THE LESSONS OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.
The hostile operations between Spain and the United States, considered as a war, have not afforded many practical object-lessons to the naval strategist. It is a matter upon which we have mixed feelings. Object-lessons in war cannot be learned without much letting of blood on both sides; therefore, as simple humanitarians, we rejoice that so few lessons were learned during the late warlike operations; it would be almost too much to call them “war”; there was so little hitting back by one side. But our humanitarianism, like most of our qualities, good or bad, is compound rather than simple; so, with a balance of feeling in favor of our own countrymen, we would like such military object-lessons as may be needed by mankind to be paid for by the blood of others rather than by our own. If, however, we put aside our war standard, and compare the amount of instruction received on a peace basis—as represented by naval maneuvers, theoretical disquisitions, or that most problematical of guides, the war game—we find a wealth of instruction; enough to keep our naval strategists and tacticians busy for the next year or two, showing the results of the war to be proof of the soundness of their own special theories.
War has its consolations, just as peace has its victories, and they come to the warrior oftener than to the citizen. Amongst those to whom the Spanish-American war—for we must perforce give it its courtesy title— has brought most consolations, as a set-off against the inevitable unpleasantness of fighting, is no doubt Admiral Colomb. He is, every one knows, as amiable and gentle a sea warrior as ever longed to blow a ship’s company into eternity, but before the war had progressed far he made some remarkably shrewd forecasts of what should happen, and, to his great glory and satisfaction, now that the war is over it is seen that things should have happened just as he foretold. That they did not, exactly, is beside the mark. The principles were sound, and if events did not justify them, that must be laid to the blame of events. In all seriousness, however, it may be said that the Spanish-American war has shown the soundness of the views that Admiral Colomb has put forward with so much perseverance through many years past. Years before Captain Mahan wrote, he industriously preached the great doctrine of naval supremacy and the futility of military preparations—more especially in the form of fixed defenses—unless supported by adequate naval force. He showed the small fear we need have of invasion so long as there was a “fleet in being,” and impressed the wisdom of sending our fleet anywhere to seek an enemy’s ships rather than keeping in home waters; or, in other words, that the best protection for our coast was to seek out and destroy the fleets of the enemy, all other operations being subsidiary to this first need for our existence as a great power among nations.
At the present time these principles have become almost truisms in the popular mind, and the navy now receives the consideration it merits, and which expediency demands for it. This sounder policy is largely due to Admiral Colomb; far more so than the general public appreciates. If, as some think, he has occasionally overshot the mark in the enthusiasm of advocacy, his main contention has been sound, and the thanks of the country are specially due to him for his untiring and disinterested labors. On Wednesday, March the 8th, he contributed a paper to the Royal United Service Institution, in which he set forth some of “The Lessons of the Spanish-American War.” Perhaps, some critics may be inclined to say, one of the most remarkable of the “lessons” is that Admiral Colomb has learned there may be some virtue in a fixed defense. He speaks of the difficulty of grappling telegraph cables in deep water and says: “The lesson appears to be that it is not impossible that if we were at war attempts might be made to damage us in that way (i. e. by cutting our cables in shallow water); and it seems a legitimate conclusion to assume that the ends of our cables ought to be covered and protected by a few of the longest-ranged guns properly mounted in a battery.”
Admiral Colomb holds that the proper strategy of the Americans was to send a sufficient force to the coast of Spain. “The seizure of Minorca as a base would,” he says, “probably have been an easy operation; and in any case it would have been morally certain that if this action had been taken nothing offensive on the other side of the Atlantic could have been thought of by Spain. Then for Cuba and Porto Rico, landings for conquest might have been effected at leisure.” Unhappily for the Spaniards, “nothing offensive” was possible on either side of the Atlantic with their ill-served and ill-fitted ships, but that, of course, was not known at the time. The strategy Admiral Colomb advocates, supposes that America possessed a sufficient fleet to seal up the Spaniards in their ports, and also a surplus of ships capable of destroying any vessels Spain might have sent to West Indian waters; and which might have constituted “a fleet in being” absolutely forbidding—according to Admiral Colomb’s own teaching—any operations of the nature of landing troops. That consideration, however, does not affect the wisdom of seeking the enemy’s ships wherever they might be, so far as strategy was concerned, but probably political considerations had weight in this connection, as the author suggests. In regard to the efficiency of “the fleet in being,” it may here be said that Admiral Colomb holds “that whatever the restraining power of ‘a fleet in being’ might be, when fleets moved according to the wind, it would be enormously increased by the employment of steam propulsion.”
The author of the paper condemns “the sort of panic” that reigned all along the Atlantic coast of the United States, because Admiral Cervera was at sea, and no one knew where nor when he was likely to turn up. He says:
“I wonder how much money was wasted in preparing by means of fortifications and submarine mines to meet—not to prevent—attacks that were least likely of all the possibilities of war. We have heard of the inconveniences suffered from the presence of submarine mines in the American ports, but we have yet to hear of the little annual bill which will for years be presented for the scheme of local defense of the American coasts, which it seems is certain to be adopted. . . . As long as we look at things from the side of the defenders, it seems the most reasonable thing in the world to close the harbor of New York by submarine mines, batteries, and what not in war time, lest an enemy’s squadron should come inside and bombard the city. . . . Naval commanders will run into considerable dangers in order to get at ships. But towns are not their business. If towns are to be attacked there will be a landed army and all things regular. No naval officer with his hands free would, in war, proceed into New York harbor in order to damage New York— even if he believed there were no batteries and no mines to prevent him.”
Of course the views of Admiral Colomb, and those who think with him, as to the assured immunity of towns and cities from attack by hostile craft, are challenged by a large number of authorities; and certainly an influential school amongst Continental strategists hold that a cause may be helped by operations of this nature which they will not scruple to undertake. Even in this short war we find an instance of the value of such a power, when Admiral Dewey silenced the batteries at Manila by a threat of bombarding, not the batteries, but the town, if his ships were molested. If such a concession could be obtained, why not others? Doubtless the ultimate issue of a war could not be determined by occasional bombarding of coast towns and ports, but the experience would be very unpleasant while it lasted.
After all, this question of ship defense or fixed defense is a matter of cost. A ship is better than a fort because of its mobility. Very true; but those who tell us this also tell us we have not ships enough. If we ask “Why?” we learn that it is because ships cost money, and we spend all the taxpayer will find; in short, money is the limiting condition. Now, to bottle up and blockade the fleets of our enemy we need three ships for every two bottled up; and if we take a very possible alliance against us, we find little more than a balance of vessels between ourselves and our opponents. This brings about a condition of a number of unbottled ships of our adversary free to carry out their avowed intention of preying on our commerce or bombarding our defenseless coast towns. Still looking at the matter from an economical point of view, how are these towns best protected? They lie at a distance of every few miles all round the English coast. There may be twenty unbottled cruisers of our enemy, and it might take two, or perhaps three, forts to keep them at a harmless distance from any one town. Each town must have its own fort or forts, and there are more than twenty towns. The question then arises, Would it be cheaper to build thirty more ships to bottle up the enemy’s twenty, or to construct forts sufficient for defense of all the towns?
Forts are certainly cheaper than ships, and they cannot be sunk, but then ships can go out and sink other ships, which forts cannot do, therefore the enemy’s vessels always remain as a menace, so far as the forts are concerned. Mine fields are of very limited use. They cannot be extended indefinitely, and modern naval guns are effective at long ranges. It is not very likely that an enemy’s ship would venture far into inland waters whilst there was a possibility of a superior force catching him in the trap. The bombardment of London, or even Gravesend, would presuppose the loss of the sea to us, and in that case fixed defenses would be of small avail. There is, however, the important consideration of the defense of our oversea commerce, and that needs ships, not forts, although certain defended positions would be desirable for merchant ships to make for at need.
As we have said, the problem is one of finance, and we trust it has been duly worked out by our intelligence departments. It is to be feared, however, that each branch of the service thinks so exclusively of its own function that no combined effort of this nature has been attempted. This aspect of the question is one of the first importance, a fact that was illustrated during the late war when the Americans, almost unopposed as they were, suffered considerably by the lack of cohesion between the naval and military branches. The respective values of forts and ships should be doubtless settled by compromise. Admiral Colomb himself points out the protection and assistance that forts can afford to ships; and where such cheap auxiliaries to the navy can be made effective, it would be foolish to neglect them. The need of safe havens in which ships can refit, or in which they could take refuge in the face of superior force, are among the foremost teachings of history, but to hope to put it out of the power of hostile vessels to hurt us anywhere simply by fixed defenses is beyond hope. After all, if we go to war, we must take our chance of being hit, and the craving for absolute safety is not one that can be satisfied.
The absence of torpedo operations was a feature in the war that caused a good deal of surprise to many people. The Americans made so much use of the torpedo in their own Civil War—considering, that is, the very imperfect state of its development at the time—and the weapon seemed so fitted for the ingenuity and mechanical audacity of the race, that we fully looked forward to some new and diabolical departures in this field. As a matter of fact, however, the American Navy had nothing very effective in the way of torpedo craft, and the Vesuvius with its dynamite gun, which was to have worked such wonders, proved comparatively a failure, so far, at least, as rendering efficient aid to the fleet was concerned. The Spaniards, on the other hand, possessed some fast and well-equipped vessels; but these, like the rest of the Spanish fleet, had been allowed to fall into such a deplorable state that probably little could have been expected from them had they had the chance of operating.
Admiral Colomb refers to the danger from conflagration resulting from shell-fire. Since the battle of Yalu this lesson has needed no enforcing for those who will take the trouble to read plain facts. Admiral Colomb agrees with the late Admiral Sir Cooper Key, who, thirty-three years ago, said that the danger from fire, through the bursting of shells, even in wooden ships, was not great. It was not that fires would not be started, but with well-disciplined crews they would be taken in time and easily subdued. It is the case over again of “the carpenter’s cap being the best fire extinguisher in a theater,” and Admiral Colomb rightly says it is a question of men rather than materials. Still it is wise to reduce combustibles on a warship to the lowest limit, either by treating wood chemically or by substituting metal for it. This is an important point we shall return to again. The admiral does not approve of the present arrangements for pumping service or fire service in our ships. He has “never reconciled himself to the main drain, nor to the main fire service of pipes,” but is more inclined to the isolation of compartments; “feeling that in one case there would in emergencies be an unexpected flooding of compartments supposed to be cut off, and in the other a breach of continuity in the water-pipes.” When he had to consider the matter formerly, however, he could see no alternative, but now he is of opinion that “the dynamo, the motor, and numerous alternative electrical communications offer conveniences for isolating compartments as to pumping and flooding service.”
There is one other point that we will mention before closing our notice of Admiral Colomb’s valuable paper; a contribution which will be printed in full in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, where all interested in these matters should refer to it, as we only touch on some of the most salient features. The remaining point is the effect of gun-fire on the thickness and disposition of armor, the question arising in connection with the risk of conflagration through shell-fire. A theory largely held was, and doubtless is, that no armor was better than thin armor, as shells would go through unprotected sides and thus right through the ship without bursting, but if there were even thin armor, the resistance would be sufficient to cause the shell to explode. This resulted in a small area of very thick armor and a very large area quite unprotected. In reference to this Admiral Colomb says that:
“Experiments undoubtedly showed that projectiles which penetrated armor, especially if they broke up, created much greater interior havoc than such as passed clean through thin plating intact. Hence the argument was, that there should be no armor except such as would stop everything, and that otherwise everything should be allowed to go through. The logic was sound enough if it could be guaranteed that the enemy would only fire heavy projectiles. But as the policy left 3-pounders effective, it was inevitable that they would be effectively used. To me the real point was a balance between the gun and the armor. If the balance were to be drawn at 3-pounders it was still a balance, so that the loss due to letting 6-pounders through was compensated by the gain of keeping 3-pounders out; or if the balance were to be drawn at 6-pounders, then the loss due to letting 12-pounders through was compensated by the gain of keeping 3-pounders and 6-pounders out, and so on.”
The reasoning here is quite sound in principle, the difficulty of course lying in balancing the chances. It should, however, be remembered that when the Inflexible was designed—which ship the author refers to as being inferior in her system of armor to the original La Gloire, and also to the Achilles and Minotaur—the principal armament was almost the only armament, and it is the wonderful growth in the efficiency of secondary armaments which has caused designers very logically—and often very courageously—to alter their plans and adopt a system that may have been premature at the time it was first suggested. The earlier ships manned had to be armored to meet what was practically wholly a secondary armament, and now that secondary armament is once more to be in the ascendant, we have a return to the older conditions.—Engineering.
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.
A mass of official correspondence relating to the late Spanish-American War has recently been published by the United States Government. It consists chiefly of letters or dispatches that passed between the Government and the naval officers on the scene of action, and is contained in a bulky volume published as an “Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation” for 1898.
The British citizen, into whose hands this volume may fall, versed only in the ways of our own secretive government, will be astonished at seeing so many things that we consider almost sacred, and for official eyes alone, published abroad so that all the world can read. When our natural prudery becomes a little blunted by custom, as it must in going through the volume, we ask ourselves, “What harm is done by this openness of speech?” and the answer appears to be, “Very little; and what there is is far more than balanced by the good.” It is well the public, who pay the bill, should know (after the event, when no sinister result will follow through the enemy also gaining knowledge) how well or ill the servants of the state have done their duty. With the higher permanent officials of the government departments there is often no other means of punishment for neglect or incompetence than public censure; but want of knowledge blunts this weapon. There is a great deal too much of the spirit of trades-unionism in the Civil Service for the sins of omission or commission to be brought home to individuals. It is always the fault of the system, or, at worst, the department. Now, although we are very far from saying that they manage public affairs better in the United States than we do in England, yet in the publication in question very concise particulars are given, so that if there had been failure on account of unpreparedness, the American public would have known pretty well where to put the blame. Had there been the assurance of such a publication as this hanging over the heads of our own military departments, certain untoward events in our own history, due to forgetfulness, or worse, and which resulted in loss of life and treasure, would hardly have occurred, because there would have been the fear that an indignant public would have demanded swift punishment. As it is, only those concerned know that some neglected their duties; but no one is punished.
Other publications have also been issude by the Office of Naval Intelligence from abroad, by the secretary of the United States Navy, and by the engineer-in-chief. From these various sources a great deal of information as to the strategy and political aspect of events may be gleaned. With these features, however interesting they may be, we cannot hope to deal, as being somewhat beyond our scope and certainly outside the limits of our space. There are, however, certain matters bearing on naval materiel, etc., which may be with advantage put on record in our pages.
One of the most interesting features in the report of the chief of the Bureau of Navigation consists of reproductions of a series of photographs of the disabled Spanish ships. These show in a very impressive way how destructive is the fire of the modern artillery when properly handled. The first series of these photographs illustrate some of the ships that were destroyed at Manila. It will be remembered that on May I, 1898, the United States squadron, under Commodore—afterwards promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral—George Dewey, consisting of the U. S. S. Olympia (flagship), Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, attacked the Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lozo, Marquis del Duaro, El Cur-reo, and Velasco. There was also a transport and a water battery at Cavite. It would be a profitless task to compare the respective strengths of the squadrons, even if we had full material to do so, as the Spaniards could make hardly any defense. As a matter of fact, at Manila, as elsewhere, the Spanish ships were not in a condition to fight. Many of them might almost as well have been merchant vessels.
Two mines were exploded ahead of the Olympia as she steamed into the bay, but too far off to do any damage, and the opportunity of defense by fixed engines was almost neglected. The American squadron maintained a continuous fire at ranges varying from 2000 to 5000 yards. The Spanish fire is described as “vigorous but generally ineffective.” The shore batteries also replied, but the latter description may evidently be also applied to their fire, as the American squadron was “uninjured and only a few men were slightly wounded.” In fact the Americans had practically a “walk-over.” This does not detract, however, from the credit due to them for the efficiency and readiness of their fleet, or from the courage and determination shown by Admiral Dewey and those under his command in entering the enclosed waters of Manila harbor— which might have been expected to be heavily mined—in order to get at the enemy’s ships, and in spite of shore batteries.
