The following references* by Presidents of the United States to the urgent need of the United States possessing a proper Navy, corresponding to the nation's position as a great power, and ready at any time for efficient service in war, could be multiplied a thousand-fold from the speeches and writings of almost all the statesmen who have striven disinterestedly and intelligently for the true honor and greatness of America. By no means all of the references made by the Presidents themselves have been taken. Many of them, such as President Taylor's urgent appeals for the establishment of a retiring list, and pension list, and the improvement of the personnel of the Navy, or the recitals of the glory gained and conferred by the Navy in the war of 1812, and the civil war, are omitted because they do not bear on the Problem of the present day, which is further to augment the Navy, both in materiel and personnel, in battleships, in torpedo-boats, in dry docks, in numbers of officers and men.
Fortunately the quality of the ships and guns, and of the officers and men, that we have, is excellent.
The utterances of the Presidents here quoted tell in outline the growth of the Navy. Washington first advocated its formation for reasons which apply now as forcibly as they applied when he wrote, over a century ago. What he said shows well how, on this, as on all other questions, the greatest of Americans approached every problem of vital interest to America in a spirit of the broadest patriotism and statesmanship, combined with clear appreciation of the needs of the present and keen insight into the greater needs which the future would develop.
Under the elder Adams the navy which Washington advocated was actually begun, and even in its infancy it accomplished feats of note. The work of building it up was unwisely stopped, and the war of 1812 showed clearly the vital benefits conferred upon the nation by the little Navy which it possessed, and the terrible loss and damage caused by the fact that in size this Navy was but a small fraction of what it should have been. The utterances of Monroe, the younger Adams, and Andrew Jackson, show that the lesson was at least partially learned, and our Navy, though never brought up quite to the standard it should have been in point of size, was, nevertheless, maintained in a condition not wholly out of proportion to the needs and the honor of the nation.
Especial attention should be paid to the third quotation from Andrew Jackson. The victor of New Orleans had that "instinct for the jugular" which is possessed by every great fighter. All that he says applies to the present day, for, as he points out so clearly, the only effective defensive is the offensive; the only way to defend our own seacoast properly is to attack our enemy instead of waiting for him to attack us. It is for this reason that we can not afford to rely purely upon torpedo-boats or upon any kind of mere coast-defense vessels. Though it is of course absolutely necessary to have an abundance of torpedo-boats, we must also possess a powerful fleet of ships able to hold the seas, able to make long voyages, to stand rough weather, and to meet and overcome in the shock of actual fight any enemy's fleet; for it is the enemy's fleet which should be the true objective in naval war. Fortifications are indispensable, but they in no sense equal, or supply the place of, a fighting navy.
The effect of bringing the Navy up to something like a proper standard was shown in the inestimable services it rendered during the civil war. It is characteristic of Lincoln's far-seeing statesmanship and loving care for the welfare, ultimate as well as immediate, of the people for whom he was soon to lay down his life, that in the midst of the iron stress of the civil war, when the problems of the present would have wholly absorbed any lesser man, he should yet have thought of the future in connection with our Navy, and should have advocated the building of those seagoing battleships which, though not needed in civil strife, would most assuredly be indispensable if the honor and renown of America were to be upheld against foreign powers.
After the close of the civil war there came a period of reaction and decline. In spite of President Grant's repeated warnings and protests, a spirit of unwise economy prevailed, and our Navy was suffered to sink below the level of that of even the third-rate Powers. Then, in the middle of President Arthur's administration, the turn came; the people and their representatives awoke to what was demanded by national self-respect, the foundations of our present Navy were laid, and ever since then under every administration the work of building it up has gone steadily on.
In point of efficiency our ships need fear comparison with those of no foreign nation, and though they are not nearly as numerous as they should be, yet long strides in the right direction have been taken. To stop now would be to leave the work half clone. But if we continue to build up our Navy for a few years to come, along the lines we have followed for the fifteen years immediately past, we shall, within a comparatively short period, Place the United States where she should be, among the naval Powers of the world. Such a Navy would be, as all of our great leaders from the days of Washington and the elder Adams to our own have pointed out, the surest guarantee of peace; and if by any unlucky chance we were to have war, it would not merely save us from material disasters, but what is of incalculably more moment, it would prevent that loss of national honor which would be felt as keenly in the farthest interior of the country as on the seaboard of the Atlantic or the Pacific.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
January 8, 1790.
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
ANNUAL ADDRESS.
December 7, 1796.
To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other option.
These considerations invite the United States to look to the means, and to set about the gradual creation of a navy.
However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies. This lack would impair the energy of its character and hazard its safety or expose it to greater evils when war could not be avoided; besides that, war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of the military art ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting, by proper establishments, the knowledge of that art. The art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated. It demands much previous study, and the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation.
JOHN ADAMS.
May 16, 1797.
Naval power is the natural defense of the United States.
December 8, 1798.
In demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war, for the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. Efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.
The beneficial effects of the small naval armament provided under the acts of the last session are known and acknowledged. Perhaps no country ever experienced more sudden and remarkable advantages from any measure of policy than we have derived from the arming for our maritime protection and defense. We ought without loss of time to lay the foundation for an increase of our Navy to a size sufficient to guard our coast and protect our trade. Such a naval force would afford the best means of general defense.
December 3, 1799.
A steady perseverance in a system of national defense commensurate with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious dictate of wisdom; for nothing short of the power of repelling aggressions will secure to our country a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national degradation.
November 27, 1800.
A navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient defense of this country against all foreign hostility.
JAMES MADISON.
May 25, 1813.
The brilliant achievements of our infant Navy claim the highest praise and the full recompense provided by Congress.
December 5, 1815.
The signal services which have been rendered by our Navy and the capacities it has developed for successful co-operation in the national defense will give to that portion of the public force its full value in the eyes of Congress. To preserve the ships we now have in a sound state, to complete those already contemplated, to provide amply for prompt augmentations, is dictated by the soundest policy.
JAMES MONROE.
January 30, 1824.
In the late war our whole coast was either invaded or menaced with invasion. There was scarcely an harbor or city on any of our great inlets which could be considered secure. In whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops, our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to them. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only, but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering these inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there. The expense and exposure of the inhabitants and the waste of property may readily be conceived. These occurrences demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights, and that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power, the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. No government will be disposed to violate our rights if it knows we have the means and are prepared and resolved to defend them.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.
December 6, 1825.
A military marine is the only arm by which our power can be estimated or felt by foreign nations, and the only standing military force which can never be dangerous to our own liberty. A permanent naval peace establishment, adapted to our present condition and adaptable to that gigantic growth with which the nation is advancing in its career, is among the subjects which have already occupied the foresight of the last Congress. Our Navy, commenced upon a scale commensurate with the incipient energies, the scanty resources, and the comparative indigence of our infancy, was even then found adequate to cope with the powers of Barbary and with one of the principal maritime powers of Europe.
At a period of further advancement, but with little accession of strength, it has not only sustained with honor the most unequal of conflicts, but covered itself and our country with unfading glory. But it is only since the close of the late war that by the numbers and force of the ships of which it was composed it could deserve the name of a navy.
December 5, 1826.
We have twelve line-of-battle ships, twenty frigates, and sloops of war in proportion, which, with a few months of preparation, may present a line of floating fortifications along the whole range of our coast. Combined with a system of fortifications upon the shores themselves, it has placed in our possession the most effective sinews of war and has left us at once an example and a lesson from which our own duties may be inferred. The gradual increase of the Navy was the principle of which the act of 29th April, 1816, was the development. It was the introduction of a system to act upon the character and history of our own country for an indefinite series of ages. It was a declaration of that Congress to their constituents and to posterity that it was the destiny and the duty of the United States to become in regular process of time and by no petty advances a great naval power.
ANDREW JACKSON.
March 4, 1829.
The increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant climes our skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preservation of our forts, arsenals, and dockyards, and the introduction of progressive improvements in the discipline and science of both branches of our military service, are so plainly prescribed by prudence that I should be excused for omitting their mention sooner than for enlarging on their importance.
December 8, 1829.
Constituting, as the Navy does, the best standing security of this country against foreign aggression, it claims the especial attention of Government, and should continue to be cherished as the offspring of our national experience.
March 4, .437.
No nation, however desirous of peace, can hope to escape occasional collisions with other powers, and the soundest dictates of policy require that we should place ourselves in a position to assert our rights if a resort to force should ever become necessary. Our local situation, our long line of seacoast, indented by numerous bays, with deep rivers opening into the interior, as well as our extended and still increasing commerce, point to the Navy as our natural means of defense. It will in the end be found to be the cheapest and most effectual, and now is the time, in a season of peace, that we can year after year add to its strength without increasing the burdens of the people. It is your true policy, for your Navy will not only protect your rich and flourishing commerce in distant seas, but will enable you to reach and annoy the enemy, and will give to defense its greatest efficiency by meeting danger at a distance from home.* It is impossible by any line of fortification to guard every point from attack against a hostile force advancing from the ocean and selecting its object, but they are indispensable to protect cities from bombardment, dockyards and naval arsenals from destruction, to give shelter to merchant vessels in time of war and to single ships or weaker squadrons when pressed by superior force. Fortifications of this description can not be too soon completed and armed and placed in a condition of the most perfect preparation. The abundant means we now possess can not be applied in any manner more useful to the country, and when this is done and our naval force sufficiently strengthened we need not fear that any nation will wantonly insult us, or needlessly provoke hostilities. We shall more certainly preserve peace when it is well understood that we are prepared for war.
JOHN TYLER.
December 7, 1841.
Every effort will be made to add to the efficiency of the Navy, and I cannot too strongly urge upon you liberal appropriations to that branch of the public service. Our extended and otherwise exposed maritime frontier calls for protection, to the furnishing of which an efficient naval force is indispensable. We look to no foreign conquests, nor do we propose to enter into competition with any other nation for supremacy on the ocean; but it is due not only to the honor but to the security of the people of the United States that no nation should be permitted to invade our waters at pleasure. Parsimony alone would suggest the withholding of the necessary means for the protection of our domestic firesides from invasion and our national honor from disgrace. I would most earnestly recommend the increase and prompt equipment of that gallant Navy which has lighted up every sea with its victories and spread an imperishable glory over the country.
JAMES K. POLK.
December 2, 1845.
Our reliance for protection and defense on the land must be mainly by our citizen soldiers, who will be ever ready, as they ever have been ready in times past, to rush with alacrity at the call of their country to her defense. This description of force, however, can not defend our coast, harbors, and inland seas, nor protect our commerce on the ocean or the lakes. These must be protected by our Navy.
Considering an increased naval force, and especially steam vessels, corresponding with our growth and importance as a nation, and proportioned to the increased and increasing naval power of other nations, of vast importance as regards our safety, and the great and growing interests to be protected by it, I recommend the subject to the favorable consideration of Congress.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
December 8, 1863.
The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during the year, and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have been discharged with fidelity and eminent success.
The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself.
The armored vessels in our Navy, completed and in service, or which are under contract and approaching completion, are believed to exceed in number those of any other power. But while these may be relied upon for harbor defense and coast service, others of greater strength and capacity will be necessary for cruising purposes and to maintain our rightful position on the ocean.
No inconsiderable embarrassment, delay, and public injury have been experienced from the want of Governmental establishments (sufficient in number and adequate in character) for the construction and necessary repair of modern naval vessels. I think it my duty to invite your special attention to this subject. Satisfactory and important as have been the performances of the heroic men of the Navy, they are scarcely more wonderful than the success of our mechanics and artisans in the production of war vessels which have created a new form of naval power.
I commend to your consideration the policy of fostering and training seamen for the naval service.
U. S. GRANT.
December 5, 1870.
