TORPEDOES IN EXERCISE AND BATTLE.
Lieutenant H. C. POUNDSTONE, U. S. Navy.—Part of the data given in the essay is covered in "Notes on Care and Handling." The notes and suggestions on care, handling, adjusting, and practice, already formulated and in manuscript at the Torpedo Station, would, if published for the information and guidance of torpedo officers, be of the greatest assistance. The essay, in a great measure, furnishes a substitute for the notes, etc., referred to, and is a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of torpedoes and their use. It is to be regretted that the writer did not more closely follow the standard service nomenclature.
I agree thoroughly with the writer as to the necessity for instruction of officers in the mechanism and use of torpedoes, and of more frequent practice to enable officers to gain familiarity and confidence in the use of this weapon; for, as the essayist states, something is learned from each that, if the conditions and results are fairly analyzed; and the fact that torpedoes exhibit vagaries, apparently inexplicable, should be no bar to their use, for the percentage of hits, within their range, will more than favorably compare with gun fire. The question of cost should be obliterated, not, however, neglecting due precautions in handling, adjusting, etc.
The whole question of torpedo practice, as to adjustments, discharge, dive, set depth, speed, range, deviations, deflections due to speed, and abnormal performances, is in hand at the Torpedo Station for solution, land we shall doubtless soon have the results of practice, up to date, published for the information of the service.
The sections of the essay on "Battle Practice" and "Torpedo Boats and Drill Ground" are well thought out and should have serious consideration.
I congratulate the essayist on a most intelligent comprehension of his subject, and trust that the points to which he calls attention will be taken heart by the service at large and by those in authority.
Lieutenant R. C. SMITH, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Ellicott's essay on Torpedoes in Exercise and Battle must strike every reader with its valuable suggestions. A great deal of it could well be embodied in a manual of torpedo instruction for issue to the service. I believe such a work has been begun at the Torpedo Station. At any rate there is much "copy" available in the shape of reports of boards, torpedo-boat officers and others. I recognize a good many points in the essay that exist in that form and that well might be more widely known.
His point in regard to the occasional loss of torpedoes in exercise is certainly well taken. The Indiana has just held a gun practice which must have cost in the neighborhood of $15,000, or approximately the price of four to seven torpedoes according to the Mark. This number would hardly be lost in a cruise with constant exercise. I do not agree with him that every torpedo in the ship should be used for practice. After many runs all bearings and connections become loose and the accuracy is greatly affected. Each torpedo should be kept carefully adjusted and given a run once or twice a year for verification, but for the ordinary practice I think it would be better to select a few torpedoes from the allowance and use them exclusively. The exercise is more for the practice of the torpedo division than to test the torpedoes, and for this purpose old torpedoes answer perfectly well.
The rules for adjustment on page 418 are those ordinarily given. There is one point that is not generally noticed, and I do not know that it has been formulated; but when once made plain, it aids very much in all the rudder adjustments. In following the rules the natural impulse is to start from forward and work aft through the various connections to the rudder. This is like pouring water through the small end of a funnel. When you reach the rudder you often have to go back and change the corrections already made, as each subsequent correction changes those ahead of it. By reversing the proceeding and adjusting the length of rudder rod first, then the valve star, the locking star and the rest, when you get to the hydrostatic piston the work is finished.
I am in entire accord with Mr. Ellicott's suggestion as to holding torpedo practice at sea in deep water. With the exception of a few cases of "running away," and one of leaving out drain plugs—not counting those of firing with negative buoyancy, which is never necessary—all the accidents I can recall have come from striking bottom or sticking in the mud at the bottom. As far back as 1880 an English board, in considering the desirability of adding a buoyancy apparatus to raise lost torpedoes from the bottom, decided that if the practice was held in deep water, in nine cases out of ten, the torpedoes not being able to strike the bottom, would not be lost.
