The events which precede and follow the outbreak of war progress too quickly to allow time for general or special reconnaissance of the theatre of operations, either at home or abroad. Hence this work which took place formerly in time of war should be made now, in time of peace.
This is particularly the case with naval warfare, for to the existence of men and vessels in reserve, and the powers of rapid assemblage, are added enhanced qualities of speed and sea endurance. These qualities give to naval operations such possibility of quickness and vigor in execution and increased length of reach, that the time permitted for preparation for defense is correspondingly shortened. Besides, measures taken upon the eve of war—a time of emergency and excitement—will naturally be imperfect, ill-digested and extravagant.
The sudden nature of war is historical. During a period of one hundred and seventy-one years, from 1700 to 1870, one hundred and seventeen cases of hostilities have occurred in the civilized world; one hundred and seven of which have been commenced by European subjects, or citizens of the United States, without due declaration of war.
With preparation for war and defense properly made, among other things by the study of past naval campaigns, of tactical evolutions in our own and neighboring coasts and waters, we then are in position to put into operation all the forces at our disposal at the outbreak of war; for in regard to this promptness of initiative, it is well said that "Rapidity of movement kills in the germs a crowd of measures which the enemy would have taken."
Though a proper decision is also a matter of character, Col. Maurice, R.A., wisely remarks: "That a commander is much more likely to decide aright if he has in mind some large knowledge of the accumulated experience of the past, than if without anything to guide him he judges by a so-called common sense which has already led him to ignore the earnest advice of those who have been themselves most successful in war."
The questions discussed, and worked out at the Naval War College, relate to strategy, naval history, naval tactics, coast defense, torpedo warfare and international law.
These subjects are not fully studied elsewhere, and but one or two even touched upon at the Naval Academy, whose course is already crowded, and an extension of which would lead to a postponement of graduation, at an age too advanced for sea habits, and for the acquisition of that sea instinct and faculty so necessary for naval officers.
In addition, the study and acquisition of the matters dealt with at the War College require that officers should have considerable previous experience afloat, and a knowledge of the details of naval life. It is not intended that the work at the College shall interfere with sea duty—whose importance is recognized as paramount, both by officers and men. But it is proposed that it shall take a portion of the time of officers between cruises; a time now given to considerable extent to routine occupations, to dock yard service and matters not essentially pertinent to the great object of the existence of the Navy—preparation for and action in war.
In addition to the lectures upon the main subjects of the College, it has been the custom in the past to afford specialists in the different departments of naval activity opportunity and encouragement to communicate the results of their experience to the officers in attendance.
One of the most important of these specialties is that of international law, taught with fullness nowhere else, and whose practical utility to officers of the Navy is daily demonstrated.
There is also immediate practical work to be taken up and continued in the study of the elements entering into naval defence of our coasts and waters, which study is in fact now under way so far as the very scant personnel of the College will allow.
As pertinent to the preceding, the following opinions of eminent officers are given:
Captain Mahan, in the last annual report made by him as President of the College, says: "Having given now seven years to the study of these subjects (naval strategy and naval tactics in their various branches), with my whole attention engaged upon them, and in view of the opposition the College has had hitherto to encounter, I feel warranted and compelled to say that no sustained work has been done, nor is any now being done upon them, except by and through the College. Its claim upon the favor of the Government and Congress depends upon the importance of the subjects with which it alone among the organizations of the Navy undertakes to deal."
In regard to naval tactics, Vice-Admiral Colomb of the British Navy, says: "The science of naval tactics still remains in an exceedingly vague and unsatisfactory state; but the author is now, as ever, persuaded that there are no difficulties in putting it on an absolutely sound basis in peace time. He believes that proper experiments and proper inductions arising thereon are entirely reliable as the foundation of the science; and he has always viewed with alarm the general apathy of British admirals on the whole subject. He trusts it may never be with any of them as it was with Villeneuve on a great historical occasion. 'No doubt,' wrote this unfortunate admiral in August, 1805, 'It is thought that sailing hence with twenty-nine ships, I am considered able to fight with vessels of anything like the same number. I am not afraid to confess to you that I should be sorry to meet with twenty. Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither the time nor the means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations.'"
Of strategy, Admiral Colomb says: "But the instances I quoted of Nelson at the Nile, and at Santa Cruz, are sufficient to indicate that bravery and strategy combined are very much more powerful than bravery alone. The brave man had better be intelligently brave while he is about it. It may raise his reputation for pluck to win with great loss; but it will benefit the State more that he should win with small loss. Besides, a man cannot be argued into bravery, and he can be taught strategy."
Of naval history, he says: "In writing this book (Naval Warfare, etc., historically treated) I have kept in mind the double object of showing that there are laws governing the conduct of naval war which cannot be transgressed with impunity; and that there is no reason to believe them abrogated by any of the changes of recent years."
Vice-Admiral Randolph, R. N., says: "Why should there not be a systematic course of practical maneuvers, including experiments in turning under difficulties, in the shortest time and space, in stopping dead from different speeds and going astern, etc., through which every executive (line officer) should pass, in vessels of any available size, from steam pinnace to big unarmored ships."