Whichever way our political sympathies may turn, we cannot but admire the courage and self-devotion of the officers and men of the Spanish fleet. All that could be done with defective materiel and lack of practice was done by the Spanish sailors. Early in the engagement they put out towards the Olympia with the intention of torpedoing her, and this it will be remembered in broad daylight, with no prospect of being unobserved. Of course, it was a forlorn hope, or rather there was no hope; it was only an effort to make some sort of defense for the honor of the flag. The fire of the American ship soon put the boats out of action. “The Spanish flagship Reina Cristina,” to quote from Admiral Dewey’s report, “made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come to an engagement at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the Olympia being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point.” The shell-fire of the Americans at this time set the vessel on fire and she burnt until she sank. The American squadron had opened fire at 5.41 A. M., and by 11.16 the entire Spanish squadron was in flames. As a result three Spanish ships were sunk, including the flagship, and eight were burnt, while two tugs and several small launches were captured.
The photographic reproductions referred to are, as stated, interesting; unfortunately more so than instructive, from the fact that very little is to be gathered in detail. The Reina Cristina appears to have had the whole after part of her superstructure destroyed, but whether this was due to projectiles or fire does not appear. The forward part seems to be less injured. One funnel was broken clean off, and is shown lying in almost a horizontal position; the other has a large hole in it. The next photograph shows the Castilla, with her rail just awash, and other vessels are in a similar state. A deck view of the Isla de Luzon does not give indication that the vessel had been in action, otherwise than from the circumstance that the decks are awash; in fact, this ship appears to have received so little damage to her upper works, that, so far as the photographs go, she might have been sunk by collision, if we except a view taken under the poop, where deck-beams are shown bent and plating stripped off. The fact may be taken as evidence of the excellence of the American fire, which was doubtless at the water-line.
The damage done by the Spanish fire was too trivial to need recording at length. Some plates were indented and planks torn up in the American ships, whilst a little damage was done to rigging, etc., but nothing serious enough to be instructive. On the Olympia an ammunition hoist was temporarily out of use on account of the blowing out of a fuse. The following extract may contain some useful lessons:
“The right gun worked well with the electric batteries. Battery of left gun failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance in dynamo circuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the first shot. The after turret fired 13 shells. Had three misfires with battery of right gun and two with dynamo circuit as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good results. In left gun one shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-reduced charge, which fired it. The smoke gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic sights became covered with a deposit from the powder, which had to be wiped off frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns; but it is recommended that bar sights be installed for emergencies. The batteries for 5-im guns found unreliable. Used dynamo circuit with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shells became detached from the cases on loading, and had to be rammed out from the muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and extracting.”
How poor a chance the Spaniards stood may be gathered from the fact that the Castilla was so crazy that she had, before the action, to be stopped up with cement to an extent that made it “impossible to use her engines”; and even then she was only “nearly watertight.” .The three American cruisers, according to the Spanish Admiral, concentrated theii fire upon his flagship, the Cristina. At the beginning of the action one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all the men serving four quick-firing guns, making splinters of the foremast, and thus wounding the helmsman on the bridge. Another shell set fire to the crews’ bags; but a far more serious result was the complete destruction of the steering gear by a shell. Yet another shell exploded on the poop and put nine men out of action, while another hit the mizzen mast and brought down the flag, which was immediately replaced. A shell exploded in the officers’ cabin, covering the hospital with blood, and killing the wounded who were being treated. Another shell exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand-steering gear. It was impossible to control the fire, and the Admiral had therefore no choice but to flood the magazine, as the cartridges were beginning to explode. Other shells of smaller caliber did great damage. One disabled thirteen men, another disabled the starboard bow gun, and the ship was on fire both forward and aft. The broadside guns were, however, undamaged, and with these the fight was continued until there were only two men remaining unhurt and available for firing them. The ship thus being out of control and riddled with shot, half the crew, including seven officers, killed or disabled, the Admiral gave orders to sink her before the magazines should explode. This was done, the crew being taken off by the Cuba and the Luzon, two ships which afterwards shared the same fate. Admiral Montojo then rehoisted his flag on the Isla de Cuba, and fought until all his ships were sunk, when he escaped to shore after having been wounded in the leg.
Thus ended the battle of Manila, if battle it can be called, when on one side hardly a man was hurt; the American casualties consisting of four sailors on the Baltimore receiving slight flesh wounds from splinters. However glad one may be, that those who speak our mother-tongue met with so little disaster, one cannot but sympathize with the devoted Spaniards, who preferred death rather than succumb without striking a blow for their navy and their flag.
We have yet to deal with the naval operations in the West Indies, with which Admiral Cervera was most directly concerned, being in chief command, but it may be interesting if we here turn to the views of the Admiral as expressed before the commencement of hostilities. The Madrid paper La Epoca, published last November some articles dealing with this subject, and the revelations did much to enlighten the Spanish people as to the way affairs had been conducted. The articles consisted largely of extracts from letters written previously by the Admiral. In January, 1898, he wrote a letter to a relative in which he referred to another letter written two years previously. This letter he had requested his correspondent to keep as his vindication, if, to quote his words, “we should experience the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best intentions.”
That was written about the beginning of 1896, but in January, 1898, Admiral Cervera found “the relative positions of Spain and the United States grown worse for us, because we are extenuated, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich.” The disgraceful state into which the navy had been allowed to fall is vividly described in the following paragraph, which we quote as an example:
“There is the Cataluña, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. . . . The Maquinista Terrestre y Maritimi supplies the engines of the Alfonso XIII; Cadiz, the Filipinas. If Carlos V is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power, and remember the construction is purely Spanish. Only the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa are good ships of their class, but though constructed at Bilbao, it was by an Englishman. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The Vizcaya carries a 14-centimeter breech-plug, which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect disaster. But it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day; I hold my tongue and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict, which in any way I believe would be disastrous for us.”
The conviction that those under his command would do their duty was fully borne out by the sequel which Admiral Cervera so plainly foresaw.
The simple words by which he expresses his resignation would touch the heart of the hardest adversary, and the noble way in which he fought his imperfect fleet is a thing of which Spain may well feel proud, even in the day of her disaster; whilst his treatment of Lieutenant Hobson, after the sinking of the Merrimac, shows that the Spanish Admiral possessed not only a courageous spirit, but also a chivalrous disposition that could admire bravery in an antagonist, and could treat one with courtesy even though he had just succeeded in placing a formidable obstacle in the way of the Admiral’s escape.—Engineering.
ELECTRICITY IN WARSHIPS.
In the middle of his presidential address to the members of the Instition of Mechanical Engineers, Sir William White interpolated a remark of no little significance. Speaking of the various methods employed for working guns on shipboard, and the predilection which there appeared to be in this country for hydraulic gear, he said that in recent vessels the Americans had discarded electrical mechanisms. He offered no comment. Many months ago, writing upon this subject we drew attention to a few of the objections to the use of electricity on fighting ships, and we pointed out in particular that the effect of the violent concussions, both from firing her own guns and being struck by hostile shot, would certainly disarrange many of the more delicate devices on a vessel of war. That was before the fight with Spain, and as we cannot doubt that America is making haste to profit by the lessons she learnt at Santiago and Manila, we may with some safety conclude that the electric fittings on board her ships have not proved of that wonderful value and efficiency which peace maneuvers seemed to promise.
Not long ago Lieut. B. T. Walling, of the United States Navy, delivered a series of lectures on “The Diseases of Electrical Installations in the Navy,” before the United States Naval War College. They may be found printed in the June and December numbers of the last volume of the “Proceedings” of the United States Naval Institute, and will well repay reading, both by engineers and electricians. Lieutenant Walling probably gave these lectures before the war with Spain had taken place, certainly before the experience which had been gained in the naval actions had been fully digested. In his introduction he speaks with enthusiasm of the use of electricity in the navy. “Ever since the introduction of electricity on board ship,” he writes, “there has been a constantly increasing demand for this form of energy, and it is to be anticipated that much larger demands are shortly to be made upon the adoption of electrical power, for turning guns as well as turrets, for operating auxiliaries, for all purposes, in short, which will minimize the present objectionable heat of long lines of steam piping, the annoying leaks of hydraulic apparatus, and the excessive weights of pneumatic appliances.” This is all the golden lining; on the other side of it there is a cloud, and we need not follow Lieutenant Walling’s lecture far before we find that, even apart altogether from its transmission, the generation of electricity on board ship is far from a simple matter. We must, of course, in reading his notes, not forget that it is his intention to call attention to faults and not to virtues. If one were to judge man’s health from a knowledge only of pathological dictionaries, he might be forgiven for supposing that there was no such thing as a sound person in the world. But, making full allowances for this, we are still left with the feeling that of all mechanical devices that find place on board ships of war, the one most open to failure is the high-speed electricity supply engine. Under the best possible conditions the high-speed engine is always a more or less delicate apparatus to deal with. It is, so to speak, a vehicle which is always running away down hill. It demands constant attention and watchfulness, for disaster makes haste to overtake it. With an engine running 80, 90, or 120 revolutions a minute one has time to act upon a warning, but when it is a matter of 300 or 400 turns a minute, there is scarcely time to grasp the fact that something is amiss before disaster follows. It is here that the slow, steady, unruffled running of the pumping engines which supply hydraulic power to our gun mechanisms have the advantage over the, may we say, hysterical efforts of the electrical plant. That electricity has, in certain respects, advantages, no one will question for a moment. It is possible to lead wire in places where tubes could not be conveniently carried, and it is possible to place motors in places unsuited to hydraulic engines. For these reasons the smaller guns on ships can be worked and served by electrical power when the complication of hydraulic supply debars it from competing. Then, too, it is, or could be made, lighter as a whole than hydraulic arrangements, and Lieutenant Walling claims as “the greatest weight in favor of electricity, the ready change from electrical to hand control in emergency, and the facility of maintaining and repairing leads.” As regards the repairing of the leads, we admit that it is easier to mend a copper wire than a hydraulic pipe, but that the change from electrical to hand power is easier than from hydraulic we fail to see. If Lieutenant Walling will look into the hydraulic mechanism of any of our recent vessels we venture to think he will find that the change to hand power can be performed with quite as much rapidity as the change from electrical to manual effort on board any of the ships of the United States Navy. Of pneumatic power we do not write; it has never found favor in this country, for reasons which it is quite unnecessary to enumerate. We have no hesitation in saying that it will not long remain in favor with the Americans.
In another place in his address Sir William White used words to the effect that there were still many persons who would like to see greater dependence on manual labor than there is now on our ships of war. Their position is both intelligent and intelligible, and it is only when taken to excess that it becomes ridiculous. In the British Navy, with the exception of the biggest guns, all arms are worked by hand. Every gun of the secondary armament is thus perfectly independent; and though every machine in the bowels of the ship were destroyed, yet a single gun with one man in an unwrecked casemate might prolong the fight. This is an advantage of which Englishmen will always be proud. Moreover, there can be little or no doubt that far more confidence will be felt in action when the guns are worked manually, than when the uneasy feeling is abroad that a chance shot, in a far part of the vessel, may throw a gun out of action at an instant of extreme importance. Could a more terrible event be imagined than when a torpedo-boat was rapidly approaching covered by a group of guns, elevated and trained by electricity, for, just at the critical moment, the leads to be cut by a hostile shot, and the guns rendered motionless, and this too late to make the alteration to hand power and to avert destruction? With large guns the case is, of course, very different. In our recent ships the largest mountings are provided with hydraulic, electrical, and hand power, and these are to be used in the order given. Hand power is unsuited for such heavy work, as even when a large number of men is employed the operations are performed but slowly. In one respect, however, hand power is still found to be quite as satisfactory, if not more so, than either hydraulic or electrical gear, and that is, in the working of the breech mechanisms of heavy guns. There is no necessity here for great speed, because with manual power the gun can be prepared for a new charge quite as soon as the hoists can supply it. Many attempts have been made to devise effective automatic breech gears, and there are some now at work, but, on the whole, it has been found that hand power gives the most satisfaction.
Of other objections to which electrical transmission on board ship is open, and which have influenced our naval constructors against its adoption, we have not space to speak in any detail. The danger of fire from short circuit, the difficulty of locating a leak or defect, and the fact that the power is supplied by an engine which may suddenly collapse, are among the principal reasons.
But besides the working of guns, hoists, etc., electricity has been used for a number of minor purposes on foreign vessels. It has been, and is still, used for telephones, for range finders, for signalling, and in all navies for lighting, but with the exception of the last it is but little employed in our navy, because it is felt not to be as trustworthy as other methods. This is a fact to which the Americans are at last waking up, and it is evident that the multifarious electrical devices in which they took such pride have not proved in service to be all that could be desired. Even in the matter of lighting, in which there is an accumulated experience to guide us, a useful warning was given in the sudden failure of the supply on board the Burgoyne.—The Engineer.
ARMORED SHIPS OF THE FUTURE.
We have been expecting to hear of a distinct change in the application of armor to ships since the Spanish-American war. It does not seem to have taken distinct shape yet; but it must, we think, do so before long. The fact is, that while quick-fire has developed so formidably as to make it desirable to extend armor as far as possible over the hulls of ships, the production of steel plates possessing a high degree of toughness, and at the same time a surface of adamantine hardness, has made it possible to meet this demand. The breakdown of the Spanish Navy has apparently prevented critics from carefully examining certain lessons that are afforded by the events of the war; lessons which, we venture to think, are now sufficiently plain. No incident is more instructive than the behavior and fate of the Cristobal Colon at Santiago. Unfortunately for Spain, when Admiral Cervera made the attempt to break through the American fleet, he elected to push his own ship, the Teresa, to the front, and placed the Colon third in succession, by which means he played his principal game with a ship deficient in quick-fire, and with a hull so totally unprotected, and liable to be set on fire, that her destruction was but the work of minutes; while the Colon, strongly armored nearly all over, and with a powerful battery of quick-fire guns, was so placed that it was probable that she would effect nothing. She ought to have led the way, closed with the Brooklyn, and poured in her quick-fire at such a range as would have secured hitting and not missing. This was in all respects feasible. The Spanish gunners shot badly enough; but we are discussing the powers of ships, and to plead that certain gunners were bad is to drag a herring across the true scent. As a matter of fact, moreover, the Spaniards must have stood to their guns at all events, for the number of hits on funnels, turrets, and masts shows that a great volume of fire, directed too high, passed over the Brooklyn. The latter has a hull better protected from catching fire, but exposed to destruction by langrage nearly as fully as those of the Spanish cruisers which suffered so much. On the other hand, only her principal guns could perforate the Colon’s armor, even directly; and it is not likely that more than a little dead metal would have entered her hull, except at the extreme ends. Her 5-in. guns would have broken their projectiles harmlessly on the Colon’s armor, as is actually recorded in the one 5-in. hit noted on the accessible part of her hull. The captain of the Colon, in the order adopted, was very likely not to make trial of her powers, seeing that immediately in front of him was the Vizcaya exchanging quick-fire with the Brooklyn, and it happens that these two vessels were formidable in quick-fire, while, curiously enough, both had smoke-giving powder. It could hardly be recommended that the Colon, unless it had been distinctly pre-arranged, should thrust herself in between them. So it came that, passing on the shore side of her leaders, she ran her inglorious course, receiving only enough shot to remind us how completely her armor protected her, surrendering without injury, and without probably having inflicted any injury worth mentioning on the American ships. It is easy to conceive that the Colon’s powers may have escaped recognition, because she was deficient in her principal guns. So cruelly crippled did she appear with her barbettes empty, that her power may easily have escaped estimation. As a lady flippantly put it, “In this condition was she not rather a semi-Colon than a full Colon?” Certainly; but we are considering her in her “semi-Colon” condition, and deliberately say that for the task in hand we could name very few better ships in the world. She needed speed protection, and power of delivering fire powerfully for a few minutes. Speed she had, for she got away at first, making a spurt which left the American ships five miles behind. Protection—she had sufficient to deflect harmlessly the projectiles that struck her; and that her energy of fire was good is easily calculated. Had she actually crippled the Brooklyn, and escaped with only a tolerable and reasonable amount of injury, as we think she ought to have done, the authorities of all nations of the world would have ordered vessels of her type before this. As it is, we think it is only a matter of time before this happens, and for this reason we would call attention to her class. That class consists of six ships; two Italian cruisers, the Guiseppe Garibaldi and Varese; two cruisers built in Italy and sold to Argentina, the Garibaldi and San Martin; and two built in Italy for Spain, the Colon and Pedro d’Aragon. Each ship has a displacement of 6840 tons; each is covered from bow to stern with a water-line belt of 6-in. steel made at Terni, practically on the Harvey system. The same armor both as to kind and thickness covers the barbettes, and is carried over the whole of the central portion of the hull, from barbette to barbette. Astern the armor beyond the barbette is carried to the level of the quick-fire battery deck, thus leaving only a small portion fore and aft unprotected. This 6-in. Harveyed armor is a complete match under service conditions for 6-in. quick-fire guns; in fact, the vessel has little to fear from shell fire. The armament is in each case as follows: Two 10-in. guns, ten 6-in. quick-fire, six 4.7-in. quick-fire, ten 2.2-in. quick-fire, and ten 1.4-in. quick-fire. The speed is 20 knots.
