The abandonment of sail power in ships of war—even in cruising ships; the introduction of many complicated weapons that require great care and skill for their effective use; the probability that naval battles will be shorter in the future than in the past and blunders far more fatal—these and many other facts emphasize the importance of a change in the training of men-of-wars-men. The modern ship has become pre-eminently a floating battery, as seen in the change of type from the Hartford to the Baltimore. It follows, logically, that the men to man such ships should be, pre-eminently, naval gunners—not sailors of the old school. All other than military elements have been reduced to a minimum in naval warfare and in naval architecture, and it is consistent with such a transformation that the training of the personnel should be more military, if efficiency in war is to be the aim of a navy.
Modern ships are building for the United States Navy, to be armed with the most improved weapons. The efficiency of these ships in battle will depend upon the organization and training of the personnel. A gun or a torpedo will do little harm in unskilled and unpatriotic hands. Powerful ships will not win with crews composed largely of badly trained foreigners. It is essential, therefore, that the personnel of the navy should receive as much attention as the material of war during this era of change, and it may be well to consider the service to-day, particularly the enlisted man as we find him on board ship—his habits, character, and training—with a view to improvement in organization and esprit.
It will not be denied that far greater skill and coolness are required to point a gun or a torpedo afloat than from the shore. In fact, all the conditions of battle on board ship call for quicker action, a truer eye, and greater intelligence than is demanded in directing the same weapons on land. It follows, therefore, that a navy should not be formed of men less skillful and less trustworthy than soldiers, but rather of a higher type if possible. Let it be considered how far the system now in vogue in the United States Navy is designed to attract and develop such men.
Personal observation and study of the men on board the new cruisers must convince the most conservative officer that the sailor fails to meet modern requirements, and that this failure is to be attributed more to his training than to a lack of intelligence. Officers who are in daily contact with, and who are charged with the military instruction of, the sailor will naturally be the first to discover his faults: they will see that he is not attentive enough; he is too careless in little things, thoughtless in handling new and complicated weapons. It is difficult to fix his attention, to stop his talking, laughing, and trifling at drill. Much time is wasted in his instruction—months are consumed where days should suffice—and the best results are never attained. The sailor will work uncomplainingly for hours scrubbing decks and paintwork; but the divisional officer, in attempting to arouse in him a spirit of pride in military matters, finds himself heavily handicapped at times by the extreme listlessness or weariness of the sailor, who appears to regard military duties as of secondary importance.
With petty officers the faults are still more glaring. They are often appointed with no view to their military capacity nor to their skill as marksmen, but simply for their ability and willingness in scouring and cleaning, and in working with sails. Few of them can drill a squad. When given the command of men, a petty officer will often blush to the roots of his hair. The men grin and think it funny—the idea of giving a petty officer any military duty! The petty officer has been made a nonentity in military matters. He has been given little authority, and is not respected as he should be by the men. He cannot always be depended upon, and will not, as a rule, report infractions of regulations, no matter how serious.
But the men and petty officers are not so much to be blamed as the system under which they have been reared. They have never been trained in a military manner. They have never been given responsibility in matters of discipline. As in the old days of sails, when activity aloft and seamanship pure and simple were the chief requisites, the strictly military duties on board ship are performed by the marines. Here we come to the real cause, direct and indirect, for the absence of military instincts among men-of-wars-men—the fact that a company of soldiers is placed on board ship to do the military duties, to watch and search and discipline the sailor. Quite naturally the latter feels relieved of all responsibility in such matters. Petty officers regard discipline as foreign to their duties, and they are perfectly excusable for taking this view of the case. A general laxity results, as might be expected. To get ahead of the marines, to circumvent them and deceive the officers who direct them, is regarded as perfectly justifiable. A policy of espionage tends to bring out vicious qualities and to stifle the better impulses in all men—even in sailors.
Nothing could be more harmful to the sailor than the presence of the marine guard afloat, because it prevents the development of a military spirit and deprives the sailor of the duties and responsibilities that cultivate the qualities we most require in these days—exactness, care and trustworthiness.
Moreover, the effect upon the sailor is discouraging and debasing. He is searched at the gangway like a pickpocket and shown in a dozen different ways that he is neither respected nor trusted. The good as well as the bad, the petty officers among them, are frequently subjected to humiliating treatment—treatment that has the inevitable tendency to drive good men out of the service and to keep those in who have little self-respect. No man—not even a sailor—is made trustworthy if he is never trusted, nor respectable if he is never respected. A system of discipline ignoring such a cardinal principle is responsible for the low standard in the navy, and for the fact that the tendencies and habits of the men forward of the mast are not what they should be.
In discussing this question of the employment of the marines afloat it is to be understood that the efficiency of the marine as such is not attacked. It is simply a question of the moral effect upon the sailor of placing a guard over him and teaching the officers not to trust him. Aside from their duties as police and sentries, there is no necessity whatever for retaining marines afloat. A special corps of sharpshooters is no longer necessary, because all sailors should be taught to shoot as well as marines, and it is reported that the latest target returns at the Navy Department show that the sailor is not inferior to the marine with the rifle, notwithstanding the fact that the marine would naturally strive to excel in this one particular. And considering the type of man that is needed under the conditions of modern warfare afloat, there is no more reason for having a special police force on board ship than there is for a similar force in every regiment of soldiers. The man-of-wars-man of to-day should be as competent to perform all military duties afloat as is the soldier to do the same duties on shore. It was after a careful consideration of modern requirements that the Organization Board, forced logically to the conclusion that marines were no longer needed on board ship, recommended by an almost unanimous vote that they be withdrawn from service afloat.
The presence of the marine on board ship degrades the whole service in that it deprives the sailor of a military training, reduces the petty officer to a nonentity, and thus throws many trifling duties and burdens upon the commissioned officer. The latter must follow up the afterguard-sweeper to see that he gets the sand out of the corners, and superintend everything day and night, trusting nothing to the petty officer. His time and energies are wasted in doing a petty officer's duties. The petty officer, relieved of his proper functions, becomes one among the men, and the latter respect and obey officers and petty officers accordingly.
The complaint is frequently made that the sailor is listless and indifferent and that he shows a deplorable lack of personal interest and pride in the service. The feeling between officers and men is not always what it should be. But it is very easy to account for this condition of things. When a sailor comes on board ship he is practically given to understand that there are certain duties that he is incompetent to perform; that he cannot be trusted in many respects; that he cannot step into the presence of his commanding officer and carry his orders; that he has nothing to do with the discipline of the ship—such duties belong to the marines. If it is desirable to cultivate manliness among sailors, such a system is sure to fail because it works directly against human nature.
On the other hand, the marine is taught to regard himself as the military factor on board ship; that he is to be trusted at all times; that he is the medium of communication with the captain; that he must hold himself above and aloof from the sailor; that (as a distinguished officer expresses it) he is "the bulwark between the cabin and the forecastle."
Note the difference: the sailor is told that he is untrustworthy; the marine is told that he must be trustworthy. The sailor is told that he must be watched and searched; the marine is told to do the watching- and searching. The sailor is told that military duties and responsibilities are not his; the marine is required to be strictly military at all times, careful, thoughtful, and ever attentive to little details. The sailor is debased, and his interest and pride in the service are lessened by such teaching; the marine is brought under elevating influences, his manliness is appealed to, and his efficiency is obtained at the expense of the sailor. Apply to the marines and their non-commissioned officers the treatment accorded the sailor in matters of discipline, and the corps would be ruined in a month. Here is the explanation of the sailor's attitude, the reason for his lack of pride—there is a "bulwark" between officers and men. They have lost touch with each other, and there cannot be that mutual feeling of confidence and respect that should exist between them. When this "bulwark" is removed, and the sailor is told that there is no duty too good for him on board ship; that he is required to be trustworthy and respectable; that he must do military duties; that he will be supreme in his own sphere, and that promotion will result from the faithful discharge of military obligations—when this is done, the sailor and the petty officer will be as trustworthy as the marines. A better class of men—more Americans—will either the service and discipline will be greatly improved.
As a rule the marines are not better men than the blue-jackets. The majority of them come from the same class. Scan their faces and they are no brighter. There is no element in the corps as valuable and intelligent as the apprentice, if the latter were only retained and developed. It is principally a difference in training and in clothes. A good man is more likely to be recognized in a frock coat than in a blue shirt. Why should better men enlist in the marine corps? Neither the pay nor the opportunities for promotion are so good. If trustworthy men can be found for $13 and the clothing allowance of $3 per month, it is because they are trusted and treated like men. Treat the sailors more like men and a better class will enlist. It is not so much because the peculiar duties required of sailors are objectionable. Men will accept these conditions if they are paid, promoted, and respected for faithfulness and efficiency.
Aside from the moral effect of refusing to trust sailors to discipline themselves, there are certain practical considerations calling for the abolition of marines on board ship. The engineers' force in a modern ship is proportionally much larger than in ships of the old type, and there are fewer hands available, as a rule, for the duties of cleaning and caring for a ship. Out of a crew of 180 men how many do we get to scrape the ship's bottom in dry dock? Not more than 50! Modern guns and steel ships require more care for their preservation, and there should be as few passengers and idlers as possible. Every man on board ship should do his fair share of the cleaning and drudgery. It is absurd that there should be forty marines on board the Boston, occupying one large compartment of the berth deck, contributing little to the cleanliness of the ship, with nothing to do but to watch the scuttle-butt, attend the commanding officer, stand by for ceremonies, and guard the men who form the bone and sinew of the service and upon whom the navy must depend for success in battle. All these duties are of a comparatively trivial nature and could be performed by twelve or sixteen men if petty officers were utilized in matters of discipline. If there is room for forty marines on board the Boston there is room for forty sailors in their stead, and the latter will be available for general naval duties, and will contribute far more to the efficiency of the ship in time of peace and in time of war.
To cite foreign navies as authority for the retention of marines is a poor argument and its weakness is easily exposed. Some foreign services have marines afloat and some have not; this argument works both ways. It is admitted that much can be learned by the study of foreign naval establishments, particularly in such matters as materiel, organization, and preparation for war. But there are a few problems that each nation must solve for itself, and one of these is the proper system of discipline and treatment for the personnel. A system applicable to one nation may not be to another. Under a republican government, with voluntary enlistment, men must be attracted rather than forced. Under the monarchical forms of Europe, men recognize caste and are more willing to accept subordinate positions, and enforced enlistment keeps the ranks full. But the American is not so willing to acknowledge the superiority of somebody who is NOT his superior. The American man-of-wars-man may not be willing to admit that he is less trustworthy than the marine, and we ought not to bid for men who are willing to do so. He will not, as a rule, accept a position offering little in the way of promotion, and we ought not to bid for men who have no ambition. He will not enter a service where, in the name of discipline, respect and consideration are withheld from him. Foreign wages and workingmen's conditions are not acceptable to Americans, and no more are foreign systems of naval pay and discipline. It is folly to bemoan the fact that the American is unlike the foreigner in this respect—the fact must be recognized. The navy cannot undertake to reform 65,000,000 people. The wise policy for the navy is to conform to the national institutions of the country it is supposed to serve, and naval officers will find in the study of the personal traits of their own people the only sound and practical principles upon which to base a system of discipline for the United States Navy.
The present condition of the personnel of the navy is eloquent proof that the system of pay, discipline, and promotion is not designed to attract and retain a sufficient number of trustworthy Americans. Not half of our sailors are American born. All languages are heard on our decks. It is an international navy. Modern ships are building to be manned by this heterogeneous crowd! What pride can an officer feel in his vain attempts to arouse some national spirit and esprit in such crews? There are some excellent men in the service, to be sure—some Americans who are perfectly trustworthy, though little trusted—a few who have a natural love for the navy and are not driven out by their discouraging surroundings. Many of the foreigners are good men also; but the navy should not be a training school or an asylum for such. The fact that the service is more pleasing to foreigners than to Americans proves that the treatment of the personnel is already in conformity with foreign rather than with American institutions. To continue such treatment, or to look abroad for a solution of the problem, will simply perpetuate existing evils and give us a navy largely composed of men who have no pride in the service, and foreigners, many of whom cannot speak English. An ancient system applied to modern conditions, a foreign mold for the native mind, will never attract the type of men needed to make the much vaunted "new navy" an efficient and patriotic service.
It is easy to explain why Americans of the proper class do not flock into the line of the navy, and why so many refuse to stay after serving for a time. It is simply because the profession of a man-of-wars-man is not regarded as being sufficiently respectable. The "Jacky" that we hear so much about is popularly regarded as a harum-scarum creature, quite unlike other human beings, quite unworthy of trust and responsibility. Officers have done much to give the sailor this reputation, by their attitude toward him. If they insist that he cannot be trusted and must be watched and disciplined by marines, how can people at large think any better of the sailor? When he is fortunate enough to get a billet as ship's writer or yeoman, when, in other words, he ceases to be a sailor and becomes a non-combatant, he dons a sack-coat, gets good pay, and is regarded as being respectable—he is no longer searched at the gangway. There is not much inducement for a man of any ambition to remain a blue-jacket. Promotion in the line, to a petty officer's rank, means practically nothing. Although it has always been recognized that an army cannot be efficient without good non-commissioned officers, it appears to have been decided in the United States Navy that a petty officer can have nothing to do with the military discipline of a ship. In this the man-of-war element is belittled—it affords no career. The non-combatant and fancy elements are exalted, although the service is maintained for purposes of war. A citizen of this country cannot be advised to put his son into the navy with the idea that he shall follow for life the profession of a man-of-wars-man. The young man must work for a clerkship if he wishes an honorable and paying position afloat in a ship of war.
In view of these facts it is not to be wondered at that 90 per cent of the apprentices leave the service. As soon as the novelty wears off they see that they can do better outside. They find little national pride and spirit in crews composed so largely of foreigners, and the petty office carries with it little that satisfies ambition. As a rule, the best among them leave the navy and some of the poorest remain. The tendency is toward the survival of the least fit. To blame the apprentice school is folly. That school may not be perfect, to be sure, but it is far more admirable than the service at large, considering what the latter fails to do. If the apprentice is not up to the proper standard when graduated to the cruising ship, it is the duty of the latter to develop and improve him. But neglect of the apprentice is not unusual, and the treatment he receives is not always such as to create in him a feeling of personal interest in the service. Whatever may be said of the apprentices, they form the best and the most intelligent element in the navy. That such material should not be turned to account is, in itself, enough to condemn as impracticable a system of discipline and training which, in its unbending and un-American requirements, drives back to civil life an element that should be retained at all costs.
The service afloat should be, above all things, a practical school. Examine it as such. It has already been shown that the sailor and the petty officer are not properly developed, and that the apprentice—the best American element—is lost. Surely these are not good "practical" results. Next consider the officers. The Naval Cadet is not developed as he should be after he enters this "practical school." The system is rather one of repression as far as he is concerned. Individuality and independence are constantly discouraged. In his relations with his seniors there appears to be a fear lest he may assert himself too much. Many of the duties to which he is assigned belong properly to petty officers. The reason given is that he must be "kept busy." Suppose the graduates of West Point were "kept busy" by assignment to the duties of non-commissioned officers? The latter would be ruined, and the efficiency of the army would be imperiled. The result in the navy is similar.
There are, of course, certain subordinate duties that a cadet must perform. But he should be given as much watch duty as possible, and his manliness should be cultivated from the start. He can be "kept busy" on board a modern ship and developed at the same time, both mentally and physically. Instead of copying the log it would be better to require him to write up the systems of ventilation and drainage, the machinery, etc. He should be required to study and report upon the watch, quarter, and station bill, which will, of course, embody all the principles of modern organization! Instead of discouraging the formation of an idea or the expression of an opinion by a cadet, it would be wise, rather than dangerous, to invite both, and to point out his errors, as would be the course with any young gentleman in civil life. Such treatment would inspire genuine respect for his seniors. Officers who have passed through the steerage, and whose memory has not failed them, should have learned how respect and hearty support are best secured from cadets, and the treatment that produces the opposite result. The Naval Cadets, as graduated from the Naval Academy to-day, are not less "practical" in all that properly belongs to their station than any other grade in the navy; and a searching examination of all officers would establish this fact, even in the case of many who pride themselves upon being "practical."
The ensign, at times, has been given no better chance to develop than the cadet. At an age that would make him eligible as a Senator or a Representative in Congress—at an age when he is best qualified mentally and physically for watch duty, and most needs contact with, and practical experience in command of men, he is deprived of such duty. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this subject. Every ensign should stand regular watch on board ship, even if he cannot be a wardroom or divisional officer. No harm will be done by increasing the number of watches. Officers will devote more time to the study of tactics and practical naval matters. Those who have passed through the junior grades during the past decade can bear testimony to the fact that their finds have been subjected to a smothering, stunting process that has not properly prepared them to meet the demands that war would inevitably impose upon the younger officers of the navy. Nothing could be less "practical" than this.
Nor does the divisional officer escape the professional wet-blanket. His intelligence is not fully utilized afloat. The fatigue of petty duties prevents the proper development of his mind professionally. By reason of his contact with the men on deck and at drill, he may see much that his superiors have no opportunity to observe. He may notice the beginning of bad tendencies, the cause, and the necessity for changes in organization and training. But he is seldom encouraged to report what he sees. He is often considered a growler or a disturbing element merely because he is using his brains. A few vain attempts to improve matters, by suggesting changes or reporting defects, may meet with the cold-water treatment, if not with something worse, and he soon falls back into the old groove—into what has been called the "don't care stage." Zeal is discouraged, ambition is murdered.