Captain W. H. Henderson, R. N., in a discussion held at the Royal United Service Institution in 1887, as to the study of strategy and war games, spoke as follows: "At the present moment naval officers are feeling most seriously that there is great need for their attention to be drawn to questions of tactics and strategy. Officers present know that their time afloat is occupied in perfecting details of drill, but questions as to the conditions under which we should have to conduct the operations of a great naval war on which we may have to enter any day and on which not only our naval supremacy, but our maritime power may be at stake, are not seriously thought of. It is all very well to say that naval officers will be equal to the occasion when the time comes, and be able to make up for the deficiencies caused by the neglect of a study of this subject in time of peace. I do not doubt for a moment we shall do our best, but this neglect will entail losses which never should have occurred, and will strain our resources to their utmost to overcome, the burthen of which will fall on the nation in sacrifices to a war tribute of blood and treasure unnecessarily large." . . . "We may have the best ships and the best drilled officers and men, yet these advantages will be willfully scattered to the winds if there is not in the service generally an exact appreciation and knowledge of the condition under which the naval operations of the day will have to be entered upon and carried out. To attain this means intelligent study and careful provision during times of peace for the exactions of war."
The War College, founded by Rear-Admiral Luce, was earnestly advocated by Admiral David D. Porter, while its value has been impressed upon our own and foreign navies by writings of Captain Mahan, lately its president.
In a printed report, not long since issued from the Navy Department, is the following statement: "The Department is deeply impressed with the importance of the College to the Navy, as a means for insuring the development of the science of naval warfare as distinguished from the development of naval material.
"Both are essential to the full attainment of the results to be expected from a navy. The success of the College in the past has been recognized both in this country and abroad, and its usefulness may be expected to increase in the future."
The following additional extracts from the opinions of distinguished officers on the subject of teaching the art of war are of value.
Captain Hammill, of the English Navy, commenting on the want of naval tactics for our modern men-of-war, says: "What we suffer from appears to be this, that we have no school of tactics whatever in the Navy."
And further on he says: "The only way, in my opinion, in which we can learn modern tactics, is by thoroughly discussing the systems that might be adopted, and by practicing them in peace-time, so that we may be prepared to follow some system in time of war."
J.K. Laughton, M.A., R.N., lecturer on naval history at the Royal Naval College, England, in an address on the last great naval war, includes in his remarks the following: "I fear, a great many of our officers are inclined rather to say, or at any rate to think, that Nelson was no doubt a very fine fellow in his way, but it was a poor way after all. He knew nothing of steam; he never heard of torpedoes. What we have to study now is the application of these; not the obsolete tactics of sailing-ships. Do not, I beseech you, be led away by any such sophistry. Let me impress on you that the art of war, like other sciences, is based on fixed principles which never become obsolete; which are the same now as they were three thousand years ago; and that the exact history of any great commander, the exact detail of any great battle by sea or by land, of any glorious victory or terrible disaster, whether of our time or of any other time is, to the careful student, full of matter for deep and earnest reflection."
Frederick III., in his "Order of Service for the German War Academy," has said: "The object of the War Academy is to initiate into the higher branches of the military sciences a number of officers of the necessary capacity belonging to the various arms, and thus to enlarge and extend their military knowledge and to clear and quicken their military judgment."
Count Moltke, in his ''Order of Teaching" for the same Academy, says : "It is, moreover, essential to bring about an active process of mental give and take between teacher and pupils, so as to stimulate the pupils to become fellow-workers. The awakening effects of co-operation like this will never be seen where the one only expounds and the other only listens. But it will naturally be produced by the combination of clear exposition, with practice in the application to specific concrete cases of the knowledge gained."
"Accordingly, . . . the lectures are, as far as possible, to be interspersed with practical examples." . . . "The Academy is not to give fragments of disconnected knowledge."
In his "Order of Teaching," Count Moltke says on the subject of tactics:
"The object of tactical instruction, to which, above all, preeminent importance must be attached, is ... by teaching and by setting problems to make them familiar with the endless diversity of the conditions of modern battle." . . . "The teacher must throughout endeavor to make his instructions suggestive by examples and by exercises on the map and in the open air. In this he will be successful in proportion as he makes use of the experiences of modern and recent wars."
On military history, he has said: "The lectures upon military history offer the most effective means of teaching war during peace, and of awakening a genuine interest in the study of important campaigns. These lectures should bring into relief the unchangeable fundamental conditions of good generalship in their relation to changeable tactical forms, and should place in a true light the influence of eminent characters upon the course of events and the weight of moral forces in contrast to that of mere material instruments.
"These lectures must not degenerate into a mere succession of unconnected descriptions of military occurrences. They must regard events in their casual connections, must concern themselves with the leadership, and must, at the same time, bring out the ideas of war peculiar to each age. They will acquire a high value if the teacher succeeds in bringing into exercise the judgment of his pupils.
"This judgment must never degenerate into mere negative criticism, but must clothe itself in the form of distinct suggestions as to what ought to have been done and decided."
Further on, in the "Order of Teaching," Count Moltke in describing the purpose of all these studies in military history goes on to say: ''Before there can be good practice there must be a true theory, and a true theory can be acquired only from historical study, pursued according to a sound method. Moreover, the theory can never have an independent existence; it must always derive its sustenance from fresh contact with the historical reality of which it is the abstract."…"Historical study which did not yield a theory would be barren and useless."
EXTRACT FROM PREFACE OF CAPTAIN MAHAN's WORK, "INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."
"The present work, like its predecessor, is wholly a result of the author's connection with the U.S. Naval War College as lecturer upon naval history and naval tactics.
"If the commendation bestowed be at all deserved, it is to be ascribed simply to the fact that the author has been led to give to the most important part of the profession an attention which it is in the power of any other officer to bestow, but which too few actually do.
"That the author has done so is due wholly and exclusively to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies."