The accidental non-delivery of two cable messages from the Minister of Marine (Bormejo) to the commander-in-chief of the Spanish squadron (Cervera), at Martinique, undoubtedly largely changed the whole history of the Spanish-American war.
One of these telegrams informed the Admiral of coal supply near at hand, and the other granted him permission to return at once, with his squadron, to Spain.
Admiral Cervera's firm stand against the dispatch of the Spanish squadron from the coast of Spain to West Indian waters is heroically and almost pathetically shown in the recent publication, by permission of the Queen Regent, of the official despatches. At Cape Verde, and before and after, by cable and by letter, he points out the unpreparedness of his squadron, and predicts its certain destruction if it proceeds. Knowing his strong views on this point, it is probable that he would have lost no time in coaling and starting back to Spain.
With Cervera's squadron returned to Spain, there would have been no Santiago campaign, the Flying Squadron would probably have been sent to the coast of Spain, and the land operations in Cuba directed against Havana.
Cervera's fleet not eliminated, who can say how long Spain may not have been able to resist, and what additional blood and treasure the struggle may have cost the United States.
The story of the Spanish-American war is largely a story of "coal and cables." That war for the first time demonstrated the dominating influence of submarine cable communications in the conduct of a naval war. As a result of it, the principal maritime powers, with colonial possessions, are each at present elaborating their "Cable Policy," and have awakened to a realization of the fact that reliable submarine communications under exclusive control are not only absolutely necessary, but exercise a dominating influence upon the control of the seas, whether in commercial strategy or in military and naval strategy.
A modern war between two naval powers has reduced itself largely to a war of "coal and cables."
At present the submarine telegraph is a powerful instrument of war, more powerful, indeed, than battleships and cruisers, since by wonderful and instantaneous communications of thought, it brings distant countries and colonies together in sympathy, which is the only true and permanent tie.
ELECTRICITY THE IDEAL MEANS OF TRANSMITTING INTELLIGENCE.
The triumphs of science in the last half century have been no where more exemplified than in the enormous strides made in the facility of transmitting intelligence. The mails, the telegraph, and the telephone are civilizing the world. Perfect as is the mail system of to-day, a monument to organization, yet, its swiftest messenger—steam—is so far outstripped either on land or sea by the practically instantaneous electric current, that the tendency year by year is to put more of the world's business "upon the wire."
Time has an international money value in trade, and a paramount strategic value in war. The fastest mail express, or the swiftest ocean ship, are as naught compared with the velocity of the electrical impulse, which practically annihilates any terrestrial dimension. As the distance increases, electricity surpasses steam in a continuously increasing ratio. With a message to be sent half way around the earth, the minutes required by the telegraph, run into weeks and months by the slow process of the mails. Steam time is directly a function of the distance to be traversed, and from the nature of things must require twice as long to go two miles as one. If, then, the cable saves six days between Europe and America, it will save more than twice this time between America and the East, and is from this point of view correspondingly important and necessary. Since electricity so far outstrips any other known vehicle for transmitting intelligence, it must eventually carry all the most important of the -world's information.
Strategy has been defined as, the science of combining and employing the means which the different branches of the art of war afford, for the purpose of forming projects of operations and of directing great military or naval movements; the art of moving troops or ships so as to be enabled either to dispense with a battle or to deliver one with the greatest advantage and with the most decisive results.
* * * * *
It is believed that the more the foundations of successful strategy are analyzed, both as the science of conceiving military plans and as the art of executing the same, the more it will become clear that the strategist who is possessed of the most efficient and reliable means of obtaining and communicating information, both of the enemy and his own forces, will have a paramount and insuperable advantage.
Maritime nations are at present beginning to realize that it is not ships and coaling stations alone which measure naval strength, but also reliable and efficient means of directing, concentrating, supplying, or withdrawing those ships upon the great strategic chess board of the sea.
Lord Charles Beresford, in January, 1888, declared that, in time of war, the cutting of cables would make it impossible for chiefs of squadrons of distant stations to receive communication of the plan of campaign, and that they would no longer know where to find coal nor upon what protection to count.
Nor is this means required for securing true information only, but also for the equally important role of disseminating misinformation, since deceiving the enemy has always been an important means of strategy.
If there have been any doubts of the dominant influence of land and submarine cable communications as a military and naval necessity, they would be completely dispelled by the present unparalled situation in China, in which the rest of the entire world has been kept in ignorance for a period of a whole month, by the lack of adequate communications under control.
As a means of communication over great distances at sea, nothing compares, at the present state of practical science, with the submarine cable. The nation with exclusively controlled submarine communications, not possessed by an adversary, has an organized service of surveillance, which is not only important during actual war, but which may and will prove a powerful weapon in the diplomatic and preparatory conflict, which always precedes a declaration of war, and these communications are a means of securing a first real victory, even before war has been formally declared.
It may be said, therefore, that the very foundation of successful naval strategy is efficient and exclusively controlled communications, and the lack of them more serious than inferiority in ships.