Surely, the powers thus secured for a vessel of only 6840 tons may be regarded as an indication of what new possibilities are opened by the introduction of hard-faced steel armor. The type is certainly open to objection in some respects. For example, the coal capacity is small—600 tons is, we think, too little. Nevertheless, there is evidently the possibility of adopting the main principle illustrated by this type, that is, the recognition of the disproportionate protection given to belts and upper structure, and the grasp of the fact that 6-in. Krupp plate affords very fair protection to the water-line, and its adoption opens the possibility of covering nearly the entire hull with it, or something approaching it. To lay down anything in detail would require the staff of a construction department, but what is obvious to “the man in the street,” if he has his attention directed to it, is that we have before us a class with a displacement of only 6840 tons, with high speed, and with a hull covered nearly completely with armor far thicker than the quick-fire batteries of French men-of-war, which are only from three to four inches of ordinary steel; thicker than those of the Russian men-of-war, which have for the most part five inches of armor; thicker than the armor above the belt of our own Hood, Barfleur, Centurion, and Royal Sovereign class; and equal to that employed in the casemates of our strongest and heaviest battleships; and this may be done mainly by contenting ourselves with the same thickness of belt as has been adopted for the vertical belt protection of the Canopus battleship class.—The Engineer.
WAVE ACTION IN GUNS.
By Frederick H. McGahie.
The regularity of action of smokeless powders has been made the question of the day in American ordnance circles by the destruction of a rifle during proof at Sandy Hook. The matter is now receiving a thorough examination by an investigating board, and all knowledge derived from past experience and theoretical investigation will be brought to bear upon this most important phase of propellants, for it is manifestly clear that the value of higher ballistics is negatived entirely if the powder or system employed is accompanied by a decrease in the safety given as compared with the one to be superseded. The facts of the explosion are these; A new 10-inch rifle was being proved by Dupont smokeless powder made in accordance with the Schüpphaus-Maxim patents. Other rifles of the same caliber and type had been successfully tested in the same manner, and the powder has acted normally. The powder consisted of short grains with seven longitudinal perforations, the formula being the standard army one of 75 per cent, nitrocellulose and 25 per cent, nitroglycerin. In the gun in question a charge of 141 pounds had been fired, giving a pressure of 32,000 pounds. This charge was increased a few pounds to obtain the service pressure of 35,000 pounds, the increase being calculated by the Sarrau formula, which has been used most satisfactorily the world over for many years. Disaster followed the command to fire. The breech-block was blown off with velocity sufficient to make it penetrate the protecting butt directly in the rear of the gun and to kill the recorder of tests. The breech-tube was knocked off. As to the condition of the powder chamber and the rest of the gun, nothing can be known definitely until the report of the investigating board appears. A recovered gage indicated a pressure of 70,000 pounds. These conditions show plainly that detonation did not occur, this explosive action being characterized by enormous pressures developed so suddenly that lines of least resistance are utterly ignored in the destructive effects accompanying it. Had the charge of smokeless powder detonated, the whole chamber would have been subjected to an impulsive blow, around 100 tons per square inch, that would have torn it off completely from the tube of the gun and projected it in various sized pieces over the proving grounds. I doubt if a bona-fide case of detonation of a gunpowder charge has ever been clearly established. It serves as an explanation of unknown or unestablished causes. Had the powder cracked up through excessive internal pressure, the sudden increase of burning surface provided by the fragments would have given rise to a dangerous jump in the pressure, which, reacting on the velocity of combustion of the powder, would have carried it still higher before the movement of the projectile had sufficiently increased the expansion volume. Too long a multiperforated or tubular grain will break up into a few, not many, pieces. But the short grains used were far within the limit, and many tons of such powder have been fired since 1894 without giving the slightest hint of such action.
The firings were made in a wide range of guns, with wide variations of loading and ballistic conditions. The accident has been made the subject of several articles in recent numbers of the Scientific American and Scientific American Supplement.
In the light of the above matter the theories advanced by Hiram S. Maxim appear absurd, if indeed the replies of Hudson Maxim do not reveal the nature of those letters as a vicious attack upon an excellent powder, based upon personal animosities.
The phenomenon that took place in the wrecked gun was undoubtedly that conforming in general to the theory advanced by Hudson Maxim in his letter in the Scientific American of May 13, 1899. Conditions of loading and ignition, of which no data are at hand at present, originated a wave action in place of the normal distribution of pressure. This surging of the gases moved forward along the axis of the bore with great velocity. Meeting the base of the moving projectile, it was reflected back and impinged upon the mushroom head, which would result in compressing the gaseous column, running up the pressure around the burning charge, and accelerating abnormally the rate of emission of gases. This action itself would tend to abnormal pressures, but especially upon the rapid movement of a considerable weight of powder gases being arrested by the breech, the dynamic movement was translated into an impulsive blow in an axial direction that exceeded the endurance of the breech system. In some features it bore a resemblance to a water hammer.
When the late Capt. Sidney E. Stuart was detailed by the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army to take full charge of the development and manufacture of service powders, brown prismatic was in use and abnormal pressures were observed every now and then in proving the various lots. A few illustrations are given from the firing records:
GUN. | CHARGE. | VELOCITY. | PRESSURE. | REMARKS. |
| Pounds. | Foot Seconds. | Pounds. |
|
12-inch | 400 | 1932 | 30000 | Normal |
400 | 2006 | 60000 | ||
12-inch | 342 | 1724 | 33000 | Normal |
350 | 1804 | 65000 | ||
10-inch | 200 | 1813 | 37600 | Normal |
200 | 1843 | 59000 |
In the above firings the increase of velocities with increase of charge and variation of velocities with equal charges were those normal to single tests of brown powder. The changes in pressure were enormous. In the first group the pressure with 406 pounds should have been in the neighborhood of 37,000 pounds in place of the recorded 60,000 pounds, it being remembered that the gages are screwed into the mushroom head, and their axes are parallel to the axis of the bore. Neither an examination of the lot of powder from which the charges were taken nor an inspection of the factory records of the lot gave any facts to which the pressure variations could be pinned. M. Vieille, one of the group of French explosive engineers who have published in the Mémorial des Poudres et Saltpètres some of the most valuable studies of explosives at our command, had investigated the action of powder gases in long closed tubes in connection with abnormalities found in French practice. He proved the existence of this wave action, and Capt. Stuart applied the theory to American practice with great success.
It will be well to examine this work of M. Vieille. The apparatus consisted of “a steel tube about 40 inches long and 2.4 inches in exterior diameter, the clear interior dimensions being about 35 inches and 7/8, inch respectively. The ends of this tube were threaded and received exactly similar crusher gages, the pistons of which carried pins external to the tube and projecting perpendicularly to it, designed to record the motions of the pistons. Ignition was obtained by an electric fuse carried by a screw plug entering from the side near one end. Obturation was secured by seating the plugs in copper rings. The tube was fastened in a horizontal fashion on a metallic table in the firmest manner possible. A strong axle placed near and parallel to the tube carried at each end a metal cylinder with a blackened surface, so placed as to receive the trace of the pen carried by the piston of the corresponding crusher gage. This axle was rotated by an electric motor by means of a pulley attached midway of its length, in order to avoid differences in the torsion of the axle between the pulley and the two cylinders. The scale of time was obtained by a tuning fork making 500 vibrations per second, which were sustained by an electro-magnet. Various refinements in the character and manner of this portion of the apparatus secured a rigorously exact scale of time, and the whole apparatus operated in a manner insuring a high degree of accuracy in its indications.”
Three kinds of powder were used in the experiments, (A) musket, (B) siege gun, (C) large rifle. The conditions of loading were varied in three ways, the charge being distributed uniformly throughout the length of the tube, collected at one end, or collected similarly in equal parts at each end.
While the pressure was developing during an experiment, the piston of the crusher gage would move forward in reducing the height of the copper plug, and the pin carried by it would trace a curve upon the revolving cylinder, the tuning fork meanwhile establishing a time scale. As the weight of the piston was designedly light in accordance with the theory of crusher gages, the deformation of the copper plug would keep pace with the increase of pressures, and would register any momentary excess of pressure due to the compression of the head of a surging gaseous column, arrested at the end where the crusher gage was. M. Vieille put the rectified curves into four classes, typical case being illustrated in Fig. I. Of these, a is the case in which the copper plug was compressed regularly to a normal value, b in which the deformation rose to a normal value by steps, c in which an abnormal deformation was produced by steps, and d in which an abnormal crushing was attained at once. Selecting illustrative data from the experiments, the following table shows plainly the value of uniform distribution of explosives in long tubes.
Powder. | Density of | Indicated | Class of | Conditions of Loading. |
A | 0.075 | 10,000 | a | Uniform distribution. |
0.075 | 10,000 | b | Collected at firing end. | |
0.075 | 9,800 | b | " " " " | |
10,350 | ||||
0.1 | 15,800 | a | Uniform distribution. | |
0.1 | 23,950 | c | Collected at firing end. | |
0.1 | 20,400 | c | " " " " | |
0.1 | 21,850 | c | " " both ends. | |
0.1 | 24,850 | c | " " " " | |
0.1 | 24,500 | c | " " one end. | |
25,400 | c | |||
0.2 | 34,500 | a | Uniformly distributed. | |
0.2 | 107,000 | d | Collected at firing end. | |
B | 0.2 | 29,500 | a | Uniform distribution. |
0.2 | 66,600 | d | Collected at firing end. | |
0.2 | 66,600 | c | " " " " | |
0.2 | 51,300 | b | " " " " | |
49,300 | ||||
C | 0.2 | 29,300 | b | " " " " |
26,500 | ||||
0.25 | 39,200 | b | Resuts normal with uniform distribution in previous tests. | |
39,300 |
Double pressures mean readings from both gages.
Single readings from gage opposite firing end.
Previous experiments in much shorter éprouvettes (2 to 6 inches in length and 1 to 2.5 inches in diameter) had disclosed no difference in pressures with uniform and ununiform dispositions of explosives varying widely in their quickness. The tests in the long éprouvette revealed another state of affairs, as indicated in the above table. Up to a certain low limit of density of loading, increasing with the slowness of the powder, variations in the placing of the charge made little or no change in pressures. Above these limits the collecting of the charge at one end, or of equal parts at both ends, caused deformation of the copper plugs much in excess of that given by the case of uniform distribution at the same density of loading. This occurred with powders A and B. It would have taken place with C if the strength of the apparatus had permitted a higher density of loading. Referring to the pressure curves, all cases of uniform disposition were included in type a, showing that the pressure was developed regularly. Below the density of loading limit ununiform conditions gave curves bf type b, in which the pressure rose to a normal value by successive steps. Above that limit ununiform distribution produced generally curves of type c, showing a development of abnormal pressure by several steps, and occasionally of type a, representing abnormal pressure in one step. A study of a large number of experiments of this nature led M. Vieille to the conclusion that “for densities of loading above the limiting values the crusher-gage coppers suffer excessive deformations, which demonstrate the existence of real excessive pressures, due to condensations resulting from the arrest at the ends of the chamber of the gaseous mass in rapid motion.
M. Vieille went further into the nature of this wave action, and experimented with the éprouvette suspended freely, and with crusher-gages whose pistons were too heavy to respond to the momentary pressures due to condensation at the end of the tube of the moving gaseous column. A careful review of the matter led him to formulate the opinion that wave action was possible in large rifles when certain conditions coincided. The influence of ununiform distributon of the charge above certain densities of loading depending upon the quickness of the powder has been noticed. The universal practice in ordnance matters is to employ high densities of loading, much above these limits. The influence of length of powder chamber has been indicated by the difference in results obtained in short and long éprouvettes. This refers to the absolute length, and not to relative length in comparison with the diameter. The prevalent custom of igniting the charge is by means of a primer placed in the breech block, whose explosion, acting on the priming charge, would tend to set up some motion in an axial direction and contribute to pressure irregularity. This is borne out by some firings made in 1891 at Sandy Hook in two 3.2 field guns similar in all respects except that one had a radial vent for ignition of the charge, while the other had an axial vent. Loading conditions were the same, and black moulded powder used in these firings.
CHARGE | PRESSURE | |
Axial Vent. | Radial Vent. | |
3 pounds 5 ounces | 36,080 | 32,500 |
3 " 6 " | 37,600 | 32,450 |
3 " 7 " | 41,300 | 33,600 |
3 " 7 " | 38,400 | 34,000 |
3 " 8 " | 39,500 | 34,350 |
It will be seen at once that axial ignition gave rise to higher and more irregular pressures than did radial ignition, confirmed by further tests with black and smokeless powders.
It would appear that wave action may find an origination in these conditions: Length of chamber, high density of loading, end ignition, quickness of powder, and ununiform distribution. The first three of these attend every firing of the large rifles of the day, and it may possibly be that the system of gaseous products of explosion is always on the verge of some degree of wave action that other causes may change, according to their nature, into mere irregularities or large and dangerous jumps in the pressure at the breech of the gun and extending more or less into the chamber.
Capt. Stuart noticed that abnormal pressures occurred with brown powder in the tests at Sandy Hook usually with reduced charges. Full charges were fixed to extend the length of the chamber, but smaller charges were generally reduced in length and not in diameter, providing thereby another favorable condition for wave action. Loading regulations were put into force then at Sandy Hook, designed to secure uniform distribution and regularity of inflammation of the charge. The Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army was able to report a year and a half later: “The occurrence of excessive wave pressure, frequently experienced in the earlier stages of our tests of brown powder, has been practically overcome.”
Smokeless powders are at one disadvantage compared with brown prismatic. Any accidental variations in conditions that give rise to an abnormal pressure jump will carry it further with smokeless than with brown powder, for the rate of emission of gases increases more rapidly with the pressure in the former than in the latter. The relation in question is in which V is the velocity of combustion of the powder at any pressure P, and x an exponential constant depending upon the powder used. M. Vieille has given these experimental values for x: Brown prismatic powder, 0.4s; black powder, 0.5s; smokeless powder of 50 per cent, military guncotton and 50 per cent, nitroglycerin, 0.55; smokeless powder of 50 per cent, soluble nitrocellulose and 50 per cent, nitroglycerin, 0.60; and smokeless powder entirely of military guncotton, 0.66. Furthermore, in a gun the action is a multiplying one. Some variation causes an irregular jump in the pressure; this increase makes the powder burn faster and deliver a large amount of gas. This additional increment of pressures increases still further the rate of emission, and so each reacts on the other until the movement of the projectile or the destruction of the gun relieves the pressure. This will indicate the complexity of the smokeless powder question. That article we must have. It involves the drawback just stated. On the other hand, a more uniform product is possible in commercial manufacture. Then, again, in smokeless powders the introduction of nitroglycerin in quantity gives one with a lower rate of emission exponent, manufactured more rapidly and cheaply and having far higher ballistic properties than a guncotton powder. But nitroglycerin means a high degree of erosive action at least, while many contend that it introduces a dangerous mechanical stability into powders and generally lay any trouble with a nitroglycerin powder to its presence. It is indeed a puzzling matter.
To revert to the accident at Sandy Hook, it would seem reasonable that, if the inner jackets of the chamber show no signs of a general dangerous stress, wave action may be safely considered as the cause, coupled possibly with some weakness in the breech system of this particular rifle. If the chamber exhibits plainly that an excessive pressure existed throughout it, wave action must still have a prominent consideration, but the physical condition of this lot of powder enters into the case. Multiperforated powder can be badly made just as well as any other powder. Commercial methods may sometimes diverge from good practice. In 1897 the United States Navy rejected 835,700 pounds of brown powder in getting 699,847 pounds of satisfactory powder. Badly warped and cracked multiperforated powder would not redound to the credit of the system through the results secured in firings. Shipments of cordite have been rejected on these grounds.
