(Translated by the late Medical Director Philip Lansdale, U.S.N., with the collaboration of Lieutenant Albert Gleaves, U.S.N.)
Contributed by Rear-Admiral S. B. Luce, U.S. Navy.
INTRODUCTION.
The following translation of a monograph on the naval tactics of the trireme period, by Admiral Fincati, well known for his researches as a naval archaeologist, cannot fail to prove interesting, if not instructive, to the student of naval history.
The fact that the rostra, or beak, of the trireme imposed upon the fleets of antiquity a certain system of tactics, in which ramming was a cardinal point, invests the study of this period of naval history with an interest it had completely lost during the time when ships were fought under sail, and ramming was impossible.
In the former, the effective use of the principal weapon of offense, the beak, necessitated such a formation of the line of battle as would bring that weapon most readily into play. In the latter, the conditions of wind and sails, and the artillery in broadside, were equally imperative in their requirements of a system which would give all the advantages to the gun. In the former, the ram called for the line abreast; in the latter, the gun necessitated the column as the normal formation for battle.
Admiral Fincati's article brings prominently in view two very important factors of a sea fight, which were common to both periods of naval history: The destruction of the adversary's motive power—the wrecking of the oars of the trireme; the shooting away of the spars and rigging of the sailing ship; and the practice of carrying an enemy's ship by boarding.
With the return of the beak, as a weapon of offense; with guns no longer restricted to the broadside, but rather having a practically full circle of fire; with the motive power screened, and yet not wholly inaccessible; with boarding still practicable under possible contingencies; and with the destructive agency of the torpedo added, it is for the naval tactician of the day to determine just how far, and in what direction, these conditions will control the organization of a modern fleet, and its disposition for battle. The opinion is expressed in the body of the paper that, in respect to these matters, we have something to learn from a study of the naval wars of the ancients; and one can hardly read this article without arriving at the same conclusion.
S.B. LUCE.
I.
The naval warfare of the ancients may be considered, like that of modern times, under two heads, the Preparation and the Conflict.
War having been decided upon, the admiral would collect his ships and organize his fleet. Before putting to sea he would appoint a rendezvous as near as possible to the enemy, where the impedimenta of the ships could be landed before bringing on an engagement, to the end that he could malce the attack with the vessels lightened, an important consideration in the days of oars, when every inch of draft increased their unhandiness. It was thus that Lutazio won his victory when he surprised the enemy heavy with stores and hampered with rigging. Under the same circumstances Polisenedes hastened his attack upon the Romans and Annone, the Carthaginian admiral, landed his spars, masts, etc., at Erice, after the manner of a gladiator who throws his doublet upon the ground, before crossing swords with his adversary.
The ships being thus cleared for action, it was necessary to wait for a favorable condition of sea and wind. The fleets of Caesar and Anthony lay in sight of each other for four days before engaging, wailing for the sea to go down.
The admiral had also to decide where he would tight. If he preferred the open sea, he would try to get the enemy between himself and the shore, so as to crowd him on the beach and leave him no room to get headway or to make an assault, an advantage to be kept for himself. "I will not fight in a gulf, nor in it will I cruise," said Formione, "since it is apparent that a narrow space is not suitable even for a few, well manned ships engaging heavy, badly managed vessels. It is not possible to fall upon the enemy and ram him in an effective manner, except from a good distance and ahead. Neither is it possible to properly defend one's self when crowded in a narrow space where there is no room to strike the enemy amidships, and then turn at once and ram him from astern."
Calvesius forgot this maxim and narrowly escaped defeat in consequence. "At daybreak,'' says Appiano, "the Calvisians were almost touching- the shore with their ships at the bottom of the gulf, drawn up in a crescent iniezza luna) with their prows fronting seaward. Menecrates appeared in sight of the gulf, pushed forward his ships and fell upon the Calvisians, crowding them against the shore which was close astern of them. Calvesius resisted bravely, but he was so hemmed in that he could not move his ships, while those of Menecrates hauled off and returned, each delivering his blow and relieving the other in turn. The Calvisians, however, could neither retreat nor attack."
