October 14, 1887.
Commander W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., Vice-President, in the Chair.
Lieutenant D. H. Mahan.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—By quoting the essayist's word, "There should be no sparing of criticism until we have attained uniformity in the combination of the guns' crews and the battalions of a fleet of vessels meeting even for the first time," I will make my text.
Criticism, when friendly, is but the statement of a difference of opinion. While agreeing with the essayist in the greater part of his article, I am forced to differ from him in some particulars; and to these I will call your attention by mentioning the pages. For instance, on p. 306, I think there should be no difference in the numbering or designation of companies in battalions, as all, marines as well as sailors, belong to the one organization, and should come under the same rules and same numberings. Otherwise, the orders in the tactical books should be changed and orders such as this be substituted: "1st companies and company A, deploy as skirmishers."
Again, on p. 3-7: "Any division should not be thought of." It becomes absolutely necessary, at times, to break up companies, and provision should be made to that end—the unexpected should be most carefully provided for. On the same page—his numbers for the company should be increased; instead of guides there should be signal men, each company to have two allowed to it when on detached duty. The file closers should be four, besides the 1st and 2d sergeants, to allow for guard duty. The ammunition passers, if necessary, should be separate from the company, and all passers should be incorporated in one body under its proper officers, and passers should be detailed to each battalion as circumstances may suggest. Suppose that the passers of a company should be killed just at the critical moment, the ammunition having given out, the company would be unable to get further supplies, and would either have to retreat from an important position or submit to capture. I do not consider passers very important, and I prefer, before going into action, to fill up all the men's pockets, for, as General Von Kraft says: "When a line of skirmishers advancing to attack across an open plain has arrived within one hundred or two hundred paces of the enemy, and finds itself short of cartridges, no fresh supply can be obtained. No wagons, not even a man can reach the fighters, and should for a wonder fortune favor some brave fellow in doing so, of what use would his 500 rounds be to the company?” And again, in a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution, Captain Walter II. James says: "How are you to carry the increased number of rounds the soldier must have? He cannot carry beyond a certain weight, and that weight must in the future consist very largely of cartridges. Is it possible under modern fire to send cartridges to the fighting line? I doubt it; far better at the last moment before entering an action serve out an additional supply, fairly sufficient for the fight, and only send more to the firing line as an exceptional circumstance." The company should consist of from 48 to 54 privates with six sergeants. The signal men referred to should form a body to be used as orderlies for headquarters and battalion commanders and to be sent with any detached body.
On p. 308—"On drill days, two markers, etc." Do not have anything during a drill that you would not have in actual service; consider what General Wolseley says: “I consider it a very dangerous thing to teach a soldier in peace anything which he is not likely to practise in war." So why teach him to rely on a marker for distance, or on a drummer for the cadence of step? An illustration may be drawn from the last flag drill—while the cadets marched very well to music, when the music was silent they very soon began to bob up and down as if dancing the polka.
On p. 309—The artillery company is very much too small; sixteen men for the piece and seven additional for the limber would make but sorry work on a march. In the Egyptian campaign, a crew for a Gatling gun was composed of 30 men, and in addition thereto four mules; sometimes all of these found it difficult to move the piece. I do not think that a piece of artillery with a limber should be manned by less than a company of infantry for general work. In a lecture delivered by Major A. U. Anderson, K. H. A., before the Royal United Service Institution, he proposes to give the machine guns to the infantry, in the proportion of one gun to a company. He, however, does not carry his gun as we would, but proposes to carry the gun and tripod on one mule and the ammunition on another. He says: “We thus ensure all the companies in the regiment taking an interest in their own gun and training men for work with it." By giving a company as the allowance per gun there would be a sufficient number for a heavy drag, and the men not stationed on the drag rope would be valuable as an infantry reserve in action, or as guards on the march.
Referring to (p. 304) the attempt to organize the ship's company with the battalion as a basis, and again, on p. 310, as to regulations of Ordnance Manual, I would suggest that companies should first be formed and then apportioned to a ship as maybe necessary to fill the ship's fighting quota; there may be a few extra men, but better so than too few. To support my position I will quote some words of General Von Kraft, to whom the essayist refers on p. 329. "My desire is that elementary tactical instruction should be completed in the company instead of being carried on, as now, in the battalion. Hence the company has become the real tactical unit." And again, from General Sir Lumley Graham's work: "The importance of the company as a battle unit is much increased, and pari passu the importance of the captain as a commander."
Neither the powder nor the engineer's divisions should be landed. They are now the two most necessary divisions on board ship, and in the event of a landing in an enemy's country, they are the ones who should be left to protect the ship. For this purpose the engineer's division should be thoroughly drilled in the management of all guns, and then, in case of attack during the absence of the brigade, the men on watch could manage the engines, while the men off watch handled the guns with the assistance of the powder division. The handling of charges and projectiles will be the turning point in an engagement, and for that reason the powder division should not be interfered with in the slightest degree, lest its efficiency should be impaired.
On p. 311—I wish the essayist had specified a little more clearly from what ships the twenty companies and the ten pieces of artillery are to be drawn. It is easy to say, land so many men, but the thing is to detail them to the different ships according to their rates. With such a detail made out an admiral or commander of a fleet could tell at a glance just how many men he could land; that is, how many companies and pieces of artillery. There should be a fixed and unalterable plan. At the present time too much is left to the executive officer, and that accounts for the “very dissimilar battalion organizations." Should such a plan be adopted, an executive officer would be spared much trouble, and would have more time to devote to his present onerous duties.
From the same page it would appear that two medical officers are enough for the brigade. I think that there should be one surgeon to every battalion of three companies, besides the surgeon on the staff—remembering that there must be some detached work. The allowance of two surgeons to 1295 men (not counting the officers) is clearly insufficient.
As to the pioneers (p. 311), it must be allowed that they will have plenty to do without helping the ammunition passers. The pioneers should correspond to the army engineers, and should be drilled in such work as generally falls to the lot of the army engineer.
On p. 312 it is suggested that the marines should be landed in boats pulled by sailors. The objection to this would be the number of sailors required to pull a certain number of marines ashore; if the marines cannot pull themselves (as they should), send them ashore in steam launches. As to the Intelligence Staff (p. 312), I think it would be desirable to have the officers from the Office of Intelligence on the immediate staff of the commander of the brigade. It is to be supposed that, being sent from that office, they will be well acquainted with the country in which they are to serve, and on that account should be continually near the commanding officer. On p. 313 is mentioned one signal officer; he should be in charge of all signal men, and besides being headquarters signal officer he should be an aide to the brigade commander.
In regard to the equipment of the sailor (p. 315)—for a firearm the Lee magazine gun is to be preferred. With it the sailor is not given the opportunity to use the magazine nearly as much as with a rifle which carries its magazine in the stock. The magazines for the Lee are easily carried in the waist belt, and by one simple movement a man, if hard pressed, is given command of five shots. With a stock-magazine rifle he will, in nine cases out of ten, have emptied the magazine in his hurried advance to the fire line, and at the moment of his greatest danger he will have an empty magazine and have to resort to loading by hand. Only by continued fire-practice can the critical
moment be so guarded against that the men may always be provided with ammunition. This must be brought about, as Prince Hohenlohe says, "by repeating the simple routine "—the context shows that he means a real action exercise—" hundreds and thousands of times."
I must differ from the essayist as to the arming of a gun's crew; they should all be armed with magazine rifles, preferably with the Lee. It will be necessary, at some stage of an action, to change the men serving the guns. Will they have time to change their belts and equipments so as to keep the men stationed at the guns uniformly armed.' If they will not have time, why make any difference in the equipment of the crews?
On p. 315 the proviso is made, "should limbers be landed." There should be no limiting word, the instructions should read—limbers will always be landed with pieces ; in fact, it should be made as hard for our landing party to drag the piece alone as it is for the army. What would a field-piece be worth without a limber?
The same objection obtains in regard to arming the limber's crew (p. 316) as in regard to the gun's crew. As to shields for artillery, if these shields can be made a part of a gun carriage, serving to support the ammunition boxes when on the march, have them by all means; but if they are to add extra weight to the already heavy gun, do not have them.
Again (p. 316) I must differ from the essayist in regard to cutting down the supply of ammunition for light marching order. Powder (or ammunition) is what you must depend upon when you reach the point towards which the march is directed. Light marching order is such as will admit of quick, forced marching. It will be necessary at a time of great danger and when it is supposed the fighting will be short, sharp, and decisive—at a time when the force will be able to return very soon, and consequently at a time when you should carry plenty of ammunition and doff the knapsack and other unnecessary weights.
It is well said on the same page that the sword is useless; it is worse than useless, it is in the way. So also with the bayonet; it will be of no use to a naval brigade if opposed to a body of troops armed with magazine rifles—if such weight is to be carried it should be as an entrenching tool.
The idea of a man carrying a blanket encircling the body, over the left shoulder (p. 317), should be done away with. In the recent orders issued to the armies of France and Germany this way of carrying the blanket is relegated to obscurity. In hot weather a blanket carried in this way is almost insupportable—in any weather it is in the way. The knapsack and blanket should be carried on the back, not to project more than two inches above the line of the shoulder.
In his reference to tents, on the same page, I presume the writer merely refers to landing for drills. It seems rather strange to think of men landing in an enemy's country with capstan bars and boat spars with which to erect tents. Let us rather rig our hatches with a different style of canopy frame, and have all covers made in the form of a tent, provide plenty of extra covers, with pipe poles and wire or pipe ridge poles, and there will be plenty of tents, taking up but very little room, and rendering unnecessary any application to the army for tents, or the carrying ashore of spars and sails.
