The navy has been much interested in the proceedings of the joint committee of the two houses of Congress to consider the reorganization of the navy. Although the testimony there taken has been published, it is so voluminous, there is so much repetition, so much is trivial or deals with undisputed matters of fact well known to every naval officer, there is such a lack of continuity in the arguments, one witness supplementing and completing those of another, that it will perhaps prove instructive as well as interesting to assemble the arguments and make a connected summary and comparison of the various proposals advanced.
Let us first consider the proposals relating to the line: In general, it may be said of the proposals that they are divided into two classes, those which are intended to increase the efficiency of the navy and those which are intended merely to disarm opposition within the navy to the vital measures.
After examining the drafts of bills submitted and the arguments on them, it appears that all propositions made embrace only a few main features, and the bills differ in their modification and combination of these features. It will be unnecessary, therefore, to consider the details of bills, for the general principles of all plans of reorganization are covered by a few proposals.
Necessity for Change.—The first point to consider is in regard to the necessity for any change (p. iii). In favor of the change, it is urged:
1 (pp. 3, 14, 29). That the present system brings officers to command rank at too great an age, when they have passed the period of the greatest efficiency, and when they cannot remain long enough in the upper grades to make an adequate return for their high retired pay.
2 (p. 50). It is necessary that those in the upper grades should be of greater average ability than those in the grades below them (p. 31). It is false economy to give commands to inferior men.
3 (p. 68). The present system is bad in having only a pass examination for promotion, for the Board always decides any doubt in favor of the individual then before it, instead of in favor of service efficiency (p. 19). Poor officers thus feel that they can float along until retired with high pay, for (pp. 17, 18, 68) the Board is unwilling to dismiss for professional fault. Some system is desirable that will substitute a healthy competition for promotion among officers (pp. 38-145).
It will be admitted by all that, among the plans which fulfill these objects, that is best which has the least objections in administration, and will cause least friction and be least liable to abuse.
On the other hand, those who are opposed to change say that the present organization gives results that compare very favorably with other services, for "the present U. S. Navy system of promotion by examination is really selection of the fittest; it is not necessary to look to foreign navies to break the block in promotion on a list where every man is a picked man" (p. 277), and that changes should be moderate, for "the younger men in the Navy may wish all impediments to their advancement removed; but it should be remembered that something is due to those who have grown gray in the service of their country."
It is also said (p. 72) that the present stagnation is merely a temporary one, which will be removed when the large classes of the war reach the retiring age.
The Unfitness of Officers to Decide on Necessary Changes.—On coming to examine the changes proposed, we find it admitted by all that the efficiency of the service should be considered above all things; but in their statements the Secretary of the Navy and others point out (pp. 19-26) that any measure looking to the improvement of the service will be opposed by those officers who are professionally or otherwise below the mark.
On examination of the drafts of bills submitted to the Committee, and of the statements in regard to them, it appears clearly throughout the whole that while officers are the only persons who can give valuable testimony as to the actual condition of matters in the Navy, they are far from being the proper people to draft remedial legislation; for underlying the greater part of the statements before the Committee is the tacit assumption that not only each officer's present commission and retiring pension, but also the prospects of future promotion, are vested rights of individual officers. In fact, it was frequently assumed that whatever changes might be adopted, no man's expectations should be materially worse under the schemes proposed than under the present law. It is evident that such an assumption contravenes the avowed object of the Committee, and it is surprising that its members seem to have respected it. Indeed, it is probable that no witness was anxious to point out the weight of this assumption upon the deductions drawn, so that the Committee's attention was not directed toward duly considering the claims of the government as against the interest of its employees.
Another point in this connection is that it is difficult to the most honest man impartially to consider proposals which affect himself
The Principles of the Proposed Changes.—If, in the various plans proposed, we neglect the question of pay as not being one of organization, and certain minor features as being independent of any general plan, we find only seven important principles, whose combination and modification vary according to the predilection of individuals.
These proposals are:
- An increase in the numbers of officers in the upper grades.
- The establishment of a reserved list for certain specified shore duties only.
- A specified amount of sea service to qualify for promotion.
- Retirement at varying ages, according to the rank.
- A considerable and immediate reduction in the numbers of those classes which entered during and just after the war.
- Promotion of meritorious officers by selection from those leaving certain established qualifications.
- The provision of a fixed number of vacancies in each grade each year, by the removal from the active list of the necessary number of least valuable officers.