The same thing happened to the Romans when fighting against Aderbale. Polybius gives the following description of this battle: "The ships being at length liberated with much labor, the captains drew them up in line of battle along the coast, with their bows pointing seaward. The consul, who first followed astern of the fleet, then advanced and placed himself on the left wing. Meanwhile Aderbale, with five ships, fell upon the left wing of the Romans, who thus found themselves between the enemy and the shore. Both sides advanced to the conflict in line of battle, and the pretorian ships, having hoisted their ensigns, began the attack. The battle raged furiously on both sides, the flower of the armies of both countries being on board the ships. For a time the issue of the battle seemed uncertain; but the Carthaginians finally gained ground, not only because their ships were lighter and the rowers more expert, but especially, because, having sea room they could maneuver freely, and withdraw to chase any of the Roman ships that might become separated, and run them ashore. If any Carthaginian ship was in danger, her consorts could easily succor her, through the facility of maneuvering afforded by the sea room astern of them; while the Romans, on the other hand, were constantly embarrassed by being so far in shore that they could neither withdraw nor assist each other; nor, which is more important, break through the enemy's line and assail him astern or in flank."
The notable battle of Salamis offers an example of a maxim opposed to that just stated. Here Themistocles preferred to fight in the Straits of Salamis, because a great portion of the Persian fleet could be rendered inactive and excluded from the battle altogether, owing to the impossibility of forming the line of battle in such a narrow channel.
Great care had to be observed in avoiding places subject to strong currents, which always rendered evolutions difficult and uncertain, especially for one of the combatants.
The loss of 70 ships of Nicanore was due to the contrariety of the currents. Referring to Aderbale's experience with adverse currents, T. Livius says: "The motion of the sea impeded the steering of the ships, nor was the combat equal, because, on the part of the Carthaginians, neither art nor prudence availed; the arbiter of the fight was the sea which forced its current between the contending ships, while they tried in vain to resist its influence."
Careful attention was also paid to the direction and force of the wind, in the hope that it would not be adverse on the day of battle. Vegezius observes that a good opportunity of engaging is offered when the enemy has the wind against him, and Bomilcar, in Livy, "feared to engage, not from being of inferior force, but because the wind favored the Roman fleet more than his own."
Having noted these considerations, which had more or less an indirect bearing upon the battle, we will now proceed to discuss those that concerned it more intimately.
First of all, the sails were lowered, the masts more or less inclined, the oars got ready and the arms and implements of warfare placed at hand. The ships of the Liburni, says Vegezius, "struck their enemy with the beak, not by force of sails but of oars, and at the same time skillfully avoided his blows." Livy relates that Polisenedes, "hearing of the approach of the Roman ships under sail, moved at once with serene front to meet them, upon which the Romans lowered their sails, inclined the masts and got ready their arms." And Irzius says, "Suddenly it happened that against him came a ship laden with warriors with yards at half mast; upon which he quickly braced up his yards and armed his crew for the fight." "The gallant Carthaginians, seeing the way closed by the Romans," says Polybius, "furled their sails and, encouraging one another with loud shouts, threw themselves into the conflict."
Annone with great skill availed himself of his sails to escape from an overwhelming force of Syracusians. Finding himself confronted by the numerous ships which Dionysius had sent out against him, he clewed up his sails as if about to fight; the enemy did the same, and while the latter was arming and getting ready for action, Annone quickly made sail again and fled.
II.
Before describing the sea fight, it will be necessary to give some account of the tactics. Naval tactics then, as now, were of the highest importance, for upon the battle formation depended in a great measure the result of the engagement. The formation varied according to circumstances.
The formation of the Roman fleet corresponded with that of the army, that is, it consisted of four parallel lines or squadrons called "classes," disposed in column. The first line was known as the "prima acies," or "prima classis," the second and third lines were numbered accordingly, while the fourth was called the "triarii," as in the army. Later the name of "subsidiariae" was given to all ships not in the first line, which, being the strongest, constituted the line of battle proper, and retained its name of "prima classis."
Our authority for this is Irzius, from whom we also learn that the theory of the "group" or "peleton" was known to the ancients.
"Caesar turned his fleet within the light-houses, and forming his line confronted the Alexandrians; he placed the Rhodian ships on the right, the 'pointed ones' on the left, and kept the reserves (subsidiariae) in the rear, with orders to support the first lines. The Alexandrians at once assumed the same order with 22 ships in the first line."
The term subsidiary was not vague or indefinite. The subsidiary (auxiliary) ships were in effect to reinforce those in advance of them; all had their stations assigned and their movements prearranged. If our Re d'ltalia had had a "subsidiaria" astern of her, the Kaiser Max would have been sent to the bottom, or else she would not have attempted the stroke that cost us so dear.
Sometimes there were added a third line of lighter ships, the veliti, which, unlike the veliti (or skirmishers) of the army, did not skirmish with the enemy, but accompanied the fleet and held themselves ready to lake any part that might be assigned them, thus constituting, as it were, a reserve to the reserves.
Sometimes they preceded the fleet as scouts. It was then their duty to molest the enemy by cries and menaces, and annoy him by showers of burning arrows.