On the same page medical officers are allowed to wear swords. Why? So that they may trip over them when hurrying to assist some wounded man.' And why take ashore a master-at-arms and a ship's corporal? They are efficient petty officers on board ship, but spare Jack the sight of them ashore. It is provided (p. 318) that each officer and man shall have a piece of painted canvas to sleep upon, and it is suggested that a tarpaulin makes an admirable bed; there is, however, no consideration of the weight of these things. Can any one picture to himself the struggle two men have with one tarpaulin when covering a hatch at fire quarters!
In regard to the mounting of some of the officers—be sure they know how to ride before you put them on horseback. It is not a pretty sight to see an officer riding up Broadway holding on to the pommel of the saddle to keep himself down in his seat. When the brigade is under fire is just the time for all officers entitled to be mounted to be in the saddle, so that the colonels may give attention to such parts of their command as need encouragement, and that the aides may be ready to carry messages to the different parts of the field.
Passing over the tables of light and heavy marching order, we find given on p. 321 the strength of the Naval Brigade. Not knowing into how many battalions the twenty companies are divided, I can say nothing as to numbers, officers, etc., so I will only refer again to the paucity of surgeons and signal men, and, as regards the artillery, to the insufficient number of men for the work required.
The pioneers are very much handicapped (p. 322) by having to carry 13 pounds (tools, and a bag of miscellaneous implements); besides, 30 pioneers for such an expedition are insufficient.
On the subject of rations (p. 324) allow me to say, that although the ration on board ship is excellent, it is not altogether what is wanted for a landing party. Articles should be put up in small packages, say of four inches cube, and so packed in boxes as to be ready at hand when it is necessary to land the brigade. These cubes can be distributed amongst the men, while for half barrels and quarter barrels other means of transportation have to be employed. An entire change in the ration for the brigade would be beneficial. While on the subject of rations, moreover, it would have been well to give some ideas as to means for cooking.
Under the heading of Tactics—the cry for an immediate change in tactics is good. General Morris says: "A general change of front as made by an army is so different from the methods perplexingly described and geometrically illustrated in text-books, that it presents a curious instance of the difference between theory and practice." General Wolseley says: "The days when men advanced in line as at the Alma and elsewhere, are dead and gone." If these two authorities speak truly, does it not show that new tactics are necessary? The tactics now used by our army and navy are behind the times; we trust too much to appearance and forget the reality that will be necessary. We teach the touch and lock step, while forgetting to teach the man how to look out for himself when alone. As the essayist says: "Instead of masses loose order will have to be adopted." Is not this a complete change?
In the advance by rushes it must be remembered that the rushes are not of such a length as to heat the blood to any great extent, and for that matter a body of troops under fire frequently has its blood very much heated while standing still. In advancing on the enemy now-a-days, shelter is to be sought after, and that speed in taking advantage of offered shelter is necessary is seen when it is realized that the enemy is standing quietly behind an earthwork, and ready to concentrate the fire of several upon one while shelter is sought. Might not the conditions mentioned as existing at Tel-el-Kebir have been much changed had the English been attacking a civilized foe? When the lamented Upton submitted his tactics it was with the knowledge that they would need to be changed almost entirely in twenty years. Has not that time come now? I would substitute "trail” for " carry " (p. 325) at all movements from a halt and "order."
The brigade being in column of battalions (the writer has deemed it advisable to advance in two or more columns, which I take to mean columns of battalions), skirmishers should be deployed by deploying in succession the companies of one battalion (p. 327). The battalion chosen to deploy should be determined upon in the plan of attack. All the battalions will, however, eventually reach the firing or fighting line.
The Grand Tactics phrase (p. 329) emphasizes my remark, that the number of men allowed to the piece of artillery is too small. I think also that the elementary tactics ought to teach all that is needed to bring a battery into action, and that all movements given therein should be performed at a "double time" speed. If the cutlass and bayonet are done away with for these men, they should be provided with a short entrenching tool (shovel and pick combined), such as is now in use in the German army. By the increase of the gun's crew the infantry support can be assured. Before leaving this subject I wish to say that I gather from this essay that the artillery is to be drilled only as artillery and the infantry only as infantry. If that is the idea I wish to disagree, as I think a company of infantry should constitute the crew of a piece, and be as well versed in the management of the piece as in the manipulation of its own rifle.
The embarkation of the brigade in boats well merits all that the essayist has said—he might have gone further and said that our present boats are not fit for a first class navy. Why have larger and smaller boats? Why, with the new ships, can we not have a new style of steam launch, pulling cutter, and light pulling life boat? Why cannot these boats be all alike in their classes, and have these classes of the best? To what does the essayist refer when he speaks of heavy boats? Does he propose to keep the pulling launches in the service, to wear out a man's life before he has pulled one half mile? He can scarcely refer to any of our present cutters, for there are but few which will stand the continual fire of a 3-pounder B. L. rifle.
There is one point on which I do not think stress enough has been laid—that of getting the machine guns ashore dry and clean, and also trying to get the men ashore dry-shod. There is nothing that makes the feet sore more quickly than a pair of wet shoes filled with sand. Cannot our whale boats be so rigged as to be used as pontoons? I think so. With but little additional cost per boat they can be arranged for use as pontoons, and with two whale boats abridge 30 feet long and 10 feet wide can be erected. Such an arrangement as this would be of much service if landing where the sea is not too rough, as also in crossing small rivers and streams. These whale boats should be manned by the pioneers (artisans), who should also, in boat evolutions, be used to repair damages to the fighting boats.
In speaking of stoves (p. 331) the essayist mentions no particular stove, so I suppose he refers to the old boat stove. A more useless article of furniture it is difficult to imagine. One has been invented in Germany which cook; well, is light, and by a few changes could supply all that is required of a campaign stove.
As for disembarkation it is to be said that "circumstances alter cases,' that at present we have but about four vessels to a fleet, and that the electric search light is comparatively new to us and not generally supplied to our ships, so that the remarks on this point help us but little at the present day As to marches, the words, "the commander of the expedition will decide how the march is to be taken up," say almost all that is necessary.
In the remarks on quelling a riot the words—“if forced to fire on the mob use ball cartridge, and never fire over their heads"—might be introduced. A few lives sacrificed at the beginning will save much trouble and much bloodshed.
In conclusion I must say that I can see in the essay no definite plan o organization. For the success of the Naval Brigade it is necessary that I should be under a permanent head; that it should be governed by rigid rules for the carrying out of which commanding officers should be held responsible. Until this is done we are bound to have a different way of drilling in each of our squadrons, varying according as the ideas of the commanders of these squadrons vary. Uniformity in drill, strict attention to the firings and skirmish exercises, and continual practice are necessary before we can expect to realize anything like a perfect Naval Brigade.
Lieutenant Colahan.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen :—In regard to increasing the number of men allowed to a company, I consider the present number—thirty-six—as the one most conveniently supplied from the gun divisions of ships of any size. I consider this number also as a maximum for the artillery sections with limbers. I do not think it advisable to arm all the artillery force with the rifle—one half would be quite sufficient. Men in heavy marching order would have quite enough to carry without the rifle; there should be at least half the section as unencumbered as possible, so as to be able to do good service at the drag rope. These could be armed with revolver alone, while the other half would be armed with the rifle as infantry support. The latter could assist, if necessary, at drag rope and relieve the regular numbers stationed at the ropes.
I believe that some form of bayonet is necessary, and suggest a knife bayonet somewhat after the style of the Spanish machete, though not so large, say about ten inches long. This would be serviceable as a bayonet as well as for clearing any underbrush on landing or on the march, and would be of general usefulness as a knife.
The necessity for some means of transporting extra ammunition for Gatlings and small arms, as well as stores and cooking utensils, was made manifest in exercises of N. A. Squadron. A cart, two-wheeled, of the same gauge as the artillery carriage, provided with tongue and side drag ropes, should be issued to all ships. Independently of its use with the brigade, it would soon pay for itself in ordinary ship's work.
The idea of using capstan bars and sails for tents is a poor one, even for a camp of instruction. They are excessively unwieldy and heavy. At the camp at Gardner's Island they had to be hauled up the bluff with tackles, causing great fatigue and trouble, as the beach master, Lieutenant Belknap, can testify. They would be utterly useless on an expedition on shore. The shelter tent and rubber blanket would be all the protection necessary for the limited stay on shore required of the Naval Brigade.
Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—The difference of opinion expressed by Lieutenant Mahan on the essay calls for a few remarks in reply.
In the first place, it is not necessary to change "the orders in the tactical books," but to confine ourselves to tactical language. I very much doubt if any fighting will be done hereafter without ammunition passers and carriers. At present we have no facilities for making up an ammunition train on shipboard, and somebody must carry ammunition. An examination of the essay will show that I have sifted the words of General Von Kraft, as well as those of Captain Walter H. James, referred to by Lieutenant Mahan. The essay states, "Extra belts can be filled with cartridges and packed away in canvas bags, to be served out in an emergency." I hold that the belts filled serve the purposes of the Naval Brigade better than filling men's pockets with ammunition.