As soon as the possibility of communicating at long distance, by means of submarine cables, was practically demonstrated, England understood what commercial and political preponderance the creation of a great network of cables, resting under her control, would give her.
Without letting herself be discouraged by heavy losses in the beginning, with a perseverance worthy of admiration, she has succeeded in creating and developing, methodically and without delay, a network of submarine telegraphic cables, which to-day encircles a large part of the entire world.
The English cables, up to the present, have been laid principally by private companies, but Article 7, of the conditions which govern them, provides that all official despatches shall have precedence over others; Article 3, that the companies can have no foreigners among their employees, nor can the wires pass into a foreign office, nor under the control of a foreign government, and Article 9, that in case of war the government can occupy the different stations and place its own employees therein.
During the past two years, however, there has been a great national protest in England and her colonies against the exorbitant rates imposed by the monopoly of the private cable corporations, until the principle of absolute state ownership has come to be a controlling one in England's future cable policy.
THE IMPERIAL CABLE SYSTEM OF GREAT BRITAIN.
England's sea power is not alone measured by the number, character and tonnage of her warships, it is immensely increased by the system of exclusively controlled submarine cable network, at present including nearly four-fifths of all the cables in the world, woven like a spider's web to include all her principal colonies, fortified ports, and coaling stations.
Although submarine cable communication is scarcely fifty years old, yet the British Empire is already bound together in one vast intelligence transmission system, with London as its center. Nothing important can happen at any quarter of the globe which does not find its way to this great world's news exchange—London. And this system is and has been a principal element of her strength, and has largely made possible a government including subjects naturally widely differing in character, habits, and modes of thought.
The colonist in New Zealand or in British Columbia can read each morning what was said in Parliament the day previous Upon any subject important to British interests.
This great cable system, as at present existing, is the more Important from our present standpoint, since no other country has such a system, and this fact has placed in the hands of the British Empire a powerful means of real dominion over the rest of the world. Nor is England satisfied with her present extensive telegraph system of world control, she has in projection for the very near future, an extension of this system, which will be nothing less than a British imperial telegraph system encircling the entire globe.
A pioneer advocate of a British imperial cable system has been Sir Sandford Fleming of Canada.
It was early discovered by every country in Europe that so efficient and valuable a servant to trade and commerce, so important an aid to the state itself, as the telegraph, should become a national institution. Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium, each established a state telegraph system. Thirty years ago the English telegraph lines were transferred to the state, and experience has shown that this has been done with advantage to the state itself and benefit to the public at large. At the present moment the British Empire is advancing rapidly to the accomplishment of a state controlled cable system. Imperial penny postage having been recently realized throughout the British Empire, the next great step in imperial development along this line is to connect the state-owned land telegraph systems of the Empire by a state-owned and controlled system of submarine cables. An essential and necessary condition which has guided in the conception and realization of this cable system, has been that none of the lines shall touch foreign soil. So important has been this principle in the proposed British-Pacific cable, that we find Great Britain, for some years past, anxiously negotiating for sovereignty over an insignificant island in the Hawaiian Group upon which to land her proposed cable to Australasia; and failing in this, we find her boldly ready to lay a single span of cable of over 3500 nautical miles in length, from Vancouver to Fanning Island, for the sole imperial reason that the cable shall touch only soil exclusively owned and controlled by Great Britain. This principle will be bought, in this case, at the price of permanently placing at a disadvantage British cable traffic in the Pacific; since, as will be pointed out later, the United States, by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, can reach the East across the mid-Pacific by cables having no single span longer than the present Atlantic cables, and yet adhere to the same principle of landing only on territory belonging to the United States.
BRITISH PACIFIC CABLE.
England at present has direct telegraphic connection with Vancouver, with wires independent of any foreign power, since practically all of the Atlantic cables landing at Newfoundland, or Nova Scotia, from the coast of Ireland, are under British influence, and in connection with the Canadian Pacific telegraphic lines, therefore, furnish England with direct communication to the west coast of North America.
The proposed British-Pacific cable has been prominently before the British government as an imperial measure for a number of years. It has been the subject of colonial conferences, and of exhaustive research by a Pacific Cable Commission. Its construction is now assured beyond a reasonable doubt. The route is from Vancouver to Fanning Island, thence to Fiji Island, thence to Norfolk Island, and from thence by two branches to New Zealand and the eastern coast of Australia. The land lines of Australia would then complete telegraph connection with the western coast. In the Indian Ocean it is proposed to connect West Australia to Cocos Island, and then to Mauritius, and from thence to Natal and Cape Town. Cocos Island is further to be connected with Singapore by a branch cable. Singapore being already in connection with Hongkong by an all-British cable. Another branch is also proposed from Cocos to Ceylon. At Mauritius a connection would be formed with the existing cable at Seychelles, Aden, and Bombay. In the Atlantic Ocean, in order to avoid the shallow seas along the west coast of Africa, Spain, Portugal, and France, a cable from Cape Town, touching at St. Helena, Ascension, and St. Vincent as mid-ocean stations has been laid within the last few months. Its construction was hastened after the outbreak of the Boer war, to furnish an alternate British route to South Africa by the West Coast. It is further proposed to extend the cable from Ascension to the British Island of Bermuda, perhaps touching at Barbados, as a mid-ocean station.
