to the tactical advantages to be gained from such designs in time of war. Nevertheless, there are two types of auxiliaries which both tactics and strategy demand shall be ever near or with the fleet in time of war, and which could always add to its mobility and efficiency in time of peace, viz., the collier and repair ship.
Von Moltke, having land campaigns chiefly in mind, said that strategy was three-fourths geography. Had he been an admiral, I think he might have added "and one-fourth coal." Other things being equal, that combatant which best solves the problem of coaling its fleet in time of war, will come out victor. All sea powers realize this, as is evinced by their efforts to seize islands and establish coaling stations here, there and everywhere in the waters of the oceans; yet every student of strategy knows that such coal piles will be used by whichever contestant proves to be the stronger highwayman in their vicinity for the time being. Briefly, the disadvantages of a coaling station are:
Its location is exactly known to the enemy.
If it lies on your line of communication toward him it is equally on his toward you, and will be as accessible to him as to yourself.
It is immobile and must be sought at greater or less distance from the theater of operations.
On the other hand, for colliers, we have the reverse conditions: They are mobile and can be sent to any desired rendezvous, and away from it again, if necessary, after coaling from them, or they may be kept constantly with the fleet.
They need never serve to replenish the enemy's bunkers, for they can be sunk when in danger of capture.
Even with coaling stations, colliers are ultimately necessary for replenishment, and in the long run the possession of coaling stations is but an added risk of serving the enemy.
Of course the great advantage of coaling stations, in fact their only raison d'être as a strategic precaution, is that they afford harbor facilities for coaling, but the problem of coaling from colliers at sea seems fairly solved, and if coal is kept afloat with the fleet in time of war, it will not be difficult to find sufficient shelter to permit its transfer to the bunkers when necessary.
If, however, colliers are to accompany the fleet, they must not be in any sense impediments. They should be specially designed and navy-built, with the following characteristics:
A cruising sea speed at load draught equal to that of battleships.
Devices for trimming with sea water to maintain their immersion as their cargo is diminished, or to keep them sufficiently immersed to maintain their speed.
All the recent appliances for coaling vessels at sea.
Arrangements to quickly sink the vessel when necessary to avoid capture.
Ample equipment for quickly abandoning ship in such an emergency.
A well arranged battery of light rapid-fire guns, with protection to navigating positions and to battery sufficient to keep out projectiles of its own calibers.
A protective deck over boiler and machinery spaces.
The necessity for repair ships of the Vulcan class was demonstrated fully in the Spanish-American war. They should be navy-built and maintained in peace times as well as during war. One at least, should be on every station we maintain, and they should accompany their squadrons in cruises and maneuvers. They would not only add to the tactical efficiency of the fleet at all times, but would, by curtailing expensive sojourns at navy yards, prove an actual monetary saving to the government.
THE NUMBER OF SHIPS.
While it is of vital importance to determine by careful study the best types, characteristics and sizes for warships, it is of equal importance to develop a definite, continuous and progressive building program. To this end, we should study the methods of the country or countries most closely comparable to ours in commercial and colonial conditions and in national rank. Take Germany, for instance—a young nation with an agricultural, manufacturing and commercial population; with a littoral and interior water communication similar to ours; with a growing, world-wide trade, and with newly acquired colonial possessions. She is closest to us today in naval power, and we will run a close second to her in naval construction for the next four years. She has, moreover, a carefully matured program already established by far-reaching legislation, which is to bring her navy up to a certain strength in a certain number of years and to maintain it at that strength thereafter.
We cannot, with certainty, maintain our position as a world power unless we adopt some such program. It is a problem which can be solved by answering the following questions and acting upon the answers:
1. How many battleships should we have today in order to cope on equal terms with any other first-class naval power?
2. That number provided for by a program covering the briefest practicable length of time, how many additional battleships must we build each year to maintain a total force in undiminished proportion to that of our strongest naval competitor?
3. What should be the retiring age of a battleship, and, that determined, what yearly construction will be necessary to fill vacancies caused by retirement?
The above three questions answered will give us a definite number of battleships to be built each year for a period reaching continuously into the future as far as construction in other countries will give us data for computation. Next, to insure tactical homogeneity in the fleet we should determine that—
For every N battleships there should be X armored cruisers, Y protected cruisers, Z navy-built colliers and Z¹ navy-built repair ships.
We are separated by oceans from all other great naval powers. It seems reasonable to presume that none of them could afford to send more than half their battle fleet away from home waters in a war with us. Great Britain is the greatest naval power and has fifty battleships. We should, then, have twenty-five built or nearing completion. We actually have fifteen and should provide ten more in the shortest time practicable to make up our deficiency. At the same time we must watch the yearly budgets of all other naval powers and build additional battleships in proportion to our closest competitor.
The only country which has, as yet, placed a legislative retiring age upon warships, is Germany. She retires battleships after twenty-five years' service. Without exact data we would do well to adopt that figure in order to maintain a definite building program.
Being thus able to designate exactly the number of battleships which should be laid down each year for as many years ahead as we please, the number of vessels of other classes to be built should be worked out proportionately from tactical considerations. If the correct tactical use of armored cruisers is that which I have suggested in the early part of this paper, i. e., as a mounted infantry of the sea, they should constitute about one-third the line of battle. It may be stated then, that for every two battleships there should be one armored cruiser.
Scouts cannot be too numerous. It is conservative to say that to every ship-of-the-line should be built one scout. For the three ships above enumerated there would thus be three protected cruisers. Basing them upon the battleships it may be stated that for every two battleships there should be three protected cruisers.
Gunboats, being designed for special purposes and localities, are not, tactically, a part of the battle fleet, but tactics demands a due proportion of colliers and repair vessels in a theater of operations. The six vessels which would be provided in the preceding apportionment would carry 9000 tons of coal. They would need two 5000-ton colliers ever present with them to refill their bunkers. They should also be accompanied by one repair ship. The algebraic expressions in the tactical rule for new construction can, then, be replaced by figures, thus:
For every 2 battleships there should be 1 armored cruiser, 3 protected cruisers, 2 navy-built colliers and 1 navy-built repair ship.
The building of ships is not alone sufficient to maintain an adequate navy. It is imperative that the personnel shall expand with the material. In 1882, it was decided by the Navy Department that 1500 officers and 7500 men constituted a sufficient permanent personnel for sixty vessels of the kind we then had. Since then, the navy has increased 75 per cent in number of ships, many of them vastly larger and more complex than those of 1882, and the enlisted force has been almost proportionately increased, while the commissioned personnel has remained practically unchanged in aggregate numbers. This attenuated condition of the officers' list is not only alarming, it will soon become irreparable, for it takes longer to make an officer than to build a battleship. On our own officially stated basis of 1882 we should now have at least double the number of officers, in all grades, that we actually have, and it should be a matter of fixed law that the personnel, both officers and enlisted men, should ever hereafter be proportionate, year by year, to the ships fit for service.
The Spanish-American War has given the people of the United States two great object lessons in the usefulness of a navy. The legislative branches of the government, in accord with the newly awakened appreciation of the people, seem ready to respond to the naval needs of the nation. Now, therefore, is the time when we, whom the nation has trained to fight its battles on the sea, should tell Congress in no uncertain way the equipment we need to do that fighting. Only the artisan knows what tools he needs in his art.
The hand-to-mouth policy will no longer do. We have become a world power, "whether we would or no," and we have got to arm for international strife, or we will be despoiled, maltreated and thrust into oblivion by our neighbors. If we can formulate a plan for naval armament which is adequate, progressive and definite, Congress will, I believe, legislate upon it from year to year with much less debate and curtailment than that which now follows our desultory demands.
That nation which is best prepared to maintain its position in the great community of world powers vi et armis is most likely to have peace.
APPENDIX.
Weights removed from Kearsarge by taking out her 13-inch battery, as shown by "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1896," pp. 280 and 281:
Approximate weight of 13-inch: TONS.
Barbettes, bolts, nuts, and wood backing 610
Turrets and attachments, and wood backing 530
Guns and mounts 375
Ammunition 160
Turret-turning machinery 100
____
Total 1,775
Replaced by:
Structural parts common to 8-inch and 13-inch turrets 160
Barbettes for 8-inch turrets 200
Turning machinery for same 15 375
____ _____
Net reduction in weight 1,400
Replaced by:
Additional coal 800
Increased motive power 500
Changes in hull 100 1,400
____ _____
0,000