It is admitted that a subordinate officer, to be useful, must perform uncomplainingly the proper duties of his grade. He must not seek to tear down without building up. He must not expect that his suggestions will always meet with the approval of his seniors. On the other hand, it has always been recognized that to be successful a commander of men must utilize the intelligence, stimulate the ambition, encourage the zeal, and turn the very vanities and weaknesses of his subordinates to account. Failing in this he cannot inspire genuine respect, and he contributes little to efficiency. Military discipline, and the bearing of officers toward each other, should not be such as to forbid hearty co-operation and enthusiasm in professional matters on board ship. And yet it cannot be denied that, as a rule, officers in the junior grades of the United States Navy find themselves treated with more consideration and their intelligence more fully utilized on shore at the Bureau of Ordnance, at the Naval Academy, at the Intelligence Office, and other stations, than afloat in ships of war. In this there is a natural tendency for brains to seek the beach and stay there. The system that produces this result cannot be considered "practical" in a naval sense. Now as to questions of organization and routine in this "practical school" afloat: ingenuity could not well devise a worse system of messing than that now in vogue. The best marksman in a ship may be in the powder or navigator's division, and the poorest at the heaviest gun. Target practice is conducted so carelessly at times as to arouse no enthusiasm or pride among officers and men. There are few instances where a spirit of rivalry has been cultivated among the different ships of a squadron. Owing to the fact that there is little care shown in selecting gun-captains, and no permanency in the rate, there is no certainty that the men who get the little experience at target practice in time of peace will be at the guns in time of war. In fact, it is evident that in many cases they will not or ought not to be there. Therefore, as far as it may influence accurate shooting in battle and determine the result of a fight, much of the ammunition expended in target practice might as well be dropped overboard.
There is, or should be, one essential difference between a yacht and a man-of-war. On the latter, men should be trained to take more pride in military duties than in anything else. Routine cleaning is very important, but it should not be kept uppermost in the minds of men-of-wars-men. Suppose a regiment on shore spent most of its time in cleaning its barracks, and suppose non-commissioned officers were appointed for ability in that direction, would efficiency as a military organization be judged by such work—work that women could do as well as men? The same principle applies to the navy.
To sum up, it appears that in the service afloat, sailors, petty officers and officers are not properly developed in a military direction, and that important problems in organization and training are left unsolved in the absorbing work of carrying out a "routine." But what is the "practical" value of a routine if it fails in such particulars? It has come to pass, as a result of such a routine, that the service afloat is less "practical" than any other part of the naval establishment, and that is saying a great deal.
It will, perhaps, be admitted that the navy of each country should be organized and trained with due regard to the peculiar conditions which war would impose upon that country. In the case of the United States the navy is very small, considering the task that would fall to it in the event of war. It is a mere nucleus, and would of necessity be recruited to three or four times its present size. It would fight at great disadvantage along an extensive coast, against heavy odds, with scant material, and with comparatively few ships and guns. Every man and officer would suddenly find himself in a position of responsibility far in advance of that he holds to-day. It follows from this that men and officers should be prepared for quick promotion—ready for the duties of the next higher grade. If possible, every man should be an American, competent to lead the recruits. In short, it is undeniable that this nucleus should be the most perfectly trained of all navies.
But, as it is organized and conducted to-day, these essential conditions and requirements are to a great extent ignored in the United States Navy. Instead of preparing a man or an officer to do the duties of his own grade or the next higher, he is required in many cases to do the duties that properly belong to the next lower. Instead of encouraging officers to study and anticipate the war problems that may at any time fall to them to solve, their minds are kept on petty officers' duties. Instead of developing the petty officer and preparing him for greater responsibilities, he is practically reduced to the ranks. Instead of attracting Americans, we cling to a system that invites foreigners and repels Americans. Instead of establishing a high standard, and developing a trustworthy, self-respecting set of men, we establish a low standard, and neglect to develop the personnel in a military direction; thus in time of peace there is no proper preparation for war. It does not appear that any genius is displayed in directing the minds of men and officers. In fact, it would be difficult to devise a system better designed to unfit men and officers for the ordeal of war—the emergency for which they exist.
REFORMS IN TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.
To prepare the personnel of the United States Navy for war, three important reforms must be sought:
1st. To attract Americans and create a true national spirit in the service afloat.
2d. To raise the standard and develop the type of man required under modern conditions in a navy which is a mere nucleus in time of peace.
3d. To improve the discipline and military efficiency by inspiring not only the officers, but the men with a feeling of personal pride and interest in the service.
To secure the first result, the passage of the Alien Bill is absolutely necessary. It is reported that there was some opposition to this bill on the ground that its passage would render it difficult to recruit the navy. But the folly of such opposition is apparent. It is important that the sailors, as well as the officers, should be citizens of the United States. If the conditions are such that Americans will not enlist in the navy, the sooner these conditions are changed the better. A system that attracts foreigners should give way immediately to one that will attract Americans. The bill should pass, even if the ships of the navy are laid up for lack of men or manned with half crews for months to come. Proper concessions to national traits and institutions will convert the navy from an international to an American service. Until these concessions are made there can be no American navy, properly speaking. It will continue to be a more or less mercenary service, inefficient in time of peace, and lacking in the loyalty and esprit essential to success in war.
QUARTERS AND COMFORTS FOR THE MEN.
An important concession must be made in the matter of quarters and the conditions of life on board ship. Americans of the proper class will not submit voluntarily to the discomforts that foreigners are compelled to accept under enforced enlistment. This fact may as well be recognized first as last. Ships like the Charleston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Newark, San Francisco, and Yorktown are not designed to attract Americans, but rather to keep them out of the service. The uncovered gun-decks of these ships are an abomination in more respects than one. The living space for men is insufficient, and in bad weather they will, at times, be compelled to live little better than pigs in a pen. It is an unfortunate fact that some of these cruisers will be far more uncomfortable for their crews than ships of the old type. In this there is a step backward, an utter disregard of the means necessary to attract the men of the proper class for modern men-of-war's-men. Such a lack of consideration for the comfort of men will delay, if it does not prevent, the Americanizing of the navy. No more ships should be built without flush decks, and all those now finished or building should be decked over without delay. The slight additional weight may reduce the speed 1/8 to ¼ of a knot, but the gain in the efficiency of the navy by such a concession to the men will compensate ten-fold for the trifling loss in speed. In the craze for speed all other elements of efficiency should not be forgotten.
The men need more locker room on board ship. As a rule they have no proper place to keep their rain clothes and rubber boots, and they are usually compelled to lash their pea coats in their hammocks or to stow them in various corners, where they soon get dirty, wrinkled and ragged. A ship's company dressed in pea coats is a sight that gives evidence of shameful neglect. More attention must be given to many of the little things affecting the comfort of the men, if it is desirable to make them contented and fond of the service.
PAY AND PROMOTION.
To secure the second reform—"To raise the standard and develop the type of man required under modern conditions"—there must be an increase of pay, and better opportunities for promotion in the service. Proper promotion will be afforded by making the combatant petty officers the most trusted and responsible men in the discipline and organization of a ship. Permanency in ratings, and the option of retirement after a reasonable continuous service, will keep good men in the navy, ensuring them a proper reward for long and faithful service. No doubt the Board of Organization solved this problem, but their report has not been published.
It may not be necessary to materially increase the pay all along the line. If the petty officers are well paid and are not deprived of their rank except by sentence of a general court-martial, the inducements for good men to enter and remain in the service may be sufficient, because the proportion of petty officers in a ship's company is so large that a man may reasonably hope to get a petty officer's billet after a short term of service as an apprentice, or seaman. It may be well to pay seamen $30 per month, as in the Lighthouse Service. Thus a comparatively small increase in the appropriation for "Pay" may serve to give us an American navy. If the matter is properly represented. Congress will no doubt respond. It is not probable that the people will consider it good economy to spend $7,000,000 annually for an international navy, when an increase of about 10 per cent may secure a body of intelligent Americans who will give a far better account of themselves when war comes. It is beneath the dignity of a great nation to hire foreigners to defend its flag, in order to save a few dollars. The United States can afford to employ Americans for that purpose, no matter what it costs.
ORGANIZATION AFLOAT.
The third reform—"To improve the discipline and efficiency by inspiring not only the officers, but also the men with a feeling of personal pride and interest in the service"—may be secured by changes in the organization and training on board ship.
Under a republican government, with voluntary enlistment, it is evident that the navy must compete, to a certain extent, with the trades and civil employments if good men are to be induced to enlist. It must hold out equal opportunities for an honorable career—otherwise good men will refuse to stay in the service. Good discipline must be secured by first appealing to the personal pride and interest of men, and not until such a policy fails should there be a resort to severity and force,—otherwise, foreigners, the lower elements and the slums must be depended upon for recruits. The navy of the United States cannot be formed of good and trustworthy men until the latter, as well as the officers, are permitted to have the true interest of the service at heart, the same feeling of personal pride, the same hope of permanent and lucrative employment, and the same certainty of reward and proper treatment in return for faithful service. There is no alternative.
To create this feeling of personal pride and interest among men-of-wars-men should be the constant aim of the service afloat. This policy, as well as the necessity for the military training of sailors, requires the immediate withdrawal of the marines from service on board ship, and the recognition of the fact that the sailor of to-day must be the equal, if not the superior, of the soldier in skill, trustworthiness, and respectability.
In briefly outlining a system that shall require, above all things, the military development of the man-of-wars-man, the blunt remark of a former messmate—"It is about time that the battery instead of paintwork and sails should form the basis of modern organization"—may be taken as a text. It is a rock upon which to build.
Imagine a modern ship in battle. Surely the intelligent spectator of a naval fight would consider the rapidity and accuracy with which the great-guns were fired as the governing element of victory. He would look to the patriotism and cool courage of the men who aim the guns as the principal force influencing the result of the fight. Napoleon's maxim—"Fire is everything, the rest is of small account" is as true at sea as it is on shore. And yet, in the United States Navy, this maxim is utterly ignored. The men who pull the lockstrings and upon whom the issue of battle depends are appointed, as a rule, with no regard to military fitness. They are given less pay than the ship's bugler, or the cooks and stewards, and the same as the tailor and the barber. They are not trusted to govern themselves or others, and are regarded as inferior in military matters to the landsman who, as a marine, comes on board ship for the first time in his life. It is pure sophistry to attempt a defense of a system so sublimely absurd.
As the gun, the important weapon, should form the basis of modern organization, so the gun-captain should be the leading man in the discipline of a ship's company. The one principle naturally follows the other. The leading men in time of war should be the leading men in time of peace. The men who have the greatest responsibility in battle should not be relegated to a position of inferiority when the fight is over. This is the key to the problem. The petty officer must not be robbed of his just reward. He must have the same duties in the organization and discipline of a ship that the non-commissioned officer has in the army. This can never be while the marines remain on board ship. They are an ever present obstacle to the development of the petty officer.
In modern organization, a new rate of Gun Captain should be created, with pay of $50 per month in the beginning, and with longevity of $1 per month for each year of service. These men should be required to qualify as marksmen, as well as seamen, before receiving their rates, and they should not be disrated except by sentence of a general court-martial. They should be gun-captains in fact, responsible for the bright-work and the condition of the battery, the men being taught to obey them implicitly. They should be required to know the elements of tactics and to drill and instruct the men frequently, under the supervision of the officers.
In the organization of a ship there should be no such names as forecastle men, afterguard, etc., but the men of each division of guns should be required to clean a certain part of the ship. "Lay aft the Fourth Division," instead of "Lay aft the Afterguard"—orders like this would emphasize the fact that the battery and military elements are always foremost in the modern ship. "Captain of No. 3 gun," instead of "Captain of the maintop," should designate a petty officer.
This rank and pay would raise the petty officers of the line to the position they deserve, for are not their duties as important as those of a ship's writer, or a yeoman, or a boilermaker? Every petty officer should be made to assume responsibility and be held accountable for the discipline and good conduct of the men in his part of the ship. He should be the man upon whom to call for assistance in military discipline, and there can be no doubt that with such a staff the officer would find his orders obeyed with greater willingness and alacrity than at present.
The blue-jacket, instead of looking to a non-combatant billet—to the position of a clerk or a yeoman—for promotion and good pay, would soon learn to regard the gun-captain as the most important petty officer in the ship, as in all reason he should be. He would recognize the fact that the man who fires an VIII-inch gun in battle, and who helps to discipline the crew, is quite as respectable as one who serves out soap and tobacco, and, very naturally, he would strive for excellence in seamanship and gunnery as the surest means of obtaining promotion to an honorable office. In short, the calling of a man-of-wars-man would be made sufficiently respectable to attract Americans, and they would not seek to get rid of the blue shirt as the only means of securing a good position in the navy, the only way to be trusted and treated like men. That many who leave the navy now—and the very men we need, too would remain under a system like this cannot be doubted, and the navy would soon find itself raised in tone and esprit to a patriotic and efficient service. Among the yeomen and appointed officers we now find many excellent men. The rate of gun-captain would be quite as acceptable to men of that class, and other rates in connection with the battery and torpedoes, with good rank and pay, would raise the man-of-war element to its proper place afloat. After twenty years' continuous service, the man-of-wars-man should have the option of retiring on a pension.
The Board appointed to consider the question of new ratings doubtless made all the necessary provisions in this line, but their report has not been published. Since this paper was begun the writer learns that the rate of Gun-captain was proposed by the Board.
The beneficial effect upon the apprentice of such a change in the service cannot be overestimated. He would be brought under a better and more elevating influence. He would regard the petty office as one worth working for, and he would learn how to be a good petty officer—a thing that he does not learn and is not taught to-day. His energy and ambition, his better impulses, would come to the front, and decency and good conduct would receive proper encouragement. The vital importance of this part of the subject must not be forgotten. Instead of losing 90 per cent of the apprentices, a large proportion of them would remain, because the service is not without its attractions to many of them. With all its drawbacks there are undoubted charms and advantages in a naval life, and much that makes it objectionable may be removed with great improvement in discipline and efficiency. The navy can be made as attractive as any trade or employment on shore, and men will gladly choose it for life, if their manliness is recognized and cultivated, if faithfulness is rewarded.
The recruiting stations should play a very important part in the preparatory drill and discipline of the enlisted men. Barracks and strict military routine, and thorough instruction with modern arms, provided for that purpose, should be the rule. Gun-captains should be charged with much of the squad drill and instruction, to accustom the men from the start to being controlled by petty officers. Duty at recruiting stations should be regarded as being of the first importance, otherwise valuable opportunities will be lost. An excellent system is now in operation on board the U.S.R.S. Vermont. Petty officers and seamen are taught to drill the recruits, and they do this duty to the perfect satisfaction of the officers in charge. This is an example of modern naval training.
There are some who fear that to make a man military in his habits is to ruin him as a sailor. But there is no ground for such fear. Naval officers should not be thrown into a panic by such a ghost. Why should military instincts and training make a man less efficient as a sailor? Is it necessarily the case with an officer? Why should a slouchy bearing, bad habits, and general untrustworthiness in military matters be conducive to perfection in a sailor? It is not so. On the contrary, military training will make any man more efficient as a sailor—certainly as a modern man-of-wars-man, and that is what is wanted first of all. It will cause him to obey an order the first time, instead of waiting until it is three times repeated; he will obey a petty officer instead of entering into a long argument; he will be more attentive and aspiring, and for this reason it will be far easier to teach him than it is now.
The nautical training of apprentices and seamen need not be neglected. It is not proposed that the instruction in seamanship shall be less thorough. Training ships should be full-rigged as Admirals Porter and Luce declare, because the drill aloft certainly breeds qualities that are invaluable—alertness, fearlessness, and nerve—qualities that cannot be so well secured by any other training or exercise. It may be well to have a training ship on the home coast for seamen and landsmen, where men may be sent from the recruiting stations for instruction in things nautical, in matters pertaining to anchors, chains, hawsers, and wire rope. The English have a ship for this purpose in the Mediterranean.
Until sails disappear entirely from the merchant marine, officers and men in the navy must certainly be taught to handle sails and sailing ships. Every cruising ship should be barque or brig rigged, with light spars and a single suit of sails. In time of peace the necessary instruction may be given to prevent complete ignorance of such matters, and the important advantage of the exercises, physically and professionally, may be secured without undue sacrifice of time. When war comes, the spars and sails may be sent ashore, leaving only the lower masts standing with their military tops. This position regarding sails is a happy mean which will secure, in time of war, all the advantages claimed by the advocates of mastless cruisers, and, in time of peace, all the essential advantages claimed for full-rigged ships. It simply surrenders the idea of using sails as a motive power in time of war.
In all reason, the modern man-of-wars-man should possess, alike, many of the qualities of the sailor and of the soldier. He must know all that the marine knows and much more. To be exact and trustworthy like a soldier or marine, need not make him less skillful with sails, boats, anchors, hawsers and chains; while with guns, torpedoes and explosives he will be more expert, and more to be relied upon. Such a system will attract better men—Americans—who will take more interest in the service if they are made to feel that they form an important part of it, and who will learn seamanship quite as well as the foreigner, or the devil-may-care "Jacky" of the old school.
The seafaring element need not be regarded as the only class from which to recruit modern men-of-wars-men. With proper regard for comfort, pay, and promotion, recruits may be obtained from the interior who will be quite as efficient afloat, after a little training, as officers are, who come from the same districts. As soon as it is noised abroad that the navy has become an American institution, that it seeks a self-respecting and trustworthy class of men, assuring them an honorable career, there will be no trouble in obtaining desirable recruits.
There need be no difficulty in providing for necessary guard duty in case marines are withdrawn from service on board ship. Ships in the navy have done without marines many a time, and there has been no trouble whatever. Men in the Revenue Marine, the Coast Survey, and the Lighthouse Service prove themselves worthy of trust and responsibility. But the man-of-wars-man is a very dangerous character! He must be suspected, to have good discipline! He is necessarily a lower type of man and cannot be trusted—this seems to be the theory. And yet sailors have served on shore with credit, and have performed military duties faithfully when required to do so by their officers.