When Attalus fought Philip, he distributed these little vessels among his fleet, but became so entangled with them that he lost the battle. Timothy, on the other hand, put them in the first line and pushed them forward among the enemy, driving in his skirmishers and demoralizing his fleet. Then advancing with his fresh and hitherto unengaged line, he succeeded in winning a complete victory.
When the fleet was formed in single line, as often happened, the best and strongest ships were placed in the wings and the weaker ones in the center. This order was observed at Salamis. The Spartans and Athenians were collected upon the left wing, confronting the Phoenicians; the Megareans, which were, as says Diodorus, the narrator, the most formidable at sea, took post on the right wing; in the center were posted all the other Greeks.
Similar dispositions were made in the fleets of Caesar and Anthony, and Vegezius, in his Military Institutes, directs that at the extremities of the front line shall be collected the flower of the ships as well as of the fighting men. The commander-in-chief should place himself in his flagship, at the head of the right wing; but if the formation be semi-lunar he should post himself in the center.
"If thou shouldst form in crescent, oh, Captain-General (says the Emperor Leo, in his tactics), place thy dignity in the exact middle of the arc, to the end that thou may'st see everything, order everything, govern everything, and lend assistance wherever it may be needed."
In any case and with every tactical formation, the captain-general, contrary to the rule laid down in armies, should always occupy the most conspicuous post of his fleet. Conon availed himself of this invariable rule to deceive the enemy. Having heard from a prisoner that his adversary intended concentrating every effort against himself personally, he placed his flagship on the right of the line and then took his position in another ship on the left.
The battle formation which the Greeks called skema taxcos was either usual or occasional. The crescent form was much used, because in it the ships were disposed in an uninterrupted series so as to form in the center a concavity, or bay, from which the extremities were projected like arms or horns. In this curved line the ships mutually presented their flanks with all their prows pointed toward the opening of the arc, and steered a course parallel to the sine of the arc, up to the moment of converging towards the enemy and enfolding him in their midst, as if in a huge embrace.
It will be seen by these examples that the lunar form served to encompass and confine the enemy, and to overwhelm him if he tried to break through the center, so that, entangled by this maneuver within a semicircle, he presented necessarily his flanks to the beaks of both wings, which, to wound him effectually, had only to make a half turn and strike him in the flank. (See Fig.1)
In line abreast (a straight line), the ships were disposed side by side, like a squadron of horse; this might be single, double or triple. It was single when the line was continuous, double when the line was separated by an interval, dividing it into two squadrons. When the line was separated into three squadrons it was triple and formed then a battle-corps in the center, with two wings on the sides, all in line abreast, like the three battalions of a regiment. The post of the commander-in-chief was always on the extreme right. (Figs. 2, 3, 4.)
If the three squadrons, instead of being in line abreast, were disposed as "column of squadrons," the formation was called the phalanx, and in this all the ships would be subsidiary to those which preceded them, as already explained. (Fig. 5.)
These were the principal formations, but there were others in occasional use, namely, the pinchers (forceps), the wedge (cunaeus), the oval (ovalis) and the convex (incurvae or falcafa).
The forceps order presented, as Vegezius explains, the form of the letter V, in which the ships formed the two arms, with their prows pointing from the point. This order was a modification of the lunar or crescent order, in which two straight lines were substituted for the curves which composed the second. (See Fig. 6.)
The wedge order was the reverse of the last, having the form of the letter A, in which the ships were disposed in two lines, as in the forceps, but having their prows toward the apex. It was essentially a formation for attack, or for chase, and transformed itself into the other order, by simply reversing the course. The Romans were accustomed, sometimes, to add to this formation a third line of ships, disposed between the two wings, thus completing the form of a triangle, in which the bows of all the ships were pointed towards the advanced angle, the course being at right angles to the third line. In this order, as in the preceding, the ships were admirably subsidiary (auxiliary) to each other. (Fig.7)
In the circular, or oval, formation, the ships were arranged in a circle, more or less large, and like radii, or the spokes of a wheel, their sterns were towards the center, and their bows pointed to the circumference. (Fig. 8.)
Polemius called this formation the "cyclon" (circle) and describes it very minutely. He says, "when the Carthaginians sighted the great fleet of Dionysius, they disposed their ships in a circle, with the triremes in the centre. The ships of the outer line were crowded with soldiers to resist the first assault of the enemy. During the engagement, and at the proper moment, the triremes were to rush out through the intervals between the ships and attack the disabled vessels of the enemy and sink them."
The advantage of this formation consisted in the defense of each ship on the flank, and in keeping bows on to the enemy in every direction. It was considered the best defense against a foe superior in numbers.