At Bermuda a connection would be formed with the cable already existing to Halifax, and at the latter point with the Canadian and trans-Atlantic lines. The extension of the above cables in the Pacific, the Indian, and the Atlantic Oceans, would involve the expenditure of something like £6,000,000 sterling, and the laying of about 23,000 knots of new cable. With the equipment and experience which Great Britain has had in cable laying, these new cables can be manufactured and laid by England in a very short time, and there can be little doubt but that this extension of British cables, if not along the exact line above specified, yet With slight variations, will be an accomplishment of the near future.
With this extension of imperial cables added to her already extensive state-owned land line system, England will have the most complete telegraphic system in existence, placing each of the following fortified and garrisoned coaling stations in direct connection each with any other station, viz.: Hongkong, Singapore, Trincomalee, Columbo, Aden, Cape Town, Simons Bay, St. Helena, Ascension, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Bermuda, Halifax, Esquimalt, King George's Sound, and Thursday Island. The following "defended ports" would likewise be connected, viz.: Durban, Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Rangoon, Adelaide, Melbourne, Hobart, Sydney, Newcastle, Brisbane, Townsville, Auckland, Wellington, Lyttletown, and Dunedin.
Since with the completion of the cable across the Pacific the last telegraphic gap will be completed around the earth; it will give the great advantage of duplicate routes, since from any point there will be then two routes—one east and one west—to any other station.
PROPOSED COLONIAL TELEGRAPH SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED STATES.
The objects and benefits of intercolonial cable communications are well recognized. Since the events of the Spanish-American war the supreme importance of exclusively controlled communications, as a means of military and naval warfare, has been realized as never before. All the principal nations are studying this subject in its various aspects, and already a distinct cable policy is entering into the politics of the principal countries possessing colonies, and seeking for commercial, military, and naval supremacy. Having examined briefly the principles and present benefits of the British imperial telegraph systems, it is clear that the United States will be wise to recognize this important subject, and not delay in laying a system of submarine cables, under the exclusive control of the United States, which will not only place every part of our new possessions in direct communication with one another by the best means of intelligence transmission, but will complete the system by deep-sea cables, directly connecting these possessions to the mainland of the United States.
In this connection it may be of interest to note briefly what has been the telegraph policy, up to the present, in dealing with the territory of our new possessions. In Cuba and Puerto Rico, and in the Philippine Archipelago, every effort has been made by the Signal Corps of the army to cover the islands with a network of wires, so complete and reliable that intercommunication is insured at all times. In the pacification of Cuba and Puerto Rico, in the suppression of the Philippine uprising, it is believed that there has been no more potent agent than the military telegraph.
For years Spain had been trying to pacify the Island of Cuba and yet her telegraph system was incomplete, obsolete, and unreliable in the extreme. It was possible for bands of insurgents to move about much at their pleasure, appearing here and there, with no means of locating or concentrating for their distruction. It was not that the number of troops was not sufficient, so much as it was that there were no efficient means of directing the troops in such a way as to make results decisive.
PHILIPPINE MILITARY TELEGRAPH SYSTEM.
During the Philippine war the utility of the military telegraph has been most forcibly illustrated.
It has been assumed, as a principle from the outset, that the quickest means of pacifying and civilizing the Philippine Archipelago is to cover it with a network of telegraph wires. A given district, with adequate telegraph communications, can be guarded with less than half the troops than when such communications are wanting. Commanding officers can crush an incipient uprising suddenly, and before it has time to assume dangerous proportions, by concentrating, by telegraph, the garrisons from all directions upon the one point involved. Already there are about 2500 miles of land telegraph lines in operation in the Philippines, and about 260 miles of inter-island and lake cables have been laid, while a cable-ship transport, carrying four hundred miles of additional deep-sea cable, will leave New York for the Philippines within the next two months. At the last report, the telegraphic messages in the Island of Luzon alone exceeded 6500 per day, averaging over 40 words each, or approximately 260,000 words daily. As an illustration of the absolute necessity of telegraphic and cable communications in the work in the Philippines, it may be added that the telegraph is practically the only mail service that exists, and that recently while the English cable from Manila to Iloilo was interrupted by earthquakes for a period of six weeks, it was impossible to communicate with the southern islands. About three weeks ago a battle was fought at Cagayan, in the island of Mindanao, in which 150 American soldiers met with one of the heaviest resistances yet experienced in the Philippines. Owing to the lack of telegraphic communications, and lack of boat transportation, nothing was known as to the fate of these men for over two weeks.
A comprehensive and progressive scheme of land lines and inter-island cables, embracing the entire Philippine Archipelago, is rapidly being constructed. Already the Department of Northern Luzon is well covered with lines, reaching from Manila to the northern extremity of the Island.