If the practice must be held in shoal water, it may be desirable to have one or two of the torpedoes fitted with a recovery apparatus. The writer experimented with one at the Torpedo Station a couple of years ago, depending on the release of a buoy and line from the torpedo a few minutes after firing. The experiment went far enough to show the scheme to be feasible. I think the torpedo outfit should include a small air pump and gauge to test for air-tightness, such as is now in use at the Howell testing station; and were I in charge of a plant I should make requisition for one at the earliest moment. The drain holes in the Whitehead are a good place to make the connections, and they were so used lately aboard the Cushing.
On page 429 the probable deflection is given as about 1” per knot of speed of the firing vessel. Later experiments show that 20 is a better estimate for the short Whitehead torpedo and ½” for the Howell. If the Obry gyroscope, now in use abroad and which is being 4xperimented with in this country, realizes expectations, the question of deflection can be eliminated from the mind of the torpedo officer.
The suggestions for simplifying the Whitehead torpedo made on page 431 might be given a trial. It is well, however, to bear in mind that many bright people have been working at the Whitehead for thirty years, and that the first presumption should oppose minor changes. Of course the torpedo is improving all the time, and some one must think out the changes. Consequently, all those that seem of sufficient merit should be given a trial.
In regard to the installation of torpedoes, as discussed on page 438, Mr. Ellicott arrives at the almost unanimous conclusions instanced by foreign practice. Let us by all means take up under-water fire. From all accounts it is by far more accurate, and no one can doubt its greater tactical value.
His conclusion as to control of fire—not by the captain, but by responsible persons at observation posts—is also accepted everywhere. Our own sighting arrangements are designed entirely on that principle, except in the case of the bow torpedo, if there is one, which is fired from the conning tower. Probably no more bow or stern torpedoes will be installed. They are even now being removed from ships which had them.
I do not agree with the views of the essayist on page 440 as to the desirability of installing torpedoes aboard cruisers and gunboats. These vessels should be built for one purpose alone, should have a light battery and as much speed as possible, and should not be hampered with extra weights and fittings of no ordinary utility and of possible use only in emergencies little likely to arise. In most cases the fittings would be shot to pieces before there was any chance to launch the torpedoes. Has the essayist considered the ethics of destroying merchant vessels by torpedo fire?
The discussion as to a torpedo-boat depot and drill ground, beginning at page 441, is the very best thing on the subject that I have chanced to see. I cannot think of a requirement that is not noted among those he mentions. And I do not see how there can be any escape from his conclusions as to the general locality to be selected. Surely after this discussion it would seem beyond reason to establish a station at either Boston or Newport. The only possible claim these points can have is that plants now in existence can be utilized to some extent and that they are near centres of labor. At any place selected, even Boston or Newport, sheds and launching ways would have to be constructed, and this would be a large item of the expense. Laborers can be obtained at any point where there are steady employment and fair wages.
In the programme of exercises on page 444 it does not strike me that torpedo-boats should be used to work out general tactical and strategic problems, simply because there will be no time for such work. Torpedo work and torpedo tactics will occupy every particle of time that may be available. For the same reason I do not believe they should be employed in reconnoissance of harbors and interior waterways, except for their own use, which is of course very important. The whole interior waterway system should be thoroughly developed and charted on a scale suitable for torpedo-boat navigation. For the preparation of plans of defense and war charts under the War College, I should think the college could ask for and obtain two small light-draught vessels designed expressly for such use, which, with larger quarters and deck houses, would be in every way better adapted for the purpose.
THE CONSOLIDATED MESS OF THE CREW OF THE U. S. S. INDIANA.
Lieutenant-Commander E. B. BARRY, U. S. Navy.—I have read with great interest the paper by Lieutenant Decker on the consolidated mess of the Indiana. The idea is a very good one. Everything tending toward consolidation in internal affairs aboard ship is a step in the right direction, provided it does not go too far. I think, however, if the chief petty officers are exempted there is no reason why the first-class petty officers should not be; it would help to maintain the distinction between them and the ship's company, and after all would be only one more mess.
In connection with this subject is that of a beer canteen. I am not a "water drunkard," but I believe in real temperance, and I have yet to see any good results coming from a beer canteen. It is almost impossible to prevent doubling, and many men get loggy with beer, the taste grows, and where one day one bottle was sufficient, next week two will be hardly enough.
I do not ascribe the murder of the Indiana's master-at-arms directly to the canteen, but the probabilities are it would not have happened if there had been no beer about.
I look upon a regularly instituted beer canteen, especially when cargoes of beer are carried about from port to port, as injurious to the morale and discipline of a man-of-war.
It is the entering wedge to undo the grand work of the late Flag Officer Foote and others, who saw the evils of the spirit ration and succeeded in abolishing it. I trust most devoutly we never shall return to the condition of affairs existing before 1860.
Whether the mess can be maintained on a foreign station is yet an unanswered question. The difficulties are greater than at home, but I can see no reason why they should not be overcome. If a satisfactory solution is reached abroad, perhaps the consolidated mess may become part of the Department organization.
In my opinion the best man to have charge of the funds would be the ship's paymaster; the commissary yeoman would fall naturally under his direction. I repeat that the idea is a very good one and warrants general trial. If it works under all conditions it should be adopted as the Navy system.
Lieutenant-Commander DANIEL DELEHANTY, U. S. Navy.—I have read with pleasure Lieutenant Decker's paper on the consolidated mess of the crew of the U. S. S. Indiana. The subject is one concerning which I have been deeply interested for many years past. It has long been my opinion that the system in vogue for messing the men in our ships is faulty in the extreme, as bad a one as could be devised for all concerned.
About eleven years ago, while executive officer of the receiving ship Independence, Mare Island Navy Yard, under Captain Frederick Rodgers, I had the honor to put in successful operation the first consolidated mess. Like all innovations, it at first met with considerable opposition, but after a month or two the advantages were so manifest to the men in the better character of the food, its superior preparation, economy, cleanliness and adaptability, that all opposition ceased and the men willingly conceded that it was the only satisfactory way for them to mess on board ship, and the Independence mess is to-day operated exactly as it was ten years ago.
I have always believed and advocated that the system is wholly practicable for sea-going ships as well as for receiving ships, and that the proper way to run them both is on identically the same lines.
Nothing tends more to the contentment and comfort of a ship's company than a satisfactory commissary, and I believe the true way of accomplishing this is by the adoption of the system outlined.
On the first of last June the single mess was formed on board this ship under my personal supervision, with five cooks, the total number of men in the mess being three hundred and forty-five, which includes the entire crew excepting the officers' servants.
A temporary pantry was established on the gun deck abreast the galley. Two of the cooks were assigned to this pantry to prepare the food for the galley and to distribute it afterwards to the mess attendants; three of the cooks were stationed at the galley to attend to the cooking. A commissary yeoman was designed to select and order the supplies, a petty officer and a non-commissioned officer of the Marine Guard were named to advise with the yeoman and to certify to the correctness of the bills.
Under authority of the Navy Department one-half the number of rations were commuted. The practical results at the end of the month were that the men lived considerably better, the character and preparation of the food were greatly improved, and, barring miscalculation of the quantity necessary on several occasions, the men were clearly well satisfied with the experiment. No one had to contribute a cent to the maintenance of the mess, while the contributions from individual messes before that time varied from two to five dollars per month for each man. At the end of June the mess, however, was found to be in debt sixty dollars. For the month of July the number of commuted rations was increased to three quarters of the whole, and at once a decided improvement in the mess was the result, with a surplus at the end of the month of one hundred and ninety dollars; this, after paying to each of the five cooks ten dollars, which, in my opinion, is an equitable, wise and satisfactory arrangement, as it stimulated the cooks to the best performance of their duties.
On the first of the present month the commanding officer directed the reduction of the commuted rations to one-half until such time as the Department may authorize an increase.
With all my experience in the conduct of this system of messing, I am unqualifiedly of the opinion that all rations should be commuted. It may appear to those who are not fully conversant with all the conditions that this would be a radical and dangerous experiment, but I am clearly of the opinion that it would be otherwise. No more room would be required than under the present system; very little, if any, more provisions would be brought on board independent of the paymaster; most of the staple articles, such as pork, flour, sugar, beans, tea, etc., will be drawn from the paymaster and paid for at the invoiced prices, all of which would be an advantage to both the crew and the Government.
The system is so well established and so popular on board this ship, and, I believe, also on board the Indiana and Massachusetts, that I am convinced that it is only a matter of a short time when it will be extended to all vessels in the Navy.
There is undoubtedly room for improvements, and with such made, the system will be satisfactory and conducive to the comfort of the crew; the number of desertions will materially decrease, and the men will look upon their ship as in reality their home. I believe I am fully justified in this observation, as the system has been conducted on board under my personal attention and I have carefully noted the results, and the most important one is that since the inauguration of the mess on board, desertions from this ship have decreased more than fifty per cent.
I would strongly advocate—
1. That hereafter the system shall be uniformly conducted on all ships adopting it.
2. That a part of the ship near the galley shall be set apart for a commodious and properly constructed pantry, with a sink, draining overboard, for the washing of cooking and pantry utensils, with an adequate supply of running fresh water; bins of sufficient capacity for the daily supply of flour, sugar, coffee, etc., and that a bread bin be built near the pantry similar to the one used on board this ship, the bottom of which is a movable grating, to accommodate one or more days' supply of bread, with a false bottom below from which to clean the bin when filled.
3. That the practice of permanent seats at the table be absolutely prohibited. This is important, otherwise there is a great tendency for cliques, which exist in all ships, to seize certain tables as their right and to demand, or procure by other means, a discrimination in their favor at the expense of the more tractable men in the crew.
4. That all rations be commuted. If the Navy Department will consent to this it will unquestionably contribute to the success of the mess. In its operation at present a considerable quantity of the drawn ration is wasted, as the men will not eat it, and it is eventually thrown overboard or returned to the paymaster, the value being lost to the men and nothing is gained by the Government.
In conclusion I wish to say that during the latter part of last month this vessel was assigned to the duty of taking on board part of the New York Naval Militia for one week's instruction at sea and in port. Before the men came on board the commander of the division called on me to make arrangements for their subsistence. He stated that the state allowed each man forty-eight cents per diem for this purpose. I told him that they could be subsisted on board in a satisfactory manner for thirty cents per day, but he urged that his men were used to better fare than they were likely to receive on board ship and he desired to make arrangements for the additional supply of food. I suggested that our commissary be given a trial first, and on this understanding his men came on board, remained a week, received the same fare as the ship's company, did not expend one cent for additional food, and left the ship loud in the praises of the mess.
I am a firm advocate of the system under discussion and believe it will come to all ships to stay, and will bring and keep in the service a superior class of men.
Captain C. M. CHESTER, U. S. Navy.—There is no question but that the crew of a ship, save perhaps the 1st class petty officers, should be in one mess, and that the food should be prepared by two, three or more cooks of a much higher grade than those that heretofore have been found as a part of the complement of our ships of war.
The assistants, under the direction of the head cook, should prepare all food for the ship's company, in the same way, and serve it to the messmen or waiters (erroneously styled berth deck cooks) for distribution to the crew.
I am totally antagonistic to the plan of commuting rations and purchasing food to suit the tastes of individuals, for it would seem to me this matter should be controlled by the highest authority. The paymaster, who is the commissary of the ship, as far as Government supplies are concerned, should take charge of all purchases for the crew, and not have a part of them furnished by him and the rest by a line officer detailed for the purpose.
The messing should "have the personal interest and assistance of the executive officer," as is required by regulations.
The rations should consist of plain, wholesome food as at present provided for issue at sea, and as a change, a suitable variety of fresh provisions in port; these should be strictly defined by regulations, to be made, however, elastic enough to take in the market of the port visited and the season of the year.
The commanding officer of a ship, or when in squadron, the commander-in-chief, should direct the purchase of "harbor rations" as may be required, in the same manner as provided for other Government supplies. When the ship goes to sea, as well as on two or three occasions during the week in port, as preparatory for sea service, the ship's company should be put on sea rations, with such small additions of vegetables as the present regulations contemplate; the whole idea being that the supplies of food, like all other supplies, should be under the direct control of the commanding officer. He then would be prepared, at all times, to move his ship at short notice for any service that may be required of him and for which he may not be able to make any special preparations.
What would become of the Indiana plan if that ship was suddenly ordered to watch an enemy's port, or sent under secret instructions, of which no information could be given to any one?
Why should a coal bunker be used for an issuing room for extra supplies when the ship is already deficient in coal endurance?
Any of us might say, "I never lived better in my life" by taking our meals at Delmonico's or some other famous hostelry, but the question we must consider is, what would be the effect of such living on the physical condition of men who are being educated for the struggle of battle.
If the food the Government provides is not suitable, let us make a change; but let us do it without sacrificing the principles of military control.
Frequently the Newark, during her last cruise, was required to proceed to sea upon telegraphic instructions, which did not permit laying in of supplies, and once she remained at sea for a month without other than sea stores.
Another strong objection to this messing system, to my mind, is its associations with a canteen, " started for the serving of beer, the profits of which went towards bettering the food that could be furnished."
The profits from this unwholesome traffic amounted to two on board the Indiana, but from whom was this large sum drawn? The men themselves furnished it, and it is hardly probable that they would have been willing to have this tax levied upon them save that through it they were enabled to procure more beer; and their demand for an increase has added to the quantity which was at first allowed (one bottle per day), to three and four at the present time.
The fund could easily be doubled by increasing the allowance of beer, or money could be made for the mess by allowing the apprentices to join the beer club, which happily has thus far not become a common practice.
A number of years ago the whiskey ration, owing to popular disapproval, was abolished by an act of Congress; since that time the moral tone of the Navy has greatly improved, and yet recently we have gradually introduced a beer ration that not only contains more alcohol, but which (physicians tell us), taken with the other ingredients of beer, is the most baneful beverage that man can drink, enervating the system and debasing the moral senses.
It is pointed out by those favoring the use of beer in the Navy that drunkenness has decreased since beer was allowed and it is due to this cause; but I claim that this beneficial result is owing to a growth in moral sentiment among the men and is in spite of this handicap.
There are few ships, in my opinion, where grave breaches of discipline cannot be traced to the beer ration, and I wish the messing system, whatever it be, could have this prop taken from under it.
Lieutenant W. F. FULLAM, U. S. Navy.—It is fortunate that the Navy Department and the Naval Institute are alive to the necessity for an improvement in the system of messing the enlisted force on board ship. The present indications are that a plan will be devised which will give satisfaction to the men and greatly improve the efficiency of the ship.
In this connection it may not be amiss to consider the following statements and suggestions which have been made in a most respectful and subordinate manner by an intelligent petty officer serving afloat:
"On board this ship we have twenty messes and it takes twenty cooks and eight assistant cooks to run them. A sum of $400 is paid monthly by the messes to these men for cooking.
"Of course every officer in the service knows that much the same state of things exists on board other cruising ships. They are aware of the waste of money in paying cooks, the exorbitant prices charged by bumboats, the frequent occurrence of runaway caterers leaving their messers hungry for a month or two, and how hard it is for a 3rd class apprentice to contribute monthly to his mess.
"Under the present system the bumboat is a great source of expense to the men. The following table will show the difference in prices charged for certain articles ashore and by the bumboat in the port:
Bumboat. Groceryman ashore.
Potatoes, per 100 lbs. $1.60 $0.85
Eggs (Too) 1.32 .88
Milk per quart .10 .05
Milk, condensed .20 .15
Scrubbing brushes .35 .25
Tooth brushes .25 .15
"The men could be saved a great deal of expense from bumboats if certain articles such as writing paper, ink, toilet soap, towels, etc., could be purchased on shore and a small space allotted to them on board ship (a U. S. Army canteen on a small scale). Reasonable prices could be charged for these articles and the profits turned in for the benefit of the general mess.
"Men who have lived under Lieutenant Delehanty's messing system, which was applied with such success on board the Independence in 1880, believe that a similar system with certain modifications could be adopted on board cruising ships. By having a proper allowance of ship's cooks the men could be put in one mess with a competent caterer at its head. With one-half the rations commuted and by the adoption of a small canteen on board each ship, the profits of which should go to the mess, the men could live well without being obliged to contribute a monthly sum of money."