Lieutenant Mahan states, "The artillery company is much too small; sixteen men to the piece and seven additional for the limber would make but sorry work on the march. In the Egyptian campaign, a crew for a Gatling gun was composed of thirty men, and in addition thereto four mules." Commander Goodrich, who is authority on the Egyptian campaign, 1SS2, states that "the actual crews were each of 24 men,"—just one more than I have allowed in my organization. In the Egyptian campaign fourteen of the men in the gun's crew were armed with rifles, the rest of the detachment with cutlasses and revolvers. Twenty-three men to an artillery company appears to be about the number necessary. Were we to go on an expedition like the Egyptian campaign, referred to by Lieutenant Mahan, we would do exactly what the English did at that time—provide mules or horses to drag the artillery, and increase the number of men at each piece, to be used as stretchermen, mule and baggage guards.
When General Von Kraft referred to a company he did not mean forty-six men, neither did he mean sixty men; the German infantry company is more than double the size of the average ship's battalion of infantry; dividing the company into four sections, there is an officer to command each. Lieutenant Mahan states, "It is easy to say land so many men, but the thing is to detail them to their ships according to their rates. With such a detail made out, an admiral or commander of a fleet could tell at a glance just how many men he could land—that is, how many companies and pieces of artillery .... At the present time too much is left to the executive officer." The Bureau of Ordnance puts on board each vessel of the Navy a fixed number of small arms, according to her class, also so many pieces of artillery; consequently, to detail the men is one of the easiest as well as one of the simplest things an executive officer of a ship has to do; in fact, the Bureau of Ordnance settles this matter, and any admiral would know how many men each ship will land by a glance at the ordnance return of arms, guns, etc. The executive really has nothing to do with the number of men the ship is to land ; he has but to use all the small arms (rifles) and the guns put on board for the artillery.
By reference to the essay we will find the following on blankets: "There is no reason why men should not be furnished with light canvas knapsacks for carrying blankets and clothing." One of the latest German naval expeditions, to Witu, August, 1SS5, the men carried no knapsacks. Notwithstanding "the recent orders issued to the armies of France and Germany, this way of carrying the blanket is relegated to obscurity," as stated by Lieutenant Mahan. I was not aware that the armies of any country carried their blankets in any other way except on the knapsack; in fact, I was under the impression that the relegating spoken of by Lieutenant Mahan occurred more than a quarter of a century ago. Again, referring to the essay, we find it states, "Experience teaches us that without them (knapsacks) there is little comfort either in the camp or on the march." (In the camp they are used as a rest for the head.)
Every one knows that steam launches cannot reach the beach, and how we are to land the marines in them dry-shod I am unable to understand. When the marines are not able to pull themselves they should be landed by the reserves.
Again, a careful perusal of the essay would have informed my critic with regard to the tents, that I have provided for landing a force fitted out with what we now find on shipboard and will find for some years hence. At the same time I have also, in many instances, suggested what I thought would be a better equipment. Quoting from the essay: "For a prolonged stay on shore, application for tents to be supplied from the Army would be better. There is no reason why each vessel in the Navy should not carry several tents instead of so many useless and spare sails." With regard to the tarpaulin, I have camped in a swamp on soft wet ground, three of us sleeping on one for a week, and I found it excellent. Of the "old boat stove," of which Lieutenant Mahan says "a more useless article of furniture it is difficult to imagine," I shall quote from the report of a landing exercise by the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Swatara, 1882: "The boat stoves (two, launch size) proved amply sufficient for the needs of the party (103 officers and men). As but little previously was known of their capabilities, there was instituted a series of experiments to develop them. Boiling, broiling, frying and stewing—in fact, every feature in a culinary way, with the exception of baking, was successfully accomplished." Could any more be said in their favor?
Two surgeons and three apothecaries, as stated in the essay, I believe to be all that are required for the brigade.
Lieutenant Mahan states, "I wish to say that I gather from this essay that the artillery is to be drilled only as artillery and the infantry only as infantry," etc. A careful reading of the essay will convince Lieutenant Mahan that this is not the idea, and that there is one point on which we do not disagree. Quoting from the essay: "But, as the crews of two guns combined form one company, they could be landed as such if desired from those ships that would under ordinary circumstances land two pieces of artillery with limbers. The Ordnance Manual already requires that the crews of the howitzers and machine guns shall be united so as to form an infantry company and be drilled as such.”
When our ships are equipped with limbers, the remark, "Limbers will always be landed with pieces," will apply. Continuing to quote from the remarks of Lieutenant Mahan: "As to shields for artillery, if these shields can be made a part of a gun carriage, serving to support the ammunition boxes when on the march, have them by all means." Lieutenant Mahan having made a cast-iron rule that "limbers will always be landed with pieces," he will admit of my shields as part of the gun carriage if they will serve to support the ammunition boxes when on the march. If you have limbers, ammunition boxes go on them, and not on the gun carriages. Of course, if you are going to load down both the gun and limber with ammunition, it will be necessary to have larger gun's crews, and larger than the English had in the Egyptian campaign, for they carried their ammunition on the limbers.
In speaking of the electric light, Lieutenant Mahan states that "the electric light is comparatively new to us and not generally supplied to our ships, so that the remarks on this point help us but little at the present day." About one-fifth of our cruising force have been and are being fitted with the electric light. It is one of the most important adjuncts with which the Naval Brigade can be equipped. It is now being experimented with at the War College, and I can speak from experience in Egypt that it is invaluable to a landing party, when used from the masthead of a ship.
In concluding these remarks, I regret that my plan of organization is not definite enough to be seen from Lieutenant Mahan's standpoint. I appreciate his friendly criticism, which has brought up some points that I had supposed were generally known throughout the service. Criticism, particularly of a professional subject, can carry no weight with it, however, unless sustained by something beyond the mere statement of a difference of opinion.
NEWPORT BRANCH,
October 12, 1887.
Rear-Admiral S. B. Luce, U. S. N., in the Chair.
Commander Bainbridge-Hoff.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—My remarks can hardly be termed a discussion of Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins' essay, but I am led to make the following remarks as germane to the subject. Mr. Hutchins places his boats to land in line. This means varying speeds and different instants of landing. Some boats will be under fire longer than others. The quickest way to get your boats in and have the crews land together is to come in columns—three or four of them—towed in by the steam launches. These launches should carry Gatlings, and then we would have machine-gun boats leading in with quick fire. The tows should cast off and the boats land in groups on the beach, before the water became so shoal that the steam launches would be in danger of taking the bottom, which they should never be permitted to do. Steam launches should never be used to carry men, and should have a Gatling or rapid-fire gun which is not to be landed. They must be the gunboat flotilla to protect the landing.
In regard to manning boats for landing, I believe in the "platoon system"—the system of sixteen. Not only should the landing bill be founded on it, but ALL bills on board ship should be founded on this system. It is a nine-inch gun's crew; it is a boat's crew; it is half a company; it is a howitzer crew, and an engine-room watch. It can handle a sail, it can clean a part of the ship; and if we adopt the newer system for supplying rifled guns—i. e., suppressing the powder division—it forms a chain from magazine beside the gun's crew. It should have always two leaders associated with it—a boatswain's mate and a quarter gunner. All rates, such as captain of top, coxswain, ship's corporal, should be abolished. A ship should be entitled to so many platoons. Each platoon should be composed of four landsmen, six ordinary seamen, and six seamen. There should be one officer allowed to each platoon.
Mr. Hutchins puts his artillery boats in certain positions. This I consider bad, as it makes a hard and fast rule. Artillery boats, confined to arms firing larger ammunition than shoulder rifles, should be placed where needed. Gatling guns should be considered an infantry arm.
Lieutenant A. C. Dillingham. —Mr. Chairman:—In considering or discussing the very able essay by Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins, I begin by agreeing with him in this, that "there has been, and always will be, some opposition by naval men to the Naval Brigade, and to the landing of sailors for operations on shore."
That every squadron should have an organization capable of operating on shore in case of necessity has been demonstrated not only by the navies of foreign countries, but since I have been in the service, by our own navy; for instance, the operations of Admiral Bell at Formosa in 1867, of Admiral John Kodgers in 1871 at Corea, and again more recently by the operations conducted on the Isthmus of Panama. There may have been opposition on shipboard by the sailors to being landed as infantry, but the experiences we have had in the North Atlantic Squadron show us that to-day the men of the squadron consider it just as much their legitimate duty as the great gun drill or the crossing of top-gallant yards at colors.
Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins has observed with great care the most important element in connection with the organization and landing of a Naval Brigade; for it is only by the strictest attention to detail, as he says, that the success of the landing can be insured. The question of landing a Naval Brigade allows of so many circumstances that will govern the details that I do not believe any positive rules can be laid down that will satisfy more than one case. All that we can do is to lay down the general principles, and by practice ashore under different circumstances be better prepared to meet an emergency. The details for an expedition should be most carefully considered, and once made should be strictly adhered to.
The squadron of the North Atlantic Station has greater facilities for carrying on the requirements of a Naval Brigade than any other squadron we have. It has our own shores to land upon, and has easy access to materials, so that it may be considered the squadron where such an organization should be perfected by practice. It would add much to the efficiency of our drills in this respect if we had some permanent place where all the equipment necessary for the Naval Brigade could be kept. Here the squadron could assemble and go into field for such drills or operations on shore as the commander-in-chief should think best.
I speak of this for the benefit of those whom I have heard criticise adversely the brigade drills of the North Atlantic Squadron. They have said that "too much attention was given to the Naval Brigade—too much weight was given to its importance." These officers I believe to be in error, when we consider that the drill is a necessary departure from the customary drills of a man-of-war's man. If we consider the actual practice we have had in landing the brigade for drill, it has not amounted to more than is necessary to show those concerned that an organization of this kind is possible and efficient. There is something to be said, too, in favor of the parades or displays we have had; though tiresome to us in themselves, they have nevertheless brought the sailors before the public, and have allowed the public to realize that we still exist. We are obliged to patronize the public, and to allow the taxpayer to see that his money is expended for material.
The organization of the battalion on board ship should be, as far as possible, the key to the organization of the brigade. But the battalions of the different vessels of a squadron differ so much as to the number of men composing them, that a strict adherence to ship organization is not always possible.
The first point that I take issue with the essayist upon is this one: "In combining the battalions under one head, each ship's battalions should land and fall in together." Under these conditions the battalions of the different vessels land, and after landing the brigade is formed. This might be done if the landing is unopposed or not under fire; but if the force is to be landed under fire, such a plan I should consider almost fatal. Upon landing, the companies would have to go to the positions they would occupy in the battalions, and it might be that a company upon the right of the line would have to proceed to the left, on account of the rank of the commanding officer. Upon landing when opposed, it is necessary to obtain and maintain a position as soon as possible. Such a state of affairs as I have spoken of would be confusion, hence delay. Such a condition is by all means to be avoided. A brigade might be landed in this manner if unopposed, with plenty of time to organize ashore, but why have more than one system? If we always land as if opposed we are always prepared.
The organization of the brigade should take place in the line of boats, before going under fire, so that when the companies leave their boats they are in the proper positions in the battalion to which they belong. This is accomplished by each boat, after leaving its vessel, taking that position in line which would be occupied by the men it carries, in the brigade. A map of "order before landing" is made and distributed among the vessels. The position of each boat in line is here indicated, and the officers to be landed know exactly where to go. It is just as easy for boats of battalions to find their places, forming the brigade in boats, as to find their places as described by the essayist. This is the practice in the North Atlantic Squadron and it has worked to perfection. Upon landing there has been no confusion. The brigade was formed, and an immediate advance could be made.
I agree with the essayist, that the size of a company of infantry landed should be consistent with the number of men in a division aboard ship, and that men landed should be commanded by the same officers that they are under on board ship. He decides, however, that the size of a company shall be 20 files, with 2 guides, 2 file closers, and 2 ammunition passers; total, 46 men. There is no division aboard any ship in commission in our service, and less likely to be one in the future, on account of the less number of men required to man a modern gun, that can supply an infantry company of 46 men, unless we except the powder division or the engineer's division. For a company of this size men would have to be drafted from other divisions, thus destroying the principle laid down in the essay, that officers shall command the same men ashore that they do afloat. I suggest that a company be composed of 16 files, with 2 guides and 2 file closers; total, 36 men. The 2 file closers are not necessary, excepting to be used as ammunition passers or carriers when so required. It is only under certain conditions that ammunition passers are required. It must be a very long and continued action when a man will exhaust the 80 rounds carried in his webbing belt, if he is under proper fire discipline. During the whole time till ammunition passers are necessary, these men, as detailed by the essay, do nothing. The file closers, when the time arrives, can be detailed to pass ammunition, and also as carriers, when their rifles will make excellent supports for material carried. A company of 16 files can be broken into platoons, which is not the case with one of 20 files.
From the number of field and staff in a brigade of 20 companies of infantry, viz., 12, I should say that the essayist intends a battalion to be composed of 10 companies. It will be a long time before we have a squadron afloat large enough to land 20 companies of infantry besides the artillery. The North Atlantic Squadron, about the largest we have, in order to leave the vessels efficient, able to move, or to go into action, can land but 11 companies, and these of only 16 files. I think that a battalion of infantry landed should not consist of more than 6 companies. This battalion can be maneuvered in three divisions. Such a number of men can better be kept in hand, and more battalions are available for distribution on shore. I think it is not always desirable that the commanding officers of battalions should be the senior executive officers, as detailed by the essay. With the limited number of officers sent to vessels this plan of detail is good, but some officers have more aptitude than others for such service or duty. I believe a better detail would be one made by the commander-in-chief. The objection I see to this plan is that it excludes from brigade duty all officers senior to the detail.
In considering the plan of "order before landing," I see no good reason why the skirmish lines should be in boats, in advance of the main body. It gives more mass, consequently a better target; though it has the advantage of shortening the front. Supposing the whole front of a brigade could land on one beach, I suggest that the skirmish line be composed of the right company of the first battalion and the left company of the second battalion, where there are only two battalions of infantry, as in the brigade of the North Atlantic Squadron. When the signal, "Skirmishers advance, land, and deploy," is made, the boats containing these companies pull to the shore, and, upon landing, the right company deploys to the left, meeting the left company, which is deployed to the right. By this means the flanks are reached the sooner and the front covered at once. The officer commanding the skirmish line will of course handle his line so as to cover the line of battle taken by the main body. The legitimate duty of the marines should be the first skirmish line; but, until they are capable of pulling and transporting themselves, this is impracticable. I see no reason why the marines should not be instructed in boat pulling and boat sailing. The best distribution at present for the marines is among the boats from their respective ships; they land with the main body, and after forming, proceed at once either to relieve or reinforce the first skirmish line. Putting them in the boats to be pulled by the men of the reserve, as suggested by the essayist, would cause confusion by separating this part of the reserve from the main body. If the first skirmish line is relieved, they assemble upon the battalions to which they belong and in their proper places.
The essay makes a rule for the position of the boats containing the artillery. There can be no hard and fixed rule for the position of the artillery, unless we consider the Gatling guns as a part of the artillery. These guns should invariably go with the infantry. As soon as the artillery is on shore the Gatling guns should be sent to the battalion commanders, who should place them to the best advantage with the infantry. Should the vessels of the squadron be able to clear and maintain a clear beach, then the artillery would form a second line and land after the main body, taking such positions in rear of the main body as the topographical features of the landing present. We would not attempt to drag artillery up a bluff, nor land it in the face of outlying rocks or shoals. Places should be selected where the guns can be landed with the least trouble, considering, of course, their future position after landing. It might be necessary for the artillery to be put in advance of the line, in event of the vessels being out of range and the contour of the shore being such as to prevent an enfilading fire. I mention these points in my endeavor to show that there can be no fixed rule for the position of the artillery before landing, it depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. The balsas now supplied make excellent rafts, and one should be towed astern of each artillery boat, to land the guns on if necessary.
I think that the proper use of the steam launches is not appreciated in landing the brigade. Generally they are loaded down with music and marines; they take the ground early, and in the endeavor to get them nearer to the shore they are put out of action and use by being hopelessly aground. The steam launches are the most rapid means of communication between the shore and what would be ordinarily the base of operations—the squadron. The steam launches can be used to advantage for towing, but they should be free to cast off before grounding, in order to be on hand to haul off the beach the heavier boats that cannot be gotten afloat by their boat-keepers. It is a most important consideration that after the boats have landed their men they should be ready, as soon as possible, to re-embark them. We have had in this squadron numerous cases of steam launches being put out of service by grounding. I would place in the bow of each steam launch a revolving cannon or a rifle howitzer. They should carry only the men necessary to work these guns, and the running crew. After they have done the duty of towing, if thus armed they would make an efficient patrol for the beach, and by their rapid moving power could be employed to cover necessary points within their range. At the operations on Coddington Point, had the steam launches been so armed, it would not have been necessary to weaken the artillery force by sending a platoon to cover the retreat of the brigade to Coaster's Island, as they could have taken, in that instance, such positions as to have performed this service thoroughly. A steam launch towing artillery boats, one on either side, would present an excellent and rapid-moving battery of three guns. The steam launch should carry the spare ammunition, which should be put ashore by some of the lighter boats before reaching shoal water. Of course, in operations at a distance from the squadron, ammunition and stores would go with the brigade; but in operating near the squadron, the steam launches could carry to the shore stores to be landed by the lighter boats, and these would be protected by the guns of the steam launch.
In landing the brigade, the boats are already loaded down with men and such articles as are absolutely necessary to be landed at once. I would say it is only the men and such articles as may be immediately needed that should go in the boats. The stores and spare ammunition should come in later, after the landing is effected. For the rapid and safe landing of these articles the steam launches are available. Boats to carry the companies ashore should be as light as possible, for quick transportation and for getting in close to the shore. I would exclude from these boats all other articles than the entrenching tools.
The signals used should be of the simplest, and as few as possible. The boat carrying the commanding officer of each battalion should have a staff and a set of signals to be used if necessary. Each boat should be provided with answering pennant and tactical signal book. Enough signal men should be landed to allow two for each battalion and four for the brigade commander. In landing to operate near the squadron we have found that but few signals are necessary, as for instance:
No. 1 exhibited means. Forward.
No. 2 exhibited means. Skirmishers advance, land, and deploy.
No. 3 exhibited means, Main body land.
No. 4 exhibited means. Artillery commence firing.
No. 5 exhibited means. Artillery land.
No. 6 exhibited means. Reserve land.
All other signaling was done by the wig-wag flag. I see no reason why our men should not be instructed in erecting telegraphic communication. Such knowledge and material for its use might prove of great service.
It is of the greatest importance, when action takes place near the landing where, there is no cover, that after the advance line is maintained the brigade should be protected by entrenching, particularly in event of retreat. To effect this in any reasonable manner or time requires, we have found, the efforts of the entire force left. The number of pioneers landed is only sufficient to form, perhaps, the leaders for this work. They should for this reason go in the boats containing the companies to which they belong, and be prepared to carry, where needed, the entrenching tools brought on shore. When landed, they should remain at their boats till these implements are landed, and under the direction of the beach master transport them where they are required for use. The essayist, in the combination of the units (ships' battalions) to make up a brigade, cuts down the number of pioneers as landed with the ships' battalions. This I think a mistake, on account of the work that might have to be done by them. To be of any practical use they must be of sufficient number. At all events, whatever the number of pioneers, signal men, or whatever else, that number should land for that particular purpose, and not be liable to change at the landing.
Stores and spare ammunition to be landed can be handled by the boat keepers assisted by the company cooks, as far as putting them ashore is concerned. After this, for transportation from the place of landing a working party would have to be detailed from the battalions, so many from each company. If the action is to take place near the place of landing, no stores should be landed till the landing is effected and sure of being maintained. If at any distance from the landing, the stores should be carried to the means of transportation by the working parties detailed as I have said. The question of maintaining supply is a vital one, and a neglect of this would cause failure.
We have these facts to deal with if we consider the Naval Brigade without co-operation. The squadron must be left efficient, capable of moving and of fighting. We have so many men ashore for the purpose of the expedition: with these we must make the best disposition possible under the circumstances. The supply train must be sufficiently guarded, and the men to handle material must be available. The commanding officer of the brigade will decide the best means of doing this, the means depending upon the circumstances of the case he has in hand. Cooks should be detailed, one for each company of infantry and one for each platoon of artillery, this force increased by a detail of one assistant cook from each company of infantry and platoon of artillery when in camp or bivouac. These cooks, on the march, should be with the quartermaster and commissary, to act as a guard and assist in handling stores.
As far as the infantry is concerned, I see no reason for any change from the army tactics. The evolutions employed should be of the simplest character, and the method of deploying by numbers recommends itself as leaving an entire front for the main body after the skirmish line has been thrown out. The simpler company movements of forming column, and from column forming line, are quickly acquired by the sailorman, and make up with the skirmish formations about all that is necessary. In fact, the company commanders will be depended upon to a very great extent, the battalion commander giving them directions as to what is to be done.
The bivouac of the brigade (Plate III.) is a system well planned, excepting that all the artillery is parked to the rear. The main body certainly should not be without the Gatling guns distributed along the line of the most probable points of attack. I would place the Gatling with the grand guard, the rallying point of the outposts. Even with the front towards an enemy, I believe in a concave formation for the main body in bivouac, as a means of protecting the flanks in event of surprise. In conclusion, I would say that the Naval Brigade should not be landed except when prepared for active service, nor without some problem to solve ashore. Under these circumstances the best instruction could be had, the men would become used to the weights to be carried, would learn how best to dispose of them, and with an object in view in landing, the interest would be intensified.
Lieutenant Clason.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—On two points I cannot agree with Mr. Hutchins. I read in the essay, p. 307, "A company of infantry should be composed of 40 men, with 2 guides, 2 file closers, and 2 ammunition passers and carriers—in all, 46 men. Companies should not be too large and unwieldy; large companies could only be a question of economy of officers, and in this matter no navy to-day can afford to be wanting." I propose, instead of this, a company composed of 64 men, with 2 guides, 3 file closers, and 4 ammunition passers and carriers—in all, 73 men, with 3 company officers. Such a company would require in addition from 6 to 8 boat-keepers —an adjunct not mentioned by the essayist in computing the force to be dispatched from the Atlanta. My reasons for desiring this change are these: (1) To have such small companies is contrary to the universal practice of every army of which I have read—a fact that in itself speaks volumes in favor of my proposition; it cripples the ships seriously by withdrawing so many watch and division officers; (2) unanimity of action is much more difficult of attainment; (3) the mass of such a company, 46 men, is so small, especially after being under fire, that its shock can produce little, if any, effect upon an adversary. An officer in command of a company sees an opening in the enemy's line—a timely attack may bring victory to our arms. He looks about him; 25 to 30 men constitute his available force. Now or never is the time; but 30 men are insufficient;—he sends word to the captains of companies to his right and left, and also to the battalion commander;—one captain thinks the chance hazardous, the other will not advance without orders—they hesitate: when the battalion commander, or his orders, arrives upon the scene it is too late, the enemy has seen and repaired his error, the chance is gone, and with it, perhaps, the victory.
The proportion of officers to men varies considerably in different armies, from 1 to 50 in the German army to 1 to 33 in our own army. Mr. Hutchins gives 23 men to each officer; I propose 24 men per officer, a lieutenant to command, with two juniors associated with him. These officers should be taken from the same divisions the men come from; I thus have the companies officered "by their own division officers, with whom they are familiar as well as known."
Again I quote from the essay: "Then, in a vessel of the Atlanta class, we would have from the crew 2 companies, 92 men, and two guns and limbers, 46 men, 4 pioneers, 4 ammunition passers and carriers, 2 stretchermen, 2 signalmen and I bagman, in all 151, out of a complement of 242 men, not including the marine guard, which would probably land 37 men, making a total of 188." No account is taken of the 12 to 14 boat-keepers necessary in addition, and the 5 men to run the steam launch, which would generally tow the boats. This makes a grand total of 205 or 207 men and 9 officers. Even allowing that the complement was full (a thing which every naval officer knows is rarely the case), my experience proves that such a force cannot be landed and leave the ship effective, and in this opinion I am backed by every officer attached to the Atlanta to whom I have spoken on the subject.
I propose to land from the Atlanta I company of blue jackets (73 men), 1 gun and its limber (24 men and 12 G.). I platoon of marines and 2 sergeants (34), 4 pioneers, 2 signalmen, 2 stretchermen, I bagman or apothecary, 12 boat keepers, 5 launch's crew, with 3 company officers, I artillery officer, i marine officer, I engineer officer to command the pioneers: to land more men would render the ship inefficient. I have a total of 158 men and 6 officers as against 205 men and 9 officers mentioned in the essay.
Major W. R. Livermore, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A.—In referring to my remarks at the War College this morning, Mr. Dillingham was correct in thinking that I said that in the maneuvers planned for to-morrow, it was not expected that the troops would adhere to the formations and commands laid down in Tactics. I referred to Upton's Tactics, but did not mean to imply that Tactics should be thrown aside in the fighting formations. On the contrary, I think that is when Tactics are most needed; and it is one of the fundamental principles of the system I would like to see adopted, that it should afford a language as applicable to the irregular groups of a modern fight as to the rigid masses and lines of the past. It is quite generally admitted in the Army that Upton's Tactics are not applicable to a modern fight, and the illustrious author of that system was fully aware of its imperfections, and was at the time of his death preparing to correct them.
With regard to the company column, we must remember that it is the successor of the battalion column of former days and not of the old companies; and the same principle that reduced the battle unit from 1000 to 250 men will soon reduce it again to about 60 or 80, and with our present organization of 100 men we can count on about that number in rank. It is desirable to organize the regiments with 12 companies, not so much for the sake of having three battalions to a regiment as for the sake of having four companies to a battalion, and in time of war it would be well to add another battalion so as to make 16 companies in the regiment.
It would be well also to group the higher and lower units in fours, and all European nations are coming to this conclusion. Napoleon said that no man should be required to command more than four others. It is simple and better to describe all tactical movements on the supposition that each unit is divided into four fractions, and these descriptions will answer for any number that may be presented.
Troops are disposed upon an area having two dimensions—length and breadth; and the simplest manner of dividing a unit is to separate the front and rear and divide each into the right and left fractions.
In advancing to action under distant fire there is no formation better than the square of 16 men. There should be sufficient interval in every direction between the men to enable them to move and face without interfering with each other, and the groups should be separated by sufficient interval to avoid heavy loss from hostile fire. It appears to me from this evening's discussion that this grouping of units is that best adapted to the Naval Brigade, as well as to the requirements of the Army.
All foreign armies are simplifying their tactics so as to reduce the number of evolutions to a, minimum, and to devote most of their attention to applied tactics to teach the troops how to take advantage of topography.
Infantry so fractioned and grouped is better disposed for the irregular operations of modern warfare. But whatever system may be adopted in the Army, it will be so flexible as to be fully applicable to any other grouping that may be required from time to time, for the organizations will seldom be complete, and the fractions of several units will be often united.
In organizing the Naval Brigade, the important principle is to preserve the hierarchy as far as possible, and I think that this should be adapted to the requirements of the ships, and that any system that may be adopted by the Army will be found to be applicable.
Commander C. F. Goodrich.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I regard the essay as a paper of great value to naval officers. When it is considered that the conditions of the competition limited the writer to 40 pages of the "Proceedings of the Naval Institute," it is remarkable that so much ground is covered, and covered so well.
Having been associated with Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins, and knowing his habit of mind, which is so well displayed in the essay, I feel it incumbent on me, in his absence, to meet some of the criticisms which have been passed upon his article, although I speak entirely without authority. The subject of the essay covers so many points that it would be remarkable if some were not overlooked, or if in some things the writer was not of our way of thinking.