Let us examine multiperforated powder as regards uniformity and regularity, as these bear upon the starting of wave action. The general formula may be varied to produce powders running from a pure guncotton to a 60 per cent, nitroglycerin basis. In addition to the incorporation in the usual mixing machine, the ingredients are further mixed and kneaded thoroughly on rolls. From the press the powder issues in rods having exactly the cross-section imposed by the forming die. Good practice in manufacturing insures that the shrinkage in drying is small and regular, this shrinkage occurring with all powders made with solvents. It is less in multiperforated powder than in other powders, and is distributed through at least three burning thicknesses in place of the one thickness of solid grains. The final dimensions of grains are completely in the control of the manufacturer, and accordingly all working details contribute to a maximum uniformity of powder. Matters still favor it in the gun. The gravimetric density of the grain is greater than with any other shape; that is, a given weight of multiperforated powder of any formula, with a given least dimension, will occupy more volume than the same weight made up into any solid grain with the same least dimension. Under these conditions more multiperforated powder can be used for a given pressure than is possible with the other powders. The natural result is that the chamber is more fully filled by the charge, and the danger of ununiform distribution through accident obviated to that degree. An essential point to regular pressures is regularity of inflammation of the powder by the priming charge. For this condition the multiperforated grain is ideal, since the perforations of the grain and the air spaces between the short cylinders afford an easy path for the igniting gases to penetrate and start simultaneous combustion throughout the entire charge. Laminal and cubical grains are sadly lacking in this respect, and their firing records testify to it. The mechanical integrity and structure of the grain rests here, as in other powders, with the personal equation of the factory. The company that developed the powder in question used the most trying formula, and yet every lot delivered gave a satisfactory account in guns, running from the 6-pounder rapid-fire gun to the 12-inch rifle, exciting comment by its remarkable uniformity and regularity of action. Another word in regard to the Hiram Maximized theory of internal explosion of the grains. Were it true nothing but solid rods are permissible. Yet nobody objected to brown powder with its central hole, or to short tubular smokeless powder. The short grains afford easy passage for the gases of internal combustion in their initial dimensions, and combustion increases the area of the passage as the square of the linear enlargement, while the burning surface is growing only in direct ratio. The best testimony of the erroneousness of the theory is given by some grains in the possession of Dr. R. C. Schüpphaus.
After a firing in the 3.2-inch field gun of a somewhat slow multiperforated powder, the pressure being 30,000 pounds, grains were found in the sand in front of the gun burned out perfectly, so that the circular perforations were almost tangent. Though quite fragile, they were perfectly intact. Another sample is an extra slow powder fired in an 8-inch rifle at 15,000 pounds pressure. It is burned up about half and in first-class condition. Again, after a firing in an 8-inch rifle at 35,000 pounds pressure, I picked up many of the curvilinear rods formed by the burning out of powder with circular perforations. Their heights were all uniform, and equal to the original heights less twice the burning thickness, as was to be expected from the combustion at both ends. I regret that the absence of Dr. Schiipphaus does not allow photographs of the grains mentioned, but the Scientific American Army Supplement contains one of the grains partly burned at 5000 pounds pressure.—Scientific American, May 27, 1899.
THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
The explanatory statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Navy Estimates for 1899-1900 was issued the end of last week as a Parliamentary paper. Mr. Goschen commences by saying that the estimates for the coming year amount to a net total of £26,594,500, as compared with the sum of £23,778,400 voted for the year 1898-1899—showing an increase of £2,816,100. Of this increase the votes connected with the personnel account for £452,600—including an increase of £55,300 in the non-effective votes—which will amount to £1,890,700. Various miscellaneous votes show an increase of £40,900. The works vote is higher by £145,000. The ordnance vote is higher by £161,600. The shipbuilding vote shows an increase of £2,016,000. The liabilities included in this vote due to the supplemental programme of last August amount to two millions.
The total number of officers, seamen, and boys, coastguard, and Royal Marines voted for last year was 106,390, an increase on the previous year of 6,340. On February I the number was 105,280, leaving only 1100 to be entered during February and March. There is no reason to doubt that the total number voted will be reached by the end of the financial year. A force of 110,640 is proposed for 1899, being an increase of 4250. The additions proposed to meet the larger requirements of the fleet are 463 officers, 1700 petty officers and seamen, 215 engine-room artificers and artisans, 1000 stokers, 172 miscellaneous, 500 marines, 200 boys under training.
The increase in the numbers voted during the last few years entail a corresponding increase in the number of men in the gunnery and torpedo schools. Additional accommodation has therefore become necessary at Whale Island, for which provision has been made in the estimates.
On account of expansion it has been necessary to increase flag officers from 68 to 80, captains from 208 to 245, commanders from 304 to 360, lieutenants from 1150 to 1550. These additions will be effected gradually over a certain number of years. The number of engineer officers is to be raised from 950 to 1050, the increase to be spread over two years. Medical officers are to be raised from 450 to 490 gradually, chaplains from 59 to 69, and naval instructors from 50 to 60; chief gunners and chief boatswains to be increased from 80 to 100, gunners and boatswains from 920 to 1150, chief carpenters from 18 to 20, carpenters from 207 to 240.
During 1898, 2871 recruits were raised for the Royal Marines, of these 572 were drafted to the Artillery branch, and the remainder trained for the Infantry. The waste of the corps for the year amounted to 138, including men who were transferred to serve as stokers, ship police, artificers, and in other ratings at their request. It has been decided to increase the net pay of the Marine on shore by 2d. a day. The deduction of 7d. now made for rations and groceries from his pay of is. 2d. will be reduced to 4d., while, on the other hand, the penny a day for beer money will be abolished. His net pay on shore will accordingly in future be tenpence in place of eightpence. The average number of non-commissioned officers and men on shore during 1898 was 7079. Of this number over 6000 were put through the annual course of musketry training.
The total number of executive officers of the Royal Naval Reserve now on the active list who have served for twelve months or more in the navy, or who are now undergoing twelve months’ training, is 243, an increase of eighteen since last year, notwithstanding that 35 of these officers have been appointed supplementary lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in the Royal Navy. In the estimates for last year provision was made for increasing the executive officers’ list by 100. The additional officers have all been appointed, and there are now no vacancies, while 175 candidates are on the list of applicants for appointments. By order in council of May 19 last an increase of 100 in the engineer officers’ list was sanctioned, raising it to 400 officers. In all 351 officers are now borne, and it is anticipated that the list will be complete in a year at the present rate of volunteering. During the year ended December 31 last 1711 seamen were embarked for six months’ training in Her Majesty’s ships. On that day 810 of these men were so serving. It is expected that 1800 men will have been embarking during the financial year ending March 31, 1899, an excess of 600 men over the number estimated. Provision has now been made in the estimates for the embarkation of 2000 men.
All the vessels proposed to be commenced during the financial year under the original programme 1898-99 have been begun. Of the vessels included under the supplemental programme the four battleships and two of the cruisers have been ordered, and tenders for the remaining two cruisers have been invited. Tenders for the 12 destroyers have been received, and are now being considered. It was not possible to complete these arrangements at an earlier date, having regard to the preparation of the necessary designs and specifications, and to the large amount of current work on new construction. The expenditure and progress on ships building have been greatly influenced by the unprecedented activity in mercantile shipbuilding, which has followed the settlement of the labor difficulties that so seriously affected the work of last year. The disarrangement of work arising from those difficulties has produced a sensible effect on the completion of ships in 1898-99, the most serious result being the great delay experienced in the supply of steel and other materials required by private firms to whom Admiralty orders have been given. This has been especially felt in the case of ships commenced in private yards in 1898-99. The dates of laying down the ships were consequently later, and the sums earned on these vessels had fallen below what would have been earned under ordinary conditions. The manufacture of armor has been affected by the fact that the introduction of a new and superior quality has necessitated the reconstruction of plant, and involved many difficulties only to be overcome by experience. The output has been greater during the current year, as compared with 1897-98, but the anticipation of the Admiralty that there would still be a temporary limitation of the supply has proved to be correct. All the neighboring firms have been kept full of orders, and urged to increased production, but the earnings for the present financial year will fall considerably below the sum provided in the estimates. It is hoped that in the coming financial year 1899-1900, a larger output of armor will be available on contract work generally, including armor, hulls, machinery, gunmountings, etc. The various hindrances above mentioned will cause the aggregate earnings to fall short by about £800,000 of the estimated amount on ships previously ordered, which were in stages of construction less affected by the peculiar conditions of the year. Excellent progress has been made, and in some cases the amounts earned have exceeded expectations.
Extra expenditure on labor and ordinary materials for new construction and on repairs in the dockyards will to the extent of about £360,000 absorb the short earnings on armor and other contract work.
The battleships Hannibal and Illustrious (Majestic class), which were practically ready for service at the end of the last financial year, were commissioned soon afterwards. Of the Canopus class two (the Canopus and the Ocean) will be completed and ready for trials about June next. The Goliath will follow three months later, and the Albion and Glory will, it is anticipated, be delivered by the contractors in time for completion before the close of the financial year 1899-1900. The last vessel of the class—Vengeance—is being rapidly advanced, and, according to the contract, will be delivered in July, 1900. Of the Formidable class two—the Formidable and Irresistible—were launched before the end of 1898, and the Implacable is to be launched this month. In this case the rate of advancement has exceeded expectation. The four battleships recently ordered under the supplemental programme are intermediate in size between the Formidable and Canopus classes, and have practically the same armament as the Formidable, but are to have superior speed and thinner armor. They are to be known as the Duncan class.
Of eight vessels belonging to the Diadem class, which were in hand at the beginning of 1898-99 two (the Diadem and Niobe) are in commission. The Europe has been for some time complete. In the Fleet Reserve the Andromeda and the Argonaut have completed their trials and will be ready for service by the end of the present financial year. The Ariadne has finished her steam trials and will be completed at an early date. The Amphitrite has been delivered by the contractors and her trials will shortly take place. The Spartiate is being advanced at Pembroke. All these vessels will be ready for service in 1899-1900. Six armored cruisers of the Cressy class are building by contract. Two of these have been ordered in 1898-99 as part of the new programme of four armored cruisers included with the estimates of that year.
Two of the three vessels of the Arrogant class in hand at the beginning of 1898-99, namely, the Furious and Vindictive, have been completed, and one of them, the Furious, has been in commission since July last. The third, the Gladiator, will, it is anticipated, be completed this financial year. Three vessels of the improved Talbot class (Hermes), building by contract, have been well advanced during 1898-99 and will be completed early in the next financial year. The Hermes will be delivered this month.
Of the ten third-class cruisers of the Pelorus type which were in hand on April 1, 1898, the Proserpine, Pactolus, and Pegasus have been completed and are in commission. The Psyche, Pomone, Perseus, and Prometheus will be completed very early in the next financial year. The remaining two vessels will be completed before the end of the year.
Six sloops of the Condor class are in hand. Two of these are to be completed early in the next financial year. The others will be considerably advanced. The four twin-screw gunboats (Dwarf class) building by contract are approaching completion.
The supplementary programme provided for the twelve additional torpedo-boat destroyers. Orders for them will be placed before the end of the present financial year. Of the 42 destroyers, of 26 to 27 knots’ speed, two did not complete their trials successfully with locomotive boilers, and water-tube boilers are now being fitted. It is hoped that they will be ready for service during next summer. Of the 50 vessels of 30 knots’ speed which have been ordered in previous years, 31 have been tried and delivered, and another has been tried and soon will be delivered. The remaining 18 are well advanced, and some have passed their preliminary trials. Four experimental vessels of still higher speeds have been ordered. Two of these are under trial.
In the coming financial year it is proposed to commence in the dockyards two battleships (design not decided), two armored first-class cruisers 9800 tons, three smaller cruisers (design not decided), and two sloops. By contract it is proposed to build two first-class torpedo-boats to replace others struck off the list. The two sloops to be laid down are to be in their general character similar to the Phoenix and Algerine. They will be propelled by twin screws and be of moderate draught suitable for river service.
The manufacture of guns is proceeding satisfactorily, and the production is keeping pace with the requirements of the fleet. A design of a new and more powerful 12-inch B.L. wire gun has been approved, the first gun has been delivered, and is now under trial. This type of gun will be mounted in the Formidable class of battleships. A new design of 9.2-inch B.L. wire gun has also been approved. The first gun is under manufacture, and not yet completed. It is intended to mount this type of gun in the armored cruisers of the Cressy class and of the Drake class.
The principal new works for which provision is made in the estimates for 1899-1900 are:
At Chatham.—A new building slip and a new foundry. It has been found impossible to reconstruct the old foundry owing to the failure of the foundations.
At Porstmouth.—Extension of No. 5 building slip and the reconstruction of a new smithery.
At Pembroke.—A new smithery.
At Wei-hai-wei.—It is proposed to begin the establishment of a naval depot. Dredging operations have been already commenced.
For hospitals.—A considerably increased expenditure is again required to provide accommodation for the increased numbers borne and to improve the existing buildings. A bill to make provision for the continuation of the works under the Naval Works Act, and for the commencement of certain others, will be submitted to Parliament.—United Service Gazette.
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN GUNNERY.
Many complaints have been made lately about the shooting in our navy, and invidious comparisons have been drawn between our gunnery and that of the United States. The question is one demanding attention, because our accuracy of fire might at very short notice become a matter of vital importance, and it would then be too late to make up shortcomings. The subject has an aspect at the present moment which is not altogether free from difficulty. Crudely expressed, the conclusion that appears to loom up is as follows: Our shooting is not up to that of the American Navy. In the fight at Santiago, which is the only action of which we have anything like a record, the American Navy scored something like 3 per cent, of hits out of the total number of rounds fired. If we are to score much less than this the effect of our fire is indeed poor. If, on the other hand, we conclude that skill goes to the winds on actual service, then there is no use conducting annual practice at all. Clearly the question is masked by the difficulties raised by the disappointing results at Santiago. We should observe that we mean disappointing from the point of view of accuracy, for the actual effect of this small percentage of hits was tremendous. The great incendiary effect produced was due to circumstances which were more favorable than would probably be found again. The Spanish cruisers were singularly open to destruction by fire, and their means provided to deal with fire were very inadequate and failed in time of need. The type of ship we are more likely to encounter in the future will be much better protected. If a cruiser, she may be of the type of the Colon, which at Santiago did not suffer any injury worth notice from such projectiles as struck her. Consequently, we may be sure that the American Navy would not contemplate with equanimity the prospect of making only 3 per cent, of hits in future actions. The first point is to account for this result, and to ascertain if there is a really satisfactory way of accounting for it, and we may say at once that we can hardly conceive circumstances where wild firing would be more certainly provoked than those of Santiago. The Americans were tired out by an uneventful watch round the harbor mouth for several weeks. One hot morning, without the slighest warning, the order was given to close and fire on the Spanish cruisers which were moving out. The United States ships were in most cases slower than the Spanish, so their only chance of hitting lay in what could be done instantly. In a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes all the chances for most of the vessels might be over, and the United States ships had drifted out to a distance far beyond that of practical fighting. In about eight minutes firing had begun, but it was at a range of 6000 yards. Nearly every ship fired smokegiving powder. If men in a state of repose are suddenly told to score all they can in a few minutes at a rapidly-moving enemy, 6000 yards off, concealed in smoke, they themselves moving as fast as possible, what could be expected? Saving ammunition was no object. The wildest attempt made while the range was possible was better than nothing. Could circumstances arise more conducive to wild firing? Further, so much injury was done to the Spanish ships by the burning out of their wood, that a considerable part of the effect of common shell must have disappeared; hence we think that this terribly small percentage of hits may be accounted for, however unsatisfactory it appears. Certainly the conclusion arrived at by the Americans themselves is, not that accuracy is out of the question, but, on the other hand, that it is to be attained by all means, for the annual practice is to be greatly increased, that is, from six practices to fourteen per annum, at ranges, so we are told by Mr. Wilson in the Daily Mail, of from 800 to 3000 yards.