The employment of this formation was not always successful. Thucydides, relating the naval battle between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, says that the former "arranged their ships in a circle as large as possible, without, however, leaving the intervals wide enough to permit the enemy to pass through; a convoy of light barks were placed in the center together with five of the fastest ships which were held in readiness to reinforce the point of attack.
"The Athenians approaching in single column (line ahead) swept around the circle, almost touching it, and threatening every moment to assault, thus forcing it to contract. But Formione, the Athenian admiral, had given orders not to attack without signal, believing that the enemy would lose his formation and his vessels foul each other and the convoy. Should the prevailing easterly wind blow out of the gulf, the confusion would be greatly increased. In this event, he could assail them with his fast ships at pleasure. (See Fig. 8.) What he anticipated actually happened; it came on to blow, and the ships already crowded in a small circle, collided with each other and with the barks. So that, with the cries of the sailors, in their mutual efforts to avoid collision and injury, orders were no longer heard, the voices of the 'regulators' were lost in the terrific din, and the men being unaccustomed to use their oars in rough water, the ships became unmanageable and no longer answered the helm. At this juncture, Formione hoisted the signal for action; at the first attack, the Athenians sunk one of the divisional flagships (navi capitane). The Peloponnesians were thrown into a panic: they cast away their arms and fled in confusion towards Patrae and Dyme, in Achaia.
"The Athenians pursued them, captured ten of their ships, and having made prisoners of nearly every one on board, sailed for Molicrius, where they erected a trophy at Rhium; dedicated a ship to Neptune, and then headed for Naupactus."—(Thucydides, Book II.)
The convex form, called by the Latins "falcata" (sickle-shaped) was the reverse of the lunar, already described; in the latter the horns, or arms, are thrown forward; in the former to the rear, with the center in advance. Thus the lunar was a modification of the forceps; and the convex a modification of the wedge, in both cases the right line being changed to a curve. (Fig.9.)
These formations were sometimes reinforced either upon the wings, the center, or the flanks. In fact they differed but little from military maneuvers, which at that period was natural and rational, and often necessary. This similarity between the movements of the fleet and the army was not materially varied, except when the use of the oars restricted the interval in which a ship could be effectively handled to less than two-thirds of the circumference of a circle.
The crews of the vessels were assigned stations according to their duties, their arms and their individual merit. On the catasiromaia or forecastle, in the turrets, or rambale, were stationed the warriors clothed in heavy armor, kneeling down behind their shields; behind them were those whose duty it was to manage the war catapults, fire tubes, etc. Then came the archers and slingers, who wore no armor and who kept themselves behind the defenses. The pilots were at the helm and the rowers at their oars, with arms extended, all waiting for the signal of battle.
III.
Besides these dispositions and preparations, the fight was still further preceded by ceremonies intended to exert a moral influence upon the combatants. The first was the seeking of auguries which, when favorable, were immediately made public.
Augustus, passing along the coast of Actium, before engaging in battle, met an ass with its driver; which, unfortunately for Anthony, were named respectively Nikon and Euticus, meaning victory and good-luck. The augury could not have been more happy nor more explicit. Not so, however, the sneeze heard afar in the army of Timotheus, nor the thunder-bolt which fell upon the army of Caliria, which conveyed sinister prognostics.
Referring to these incidents, Frontinus remarks that skilful commanders were extremely cautious how they dipped into the future, and took good care that the interpretations were favorable to their enterprises. Sacrifices and votive offerings were next in order. The sacrifice was always performed by the commander-in-chief, with his head veiled in the skirt of his garment. "While Themistocles stood sacrificing on the poop of his flagship, there were brought before him three young prisoners, beautiful in form, covered with splendid vestments, and wearing gold ornaments. They said they were the sons of Autaretes and the king's sister. At that moment, the seer Euriantes, who had seen a flame of great brightness arise from the victim he had just immolated, and had heard a sneeze on his right side, clasped the hand of Themistocles and commanded that these youths should sacrifice at once a victim to Bacchus Omestes, after which safety and victory would be assured to the Greeks."
Besides the sacrifices the commander-in-chief also made votive offerings, which were first proclaimed by the "celeuste," or singer, who, in a loud and clear voice, promised to the gods, altars, temples and other gifts, if they only would vouchsafe to them the victory.