In regard to Commander Hoff's criticism of the formation for landing, it is very true that the boats may not approach in line, and hence the exact form prescribed by the essayist cannot be carried out. But what of that? It is precisely what is to be expected in action, and our plan must be made for meeting such an emergency on the spot. This will be true in regard to any method of formation which may be proposed. Absolute regularity of formation and coincidence of arrival at the beach, however desirable, may not be obtained, but we should strive for them, and if not successful, do the best we can under the conditions that exist at the time of landing.
I differ with Lieutenant Dillingham in regard to the detail of officers to the command of battalions. I am very jealous of maintaining the prerogative of the executive officer. I believe that this does much to preserve a sound esprit de corps, and I do not think the executive of ships will be willing to resign important commands. It has always been the rule in the service that the executive officer should command expeditions sent on detached service. Furthermore, I do not think that the men would have as much confidence in a strange commander as with one under whom they habitually serve, although the strange commander might, perhaps, be the better man.
Lieutenant Dillingham wants the material for landing the Naval Brigade on this coast kept at one point where the vessels could rendezvous from time to time for exercise. I cannot approve the custom of confining such operations to one place. On the contrary, I think that every ship should be so provided and her landing party so organized that she could, on leaving this squadron, for instance, go abroad and find her proper sphere of usefulness in any other squadron which she should join. In other words, I think that the equipment and organization of landing parties everywhere should be the same.
If I understood Lieutenant Dillingham rightly, I think him in error in diminishing the number of ammunition carriers; I think the essayist has, possibly, not provided ammunition carriers enough. The large expenditure of ammunition, due to the introduction of magazine rifles, makes the rapid and sufficient supply of ammunition of very great importance. Although the number of rounds now carried is large, they will be shot off so quickly as to leave the troops in the front without ammunition very much more speedily than was the case with the old-fashioned arm. Moreover, if any considerable distance is to be covered, it will be found impossible to count upon the possession of the regulation 80 rounds of ammunition upon the part of every man, for it is well known that armies on the march relieve themselves of weight whenever possible. Indeed, their route may often be traced by the cartridges which have been dropped by the soldiers in order to lighten their equipment.
Lieutenant Dillingham's remarks upon the function of the steam launch in this connection are admirable. They are based on experience, and they commend themselves to all interested in the problem.
I think this is a good opportunity to speak of the very indifferent system of signals by the use of bunting to which the Navy has been tied for so many years. The flags themselves, and the code for which they are utilized, have always been unsatisfactory, as it is barely possible to make out a signal at any distance except under rarely peculiar and favorable circumstances.
In conclusion, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the terseness of Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins' style and of the practicality of his suggestions. The latter exhibit a happy combination of study and experience. Indeed, the whole essay commands our admiration, since by the wording of the subject proposed it was made to cover almost the entire art of war.
Commander Bainbridge-Hoff.—I think our signals are better than Commander Goodrich allows. We have fewer flags than any other nations, and our naked masts permit a four-flag signal to be as easily read as a three-flag, provided the flags are supplied of slightly smaller dimensions than now. Our Army and Navy Code, with its Morse alphabet as now adopted, is as good as any, and our signalmen can be put on the electric key. The Ortman lamp now used in some of our ships in this station is better than any foreign lamp, as we can make more symbols from the nature of flash given to the eye by the Ortman shutter. The signal book has been thoroughly overhauled, and the new drill book, taking the place of the old tactical signal book, has passed the inspection of several boards—Mr. Hutchins being on one of them.
Lieutenant-Commander C. T. Hutchins.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—If there is any one subject upon which naval officers are most prone to disagree, it is the organization and detail of the Naval Brigade. The discussions of the essay by the able officers who have taken part show, however, that the subject is one of vital importance to the service.
I have quite expected criticism of my essay on certain points, more particularly on the size of the infantry company and the deploying of skirmishers by numbers. I believe that the latter has been given up by European infantry tacticians, who strive for the individual deployment of skirmishers in a fan shape; still, I do not know that there is anything better for the seaman, who does not have many opportunities for skirmish drill on shore.
In reply to some of the criticisms:—
In the remarks of Commander Hoff on my "order before landing" he suggests to place the boats in columns to be towed by steam launches, in which formation they lead in "to land," casting off the tow and forming groups, all of which is done under fire. When we consider how difficult it will be to control the varying speeds of these columns, not knowing the proper moment to cast off the tow, the depth of water, and grounding of steam launches, there is every reason why boats should advance and land in line.
One shot into a steam launch might disable her, the boats overrun each other, there is confusion, and the result may be predicted.
In the "Order before landing," the signal is made to "land," when the boats get to the beach, as soon as possible; the skirmishers having already landed, the artillery clearing the landing place by a cross fire from the flanks.
The line formation presents the least exposure to the enemy's shot, and I fail to see why boats under fire should be huddled together in groups, with the object for grouping wanting, at the same time making a good target for the enemy and interfering with each other's movements.
We are all familiar with the difficulties encountered in the disembarkation and landing of the brigade. At night there may be occasions, when the electric lights are used, to form the boats in the shape of a triangle, the boats advancing in the dark zones, the point of the triangle leading. Even in this formation there will be a time when the boats must form line in order to find room to land on the beach.
The nearer we can come to the simultaneous arrival of the boats at the beach, the more certain we are of obtaining a foothold; which is not obtained by the advance of boats by columns and forming groups. Boats should be towed in toward the beach 'of tugs or steam launches, but they should cast off the tow and form the "order before landing" before the advance is made.
Commander Hoff says that the steam launches should carry Gatlings. I have it from the best of authority that "in Europe the Gatling is completely played out, and it should be in this country." Steam launches would be better armed with the 1-pounder Hotchkiss, the best all-around gun now in use.
Like Commander Hoff, I am in favor of placing the artillery boats where most needed, and this I believe to be on the flanks, where they will also interfere less with the command and the direction of the infantry boats. You cannot obtain the maximum cross-fire on the shore with the artillery in any other place, and to attain the greatest effect artillery boats must be placed in echelon formation.
Lieutenant Dillingham takes issue with me in my combination of the different ships' battalions, and says: "Under these [my] conditions the battalions of the different vessels land, and after landing the brigade is formed." I am sorry that I did not make myself clear on this point, for by reference to page 330 of the essay, under the head of Disembarkation and Landing of the Naval Brigade, I state that each company of infantry (seamen) lands in the two ship's boats belonging to the division, and that these two boats always keep together, and must take the same relative position in the order before landing as the company holds in the brigade when formed on the beach.
The object of the "order before landing" is to organize the brigade in the boats before it is landed, each company being in its two boats and opposite to the place it is to occupy in the line of battle on shore. Where the company lands it forms, and I have never heard of, nor much less have I ever seen, a landing made in any other way.
Again, Lieutenant Dillingham says: "There is no division aboard any ship in commission in our service, and less liable to be one in the future, on account of the less number of men required to man a modern gun, that can supply an infantry company of forty-six men, unless we except the powder division or the engineer's division." For his information I would state that the Lancaster has two gun divisions with each one containing more than 50 men, and that the forward and after pivots have together 50 men, the officer in charge of these guns to go with the company. When I left the Lancaster, some three years ago, her first division had 56 men, and the second division about the same number. I am not aware that her complement has been cut down. The Marion's second division has more than 50 men in it, and I take it for granted that every ship of her class, seven of them, has the same. There is no reason why nearly every small ship in the service should not have a gun division of 46 men, and every large one two gun divisions, with 46 men or more to each. The modern idea in the navies of Europe is to have an officer to each gun of any size on shipboard, ammunition having become so expensive that the firing with great guns must be kept under control. Why have small divisions under inexperienced officers, when they can be combined under an experienced one? The smaller vessels are capable of landing a company of infantry composed of 46 men; they would hardly be able to land two companies of 36 men each. Taking into consideration all classes of vessels, and being able to form one company of infantry from two artillery companies, I believe 46 men to be the most suitable number for the needs of the Naval Brigade. I am aware that officers may not be able at all times to have command of the same men in the brigade organization, but it should be the object sought after. Modern tacticians divide an infantry company into sections, and the formation of the company and its movement by either flank remain to be brought out in a future tactics. A fairly well drilled man with the Lee magazine gun can fire away So rounds of ammunition in five minutes: could modern thought doubt for an instant the necessity of ammunition passers and carriers? Lieutenant Dillingham suggests that file closers be used to pass ammunition. File closers in the modern fighting line direct the firing of sections of the company; they are the most important men in the company, and must give all their attention to fire discipline. I will admit they are of no use for parades, but my belief is that two file closers are not enough for a company, judging from the company organizations of European armies.
Lieutenant Dillingham sees "no good reason why the skirmish lines should be in boats in advance of the main column." The skirmishers in advance (two boats' length) of the centre of the main body in light, fast boats, are opposite to a point where they are to land and deploy, or deploy by boat and land. The flanks of the main body are protected by the artillery, and probably by several ships of the squadron; therefore, in only very exceptional cases should the deployment of skirmishers be from the flanks. It would be a violation of a principle in tactics to attempt to cover a front of a line of battle by the deploying of skirmishers from its flanks, as suggested by Lieutenant Dillingham. It might do for the pomp of war, but it does not belong to any school of tactics. Lieutenant Dillingham also says, "it might be necessary for the artillery to be put in advance of the line" of battle. This would be a violation of a principle in the art of war, not to bring guns into action without infantry supports in advance.