Select from each division the men who are to form the guard for the day, with a certain number of petty officers to act as corporals. A line officer should be detailed to take charge of the torpedo and electric plants of each ship, and to him should fall the duties at present performed by the marine officer. The guard should receive his special attention, and he should require at all times the strictest performance of military duties. At the same time he would be available for watch duty and general service in case of emergency. May not a line officer be as efficient as a marine officer in matters of ship discipline? Does he lack the education and training required of a disciplinarian? Do his duties unfit him to decide how men shall be trained on board ship, and is he incompetent to train them?
Boatswain's-mates on both decks should exercise military authority, and perform the functions of corporals of the guard at all times, in addition to the men specially detailed for that purpose each day. They should be taught to bring men to the mast for every violation of good discipline. Why should a boatswain's-mate be taught simply to whistle and shout and stand a helpless spectator while the officer of the deck waits in vain for the corporal of the guard to come to his assistance?
Every man in charge of a compartment below decks should be taught to be a sentry in that compartment, and to report all infractions of regulations within such limits. Why should his responsibility be limited to the skillful application of scrubbing brushes, soap, and swabs, to decks and paint-work?
It is absurd to say that "Jacky" cannot be made to do these duties. If the men who now compose the crews of our ships are never to be trusted in anything, they are not the men we want, and there could be no better reason for condemning the system that has brought such men into the service and made them so worthless. Every man who will not do military duties as faithfully as a marine, should be dishonorably discharged from the service at once, and means should be taken to prevent his re-enlistment. As soon as it is understood that the navy will accept none but good men, such men will enlist. As soon as men understand that discharge from the service will inevitably follow military inefficiency, they will do their duty. There may be some friction at first in introducing a system that requires men to be self-respecting and trustworthy. It could hardly be otherwise after insisting for years that the sailor is essentially unreliable. But the service would recover from the shock much sooner than timid people imagine. The navy will be considered desirable by the better elements when it is made too hot for the worthless.
A brother officer has suggested that a partial change in the uniform may influence the bearing of the man-of-wars-man. This is an excellent idea. Perhaps it would be well to do away with the present "mustering suit" and "flat cap," and substitute a suit and cap like those now worn by first-class petty officers. The coat should have a standing collar, and be fitted to the form so that the belt could be worn outside. This uniform should be worn while on guard duty, and upon all full-dress occasions that involve no going aloft. The change would emphasize the fact that modern men-of-wars men must be soldierly, and there would be a natural tendency for men to brace up and be less slouchy in their bearing. With the exception of this change the present sailor dress may be retained for general service.
The effect upon the sailor of requiring him to do military duties will be to greatly improve his morals. If his commanding officer will trust him as an orderly, he will prove himself worthy of the trust, and his respect for his superiors will be increased. If petty officers are consulted, as a marine officer consults with sergeants and corporals in matters of discipline, the commissioned officer will find himself supported at all times by a powerful influence in the midst of the crew. Every petty officer will bring a squad with him to the immediate execution of an order, and there will be a shuffle of feet whenever a command is given.
The standard proposed is not too high. The higher it is made, the more surely will trustworthy Americans enlist and remain in the navy. Among 65,000,000 of people the men can be found who will satisfy the requirements of modern men-of-wars-men, and the petty officers will be forthcoming—there are many in the service to-day—who will prove themselves as worthy of the confidence of their superiors as are the non-commissioned officers of an army.
The marine corps is needed for duty at the navy yards and shore stations. If withdrawn from service afloat, the corps would reach even a higher degree of discipline and efficiency than that for which it is justly noted to-day, because battalions would be more permanent, and instruction and drill could be made more thorough and progressive. The corps would be invaluable as a highly trained, homogeneous, and permanently organized body of infantry, ready at all times to embark and co-operate with the navy in service like that at Panama a few years ago. The education of marine officers at Annapolis fits them perfectly for service in connection with the navy. Both the marine and the sailor will be rendered more efficient by such a course.
No reflection is cast upon the marine by advocating his withdrawal from service afloat. It is simply proposed to stop casting reflections upon the man-of-wars-man, for it is impossible to dodge the fact that the presence of the marine is equivalent to the charge that the sailor is an inferior man. If this is so, it certainly ought not to be. As claimed in the beginning of this paper, the modern sailor should be the equal, if not the superior, of the soldier in all respects. Then why not try to make him so?
The argument that marines should be retained until we get better men is a very poor one. The best way to get good men is to raise the standard by establishing the fact that marines are not needed. As long as the marine remains, the officer will not learn to rely upon the sailor, nor to trust and develop the petty officer. As long as the officer insists that the marine is the only being who stands between him and anarchy on board ship, he condemns the men who should be his best friends, acknowledges that he is afraid of them, and places upon them the brand of inferiority.
The recommendation of the Board of Organization to withdraw marines from ships of war, recognizing that they stand squarely in the way of the military development of the sailor, is the most important reform affecting the personnel that has ever been proposed, the first and most important step toward improving the tone and efficiency of the service; a reform that takes the most intelligent means of attracting Americans to serve their flag afloat by abolishing a pernicious semi-convict system of discipline, and securing to petty officers and blue-jackets their proper duties and their legitimate rewards on board ship; a reform that will tend to create some national feeling in the navy; that will cultivate the manliness, utilize the intelligence, and win the hearty loyalty of 8000 men, by enabling them to feel that they may have a personal pride and interest in the service, instead of being merely its scapegoats.
And the sailor and petty officer having been assigned their proper places in the organization and routine afloat, the commissioned officer, freed from petty duties that degrade his intellect, will bend his mind and devote his energy to the work that properly belongs to an officer—in short, brains and manhood will have the same chance in the navy as in any other profession, which is not the case to-day.
DISCUSSION.
Commodore Jas. A. Greer, U. S. Navy.—I can only say that I fully agree with the views and suggestions so admirably expressed by the writer.
Lieutenant Seaton Schroeder, U.S. Navy.—I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my cordial approval and endorsement of most of the views advanced by Lieutenant Fullam. There is no doubt in my mind that two of the most serious questions we have to deal with in the service are the presence of the marines on board ship, and the performance by commissioned officers of non-commissioned officers' duties.
The idea of individual responsibility is the one most difficult to inculcate among our petty officers, and the serious fact exists that in that feature they do not come up to the mark. The worst of it is that this is often thoughtlessly attributed to the supposed fact that a sailor naturally cannot be trustworthy like a marine. A remarkable conclusion indeed! Of two men taken from the same social class in civil life, the one is assigned to duty on the police force of the ship, accepts that duty and does it, and does it well, whatever may be his natural proclivities as exhibited when on liberty; the other, who may have served in many ships and faced many dangers, who may be remarkably expert with helm, oar, marlinspike, and gun, is invariably brought up to believe that in one essential particular he is lacking, viz., in trustworthiness, responsibility, ability to exert authority; and, that fact being so constantly thrust before him, he naturally accepts it, and loses much of his inherent value in consequence.
Our men can be perfectly relied upon to perform the duties they are trained to do. They are good seamen, skillful gunners, and can march, and handle a musket efficiently; but when it comes to assuming responsibility, commanding attention at drill, enforcing obedience, reporting one of a gun's crew for being drunk or out of uniform at inspection, that is not their business, and it never will be their business until they form their own police force. If one of those very men were rated master-at-arms or ship's corporal, then he would probably do his duty well, just because his shipmates are accustomed to the master-at-arms doing that work. If the marine guards were withdrawn from shipboard, and the guard duty devolved upon the several gun-divisions in rotation, they would quickly get accustomed to the new order of things. At the very first there might be some little difficulty—such as always attends any change— but that would not last long, and the good effect of the change would be felt in every feature of naval life.
In expeditions on shore in a hostile country the blue-jackets are perfectly trustworthy when on guard; why should they not be so at other times? There is certainly no reason why the system in vogue in all armies and in some navies should not be equally successful when applied to our navy. It is not at all necessary that the surveillance over a military body should be exercised by men of a different corps and uniform. I can picture to myself the astonishment that our brothers of the army would feel on being told that it had been decided to have at each post one watch of sailors to preserve discipline, search the non-commissioned officers and privates when returning from leave, etc., etc. Yet that would be no more absurd than it is to have marines performing the same duty on board ship.
The essayist is quite right, I think, in laying stress upon the question of pay. When a barber gets more money than a seaman-gunner, and a bugler more than a gun-captain, it inferentially takes away from the prestige of those positions. If the excellent recommendation be carried out of creating the rating of gun-captain, with the pay of $50 a month, we shall get good men—men from whom we can exact not only good shooting but also power of control over their arms, a personality that will impress itself among their fellows, and command prompt and cheerful obedience to their orders. The rating should not be lightly conferred. A tailor, from the constant sight of a gleaming needle, is apt to be a very good shot with a parlor rifle; but to get good work out of a six, ten, or thirteen-inch gun in action, or even in target practice, requires certain qualities not always possessed by tailors.
In the matter of supervision of routine work there is no doubt that at present the younger officers have to do much that should properly devolve upon the petty officers.. A ship's smartness, both as regards appearance and actual efficiency, is not generally kept up unless the officers give their constant personal attention to the smallest details. In some ways this is harmful to the officers, but less so than it is to the men. The cadets, on leaving the Academy, are an intelligent and highly-trained body, but must profit by contact with the men forward, I think. With regard to the effect on the men of too much supervision from aft, it is at once one of the causes and one of the results of their not being brought up to think more of themselves; and it cannot be changed until we take steps to imbue them with a higher sense of their own worth and of the power that we wish them to exert. In my opinion, one of the first steps to take to secure this, is to withdraw the marines from service afloat, and to let the men, who are naturally their equals in intelligence and their superiors in attainments, do their own guard duty, and incidentally acquire the power and habit of exercising authority when conferred upon them.
The sailor can do everything that a marine can, and a great many things besides. He now receives just as much instruction with the rifle, has as much small-arm target practice, and is as good a shot. And there the attainments of the marine end. Substitute sailors for marines, man for man, and you would increase by just such a number the number of men on board trained to maneuver and fight their ships and their boats, and capable of meeting all the emergencies likely to arise afloat.
For fear of being misunderstood, I would like to say that it is not a lack of respect or of admiration for our gallant marines that prompts the emission of the views I have just expressed. I consider them a splendid body of men; the reputation of the corps for steadiness and gallantry under trying circumstances is excellent, and deservedly so. But I think the ship is not the place for them now, except for transportation, like the Infanterie de Marine of France, for instance. They not only take up room that could be occupied by men better adapted to service on the sea, but they actually, though innocently, are a stumbling-block in the development of a thoroughly efficient naval personnel.
Ensign A. P. Niblack, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Fullam has shown up very vigorously a great many of the weak features of our present organization and methods of training and discipline, without in the least overstating the case. With regard to the withdrawal of the marines from service afloat, he has even quite overlooked a most important phase of the argument. The limited berthing space of the new ships necessitates a resort to a most radical reduction in the number of men aboard each ship, and at the same time requires of those she can carry, largely increased intelligence and the ability of each individual to perform a wide range of more or less important duties. Now, the marine of to-day is just what he was thirty years ago, and probably will be thirty years hence, unless the fundamental idea is modified. Either the marine has got to become more of a sailor, or else he must ultimately go. Whether he goes or not, the sailor has to become more of a military element. Of course, if the marine goes, his duties still remain to be performed by some one else, and, unless that some one else is more versatile than the marine, we have gained nothing either in berthing space or in efficiency. If the every day enlisted man cannot be trusted to perform the duties now carried on by marines on board ship, then we have the best reason for withdrawing the marines and starting in on first principles to teach and compel the men to perform such duties faithfully. If line officers throw up their hands in fear and horror when such a thing is suggested, it is a good sign that something is fundamentally wrong with their ideas of discipline. A consideration of the laws relating to the Marine Corps will show that no violence is contemplated. Sec. 1616 of the Revised Statutes says, "Marines may be detached for service on board the armed vessels of the United States, and the President may detach and appoint for service in said vessels such of the officers of said corps as he may deem necessary." As a matter of fact, the Marine Corps was organized before the Navy—hence the foregoing. Sec. 1616 says, "The Marine Corps shall be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States, on the sea-coast, or any other duty on shore, as the President at his discretion may direct." This really opens up the proper field of usefulness for them, as it would undoubtedly add to the efficiency of our national sea-coast defenses to have them in charge of officers who have had nautical training. The marine is simply no longer necessary on board ship, and it is quite in the line of promotion that this efficient and able corps should be given duties commensurate with their capabilities. We inherited many of our naval traditions from England, and the marine guard on board ship was one of them. In the English service to-day they have two kinds of marines, the "reds" and the "blues"; but the feeling of the necessity for withdrawing them from service afloat is as strong and general as in our own navy. On many, if not all, English men-of-war the ward-room servants belong to the marine guard. The marine is now out of place aboard ship. He takes up too much room, he is not versatile enough, and his presence is the worst kind of a stumbling-block to the military training of the rest of the crew. If these reasons are not conclusive, then the only other thing is to reverse the process and train all our men to be an "improved" type of marine that can paint and coal ship, tar and rattle down, fence, swim, pull an oar, sail a boat, pass a weather-earing, steer a ship, strap a block, or do all of the thousand and one things that only a regular man-of-war's-man knows how to do, adding to it all the military training of the marine.
What we really do want in the way of improved training of our men is to have the term of enlistment made four years, and have the preliminary training of recruits carried out thoroughly on shore before they are drafted off for service afloat. A modern ship, in the first months of her commission, offers few opportunities for the training of men in the rudiments of their profession, and the more that is accomplished at the recruiting station, the better. This applies equally to men in the engineer's force.
The seaman-gunner, the seaman-artillerist, should be the keystone of our present organization, and the scheme now being so efficiently carried out on the Dale for the improvement of the seaman-gunner type is full of promise for the future. With the addition of the Alarm, with her new 6-inch B.L.R., as a gunnery-ship, and the rifle ranges at the Bellevue magazine reservation, it is contemplated that when a man qualifies hereafter he shall require excellence in marksmanship to get his certificate. It would be a wise plan to have a board organized temporarily to draw up an improved plan of instruction for seaman-gunners, with a view to uniformity in future requirements and requalification of those now in the service. The Chiefs of Bureaus of Navigation and Ordnance, the Commandant of the Washington Navy-yard, and commanding officers of Dale and Torpedo Station would certainly be able to outline and carry out a definite and uniform system of instruction and promotion for seaman-gunners. Just now it is not at all uniform.
New watch, quarter, and station bills are needed for our new types of ships. "Coal is king," and with twin screws it is idle to talk of sail-power except for storm purposes. The gun, the ammunition-whip, and the coal-bunker should be the basis of our new organization. Abolish parts of the ship, and have three gun-divisions, embracing 45 per cent of the crew. Have no special duty men whatever taken from the gun-divisions. The engineer's force, with twin screws, requires on an average 25 per cent of the crew. From the remaining 30 per cent, with the assistance of as many of the engineer's force as are needed and can be spared, organize the powder and navigator divisions. This 30 per cent would include petty officers and idlers, messmen, watch petty officers' orderlies, sentries, side cleaners, messenger boys, the mail carrier, steam launch and dinghy’s crew. (This assumes that the marine guard is withdrawn.) In special ships it might be found desirable to increase or decrease the 30 per cent at the expense or gain of the gun-divisions, but the point here aimed at is to do away with all this excusing men for special duty out of running boats and from the guns' crews. Make a gun's crew a boat's crew for "arm and away" and for running boat. The powder division is the disorganizing factor in our present organization, and its importance is hard to overestimate. With the numerous chains of supplies for all sorts of guns that fire ammunition so rapidly, with the numerous water-tight doors on and below the protective deck to be looked out for, numerous pumps to man in case of fire or accident, with the care of the wounded sent down from the decks above, and with the scattered forces of such a large division to keep in hand, we have some very difficult problems to work out. The only satisfactory solution is to wipe out our present type of watch, quarter, and station bill and begin all over. Lack of space forbids the attempt to outline even what we should have in our new ships.
The next few years will see some changes and improvements in the character of the personnel of our crews, and it behooves every one to awake to a realization that new ships mean enormously increased responsibilities on the part of the officers. It is worth an earnest effort to try and attract and help keep in the service the best class of Americans possible. Lieutenant Fullam has hit so many nails squarely on the head that it is only possible, without going into details, to endorse briefly all that he has said. In his service on the Boston, Vesuvius, Yorktown, and Chicago, he has evidently done some thinking, and time will demonstrate that unless more thought and good-will is shown in the improvement of the status of our enlisted men, we can never hope to have a navy that will merit the respect and confidence of the American people.
Lieutenant C.E. Colahan, U.S. Navy.—I have read with great interest the paper written by Lieut. Fullam, on the system of naval training and discipline required to promote efficiency in the navy, and do earnestly endorse and approve the general argument contained therein.
There is, in my opinion, a lamentable neglect in the present system, in not making the position of the petty officer on board ship one of responsibility and importance. The pay of the petty officers of the higher grades, especially those of the line, is clearly inadequate.
The chief petty officers of a vessel of war, and those receiving the highest pay, should be the leading men in the gun-divisions, those who are proficient in all drills and capable of instructing recruits; they should be held responsible for the improvement of those instructed. These petty officers might be styled Division Mates, which rate should replace that of Boatswain's Mate; then would follow the Gun Captains, the grades thus being given the military titles instead of the old titles, which in the modern ship have no significance. These men should have the care of the deck, bright-work, etc., in the vicinity of their guns, as well as of the guns themselves; they should be held to a strict responsibility for the proper keeping of the same. The officer of the watch is now held personally responsible for innumerable petty routine matters that should properly belong to the petty officer; they should not be upon the mind of the officer of the deck at all.