The "exhortation" was made on the eve of the conflict. The ceremony was performed by the admiral alone, who, in a swift dispatch-boat, ran under the sterns of his ships and delivered a stirring address, a salute, or an admonition to each one of his captains. "Nicia, admiral of the Athenians, seeing his fleet prepared for battle," or, as was said by the Romans in phrase equally technical but more beautiful and energetic, in procinciu esse, and mindful of the great crisis, leaped into a dispatch-boat and rowed among the triremi; with hands outstretched, he called the captains by name, conjuring them in the name of the gods to vie with each other in valor, and thus crown that hope which alone remained to them."
The fleet, in procincto, awaited the signal for action.
Signals were made with a purple flag, hoisted on the most elevated portion of the flagship {nave Pretoria). They were few, simple, and clear, and sufficient for all the necessities of an engagement. No ship was permitted to signal the flagship. Such signals were considered inopportune, and indicative either of weakness or excessive prudence. "In your flagships," orders the Emperor Leo, "let every signal be in a conspicuous place, whether flag, banner or what not, that you may make known to all what is necessary to be done, to assault, or withdraw from the fight; to turn the enemy so as to attack in flank, or astern; to render assistance where it may be needed; to increase or decrease speed; to lay an ambush or escape from one, etc."
"All this will be easily understood by every one who watches the signal attentively, whether it be held upright, or inclined to the right or left, whether it is waved alternately from side to side, or up and down, whether it be taken away entirely, or exchanged for another of different form or color, as was the custom with the ancients, who made use of a red cap elevated on the point of a long pike."
"Signals should be frequently exercised with, so that all your captains may have a thorough knowledge of them, and understand them perfectly; so that when well accustomed to the use of them they may be quick to comprehend the orders they are intended to convey, and to obey them without hesitation."
Sometimes they made the signal for battle with a gilt shield—in fact, Plutarch mentions this as the usual signal. The moment this signal was made, the trumpet of the flagship sounded the "classicum" (called by the Greeks the "polemikon," and in our day "the general"), which was repeated from all the ships of the fleet.
To the blare of the trumpet was added the ringing voices of the warriors, until the very sea resounded with the din of preparation, and the echoes repeated it from the neighboring shore. "Innumerable voices mingled in the air, and the clamor of the cries drowned the sound of the oars." (Lucanus, lib. III., 540-41.)
IV.
Having thus noted the incidents that preceded the conflict, we have now reached the point where ''the beaks take up the argument."
According to the school histories the naval warfare of the ancients consisted of a grand hand-to-hand struggle, with the single idea of boarding each other's ships, and throwing at each other stones, arrows, burning poles, boiling oil, brambles, melted lead, and even pots of serpents and scorpions!
The writer remembers that when a boy at school a professor on one occasion, giving the class an account of an ancient sea fight, became so excited that he jumped on a chair, turned back his cuffs and shouted like a sailor, and when he had finished sat down, perspiring and exhausted, but satisfied that he had lectured not only on ancient history, but also upon the art and science of war.
Such graphic displays kindled our boyish admiration for the prowess of the ancients, but inspired the belief that their courage and strength counted for everything, and there was nothing to be learned from their encounters; in short, that they were ignorant of the scientific principles of war, and that with them the race was always to the swift and the battle to the strong.
Nothing could be more erroneous. From the moment the golden shield shone out from the flagship and the trumpet sounded the "classicum," the combat was fought, with lessons which have been imitated by the great captains of modern times.
First of all note that, contrary to the customs prevailing in the army, the commander-in-chief was the first to advance with his flagship. Plutarch does not leave this in doubt. "Hardly," says he, "was the fight commenced by the ship of Attilus than all the other ships moved suddenly without awaiting any further signal." And Diodorus Siculus, describing the battle of Salamis, says, "The captain, preceding all others, was the first in the fight." The main object of the captains and pilots was to go into action ship against ship, with a view to break the oars or the rudder of the enemy, or to ram and strike him, taking care, however, to avoid a like fate themselves. Although ramming was a difficult maneuver, it was preferred by skilful captams, who held boarding in light esteem. Ramming required handy but strong ships, skilful helmsmen, numerous and expert rowers, and captains with hearts of bronze and eyes of the lynx; in a word, it required naval superiority of the highest order.
The Rhodians, who proved themselves excellent sailors in their wars with the Macedonians and excelled them in martial attainments, avoided hand-to-hand fights, but repeatedly used the ram. This was naval warfare, pure and simple, and was often compared by the writers of the day, in their finest descriptions, to cavalry charges, as we read in Florias…"The Roman fleet was active, nimble and light, resembling a battalion of cavalry; the oars acting as spur and curb, ready to dash; now upon this side, now upon that, having the appearance of a living animal." Fighting hand-to-hand was not commended. Of this method Thucydides says in his description of the battle between the Corciresi and the Corinthians, "the battle was furious, but resembled more a land fight than a naval engagement, in that, having been brought to close quarters, they threw themselves upon each other and fought hand to hand. None of the ships attempted to break the enemy's line and attack in the rear, but all fought with the fury of courage and strength rather than with science, so that the action presented a scene of disorder and confusion."