These statements merit attention.
The existence of a large surplus in the case of a general mess has caused some dissatisfaction. But this difficulty can be easily removed. If the mess accounts are squared monthly, a man who is detached from the ship may be paid his proportional share of the surplus, and a new man entering may have the same charged against him, just as in the case of officers' messes.
Captain A. S. BARKER, U. S. Navy.—I have read Lieutenant's Decker's article on "The Consolidated Mess of the Crew of the Indiana" with interest. Whether or not the system will prove as efficient as the present method of messing, under all service conditions, can be determined by further trial.
I do not understand that the "canteen" is necessarily a part of the system; if it be, I am opposed to it.
I neither believe in having canteens on board our men-of-war, nor in having beer brought alongside in boats to be peddled to the crew.
It is time drunkards were weeded out of the service, and in my opinion no custom should be tolerated which tends to promote or keep alive a taste for drink.
I know there is, or has been, a difference of opinion on this subject, but I think that many of the former advocates of the innovation are now convinced that its influence is pernicious.
For one, I wish the Navy Department could see its way clear to forbid the custom. It has never obtained on the U. S. S. Oregon.
CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF ESSAY BY DOHRMAN. (See No. 82.)
JOHN S. WATTERS, Comdr., La. N. M.—The paper of Mr. H. G. Dohrman contains so much that is valuable that it is hard to cover all the points in a brief discussion. That the facilities for educating officers who have had no nautical experience, so that they may be even theoretically posted on a small fraction of what an officer of the Navy is expected to know, are at present so meagre that but little progress can be made, probably every commanding officer who has himself served in the Navy will admit without argument. That it is impossible for officers at a distance from Newport to attend the War College or Torpedo School is another thing that admits of no argument. The officers. of the Naval Militia are mostly men whose time is not their own and whose means are limited. What attention they can give to their militia organization is only during the evening and on Sunday, and it can scarcely be expected of the most enthusiastic man in the world that he shall give every evening and every Sunday; but it would take pretty nearly that to enable him to obtain a fair grasp of his duties. As for the commanding officer, so many minor details must necessarily receive his attention that it is impossible for him to give proper attention to the instruction of officers.
I agree thoroughly with Mr. Dohrman's plan of a detail of naval officers who would come prepared to deliver a systematic course of lectures, following a well considered plan, for the instruction of the officers of the Naval Militia. A few lectures would do more good than any amount of literature, which would not make anything like the same lasting impression. Further, no greater encouragement could be devised than the manifestation of such an active interest in the Naval Militia by the Department. A certain amount of preliminary literature of such a character as could safely be disseminated would enhance the value of the course of lectures.
Provision should be made by Congress for defraying the expenses of commanding officers, so that they can attend the War College and Torpedo School. The actual expenses of transportation and the pay of their grade while on such duty should be allowed them. This should be paid out of the national treasury, as the Naval Militia organization is, to a certain extent, national in its character, and the instruction of the commanding officers is a matter of sufficient importance to warrant this trifling outlay. Those who could spare the time could thus avail themselves of the opportunity, which is now a matter of impossibility for most of them; while if the various State legislatures had to make such provision, it would be a long time before it could be accomplished, if accomplished at all. This may strike some persons as savoring of mercenary motives, but as long as commanding officers are not millionaires, as they undoubtedly should be, there is no other way for them to get the instruction which it is important they should have. It would be little enough recompense for their outlay of time, trouble and money in a worthy cause.
I offer this as a suggestion, as there is a great deal that could not be touched upon by the officers detailed as lecturers to the officers generally, and of a character which could not be printed, but which commanding officers should know.
The listing of all merchant steamers visiting the port during the year, and keeping up with the condition of her machinery, coaling facilities, supplies generally, machine-shop facilities, etc., of local towns, is legitimately within the province of the Naval Militia, as is also the reconnaissance work which has been so successfully carried out by the New York battalion; the only difficulty in the way being that, as nights and Sundays are the only time during the year available for devotion to such work, barring perhaps a week during the summer, progress will naturally be slow in this direction.