I cannot agree with Lieutenant Dillingham in the use he makes of the Gatling gun. It is well known that in European armies the Gatling has been thrown out of service—in fact, the bullet-firing gun is practically abandoned for military use. England, like ourselves, being behind the times, is the only country in Europe that has bullet-firing guns incorporated in its military armament. All the other great powers of Europe have no bullet-firing guns either in their military or naval outfit, Italy excepted. In my essay I class the Gatling last in its usefulness for the Naval Brigade, and it is about in keeping with the Springfield rifle. There maybe occasions when it would be advisable to have with the grand guard a few pieces of artillery—for instance, one or two l-pounder Hotchkiss guns ; but I am opposed to the mixing up of artillery and infantry in the bivouac of the Naval Brigade ; both arms have their proper
and separate functions to perform, and it might lead to confusion when forming line of battle in the event of an attack. In the bivouac the formation will depend on the nature of the ground, roads, etc. The inner line or main body, with level ground, should be somewhat concave toward enemy, but the outer line, pickets and sentries should be convex.
Lieutenant Clason takes issue with me on the size of the company of infantry, and suggests 73 men, his reasons being, "To have such small companies (46 men) is contrary to the universal practice of every army," etc. I am aware that small companies are quite unknown in armies that have plenty of men; but I hold that the small company suits the purposes of the Naval Brigade, and that 40 files in a company are quite as common as 64 files, his own number; and the combination of the artillery companies is not possible with this number (64) of men to a company.
Again, Lieutenant Clason states that "205 or 207 men and 9 officers can not be landed from the Atlanta and leave the ship effective." Effective for what? Certainly the ship could bank fires and fight most of her guns, or keep under way and fight some of the heavier ones.
To quote from the essay: "The circumstances governing the work required of the ship during the absence of the battalion would decide if all the force or a certain number of companies should be landed."
With regard to "the 12 or 14 boat-keepers, and 5 men to run the steam launch," of which Lieutenant Clason claims I have "taken no account"—in extreme cases boat-keepers would have to be reduced to a minimum.
Admitting that men in the service are as efficient as the special service men at the Naval Academy, I fail to see why 5 men should be required to run a steam launch under the circumstances. We have been running 12 and 13 steam launches at the Naval Academy, some of them 40 feet long, and a Herreshoff 56 feet long, for the past two years or more, with 2 men all told to the former and never more than 3 men to the latter. "The 12 or 14 boat keepers” can be cut down to 7 men. Now, one more word about "leaving the Atlanta effective." If you wish to fight her in the absence of the landing party, land but one company of infantry and one piece of artillery ; but when the time comes to land all the battalion, I am convinced, notwithstanding what Lieutenant Clason says, that the Atlanta can do all that I have claimed. As an instance of what can be done in the engine and fire rooms of a ship, where the Atlanta would have to draw men from to work her guns in an emergency, I give the following incident: The monitor Lehigh was lying at Port Royal, S. C, when we were ordered to proceed up the Savannah River, where we anchored off Fort Jackson and hauled fires. The third night after anchoring, and by the time I could get on deck and take in the situation, the ship had dragged three anchors about one-eighth of a mile, a freshet having come down the river sweeping everything before it. With the turn of the tide the ship dragged again and fetched up on some heavy piles—obstructions in the river—the ship's overhang resting on them. It was now a question of which would win, tide or furnaces; for on the turn of the tide again the overhang would hang on the piles, and probably separate from the hull of the ship. But one hour and forty minutes remained to get up steam, with no engineer, two machinists—one a stranger—and two marines borrowed from another vessel—the marines had once worked in the fire room. All the Lehigh's firemen had been sent down the river to help another vessel of the fleet. Fires were started and steam got up, and in less than two hours the Lehigh was anchored out in the stream, with a cost to the Government of little over one barrel of oil and a few bulkheads used for the fires, with two machinists, two marines, and four deck hands to pass coal, all told, in the engine and fire rooms to do the work. All this could have been done, and probably better, in war times. I still must claim that the Atlanta can and is quite able to-morrow, should the opportunity present itself, to do what I stated she could do in my essay, and leaving 82 men and 13 officers—a total of 95—on board. I do not claim the organization I have given in the essay for the Atlanta to be her habitual one, I only desired to illustrate what landing force a ship can organize when a large number of men are wanted. Had one-third of the men been landed from the English fleet at Alexandria, Egypt, in 1882, that city would have been saved from pillage.
The Chairman.—The Naval Brigade, its organization, equipment, etc., is still in an unsatisfactory condition, not so much as to the actual organization of the brigade itself perhaps, but rather as to how the men forming the companies of infantry of each ship are to be selected. The question really begins with the organization of the ship's company as the basis of all other organizations. Our thoughts on this subject are in a state of solution, as it were, and it is to be hoped that by means of these discussions they may crystallize into clear ideas, not only on this but on all other subjects of a kindred nature.
Our sailors will be called upon in future, as they have been in the past, to land as a military organization for military operations on shore. In this respect we do not differ from other navies. The English, French, and Italian navies are constantly sending their sailors on shore to co-operate with troops in belligerent movements—the English in Egypt, the French in China, the Italians in Africa. Our Naval Brigade should be so organized as to enable it to operate on shore with the utmost efficiency, and at the same time with the least inconvenience to the ships of the squadron. Moreover, the brigade should be landed frequently.
"It is a well known fact," says a recent writer on military tactics, "that for the first three years of the War of the Rebellion, there were more lives lost and property destroyed from mere ignorance than from any other cause. The object of all military training should be to prepare men for war. Drill, as a means of teaching discipline, as well as preliminary field movements, etc., can be taught anywhere; but the underlying elements on which the art of war is founded can be learned only by practical experience." These remarks apply with equal force to us. But, to drill with the best results, our organization should be as nearly perfect as it is possible for us to make it.
I believe I fully express the sentiments of the meeting in returning thanks to Lieutenant Hutchins for his excellent paper.
WASHINGTON BRANCH,
October 17, 1887.
Commander A. D. Brown, U. S. N., in the Chair.
Ensign W. L. Rodgers Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—In reading Mr. Hutchins' essay, my first thought was o£ the entire practicability of all its ideas, so that, with one exception, my remarks must be confined to details.
I think a change for the better might be made in the titles assigned to the officers of the brigade. The army titles appearing in the printed ship's battalion bills are objectionable, because the Navy Regulations assimilate them with certain naval ranks not usually held by the brigade officers, and when to a young officer attached to a small force we give the mouth-filling title of quartermaster-general or adjutant-general, it makes him and his office ridiculous. I think we may find a fitting military title for the brigade commander in the obsolete army title of brigadier. For the commanding officers we might form titles derived from the French "chef d'escadron," and call them battalion chiefs, battery chiefs and company chiefs. For the officers on the staff expressive titles would be brigade adjutant, battalion quartermaster, battery surgeon, etc.
In assigning the brigade to boats, Mr. Hutchins distributes the marines as sitters in boats pulled by sailors. This seems objectionable, whether the marines are distributed among the sailor companies or whether they have their own boats pulled by extra seamen; for in one case the marines are disorganized and in the other the non-combatants are increased. In the North Atlantic Squadron the marines row their own boats, and when we think that any landsman can soon learn to pull a good oar, and that landing will rarely be made in bad weather or in heavy surf, this plan seems preferable.
I now come to the only point upon which I strongly disagree with Mr. Hutchins. In the matter of tactics he speaks approvingly of Upton's deployment of the skirmish line by numbers; I think this idea cannot be too strongly deprecated. We must recollect that although this system is now twenty years old it has never been employed in battle, and that the experiences of the recent great European wars have been so unfavorable to formations of such a nature that its author was engaged upon a new tactics at the time of his death.
The necessities of modern fire tactics require the strictest control of the fire on the part of officers and leaders of all ranks, which can only be obtained by always associating the same officers and men together, and so exercising them in maneuvers and firing. This is particularly important in the case of the small squads of 10 to 15 men. It has also been found necessary to give to the commander of any given part of the fighting line the supports and reserves required to carry through his part of the action; so that commands should be organized in depth rather than in length. In the skirmish line by numbers these rules are violated; adjacent men in the line are unacquainted with each other, and the officers of the line are chosen by an arbitrary rule of odd and even. When the supporting lines are advanced they start in the same disorganized condition and without any connection with each other, so that mutual support amounts to nothing.
In the armies of continental Europe, each command forms its own firing line with supports and reserves, and the ultimate units on the firing line are groups of ten or fifteen men, under leaders to whom they are known and by whom they are always commanded. A German company (250 men) is divided into three divisions. In the development of the line of battle, one division is thrown forward to form the skirmish line, and as the enemy's fire becomes more and more effective the division subdivides until the skirmish line is formed, but each "group" (10-15 men) remains under the strict direction of its leader. As the line needs reinforcements, the men of each group on the firing line close their intervals and complete groups from the supporting lines are pushed into the gaps thus formed.
Upton's deployment of skirmishers by the flank, however, can be readily employed in such a way as to fulfill all requirements. It the company of our landing force is organized as suggested in the Ordnance Instructions, the platoon of 16 men should be regarded as the smallest tactical unit, and the men in it should always be the same, and should be constantly exercised in every kind of collective firing. If the companies are grouped together in divisions of two companies each, under the senior company chief, and the divisions in threes under a battalion chief, we should have a battalion of the size of the German company.