It is clear how, under some circumstances, the most skillfully planned battle would degenerate into a fierce melee, the issue of which would depend more upon personal gallantry and strength of arm than skill in the art of maritime war. This art was called by Lucan "artem pelagi" and consisted chiefly of skilful rowing, bursting upon the enemy under full headway, and tearing or flanking his vessels, and pursuing detached ships. Their battle tactics commenced by feeling the enemy—that is, in approaching him—then suddenly withdrawing and maneuvering in sight of him. Polybius, speaking of Hannibal's attack, says: "He provoked the enemy to fight by maneuvering about him; now dashing forward, now making a masterly turn, now stopping short, as mounted troops are fond of doing with their horses." With these and other offensive movements he sought to deceive and fatigue him until a favorable opportunity offered to spring forward, dash against him and sink him, breaking through his line and assailing him in the rear by a sudden turn, or turning and taking him in flank. This charge was repeated again and again, until the enemy's line was broken in one or more places, through which a passage could be effected to his rear. Then turning quickly he might succeed in striking the adversary in the stern; and if the enemy had imitated this maneuver the two lines would again find themselves confronting each other, bow to bow, as in the beginning of the action, having simply inverted their respective positions. In the "circumvolution" the ships doubled the enemy's line and took him in reverse or pursued him, each party endeavoring to crush the oars of the adversary by rushing upon him at full speed. As Livy says, "two of the royal ships attacked one of the enemy's on both sides and cut off all his oars."
The combatants also tried to ram each other; as the weakest part of a ship was the beam, every effort was concentrated to strike right amidships. On the other hand the defense exerted all their skill in trying to receive the blow on the bow, or at least as obliquely as possible. There are a great many examples of ramming, proving that it was considered the principal and most natural form of attack.
"The Peloponnesians dashed forward to ram the enemy's ship, but the latter with singular skill kept their bows constantly end on, and so only received glancing blows."
"Four Rhodian ships issued from the gulf and were attacked by the Alexandrians, who stood on to meet them. The Rhodians resisted, and handled their ships with such skill, that, although inferior in numbers, their adversaries could neither strike them in flank nor cut down their oars, for they kept their bows always presented to the attack." (Irzius in the Alexandrian wars.)
Occasionally the beam of a ship was presented to the enemy. This maneuver may have sometimes occurred as a result of inattention on the part of the pilot or of confusion of orders, and thus led to most disastrous consequences, but ordinarily it was done with the deliberate purpose of receiving the thrust, and then making fast to the adversary at the moment of his striking, as we learn by the example of the Illyrian ships, each one of which, having lashed on each side of it another vessel to serve as a shield, allowed the enemy to strike on the beam. The vessels which acted as buffers were, of course, crushed by the enemy's beak, but the attacking ship was immediately seized and made fast, when the warriors accumulated on the triple decks of the three lashed together, boarded and took possession of the assailant. This species of stratagem was resorted to by slow and heavy ships, which could not maneuver with quickness and dexterity. They fortified themselves in the manner described, and by the sacrifice of the defense vessels obtained an easy victory. Thus did Brutus, saying to his pilot:…"paterisne acies errare profundo?" etc., (Lucan, lib. Ill, v. 559.) This expedient was practicable only when, through the great strength of the ship itself, or by making use of others as bulwarks, there was no fear of the enemy's beak. In all other cases the blow in the flank was fatal and to be avoided if possible. In the fleet of Mindarus "seeing that the enemy was so formed as to offer his flank to the attack, each one began anxiously to fear for his own safety." (Diodorus, lib. XIII.) So with us at Lissa!
In the fight between Caesar and Anthony, described by Plutarch in his life of the latter, both antagonists refrained from ramming; the ships of Anthony were too slow and Caesar's ships were too light to risk contact with Anthony's, which he knew were reinforced with wood and iron. A blow upon the bows was much less damaging than one upon the flank, from the greater strength of that portion of the hull, but on this very account, and from the fact that the two ships then met at full speed, the shock was so violent that many were sometimes knocked overboard from the forecastle. Appianus says, "Then the ships rushed at each other, striking either in flank or astern, or on the bows, this last being the blow that, more than any other, staggered the combatants and brought up the ships suddenly, causing them to gather stern board, and if this did not occur from the shock, those which had had the best of the encounter hastened to draw off, backing on their oars, either to keep the enemy from making fast, or to prevent the water from entering the breach made by the beak. Livy wonders and notes it as an unheard of thing that, in a combat between the Romans and the Tarantini, no one seemed to care to withdraw from the enemy after having wounded him with the beak.