The appropriations made for the last and current years were evidently intended by Congress, and are sufficient only, to keep the Navy on its present footing by the repairing and refitting of our old ships. This policy must, of course, gradually but surely destroy the Navy. It can hardly be wise statesmanship in a government which represents a country with over five thousand miles of coast line on both oceans, exclusive of Alaska, and containing forty millions of progressive people, with relations of every nature with almost every foreign country, to rest with such inadequate means of enforcing any foreign policy either of protection or redress. Separated by the ocean from the nations of the eastern continent, our Navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for the enforcement of any foreign policy.
December 2, 1872.
Unless early steps are taken to preserve our Navy, in a very few years the United States will be the weakest nation, upon the ocean, of all great powers. With an energetic, progressive, business people like ours, penetrating and forming business relations with every part of the known world, a Navy strong enough to command the respect of our flag abroad is necessary for the full protection of all their rights.
December 2, 1873.
The distressing occurrences which have taken place in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, almost on our very seaboard, illustrate most forcibly the necessity always existing, that a nation situated like ours should maintain in a state of possible efficiency a. Navy adequate to its responsibilities. Congress [should] provide adequately, not only for the present preparation, but for the future maintenance of our naval force.
CHESTER A. ARTHUR.
December 6, 1881.
I can not too strongly urge upon you my conviction that every consideration of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation of our Navy.
With a full appreciation of the fact that this must involve a large expenditure of the public moneys, I earnestly recommend such appropriations as will accomplish an end which seems to me so desirable.
Nothing can be more inconsistent with true public economy than withholding the means necessary to accomplish the objects intrusted by the Constitution to the National Legislature. One of these objects, which is of paramount importance, is declared by our fundamental law to be the provision for the "common defense." Surely nothing is more essential to the defense of the United States and of all our people than the efficiency of our Navy.
If we heed the teachings of history we shall not forget that in the life of every nation emergencies may arise when a resort to arms can alone save it from dishonor.
December 4, 1883.
The work of strengthening our Navy by the construction of modern vessels has been auspiciously begun.
That our naval strength should be made adequate for the defense of our harbors, the protection of our commercial interests, and the maintenance of our national honor is a proposition from which no patriotic citizen can withhold his assent.
December 1, 1884.
I can not too strongly urge the duty of restoring our Navy as rapidly as possible to the high state of efficiency which formerly characterized it. As the long peace that has lulled us into a state of fancied security may at any time be disturbed, it is plain that the policy of strengthening this arm of the service is dictated by considerations of wise economy, of just regard for our future tranquillity, and of true appreciation of the dignity and honor of the Republic.
GROVER CLEVELAND.
December 8, 1885.
All must admit the importance of an effective navy to a nation like ours. Yet we have not a single vessel of war that could keep the seas against a first-class vessel of any important power. Such a condition ought not longer to continue. The nation that can not resist aggression is constantly exposed to it. Its foreign policy is of necessity weak, and its negotiations are conducted with disadvantage because it is not in condition to enforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice.
BENJAMIN HARRISON.
December 9, 1891.
When it is recollected that the work of building a modern Navy was only initiated in the year 1883, that our naval constructors and shipbuilders were practically without experience in the construction of large iron and steel ships, that our engine shops were unfamiliar with great marine engines, and that the manufacture of steel forgings for guns and plates was almost wholly a foreign industry, the progress that has been made is not only highly satisfactory, but furnishes the assurance that the United States will before long attain, in the construction of such vessels, with their engines and armaments, the same pre-eminence which it attained when the best instrument of ocean commerce was the clipper ship, and the most impressive exhibit of naval power the old wooden three-decker man-of-war. The officers of the Navy and the proprietors and engineers of our great private shops have responded with wonderful intelligence and professional zeal to the confidence expressed by Congress in its liberal legislation.
There should be no hesitation in promptly completing a Navy of the best modern type, large enough to enable this country to display its flag in all seas for the protection of its citizens and its extending commerce. It is essential to the dignity of this nation and to that peaceful influence which it should exercise on this hemisphere that its Navy should be adequate, both upon the shores of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.
December 6, 1892.
I earnestly express the hope that the work which has made such noble progress may not now be stayed. The wholesome influence for peace and the increased sense of security which our citizens domiciled in other lands feel when these magnificent ships under the American flag appear is already most gratefully apparent. The United States is again a naval power.