As a logical sequence of the surrender of Santiago, the necessity for blockading that port ceased to exist; hence began the gradual withdrawing of the vessels, and the fleet was anchored in Guantanamo Bay, forty miles to the eastward of Santiago. Vessels were coaled, temporary repairs were effected, and the crews were given a welcome relaxation from the strain of blockading service.
The troops in the vicinity of Caimanera had not been informed officially of the surrender of the province, and created occasional excitement by firing vicious but badly directed shots at the occupants of the steam launches as the latter were busily engaged passing from ship to ship. No damage was done, and the shots probably came from stragglers in search of food that were hidden from view on the western shore of the bay.
The plans for the Eastern and Covering Squadrons were perfected; vessels were coaled to their utmost capacities, and, in the case of the Newark, sixty tons were bagged and placed on deck. Information from the department of preliminary peace negotiations, with the order postponing the sailing of the squadrons for Spain, strengthened the belief that the end was approaching. Apparently all was not plain sailing, for rumors became rife of delays, the impression being that Spain was temporizing and was not yet prepared for peace propositions.
It was well known that the Isle of Pines and certain other portions of the southern coast of Cuba were favorite resorts for blockade-runners, the natural conditions existing in these localities offering great advantages for this work. To establish a base on the Isle of Pines to break up the blockade running, and thus to shut off supplies to Havana from the southern coast, was desired. For this purpose the commander-in-chief organized an expedition composed of the Newark, Resolute, Suwanee, Hist, Osceola and Alvarado. The marines under Colonel Huntington broke camp and embarked on board the Resolute (Commander Eaton), and, in company with the Newark, sailed from Guantanamo at 4 P.M., August 8, the intention being that all vessels of the squadron should rendezvous off Cape Cruz.
The detailed plans of the expedition were, of course, not known save to the commanding officer, Captain C.F. Goodrich of the Newark, but it was generally understood that a decisive blow was to be struck, and that any reverses additional that the Spanish arms might suffer would tend to expedite the progress of a speedy return of peace. The condition of the small squadron was excellent. The green crews had been shaken down, and the experience gained had brought self-reliance and a familiarity with war operations that were everywhere apparent. The general health was very good, and officers and men were keyed up to a pitch of enthusiasm and energy that bespoke a successful result for the expedition. Stops were made off Santiago, to communicate with the St. Louis; off the wreck of the Colon to investigate the work of the wrecking steamer Senior; and about 2 P. M., August 9, the Suwanee (Lieutenant-Commander Delahanty) and Hist (Lieutenant Young) reported to the Newark off Cape Cruz.
Information, from a supposed reliable source, was brought by the commanding officer of the Hist to Captain Goodrich, that the forces at Manzanillo, consisting of about 4500 men, with all the shipping and the town itself, would surrender on the appearance of sufficient force. The senior officer in command found himself confronted with a condition that required immediate action; with him was the entire responsibility, as communication with the commander-in-chief was impossible. It was plain that a decisive blow, with great moral effect, could be struck at Manzanillo; it was also evident that to take a vessel the size of the Newark, within bombarding distance of the town, was an undertaking beset with danger and possible disaster. The responsibilities were accepted, and the decision made to demand the surrender of Manzanillo. Risks were to be taken that in time of peace might be deemed inexcusable; war conditions demanded them, provided the necessary nerve and ability were combined; on this particular occasion the two qualities, so necessary, were largely in evidence.
The four vessels were disposed off Cape Cruz for the night to intercept any possible blockade-runners, and at daylight were joined by the Osceola (Lieutenant Purcell) and Alvarado. The latter gunboat, taken at Santiago, was one of a class built in England for Spain, to be used in breaking up filibustering expeditions from the United States. Lieutenant Victor Blue had been assigned command of the prize, and the Alvarado, cleansed and painted a war color, manned by an American crew, looked more like some dainty steam-yacht than the really efficient gunboat that she was.