A ram blow in the stern was particularly dangerous on account of the rudder, and it was also difficult to accomplish, owing to the possibility of the vessel rammed returning the blow by one amidships.
Ramming was adopted by the Syracusians, after Aristones had advised them to make the bow shorter and lower the position of the beak or ram, like the Corinthians at the battle of Erineus. "In this way," says Thucydides, "the Syracusians hoped to defeat the Athenians, who were unaccustomed to practice such hazardous maneuvers."
These tactics resolved the fight into so many duels, each ship endeavoring to lay herself alongside one of the enemy. The fight, however, began at arrow-range, so to speak, with stones, javelins, arrows and weighted darts discharged by hand, or from suitable machines, aim being particularly directed at the helmsmen, the pilots and the captains. When the fleets closed, the ships grappled, the quickest crew boarding with a cheer (barrilo, the cry of an elephant), and the fight was ended by a bloody carnage with lances, swords and two-edged battle axes. The engagement thus assumed the appearance of a fight on shore, "terrestria praelia miscent," because the style of fighting and the arms were those incident to the attack of a fort. Even the famous bridge of Duilio was very much like the bridge which was lowered from the movable tower when assaulting the walls of a besieged city.
"Now ceases the throwing of darts, nor do the soldiers fall pierced from afar. The encounter is hand-to-hand; from his own ship each stands within reach of the blows of his adversary, and the sword finishes the fight." (Lucan, lib. Ill, v. 567.)
The invasion of a double barbarism, physical and moral, which led to the disappearance of the high state of civilization of Greece and Rome, and which for three centuries we have been endeavoring to restore, destroyed both the civil and military order. Brute force invaded the field of science and art; and battles, by sea and land, scientifically conducted by the great captains of Rome and Greece, became disorderly struggles (melees), in which ferocity was the only criterion of success.
Vegezius, in the 4th century, and the Emperor Leo the Wise, "in the 9th, embodied in one system all the military art of the ancients; but their labors remained a dead letter until the great age of the Renaissance, in which, with philosophy and the arts, civil and military science began to revive.
Up to the middle of the 16th century the ships of war of the Mediterranean did not differ from those of the ancients, except in their ornamental and accessory parts. The form, capacity, armament and oars of the Venetian and Genoese triremes were like those of Athens, Syracuse and Rome. For this reason the order of battle and the method of fighting were counterparts of those so clearly and exactly described by Thucydides, Polybius, Titus, Livius and others. This is clear from what is recounted by Nabal Conti in his "History of My Times"; by Bartolomus Crecenz in "Nauta Mediterranea"; by Christopher da Canale in his "Dialogues on Naval Affairs;" and, especially, by the very learned Captain Pantero Pantera, who, in his "Armata Navale," illustrates all his laws and maxims with examples drawn from the naval engagements of the ancients.
"The fleet," says the captain of the Santa Lucia, should be divided into four squadrons—the advance guard, the line, the rear guard and the reserve. Let the admiral choose a few fast galleys to cruise ahead of the fleet as scouts, exploring the neighboring coasts and gathering news of the movements and intentions of the enemy. He will select officers for the command of his squadrons and assign their stations in the order of battle, so that each one, knowing his position, will not interfere with the movements of the others. At sea the distance between the squadrons shall not be less than 1600 metres.
"Each squadron shall have its own distinguishing standard, and every galley or other vessel attached to a squadron shall fly, in a conspicuous place, a standard conforming to that of its own squadron.
"The Fleet of the League (1571) had distinguishing standards of different colors; the advance guard flew a green standard, the centre blue, the rear guard yellow, and the reserve white."
Captain Pantera recommends only two of the Greek and Roman fleet formations; the order of line abreast for sailing ships and the semicircular or crescent (di mezza lune) for those propelled by oars, reinforced at the centre and the wings, as was adopted by the great fleet of the League which triumphed at Lepanto. "Some would have it," says Captain Pantera, "that the galleys should maintain such a distance apart, only, as would afford room to row without collision. Others maintain that the interval should be such as to allow each galley to maneuver, i.e. to turn and change front without interfering with the others. This distance would be larger than the former; hence, others are of the opinion that, when on the eve of an engagement, the galleys should not be so widely separated, lest the enemy pass through the intervals and attack in flank or astern." He adds, "Where the intervals are wide a confusion of the order of battle is likely to occur, and if the fleet be numerous, covering a wide extent of sea, the extremities would be too far separated to lend mutual aid in case of necessity. For this reason, others advise that the galleys be kept an oar's length apart, i.e. far enough to avoid fouling each other's oars."