Two trunk lines have been established—one along the west coast, the other along the Rio Grande de Cagayan river. The islands of Cebu and Loite have been connected by cable, and a complete new route from Manila to Iloilo will soon be in operation, furnishing a duplicate route to the present English cable direct from Manila to Iloilo. In the Department of Mindanao and Job, the plan involves direct communication, by cable, between the principal islands, and by land lines and cable to the telegraph system in the Department of the Visayas, and from thence by duplicate routes to Manila.
THE ALASKA TELEGRAPH SYSTEM.
The growing commercial importance of Alaska, and the prospective future of that country, as indicated by the best experts, has made the construction of a telegraph system for this territory an imperative necessity. The recent creation of the new military Department of Alaska, with headquarters at St. Michael, on Norton Sound, and the establishment of military garrisons along the Yukon to the Canadian border, has made such a line a commercial and military necessity.
Congress recently authorized an expenditure of $45o,000 for the construction of such a line, and at this moment all the material for the construction and equipment of this system is under contract, and the work of manufacture is being pushed night and day.
Owing to the shortness of the working season in this latitude, and the very unusual conditions under which the line must be constructed, as well as the lack of any adequate transportation, it will probably not be possible to complete the line this season.
The military cable connecting the gold district of Cape Nome with the headquarters at St. Michael, and also connecting St. Michael with Unalaklik, which is to be the terminus of the land line up the Yukon, will be completed early in September next, and will place the department commander at St. Michael in direct communication with Cape Nome.
These submarine cables, as well as all cables for the Philippine Islands, involving in the aggregate nearly 800 miles, are being constructed by American manufacturers, and are to be laid, equipped, and operated by American engineers.
The military forts to be connected, with the approximate distances, are shown in the following table:
| Valdez | Fort Egbert | Circle City | Fort Yukon | Rampart | Fort Gibbon | St. Michael |
Fort Egbert | 350 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Circle City | 520 | 170 |
|
|
|
|
|
Fort Yukon | 610 | 260 | 90 |
|
|
|
|
Rampart | 870 | 520 | 350 | 260 |
|
|
|
Fort Gibbon | 940 | 590 | 420 | 330 | 70 |
|
|
St. Michael | 1,490 | 1,140 | 970 | 880 | 620 | 550 |
|
Cape Nome | 1,610 | 1,20 | 1,090 | 1,000 | 740 | 670 | 120 |
By a recent temporary arrangement with the Canadian authorities this telegraph system will be enabled to reach the United States over the line now being constructed by the Canadian government between Atlin and Quesnolle, a distance of about 900 miles. It is doubtful, however, if this land line can be completed this season. When completed, and in connection with the Alaskan system outlined above, there will be direct telegraphic communication between the United States and the military department of Alaska at St. Michael.
INTER-ISLAND COMMUNICATION FOR THE HAWAIIAN GROUP.
There is no other example in the world of a highly civilized community, with a republican form of government, which is entirely cut off from all communication from the rest of the world, except the Hawaiian Islands. A system of communication between the principal islands, either by submarine cable or by wireless telegraph method, is a necessity, and it is reported that this work, by the use of wireless telegraphy, is about to be carried out. The principal islands of the Hawaiian group which Should be connected, with the approximate distances involved, are given in the following table:
Distance (Naut. Miles.)
Kauai to Oahu 61
Oahu to Molokai 23
Molokai to Maui 8
Maui to Hawaii 26
Total 118
TELEGRAPH SYSTEM IN CUBA AND PUERTO RICO.
The land telegraph system of Cuba now aggregates about 2500 miles and includes a central trunk line the entire length of the island, which is duplicated from Havana to Sancti Spiritus. In addition to this trunk line there are no less than thirteen lines across the island, which divide the island up into comparatively small sections. Although these lines have had to be entirely reconstructed under great difficulties, yet their reliability is evidenced by the fact that the entire Puerto Rican government business, which is now transmitted over the new land lines from Havana to Santiago, was conducted during the month of June without a single interruption.
In the island of Puerto Rico every important commercial or military point is in telegraph connection by a system of lines, which, under Major W. A. Glassford, Signal Corps, has been entirely reconstructed and routes improved since the disastrous hurricane of 1899.
A PACIFIC CABLE.
In order to bind together the local land telegraph systems, which have been outlined above, these systems should be directly connected at an early date with the United States. First of all, in this colonial system, is the proposed trans-Pacific cable, connecting California with the Hawaiian Islands, thence to Midway Island, thence to the Island of Guam, and from thence to the Island of Luzon. The project of a trans-Pacific cable has been much discussed recently, and President McKinley sounded the key-note for its construction in his message to Congress in February, 1899, in which he states that "Such communication should be established in such a way as to be wholly under the control of the United States, whether in time of peace or of war." The construction of such a cable has been shown to be entirely practicable, and American manufacturers have shown themselves willing to undertake and guarantee the manufacture, laying, equipment, and operation of such a system of trans-Pacific cables.