Shortly after daybreak the course was set for Cuatro Reales channel, and from that moment until the return of the squadron, exciting events followed in rapid succession.
Manzanillo, as the crow flies, is about fifty miles from Cape Cruz, but the distance by water is greater and the courses are devious. From Cape Cruz to the northward and westward extends a fringe of keys of various sizes; the bottom is most irregular, and of the currents no man is able to tell. Inside the outlying keys is the bank and large bay, or inland sea, of Buena Esperanza; this is interspersed with keys and threaded by numerous channels of varying depths. Ballandras channel, the shortest and most direct route, gave but 18 feet of water, and as the Newark drew 22 feet 3 inches, it was necessary to make the attempt by Cuatro channel to the northward and westward. The only available chart showing the approaches to Manzanillo was on one of the western portion of Cuba; this chart being on a small scale, our objective port with its surroundings occupied but a small part of the sheet. Experience had demonstrated that charts derived from Spanish sources were not always to be depended upon, and navigators had found that many errors as to coast-line, positions of important points and soundings, existed on the only charts that could be obtained. A small chart, taken from a Spanish survey, showed 5 ½ fathoms as the least depth of water in the channel to be attempted; this was most encouraging, but the information contained in the sailing directions issued by the U.S. Hydrographic Office, to the effect that Cuatro Reales channel was closed, was not reassuring. The Cuban pilot of the Hist insisted that 5 ½ fathoms could be carried through the channel, and the squadron headed for the entrance.
To those not possessing local knowledge, the keys in this vicinity have a strange similarity in appearance, and as the chart failed to show some that existed, and depicted others that neglected to appear, the difficulties of determining positions by bearings can be realized. In addition to this, the strange variance of the soundings obtained from those shown on the chart rather casts doubts upon the reliability of this important aid in navigating.
The Hist, with the Cuban pilot on board, was sent ahead, and following, in the order named, came the Suwanee, Osceola, Resolute and Newark, the Alvarado being kept close to the latter vessel. The leading vessels were directed to display the danger signal should the soundings fall as low as five fathoms. With the sun to the westward, the channel was entered and showed one buoy planted by the Wilmington on a previous visit; this was the only mark to indicate shoal water. From aloft in the fighting-top the varying shades of green gave no indications of shoal spots, but a peculiar tinge of brown, unmistakable when the sun was near the meridian, but difficult to see in the oblique rays, was a sure indication of dangerous shoaling. Once only was the danger signal hoisted by the vessels ahead; the Newark, under low speed, steered by the best helmsman in the ship, with leads going in both chains, passed in safety through this questionable channel with a least depth of 5 ½ fathoms. The first danger had been successfully passed; the squadron was inside the reefs, and at 7 P.M. anchored close to an uncharted island in this beautiful inland sea.
Apparently the necessity for a flag of truce had not been considered in the allowance, for the signal outfit contained no white flag, so quartermasters and signal boys were busily employed making these flags for the use of the squadron.
At 4.15 A.M., before daylight, the vessels went ahead with comparatively smooth sailing until the keys off Manzanillo could be reached. To buoy certain sharp turns in the channel as guides for the return trip, pickle kegs were thrown overboard and anchored. About 10 A.M. anchor was dropped three miles off Manzanillo, and the Hist was sent to Calecto, six miles from that place, to communicate with the Cubans, and to request co-operation in the event of a bombardment.
From the ship it was difficult to discover the defenses of the town; a line of fortifications was visible, block-houses and rifle pits were easily made out, the wrecks of gunboats and transports destroyed in a previous bombardment were seen, but the actual positions of the guns were unknown. A chart prepared by Lieutenant Young of the Hist gave the number of the guns that took part in a previous action, and, with this, the general positions were located with fair accuracy. The town itself straggled along the water-front, the houses being built on the land that rose from the sea with a gentle slope inland. Several keys divided the entrance, giving channels to the northward and southward. Both channels, however, were far too shallow for the Newark; in fact, the lack of water precluded any maneuvering on the part of that vessel. It would be necessary, in the event of a bombardment, to run in as close as possible and to keep heading in one general direction, as the room for turning was decidedly limited. Before anchoring, the Newark hoisted a flag of truce, and the Alvarado, flying a white flag, started for Manzanillo with the following communication:
"U. S. Newark,
Manzanillo, Cuba, Aug. 12, 1898.