"The position of the admiral or general in his royal galley is in the center of the line. The extremities or horns of the line, as well as the van and rear of each squadron, should be in command of officers of high rank and acknowledged ability.
"The reserve squadron (la squadra del soccorso) should be composed of the fastest and best galleys, and in command of an excellent captain, who will know where succor is most needed and HOW TO AFFORD IT IN AN ORDERLY AND EFFICIENT MANNER.
"This squadron must be stationed well astern of the line of battle, whence it can move quickly, and without loss of time, to any point where assistance is most urgently needed.
"In order that each squadron may maneuver freely and without interfering with the others, there should be left a sufficient interval between the line of battle (centre) and each horn (wings).
"In addition to the reserve squadron there should be assigned to each divisional commander two well equipped galleys ready to assist, if necessary, their chief. Their positions should be astern of the divisional flagship. (See Fig. 10.) If galeasses are attached to the fleet they should be posted about a mile ahead when the fleet is in line of battle."
It is worthy of note that Captain Pantera does not refer to ramming or other maneuvers of that kind. It appears, therefore, that the "artem pelagi'' of the doughty captains of antiquity had been forgotten, or that their successors no longer dared to practice it.
VI.
From the foregoing it appears that the ancient ships were weakened amidships and strongest in the bows. Each one was armed with a ram, and carried in the bows the catapults and the bronze tubes which were used for throwing Greek fire. These tubes were the prototype of the 30-pounder guns, four of which at a later period were mounted in broadside.
From Salamis to Lepanto, a period of twenty centuries, the ships of war, par excellence, were always triremes. Their dimensions did not vary materially from a standard which is described in detail by Cristoforo da Canale, who gives the following dimensions: length, 120 feet; breadth, 16 feet; depth, 6 feet; displacement, about 150 tons. The sides of the ship in the wake of the oars were strengthened by two layers of timber, one placed fore and aft, the other vertically. Besides taking the strain of the oars, this additional thickness was a defense for the rammers, and served to deaden the blow of a ram. These timbers formed a kind of casing which at a little distance looked somewhat like enormous ears, and had some resemblance to the paddle boxes of our side wheel steamers. A fighting deck was built in the bows; this was called the "catastromata," and has already been referred to.
The crew consisted of 200 men, of which 150 were rowers and the remainder were soldiers or fighting men. The rowers were arranged three by three on twenty-five benches, on each side of a midship passage-way. The longest oars were about 32 feet (Venetian measurement) long and each was pulled by the man farthest in board. The middle was 30 feet long, and the outboard oar was about a foot shorter. The oars, therefore, projected in groups of threes.
The greatest speed of a trireme was about 6 or 7 knots per hour; on a voyage, however, it could not make more than 4 knots the first hour, and from 2 ½ to 1 ½ knots afterwards, for in a short time the rowers became exhausted and had to be relieved. The distinguished Admiral Jurien de la Graviere denies the possibility of the arrangement of rowers as described above: he says, "et vous Genes et Venise ne compliquez pas la question; vous n'avez jamais essaye de faire asseoir sur une seule planche irois rameurs, ayant chacun en main, un aviron; voire banc n'est qu'une fagon de parler; il n’indique pas un siege, il indique un espace."
About the middle of the 16th century "sweeps" were introduced, and the thwarts, which for the oars had been placed obliquely to the keel, were placed at right angles to it, and one oar was assigned to each thwart, but each oar was pulled by three, four, or five men, and sometimes even by as many as eight. The larger ships pulled thirty oars. These monstrosities, however, had a short life, for their utility proved inferior to the hopes of the designers of the period. Their number was limited to one, two, perhaps three in a fleet, the other vessels being rowed by three men to each oar.
The glorious trireme closed its long and brilliant history with the splendid victory of Lepanto. Thenceforth, for two centuries, the laurels of the sea were to be won by immense line-of-battle ships propelled by the wind and armed with heavy artillery. When the galley period ended the era of sails began, and this new condition forced new tactics and new methods of naval warfare. Rome, 1879.
[Note.—It is interesting to note in this paper the prototypes of latter day methods of clearing ship for action, the call to general quarters, wig-wag and other signals, ramming tactics and battle formations. There is nothing new under the sun. It was largely due to violation of Formione's maxim that the Chinese lost the battle of the Yalu.—A.G.]