Now to come to the invidious, but perhaps valuable, comparison that has been raised between our own shooting and that of the American Navy. It must be understood that the comparative number of hits made by vessels in annual practice is very deceptive. In the case of our own fleet, we believe that it will be found that ships on the Pacific station year after year obtain better results than those elsewhere, because the conditions under which they fire happen to be more favorable. The American heavy guns fire at a target 56 ft. long, and 16¾ ft. high, which is enormously larger than our target. Without, however, disparaging our own gunners, who probably do very well according to the opportunities afforded them, we cannot fail to conclude that we must be at a great disadvantage if we practice much less than the American Navy, which it appears is the case. Latterly, happily, attention has been awakened to this question. Our admirals are doing what they can to encourage good shooting at their various naval stations, and the Admiralty are increasing the amount to be spent on annual practice. Let us hope that this is only the beginning of better things. At Crete the British ship engaged fired with such success as to present a striking contrast to her foreign consorts; nothing, however, can be built on the results of two or three rounds. It is well to be glad that we appeared to advantage, while, at the same time, taking means that as little as possible shall be left to chance in any future war. Money can hardly be better spent on any purpose connected with war which would yield such fruit as that laid out in perfecting our shooting.—The Engineer.
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE BRITISH BATTLESHIP.
If experience at sea under all kinds of weather is to prove a valuable factor in the next great naval war, then the British Navy, writes E. H. Mullen in the course of an article on “The Problem of Battleship Design: A Defense of Sir William H. White, Director of Naval Construction of the British Navy,” appearing in the current issue of Cassier’s Magazine, has the advantage of every other navy in the world. The mere ordinary reliefs of 200 war vessels of all kinds at present in commission, and spread over every quarter of the globe, mean in the aggregate an enormous amount of cruising through calms and storms, or steaming from cold climates to hot and vice versa. Out of this experience has come the prevalent British practice of having all warships good sea boats; and from this there has followed, at first perhaps unconsciously, but now as a carefully studied art, the designing of war vessels to be good gun platforms in fair weather or foul.
An observer who saw the British and French fleets meet in mid-channel in 1895, as escorts to the Tzar of Russia, who was then visiting the principal countries in Europe, says that the British ships were as steady in the choppy sea as if they had been riding in a land-locked harbor, while the French ships danced about so much that many of the officers and men were palpably seasick. Now men who are seasick are almost as much hors de combat as if they were severely wounded.
On the other hand, a warship may be a good sea vessel, and yet, owing to the low elevation of her guns, may not be able to use them in a storm. Lieutenant E. W. Eberle, U. S. N., has said that the United States battleship Oregon, which proved herself to be an excellent sea boat, could not have fought any of her 13-inch guns during a gale, or for hours afterward, and could have fought her 8-inch guns only at intervals in rough seas. This argument in favor of the high freeboard in the Majestic and Canopus classes is apparently irresistible.
In practice shooting, made to resemble service conditions as nearly as possible, the British Navy attains an average of 30 per cent, of effective hits, but no one expects this average to be maintained during the excitement of an action. If the Olympia had maintained this average at Manila she would have made ninety-six effective hits, or enough to have destroyed the whole Spanish fleet single-handed. It is, therefore, in the opinion of Sir William White and his fighting chiefs at the Admiralty, not so much a matter of the number of guns as the excellence of the shooting with those that are provided. Moreover, with 6-inch quick-firing guns, using 750 pounds of shot and cordite every minute, it becomes a matter of practical difficulty to keep more than a certain number of guns supplied.
It is to Sir William White’s credit that amidst all the mechanical complexities of the modern warship, he never lost sight of the fact that without men a warship was merely a costly lump of steel. Quick-fire guns, light and heavy, well dispersed and each with a wide angle of fire; ample protection for gunners and stokers alike, plenty of ammunition, coal and supplies; a good gun platform in rough as well as fine weather—these were the qualities realized by him in the Majestic, and these have made her a favorite type for imitation by naval architects of other nations.— United Service Gazette.
COLOR-WEAKNESS AND COLOR-BLINDNESS.
It is generally accepted as a well-established fact that the traveling public is fully protected by the present tests for color-blindness to which railway employees and pilots are subjected. Yet several of the mysterious accidents that have occurred during the last two years might be explained ' on the supposition of color-blindness on the part of responsible lookouts. In fact, I believe myself in position to prove that persons of dangerously defective color-vision actually do pass the regular tests and obtain positions where their defects are continual dangers to public welfare.
In the first place, I have at the present time among my students one who is absolutely perfect at the wool-test. He can match wools with incredible precision at any distance away; he is, nevertheless, color-blind. This case is typical of a class of persons with eyes abnormally acute for differences in color, but yet with only two fundamental sensations instead of three.
In the second place, I have had among my students those who possessed perfect color-vision for near objects or bright objects, but who were practically color-blind for weakly illuminated or distant objects. These persons possess the typical three fundamental color sensations, but have one of them weaker than the normal. A person of this kind may pass the wool-test with the utmost perfection if the test is performed close by, but will fail if the wools are removed to a distance of 20 or 30 feet. This peculiar defect I take the liberty of terming “color-weakness.” The first 29 student of this kind that I examined passed the wool-test close at hand and yet was unable to distinguish red and green lanterns a few hundred yards away. Cases similar to this have been reported by the British Marine Examiner, Edridge-Green. Among other cases he quotes a letter from an engineer containing the following statement: “I have been on the railway for thirty years and I can tell you the card-tests and wool-tests are not a bit of good. Why, sir, I had a mate that passed them all, but we had to pitch into another train over it. He couldn’t tell a red from a green light at night in a bit of a fog.”
To eliminate both these classes of persons we must have a method of testing on quite different principles from the usual ones.
In the first place, the sorting of delicate shades of colors, according to likeness, must be replaced by flaming certain fundamental and familiar colors. The sorting of wools is a quite unusual and perplexing task to a man brought up in a railway yard and on shipboard. It puts a nervous man at quite a disadvantage; it furnishes the unsuccessful candidate with the excuse that the judgment required was so unlike any he had made before that he failed from nervousness; and, finally, it is not a guarantee that all who pass are not color-blind. The naming of colors should —as Donders proposed—be rigidly required. The engineer or the pilot in his daily routine is not called upon to match colors, but to decide whether a light is red, green or white; he should be tested on just this point. The color-blind student referred to above who can pass the wool-test to perfection fails at once when called upon to name the wools. The naming of delicate and perhaps unusual shades should, however, not be required; the colors to be named should be the three familiar ones: red, green and white, so manipulated that every possible chance for confusion is presented.
The second necessity for eliminating danger is that of an absolutely certain test which shall detect both the color-blind and the color-weak. Acting on the basis of suggestions from the work of Donders and of Edridge-Green, I have devised a test that meets this requirement as well as the first one.
The instrument* which I have invented may be termed the “color-sight tester” or the “color-sense tester.” In general appearance it resembles an ophthalmoscope. On the side toward the person tested, there are three windows of glass, numbered I, 2 and 3, respectively. The opposite side of the tester consists of a movable disk carrying twelve glasses of different colors. As this disk is turned by the finger of the operator the various colors appear behind the three windows. At each movement of the disk the subject calls off the colors seen at the windows. The windows, 1, 2 and 3, are, however, fitted with gray glasses. No. 1 carries a very dark smoked glass; all colors seen through it will be dark. No. 2 carries a piece of ground glass, showing all colors in full brightness. No. 3 carries a light smoked glass. There are thus thirty-six possible combinations of the colors. The twelve glasses are, however, mainly reds, greens and grays.
A suitable arrangement of the colors gives direct simultaneous comparisons of reds, greens and grays of different shades. The well-known confusion by color-blind persons of dark greens with reds, greens with gray, etc., are exactly imitated, and the instrument gives a decisive test for color-blindness. Its peculiar advantage, however, lies in the fact that it presents reds, greens and grays simultaneously in a large number of different shades of intensity. The light of a green lantern, at different distances or in a fog, is simulated by the green behind the different grays; at the same time a white light is also changed. The colpr-weak person to whom weak green is the same as gray (white at a distance) is utterly confused and thinks that the weakened green is gray (white) and the dark gray is green.
The actual test is performed in the following manner: The tester is held toward a window, at about 2½ feet from the person tested. The operator begins with any chance position of the glasses, and asks the person tested to tell the colors seen through the three glasses, Nos. 1, 2 and 3. He answers, for example: “No. 1 is dark red; No. 2 is gray; No. 3 is green.” The operator records from the back of the tester the letters indicating what glasses were actually used. If he finds that A, D and G were opposite the glasses Nos. 1, 2 and 3 he records: A 1, dark red; D 2, gray; G 3, green. The disk is then turned to some other position; the colors are again named, and the operator records the names used. For example, the result might be: “No. 1 is dark green; No. 2 is white; No. 3 is red”; and the record would read: G 1, dark green; J 2, white; A 3, red. Still another record might give: J 1, dark gray; A 2, red; D 3, medium gray. Similar records are made for all combinations. Of course, the person tested knows nothing concerning the records made. A comparison with a list of the true colors for each position determines whether the test has been passed or not.
The three records just cited were all obtained from the red glass, A; the gray glass, D; the green glass, G; and the ground glass, J, in combination with the dark gray, No. 1; the ground glass, No. 2, and the medium gray, No. 3. Those familiar with color-blindness will notice that these combinations place side by side the colors most confused.
The records can be taken by any one, and, on the supposition that the record has been honestly obtained and that the instrument has not been tampered with after leaving the central office, the comparison is mechanical. There is none of the skillful manipulation required in the wool-test and none of the uncertainty attaching to its results. The only instruction given to the subject is: “Name the colors”; the results render the decision with mechanical certainty.
One of the testers is in use on one of the English railways, another on the central division of the New York Central Railroad. From the former I have not yet heard, but the examiner on the latter reports that since using the tester he has found men who get through the wool-test, but are caught by the tester. On the other hand, he states that “the men examined say that this test is more like the signals they are used to seeing every day on the road, and is, therefore, fairer than to ask them to pick out a lot of delicately tinted pieces of yarn.”
An experience of several years seems to justify the following claims for the color-sense tester:
- It detects with unerring precision both the color-blind and the color-weak.
- It is a perfectly fair test for the men concerned and injures no man by requiring an unfamiliar judgment.
- It requires but a very small fraction of the time used on the wool-test.
- Its decisions are self-evident and unquestionable.—E. W. Scripture in Science.
THE IMPROVED TURRETS OF THE BATTLESHIP TEXAS.
By Robert W. Henderson, United States Navy, U. S. S. Texas.
The great naval battle of July 3, off Santiago, which ended in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera’s fleet, has shown in the most realistic manner possible that too great a value cannot be placed upon rapidity of fire and rapid-firing guns on board a man-of-war. The battleship Texas took a very important part in this battle, and the efficiency of her large guns is due chiefly to the improvements on her turrets, instigated by Lieut. F. J. Haeseler.
The Texas is a first-rate battleship of the second class, having a displacement of 6315 tons. She is 309 feet over all, has twin screws, triple expansion engines, and on her trial trip she had an indicated horse-power of 8610, giving a speed of 17.8 knots. Her main battery consists of two 12-inch breech-loading rifles mounted in turrets and six 6-inch B. L. R.’s which are slow fire. The turrets of the Texas and those of the Maine are on the same general plan, the port one on the Texas being forward, the starboard one on the Maine, the turrets being situated in echelon. The Texas turrets and barbettes are of 12-inch face-hardened steel armor, while the ammunition hoists and tubes are protected by 8-inch armor. The turrets, ammunition hoists, and rammers are all worked by hydraulic power, the engines being of the three cylinder Brotherhood type. The power is furnished by four powerful hydraulic pumps, all the machinery being inside the armored redoubt.
When the Texas went into commission, it was impossible to load these 12-inch guns except in two positions, pointed directly ahead or directly abeam, the rammers for these two positions being outside the turrets. When firing in intermediate positions, it was necessary to train the gun off the target to load, picking the target up again after loading. This consumed much time, the interval between two shots from the same gun being at that time about seven minutes.
Lieut. Haeseler advanced the idea of carrying a light but strong telescopic rammer inside, which was to revolve with the turret, thus enabling the gun’s crew to load from any position. To accomplish this it was necessary, besides securing a strong rammer that could be easily handled, to change the lead of many of the hydraulic pipes, secure a “change” or “balance pressure” valve, and to devise a means of loading inside the turret. A “balance pressure” valve that could be used as a supply, exhaust, and reversing valve was obtained by a slight modification of a “Sellers” valve, and the hydraulic plant was changed accordingly. Immediately behind the breech of the gun, when level, a strong but light telescopic rammer was balanced on trunnions, which permitted its being raised or lowered into working position by one man.
The next problem was to devise a means of transporting the 12-inch shell, which weighs 850 pounds, from the ammunition hoist outside the turret to the breech of gun, as formerly they were hoisted into a loading position forward of the stationary rammers. A circular track carrying a small traveling car was placed entirely around the turret inside the redoubt and a grooved table was put just inside the turret opening. When a shell was sent up from the ammunition room below, it was whipped by a chain strap and differential pulley into the traveling car, run around to the turret opening by one man, and shoved into the stationary table.
Inside the turret another ammunition lift was placed, running by hydraulic power, and fixed so that in its upper position the shell table on it was level with the bore of the gun in its loading position. One man pushes the shell into the shell table; the powder, which is in four sections, is placed in stands beside the shell; the car is hoisted; the shell and powder are run home by the rammer, and the car lowered for another charge. A small loading platform, working on hinges and secured by a hook, was placed under the breech of the gun, to allow a man to wipe out the powder chamber after the gun has been fired. An interesting experiment was tried in regard to sighting the turret guns, which would have been very useful in case of accident to the regular sights. The gun is sighted by means of telescopic sights placed in hoods on each side of the breech, the officer in charge being in this hood and sighting gun. Ordinarily, in case this hood were to be demolished by a shot, the gunners would be unable to obtain anything like an accurate aim.
Through an aperture in the turret, near the gun, a small tube was placed which was laid exactly parallel with the bore of the gun. Cross wires were fitted in the ends of this tube for sighting. Near the elevating slide, at the side of the gun, an arc was fixed firmly, graduated in yards, and a pointer attached to the slide pointed out the yards on this arc, the accuracy of the arc having been tested by the regular sights. To aim the gun by this improvised sight, the gun was trained on the target by means of the fixed tube, and the gun was elevated or lowered until the pointer on the slide showed on the arc the number of yards indicated on the range finder. The test shots with these sights gave very accurate results.
This constituted the repairs that were made on the guns in the New York navy yard, and after preliminary drills the Texas went out beyond Cape Henry, at Old Point, to test the work. The result was even more than expected. A mean between the intervals of five shots was one minute and fifty-five seconds, a vast improvement on the old record, while one interval was as low as eighty-five seconds. The Texas returned to Old Point ready for whatever was to come, and her record during the late trouble showed how completely she can be relied upon.
Formerly, for these 12-inch guns, there were but two kinds of shells, common and armor-piercing, as shrapnel are not used in the larger guns. Common shells are rather long, weigh 850 pounds, and carry a bursting charge of about 60 pounds of powder. Armor-piercing shells are the same weight, but are somewhat shorter, carrying no explosive charge. They are made of the hardest steel, with toughened point, intended, as the name indicates, to penetrate armor. The new armor-piercing shells have soft steel caps on the points, supposed to give them a greater penetrating effect. A new shell that has lately come into use, and which did good service during the late war, is known as a “semi” shell. It is a combination of the other two, of the same weight, has a hard steel head designed to penetrate light armor, and carries in addition a bursting charge of about 50 pounds. This shell is especially designed for use against armored cruisers or vessels of light protection, and is very effective. The igniting fuse for this shell is a base fuse, instead of the old nose fuse used in common shells. Common shells are intended to be used against forts, earthworks, and unprotected vessels, and were used almost entirely against the batteries before Santiago.
It could always be told when a shot struck, as a great cloud of dirt, smoke, and debris would rise in the air as a shot exploded. Several times, most notably during the engagement of the Texas and La Socopa battery, the guns of the Spaniards were completely buried by the earth thrown up by these shells, but the Spanish soldiers had discreetly retired to a pit on the opposite side of the hill, smoking in calm safety, to return, when the ships had retired, with mules and workmen, hauling out and remounting their guns.
While armor-piercing shells are meant to be used against protected vessels, the “semi” shells, carrying an explosive charge, were used principally during the battle, July 3. Of these shots there is a record of but two, both of which struck the Infanta Maria Teresa on the port quarter, entering just under the berth deck. A remarkable feature was that the holes made by these two shells were so close together that they lapped each other, giving a convincing proof that “lightning” does strike twice in the same place. These shots entered and exploded in the after torpedo handling room, and the effect, as seen by the writer, was something awful. Stanchions were cut to ribbons, frames wrenched from the side plating, and the deck beams were severely twisted. Everything in this part of the ship was wrecked, and a large jagged hole, about 4 feet square, was made in the starboard side. The effect of some of the 8-inch shots was nearly as great. The one exploding in the forward turret of the Oquendo alone wiped out the entire gun’s crew, and put the gun out of commission.
That the large guns of the Texas did most efficient work is shown by the attitude of the Spanish officers, who not only feared the marksmanship of the Texas, but were surprised to hear that she was not one of our best and most formidable ships. A bright tompion in the muzzle of the starboard 12-inch gun shows by the following inscription the service it has seen: “Santiago de Cuba,” “Guantanamo,” “Maria Teresa,” “Viz caya,” “Oquendo,” “Cristobal Colon,” “Pluton” and “Furor,” “Reina Mercedes,” “La Socopa.”
The crew of the Texas showed their appreciation of his services by presenting Mr. Haeseler with a beautiful gold watch with the following inscription: “Presented to Lieut. F. J. Haeseler by the crew of the Texas, in appreciation of his services in creating the ‘Old Hoodoo’ into the ‘New Hero.’”
Considering the severe tests to which she has been subjected, it is safe to say that when her slow-fire 6-inch guns have been replaced by rapid-fire guns of the same caliber, there will be no more efficient vessel of her size in our entire navy than the battleship Texas.
The shells are brought to the ammunition hoist in a sling, suspended from an overhead track. The cage has two platforms, the upper of which carries the powder, done up in sections, and the lower the shells. The cage is hoisted by hydraulic power, and the ammunition is transferred from it as already described. On the same deck with the magazines are the engines and boilers, and above them is a steel deck, 2 inches in thickness, which protects this portion of the vessel, known as the “vitals,” from shell fire. Along the sides, at the water-line, is a belt armor of 12-inch steel, and between the belt and the boiler rooms are the coal bunkers, which add their protection to that of the belt. A shell striking above the belt would have to pass through several feet of coal to reach the interior of the ship; if it struck on the belt, it would have to penetrate 12 inches of Harveyized steel and several inches of wood backing and many feet of coal before it could endanger boilers, engines, or magazines. The water itself effectually prevents the entrance of shell below the waterline.—Scientific American.
A PROCESS OF FIREPROOFING WOOD FOR THE WOODWORK OF WARSHIPS.*
By C. J. Hexamer.
A process for fireproofing the wood of war vessels must possess the following qualifications: (i) The material deposited in the fiber of the wood must render it thoroughly incombustible; (2) moisture or water, whether fresh or salt, must not affect the materials in the wood, in other words, they must be insoluble; (3) the impregnating matter must adhere permanently to the fiber so that it cannot be shaken out by any amount of wear or jarring; (4) glycerin or like hygroscopic substances, used in conjunction with other chemicals to render theater scenery incombustible, must not be used, as they would tend to rot the wood; (5) the entire mass, not the surface only, must be equally well protected by the fire-resisting substance, because in battle the woodwork is broken and shattered, and external applications permeating the wood but a short distance, though valuable in ordinary buildings, would be useless for the former purpose.
Water is not only our cheapest solvent, but also the one universally obtainable, and therefore best suited to be used on a large scale. For this reason I concluded to employ a substance soluble in water in the primary saturating liquid, which, in turn, was to be rendered insoluble by precipitation in the fibers by an aqueous solution of another substance, forming with it an insoluble compound. Such a process, with ideal substances, would possess the additional advantage that the insoluble compound would be precipitated, as infinitesimal particles, into the very fibers of the wood, causing it to remain there permanently. No amount of jarring or vibration could shake it out, for, like a soluble dye-stuff made fast or insoluble by a mordant in textile fabrics, it would last as long as the fibers in which it is imbedded.
Injection into the fibers of the entire mass, and the precipitation there of an insoluble fire-resisting compound is, therefore, the desideratum. The question naturally arises, how can a solution be forced into the innermost recesses of the fibers of thick masses of wood? I knew that the most reliable experimental work regarding the saturation of wood with solutions had been done in connection with various attempts to preserve it against rotting and the teredo or ship worm. Before, therefore, beginning to experiment blindly, I carefully studied what had been done in this direction; examining technical books and journals, Wagner’s “Jahrbuecher,” the reports of committees, boards of inquiry, state commissions, patent reports and processes in actual use.
As a result of my studies and experiments, I came to the conclusion that the best method for impregnating the entire mass of the wood was to subject it to the following process: In the first place, use only well-seasoned timber, thoroughly air and kiln-dried, and worked approximately into the dimensions needed, or, better still, impregnate, whenever possible, the finished articles. Then place the wood in a strong metal chamber, specially made for the purpose, capable of withstanding strong pressures, and supplied with a lid that closes it hermetically. The receptacle is surrounded by a steam jacket, so that the temperature in it can be regulated at will. The interior of the chamber must be thoroughly dry before the wood is placed there. Let me caution you against steaming lumber before saturating it, a custom still prevalent in many creosoting works. The laborious tests of Drude have conclusively proved that steaming wood before impregnating it with solutions tends to lessen its absorptive powers, and that, therefore, it should be as dry as possible. The temperature in the receptacle is slowly increased above the boiling point of water, which is maintained until all the moisture in the wood has been expelled and the mass is equally heated throughout. The chamber is then hermetically sealed and the temperature in it is reduced to 60° C., and held there. The air in the receptacle is now extracted as quickly as possible by means of an air pump. The more complete the vacuum the better will be the ultimate results. Few persons have any idea of the amount of air contained in porous substances like wood. After the air in the wood has been removed a solution of water-glass in about three times its volume of water, previously heated to 60° C., is sprayed into the vacuum. This method of injection is used to remove the air in the solution. The solution must not be too dilute, but at the same time not so thick as to refuse to enter the finest tissues of the wood; in other words, it must be of such a consistency that after impregnation it is completely retained in the pores. It is almost needless to add that the final results depend on the completeness with which the moisture, sap and air have been removed from the wood before impregnation.
I will not weary you by recounting the lengthy list of materials employed as a primary impregnating fluid, only to return at last to the one with which I had started—soluble glass, one of the best known of fireproofing materials, which possesses the additional advantage that it is cheap.
I might state here that for ordinary purposes a block of wood can be made fire-resisting by repeatedly soaking it in a water-glass solution, and, when dry, coating it with a mixture of the liquid and cement.
To return to the process, when the wood has become saturated with the solution at normal conditions, hydrostatic pressure of about ten atmospheres is applied, which is kept up for three hours; this drives the liquid through the mass. Numerous experiments made in Germany for the conservation of wood (see Mittheilungen des technologischen Gewerbemu-seums, Abtheilung, Holz) have conclusively demonstrated that the “hydrostatic-pressure method” is the only one to be relied upon for forcing solutions to the innermost parts of a log.
The question now becomes what to use to precipitate insoluble silica from the solution of soluble glass, thereby forming an insoluble compound in the fibers? A dilute solution of hydrochloric acid was tried at first, but this affected the wood, and would in practice attack metal receptacles. Gaseous and liquefied carbonic acid were experimented with, also calcium chloride, until finally a solution of ammonium chloride, a very cheap substance, was used with excellent results. This produces in the very fibers of the wood a gelatinous precipitate of silica, most suitable for our purpose; salt, which is readily removed from parts near the surface by soaking in water, tending to preserve the wood in the interior; and ammonia gas, which goes off per se.
To apply this secondary liquid the water-glass solution is drawn from the receptacle, and the before-described process is repeated with the ammonium chloride solution. In practice it may be found advantageous to use a second receptacle, removing the wood from one to the other. The pressure should be applied gradually in the second treatment, so as not to force out the first solution. After the precipitation has been completed the wood is thrown into a stream of running water to dissolve and wash out the salt near the surface, and is then slowly dried.
It may be of interest to add that, as a secondary result of my experiments—by using stronger solutions than are necessary for fireproofing purposes—I had some beautiful specimens of petrifaction, and Dr. Keller so completely turned a piece of filter paper into stone, that it seemed to be a delicate film of some pure white silicious mineral, and no one could possibly have surmised what the substance originally was. It is, therefore, possible that this process can be utilized in the arts in the future to petrify organic substances.
It will probably be urged that my process is expensive; but in a case like this expense is not a factor. We cannot afford to take the risk of not having everything possible about a man-of-war—or for that matter of any ship—fireproof, when upon that fact may depend a victory or a defeat of our navy. Nor is the expense as great as it at first appears; for the Government should attend to this work itself, and not leave it to contractors. In point of fact, I believe it will be found that the only considerable outlay necessary would be the first cost of the large air-tight receptacles. There are, no doubt, plenty of pumps on hand that could be utilized, the amount of labor required is trifling, the chemicals used are of the cheapest, and the plant can be located in a place where running water costs nothing. I therefore fail to see any possible reason why lives on ship should be endangered by fire in the future.
I beg leave to state, in conclusion, as my humble opinion, that everything on board of a ship can be made fireproof. Some things, of course, must be excluded by necessity, such as food, fuel and ammunition.—Engineering News.
THE GATHMANN SHELL TESTED.
The first of the two experiments with the new Gathmann shell took place at Sandy Hook on May 9, in the presence of ordnance officers of the army and navy. The Gathmann shell employs for its bursting charge guncotton in the place of powder, which had not always been satisfactory. Sometimes there is not sufficient gas generated by powder to burst the projectile, and this is particularly true in armor-piercing shells. The great danger from the use of guncotton in shells is premature explosion. The inventor, Mr. Gathmann, believes that his projectile will not explode inside the gun and that it will not explode prematurely on loading it, and that the wet guncotton will only explode by detonation. The chief recommendation of the shell was that it could stand the use of smokeless powder as a propellant. In the experiment an old 15-inch Rodman gun was taken to the beach and a very heavy charge of smokeless powder was placed in it; then a 15-inch Gathmann shell containing 82 pounds of wet guncotton was put in place. The gun was then taken to a hole twenty feet deep which had been dug in the beach and was lowered to the bottom, lying horizontally. An electrical fuse was attached and the bore of the gun filled up with sand and stone to increase the strain of the explosion on the shell. The officers and interested parties got out of danger and the gun was fired. It was shattered with the force of the explosion, which blew out a cavity in the beach 30 feet deep and 25 feet in diameter.
The work of digging for the shell was very severe, owing to the peculiar nature of the sand. The remnants which were found are satisfactory to Mr. Gathmann and his associates. The guncotton had been driven into the sand with such force that it was almost pulverized and, as it was recovered, seemed to consist of about as much sand as guncotton. The breech end of the gun had been shattered and was found in small pieces for a space of 16 feet. The base part of the bronze shell was also found much broken in the breech end of the gun. It was bright on the inside, and this, when added to the evidence of the unexploded guncotton found in the sand, showed that although the shell itself had-been broken by the explosion, and although the detonator undoubtedly exploded, the Gathmann arrangement for protecting the charge of the shell had worked perfectly. The muzzle end of the gun for 5 feet was broken into five pieces longitudinally. A portion of the forward end of the shell was found about feet from where the muzzle of the gun had been. The official report on the experiment will be looked for with interest.—Scientific American.
THE BEST FORM OF WATER-TUBE BOILERS.
Passed Assistant Engineer J. K. Robison, United States Navy, in the course of an article in Cassier’s Magazine, for May, on “The Best Water-Tube Boiler for the Navy: A War Lesson,” observes that the arguments for and against water-tube boilers have been gone over again and again until they are threadbare; but the fact that we must have boilers that are capable of being divided into small units and that are capable of quickly generating steam from a cold boiler, must settle the question. Whatever the faults and virtues of this general type of boiler, it must be used to satisfy the manifest requirements of the service. We find that water-tube boilers must be used on men-of-war, but we also find a great deal concerning the type of water-tube boiler that must be used. An increase in the space on board ship devoted to machinery, above the large amount already so allotted, must be avoided. Inasmuch as the grate surface of the new boilers must be greater for the same power developed at the engines, than that in the type of boilers now used, there would naturally be an increase in the boiler-room space required. This must be avoided; and this can be done only by increasing the ratio of grate surface to floor space occupied above that in cylindrical boilers. This ratio must be a large one, and the larger the better.
Considering the crew a ship is sure to have in time of war, and the fact that frequently the water tenders will be new to the ship, and, possibly, even to the type of boiler used, the boilers must not be complex. The number of attachments must be as small as possible to minimize the work of these busy men. No great efficiency in firing must be required to attain a good efficiency of the boiler. This follows from the fact that the firemen in the navy in time of war are not equal to doing any particularly good firing. The fact that no great efficiency in firing must be expected or required, means that the complete combustion of the fuel must not be attempted in one chamber above the fire. There are sure to be holes in this fire. It will not be the same thickness in one place as in another, and the coal will not lie evenly over the grate. At some point, then, beyond which an opportunity for the economical extraction of the heat from the furnace gases is afforded, the gases of combustion must be thoroughly mixed and a combustion chamber furnished. The care of the boiler while steaming must not be attended with any great difficulty. The water level must be steady. This requires a large area of cross section of the boiler at the water level, and in general requires a large amount of contained water in the boiler. This amount of water must not, however, be so great as to interfere with the ability of the boiler to furnish steam quickly from a cold condition. The parts of the boiler must be afforded a free expansion to make the quick raising of heavy fires under a cold boiler possible without any danger of causing leaks. For the same reason, a good, free circulation of the water in the boiler must be assured. As it is not possible to entirely keep salt water out of the boilers, they must be capable of use with salt water, and the interior must be accessible for cleaning. It must be possible to remove salt and other scale from the water side of the heating surfaces. The tubes must, therefore, be straight tubes and not of very small diameter.
The above conclusions are direct deductions from actual war experience. They must be satisfied to satisfy real war conditions.—United Service Gazette.
LIQUID FUEL.
At a recent meeting of the British Society of Arts Sir Marcus Samuel, who has been engaged for several years in developing the oil fields of Borneo, read a paper on “Liquid Fuel,” which contained several points of interest, particularly concerning the use of oil as fuel in steamships. In speaking of the development of the Borneo fields, he stated that the first steamer employed in the business of transporting oil in bulk through the Suez Canal was a vessel of 4000 tons burden of oil, while the largest of those employed now carried 6500 tons; three steamers are in course of construction to carry 9000 tons of oil each, or 3,000,000 gallons. There was an enormous future before this fuel, even if it only depended upon its relative cost compared with coal; but when they came to the collateral advantages it enjoyed, the benefits of using it, as compared with coal, were simply overwhelming. As showing the immunity from danger, he said that, the business having been conducted for now over seven years, not a single accident of any kind had happened, either to a ship while engaged in carrying oil, or to an installation. Dealing with the relative efficiency of oil and coal, the speaker instanced the performance of the boiler of a launch used in Hong Kong. In this repeated and carefully checked tests had shown that, while the consumption of coal was 7 pounds per minute, the consumption of oil was only 2 pounds per minute. The pressure of steam realized by 7 pounds of coal was from 96 pounds to 105 pounds, while that raised by 2 pounds of oil was sustained at 116 to 120 pounds. The speed realized in the launch under coal had never exceeded 9 knots, while under oil a speed of 10¼ knots was readily maintained. The author then dealt with the application of oil fuel to locomotives, and, in conclusion, said oil could be carried in spaces which it was impossible to utilize in any other way.
Oil carried in the bottom of a steamer, below the water-line, would be impervious to shot, and by the system of service tanks, patented by Sir Fortescue Flannery, as oil was pumped out of the ballast tanks of a steamer water could readily be taken in to replace it. The importance of the new departure had been promptly recognized by Lloyds, who had issued regulations allowing liquid fuel having a flash point of over 200 degrees F. to be carried in steamers’ ballast tanks, and this would greatly facilitate its general use. The speaker said that the experimental stage in the burning of liquid fuel had long since been passed. No less than 7,000,000 tons per annum were consumed in Russia for liquid fuel alone. There are no fewer than eight steamers at present engaged in the Eastern trade which were fitted for it, and the results' attained had answered the expectations of their owners beyond their most sanguine anticipations, while large numbers of vessels were under construction expressly for the use of liquid fuel, and a great number of steamers hitherto burning coal were also being altered. In the Far East tanks had been erected at ports ranging from Yokohama to Suez, including all the Indian ports, while cargoes of the Borneo oil had also been landed at the principal ports, and 4000 tons was on passage to London.—The Iron Age.