To His Excellency the Military Officer in Chief Command of Manzanillo, Cuba.
Sir:—I have the honor to present my compliments to your Excellency and to make, in the name of the United States, the following demands:
1. The unconditional surrender of Manzanillo and its dependencies with all the Spanish forces therein, military and naval, regular and volunteer, civic guards and firemen; also of all vessels of every description now, afloat in the harbor, the latter to be delivered to me intact and uninjured. Also of all guns in the fortifications, with their ammunition, mounts and appurtenances; all field guns with their carriages and caissons, as well as ammunition and equipments, all in efficient condition.
2. The police and fire departments to deliver up their arms, but to continue on duty as before.
3. The civic authorities will retain the exercise of their functions during the pleasure of the United States.
4. All lights, beacons, buoys, and other aids to navigation shall be established as before, and the authorities, both civil and military, must assist to the utmost in replacing and establishing any buoys that have been removed. The light on Cape Cruz shall be immediately lighted and maintained. The charge for the same shall be borne by the United States.
5. Public property of every description belonging to His Majesty, the King of Spain, shall be turned over to the custody of the United States. Seals and guards shall be placed by you upon any such property which is liable to pillage or destruction.
6. All telegraph lines, instruments and offices shall be kept by you intact and handed over to me in perfect working order.
7. As the religious authorities will be left undisturbed in the exercise of their holy office, they will be expected to diligently and actively exert their influence to preserve order and quiet.
8. If the foregoing conditions be accepted and carried out in good faith, the same treatment and disposition which was granted the Spanish troops at Santiago will be extended to the forces surrendered by you.
9. These terms must be accepted immediately. If you decline them, then I pray your Excellency to immediately notify all women and children, and other non-combatants now present, of my intention to bombard and assault Manzanillo within three hours from the moment of handing you this communication. Upon your Excellency's head will rest the grave responsibility of causing needless bloodshed. Begging your Excellency to accept the assurance of my distinguished consideration.
I am your obedient servant,
C.F. Goodrich,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding the United States Naval and Military Forces Present. Delivered at 12.35 P.M.
Victor Blue, Lieutenant, U.S.N.
Manzanillo had been subjected to attacks before this, for on two occasions the Helena, Wilmington, Scorpion, Hist, Osceola and Wompatuck had bombarded the town, sinking and destroying several gunboats and transports. The place offered advantages for running the blockade, and while its inhabitants had been brought face-to-face with warlike conditions, they had not yet experienced the effect of a six-inch shell and smokeless powder. To the Spaniards it must have appeared the irony of fate to have this ultimatum delivered by the captured gunboat Alvarado. From Lieutenant Blue it was subsequently learned that his reception was courteous, the guard was paraded in his honor, and the Spanish officers were very curious to know whether the Alvarado had come from Guantanamo under her own steam or had been towed by the Newark; apparently the trip for so small a vessel was, by them, considered a serious undertaking. The Hist returned from the interview with the Cubans, and brought the information that reinforcements had reached Manzanillo. At i.io the Alvarado steamed alongside, and the excitement on the Newark was intense. Was it peace or war? Would the Spaniards fight or surrender? Nothing could be told from the usually impassive face of Lieutenant Blue as he came on board and retired with the captain to the cabin. The order to clear ship for action, and the hoisting of that signal to the other vessels, dispelled all doubts. The Spaniards would fight; they thought the time allowed was not long enough, and their commanding officer was quoted as saying that their code did not permit a surrender unless actually beleaguered by land and sea.