In regard to the presence of the marine guard on board ship, I have merely to say that there is no room for them. The Marine Corps is a remarkably well disciplined and a very efficient corps; so also is the 1st regiment of U.S. cavalry, but neither of them has a place on board a man-of-war, which should have a homogeneous crew of the seaman-military class, each member of which could be called upon for all duties: for that of the service of the guns, that of the sentry on post, or those duties in connection with the sails, anchors, boats, etc. We cannot give room on board ship to a number of men having circumscribed duties only.
It will be admitted that the seaman has quite attained to the proficiency of the marine as a sharpshooter, that his drill with the rifle is quite as good; his intelligence is also about on an equality; then why, in the name of common sense, should he not be quite as efficient in police and sentry duty? By distributing this duty of trust and responsibility throughout the ship's company, the discipline must be bettered.
The whole question contained in the title of the paper under discussion may, I think, be answered in a few words. The pay of the chief petty officers must be increased, or our best men will be lost to us; their position must be made one of responsibility and trust, and their every-day service be of a more military character.
Lieutenant R.C. Smith, U.S. Navy.—With the general ideas expressed in this paper I am wholly in accord. It is well-timed and forcible. The subjects discussed are demanding the serious thought of every officer who finds himself serving on the new cruisers. Lieutenant Fullam's presentation of the idea that the ship is designed for fighting and for no other purpose is logical and to the point. The personnel is a tool to this end that can be no more neglected than can the materiel. It is undoubtedly true that the lack of efficiency of men now found in the service is due to the survival of methods which in their day were admirable but which cannot now be utilized. All energies lately have been turned to building up a navy. It is only when results begin to appear that it is discovered that the organization and methods of the steam sailing ships are no longer applicable. The present condition of affairs is clearly shown in the paper. It is totally unsatisfactory. To devise improvements is to reorganize the navy. Mr. Fullam has certainly advanced many practicable and desirable changes. I do not know that I agree with him in putting the disembarking of the marines in the first place. That their influence on shipboard is harmful there can be no doubt, and that it would still be harmful if the seamen were trained to the highest point of military excellence is also probably true. At the same time I believe that there are methods of raising the tone, morale, and military efficiency of the blue-jacket which would produce greater results than simply sending the marines ashore. Therefore I put these methods, many of which Mr. Fullam discusses, in the first place, though I agree with him that the ship would be better off at the same time without the marines.
I think I understand the word "military" in a little different sense than that used by Mr. Fullam. He starts by saying that "all other than military elements have been reduced to a minimum in naval warfare and in naval architecture," and later that "the strictly military duties on board ship are performed by the marines. Here we come to the real cause, direct and indirect, for the absence of military instincts among men-of-wars-men—the fact that a company of soldiers is placed on board ship to do the military duties, to watch and search and discipline the sailor." The italics are mine. Now, if all the elements of naval warfare are to consist in such military duties as the marines perform on board ship, we shall not progress very far. The inconsistency would be removed by substituting "guard and sentry" for "military" where it relates to marines, though I am afraid it would destroy the point. Guard and sentry duty is not the best means for teaching men to be military, and by military I mean attentive to duty, disciplined, and exact in handling all the weapons with which the ship is provided. It is in frequent and progressive drills with these weapons that military efficiency is best promoted. Guard and sentry duty is good, to be sure; but I should like to see the marines done away with afloat, more on account of the injurious effect on the morale of the sailor element that their presence as a police force exerts. If they are not needed as guards and sentries, there is evidently no reason, as Mr. Fullam very clearly shows, for retaining them on board ship.
In regard to improving the quarters of the men, Mr. Fullam's suggestion of flush spar decks is a good one. The plan is being followed extensively abroad, and will be followed perhaps in our Bennington. I do not believe the open decks are the sole cause of discomfort in the ships named. In the Yorktown, which is the only one of them with which I am familiar, one great trouble seemed to be that the officers as a whole occupied a very large share of the available space. They were more numerous by a third or a half than in foreign ships of a similar type. When by the necessities of the service the complement of officers has been materially reduced, it would seem that a more economical arrangement could be made by a combination of the messes, thus rendering more space available for the men, and at the same time reducing the non-combatant servant element. It is probable that all or nearly all the officers required for the Yorktown class could find comfortable quarters under the long poop. The space surrendered below would be given to the crew. In the French cruiser Forbin, of the same size and total complement, there were ten officers to fifteen in the Yorktown; they were all quartered under the poop, and the whole of the lower deck was given up to the men. An arrangement of this sort would remedy much of the discomfort that Mr. Fullam mentions. The changes now in progress in the Yorktown are in this direction.
I concur in all the other suggestions for promoting discipline and efficiency, and for attracting a suitable class to the service. It is to be regretted that the writer did not go farther in a plan of drills and interior organization that would promote the same end. The main ideas to inculcate are, that the ship is a fighting machine, and that duties tending to increase her efficiency as such must take precedence of everything else: the buoyancy, morale, spirit of the whole personnel must be raised; duties that exert a repressive influence should cease; responsibility should be more extended; and lastly, the health, comfort, and happiness of officers and men should be zealously sought.
Lieutenant-Commander E.H.C. Leutze, U.S. Navy.—Having only a limited amount of spare time, but feeling very strongly on this subject, I would like, if possible, to aid this "good cause" by a few words. I thoroughly agree with the author in everything he says in regard to the blue-jackets and marines. The latter are not only not needed on board of a modern vessel of war, but are doing a positive harm, their presence tending to drive self-respecting men from the service, or, in other words, the class of Americans that we need and must have. The blue-jackets are the men who should be fostered, as they will be the mainstay of the vessel during action. I agree with the author that there should be only one mess of officers, excepting flag and commanding officers, on board a vessel of war. I think it would be beneficial to both the older and younger officers, and would lessen the number of non-combatants. I agree with the author that young officers should be put in more responsible positions on board ship immediately after they have learnt the duties and methods of carrying them on. In regard to the organization of the crew of a war vessel, I would state that the one suggested by the author, namely, by gun-divisions, is in practice on board the U.S.S. Baltimore and U.S.S. Philadelphia, of which latter vessel I have the honor to be the executive officer. I can therefore say advisedly, that even with the present drawbacks, the system gives excellent results; but before it can be perfected we must have the rate of gun-captain as the principal working petty officer of a vessel of war; and other corresponding changes must be made.
Lieutenant H.S. Knapp, U.S. Navy.—To attract Americans of the proper sort, and to hold them in the naval service, a career must be provided for the men, and the conditions of life be made comfortable and self-respecting for them. The career, to my mind, must relate to the gun, and Lieutenant Fullam strikes a key-note when he says, "the men to man such ships should be, pre-eminently, naval gunners—not sailors of the old school." The gun and torpedo, in other words, the military instruments of offense and defense, must become before long the basis of our naval organization; and with that change will necessarily come a change in ratings that will carry with it the abolition of many of them, time-honored but now obsolete. Warships are built primarily to carry guns, and the absurdity of organizing their crews on any other basis than the gun is so evident that I cannot believe our present system will survive much longer. Very few petty officers should have better pay than the captain of a main battery gun or a torpedo-tube. We must have the best men we can find for and in these billets; but it is idle to expect the best men in ratings inferior in pay and position to a large number of other ratings in the ship's organization. Right here is the possibility of creating an attractive career for our enlisted men. Let the ratings be given and named, as far as possible, in relation to the weapons of the ship, and let the gun-captain hold a rating not to be secured without effort, but permanent under proper conditions when once attained, and carrying with it responsibility, position, and sufficient pay to retain good men. Fifty dollars per month, or even more, if found necessary, would not be exorbitant. It will be wise economy in peace, and wise insurance against war, to have a trained body of gunners who will make every shot tell. We can't afford to be without them; the fire of modern guns is too expensive, and the supply of ammunition on shipboard too limited. The adoption of such a scheme would, I firmly believe, by opening up a considerable number of attractive billets, serve to keep a far larger proportion of apprentices in the service than at present. As Lieutenant Fullam observes, they form now by far the most intelligent part of our crews, and every means should be adopted to hold them, especially if such measures conduce to efficiency. But, in addition, if we are to get and keep the class of men we want, better provision for their comfort must be made. Their quarters on many of the new ships are painfully inadequate, and the present system of messing abominably bad. Every man should have a comfortable billet, without the necessity of having somebody slinging above or below him. Petty officers should berth and mess apart, both for their better comfort and as a matter of discipline, to make their position more marked. Certain ones, whose duties are especially arduous, should have state-rooms or quarters somewhat similar to those occupied by the junior officers, where they can sleep in peace after "all hands" in the morning, or during the day when off watch. Wet weather clothing is prescribed, not permitted, and yet no place is ordinarily provided. To provide for these matters in the ships already built would doubtless be difficult, but they should be looked to in all new constructions.
The measures mentioned above would, I am convinced, promote discipline and efficiency, apart from the fact that they would operate to bring in and keep a better class of men in the service. With the separation of the petty officers from the remainder of the crew, and with a greater difference than now between their position and pay and those of the rank and file, the former's self-respect and manliness will be fostered, their control of those under their supervision and authority be increased, and they will be in touch with the commissioned officers in matters of discipline, which, unfortunately, is not often the case at present. On the other hand, the commissioned officer will hold the petty officer in higher estimation, and look to him for more assistance in proportion as his position is magnified. More responsibility should be given the petty officer, and he should be held vastly more accountable than now for the proper performance of duty by his subordinates. In this matter the commissioned officers are at fault to a very great extent, and the remedy is as largely in their own hands. The petty officer cannot hold his office in great esteem when his seniors treat him merely as one of the crew, give him little or no responsibility, hold him to little or no accountability, and give him only the slightest backing in his proper exercise of authority.
When the Board of Organization recommended the abolition of the Marine Corps, as far as sea-going duties are concerned, I confess that I was opposed to the step. But a more careful consideration has led me to see the wisdom of their decision. Now that every combatant on board ship is taught to use his rifle, marines are not needed as sharpshooters. I have served in one ship where there were no marines, and orderly duty was done by the sailors, to the entire satisfaction of everybody, as far as I know. I have also seen a quarterdeck guard of blue-jackets render honors quite as acceptably as the marines, barring the absence of the drum. Really, then, there is no apparent reason for this retention except to do guard duty. The army has no distinctive corps for that purpose, and I am unwilling to admit that the men of the navy are worse disposed than those of the sister service. Thus there seems no necessity for marines on board ship; and if the bad effect of their presence on the rest of the crew, so earnestly and fully described by Lieutenant Fullam, be conceded, there are slight reasons for, and very urgent reasons against, their retention. I believe this bad effect does exist, though not perhaps quite to the extent that the lecturer thinks. Therefore, being convinced on this point, and feeling assured that no necessity exists for retaining marines on shipboard, I endorse the opinion of the lecturer that they should be replaced by an equal number of general-service men, no less combatants than they, and at the same time available for all-round duty.
Throughout these remarks, from force of habit, the appellation "petty officer" has been used. It is a misnomer, and I suggest changing it to some such title as "sub-officer," in the interest of the self-respect of the men who come under its designation.
The opinions advanced by Lieutenant Fullam are radical, and will doubtless encounter earnest opposition. But his conclusions represent, in the main, the views of a considerable number of officers, who will be glad to see them so ably and forcibly presented.
Ensign A.A. Ackerman, U.S. Navy.—One feels grateful to Lieutenant Fullam for his courageous expression of conviction, supposed to be distasteful to many officers connected with the Marine Corps.
It is an excellent indication of the tone of the service when a junior officer (one of those, who, in personally supervising every petty detail of the work aboard ship, are closest to and best acquainted with the character of the bluejacket of to-day) announces that he is as capable of policing himself as any soldier could be.
Undoubtedly, if the Marine Corps is dispensed with, there must be a wiser, firmer, and more watchful control exercised by the officers than is now necessary. But, on the other hand, what a commentary on the wisdom, firmness, and energy of the officers of the navy, the present duty of the Marine Corps affords!
The presence of the marines on shipboard is almost as un-American as would be the control, by troops, of citizens already provided with their legal and efficient authorities; for our ships are efficiently officered. No better amendment to the act prohibiting the enlistment of aliens could be made than one providing that American sailors should constitute their own police, and formulate their own pattern of military excellence on the sea.
When navies were manned by force, and governed by bloodshed and brutality, in the days of the press-gang and cat, then there may have been need of a special corps to carry harsh rules into effect, and protect the authorities against men wronged to desperation. Does the blue-jacket of to-day obey simply through fear of the marine guard? Does he respect his officers the more because they trust their own authority and governing power the less? The blue-jacket is to-day robbed of quarters, military training, pride and honor, by the Marine Corps. Is it a wonder that he so rarely exhibits spontaneous patriotism?
I am sorry that the essayist has expressed himself in favor of retaining sails and spars "for exercise," especially as it seems inconsistent with his previous remarks concerning routine exercises. The handling of sails and spars, from the creation of the navy, has formed the very foundation of routine; it is improbable, should they be retained, that they will not continue to occupy a more prominent position than their merits for exercise warrant; neither is it probable that a reorganization scheme, having improved service and fighting efficiency for its objects, will be promoted by the continuance of obsolete elements upon which the present organization was founded. With regard to our present routine drills, some are provisional and new; the rest retain almost all the features that have been added during the past one hundred years, however inappropriate they may be at present; nevertheless they are excused because "they exercise the crew." No wonder that the sailor-man becomes restless on drill, when day after day he must play a part in so dreary a farce. The worst feature of it is that there is nothing in the drill to indicate what is real and what is farcical; sometimes the two qualities are hopelessly confused. No wonder these drills lack snap when the incentives of purpose and competition are alike absent.
If it is the sincere intention to devote a certain time to the physical culture of the crew, let the matter be handled systematically, keeping that purpose to the front. Let boxing, wrestling, and fencing masters take the men in hand. Without the accompaniments of storm and urgent need (and these would hardly affect "light spars for exercise"), work aloft will no more develop nerve and courage than traveling on the elevated railway or over the Brooklyn Bridge, though doubtless many have felt trepidation while undergoing this experience for the first time.
The new navy is not a vague possibility. It is here. But unfortunately it lacks a personnel benefited by the experience that would have led to its natural and progressive development. Turn in many directions and we are confronted by misfits. Both organization and drill need a radical overhauling, though the confusion of change and condemnation of old standards apparently leads to such demoralization as to bring about a sturdy resistance from some of the most conservative officers in the service. In this connection it may be said that the service cannot help but be conservative, as three-fourths of the officers are ten years longer engaged in subordinate duties than they would be with a steady and regular promotion. The ships are new; the officers are ten years older than they should be to perform their duties to the best advantage.
Lieutenant W.L. Rodgers, U.S. Navy.—I agree heartily with almost all that Mr. Fullam says.
The navy is largely filled with foreigners, who ship only to send their wages to Europe; and when our apprentice-boys leave the training-ships they find themselves in a foreign atmosphere to which they are unaccustomed.
Further, the present system of messing (which satisfies our present navy, composed of what a politician would call the "pauper labor of Europe") is simply disgusting to American-bred boys, and it is no wonder they cannot be retained in the service. The remedy for this state of affairs appears to be in the adoption of the Alien Enlistment Act and an entire change in the mess.
I think it would be practicable to put the men's mess on substantially the same basis as the ward-room mess. The ship should have a large space divided off as a pantry, and this would require much less room than at present, the whole berth-deck being occupied as a kitchen all day long. All the rations could be commuted, and supplies drawn from the paymaster's stores or purchased on shore, as convenient. An officer should have the general supervision of the matter, and a steward, ship's cook, an assistant, and four or five scullions would be ample for a crew of two hundred men or more. Dishes would be washed and mess tables put away after each meal by one or two "hands from each part," or other daily or weekly detail.
It is apparent that further inducement must be offered to get a high class of men in the service. I think, as does Mr. Fullam, that the pay at present offered is in most cases sufficient. The increased expenditure necessary should be applied to "flush-decking" all our ships built hereafter, for the greater comfort of the crew. The fighting efficiency of the Baltimore, Yorktown, and the other new ships may be well enough, and the ships altogether suitable for navies depending on conscription. For such a navy as ours, depending on voluntary enlistments, these ships are not commendable, as desirable men refuse to, remain in a service where their material comfort is entirely disregarded. Constructors tell me that even with the present poop and forecastle vessels they could do much to increase the comfort of the men, were it not for the condition imposed upon them of granting absurdly large quarters to commanding officers. The Boston and Atlanta are the only ships that I know of where the cabins are of moderate size in proportion to the ship. Consider, for instance, the advantages that the changes just announced in the Bennington will give her over the Yorktown. With a flush deck, the wardroom will doubtless be put on the main deck and the cabin be much reduced in size. Ships of the Bennington's size need no junior officers. The present ward-room and junior officers' quarters should be assigned to the petty officers as their quarters and mess-room. The principal petty officers should be given state-rooms or alcoves, two men in each room. Storekeepers now make it a general practice to sleep in their store-rooms; this custom should be maintained, as the ventilation is very good. If all cruisers were to have such accommodation for the crew as the Bennington, ships would be comfortable homes, and much more desirable men would enlist. Another great amelioration would be to have a table always spread with cold dishes for the engineer's force. This is the rule in the merchant service, and is much missed in the navy by all concerned.
Marines have no longer a function on board ship that can be filled by them alone. No doubt, were the marine guard removed from a ship, there would be some trouble for a little while, but only such as a man recovering from lameness might experience when he first throws away his crutch. On board the coast-survey and small ships in the navy, marine guards are found unnecessary; so there seems no reason for retaining them on the large vessels. This is tacitly acknowledged by marine officers themselves when they express a desire to have the secondary battery, etc., turned over to the marines; for, if they now have their well-defined place in the ship's organization, why should they wish for more? If the marines are not a necessity on board ship, the disadvantages of a double organization and system of discipline, where men cannot be transferred as convenience demands, are perfectly obvious.
Finally, I come to the only point in which I disagree with Mr. Fullam, namely, in regard to sail-power on our new ships. In a single-screw ship, sail power is necessary as a reserve motor in case of accident to the primary motive power. But in twin-screw ships, one engine is the reserve of the other, and I see no more reason for embarrassing such ships with sail-power as a second reserve motor than I do for putting sweeps on board a single-screw ship as her second reserve. As for sail-power enabling ships to keep their coal on hand, we must recollect that in making a passage under sail at low speed the consumption of coal for lighting, distilling, etc., will be a large proportion of what would be required to make the same passage under steam at a higher speed, and also that the coal endurance of a large ship is quite equal to her provision endurance, and that provisions as well as coal have been declared contraband of war by the French.
No doubt, as Mr. Fullam says, officers and men should know how to sail ships in order to take charge of their prizes; also, the handling of sailing ships cultivates a certain nerve and resource, but this could be acquired in special sailing-ships such as the English "Cruiser," attached to the Mediterranean squadron, which takes drafts of men from the mastless ships for three months' instruction under sail and then returns them to their old ships.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat that what seems to me most needed to raise the quality of our enlisted men are improvements in their condition and increase of comfort on board ship, and to point out that an amount of money annually expended on increasing the pay of the navy would produce no result whatever; if spent on increasing somewhat the displacement of ships building, so as to give better quarters to the crew, it would probably produce very marked benefits to the service.
Lieutenant J.F. Meigs, U.S. Navy.—I think that naval officers are, as a rule, in agreement with .Lieutenant Fullam as to the necessity for a change in the method of recruiting and training our enlisted men. To retain Americans in the navy we must hold out to them advantages which, at least, approximate to those found in other occupations. The matter of training them will, perhaps, follow easily when we have devised a method by which to get and keep them. When we come to examine the exact steps necessary for this, a considerable diversity of opinion will be found to exist, though as to the nature of these steps there is substantial agreement that an advance of pay and a general betterment of position are necessary. It is my belief that Congress will give us the additional amount of money required to pay certain ratings more, as soon as we have decided what those ratings and their duties shall be, and that the betterment of their condition lies almost wholly within our present power. I may mention that it is my opinion that the creation of a rate of gun captain, in the manner suggested by Lieutenant Fullam, would be well received by officers generally. Other, and in some cases similar, changes would follow naturally. It is not strange that we should be unable to agree as to exactly what we want in these matters; that will come as the issue of the publication by the Naval Institute of such excellent papers as that of Lieutenant Fullam.
Lieutenant-Commander C.S. Sperry, U.S. Navy. In the days of sails, the training of the crew in handling them was of vital importance. In a modern vessel, the captain, beside the man at the steam-wheel, maneuvers the ship, and upon the organization of the battery the issue of the combat depends. It has long been my settled conviction that the battery should be the basis of the organization, and of the titles and ratings of the petty officers.
As for the petty officers, they should be as few in numbers as consistent with efficiency. The fewer they are in number, and the more rigidly they are held to the performance of their legitimate duty, the greater will be the dignity and comfort of their positions.
Every officer knows the disadvantage of a swarm of rated men on board ship with petty titles, which they consider a sufficient excuse for never seeing the light of the sun except when the executive officer has the deck. These men should have no rates. A sufficient number of people should be detailed to perform their duties, but they should be excused from only as much of the general work of the ship as is absolutely necessary. Certain of them, while performing special, and perhaps extra, duty, should be allowed a specified extra pay. As few men as possible should be unavailable for general work at any time.
Rank and pay commensurate with their importance, and that is second to none, should be given to petty officers exercising military control over men.
As for the presence of the marine guard on board a vessel of war, I fail to see that it degrades the position of the sailor.
Indiscriminate overhauling and searching of the person would be none the less humiliating, as customs go, if done by a blue-jacket police. The question is: shall a vessel with a complement of two hundred men have thirty men on board whose general usefulness is very limited, and is usually extended by making them do the work at the battery of the sailor-men whom they crowd out of the complement? Or shall we have thirty able-bodied general service men who can be taught to shoot as straight as a marine, and at the same time consider it their natural mission to work a gun, handle a sail, or go in a boat?
It is doubtful if we can undertake to give in the service the wages that a good, capable American citizen can earn on shore; but there are possible compensations. Under a liberal system of continuous-service enlistments and retiring pensions, his income, though small, would be secure. As a well-paid, trusted, and responsible petty officer, to be disrated only by sentence of a court-martial, his position would probably be quite equal in dignity to any he is likely to attain on shore, and in many ways would be very attractive.
Quarters should be good, even if a light upper deck must go on, pay and clothes good, and the tenure of rates secure. But all of this is of no use if we wish to keep in the service the Americans whom we shall long for in the day of battle and danger, unless the positions to which they are advanced carry with them real, active responsibility.
We all know what kind of shipmates some of the best of our countrymen make when they have little to do and no responsibility—and how they stand behind one when things look black.
We have many fine men now whom we are always glad to shake by the hand as old shipmates. Let us hope we may get more and keep them.
Lieutenant J.C. Colwell, U.S. Navy.—It is not washing our dirty linen in public to try to improve the personnel of the navy by telling the truth. The American public is neither blind nor collectively fools; but it is spending many millions of dollars each year with the object of having a navy, and it wants results. It cares nothing about our hobbies. It wants the full value for money expended; and when some day it takes it into its head to investigate for itself, the service optimist who proclaims himself satisfied with the present efficiency of officers and crews will find that he has not lightened the weight of the hand that will surely fall.
I believe Lieutenant Fullam has done a great service by speaking out in meeting and saying what he believes about the inefficiency of our present system of organization and training. At least it will cause discussion.
Radical changes are what the navy needs, and radical changes will be made for us before many years, unless we indicate those needs and so have a voice in the making. The personnel surely should receive as much attention to develop it as does the materiel. The enlisted man, as we find him in the drafts that come to us, is the person we have to work with, not some theoretical sailor-man who does not make his appearance. His origin is what we must first consider. With a proper organization and a consistent system of discipline, we can form his habits, control his character, and make his training what we choose. If he be a seaman, the chances are that he has been brought up in a merchant ship hailing from some port in the north of Europe where work is hard and pay poor, and he sees that if he does fairly well the work to which he has been accustomed, about the decks or aloft, his pay will be raised and he will be rated a petty officer. The distinction is not valued, but the additional American dollars are, and he devotes himself to being a more or less efficient care-taker of the decks and rigging. He cares nothing for the drills, because he sees other men, like himself, given a rating when they do not understand the difference between a 6-inch and a 6-pdr. gun, and cannot read the figures on the sights of their rifles. He expects to receive his reward in due course. He has no pride in the service because he is there for dollars only, and values the service because he is paid more of them for fewer and less valuable qualifications than he would receive in any other seafaring occupation in the world. If he be an ordinary seaman, apprentice, or landsman, he is listless at drills because it is not made an object to him to be anything else. He sees the honors bestowed for reasons that ignore the existence of guns on the ship. He takes no pride in the service because he finds placed over him men who do not value the honor beyond the extra pay it brings, and for whom, if he be intelligent, he can have no possible official respect. It results that the officers have to devote much of their attention to doing the duties of petty officers, who think that they are giving a full return for pay received if they man the brooms when sweepers are piped, or answer in person a call for a hand from their part of the ship.
The native element that comes to us is good enough for all the petty offices we have to bestow, if it is taught to think so, and this element will rise to the requirements in a surprisingly short time. I have known a young American, on his first enlistment drawing a landsman's pay, after six months' drill and instruction (not coddling), to be quite competent to drill a squad of recruits at a great-gun; and he was trusted to take charge of a cutter under oars for the instruction of others. In the same ship were petty officers who could not be trusted to do either. After an experience of about a year of our most un-American system, the young man very naturally deserted. The apprentices, properly handled, are an excellent element; but they are not our sole hope for salvation from the north of Europe. Young men up to the age of 24 or 25 years should be offered the inducements of a career of good pay and preferment according to zeal and ability. One year's training of the right sort would make excellent men-of-war's men, and the training should be with the type of ship and gun they would be required to man should war come upon us.
I heard a distinguished officer of our service once say that the best ship's company he ever commanded was composed mainly of a regiment of mountaineers from one of the Southern States, prisoners of war, who had been induced to enlist to escape confinement, and that after a few months' hard training he had a crack frigate's company.
To attract the class of men we need, we must show that we are prepared to recognize and reward by advancement, brains, zeal, and good conduct, just as those qualities are recognized in the labor market of our country. Under our present system, a young American with the sea instinct, and possessing all those qualities, but who is unfortunate enough to enlist as a landsman, finds himself in a veritable slough of despond. His brains are unrecognized, his zeal is mistaken, and his good conduct serves but to get him on the liberty list. I have known several such who ended an enlistment in the rate they commenced— still landsmen after three years' good service, with no recognition of any qualities beyond those exhibited as permanent sweeper or berth-deck cook. These men, who had the making of first-class men-of-war's men in them, had they been properly encouraged and advanced, saw one foreigner after another, inferior to themselves in every desirable quality, advanced to petty-officer's rank simply because the talismanic word "seaman" appeared after their names on the muster-rolls, a title that means nothing as to the man-of-war efficiency of the possessor. Young men of that type should be given every encouragement to improve their technical knowledge and to stay with us; but rarely do they serve out an enlistment, and when they do, it is to leave the service with a well-grounded disgust, and to disseminate a dislike for it among the very people we should attract. The apprentices feel the same discouragements. Vastly inferior men may be, and are, placed over them as petty officers, because the seaman-apprentice is too small, or too young, or hasn't been at sea long enough; and then we solemnly stultify ourselves by making the same young seaman a gun captain, and stationing the captain of his part of the ship at the same gun—a military anomaly and a direct blow at discipline. But the apprentice was intelligent and could handle his gun admirably, while it was beyond the understanding of his petty officer. It is safe to say that that young man will not be a good recruiting agent when he drops a service that opens no career to his seamanlike qualities of the best kind. Or, again, when he finds all the prizes of the enlisted force in the way of pay, position, uniform, and consideration bestowed upon the non-combatant element, it is not likely that he will feel kindly towards a navy that ignores his value as a skillful fighting factor. He finds his contemporaries of sedentary tendencies advanced to positions of trust, and put in the way of ratings to writers, yeomen, and clerks, though they may know little about ship or gun and care nothing. He had the sea instinct or he would not have come to us; he developed it, and we ought to repay him with the best prizes of pay and position; but we do nothing, and he goes, while the clerk remains with us as the result of that effort to Americanize the navy.
The crews that we have fall very far short of meeting modern requirements, and it is owing to their lack of systematic, consistent, military training. They are not required to be attentive, careful, and thoughtful in military drills; they are required to be all this in caring for ship, boat and top. They are told military drills are important, but they see the rewards of service, the petty offices, going, not to the man skillful with the great gun and rifle, who attentively listens to, and intelligently grasps, the instructions of his officers on drill, but to the man who has a reputation for being a good seaman, which means with us not what it ought to mean in a navy fast becoming sailless; or to the man who toils painfully over paint and ladders, or spends hours polishing up a cutter, which, likely as not, is then forbidden to be used except on show occasions, for fear of its being soiled.
How many of our present petty officers could be safely drafted to a volunteer organization, or ship, as instructors, to form a trained nucleus around which the men fresh from civil pursuits could rally and look up to as models to imitate?
The gap between the men and the petty officer, not as he is, but as he ought to be, must be made greater, and between the latter and the commissioned officer, less. Better quarters and better pay for the fighting petty officers, and permanency of rank beyond the chances of a change of ship or of commanding officer, will do much to attract and hold the men needed.
A man-of-war that is "kept like a yacht," as we occasionally hear, is a very attractive spectacle, but that is not the end for which we are maintained by the nation. Nobody will care when we go into action whether our ships look like yachts or like coal-barges. The only solicitude will be for military results; and we are not training our crews to the end required of us. The good "seaman" (and good at nothing else) has an entirely fictitious and mainly sentimental value in these days. He was of prime importance when the captain who could most quickly maneuver his ship, handle his sails, and repair damages aloft, was thus able to place and keep his battery in its best tactical position. He is no longer needed for that purpose. A couple of men in the conning-tower place the battery where desired, and it is the battery that wins or loses the fight, according as the crew is skilled or unskilled in its manipulation. Individual skill, here and there, we have, in spite of discouragements; organized general skill, with the best men in the most important places, holding rank and drawing increased pay by virtue of that skill, is what we need. A petty officer made gun captain by virtue of his rank, who can neither shoot straight, handle his gun properly, nor drill a squad, is a very serious misuse of the weapons entrusted to us; yet this state exists. It neutralizes the advantage of possessing accurate guns, and discourages and demoralizes intelligent subordinates, who know that they possess skill and knowledge superior to the men placed over them. The effect is felt all through the ship.
A plain remedy is to make the battery the basis of organization, with petty officers selected for their military efficiency, bearing titles that indicate their responsibility, drawing pay commensurate with their value, and requiring them to exercise, at all times, authority over their own particular squads, whether at the battery, in the company, or in the necessary work in the part of the ship where their gun is mounted. Impress upon the crew that the battery with its attendant rifle and pistol practice is first; back it up by rewarding the attentive and skillful, and the best element will quickly respond. Particularly will the native element come to the front, for there is nothing the American appreciates so much as recognition of his abilities in the race of life, and the possession of responsible authority over those whom he himself has demonstrated to be his professional inferiors.
I quite agree with Lieutenant Fullam as to the desirability of dispensing with the marines on board ship, though I do not believe that it is the first nor the most important move to be made in an effort to improve the morale of our crews. The day of the marines passes with that of the old-style seaman, and we no longer need them. As a part of the fighting force of a ship they are gradually becoming an embarrassment. On one ship we find them scattered at the guns, filling subordinate stations; on another, assigned to man the secondary battery, and on another, drawn up in line to be used as sharpshooters when opportunity offers, meanwhile to be shot at and killed by rapid-fire and machine guns at distances beyond the effective range of their rifles. Each of these is a waste of good material, and a poor use to make of the training of a crack corps.
With a crew organized on the battery basis, it would be a simple matter to mount each morning a guard of one or as many gun-crews as might be needed to furnish the sentries and orderlies for the succeeding twenty-four hours. The moral effect on the crew would undoubtedly be great. There would be visible to them independent, responsible command exercised by members of their own body, the petty officers knowing their duties and trusted to perform them, respected by their superiors and obeyed by their inferiors—an object lesson in discipline that could not fail to make its effects visible in every variety of ship's duties.
The officers of subordinate rank feel discouragements of a somewhat similar nature to those indicated for the men. It does not require much brains to see that the rewards go to those who have "sought the beach." Naturally other men go there. If they have brains, they find them recognized, and duty assigned commensurately. On shipboard, the only measure of ability is the inches of gold braid on the cuff, and the only qualification for increasing the measurement is the elapsed time since the uniform was first put on, an interval during which many brains of original promise rust out, or, discouraged, fall into the rut of routine. Routine is not the end, nor is what we call discipline, nor yet is a ship polished into a thing of beauty. They are but means to the end—fighting efficiency—and unless we attain that end, all the rest is wasted time and labor. If we attain it now, it is in spite of our organization and system of training, not by reason of them.
Our crews should be trained with the tools that they are to use in war. Yards and sails are no longer those tools. The guns, torpedoes, electric plant, signals, boats, wheel, lead, engines and boilers, are. There is plenty of scope. Oars, single-sticks, and a gymnasium outfit will provide additional physical training. The latter is seen in perfection and daily use in the French navy, and is being developed in the Italian navy. I am also informed that it is successfully used in the German navy.
Sailing ships no longer carry the bulk of the world's commerce. In time of war they would disappear from the trade routes. Why, then, should our men be organized on the basis of their ability to handle what the navy will never require them to use, and why should time be wasted in teaching them an obsolete naval art? There will be no more sailing prizes brought into port. The cruiser costing from $700,000 to $3,000,000 cannot afford to detach officers and men for prize-crews. Burn, sink, and destroy (excepting, of course, neutral vessels) will be the orders of cruisers in the next naval war, and the only exceptions will be in the case of prizes of value sufficient to warrant a convoy; such prizes can be found only in the great steam-liners which are practically sailless.
Sails for war use have gone out of date ; the old-style seaman, the unit of organization in days past, must also go. But a higher type of seaman must take his place, and how to produce him and retain him is the problem that is set us to solve. According to our solution shall we be judged by the people, in the day of trial, and sentiment will not enter into the judgment.
Commander Henry Glass, U.S. Navy.—The paper which has just been read calls attention to the existing need of a more thoroughly military organization for our vessels of war than we now possess, and I think this a need which should receive the careful consideration of all officers of the navy. I am in entire accord with most of the ideas advanced by the writer, and with the suggestions for changes in the rating and pay of enlisted men, and for increasing the inducements offered to induce valuable men to remain in the service, all of which I advocated some years since in a paper written for the Institute.
The present organization of the crews of our vessels grew out of the needs of the sailing ship; and while it was perfectly suited to a frigate or sloop-of-war, even in the days of auxiliary steam-power, it has, unfortunately, been retained in the service long after the vessels for which it was intended have become obsolete. What is needed at present is an organization appropriate to the modern battle-ship and fast cruiser and the duties to be performed on board them, and such an organization should be devised and put into use as soon as possible.
I think that all the suggestions made by Lieut. Fullam were more or less fully discussed and recommended for adoption in reports made to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy by the Board on Organization in 1889; indeed, that Board went much further than he does in recommendations to increase the efficiency of the enlisted men, and to induce competent, trustworthy men to remain permanently in the service. As allusion has been made to some of the recommendations of the Board, I am permitted to state in general terms to the members of the Institute what were some of the results of its deliberations.
The Board, taking the ground that an immediate necessity exists for improving the character of the enlisted men of the navy in order to obtain the best results in the vessels of war of the present day, commenced with the recruit on his entry for service, or rather with the naval apprentice.
A large increase in the number of apprentices was recommended; the apprentices when enlisted to be sent to a central station, where they would be retained on shore long enough to be uniformed and given preliminary drills, and some knowledge of naval discipline, when they would be transferred to cruising training ships, for voyages of some months at a time, until sufficiently advanced for entry into the regular service. It was recommended that apprentices should be required to serve, at least, one enlistment of three years, after attaining their majority, before being entitled to final discharge, and that a portion of the time should be spent at the training station under special instruction.
Two vessels of moderate size, one with full sail-power, both armed with modern service guns, and supplied with torpedo outfit and electric-light plant, were recommended for the training station, to be used in making short cruises with small detachments of apprentices and young recruits, the detachments being shifted from one vessel to the other for different drills and instruction. It was recommended that one of these vessels be fitted for special instruction of firemen and coal-passers in handling fires under forced draft.
The enlistment of men without previous naval service was to be discontinued, as far as possible, and minors were not to be enlisted except through the training station, unless in the case of those too old to become regular apprentices, and in such cases a longer term of enlistment than three years, as now authorized by statute, was recommended.
As the crew of a vessel of war should be composed primarily of seamen, it was recommended that the terms "Landsman," and "Ordinary Seaman," should no longer be used; that men for special duties should have rates designating, as nearly as possible, those duties, and that the seamen should be divided into three classes, according to their experience and ability, with corresponding pay. The pay of the first class seaman was fixed at a higher rate than at present, and it was provided that seamen of all classes should receive extra pay for special acquirements; in ordnance work, torpedo work, and marksmanship, at the rate of $2 per month for each specialty. The increased pay for these specialties was to be open to all other men of the crew, with the restriction that men rated and paid for special work should not receive the additional pay for their specialties; thus a gun captain might qualify for torpedo work, or ordnance work, or both, but not for marksmanship. The present increased pay for successive reenlistments was to be
It was recommended that, with certain necessary restrictions, the appointments of all petty officers should be permanent from one enlistment to another. A retiring pension was also recommended, sufficiently large, it was thought, to offer a high premium for continuous faithful service. A recommendation was made that the time between discharge and reenlistment, under honorable discharge or C.S. certificate, should be increased to six months, with pay for three months, as now allowed by law.
The guns' crews were to become the units of the organization, and the special rate of Gun Captain was recommended, with high pay, to be held by leading men in the crew who excel in marksmanship. The gun captain was to be responsible for the men under his command when at the gun or performing duty in any part of the ship; he was to replace the present Quarter Gunner in everything relating to the care and preservation of his gun, and he was to perform the duties of a captain of a top where necessary on account of the rig of the ship.
The gun division was to take the place, for duty on deck, of the watch or quarter watch, and instead of Boatswain's Mate the rate of Division Mate was proposed, to be held by the leading man of the division, who was to command the division in the absence of an officer, when acting as a whole on drill, or in the performance of any other duty. Other rates for special duties were recommended, but enough has been said to show the character of the changes proposed. The efforts of the Board in assigning rates to men in the new organization were directed to making the title represent, as nearly as possible, the duty to be performed, to reducing the number of titles to as small a number as convenient, and to grading the pay of men for special duties according to their ability and the importance of the duty. The number of rates proposed was, in consequence, smaller than under the present system; but a more equal and regular promotion and increase of pay from grade to grade would, it was believed, be the result.
The rates of pay proposed were intended to emphasize the importance of the military and skilled elements on board ship as being greater than that of the police and clerical force employed.
I think the writer overstates the argument for dispensing with marine guards on board our vessels. Certainly the recommendation of the Organization Board was not due to any feeling that the presence of marines on board vessels of war tended to degrade the seamen, or to render them less efficient in the performance of military duties. It was proposed to withdraw the marines from ships in commission and to increase the strength of the corps considerably, with the idea that larger bodies of men being stationed together at the different navy yards, a higher degree of efficiency would result, and the Navy Department would have always at hand a compact, thoroughly drilled, and organized force to be used where landing parties were needed. At the same time it was supposed that the better class of men whom it is desired to attract to the service could perform efficiently all the purely military duties now done by the marines, and also carry on all the routine duties of the man-of-war's-man.
The concluding paragraph of Lieut. Fullam's paper seems to contain a proposition with which, under no circumstances, could I agree. While the enlisted man should be trained to the highest point of efficiency, and be entrusted with the responsibilities of much important duty, I cannot think that any duty, however trivial apparently, is unimportant in the daily life on board a vessel of war; still less that it can be degrading to either the position or intellect of a commissioned officer. It is only by careful, constant attention to all details of duty on the part of executive and watch officers that the present high standard of discipline in our service can be maintained, and our ships made to present, as they have always done, examples of neatness, cleanliness, and readiness for service.
The responsible commissioned officer may, and should, direct petty officers to carry on duty; but close supervision should never be relaxed for a moment by the officer of the watch; and no study of scientific principles, if pursued at the expense of the habit of close attention to all duty, can be to the real interests of the service.
My experience is not in accord with one of the writer's statements that the younger officers are not allowed opportunities of performing responsible duties on board ship. In every ship in which I have served since graduating from the Naval Academy, with one exception, ensigns have always been assigned to duty as regular watch and division officers, and in many of them midshipmen, or naval cadets, have been assigned to such duties, if not under orders from the Navy Department, then by the commanding officers.
Lieutenant William G. Cutler, U.S. Navy.—While I agree with the essayist that marines are no longer needed afloat, I would rather do so upon the ground that their room is needed for the general service artilleryman, than upon the less tenable ground of the latter's degradation.
What I regard as the most important point of the paper, viz., "Permanency of Rating," the essayist subordinates to the necessity of getting rid of the marines.
When we recognize that the sailor of the future is an artilleryman afloat, and when we rate and pay him in accordance with his value as a fighting factor, we will have made a great step in advance.
The question, "How can a better class of men be induced to man our rapidly building ships?" is of the utmost importance to all patriotic Americans. I respectfully suggest the following inducements:
1st. High pay to the skilled artilleryman.
Assuming the captain of the Boston's 8-inch gun to be what a modern gun-captain should be, there should be no man forward of her mast whose pay exceeded his. A recent article in the daily press complains that the seamen-gunners, after being instructed at Newport and Washington, are accepting positions in steel works and small-arm factories. Can they be blamed for improving upon the $26 of the navy?
2d. Permanency of rating to the extent that no man who, after due trial, has proved himself worthy, shall lose his rating except by sentence of a G.C.M.
3d. Increase the gun-captain's authority, gradually giving him entire charge of detail drills.
4th. Improve the men's quarters and comforts to the utmost extent consistent with the efficiency of the vessel. Procure skilled berth-deck cooks. Berth servants apart from crew, and uniform them distinctively.
5th. Reduce the number of non-combatants to a minimum; servants by consolidation of officers' messes; reduction in number of yeomen, writers, etc.
6th. Exercise far greater care in the enlistment of men, especially of men who enlist in ratings.
As to the relations of officers and men, they could not but be improved by the following:
In port relieve the watch and division officer from much of his unnecessary watch duty; not that he may go on shore, but that he may identify himself more closely with his battery and with his men. He and his men will surely be more efficient by knowing and respecting each other. Hold the division officer, and not the gunner, responsible for his battery and all things pertaining thereto.
Require all officers to be on board during working hours. The spectacle of a procession of officers fleeing the ship at 1 P.M. is surely a cause of discontent among the men. For the sake of the men, as well as the officers, naval cadets and ensigns should not be made to do petty officers' work.
Lieutenant Paul St. C. Murphy, U.S.M.C.—I have read with more or less interest Mr. Fullam's argument in support of what he considers necessary to " promote efficiency" in the navy, and while agreeing with him in certain minor matters, think that in the main his zeal misleads him, so far as existing conditions are concerned; that he errs in regard to the malign influence of "marines afloat," and that his view of the U.S. sailor of to-day is too pessimistic.
Marines and sailors have been associated from the beginning of our navy and have shared in common its toils and its glory. Marines have always contributed their full share to victories afloat, and the depressing effect of their surveillance was not discovered in the days when battles were fought and victories won. During my sea service, extending over a period of more than eleven years, I have failed to see in the blue-jackets any evidence of repressed manliness due, in even a remote degree, to the presence of the marines. The espionage complained of is exercised by the marines over their own men quite as much as over the sailors; the same is exercised by guards and sentinels in the army, yet I doubt if the esprit of marines or soldiers is impaired thereby. My experience warrants me in believing that the morale of the sailor has never suffered from contact with the marine. If sailors are to be made military, the example of a body of subordinate, well-drilled men should be a help rather than a hindrance to the development of a military spirit. Mr. Fullam omits to state that the marines, besides "watching the scuttle-butt," "attending the commanding officer," and "standing by for ceremonies," also stand regular sea-watches with the sailors, are stationed with them at all general exercises, and are noted for promptness and zeal in this sailor work; that they keep clean their own part of the ship, and that they form an important part of the ship's battalion. Marines are not in any sense "idlers," and this fact cannot be unknown to Mr. Fullam, whose acquaintance with the watch, quarter, and station bill must make him familiar with the "principles of modern organization."
If the withdrawal of marines from service afloat is to work the reform predicted by Mr. Fullam, if it is to make the service more attractive, what need for so large an increase of pay?
Mr. Fullam has few, if any, uncomplimentary things to say of the "marines as such," yet the pay of "13 dollars per month, with 3 dollars clothing allowance," does not deter good men from seeking service in the corps, the quota of which is generally full. I am not an advocate of small pay. I would like to see the pay in my own corps increased, especially for non-commissioned officers; but it seems to me that pay has little to do with the matter in question. Of course, pay might be so increased that there would be as much eagerness in seeking billets before the mast as is at present the case in the scramble for place in the civil service of the Government. It is something more than doubtful, however, whether, when the pinch comes, the material so obtained would be superior to the old.
And now a word for the sailor of to-day. I believe Mr. Fullam very much underrates him. The "heterogeneous crowd" to which he alludes as making up the companies of our ships of war is about the same "crowd" that did gallant service for us in 1812, and later, and that has made our flag respected everywhere. The men who followed Farragut, and the men of the Trenton who, with death staring them in the face, cheered the escaping Calliope during the memorable disaster at Samoa, were of the same "heterogeneous crowd." Whatever credit marines have gained (they have gained much and deserve more), has been hand in hand and side by side with these "foreign" tars. The same "heterogeneous crowd" fills and has always filled our army, and has proved itself, afloat and ashore, the material of which good sailors and good soldiers are made.
I fear there will always be an absence of Mr. Fullam's "American" element; that element may be heard from in time of war, but at any other time it cannot be counted on. Perhaps the present element can be made more military; it is possible, and to a certain extent desirable; but there is always the danger of taking the temper out of the steel by the grind of over "sojering." I have failed during my experience to see in the discipline and training of the navy the "unbending" and "un-American requirements" that Mr. Fullam sees; and the element that he considers driven back by them to civil life is, in my opinion, an element pre-eminently fitted for civil life; it is certainly quite unfit for the navy.
I see nothing to blush for in the past and present of the navy, and nothing to despair of in its future.
Captain Louis C. Fagan, U.S.M.C.—The paper written by Lieutenant Fullam, U.S. Navy, is a powerful one, granting his theory that marines are responsible for all evil is correct; but reflection will perhaps show that even if marines were withdrawn from on shipboard, there would not be that rush of young Americans to make up the crews of ships the sanguine theorist supposes. The fact must be ever borne in mind that life at sea is an unnatural one, and men cannot be persuaded to exist for any length of time away from the comforts of the shore, no matter how rude these comforts may be.
American lads, as shown by the costly failure of the training system (Mr. Fullam says 90 per cent are lost to the navy), will not stay long in the service; and even if the marines were relegated to the scrap-heaps in our quiet navy yards, the "boys" could not be induced to remain and be tossed around, even if granted a chance to look through portholes to view the world. The best proof of the bad effects that a "life on the ocean wave" produces is seen in the discontented moods and wild fancies that enter the minds of intelligent men, when exposed to the trials of mid-watches and a sea diet, and the most polite and elegant officer on shore often becomes a perfect demon to those under him at sea; even rich men owning yachts do not stay on them any longer than is necessary to entertain and display their wealth, notwithstanding the fittings of luxury. No; the object of naval reorganization of the personnel is to supply to a ship of war men who can do the fighting in case of hostilities, and uphold the honor of the flag during peace or war. Jealousy, or prejudice, or fine-spun theories ought not to interfere with this great object. The days when promotion followed, during a three years' cruise, from midshipman to lieutenant-commander have passed never to return, unless we have a successful war; and to make this possible we must foster any system that gives us warriors, whether they wear the blue shirt of the sailor or the trim uniform of the "ever faithful." The "bone and sinew of the land" will enter as soldiers under the splendid discipline of the Marine Corps, fostered by naval commanders, when they hesitate to ship as sailors, and it would be a foolish move to displace men who are acknowledged by their bitterest foes to be efficient and faithful, in order that a few officers should be benefited by increased rank and easy billets.
We have in the Marine Corps an organization largely American, and which has been pronounced a strong arm of defense, not only by the veterans who have made the navy all it is to-day, but by the most progressive commanding officers and those highest in broad intelligence, who feel most keenly the necessity for our men-of-war being manned by the best material, regardless of personal wishes of the inexperienced.
One word in conclusion. In every community there must be a visible force to back the law. Take all the bad men out of a town, or of legislative halls, and "police" would still be necessary. Now much more important is it, then, that in the unnatural life on board a man-of-war, with many of the passions suppressed among the men (picked out for their animal perfection), the captain should have a force ready to uphold the majesty of the law, and at the same time be able to undertake the management of the most complicated guns and use them against the enemy. The idea of comparing men on board ship with a regiment on shore is preposterous to any observer of human nature, for the evil passions of soldiers on shore, with practical freedom, are given vent, while on board ship, often for weeks, the natural impulses are checked, and unlawful desires fomented and violence precipitated. Then a remedy must be ready to apply.
Taking into consideration a first-class navy, not a make-shift affair, the primary thing to be thought of is, how can the navy he made most efficient for any emergency? No doubt departments and officers in plenty could be dispensed with on board ship for the general good. Great wars were conducted, the nation saved, and skillful battles fought without the aid of the Naval Academy, for instance. Yet how foolish and absurd would it be for any man or class of men to advocate the effacement of that noble school, which has given so many level-headed men of brains to the service of the country, simply because the navy, like other navies, could somehow get along without such an institution; and then, perhaps, the men who seek their own advancement through the ruin of others might be spared with great advantage.
Lieutenant E.B. Barry, U.S. Navy.—It seems to me the main idea underlying Lieutenant Fullam's essay is a condemnation, not only of the methods employed in our naval service afloat, but, also, of those employing them. I doubt if the service at large will agree with his course of reasoning. Lieutenant Fullam must have been particularly unfortunate in the composition of the divisions he has commanded on board ship; still, I think much of what he complains about is due to his own idea of what constitute military matters. What does he mean by this? Does he mean a, rigid observance of position and motion throughout all drills, as taught in the German navy, where army discipline holds good? Would he organize our navy on the German army plan? Are these ideas "proper concessions to national traits and institutions"? Men usually follow the lead of their officer; if the one is interested in his drills and exercises, the other will be. The divisional officer is to continue and perfect what is begun in the training squadron and on board receiving ships. The essayist seems to forget that we are in a transition state, and that the entire reorganization of the navy cannot be effected in a few months. He blames the old sailor for not being a soldier. When the efforts of the Navy Department to introduce some sort of system into target practice bear fruit, when the gunnery and torpedo schools have turned out enough qualified men to captain all the guns afloat, and when modern instruction can be imparted more generally, then, if no results are produced, it will be time to condemn sweepingly. The vital question concerning petty officers is rating and disrating. When they can be disrated only by sentence of court-martial, many of the evils complained of will disappear. Even this takes time. Let us begin with the rate of Gun Captain; as the essayist says, diffuse these men through the service, and watch the result. There is an old dodge known as "working for a rate"; this consists in "being seen" by the captain and executive officer, but in shirking when they are not on deck. In spite of all opposition, many of these worthless fellows were rated by those in power, who naturally believed their own eyes. This will be done away with if reports of efficiency are made by all watch and divisional officers on board ship, from which to make up a man's record. This will aid the younger officer to "escape the professional wet blanket." I fully agree with that portion of the essay on quarters and comforts for the men; also, on pay and promotion. Give properly qualified petty officers good pay, permanent ratings and a retired pension; recognize that the old-time sailor is giving place not to the soldier, but to the gunner, and the problem is solved. I think the question of marines can be settled by a uniform system of punishments prescribed by the Department, and having it strictly enforced. Human nature is ever the same. Uniformity of rewards and punishment will go far to make men contented; stern but even justice is preferable to lax and variable partiality. I think the marine will in time be withdrawn from service afloat as he becomes more and more of a non-combatant aboard ship. Either he is to become one of the gun's crew, the boat's crew, and one of the ship cleaners, or else his place will be taken by men to do these duties. But he will not go because of the bad moral effect exercised by him upon the ship's company, for, in my opinion, this effect does not exist. When that day comes, the divisional officer will find himself just as much responsible for the condition of his battery and guns' crews as he is to-day. He never will be able to throw his own responsibility upon petty officers.