Although deep-sea cable manufacture is an interest little known by experience in this country, yet it is believed that American capital and American skill and ingenuity, supplemented, if necessary, from abroad, can accomplish this great work in a comparatively short time. From every standpoint—commercial, strategic, and political—a trans-Pacific cable along the route mentioned should be undertaken at the earliest possible date. Next to the Isthmian Canal, no other great public work com pares with it in importance to the future development of the United States.
The telegraph system of Alaska, now authorized and under construction, should also be connected to the United States by lines touching only American territory, and exclusively under American control. A cable system from Vancouver via the Aleutian Islands to Japan and the Philippines has long been proposed, and has many points, commercial and technical, in its favor as a trans-Pacific route. The true solution is thought to be the early construction of both of these trans-Pacific cable lines, thereby furnishing, first, a direct connection to the United States' Alaskan system, and by a later extension to the Philippines, a duplicate route for the protection of the more southern line via Hawaii, which should be first constructed. A short cable from Sitka to Valdez would be one means of perfecting a junction with the Alaska land system.
The recent acquisition by the United States of the Island of Tutuila, and the construction in Pango Pango harbor of a coaling station, makes it desirable to join this advanced American station in the southwestern Pacific to the Hawaiian Islands by submarine cable.
This can probably be most readily accomplished by connecting it directly to Fiji, a station on the British Pacific cable route.
To further complete this proposed colonial telegraph system, it will be necessary to connect the Island of Puerto Rico, by submarine cable, to the United States, and although of greater length, a line direct from New York to Puerto Rico is suggested as offering many advantages. The shortest line is not always the most advantageous. For instance, Hayti is connected direct to New York City, instead of to the coast of Florida, which would be much shorter, and Bermuda is connected direct with Halifax for the sole object of exclusive British control under all circumstances.
ESTIMATED COST OF PROPOSED COLONIAL TELEGRAPH SYSTEM. CABLES IN THE PACIFIC.
Trans-Pacific cable, San Francisco, via Hawaiian Islands, Midway Island, and Island of Guam to Luzon $12,000,000
Inter-Island communication for the Hawaiian Group 150,000
To complete the Inter-Island telegraph system of the Philippines 250,000
For Alaska telegraph system, as already authorized by Congress 450,000
To extend the Alaska telegraph system, and to connect it to the United States by direct cable, and also for further extension to the Philippines, via the Aleutian Islands, providing a duplicate trans-Pacific route to the Philippines 10,000,000
For cable connections with Tutuila Island coaling station at Pango Pango harbor 650,000
CABLES IN THE ATLANTIC.
Direct cable from the coast of the United States to the Island of Puerto Rico 1,500,000
Total $25,000,000
Estimated cost of proposed Isthmian Canal $40,000,000
Relative cost of two enterprises 1 to 5.6
The above estimate, which is necessarily a very general one, due to fluctuations in the price of materials, the inexperience of American manufacturers, etc., shows that with an expenditure of $25,000,000, or perhaps $30,000,000 at most, the United States can have a telegraph system connecting all her possessions, and placing each part of such possessions in direct connection with the United States by the best and most efficient means of communication known.
For the expense of three or four first-class battleships the United States can provide herself with the most powerful means known for extending and preserving her commercial influence, for the speedy pacification and civilization of the people who have recently come under her control, and secure a strategic advantage—military, naval, and political—which is necessary to the position of the United States as a world power.
It is believed that there is no measure which should receive more immediate and careful consideration than the establishment of a system of deep-sea cables, wholly under the control of the United States, and joining the already extensive land telegraph system of our new possessions.
American commerce, American diplomacy, and American military and naval prestige, all conspire in demanding this system at the earliest possible date.
THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE PACIFIC CABLE.
The control of the seas along the great natural lines of national commerce is chief among the material elements which contribute to the power and prosperity of nations.
The possession of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States has a far greater future importance than mere import and export statistics can ever indicate.
The leading powers are evidencing unusual interest in the Pacific and the East, and are seeking hitherto unimportant islands wherever situated.
In these days of "spheres of influence" the Hawaiian Islands occupy a unique and a paramount position.
Geographically, Honolulu is the center of a circle of approximately twenty-one hundred miles radius within which, excepting only a few isolated and barren islands, nature has placed a vast ocean expanse with no land. This circle includes San Francisco on the east, a part of the Aleutian Islands on the north, and the Samoan Islands on the southwest. Again, of the center of the circle is placed at one of the islands of this same group to the northwest, such as Midway Island, a probable station for the Pacific cable, an approximately equal radius includes the Island of Guam, now in the possession of the United States.
Hawaiian inter-island communication being now assured, this group of islands, extending nearly two thousand miles in longitude, and standing alone over two thousand miles from continental mainland, defines a natural "sphere of sea influence" in the North Pacific of incalculable value to the future of the United States.