The order to clear ship was a welcome one, and the work was done quietly and thoroughly. All boats were lowered and towed out of range of gun fire. The men seemed overjoyed at the prospect of another fight, and appeared as if looking forward with pleasure to the prospect of killing or perhaps being killed. At 3.20 the Newark signaled to get under way. General quarters was sounded, and the usual preparations made, with officers and men at their stations. The executive officer on the main deck, junior officer in top to observe fall of projectiles, captain, navigator and Cuban pilot on upper bridge, chief quartermaster and signal boys on lower bridge.
Before leaving Guantanamo Bay the Newark had received from the public school children of the city of Newark a box containing a set of colors consisting of pennant, jack and two large ensigns, one of the last-named being of silk. These ensigns had been rounded up to the masthead, the silken one forward; and at 3.35 P.M., three hours after His Excellency had received the demand to surrender, the white flag was hauled down and the battle-flags were broken. At 3.40 the general signal, "commence
firing," was made, and at 3.41, with a range of 5000 yards, Lieutenant J. H. Gibbons fired the forward 6-incli on the Newark, and the fight was on.
Until the firing of the first gun the men had been noticeably quiet, the ship seemed unusually still, accentuated by the action of the elements that, apparently, had determined to have a share in the noise. Heavy clouds had banked to the northward, and a rain squall, with vivid lightning and rolling thunder, hung over the town. It was not the intention to damage the defenseless portion of the town, provided it could be avoided, and to this end the divisional officers had been instructed as to the objective points for gun fire. That the place was fortified was evident; sufficient notice had been given to effect the removal of noncombatants, and no consideration of possible injury to private property could deter the commanding officer from the plain duty of bombarding Manzanillo. The first shot was a good one, and after waiting to observe the effect of the shell, the several guns of the starboard battery were soon engaged. There were no failures of the electric firing attachments; the electric ammunition hoists, running at less than full speed, supplied all ammunition that could be used; the smokeless powder left no lingering cloud to bother the gun captains in looking over the sights, for before the gun could be reloaded the little smoke caused by the discharge had been dissipated. The shooting was excellent, clouds of dirt showed where the shells had struck and exploded about the trenches and at the block-houses on the hills. It was desired to head as much as possible in one general direction to use the starboard battery; the narrowness of the channel prevented any material change of course, and the report of five fathoms from the lead caused the Cuban pilot to shrug his shoulders and to intimate that the ship should go no closer. To the suggestion made that four fathoms would leave a margin of a few inches under the keel, the pilot walked to the end of the bridge, indicating that he washed his hands of all further responsibility. Slowly the Newark steamed ahead, stopping when the lead gave 4 ½ fathoms; the propellers did not have the full effect with the scant water, and though the engines were backing, the ship slipped ahead; the starboard anchor was then dropped, at the same time slowing the vessel enough to avoid all possible danger from touching the anchor. When headway was stopped the anchor was hove up and the Newark backed out to five fathoms, going ahead again and anchoring in 4 ¼ fathoms; this operation was repeated, and by this means the range was altered but little, and the change of train of the guns was small. About five minutes after the firing of the first shot, the gunboats had passed through the middle passage about a mile distant from the Newark. The Osceola opened fire first, followed by the others. The Alvarado, that had been directed to take position off the port bow of the senior officer, joined in the fray, and the action became general. The hail of projectiles was merciless, and yet the Spaniards had not replied. At 4.17 it was thought on the bridge of the Newark that a white flag had been shown on shore and the order to cease firing was given. It was supposed that the Spaniards were satisfied, and the Alvarado, flying a white flag, was sent in to receive the surrender. The gunboat fire was stopped, probably following the example of the senior officer. The Alvarado, eagerly watched by those of the large ship, had arrived within about five hundred yards of the shore, when there was a flash from one of the batteries and immediately the water-front was lighted up by the continuous discharge from the Spanish guns. The gunboats were not taken by surprise, and they were soon clouded by smoke from their batteries. The men on the Newark, who had been resting during this interval, ran to the guns without orders; to those on the bridge it seemed as if the white flag had been fired on. Unfortunately the gunboats were so close in that it was impossible to fire over them and reach the batteries. The small vessels, making a gallant fight of it, bunched to the right out of the line of fire, and the Newark was enabled to resume operations. The general recall was hoisted, and, firing as they steamed slowly out, the gunboats returned and passed under the stern of the Newark. The fire of the Spaniards continued, but their shots were wild. It seemed a miracle, upon receiving the reports of the commanding officers, to learn that not one of the gunboats had been struck; one shot went through the flag of the Suwanee, and though that vessel had grounded and was close to the batteries, she was not damaged in the slightest. Lieutenant Blue reported that the Spaniards had fired on the flag of truce; that he hauled it down and returned their fire, but as his ammunition was Spanish only about one-third of it was effective, so he had armed his crew with Mausers and thus engaged the batteries and troops. It was afterwards concluded that the Spaniards seeing the Suwanee, Osceola and Hist approaching without flags of truce flying, had done the proper thing and opened on these vessels. Subsequently it was learned that no flag of truce was displayed at this time. The gunboats anchored, and, until dark, the Newark fired an occasional shot, being replied to by the southern battery, the shots from the latter flying wide. Before dark bearings for firing were taken, and orders were issued to fire during each half hour one shell on bearings from SE. by E. to SE., the intention being to renew the action at daylight and to land the marines. At about 5 P.M. a line of smoke showed that our Cuban allies had begun an attack from the NW.; to this the Spaniards replied with field-pieces, and at 5.30 the Cubans withdrew or ceased firing.
There had been little rest on the ship for the last forty-eight hours, and at dark the watch was set, the officer of the deck firing the guns with the watch on the given bearings. The crack of a six-inch gun is not conducive to sleep, and while it was trying to those on the ship, it must have been particularly nerve-racking to those that were being fired at in the darkness at irregular intervals. About 2.30 in the mid-watch a boat with numerous lanterns was seen, but as no chances were being taken, the six-pounders were opened on the lights and they disappeared. At daybreak white flags were seen in all directions and the Newark's fire ceased. A boat flying a white flag and containing two very sad-eyed and weird-looking Spanish officers, brought to Captain Goodrich the department's despatch announcing the signing of the peace protocol. No reliable data was obtained as to the damage done by the bombardment, but it was learned that the last shell fired had exploded in a portion of the barracks, killing six soldiers and wounding several others. Communication was opened by telegraph with the commander-in-chief, and by his orders the squadron returned to Guantanamo.
Pertaining to this engagement is a matter of history that, deserves more than passing mention. A few months after the events described had occurred, the Hist again visited Manzanillo, this time with peaceful intent. It was learned from the military commandant, that at dark on the night of August 12, a council-of-war was called of the senior Spanish officers at Manzanillo, and by them it was decided to surrender unconditionally to Captain Goodrich. The official communication was drawn and signed, and was to have been delivered when daylight should render a white flag recognizable. Before dawn came the telegram announcing the suspension of hostilities. The Spanish military commandant was spared the mortification of a surrender, while the naval commander of the American forces, with the prize within his grasp, was unable to reap the fruits of his daring undertaking.
Though this fight took place practically after the signing of the peace protocol, of course unknown to the senior officer, the expedition was not barren of results. It must have impressed the Spaniards with the fact that the naval forces of the United States were on business intent. To the subordinate officers and men of the small squadron it was a most instructive object-lesson. The calm, nervy, assumption of responsibility by the commanding officer; the skilful handling of so large a vessel in dangerous waters, the thorough preparedness for attack and final engagement, were experiences that will make lasting impressions on those that took part in the last naval engagement of the Spanish war.