Arguments Regarding the Proposals.—In deciding, as each must do for himself, upon the relative advantages of these proposals, we must all bear in mind the three points previously mentioned, which, as the testimony shows, call for remedy in the present condition of the service, namely, youth in the upper grades, superior average ability in the upper grades, and competition throughout and further, we must decide how far those proposals which perhaps do not conduce to efficiency in the Navy are necessary concessions for the sake of disarming opposition, and obtaining more essential matters. Lastly, we must consider whether any change provides for a permanent basis in the future.
1. Increase in the Upper Grades.—The Secretary of the Navy argues in favor of more officers in the upper grades on the ground that it will diminish the age of reaching command rank, and that in other services the proportion of commanding officers to those below them is larger than it is with our Navy, and that more experience in command is necessary. It is also said (p. 43) that it is not reasonable to expect the older officers to go to sea as much as younger ones, as they are entitled to rest, and also (p. 53) that if the list of captains is long, the Secretary has a large body to choose from, when looking for a good man for special work. On the other hand, it is shown (pp. 53, 59, 97) that holding a commission only cannot make a man fit to command; experience is necessary, and as long as Congress does not increase the number of ships, an increase in command rank cannot give any increased experience at sea, but rather the contrary.
On the whole, therefore, it seems that the efficiency of the service would not be raised by an increase of commanding officers, unless it is admitted that some of them on the active list should never be permitted to go to sea; so that the proposal is not one of fundamental importance, but a makeshift which is sure to please all.
2. Reserved List.—Next we take up the reserved list. It is proposed to establish a list of officers who will not go to sea, but will perform certain shore duties only. It will be recruited preferably by volunteers, but compulsorily if necessary. Promotion as high as captain will be given on this list, and it is affirmed that it will be as distinguished a list as the sea-going one.
The object of introducing this list is to place people in command at sea while still young, and to shelve those officers least fit for sea duties while retaining their services. Whatever the Department may assert as to its intentions, it is impossible that such a list will enjoy the prestige of the sea-going list. Still it must not be regarded as a dishonorable list, for in any rational scheme of promotion there must be some way of indicating preferences among individuals, but no one can be disgraced by such expression of preference. As for giving a man promotion after it has been decided that it is inadvisable to send him to sea, that certainly is merely a measure for preventing opposition from those who may fear being placed on the reserve list; and of inducing others, both good and bad, voluntarily to make way for juniors, while offering to Congress a plausible appearance of economy.
It is proper here to consider the views of those officers who maintain that a change in law which unfavorably affects a part of the list is unjust and an interference with vested rights. There is no legal basis for such a contention. If there were, there could be no legislation on any subject, for every change in law works to somebody's disadvantage.
A man's prospects are no more his rights in the navy than in civil life, and the proposal of the Secretary to give officers promotion on the reserved list was most liberal, and entirely for the sake of diminishing the hardships of necessary reform. If the country is to continue to maintain a navy, it should be established on a thoroughly sound basis, with none but the best officers in the upper grades. In discussing the changes necessary to this end, navy people naturally wish for no impairment of their prospects or personal positions, but the whole weight of evidence taken by the committee shows that efficiency calls for radical changes, and it should be remembered that the longer Congress considers the matter the more generous will appear the proposals now offered to ease the fall of the weaker competitors.
Sea Service Qualifications Required for Promotion.—The third proposal is to establish a sea service qualification in each grade as a necessary requisite for promotion.
This qualification is called for in other navies (p. 165), and is a proper one, because an officer can be formed and developed only by such service. Nevertheless, in each grade the time required must be moderate in reference to the ratio of ships in commission and number of officers in the grade, because if it is unduly great it throws the choice of officers for promotion directly into the hands of the Department, without any of the restrictions which should guard such a practice.
Age Limit to Service in Different Grades.—The age limit in grades is meant to bring officers to the upper grades early enough in life, and is the simplest possible measure to accomplish the object. It is advocated as an independent and sufficient measure by those who say that it is improper to make distinctions between officers whose record is without reproach, and who believe that if the navy is to be rejuvenated it should be by a method which casts no discredit on those struck from the list for the advantage of the service. Such an argument disregards the fact that to make a change valuable it should not only bring young officers in the upper grades, but also admit only superior people to high rank, and should make every man work in competition with others to earn promotion. It is evident that between any persons occupying about the same place on the list, personal differences in health or abilities are far more important than two or three years of age; and, in the interest of the government, these differences should be made the criterion, and not age. Thus, although age retirement as the sole measure of reform commends itself to many persons, because it conveys no reproach; yet, from the government's point of view, this is a poor way for making its decision among the men of any class date. It has no more relation to their present and future capabilities for efficient service than would any chance method of choice, such as throwing dice.