The importance of the geographical position of this group is only properly determined by reference to the changes in the great trade routes which will result from the Isthmian Canal. Whether ultimately at Nicaragua or Panama, the immense merchant fleet, which will pass through this gateway, will find the Hawaiian group upon its direct course to the East, and at such steaming distance as to naturally require this as a mid-ocean stopping place. Again, the British-Canadian commercial route to Australasia along which the British Pacific cable is projected, as well as the direct mail and trade route from the Pacific States to the Philippine Islands and the East, both naturally pass through these islands.
It can be stated that there is scarcely any point in the world where there is greater need for a central cable station than in the Hawaiian Islands. Geographically situated at the military and commercial strategic position of the North Pacific Ocean, it will ultimately serve as the distributing center for ocean communication between the two hemispheres as well as to the various island groups of the Pacific.
Although it is said that cables are primarily established for peace rather than for short periods of war, yet in these advanced American outposts, extending in a chain to the Philippines in the East, the demands of both peace and war happily coincide.
Submarine cables are now established for colonial, political, and diplomatic reasons, as really as for their purely commercial purposes. Nor is actual state of war of the country itself the only fear; witness the present plight of France due to the Transvaal war; owing to the fact that the cables to South Africa are under the control of England, and the establishment by her of a war censorship, France is absolutely dependent upon England not only for news from the Transvaal, but also for communication with her own colony of Madagascar and her South Africa possessions. The importance of this subject has led her Colonial Commission to recommend recently the immediate construction of submarine cables joining France with Senegal, Madagascar and Tonkin, the latter connecting with the Danish company's cables. Indeed, the plan ultimately involves an estimated expenditure of twenty-five million dollars and includes a complete colonial cable system.
By whatever method the first Pacific cable is ultimately laid, and provided that it-shall appear that all of the present projected cable cannot be manufactured and laid in the United States within a reasonable time, it seems plain that the encouragement of American manufacturers in the building up in the United States of a deep-sea cable industry of the first class, is a wise policy for this government.
The successful completion of the submarine cable across the Pacific will mark an epoch in the telegraph history of the world. After thirty years of consideration—technical, commercial and political—the end of the century sees this great enterprise at last seriously undertaken. The full influence which it will exert Upon the Western Hemisphere and the world in general is not easily appreciated. Strategically the importance of the intercolonial communication and its preservation are very great; however, the Philippine question should not overshadow the larger question—the Eastern question—in the consideration of this project. Important as the cable will be as a means of joining the Philippine Archipelago to the United States, its larger importance will ultimately be in the future commercial development between the United States and the far East. In the broad extension of Pacific trade consequent upon the completion of the Isthmian Canal, and the development of steamship lines plying the Pacific, the telegraph cable would naturally become an important factor. The present trans-Pacific steamship lines are heavily handicapped by absence of direct means of telegraphy between the ports between which they operate. Situated on the main trade routes leading from the canal to Asiatic ports, the Pacific cable will serve as a powerful adjunct and support to this enterprise. The two go hand in band and are mutually closely related.
THE AIILITARY CONTROL OF TELEGRAPH CABLES IN TIME OF WAR.
The International Convention for the protection of submarine cables, which met at Paris in 1884, made no provision defining the rights and immunities of cable property in time of war.
In addition to incorporating an article in the convention, stipulating that "this convention shall in nowise affect the liberty of belligerents," Lord Lyons, the British delegate, submitted the following declaration, at the moment of signing the convention: " Her Majesty's government understands Article XV in this sense, that in time of war, a belligerent, a signatory of the convention, shall be free to act in regard to submarine cables as if the convention did not exist."
M. Leopold Orban, in the name of the Belgian government, also submitted the following declaration:
"The Belgian government, through its delegates to the conference, has maintained that the convention has no effect upon the rights of belligerent powers; These rights would be neither more or less extensive after the signature than they are now. The mention inserted in Article XV, although absolutely useless in the opinion of the Belgian government, would not, however, justify a refusal on its part to unite in a work the expediency of which is indisputable."
Before the Spanish-American war there were few examples of damages done to submarine cables by belligerents.
As has been pointed out, Article XV of the Convention of Paris, of 1884, for the protection of submarine cables, subscribed to by twenty-six nations, specifically states that "The stipulations of this convention shall in no wise affect the liberty of belligerents." In consequence, the question as to what, if any, special protection was to be accorded submarine cables in time of war, remained theoretical until the Spanish-American war of 1898, when a practical rule of action as outlined by General A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer of the U. S. Army.
Upon the declaration of war, General Greely, upon whom by law devolved the operation of military telegraph lines and cables, was called into the national council for his opinion as to the line of action best calculated to subserve the legitimate rights of commerce and industry, while conserving the military interests of the United States. He took the view that, inasmuch as postal communications were forbidden between belligerents, prohibitive orders should issue against such telegraphic correspondence as might benefit the public enemy, pointing out that telegrams, by their secrecy and rapidity, produce military results much more important and injurious than is possible by the use of the mail.
First of all standing for a liberal policy consistent with our advanced civilization, it was advised that cable operations should continue over the international cables between Havana and Florida, of course, under strict military censorship. Military possession of the Key West telegraph office was taken on April 23, 1898, and the cables cut so that Jacksonville could no longer work with Havana. Domestic and business messages in open text were allowed to be sent and received from Havana, but only under strict military censorship. Similar action was taken at Havana by the Governor-General of Cuba, who established a rigid Spanish military censorship, so that all messages were subject to double scrutiny.
Five classes of cables were recognized:
First. Those of which the termini are in the enemy's country; for instance, the Cuba Submarine Cable system along the south coast of Cuba.
Second. Which directly connect countries at war, so that each belligerent controls one end of cable; for instance, the International Oceanic Telegraph Company between Florida and Havana.
Third. Where one end of the cable is in the enemy's country and the other in neutral territory; for instance, the West India and Panama cables extending from Jamaica to Cuba, and to Puerto Rico, and thence to Saint Thomas.
Fourth. Where a cable extends from the coast of an offensive belligerent to a neutral country contiguous to the territory of the defensive belligerent; for instance, the Hayti cable from New York City to Hayti, where there is direct cable connection with the Island of Cuba.
Fifth. Other cables having one terminus in the territory of the offensive belligerent and the other in neutral regions remote from the scene of hostility; for instance, the Atlantic cables connecting the United States with Europe.
To cables of the first class, whether the property of the defending enemy or a neutral corporation, was applied the simple and well-known rule that they are subject to the vicissitudes of war, and that being in use for war purposes they are proper objects of offensive military operations. The orders issued to the officers of the Signal Corps looked upon these cables, whether they were laid in the high sea or along the immediate coast, as liable to seizure and total destruction.
Cables of the second class were easily dealt with, the cables between Key West and Havana were taken possession of militarily by Spain in Cuba and by the American army in Key West. Messages going and coming were subjected to the most rigid military censorship at both ends of the cable. Only messages in plain text bearing upon business and social subjects were permitted, and where any suspicion existed as to the loyalty of the sender, were either refused or not sent. Exceptional cipher messages were permitted as a matter of courtesy and favor to selected diplomatic representatives of neutral nations.
The cables of the third class were viewed as contraband of war; but it was also recognized that their liability to destruction depended in a measure on the locality of the cable. It was recognized as unsettled and of doubtful expediency, the right of any belligerent to raise from the bottom and destroy on the high sea a neutral cable, merely on the ground that such cable landed in a hostile country. A more rigid rule was applied, however, to such portions of cables, cable huts, instruments, etc., as were located within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy. Orders were given, based on the principle that such cable properties, whether belonging to an enemy or to neutral corporations, are not only subject to the vicissitudes of war, but, being contraband of war, are legitimate objects of military operations.
In accordance with this view orders were issued to cut, off the south coast of Cuba, any cables that could be grappled and picked up, either within a marine league of the coast or within range of Spanish batteries.
In Cuba and Puerto Rico, during the Spanish-American war, certain neutral cable stations of this class fell within the power of the army of the United States. In such cases the officials of the neutral cable companies were given a choice of action. They could abandon their property to the vicissitudes of war, or accepting the force-majoure, were allowed to transact business under strict military censorship. Even during the siege of Santiago the orders permitted the French Telegraphic Cable Company to accept business for Santiago-de-Cuba within the Spanish lines, every such message, however, to be vised by the military censor.
The fourth class of cables was seized by the military forces of the United States and operated under strict military censorship. Code and cipher messages were absolutely refused save for the authorized government agents and certain excepted diplomatic representatives, the latter as a matter of courtesy.
Cables of the fifth class were placed under a military censorship. Of these, there were five systems comprising eleven separate cables. Most of these telegraph cables were only constructively seized, intrusting the direct censorship of messages, under the general supervision of an officer of the Signal Corps, to the respective superintendents, men of high character, whose good faith was guaranteed by the companies whose interests they likewise guarded. The interests of the United States were thus subserved while the privacy of the affairs of the companies was conserved. The responsible officials gave a written pledge to observe such rules as might be filed by the Chief Signal Officer with the companies. These rules prohibited all messages to and from Spain, and also certain other classes which were deemed Prejudicial to the military interests of the United States. In cases of doubt messages of the latter character were examined and vised by the military censor.
The events of the Spanish-American war brought to attention the whole subject of the legal rights of cable property, and the control of the same under varying and complex conditions, in time of war. In the absence of definite international law upon the many points involved, the United States was forced to take the initiative and use this powerful military weapon for the benefit of the cause of the United States, while at the same time respecting and subserving the rights of neutrals with an equity and fairness, which has always characterized the actions of this government.