SHIPS OF WAR.
[England.]
Amphitrite.
The first-class cruiser Amphitrite, built and engined by Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and Maxim, Limited, Barrow-in-Furness, completed last week her contract trials in the English Channel. The trials are interesting from several points of view, but notably from the fact that in this vessel experiments were made for utilizing the exhaust steam from the auxiliary engines for evaporative purposes instead of using steam direct from the boilers for this object. Hitherto the exhaust steam from the host of auxiliaries has gone into the auxiliary condenser, occasioning at least two other engines before the condensed water found its way into the feed tank. This has never been a very satisfactory system of dealing with the exhaust steam, for, apart from its cost and extra weight, there was always a greater danger of leaky tubes in this condenser than in that of the main, owing to the intermittent work of the engines exhausting into it; thus salt water was always to be guarded against as coming from that quarter more than from any other. It is gratifying to find that the engineer-inchief on the one hand and the Admiralty contractors on the other are ready and anxious to conduct steam trials and experiments with a view of arriving at the most economical method of working marine engines and boilers. It was conclusively proved by water test on the Argonaut that the consumption of the auxiliary machinery was as high as 22 per cent, of the total consumption of the main engines working at one-fifth power—about the normal power of most warships—and 10.4 per cent, at three-fourths power; it can be easily understood what a margin is left in this direction for economizing fuel. It was this difficulty of distinguishing between expenditure for propelling purposes and that of auxiliary work which has given that suspicion of empiricism to all Admiralty steam trials; but now that the correct data has been arrived at in the Argonaut, this charge can no longer be levelled at those responsible for these official trials.
It seems unfortunate that, owing to the hastily improvised fittings adopted in the Amphitrite for the utilization of the auxiliary engines’ exhaust steam, after a two hours’ trial the officers attending on behalf of the Admiralty consented to the abandonment of the test, but this decision was only given because they knew that similar trials on the Vindictive would be of a much more exhaustive nature; but still, so far as the new departure went, it was very satisfactory indeed. A few minor modifications will have to be made in some of the fittings, and after these are carried out, we can safely state that one of the difficulties militating against a comparatively light expenditure of coal will have been removed. The contractors are to be congratulated on the brilliant success of the trials as a whole, for not only did the engines work beautifully and without a hitch, but the economy registered, so far as coal consumption is concerned, is the lowest yet recorded where Belleville boilers, or, in fact, any other type of water-tube boiler, have been tried. The consumption averaged for the eight hours’ full-power trial was 1.57 lb. of coal per I. H. P. per hour, and 1.43 lb. of coal per I. H. P. per hour for the three-fourths’ power trial. This is very satisfactory, and no doubt a great deal of the success was due to the very systematic firing carried out in the boilers. Arrangements were made whereby a furnace door was not opened at more frequent intervals than six and a half minutes, and then only a minimum of coal with a maximum of distribution over the grate was indulged in. In “clinkering,” too, great care was exercised to see that only portions of the fires were done at one time, so that there was not any undue cooling of the fires, and hence imperfect combustion going on. There has been a good deal to be desired in this direction in previous trials of other ships, but now that the Amphitrite has set the standard in this important detail of economy it is hoped that bad stoking will be a thing of the past.
No trouble whatever was experienced with the boilers. After the thirty hours’ run at 13.500 indicated horse-power, it was found that one feed collector which-extends across the front of the boiler at the bottom of the element of tubes was damaged. There being a spare feed collector on board, it was substituted for the damaged one, and this partly while the vessel was doing her gun and circle trials. We mention this merely to point out with what ease and facility the various parts of these boilers can be taken out and others substituted without the vessel being rendered powerless while the repair is going on. This in itself is one of the leading features of the Belleville boiler.
Another innovation was carried out in the working of the Amphitrite’s engines, and that was, no steam jacketing whatever was used round her cylinders and slides. We are not aware whether she is so fitted, but evidently as a result of the experiments carried out in the Argonaut, Sir John Durston has arrived at the conclusion that the jacketing of cylinders is of little or no value when high boiler pressures are carried. In a recent paper read before the Institute of Naval Architects, on “Trials and Experiments in H. M. S. Argonaut,” he said: “And it appears that with the comparatively low revolutions and high expansions used at 3600 indicated horse-power, the influence of the jacketing on the efficiency of the steam practically balances the expenditure of heat in the jackets. . . . At the higher power the tests appear to show that no gain in economy is obtained by steam jacketing as carried out in this vessel.” Should the precedent set in the Amphitrite be universally adopted in the cylinder arrangement of engines destined to work at high pressures, another wasteful method of using feed water, to say nothing of the multiplicity of fittings, will be abolished.
We shall be pleased to return to this subject again when the results of the Vindictive’s trials are to hand, as it is one of paramount interest to all those connected with our steam navy.—United Service Gazette.
H.M. Torpedo Destroyer Mermaid.
Recently H.M. torpedo-boat destroyer Mermaid, which has been built and engined by Messrs. R. and W. Hawthorn, Leslie, and Co., Limited, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, completed her full-power speed trial on the measured mile off the Maplin Sands with very satisfactory results, and proved herself to be the fastest vessel of the 30-knot destroyer class yet tried.
The Mermaid is 210 ft. long by 21 ft. beam, and had a displacement of 320 tons when carrying the specified load at the commencement of the trial. The machinery consists of twin-screw, three-crank, triple-expansion engines, having cylinders 19-in., 29-in., and 46-in. by 18-in. stroke. The cranks are set at 120 deg., and balance weights are fitted upon the high-pressure and low-pressure cranks to counteract the vibratory forces. Throughout the trials the vibration was very slight, and the whole of the machinery ran without the slightest hitch. Steam is supplied by four water-tube boilers of the Thornycroft type, having a total heating surface of about 13,200 square feet, and worked at a maximum pressure of 250 lbs. per square inch.
No. | Time. | Speed. | Revs. (mean). |
1 | 2 0 5 | 29.901 | 395.2 |
2 | 1 55 0 | 31.304 | 395.5 |
3 | 1 57 8 | 30.562 | 403.9 |
4 | 1 56 2 | 30.986 | 394.2 |
5 | 1 55 0 | 31.304 | 414.7 |
6 | 1 56 4 | 30.928 | 394.8 |
| Mean | 30.927 | 400.875 |
The general results of three hours' trial are as follows:
Draught of water, forward | 5 ft. 3 1/8 in. | ||
" " aft | 8 ft. 3 5/8 in. | ||
Speed of ship, knots per hour, | six runs | 30.926 | |
" " | three hours | 90.833 | |
Steam pressure in boilers | 225 lbs. per sq. in. | ||
Air pressure in stokeholds | 4.96 in. of water | ||
| Starboard. | Port. | |
Vacuum in condensers | 22.8 | 22.1 | |
Revolutions per minute | 397.8 | 395.4 | |
Mean pressure in cylinders, | high | 95.9 | 97.7 |
" " | inter | 51.3 | 50.8 |
" " | low | 17.8 | 18.0 |
Mean I. H. P., | high | 982 | 992 |
" | inter | 1220 | 1204 |
" | low | 1068 | 1075 |
| —— | —— | |
| Total | 3270 | 3271 |
| Grand total | 6541 |
It will be seen from the above that the high speed of 30.833 knots was obtained with a very moderate power.
The Mermaid has on all her trials been extremely successful. On her first trip to sea for the contractors’ preliminary trial she obtained a mean speed of 30 knots, a performance which, it is believed, has not previously been accomplished by any vessel. On the Admiralty observation trial, before leaving the Tyne, a speed of nearly 31 knots was obtained, and upon her official consumption trial, a speed of 30.149 knots was maintained for three consecutive hours in unfavorable weather. Her full speed trial is as above described. It will thus be seen that this vessel has not once gone to sea on trial without obtaining the contract speed and maintaining it for the necessary specified time.—The Engineer.
Glory.
On Saturday morning, March nth, Her Majesty’s first-class battleship Glory was floated from Messrs. Laird’s shipbuilding yard at Birkenhead.
The Glory is of the Canopus class, designed by Sir William H. White, K. C. B., Director of Naval Construction, and as this class of vessel is now well known, we will offer only a short description. Her dimensions are: Length, 390 ft.; breadth, 74 ft.; mean draught about 26 ft. 6 in.; displacement, 12,900 tons; freeboard, forward, 22 ft. 6 in.; aft, 19 ft.; indicated horse-power, 13,500; speed about 18½ knots; coal stowage about 2000 tons. The armor is of Harveyed steel, and there is a protective deck from the lower edge of the armor, covering the machinery, magazines, and other vital parts.
The ship is lighted throughout with an installation of about 750 electric lights, and equipped with six search-lights of 30,000 candle-power, each of which is capable of being worked by dynamos under protection. The officers and crew are accommodated on the main and belt decks. The upper deck extends from stem to stern without a break, and above it is a continuous bridge deck extending the whole length between the barbettes; on this deck are the conning towers surmounted by navigating bridges (which will be about 36 ft. above water), and the chart-house. The masts, two in number, are built of steel, fitted with military and signalling tops, and are already in place and complete with their derricks for hoisting boats, etc.
The armament of the Glory will consist of four 12-in. 46-ton guns, mounted in barbettes, in pairs, and firing a projectile weighing 850 lbs., with a powder charge of 148 lbs. There are 43 quick-firing guns in all, twelve 6-in. on the main and upper decks, mounted in casemates protected by 6-in. armor; twelve 12-pounders, six 3-pounder quick-firing, eight small machine guns, and five field guns. There are also four submerged torpedo tubes for 18-in. torpedoes.
The main propelling machinery, constructed at the Birkenhead Iron Works, consists of two sets of engines of the triple-expansion inverted type of the latest design. Each set is placed in a separate engine-room. The cylinders are: High-pressure, 30 in.; intermediate pressure, 49 in.; and low pressure, 80 in. in diameter respectively, with a stroke of 51 in. The boilers, 20 in number, are of the Belleville type (with economizers), working at a pressure of 300 lbs., and are placed in three watertight compartments.
The Glory illustrates the advantage of building these large battleships in dock in preference to building them on a slip and launching them, as she floated out with all her citadel and casemate armor, and most of the barbette armor in place; indeed, all the armor-plating would have been completed had it not been for the press of work in Sheffield rendering it impossible for armor-plate manufacturers to make delivery as early as required. A considerable portion of the boilers is on board. The whole of the auxiliary machinery is in place, and the pipes and connections are being fitted. The main engines are erected on board, with the exception of the cylinders, so that the vessel, as floated out from the building dock, is in a far more advanced state than would have been the case had she been launched in the ordinary way, her displacement on floating out being approximately 9000 tons. This feature is brought into prominence at the present time, as Her Majesty’s ship Implacable, of 14,900 tons displacement, for which the machinery of IS,000 horse-power is also being built by Messrs. Laird Brothers, was launched from Devonport, her weight being about 4500 tons. It is expected that the Glory will be ready to hoist her pennant within six months, but the Implacable is not expected to be ready for commission for about fifteen months. The Glory will have a complement of 750 men.—Engineering.
Implacable.
The battleship Implacable was safely launched at Devonport, the naming ceremony being performed by Lady Ernestine Edgcumbe. This vessel is sister ship to the Formidable and the Irresistible, and her leading dimensions are as follows: Length, 400 ft.; breadth, 75 ft.; mean draught, 26.9 ft. Her displacement is 15,000 tons, and her estimated speed is 18 knots. She is the largest vessel which has ever been built at Devonport, and she has been completed in a wonderfully short space of time. She was laid down on the same slip from which the Ocean had been launched, on July 15th of last year, and since that time 5300 tons have been built into her hull. It is true that there had been a certain amount of fitting together—which dealt with some 300 tons—on an adjacent slip, but the whole of the work so fitted was taken apart and erected on the slip from which she was eventually launched. The rate of progress has therefore averaged some 150 tons a week over the eight months. Her side armor, which is 9 in. thick and 15 ft. deep, extends for a length of 216 ft. The launch was attended with all success, a very small application of hydraulic power being apparently necessary.—The Engineer.
Spartiate.
In most respects, the Spartiate, which was built at Pembroke dockyard and launched in October, 1898, is a copy of the Diadem, the typical ship of the class, her principal dimensions being the same, viz.: Length between perpendiculars, 435 ft.; beam, 69 ft.; mean draught, 26 ft.; and displacement, 11,000 tons. She is built of steel on the bracket-framed system, is double bottomed, and is without side armor; but her vital parts are protected by an armored steel deck 4 in. thick, which runs throughout -her length, and is arched from 6 ft. below the water-line at the sides to 3 ft. above it on the middle line of the ship. In the way of the engines and boilers, this deck is carried upwards to the level of the engine’s cylinder covers to give protection to the machinery.
The stem of the Spartiate is ram-shaped, and is materially strengthened by the protective deck being carried right up to the ram end and firmly secured to it. The plating of her hull bottom up to above the load waterline is also sheathed with teak 4 in. thick, and covered with sheet copper; bilge keels, 3 ft. 6 in. deep, being also fitted on both her sides. She will be steered by a balanced rudder, actuated by steering engines in duplicate of Messrs. Bow and McLachlan and Co.’s make, the controlling gear being on Messrs. Brown’s telemotor principle; five of these gears being fitted for controlling the helm, from as many different stations in the ship. She will have four funnels; and two masts for signalling purposes, these having, however, no fighting tops.
The armament of the Spartiate will consist of sixteen 6-in. and fourteen 12-pounder quick-firing guns, and several smaller pieces, together with three torpedo tubes. Twelve of the 6-in. guns will be mounted in casemates on the broadsides, two will be carried on the forecastle, and two on the poop behind shields, while two of the torpedo tubes will be on the broadsides forward, submerged; and the third one right aft amidships, above the water-line.
The 18,000 indicated horse-power to be developed by the Spartiate’s engines, as compared with 16,500 by the Diadem’s, is not obtained by any increase in their size, or in the number of her boilers, but by giving the latter a much larger amount of heating surface, and, therefore, an increase of evaporative efficiency. The coal bunker capacity at the ship’s normal load draught is 1000 tons, but provision is made for carrying an extra 900 tons if required.—The Engineer.
[France.]
Suffren.
Figaro says: “The cruiser Suffren, of 12,504 tons, the construction of which was begun on January 5 last, will be launched on July 25. Thus only six months and twenty days will have elapsed from the time she was laid down until the launch. This is the first occasion on which a vessel of this importance has been built in so short a time. The rapidity of construction of British warships which has been so often cited as an example, and which has already been beaten in the case of the Jena, constructed in 7Mi months, is completely distanced by the Suffren. Eight hundred workmen have been constantly employed on the huge hull.” It should be pointed out, says the Times, in quoting the Figaro, that the message does not supply sufficient information to justify the conclusions drawn from the facts stated. A ship may be launched at various stages in her construction, but she cannot properly be said to have been “built” in the sense used here until she is completed for sea. The Jena was not completed for sea in 7½ months. No French vessel has reached the British standard in this respect.—Engineering.
[Italy.]
Liguria.
The Liguria is a well-known type of Italian vessel, a sort of small Esmeralda, with a pair of 6-in. guns fore and aft instead of a single big gun. The rest of the armament is six 4.7-in. quick-firers, and four 12-pounders, recently added, two forward and two aft on the main deck. Elswick vessels are often spoken of as being typically over-gunned; but this Liguria, though of half the tonnage and two-thirds the length of the 30Hai-Tien, carries four 6-in. as against two 8-in., and six 4.7-in. against ten of the same caliber. She certainly does give the impression of being over-gunned, her decks are very cramped; while the two huge funnels and the superstructure about them give an idea of top-heaviness. She once carried heavy military tops, but these have been removed, and small platforms for machine guns, not very high up, have been substituted.— The Engineer.