Commander S.W. Terry, U.S. Navy.—In my judgment, the article we have heard read this evening is not calculated to result in any good to the service. It is not only an attack upon the usefulness of the marine guard, an important adjunct of a man-of-war, but it is an unjust reflection upon the officers charged with the discipline and government of men on board ship, calculated to produce discontent among the men of the navy, and to create doubt and distrust in the people as to the efficiency of the service in general. For my part, I do not think this Institute was ever established for the purpose of disseminating any such doctrine, and for that reason I regret very much that the paper should be published in its Proceedings and distributed through the country and abroad.
At a time when the navy and our people at large are congratulating themselves that a good beginning has been made in building up the navy, the author of this paper comes forward and not only charges that our men are not treated as they should be in the matter of pay, promotion, and employment, but that such of the new vessels as the Charleston, Chicago, Baltimore, and Philadelphia are faulty in design; this is in the face of the fact that the plans of these vessels were prepared by a board of the most experienced experts to be found among officers of the navy.
While, I suppose, there is no one who will claim there is no room for improvement in the condition of the crews of our vessels, few will admit the correctness of their condition as described in the paper read this evening. The type of ships completed and being constructed, and the material composing the crews of the vessels of our navy, will compare favorably, in my opinion, with those of any other country. It is easy to find fault, but not so easy to formulate the remedies. I think we can agree that an efficient naval personnel can only be developed from the raw material by persistent and intelligent training on board ship, and this must be conducted by zealous and capable officers anxious to reach a high degree of efficiency. While other countries were engaged in transforming their navy from an old to a modern type of vessels with modern armaments, our own Government did nothing to keep pace with them. Their experiments and experience were of great value to us, however, and in 1883 we began the building of modern and improved ships. In March, 1883, Congress passed a law providing that no wooden ship should be repaired for a greater expense in hull or machinery than 20 per cent of the cost of a new vessel of the kind. Up to this time much money had been expended in repairing vessels that many regarded as useless, but this law marked the beginning of the end of wooden ships for our navy, and many were soon gotten rid of. Under these circumstances it has not been practicable to afford officers as much sea duty as was customary in former times, a condition, in the opinion of the best judges, unfavorable to an efficient navy. This, in my opinion, was of greater disadvantage to officers of the junior than to those of the higher grades, as many juniors remained on shore duty from three to five years. Some of these younger officers, not long out of the Naval Academy, and with limited experience in control of men, naturally interested in the absorbing question of rebuilding the navy and providing the most improved armament for our ships, have, now and then, occupied themselves in the solution of such problems as this paper deals with, and which, in my judgment, might better be left in the hands of more experienced officers. A navy, like an army, requires time, perseverance, and opportunity, for perfecting itself as a fighting organization.
We have not had for many years a navy worthy the name, and, in consequence, our men may not be up to the standard we hope to attain. It has been impossible to train men for service in the new cruisers up to this time, but in spite of this, and before any fair opportunity is had, we hear the complaint that the men are unsuited and incapable, and that the vessels themselves are faulty in design and not of a kind to attract the American sailor, this latter being represented as exacting as to his compensation and the amount of comfort to be provided in the ship; and, further, it maybe inferred that if he should choose to return from liberty, in liquor, a marine should not search him. As reference is made in the essay to the crews of the vessels composing the Squadron of Evolution, and the essayist is also on board one of them, it may be that his experience there affords ground for what he says of the unfitness of the men now enlisted for manning our new ships. I am sorry the brief cruise of the squadron should not have made a more favorable impression on his mind, and I beg to dissent from his conclusions as to the capacity of the crews of the squadron. It appears the squadron sailed in December last and returned in July following, and, judging from the essayist's paper, it might be inferred the men had not reached a very high degree of efficiency. This is not in accordance with the official reports, however.
His propositions seem to be three:
1st. To withdraw the marines from service afloat, their presence on board ship being detrimental to discipline and an implied distrust of the sailor.
2d. That in the matter of "pay, discipline, and promotion," there is not sufficient encouragement to Americans to enlist in the navy.
3d. That the navy is composed of a variety of nationalities, "a heterogeneous crowd"; "all languages are heard on our decks."
Now, let us suppose the marines are withdrawn. Other men, blue-jackets, would take their place, and there would be no gain in room. There will be a necessity for orderlies and sentinels as at present, and a sufficient number would be required to afford reliefs. Then there would be need for a guard on all occasions of ceremony. It is not claimed that the marines do not now perform their duties efficiently, but that sailors will do it as well. If it is proposed to employ sailors promiscuously in the duties now performed by marines, and in ship's work; the result, I maintain, will not be for the good. We will have neither good sailors nor good marines. Men who pull in boats, coal ship, scrub decks, go aloft, etc., must, as everybody knows, become more or less unmilitary in consequence. Look at the soldier employed on police duty in a garrison or on board ship. Is he not made less a soldier by it? It therefore appears that the principal reason for desiring the withdrawal of marines from service afloat is that their presence is an implied distrust of sailors, etc. I doubt if such an idea ever existed in the mind of the sailor, for everybody knows there is no reasonable foundation for the assumption. The author should know that the duty of searching liberty-men and boats' crews, when it is done, and in well-regulated ships this should rarely be necessary, properly belongs to the master-at-arms and ship's corporals, and not to the marines; nor are marines themselves exempt from a like search. These petty officers also confine and have charge of men under punishment.
It is a strained inference to suggest that the presence of marines on board ship implies a distrust, or lack of intelligence on the part of the sailor. Such is not the case, and I deem it unworthy of notice. In 1885, when the detachment of marines were sent to the Isthmus of Panama, the guards from the training squadron that I commanded were withdrawn, and for nearly six months the three vessels were without guards. I have no hesitation in saying that the vessels were less efficient without than with the marines, and I hope never to serve in another ship without them. The Marine Corps has formed a part of the navy ever since we had a navy. They have performed excellent service both in peace and in war. Their appearance calls forth praise wherever their duties take them. Their officers are competent and work harmoniously with the navy, and I see nothing to justify the proposition to withdraw them from the service afloat.
Let us consider the proposition that there is not, in the matter of pay, promotion and discipline, sufficient to encourage Americans to enlist in the navy. Any fair-minded person who should compare the rating and pay table now, with what it was twenty-five years ago would be surprised at such a careless statement. I think I can show that our government does more than any other country in the world in the way of inducing men to enlist, and remain in the navy, and the difficulty, though nothing like what is charged, is that the opportunities for employment in this great country are much greater than elsewhere in the world. At the close of the war, in 1865, the seaman received $18 per month. Now he receives $24, with an addition of one dollar per month for each enlistment under a continuous service certificate. This involves an increase of more than one-third, and, in my judgment, is quite sufficient. The seaman in the British navy gets £1, ($9.68). All other ratings have received an increase proportional to that of seamen, with the additional pay for enlistment under continuous service certificate. The number of petty officers and rated men have been largely increased. The following may be mentioned: machinists, boiler-makers, water-tenders, oilers, buglers, schoolmasters, ship's writers, seamen-gunners, seamen-apprentices, tailors, barbers, jacks-of-the-dust, lamplighters, caulkers, and additional stewards. All these positions offer increased pay and promotion to meritorious men. The position of boatswain, gunner, carpenter, and sail-maker is open to worthy and capable enlisted men of the service, and these positions are very largely held by men from the service. No country provides a better ration, and few as good, as our men have. The health and comfort of our men are matters that receive constant and careful attention.
The selection of petty officers rests exclusively in the hands of the commander, and they are not deprived of their rates except the commander in his judgment deems it necessary. What better disposition can be made of this authority? I confess some surprise at the criticism of little details of duty on board ship, by officers or men. Nowhere else are so many people living in so contracted a space. The cleanliness and good appearance of a ship contribute largely to her efficiency, and, therefore, it is very necessary to look closely to minor details. Now permit me to enumerate some legislation made to encourage men to enter the navy. A man who has served not less than ten years, and is disabled, may be pensioned upon the recommendation of a board of three officers, approved by the Secretary of the Navy, (Sec. 4757, R.S.). A liberal pension is provided for any man injured in line of duty; also provision for his family in case of his death. Interest at 4 per cent upon his savings deposited with the paymaster. A home on board receiving ships, and allowance of full pay during the interval between his discharge and re-enlistment, within three months, for three years. Transportation to his place of enlistment if discharged elsewhere. One-fourth additional pay if detained in the service beyond his term of enlistment. An allowance of an outfit of clothing and bedding to an apprentice on his first enlistment. Upon certain conditions a man may enlist in a petty-officer's rating, and he cannot be deprived of this except by sentence of court-martial. And finally, any man after twenty years' service, and disabled for sea service, is entitled to admission to the Naval Home in Philadelphia, or in lieu thereof, to a pension of half the pay of his rate when last discharged, (Sec. 4756, R. S.). In the matter of punishments, Congress has carefully defined their character, and officers are held to a strict account for any deviation from the law. There are, also, many privileges and indulgences lodged in the hands of the commanding officer that are seldom, if ever, withheld from the deserving men. Libraries are provided all our ships, and the men are allowed reasonable time for recreation and enjoyment. As to the matter of the Government competing with other employers in the pecuniary compensation to those entering its service, I hold it has gone far enough when our men are paid more than two and three times what other governments pay. No country ever pretended to compensate its men in money for service in its defense. This should not be expected. A man should be ready and willing to serve in the army and navy for a reasonable compensation, and a fair provision for himself or his family in case of injury or death. This much, I claim, this country gives to those in the army and navy; and the security of these benefits is more than equal to the uncertainty offered by the individual employer.
Some officers are inclined to the opinion that there is too great inequality of pay; that if such rates as ship's writers, buglers, yeoman, and other non-combatants are properly paid, the gun captain, boatswain's mate, etc., are underpaid. There may be something in this, but it should be remembered that the price of labor depends upon the demand. There is no market for the seamen, who are called upon for these latter positions, except at sea, while there is a demand for writer, buglers, etc., not only on board ship but on shore. Every one knows how very difficult it is to get a reliable and competent ship's writer, or yeoman. There is a certain qualification required of them which the seaman need not have, hence I think there is good reason for the difference in compensation in these rates.
Now as to the variety of nationality found among the crews of our vessels. This is greatly exaggerated. Native-born Americans are not by nature inclined to a seafaring life, if we except those on our coasts. In so large a territory as we have had undergoing settlement and development, it would be surprising indeed if the men should prefer the unsettled life of a sailor to the regular employment of a farm, of railroading, manufacturing, etc. Nor would any rate of pay that this very prosperous country could afford overcome the natural antipathy of its people to a seafaring life.
The remedy for the ills of the service lies not in the clamor for more pay and more promotions for the men, nor in the agitation of imaginary grievances by naval writers, but in a conscientious and hearty effort on the part of all officers to be content with what we have and strive to raise the service to a higher state of efficiency. It is to be observed that these complaints come from officers and not from the men, that a discontented service will never be an efficient service, and that those who disseminate the seeds of discontent are acting in antagonism to the best interests of the navy and their country.
We have many foreign-born men in the navy, it is true. Some are citizens and some are not; but I see nothing discouraging in this fact. Do we not invite immigration from every country except China? Are not these men good citizens, as a rule? Are they not elected and appointed to office under state and national government, excepting only the offices of President and Vice-President? Was it attempted to restrict enlistment in the army, or navy, to citizens, in the war of 1861? Are there not in the history of that war conspicuous instances of these men performing gallant and meritorious service, and, in many cases, losing their lives for the country? Many such men occupy conspicuous positions in Congress, to whom the navy looks for its very existence. Now, what should constitute citizenship to fit a man to serve in the navy? It is well known that many men come to this country, generally, I suppose, without family, and after acquiring a knowledge of our language enlist in the navy. They re-enlist and serve faithfully and loyally. The character of the service prevents them from becoming citizens in law, for it should be borne in mind that this alone does not carry with it all the benefits of citizenship.
The highest privilege of citizenship in this country is the right of franchise; to have a part in choosing our elective officers. To possess this privilege requires a fixed residence in some state for a specified time, and often other requirements are exacted. These conditions the man serving in the navy is generally prevented from complying with. Faithful and loyal service in the navy for a certain time constitutes, in my judgment, all that should be exacted for service in the navy; and this seems to be the view taken by the government. It is a great mistake to say that "all languages are heard on the decks of our ships," because there may be a few instances where men unfamiliar with our language are enlisted for special duties. It is not the rule, and the matter is entirely under the control of the officers themselves. The inducements the essayist considers necessary to attract Americans to enlist in the navy must strike those responsible for naval administration as extravagant beyond reason. I think I have enumerated what will be regarded by most reasonable men as quite sufficient inducements, but notwithstanding these, we are told the Chicago, Newark, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San Francisco are not provided with sufficient comforts, such as "decks" and "more locker room," to attract Americans. This suggests a degree of fastidiousness undesirable even in the American sailor. It should be remembered that a man-of-war in these days is a combination of many important conditions, involving a harmonious compromise of all, the principal of which are speed, armament, and capacity to keep the sea. It is believed by those most competent to judge that the limit of comfort for officers and men has been reached in these vessels, without sacrificing any of the material requirements of a fighting machine, and when we compare them in the matter of comfort with those of former days there is no room for just complaint.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I confess my surprise and regret that an officer of our navy, who has not yet been charged with the more serious responsibilities of the service, should feel himself justified in drawing such a gloomy picture of the navy as the member has presented in the paper we have listened to this evening. I do not think it will have a depressing influence upon the great majority of officers; it may do the navy harm in the country and abroad. I am glad to say, if I may speak from my own experience, which began in May, 1861, and covers every grade from midshipman to the command of the Training Squadron of the three old-fashioned sailing sloops Portsmouth, Jamestown, and Saratoga, that the time never came for me to separate from the ship I served in that I did not do so with regret. There never was a ship in which my association with the sailors of our navy did not call forth my admiration and praise for their uncomplaining performance of every duty required of them. Whether our men have been called to service in the Arctic, or to the unhealthy climate of the tropics, in whatever sphere or locality duty called them, they have given a good account of themselves.
One word more, Mr. Chairman, and I have done. Every one is familiar with Jack's tendency to growl. We ourselves know that he takes this way of enjoying himself. He means no harm, and generally does not mean what he says. Take away the "shellback's" right to growl, and I fear the navy would lose some of its most valuable men! Can it be that our young friend is developing, a little prematurely, this weakness? Let us hope so. But, seriously, this paper can do the navy no good. It is simply a case of "airing our linen" before the public, to our own injury. The controversy between the line and staff was made "a stench in the nostrils of the public," and when this seems to be subsiding, we have an attack upon the usefulness of the marines on board ship. I think this Institute will consult its right to the respect and good opinion of its readers by not publishing this paper and the discussion thereon. I therefore move, as the sense of the meeting, that its publication be suppressed.
Commander C.D. Sigsbee, U.S. Navy.—The paper presents a more dismal view of the service than will meet with general acceptance. The fact of the case is that the navy needs reorganization, and has needed it for some time, but no man, nor set of men, has been strong enough to effect it in the face of the opposition of conflicting opinions. When the question of a new navy first began to seriously engage the attention of Congress, that body found it impossible to decide on types and policy, because of the wide divergence of opinion then expressed by naval officers on the subject. Since we are now well advanced in the construction of ships, the question of reorganization is, most naturally, pressing for decision; for to be well fought, ships must be well organized. Again, we find a divergence of professional opinion that is likely to delay the adoption of active measures. Unfortunately, the opinion of a moment is as emphatically asserted as one that flows from ample consideration.
It is doubtless the case that this paper has been made strong by its able author in order to excite discussion, and thereby mould opinion to a condition approximating unanimity. If discussion fails to convince disputants, it may nevertheless clear away doubt in high places. However that may be, we must not fall into the error of supposing that great measures can always be put into operation on the stroke of a bell. The writer's views relative to the narrow range of duties required of cadets and ensigns apply not only to those grades, but all along through the watch grades of the line, a condition largely due to the backwardness of the navy as a whole. It is to be hoped that the time is not far distant when young officers will be employed in duties commensurate with their scientific education and training. The several points raised by the writer have been subjects of private discussion for some years past, and opinions are already modifying in the general direction of his views.