In the West Indies, as well as in the Philippines, the cable question was always a paramount one, and the United States finds herself now confronted with legal questions, growing out of actions necessary in time of war. Since submarine cables have become such a dominant influence in time of war, and since the cases which may naturally arise are often complex and involved, it is clear that a further international cable conference is a necessity of the near future, in which a more definite international understanding of methods of procedure in time of war may be agreed to. This international conference could properly consider other international cable matters, which the great advance in submarine telegraphy has made important. Among those may be mentioned the construction and authorization of a uniform international cable code for economical and efficient communication between different parts of the world in any of the Principal languages now authorized by the international telegraph rules. Since next year will be the 50th anniversary of the first successful submarine cable, this would perhaps be a fitting time for the calling of such an international cable convention.
THE CABLE EQUIPMENT OF A FLEET.
It seems clear from the history of the Spanish-American war that provisions must be made for laying, picking up, cutting, and operating submarine cables in time of war. From the outbreak of this war every attention was given to the problem of isolating the Island of Cuba from Spain.
The special fitting out of the Adria with cable appliances, as well as spare cable, the work of the St. Louis in cutting cables, the operations of the Marblehead, Nashville, and Windom at Cienfuegos, and of the Wampatuck, are too well known to be repeated here. It will be more valuable to endeavor to draw the correct conclusion from these operations, and thereby make proper provision for the execution of similar operations in time of war.
It appears that the searching for deep-sea cables in the high seas in time of war, without an accurate chart of the location of the cables, is a difficult and very doubtful operation; also that submarine cables must in general be interrupted near their landing places, where their exact location can be determined with certainty. From the experience of the Spanish-American war, operations of this kind are extremely dangerous, as the cable landing will be protected and defended by the enemy.
Supply of spare cable and suitable instruments for working the same, must be available, with every naval fleet; in order to supply the necessary communications with the shore, in case of the landing of either a co-operating army, or of temporary forces from the ships. Cableships engaged in either laying, cutting, or repairing cable near the shore, must either be provided with their own means of defense, or else convoyed by warships.
The above facts make it clear that a new type of naval ship is to make its appearance as a necessary adjunct to every naval fleet. Just as the naval repair ship, such as the Vulcan, has been found necessary, so will the new cable cruiser be an essential part of the navy of the near future. It is not intended here to enter into the question of the proper design of such ships best adapted for the purpose, but it would seem that a specially designed cableship with comparatively large coal capacity and high speed, and an armament of the lighter cruiser class, making her capable of defending herself and protecting her small boat parties, would be general conditions for the naval cableship of the future. She must carry a moderate supply of spare cable and machinery for laying and picking up cable, as well as instruments for testing and operating a cable, and the necessary buoys suitable, if necessary, for buoying the cable and operating the ship as a floating cable station. It is unnecessary to state that her personnel must be specially trained in the highly technical duties required, and from actual practice in all the operations necessary, be made ready for the performance of their duties efficiently under the conditions of war.
Although these naval cable cruisers in time of peace could be profitably employed in maintaining and repairing both cables belonging exclusively to the government and those subsidized by the government, under suitable arrangements, yet, at the outbreak of war, they should be absolutely and exclusively under the control of the government. It may be said at present that no modern fleet is complete without a cableship especially adapted for cable operations in time of war.
In addition to special cable-ships it is desirable and necessary that every warship should be provided with certain simple cable appliances for raising and cutting cables, and should have at least one person aboard familiar with the practical and technical side of cable operations.
Since submarine cables are so important a factor in national defense, they should be protected both at their shore landings and on the high seas by military and naval force.
In this connection it would seem advisable in case of government cables, or in cables subsidized by the government, to keep the exact route of important cables a secret, and prevent the publication of maps for general distribution, showing the exact location of cables in the deep sea. The location of the shore ends, however, are certain to be known, and probably will be the points where the cable must be picked up and interrupted. This forces, therefore, adequate land and naval protection for the landing places of all important strategic cables.
A cable landing of the future should partake of the character of a fort, and be provided with ample and adequate means for Preventing an enemy locating and destroying the cable, within the marine league, or indeed, until it has reached deep-sea, where its accurate location is not known.
The sea is usually considered as the great international highway, belonging equally to all nations; this, however, is no longer true. The real political boundaries of states are no longer defined and restricted by the land, but involve such portions of the high seas as a nation can, by her commercial and naval vessels, and her submarine cables, reach out and secure. In this great sea division, which is so surely taking place, probably there are no better guides to boundaries than the submarine cable networks, which lie in its great depths. Since each, in general, uses the shortest path between two points, the general commercial sailing lines of the world are also the general direction of submarine cable lines.
The United States will be wise if, in the great Pacific, where she has such paramount natural advantages, both for commerce and for maritime strength, she pursues a broad, vigorous, and even lavish, "cable policy." We should be able at the earliest date to manufacture upon American soil deep-sea cables of the first class; be able to lay, maintain and repair them in time of peace or war, by ships flying the American flag, and be prepared to adequately protect them upon the high seas, and at their landing places, by military and naval force.
The cable question is one of the most important of the present hour, unique in that American commerce, diplomacy, and seapower—in fact the most efficient means of advancing and securing the benefits of civilization itself—happily conspire in demanding its early solution.