Class. | Desciption of Trial. | Trial. | Weights. | Surfaces. | I. H. P. per Ton (Mean I. H. P.) | Weight in Pounds per I. H. P. | I. H. P. per Square Foot of Grate (Mean I. H. P.) | Heating Surface per I. H. P. (Mean I. H. P.) | ||||||||||||
Duration. | Revolutions. | Piston Speed. | Steam Pressure. | I. H. P. Develoed (Mean). | Air Pressure. | Coal per I. H. P. per Hour. | Machinery Complete. | Boilers Complete. | Grate. | Heating. | Machinery Complete. | Boilers. | Engines. | Boilers. | Total. | |||||
Boilers. | Engines. | |||||||||||||||||||
|
| hrs |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| sq. ft. | sq. ft. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Diadem | 3,300 I. H. P. | 30 | 67.9 | 543.8 | 218.5 | 160.5 | 3,339 | . . . . | 2.04 | 1540 | 767 | 1460 | 40.990 | 8.30 | 16.66 | 135 | 135 | 270 | 8.75 | 3.20 |
12,500 I. H. P. | 30 | 106.5 | 852.0 | 267.0 | 230.0 | 12,785 | . . . . | 1.71 | 1400 | 40,990 | 11.01 | 22.11 | 103 | 101 | 204 | 11.60 | 2.41 | |||
Full power | 8 | 116.6 | 933.2 | 286.5 | 236.7 | 16,961 | . . . . | 1.73 | ||||||||||||
Argonaut | 3,600 I. H. P. | 30 | 73.1 | 548.8 | 238.0 | 138.0 | 3,784 | . . . . | 2.03 | 1578 | 787 | 1390 | 47,300 | 8.89 | 17.70 | 127 | 127 | 254 | 10.02 | 3.39 |
13,500 I. H. P. | 30 | 112.6 | 901.0 | 260.0 | 220.0 | 13,932 | . . . . | 1.66 | 1390 | 47,300 | 12.05 | 24.17 | 93 | 92 | 185 | 13.69 | 2.49 | |||
Full Power | 8 | 123.6 | 989.0 | 291.0 | 257.0 | 19,025 | .2 | 1.64 |
[Japan.]
Kasagi.
The Japanese protected cruiser Kasagi was built at Philadelphia and armed at Elswick. She has an armored steel deck, 2 in. thick over the flat, and 4½ in. over the slopes, and she is of the following dimensions: Length between perpendiculars, 396 ft.; beam, 49 ft.; draught, 17 ft. 7 in.; displacement, 4760 tons; indicated horse-power, 15,500; 22½ knots’ speed; two propellers; and she has cost £205,200. Her armament comprises two 8-in. quick-firing guns, ten 4.7-in. quick-firing guns; twelve quick-fire 12-pounders, and four 2½-pounder quick-firing Japanese guns in the tops. She carries five orpedo tubes, all above water, one of which is at the bows of the vessel, and twenty-five torpedoes are contained in the torpedo racks on board, as the unit for ordinary service. The bodies of these torpedoes are carried in cases or racks of steel wire netting, which is an excellent arrangement, and preserves the rudders and propellers from all possibility of accident. The extreme coal capacity of the bunkers of the Kasagi is 1020 tons. She had, however, only about 550 tons on board when we visited her, 450 tons of which had been taken in the day before in nine hours. She was fairly “light” in the water, and her full weights, except a portion of the crew, were on board. It is assumed, therefore, that her coal capacity, at normal draught, would be about 600 tons. This is good for so small a vessel.
One distinguishing feature in the Kasagi is the absence of wood everywhere; decks—excepting the upper ones—partitions of cabins, sides and treads of companion ladders, ceilings of cabins, and nearly all other features which in ships have been immemorially constructed of wood, are here found to be of steel or some other metal. The captain’s saloons are ceiled with embossed steel, excessively thin and yielding to the pressure of the hand. The stamped and embossed ornaments give these apartments a very elegant appearance. The spokes and rims of the steering wheels are all of gun-metal. The men’s mess tables are about the only articles which are made of wood, but the seats upon which the men sit at meals are sheet-steel boxes, with steel lids, in which their kits—mess gear, etc., etc.—are kept. To prevent discomfort, each man is allowed a little loose board to place upon the top of his box-seat. These would be heaved overboard in action. In the officers’ lavatories there are capital enamelled baths, wash-stands, and other articles, but all are of metal, not a scrap of wood being observable anywhere.
The artificers’ workshop is very complete, and three good-sized lathes, together with drilling machines, and other machinery, all worked by steam, are fitted; but we observed everywhere an absence of spare parts and stores. The conning tower of the Kasagi is differently constructed from those on board British war vessels. The top, instead of being removable, so as to afford a look-out all round, is attached to the sides, and horizontal slits only are left for taking observations. This is possibly a wise arrangement, for there is always a chance of the cover of our conning towers being lifted off by a blow from a large projectile'. There appeared to be no voice-tube exchange stations on board. Mouthpieces of tubes, extending to almost every position, are fixed within the conning tower itself. The arrangement of anchors is curious, two being on beds upon the port side and one upon the starboard, vice versa to the plan on board our vessels.
The armament of the Kasagi is her remarkable feature. Whichever way we look at the question, it certainly appears an anomaly that our Niobe, of 11,000 tons displacement, should carry no weapon of even approximately equivalent potency to the 8-in. quick-firer of the Japanese cruiser of 4760 tons—assuming that the latter has been judiciously armed, which, however, is begging the whole question. The 8-in. guns, two in number, are mounted fore and aft upon the forecastle and poop, within very large and roomy steel hoods, 4½ in. thick. They are capable of containing, each, almost a whole gun’s crew of the medium-sized wiry Japanese bluejackets. In rear of each gun position is the circular mouth of an armored hoist leading down to the magazines. It projects slightly out of the deck, and has a semi-spherical solid steel cap to cover it, which opens and shuts. When open the ammunition hoist is seen, which works on endless chains over a roller at the top, and runs out the cartridges—in cylinders—and projectiles, on to a loading tray. A small gun-metal tramway on the deck runs past the hoist, and from each extremity of the gun’s possible arc of training. It has trolleys on it for conveying the projectiles to the various loading positions, and the lines have loops for the full and empty trolleys to pass one another.
The 8-in. gun fires an armor-piercing shot of 250 lbs., and a common shell of 220 lbs., so that the tramways and trolleys are a necessity. The gun weighs 18 tons, and the mounting 11 tons, so that the whole revolving weight is 30 tons.
The 4.7-in. quick-firing guns, which are on either broadside, have also good-sized steel shields 4½ in. thick, and are sponsoned out, so that the forward and aft pairs can point directly ahead or astern, according to their position in the ship, with an arc of training of 130 deg., whilst those between have an arc of 100 deg. of training. Of course the shields thin off towards the rear. The forward pair is casemated. Armored tubes protect the ammunition en route from the magazines, and a hatch, covered with an armored circular cap, somewhat similar to that employed for the 8-in. guns, surmounts the hoist for ammunition and projectiles. We should have mentioned that all the ammunition hoists are worked by electric motors, which actuate an endless chain at the side.
The 12-pounder guns have lighter shields, and they occupy intermediate positions between the 4.7-in. quick-firers, with the exception of the forward and after pair, which are within casemates of stout steel plating beneath the forecastle and within the captain’s saloon respectively. The ammunition for the 12-pounders is also brought up by an electric hoist, through an armored tube, and opens by a large hatchway into a small, armor-protected square deck-house beneath the poop deck. This is an excellent arrangement for protecting the 12-pounder ammunition until it arrives on deck, and from thence it is served to the guns.
Four 2½-pounder Japanese quick-firers are in the tops. These are similar to the guns of the Takasago, already described in the columns of The Engineer. They have large shields of a different shape from those employed in British tops, but somewhat similar to those of the broadside 12-pounders, only smaller and lighter, of course.
The unit of ammunition carried for the guns of this vessel on ordinary service is as follows: 100 rounds for each 8-in. gun, 200 rounds for each 4.7-in. gun, 300 rounds for each 12-pounder, and 400 rounds for each 2½-pounder. These units are doubled when the ship is despatched on war service. We were told that the whole of this quantity of ammunition could be carried in the magazines, but it is possible that the question may not have been fully understood. It appears a very extraordinary amount to maintain in the magazines, even in the eventualities of war.
The totals of the weights of ordinary ammunition would be as follows:
Two 8-in. quick-firing guns, 200 projectiles, say | 50,000 lbs. | 262,800 lbs. |
Charges with metal cylinders, say | 15,000 lbs. | |
Ten 4.7-in. quick-firing guns, 2000 projectiles, say | 80,000 lbs. | |
Charges with metal cylinders, say | 40,800 lbs. | |
Twelve 13-pounder guns, 3600 projectiles, say | 43,300 lbs. | |
Charges with metal cylinders, say | 18,000 lbs. | |
Four 2½-pounder guns, 1600 projectiles, with charges, say | 6,000 lbs. |
Or, roughly, with blank and saluting ammunition, about 120 or 130 tons. And on active service this quantity would be doubled.
The mounting and shields of the 8-in. quick-firers are rotated by electric motors, and it is said that the whole of the arc of 270 deg. could be passed over easily in one minute. Elevation is also accomplished by a small motor. These movements can, however, be carried into effect by hand and hand-gear wheels, which worked with the utmost ease and smoothness, and were in action during the occasion of our visit. The op'ening and closing of the breech was effected by a hand wheel between the breech and trunnion axis; four rounds can be fired in 64 seconds.
The appearance of the Kasagi did not impress us favorably. The large projecting sponsons, two heavy guns and mountings fore and aft, weighing each over 3° tons, gave us the impression of far too much topweight. Perched, as the latter were, upon the poop and forecastle, with 30 tons weight so close to the stem, and three anchors besides, to say nothing of chain cables, etc., we should say that the Kasagi would plunge and make very bad weather in a heavy sea. And the proximity of the broadside guns to one another is so remarkable that there would be hardly room to work them. It certainly does seem singular that a vessel only 400 tons superior in displacement to the Fox can carry an armament so immensely superior in weight of metal and in actual numbers, the following being a comparative statement:
FOX. | KASAGI. |
Two 6-in. quick-firers | Two 8-in. quick-firers. |
Eight 4.7-in " | Ten 4.7-in. " |
Eight 6-pr. " | Twelve 12-pr. " |
One 3-pr. " | Four 2½ -pr. " |
This, too, is independent of the question of coal capacity and engine power. The Japanese cruiser is better off by 50 per cent, as regards the first item. As regards the second, there is a difference of no less than three knots in favor of the Kasagi.
Wherein, then, do these vessels differ? We believe that a solution might be found by examining the framing, scantling, double bottom, and, more than all, the skin plating of the new ships. Sir W H. White puts down the following percentages of the whole displacement as distributed over the weights of a fast protected cruiser of this type: Hull, 38; propelling machinery and coals, 35, protective material, 16; armament and equipment, 11. But he had not in view engines and boilers working up to 15,500 indicated horse-power for a vessel of 4760 tons, or coal bunker capacity of 1000 tons, or armament and equipment, which must absorb at least 15 or 16 per cent, of the whole. Yet it is clear that if all these extraordinary weights are present, the percentage of 38 for the hull must have been seriously discounted in the designing of the Kasagi. We merely offer this as a possible solution of the enigma—for an enigma it certainly is.—The Engineer
Tokiwa.
During the past week the steam trials of the Tokiwa, the second Japanese belted cruiser of 7900 tons, have been completed at the mouth of the Tyne. Her particulars are the same as those of the Asama, recently given by us, and need not be repeated now; but, shortly, she is a vessel 408 ft. long, armored with a 7-in. belt, and carries four 8-in. guns, fourteen 6-in. guns, and a number of smaller guns, and five torpedo tubes. Nearly the whole of the guns have strong armor protection, and four of the torpedo tubes are below the water-line. At her speed trials runs were made at 10, 15.6, 18.8, 21.2, and 22.73 knots, and during six hours the vessel ran at a mean speed of 20.85 knots with open stokeholds. At her last trial she ran for three hours with a pressure in her stokeholds scarcely exceeding 1in. at a mean speed of 23.1 knots. The engines have been supplied by Messrs. Humphrys, Tennant, and Co., and she has twelve single- ended cylindrical boilers.
Akebono.
A very successful official trial of the torpedo-boat destroyer Akebono (Dawn), built for the Imperial Japanese Navy by Messrs. Yarrow and Co., Limited, was made on March the 4th, at the mouth of the Thames. This vessel is- one of six, the contract for which the Japanese Admiralty placed with Messrs. Yarrow and Co., Limited. The leading dimensions are as follows: Length, 220 ft.; beam, 20 ft. 6 in., displacement, fully coaled and armed, about 420 tons. The model is similar to that of the Sokol, which the same firm built a few years since for the Russian Navy, but the dimensions are considerably enlarged. The type has now become one of the leading classes in the Russian Navy The armament consists of two 18-in. swivel torpedo tubes, one 12-pounder and five 6-pounder quick-firing guns. The steam is generated by four large water-tube boilers of the Yarrow patent straight water-tube type, each with its own funnel. The propelling machinery consists of twin-screw engines of the four-cylinder four-crank triple-expansion type, capable of indicating up to 6500 horse-power with 200 lbs. pressure. The speed guaranteed by the vendors on a three-hours’ continuous run, carrying a load of 35 tons, was 31 knots. Three vessels have already passed their official trials, and the contract speed has been easily obtained. When the Japanese Government have the three additional destroyers not yet tried, which are being built at Poplar, they will have a group of torpedo-boat destroyers of higher speed than any other government in the world. The details of the trials are as follows: The draught of water forward was
5 ft. and aft 8 ft. 1 in., the load carried being 35 tons. The Japanese Government was represented by Commander-Constructor M. Kondo and Constructor-Captain H. Kurobe. Six runs were made over the measured mile on the Maplin, the following being the particulars:
Number | Boiler | Vacuum. | Air Pressure | Mean |
|
| Mean | Second | |
Time. | Speed. | ||||||||
| lbs. | in. | in. |
| m. s. |
|
|
| 31.159 |
1 | 226 | 24½ | 1 1/8 | 432 | 1 51 | 32.432 | 31.154 |
| |
2 | 226 | 24½ | 1¼ | 434½ | 2 0½ | 29.875 | 31.080 | 31.117 | |
3 | 226 | 24½ | 1½ | 434½ | 1 51½ | 32.286 | 31.206 | 31.143 | |
4 | 226 | 24½ | 1 5/8 | 436½ | 1 59½ | 30.125 | 31.162 | 31.184 | |
5 | 226 | 24½ | 1 5/8 | 436¾ | 1 51¾ | 32.200 | 31.226 | 31.194 | |
6 | 226 | 24½ | 1½ | 439½ | 1 59 | 30.252 |
|
|
* Throttled.
Based on the revolutions necessary to make a knot, the mean speed during the three hours’ continuous run was found to be 31.08 knots. The machinery throughout gave no trouble, and there was no flame visible at the funnels at any time. The weather was rather rough and a northeast wind made the sea off the North Foreland lumpy. This vessel was launched nine days prior to the official trial, and had only one preliminary run before the trial took place.—Engineering.
Shiranui.
The fourth Japanese torpedo-boat destroyer, Shiranui (Will o’ the Wisp), recently launched from the yard of Messrs. John I. Thorneycroft and Co., Chiswick, underwent a satisfactory full-speed trial at the Maplin Sands on the 30th ult. The contractors guaranteed a speed of 30 knots when carrying a load of 35 tons, and the results obtained on the trial were 30.443 knots on the measured mile and 30.517 knots during three hours’ continuous steaming.—Engineering.
[Russia.]
Gromboy
The new first-class cruiser and a transport were launched on the Neva from the Baltic shipbuilding yard in presence of the Emperor, the Empress-Dowager and other members of the Imperial family. The new armored cruiser, called the Gromboy, resembles in the main the great cruiser, the Rossia, launched from the same yard in 1896. The principal details of the vessel are: Length, 480 ft. breadth, 69 ft.; load displacement, 12,539 tons; with engines of 14,500 horse-power The transport ship, the Yenisei, measures 300 ft. in length and 39 ft. in breadth, with a displacement of 2600 tons, and the engines 4700 horse-power.—Engineering.
* For those interested in obtaining the Color-Sight Tester I will say that I have made arrangements to hare it made by the Chicago Laboratory Supply and Scale Co., Chicago.
* Abstracted from a paper read before the Franklin Institute, Nov. 16, 1898.