We have heard much about the kind of seaman needed for future naval duties. It is the common belief that he must be intelligent, active and orderly, besides being skillful to a high degree in special lines. Judging from the talk that we hear, there is not a general comprehension of the fact that these qualities bring good pay on shore, nor that the man who would make a good top-man might fall short of our new standard. Most unaccountably, ideas seem to dwell on the old kind of sailor at the old price, with a few rewards thrown in. Formerly, when the great naval powers were in serious need of men-of-war's-men, they took forcibly the first that could be found by the press-gang; then, with the improvement in social conditions, came enlistment by deception, by conscription, by blarney, and, finally, by allurements or baits, all these being supplementary to voluntary enlistment. Our own most recent naval system, in time of peace, is by means of petty baits—as one dollar per month extra on re-enlistment, for instance. This system worked well for a while and helped to fill our complements, but it will not serve to entice the new order of man. "The laborer is worthy of his hire," and the laborer knows it now if he never did before. Doubtless many a rollicking ne'er-do-well might be found to go to sea to relieve himself of the burden of orderly existence, but we should not find that kind acceptable. Our training system is good—capable of improvement, undoubtedly, but good nevertheless. The boys are well paid and well cared for, but there is only a ludicrous future offered them, and the majority of them find it out. An officer once said to me, "When a boy leaves the training service and goes on board ship for general service, he finds that he has been decoyed." If any one wish to know why naval apprentices have refused to stay with us, let him investigate the Classification and Pay Table of the Navy Register, and bear in mind that the apprentices are prepared for the seaman and military branch of the service. The table discloses that we have gradually drifted into a condition of rating and pay in which the military element in a military service is heavily discounted. The exhibit shows three grades of petty officers ranking the common seaman, and even the seaman-gunner. In the first grade of petty officers are found twelve ratings, only three of which belong to the seaman branch. These three are of the ship, not of the service; they offer no certainty of attainment, are not awarded on board all ships, and are commonly filled by seamen who have far exceeded the age at which British men-of-war's-men are retired from service. The pay allowed is $35 per month. In the other classes of that grade the pay is not less than $45 per month, and in six cases is $60 or more. In the second grade of petty officers are thirteen ratings, of which four belong to the seaman. With one exception on each side, the same marked difference of pay, unfavorable to the seaman, is found. In two instances the pay of artificer ratings is twice that of three of the four seaman ratings. In the third grade of petty officers there are eleven ratings, of which eight belong to the seaman. With one exception the artificer ratings get more pay than the seaman ratings. The next grade has no official status and contains the seaman-gunner, the nearest approach the service has to the ideal future seaman. This grade also contains the seaman and the seaman apprentice of the first class. To oppose to them there are nine special and artificer ratings which carry more pay, with a single exception, than the seaman rating. For instance, the lamp-lighter gets one dollar per month more than the seaman, and only one dollar per month less than the seaman-gunner. Let us fancy two men of equal intelligence starting out to learn, one the duty of a seaman or a seaman-gunner, and the other that of a lamp-lighter; it is no exaggeration to say that any man fit for becoming a seaman-gunner could learn the duty of a lamp-lighter in a forenoon watch. Every rating in the table that involves the knowledge of a trade, or the possession of even minor skill, is given more rank or more pay, or both, than that of seaman. Let the investigator compare the position of captains of parts of the ship, in the third grade of petty officers, with the ratings that compose the first and second grades, and let him go back thirty years and compare the relative amounts of pay at that time; then let him compute the percentage of increase of pay for the several ratings, so far as possible, up to the present time. He will find that the seaman has, apparently, had no very active friends. It is shown that the man most difficult to get and to retain is treated as if he were, of all men on board, the least valuable. Let us suppose that two naval apprentices of equal intelligence decide to remain in the service on completing their course in the training ships. No. 1 takes to the service at once and is made a seaman at $24 per month. No. 2, with an eye to windward, delays three years, during which time he learns the trade of machinist. At the end of three years No. 1 has advanced far towards being our ideal seaman; he is thoroughly well drilled, and has a good knowledge of the modern instruments of warfare. If we lose him he is a loss indeed; he must be replaced by an apprentice. In addition to his experience he has the weight of more than one apprentice, because we actually have him and we do not get all of the apprentices. However, he re-enlists and gets $1 per month additional pay as provided for by law. He now gets $25 per month. No. 2 presents himself on board the same ship, with a dozen other machinists, to apply for a place. Being used to the ways of shipboard, and his record being known, he is taken at $70 per month, and becomes a first-class petty officer at once. Suppose the commanding officer, overcome by sympathy, should decide to outrage tradition in favor of justice so far as to make No. 1 a chief boatswain's mate, and that No. 1 could then maintain that rating in his future service. No.1, with the $1 extra, now gets $36 per month. After this second term of enlistment it will require thirty-four re-enlistments, or one hundred and two years of continuous service, to bring his pay up to that of No. 2 the machinist. If No. 2 had preferred to take a three months' course in a business college instead of learning a trade, he might have enlisted as yeoman at $60 per month, or as ship's writer at $45 per month, and have been a first-class petty officer in either case. In the latter and minor case it would have required nine re-enlistments, or twenty-seven years, for No. 1 to have got the same pay. There may be some peculiar working of the Classification and Pay Table that I fail to consider, but I find it impossible to understand how we can hope to retain intelligent young men in this land of high wages, so long as we require from them seaman's duty at the price we offer. The system that is criticized is the result of attempts to maintain or improve organization by slight modifications from time to time. It is the system of no one man nor any set of men that could be named. It is the system of a service that had been allowed to drift to the rear by a people tired of war.
In any attempt to reorganize our crews it is to be hoped that the leading impulse will not be to adjust old ratings to new conditions, but that the duty to be done, and the policy that will enable it to be done, will receive the first consideration. When conditions are stable, a high regard for tradition serves to maintain a high standard of duty; but when new conditions of service are forced upon us, we may perhaps meet with greater success by giving more latitude to originality than has been done heretofore. Tradition over-valued induces half-hearted measures. The importance of a rating to the service and help to constitute the measure of class and pay. Compliment will not serve the purpose of pay. As a rule, important rank should go only with the exercise of special authority. Unless a rating requires the exercise of military authority, pay should be the inducement rather than rank. The chief object of pay should be to maintain enlistment; the object of rank, to perfect fighting efficiency. Rank too widely diffused levels distinctions, and distinctions of one kind or another are the outward evidences of authority. The distinctions of rank or grade forward of the mast should be better pay, special berthing, messing and uniform, greater responsibility, accountability and privilege, restricted numbers, address by title instead of by surname alone, and permanency of rating. The more important ratings should be of the service rather than of the ship. Special pay might be given for industrial skill and for special technical knowledge, but rank should not be carried so far as to defeat the object of rank. For example, it would only weaken a regimental organization to double or treble the number of its non-commissioned officers.
I doubt that the writer expresses quite what he means when he asserts that all languages are heard on our decks. This would convey an idea of Babel. We have many foreigners, but it would be hard to find those who cannot speak English more or less well. A fair proportion of these foreign-born men are excellent, worthy men, who have learned to appreciate the flag, at least for the benefits that it confers in excess of what they have been used to. It is the American who can do better outside the service.
In respect to dispensing with the marines on board ship, it may be claimed that many thoughtful officers favor that measure, and are prepared to accept the embarrassment that may prevail for a short time in the course of readjusting the situation. If it be true, as some assert, that marines are indispensable in maintaining discipline, then it must be because the standard and habit of the soldier are better for that purpose than those of the sailor. Surely no better argument could be given for recasting the characteristics of the sailor by adopting some of those of the soldier. I will venture to predict that this is precisely what is coming, and that the presence of marines on board ship will become anomalous, and their services be relinquished.
The writer suggests a return to sail as an auxiliary method of propulsion in time of peace. While weight still attaches to the use of square sail for training purposes, many officers believing, contrary to my own views, that it is the surest means to prepare both men and officers to enter upon the new naval duties, it is a waste of verbal ammunition to urge a reaction in favor of sail for propulsion. Sail is as dead as Julius Caesar! If the present efficiency of the coal-pile warrants the abandonment of sail in any considerable degree, the development of the latent efficiency remaining in the coal-pile will banish it altogether for naval cruising purposes. Officers sometimes fall into the error of discussing this point, as if one could rationally assume, at pleasure, either 16 or 20 of the same kind of ounces to the same kind of pound; as if a ship's weight-displacement could readily be made to exceed 100 per cent. A certain percentage of the weight-displacement is absorbed by the hull; the useful displacement remaining may be apportioned among the qualities, according to the service required of the vessel, but the total displacement, in the absence of miracle, is just 100 per cent. Sail and the adjuncts of sail have weight, and if any portion of the displacement be absorbed by sail, just so much must be taken from fighting efficiency for the supreme moment of battle.
Several weeks ago a distinguished naval officer, whose opinions have great weight in the service, published a paper in the Institute, in which he gave the strongest argument that I have heard for reconsidering the sail question. We were warned that a vessel without sail might be despatched to a distant point under steam, to give battle on her arrival, and arrive on her fighting ground unfit for fighting, through lack of fuel. It was argued that this contingency, to a country not possessed of coaling stations, demanded the retention of sail for propulsion. With much hesitation, I permit myself to differ from the conclusion at which he arrived, and for the following reasons: 1. Propulsion under sail is more or less fortuitous, and therefore unsuited to the rapid movements of modern warfare. 2. Fighting efficiency would be sacrificed to only moderate cruising efficiency. 3. It would be better to tow a coal schooner, or be accompanied by a supply steamer a certain part of the distance, as in general, promising a more expeditious passage. 4. In modern men-of-war it is impossible to give an approximation to the old sail-power. 5. Supply schooners and steamers are our natural recourse for fueling in time of war. They are, in fact, mobile coaling stations. They may be required to rendezvous anywhere. This kind of coaling station must be discovered in order to be destroyed. 6. The desideratum, I submit, is not sail power, but a method of fueling in a seaway. In conclusion, it may be said that if the adoption of liquid fuel were possible, the problem of fueling at sea would be solved immediately. It would then only be necessary to tow the supply vessel astern at moderate speed, just enough to keep the tow-line taut, and pump the fuel on board the towing vessel through a slack hose.
Captain Henry A. Bartlett, U.S.M.C—I have had as much experience as any officer in the service with marines afloat, having done duty on over twenty men-of-war, all large ships. Lieut. Fullam in his paper would give the impression that marines were non-combatants. On every ship to which I have been attached they have had a great-gun division. During the war, the marine divisions that I had charge of were, on more than one occasion, held up to the crew at general muster as an example of excellence for their proficiency at the great-guns. On every ship I have served on, the marine guard has been fully instructed in great-gun exercise. On my last ship (the Trenton) the guard was instructed in working all the guns, and we had a battery of 8 in. converted rifles, on carriages of five different designs; in case of necessity, the marines could have been detailed for any gun division. The marines have been, and in fact always are, instructed in all kinds of military duty, in addition to their regular duties as sentinels. The foundation of the navy was the Marine Corps: they were the original fighting men of the ship. The sailors, in my long experience, have always shirked military duty, and are now, and always will be, lax in everything pertaining to military discipline. They not only try to circumvent the marines on duty, but also the officers and petty officers of the ship. On more than one occasion I have known the chief petty officers of a ship to be the leaders in mutinous conduct, and if there had been no marine guard on board there is no telling what might have become of the ship. I remember well one night aboard the New Ironsides. She had a crew of over 500 men. The ship anchored off Port Wagner. We had been in action that day. About 9 P.M., I was sent for by the 1st Lieut., (as the executive officer was then called). He informed me that there were a number of men drunk; the marine guard were ordered to muster on the spar-deck. I inspected them and found nearly every man perfectly sober. This great crew were nearly all more or less intoxicated, and fighting was going on everywhere. Our chief quartermaster, and nearly every petty officer was in irons that night. Every pair of irons was in use, and fully two hundred sailors were dropped down in the forward hold, and the old frigate under the enemy's guns. What would have happened had there been no marines on board?
Again, I remember well the occasion when the grand old frigate Wabash grounded off Frying Pan Shoal with some 700 souls on board. The marines got out a launch, manned her, carried out an anchor, etc., and Captain De Camp in his official report to the Navy Department said that the ship was saved by the efficiency and good discipline of the marine guard.
A policy of espionage, if there is such, does not tend to bring out vicious qualities, but tends to check them. All enlisted or shipped men must be examined or searched at the gangway; the same course is pursued at all navy-yards and garrisons; if it were not so, liquor would be constantly brought in, and government articles taken out. This inspection applies to marines and sailors alike, and its humiliating effect, that Mr. Fullam speaks of, I have yet to notice. The marine protects the sailor as well as government property. They are the first men called upon in case of trouble either on shipboard or on shore. Many, many times have I been called upon, in my service of nearly thirty years, to assist in quelling riots, to guard public and private property at fires, and even lives on board ship and on shore, both at home and abroad.
The type of men needed, under the conditions of modern warfare afloat, have not as yet been born; the man-of-war's-man of to-day is not competent to do both naval and military duty any more than the soldier is to do both military and naval duties, or even all military duties on shore; this is why the army is divided up into different corps to perform their varied duties. Does the presence of the marine on board ship degrade the whole service? There are usually soldiers of different corps in camps and garrisons—engineers, ordnance, etc., as well as infantry and cavalry. Because the infantry and cavalry do the police and guard duty of the camp or garrison, do they look down on the others; or do the others consider themselves a lower class? In this construction the engineer's force on board ship must be considered; they now receive the largest pay, yet some of them require the most looking after; they form now a very large part of the crew; does Lieutenant Fullam wish to put sailors over them? In this case, were his argument true, they would be degraded by having another class of blue-jackets over them.
In time of war seamen must be taken from the merchant marine, and we all know that they are the flotsam and jetsam of the sea. The landsman will naturally go into the army. There are few native American sailors to-day. In time of peace it will, no doubt, be well to require the sailor to be naturalized. Our navy in war-time will be recruited by volunteers, and not by drafts, like some of the foreign navies which do not usually have their marines afloat. These sailor volunteers are a roving class, little bound by ordinary ties, and full of spirit (a little more than simple American love for liberty), and therefore they will require a different system of discipline. Until we again become a maritime nation, and even then probably, this will be true.
Congress will not allow men enough to fully man our ships in time of peace; therefore, if we are to have marines on board in time of war, there is need of them in time of peace to man all the guns, as well as to give them the necessary instruction on board that they may be prepared for war.
There are some points (as the upholding of petty officers in orders) in the paper which, if carried out, would increase the discipline and efficiency of the crew; but that the presence of the marine on board is the cause of whatever lack of these there is, I must earnestly protest against; to them rather is due most of the good that at present is obtained.
It is well known that the number of different things that the men, as well as the officers, should have some knowledge of are many more now than formerly, and it is also certain that they cannot have a thorough knowledge of all. The advisability is argued of giving officers different specialties, and the argument applies with as much, if not more, force to the men. Why, then, is it not better to keep the different branches to their own appropriate duties?—the engineers to the steam department, where they will be required in action, with enough knowledge of drills and firing for cases of emergency; the marines to the preparation for action and guard duty; and the sailor to preparation for action and cleaning duty, sail and spar drills, and boat duty, which with our small crews often takes most of the available men from the deck. Why do away with an already trained and tried corps of men (justly admitted to be such), for what seems the almost impossible elevation of the sailor to the military plane of the marine?
Lieutenant H.O. Rittenhouse, U.S. Navy.—In a discussion such as that in which the Institute is now engaged, an unguarded expression, or even the use of a simple inoffensive word, seems to raise such an intellectual dust that friends and foes can hardly be distinguished. Thus it often happens that people who are earnestly working in a common cause fall upon each other with great fury, each thinking his adversary to be the very enemy. To some nautical minds, for instance, the terms "soldier," "military," etc., are like the traditional red rag. There are those, for example, who can't tolerate the idea of having any "soldiers" on shipboard, but at the same time regard the "marine" as indispensable. Others again don't want "soldiers," but are working hard for "gunners."
It is certainly a waste of energy to continue controversies based only upon some narrow signification of a word. Speaking broadly, a soldier is a man with a gun; so also is a marine or a gunner. If we look squarely at the subject, I think we can all advance a long way together without disagreement. A modern ship is an instrument designed to fight under steam without canvas, carrying small guns, great guns, and a variety of medium-sized guns and other more or less powerful weapons, with men to handle them. The ultimate object is to so organize and train these men that the highest efficiency in action may be secured. It matters not (for the discussion) what the men may be called. "Fighters" is good enough. But it does matter how they are organized and trained. Up to this point I am sure we can all go together; and, considering the certainty that the new weapons and ships will impose at least some modifications of drill, if not of organization, and the further fact that no system (however good it may be, or may have been) is good enough if we can get a better; considering this, I say, we can well afford to welcome for discussion any proposed plan for improvement, however much we may differ from the conclusions of its author.
For myself, I think the weakest point in the efficiency and discipline of our ships is with the petty officers. The conditions of their service should be made such that their interests are with the officers rather than with the men under them. They should constitute the strongest links in the chain of discipline. As to the best method of securing good petty officers I do not concur fully with the writer of the essay, who appears to think the removal of the marine guard from the ships is a first essential; while I believe further efforts should be made to obtain them without interfering with the guard.
There is food for thought, however, in his argument. A disorderly ship is among the worst of evils. No one knows this better nor feels it more than the intelligent men of the crew. The question then arises, would they be more reliable and efficient if charged with the full duty of upholding the common welfare, than if bearing little or no responsibility for it? Again, let us suppose that in a military organization on shore, some one company of non-commissioned officers and privates should be selected to do all the post and guard duty, while the others were employed in other ways, and never took their turn at the peculiarly disciplinary duties. How would such a measure affect the efficiency of the body as a whole; and, particularly, how would it affect the non-commissioned officers? Would the result be affected in any way if the special company wore a different uniform? Our military brethren can best answer these questions. A man-of-war at sea is not the same thing as a military camp on shore, and therefore the answers would not necessarily decide us as to the advisability of removing the marine guard; but they might help us to a decision.
Lieutenant-Commander Harry Knox, U.S. Navy.—Lieut. Fullam's paper seems to me most excellent and opportune; some may deem it radical, but none can deny that it is earnest and thoughtful.
Our types of ship and armament are undergoing radical change, and it is not unnatural to anticipate the need of change in other directions, even admitting that in the past our methods have been most wise.
I believe with the writer that it would be good policy to require the general service men of the navy to perform all military duties on board ship, and I do not think there would be any trouble in carrying that plan out at once, if law and regulation permitted it.
Our aim should be to bring the general service man up to the plane of modern requirement, and it is the educating effect of the military training that I would ask in his behalf.
The question of the selection of the leading petty officers of the ship by the criterion of marksmanship alone has always presented grave difficulties. My idea is that a leading man under one system of selection would probably be a leading man under almost any system; but he might not be a good shot, at least, not the very best. The best marksman is apt to have an inborn talent, and he may be a person of no force of character, not a leader of men, not the man that one would want for a boatswain's mate or a sergeant. This fact has led me to think that we might have a gun captain who would manage the gun and crew, but who would not necessarily point and fire; though it would, of course, be most desirable to combine the two duties in the one person.