Immediate Reduction in the War Classes.—A fifth proposal is the immediate reduction in the classes entering during and just after the war.
The object is to reduce the classes to a normal size, so that the classes below will not be kept out of command rank until close upon retirement (pp. 4, 5).
Another reason advanced is that these classes have not been properly scrutinized before graduation or since (p. 173).
Another reason for the reduction of the ''hump" is that if any change whatever is to be made in the system of promotion, it is necessary to prepare a permanent basis by a transitional measure which shall at once raise the average ability of the upper grades to the desired permanent standard, while decreasing the average age. This can be done only by a careful scrutiny of the upper grades, and the removal of those least fit for service. Against the proposal that the scrutiny should now be extended to the lower grades, it may be said that the measure is simply transitional, and that the turn of the present junior officers to be weeded out will arrive in due time as their duties change with increasing rank.
6. Selection for Promotion; 7. Selection for Retirement.—The two plans of selection for promotion and selection for retirement have some common features, and if wisely administered should produce similar results; it will, therefore, be convenient to consider them by comparison with each other. Both plans contemplate an annual choice by a Board of Admirals acting under oath to consider only the efficiency of the service, and to be guided by established law and regulations. Both plans may be so administered as to place officers in command and flag ranks at any desired age; both will give increased average ability in the upper grades and both will produce competition. Selection for promotion is necessarily associated with a retirement for age in grades, because it is evidently absurd to retain a man indefinitely in the lower grades after he has passed the age for good work there.
In the selection-for-retirement plan the desired rapidity of advancement through the list is obtained by fixing the number of vacancies that must be made annually in the upper grades so as to bring about promotion at suitable ages.
Therefore, as the two systems will work similarly, if properly carried out with a view only to efficiency, it is obvious that the choice lies with the one which is the more easily capable of good administration.
Selection for promotion seems more conformable to the practice of great business corporations, and it appears the natural and proper method; but against this method it is argued that it will be subject to political abuse, that there will be wire-pulling, and that the officers who obtain promotion will frequently be far from the best. It would create jealousies and heart-burnings to the injury of the Navy, and finally, with the best intentions, it would be very difficult to weigh and estimate rightly the relative claims to promotion. Those who favor the selection for retirement scheme say that they prefer it because on each point its disadvantages are less than by the other plan. By retirement those who fail are removed from the active list where their dissatisfaction would work harm, yet no one need lose hope and zeal till actually retired. In one case the Board promotes a man because it hopes his future record may justify it; in the other it retires him because it knows his past record has justified it.
Another objection to promotion by selection is that in foreign navies, where it is the rule, the system has a tendency to become one of seniority, so that periodically there occurs a congestion which is relieved by special measures. Such a congestion now exists in the British and French Navies. By the retirement system things would run on smoothly without any tendency to such congestion. It has been urged against all schemes of selection that they are "un-American" and that they are impossible of honest execution because no one can say who is the best or worst man. It must be remembered that the problem is not to find the best man either for promotion or retirement; it is impossible for all to agree on him; the good of the Navy will be subserved if a suitable man is chosen in either case. "There would be vigorous opposition in the Navy especially in its upper half to such a measure, but the broad question is whether the good of the service, or that of naval officers as individuals, shall be the paramount consideration. If the former is to be considered then such a reform is paramount; if the latter is to be placed in front then nothing need be done. A system which promotes all officers to the highest rank before retirement leaves nothing to be desired from the personal point of view."
On reviewing all the seven proposals, it is seen that the only one necessary is either the selection for promotion or the selection for retirement, combined in the former case with an age limitation and sea-service qualifications in each grade. The reduction of the war classes is not absolutely imperative, but is very highly advisable in order to give immediate results from either measure. The other proposals moderate the change to those officers who must suffer for the good of the Navy.
Warrant Officers.—Following the order of the published testimony, we take up the case of the warrant officers, who state that their responsibilities have been much increased recently, while even petty officers now get appointments from the Department, so that the warrant no longer confers its old prestige and authority; and socially, also, they are at a disadvantage with foreign warrant officers. They ask to be commissioned to rank with lieutenants after 20 years' service, and in addition, that any who pass the requisite examination before that time, should be commissioned in the line. While the warrant officers naturally wish to better their position, their testimony does not show that their efficiency will be increased by change. On the contrary, it is clear that no increase of warrant rank as such will ever be advantageous. The reason is obvious: the duties of all commissioned officers frequently call for initiative, discretion and education, as well as for fidelity in their execution; but though very important, the duties of warrant officers are always subordinate, simple, and mandatory, calling mainly for fidelity in their execution. So their present rank is fully adequate to their present duties, whatever may be thought of the advisability of opening a way for enlisted men to obtain commissions in the line or engineer corps through warrant rank.
Enlisted Men.—The testimony of the enlisted men is mainly in regard to the difficulties in the way of drawing their pay as it becomes due, and in regard to liberty while in debt after shipping. The claims of enlisted men to a retired list, and to a chance for a commission after due examination, are also presented. The complaint in regard to pay has now been remedied by Departmental action. The establishment of a retired list has been frequently before Congress, and will no doubt be made sooner or later. The chief obstacle to granting commissions to worthy enlisted men is the fear of breaking up the apprentice system as happened before. If this can be avoided, there is much to recommend the proposal.
The apothecaries and machinists think they should have warrants, as their duties are important, and it is desirable to attract good men.
Staff of the Navy.—The entire Navy is united on the general proposition that changes are imperative, but there are three parties whose personal interests are so divergent, that they will not support each other in any proposed plan of reorganization. These parties are the senior and the junior line officers and the staff corps. In these circumstances, it will be impossible to satisfy all parties completely, and Congress only can make a wise adjudication among the conflicting claims, because it only can clearly distinguish what is personal from what is general.
The original controversy between line and staff arose out of the efforts of subordinate officers, both of the line and staff, to have their personal status, individual rights and official responsibilities governed by law and regulations, in place of the captain's arbitrary will. In our civil war what had been accomplished in this direction was in a large degree overthrown, as the emergencies of war caused every man to step outside his own duties and his rightful authority in order to help the general situation. So in the interests of a strict chain of responsibility, economy and control, the Department re-established the authority and privileges of both line and staff by a series of general orders and courts-martial, and since then the efforts of staff officers to improve their status has been shifted from a struggle for individual position to an attempt to widen the sphere of their corps, and towards escape from the control of the captain on shipboard, by becoming more directly accountable to the Navy Department. Their position would thus be less irksome on shipboard, but efficiency would suffer.
On the other hand, there has been noticeable a distinct tendency of the Department to limit and restrict the freedom and responsibility of the captain, and make him merely the agent of the Bureaus, as will be seen in the proposals made to the Committee. It should be recognized; personally, staff officers are as well off as line officers, but they complain of their positions, and ask for change, because they do not clearly perceive that they must lend themselves to that unity of command and centralization of responsibility which is an absolute necessity in every sound military organization, and which has been, and still is the rule of the U.S. Navy. Owing to this reason, the statements of staff officers as to the need of their own corps cover only one side of the question.
The Committee of Congress announced that it did not wish line officers to discuss the organization of the staff corps. This was a great mistake. The line of the Navy is the Navy, and the staff corps are auxiliaries. No doubt the work they perform on shipboard is as essential as any other, but nevertheless it is done under the direction of line officers who are primarily responsible to the Navy Department and the country; and it is manifestly unwise to allow a body of men whose positions are always subordinate to prescribe their relations to those set over them by the necessities of the service. It must also be remembered that the relations of the staff corps with scientific and professional societies and with the business community are much closer than those of the line, and thus their claims exert on Congress an influence quite independent of their actual bearing- upon the efficiency of the service. Let us examine in detail what the staff has asked the Committee to recommend.
Pay Corps.—The Pay Corps asks for nothing except to have its members appointed from the Naval Academy graduates; but in view of the suggestion to do away with the Corps and have its duties performed by officers temporarily detailed for the purpose, it points out that in such a case efficiency and economy might suffer through the inexperience and lack of interest of officers thus detailed. On the other hand, the advantage of having all officers on board trained to military life is desirable, and perhaps the difficulties of paymasters' duties are exaggerated by themselves. The arguments on both sides are weighty, and the question is one which Congress can decide better than the parties to the controversy.
Constructors.—The Corps of Constructors asks for nothing but an increase of numbers, as it is not large enough to perform its duties thoroughly.
As it seems the settled policy of the country in view of war to maintain a larger number of line officers than are needed to man the ships in time of peace, the difficulty alluded to might be overcome by detailing some of the younger ones for shore duty under the Bureau of Construction. They are sufficiently well versed in necessary technical matters to perform subordinate work creditably, and the influence as seamen which they would necessarily have on the decisions of the Bureau could only be beneficial. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Bureau of Construction has been able to silence all serviceable criticism of its ship designs on the part of seamen by the action of the Secretary in ceasing the detail of captains as general inspectors of ships under construction, on the ground that they asked for too many changes. Ships should suit those that use them.
The Medical Corps—The Surgeon-General asks for the Medical Corps:
1. To have the Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery retain the office until his retirement. The argument offered in support of the proposition is that it would be conformable to the Army method. On the other side, it may be said that perhaps the office would then be looked upon as a reward for past good service and a quasi-retirement, so that its occupants would not work as hard or be as progressive as if they were looking to a re-appointment as a further recognition of good service. The Surgeon-General further asks for a change of titles for surgeons, although the titles would still be indicative of the profession.
The Corps also asks for the substitution of rank for relative rank but this will be discussed with the Engineer's proposals.
The necessity of a permanent trained Hospital Corps for service afloat and ashore is also strongly urged. The nature of the work to be performed by this corps is so distinct from all else on shipboard that the desirability of retaining properly trained men is perfectly obvious.
Engineer Corps.—In the name of the Engineer Corps the Engineer-in-Chief set forth to the Committee that its needs are included under 5 heads, namely;
- An increase in numbers.
- The bestowal of rank instead of relative rank.
- The examination of chief engineers at each promotion.
- The legal definition of the duties of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.
- An Assistant Chief of Bureau.
Increase of Engineer Corps.—In support of the proposals to enlarge the engineer corps, the Engineer-in-Chief staled that there are now 176 engineers in the Navy, of whom 41.5 per cent, are on sea duty, 50 per cent, on shore duty, and 8.5 per cent, on receiving ships or unemployed, and that this number was inadequate to the duties, so that ships now in commission had not their proper quota of officers, in spite of the withdrawal of the officers from colleges throughout the country. It has even been necessary to detail line officers to inspect steel, although that is proper work for engineers. In view of ships building, it is imperative to increase the force of engineer officers. The Engineer-in-Chief then suggests a plan for obtaining 100 additional engineers by transfer of that number from the line of the Navy, selecting them by a board of engineers.
Those opposed to any increase say:
1. A detail of officers as college professors is much desired by colleges, and is a flattering tribute to the abilities of the engineers, but public education is not the business of the Navy, and no increase should be made on this ground.
2. Taking up the dearth of officers at present, it is pointed out that officers' on inspection duty at shipyards will soon be available for other work, as no further shipbuilding is authorized. Besides, our Navy is defectively organized in its enlisted force, so that it employs more commissioned engineers than would be necessary with an improved system. The experience of other services shows that a body of competent machinists or artificers to run the engines and perform the mechanical repairs thereto would enable us to dispense with some of the highly educated engineers on every ship, whose appropriate field is in designing machinery and in general supervision on shipboard.
It is denied by many that engineers are overworked on shipboard, except occasionally on some ships on very long voyages, and even that is owing to the unnecessary system of standing a strict watch, the outgrowth of the defective organization of the enlisted force.
As for the new ships it is useless to provide engineers for them unless the enlisted force of the navy is increased also. It may be here remarked that the proposal to transfer 100 line officers to the engineers, when compared with the converse proposal of the "Hale" bill to transfer engineers to the line, shows that to a certain point some officers in both corps are agreed as to the similarity of duties and the capability of the men for both.
Rank and Line Titles for the Staff.—It is said on the part of staff officers that rank is necessary to define clearly their status and duties on shipboard. They do not ask it to confer authority outside the particular department of each officer, and it will not entitle them to command the ship or station where they are. They represent that now they depend on the good will of their subordinates for obedience to their orders; that without it they are subject to indignities, and that the great importance of the Engineer Corps makes it just to recognize it by the bestowal of rank. As for the assumption of line titles with the rank the staff is not unanimous. Those who urge it do so on the ground that it would please them personally, and that it would increase the consideration in which they are held. Against any change of rank it is alleged that if the desire for rank is for personal reasons it is unnecessary, for every one's status is now assured by law. If it is to carry on duty more effectively it is also unnecessary, for ample authority now belongs to the staff, as is shown by the punishment awarded by a long series of courts-martial for infringement of their authority. If, however, the demand for rank is considered, together with the proposal for making the organization of the engineer's force more distinct from that of the rest of the crew, and for committing the discipline of the corps almost entirely to the hands of its own members, then the bestowal of rank would be bad, for it would threaten the unity of command and responsibility which is now the rule and is absolutely essential in all military bodies.
As to indignities to staff officers, line officers say that they are not attributable to lack of rank, but to the fault of the individual captain; subordinate line officers are equally subject to such indignities, and the remedy is not in a change of law, but in an appeal to it.
As to the assumption of line titles, line officers wish to keep their distinctive titles for themselves, and say that it is wise to have titles indicate the duties of the office. They point out that when the title is a combination of military and professional ones, as in the case of the English Army surgeons, there is always a tendency to drop the professional part in order to appear as soldiers, and so implying that the duties of the staff are not so honorable. A number of years ago, it is said, when such a movement was on foot among navy surgeons, the medical societies of the country defeated it on that ground.
Definition of the Duties of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.—The Engineer-in-Chief wishes to define the field of his Bureau so as to embrace all machinery except torpedoes and gun mounts, and instances the anomaly of the steering engine being nominally under a line officer while cared for by the engineer's force.
Line officers reply that there is no need for change; because what they have done in electricity, with ordnance, and with steel inspection has been well done, and in the case of the steering engine, they say that line officers can look out for it as well as engineer officers, but the working men to care for it are available in the engineer's force, and economy dictates the arrangement. The point for us to bear in mind is the fact that line and engineers have both done well in a common field.
Next is the proposal to place in the control of engineer officers all boards of survey on engineering machinery, material, etc., and all courts of inquiry and courts-martial on engineer officers. This is to be done on the ground that such matters are the specialties of engineer officers, and that keeping them in the minority on such boards and courts is an undeserved mark of distrust. Line officers reply that were there any distrust of engineers, they would not be represented at all; and they believe that the change would be a severe blow to the efficiency of the service, because it would force upon commanding officers full responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates, while not committing to them the discipline and control of those subordinates.
At present, the means of enforcing obedience is with those who hold the ultimate responsibility, as it should be.
The Engineer-in-Chief also wishes to make the engineer division subject only to the captain, establishing it as a complete organization independent of all else in the ship. He further proposes to decide by law what shall be a ship's complement of engineer officers. Line officers object to these proposals, because the first is opposed to unity of command and administration, and the second is proper for the Department's decision. Here, as previously, the point to be noted is that the proposal is one which trenches considerably on the present field of the line.
Pay.—Finally, the Engineer-in-Chief wishes to increase the pay of the corps, and base the table exclusively upon length of service This would of course be very satisfactory to individuals, but such a table is found objectionable on general grounds by those who say that pay should depend upon the nature of the services rendered, and therefore should be based upon grades and upon the position held. Applying their doctrine to the present case, they say that payment by grade being proper, if the staff is to be granted rank, its pay should be rather reduced to that of the line, because their position being assimilated, there is no reason for difference in pay.
Marine Corps.—In view of the discussions of recent years regarding the Marine Corps, the testimony before the Joint Committee is interesting as a full presentation of the marine's side, and as giving their own opinion of their proper sphere of duties. Their case begins by stating that the necessity of marines on shipboard is indubitable, having been recognized from the first establishment of permanent navies; next, the value of the guard duties at navy yards is dwelt upon, and then their superiority over sailors for military duties on landing parties. It is stated that "on board ship they do everything that blue-jackets do except coaling and painting ship." Were the "marines on shipboard, they could also coal and paint. Marine officers could stand watch at sea, as they are Academy graduates." "The duties of marines on shipboard should be enlarged." The commandant of marines wishes them to man the secondary batteries and to have the division always employed as a unit. He believes that there are officers in the Navy who could take a ship manned entirely by marines, except in the engineer department, and such ship would have no equal for efficiency in the service. To enable this to be done, he recommends that the force be increased to 4000 men. It appears, also, that marine officers pass examinations in ordnance, torpedoes and electricity.
The duties of the line and of the marines are more nearly allied to each other than to those of the staff. Line officers acknowledge the important nature of the services rendered by the Marine Corps and bear witness to the high standard of discipline which it maintains as becomes the oldest military body of the United States.
General Conclusion.—in reviewing the testimony before the Committee it seems clear that there are many officers among the line engineers and marines who think that the division of duties among the three corps is an artificial one rather than a natural one, inasmuch as many of them are similar in their nature in the different corps. Apparently these gentlemen would favor a redistribution of duties which would give to the corps of each all those duties which he regards as its natural specialty.
From the same premises, it appears to others that a solution of the question might be found in more or less consolidation of the three principal sea-going corps.