To form a fighting line with one or more battalions, we might begin with the battalions in line with each battalion in double column of fours, or massed in column of divisions, and advance until the enemy's fire begins to tell. A division would then advance to form the skirmish line, followed at 300 yards interval by a second division as support, with the third at a similar interval as reserve. The fighting line on beginning its advance, say at 2500 yards from good artillery, should separate into platoons, and when at a distance of some 2000 yards the platoons should deploy as they advance, according to Upton's tactics, but each platoon should look to its leader for all directions in regard to movements and firing. If the line is boldly pushed forward, it may not need reinforcement until between 600 and 700 yards of the enemy, when the losses of the line and a contraction of each platoon towards its centre will afford intervals into which the organized groups of the support may be thrown. The importance of preserving the organization of the groups and of teaching stragglers to attach themselves to the nearest group leader is considered of the highest in all military training abroad. In this way, all reinforcements should be absorbed into the firing line, and I think that by torturing Upton's deployment by the flank only a little, we shall find it equal to our requirements.
Lieutenant C. G. Calkins:—It is always very easy to criticise an essay, and "does not always require technical knowledge on the part of the critics. I suppose that is one reason why any one who joins the critics is sure to find himself in the majority. Mr. Hutchins has arranged his paper in a very methodical manner, and it is very easy to follow. A great deal of it is very easy to agree with because it is what we have been taught and what we have tried to carry out a great while, without having any great amount of success; but I think the criticism just made by Mr. Rodgers, about the use of skirmishers by numbers instead of by the flank, a very sound one. For instance, extending the line of skirmishers to cover the front of the battalion until the enemy be flanked can be much better managed by sending detachments, companies or half companies, and keeping them under their own officers as far as possible, although it is not absolutely possible to keep a skirmish line under the control of any given officers.
I think Mr. Hutchins gives too much importance to the formation or alignment of boats. It is a mistake spending a great deal of time trying to arrange boats in line and make a formation which is apt to be drifted out of shape before completed, and then advance in that formation against the enemy.
As a general thing, the fire from small boats advancing against an enemy is thrown away. Possibly some long boats with Hotchkiss guns in their bows might do something towards clearing a beach, but the fire from howitzers and Gatlings from pulling boats is a mere waste of powder, and the fire of the men also is wasted. I think the landing must be made either where the enemy is not present or where a beach can be swept by artillery firing along a sandspit, or where the water on both sides allows the ship to get a raking fire on the beach. After they get ashore, Mr. Hutchins lays down the order of march very carefully, and it is entitled to a good deal of consideration.
The science of war is something that every one is not called upon to understand. I heard a French officer, who had been in a little engagement in Formosa, who had something to say on the science of war. He said they came face to face with a lot of Chinamen who were huddled about on the slope of a hill among the bushes, on the other side of a paddy field. The men landed from the ships, were drawn up, and wanted to get across and get at those Chinamen. He said, "We didn't know how to do it, and finally were obliged to retreat. We killed some of the Chinamen, but in getting off we capsized a boat, lost a Hotchkiss gun and a few men, and in fact, summed up in a few words, we were well thrashed simply because we didn't know enough of tactics to advance over that paddy field."
When we follow the error that has always pervaded our drill books of tactics, and omit all reference to the enemy in drill formation exercises on shore, we are laying ourselves open to exactly the same kind of accidents. Of course tactics is nothing else but handling men in the presence of an enemy, and the drill book which gives a formation that would be impossible in the presence of an enemy is making a very dangerous error. It is only necessary to take up the field exercise books of any foreign army and see that they begin at once in the presence of the enemy. In the German army they take the men almost before they know the manual of arms and exercise them in changing ground, in selecting cover, in making advances, etc., giving them the most active instruction of this kind in the first six months of their drill before they pass their first inspection. With Mr. Hutchins, I think that we had better not land at all for service until we can have some instruction in the art of handling men in the presence of an enemy, and get some experience in that art.
The Chairman:—In that connection we might recall the expedition to Formosa in 1867, when Lieutenant-Commander Mackenzie was killed. We had plenty of men there, but could not do anything on account of the country being so rough and densely covered with undergrowth. The question then comes right back to what Mr. Calkins has said, whether it is advisable to attempt anything of the kind. It seems to me, in this question of the Naval Brigade, that we are not very apt to meet the enemy as it is laid down in the essay. In the first place, we are not apt to have such a large number of men that we could safely go out and camp a long distance from the ships. In the instances which have arisen in the past, such as those at Panama and at Alexandria, after landing we were not far away from the ships. Until we get a very much larger navy than we have now we are not likely to have the number of men that Mr. Hutchins has put down in his essay.
Ensign Rodgers:—I have recently read of the expedition in which Lieutenant-Commander Mackenzie was killed. The trouble was that this party was sent down to avenge an American seaman's death, and they had no tactical object before them. The result was they lost a great many men by sunstroke; the country was very difficult, exactly similar to that where Lord Wolseley used a naval brigade in Ashantee. He (Lord Wolseley) had a force of three or four hundred men from the navy before the army arrived. He knew exactly what he wanted to do with them, and he used them so they had the utmost effect on the future campaign. He beat the savages very easily; burnt their villages and destroyed their crops, which exercised a great moral effect in the campaign which followed. He was enabled to do this because he knew how to employ these sailors, whereas our people out in Formosa did not.
Lieutenant Schroeder:—If I recollect aright, the cause of Mackenzie's death was from charging into the bushes where the enemy who shot him were concealed, which is likely to occur to any one.
Lieutenant Calkins:—I do not think the enemy were seen more than once or twice in the ten days. The brush was very heavy, and it was almost impossible for the men to keep any formation in the shape of a skirmish line, if you choose to call it so; every man had to be for himself, fighting behind trees and that sort of thing.
The Chairman:—Then the point seems to me to be whether under these circumstances it is judicious to attempt anything of the kind.
Ensign Rodgers:—I think the reason that Lord Wolseley did so much was because he knew just what he wanted; yet he used just the same material, the Naval Brigade. The operations lasted only a few days. There was no army in the country, it had not come. And the cases were precisely similar except that one started without any clear idea of what was to be done, and the other knew perfectly what was to be done.
Lieutenant Calkins:—It seems to me the same principle might possibly have applied in Corea. If the marines had been landed in a certain way, the Coreans must have abandoned their forts even before the Palos went past them.
Lieutenant Schroeder:—The Palos did not go beyond the forts during the landing. I was present in that campaign. The Palos and Monocacy ran the gauntlet of the forts and came back, and ten days afterwards the landing was made from below the forts.
The Chairman:—The force was at no time at any great distance from the supports, was it?
Lieutenant Schroeder:—No. We were out of gunshot, but not very far. We were two nights and three days ashore. The Naval Brigade landed about 650 men. When we captured the citadel, a large number of the Coreans that were killed were chiefs of greater or less importance, which had some ultimate effect on the campaign, as Mr. Rodgers was saying of Lord Wolseley striking a blow that would be felt for a long time. And touching that expedition also I want to call attention to what Mr. Hutchins says about marines. On that occasion we practised our marines in pulling boats beforehand, and they pulled themselves ashore.
Ensign Rodgers:—I think two-thirds of the force of the ships were ashore?
Lieutenant Schroeder:—About 650 in all. I suppose the fleet numbered thirteen or fourteen hundred.
Ensign Rodgers:—Then the covering ships, the Monocacy and Palos, did not land any men?
Lieutenant Schroeder:—No:—at least not till the attack was over, I think.
Lieutenant Calkins:—I would like to know if the object was to kill the Coreans, or if the object was to occupy the fort?
Ensign Rodgers:—Well, the reports of that action say they needed half the force of infantry to keep back the Coreans who were trying to rescue those captured.
Lieutenant Schroeder:—Part of the force was used for that—about two companies. Some of the artillery was posted on the hill, after capturing it, to check the advance of a large body of Coreans, said to be 7000 at the time, though probably not nearly so large. We had the marines and one company of blue jackets on that outpost hill, I think. A good many of the Coreans escaped as we advanced, but about 250 were killed in storming the citadel.
Lieutenant-Commander Stockton:—I would like to say a few words upon a subject that may appear at first sight somewhat foreign to the essay; but as it relates to its practical effect upon the service, I will not hesitate to do so.
From a somewhat hasty perusal of this paper it seems to me a sensibly written one, likely to be of practical service if its ideas are put into effect.
The essay is the result of the yearly offer of prizes by the Naval Institute, which have of late years, in subject matter, become more practical, and hence more likely to be of every-day importance to us. The subjects proposed of "Torpedoes," "Naval Brigade," "Changes Incident to the New Ships," etc., etc., all bear directly upon the daily training of our men and the proper use and manipulation of our fighting material.
But there is a link missing between the preparation and publication of these timely papers and their communication, duly authorized and shaped, to the service at large. At present our drill manuals, properly authorized, are very scanty in number, obsolete in matter, and confined almost entirely to one bureau. When I speak of the drill manuals I do not refer to the many fugitive pamphlets, papers, and books issued in a semi-official manner from various bureaux, often at variance one with the other, and all lacking that stamp of definite and final authority which will allow us to use them on board ship as established service manuals. The result, however, of these various professional papers, reports of boards, and prize essays, issued with the very best and most laudable of intentions to meet the great want of modern and freshly revised drill books, is, to say the least, confusing.
Some one office or person or bureau should have the whole matter in charge, and by giving us authorized and appropriate drills, enable the service to have uniformity in its routine and its various exercises and evolutions. There is no professional and actual head of the Navy who directly controls the personnel of the service, and to whom the Secretary can go as the person responsible for the efficiency, training, and discipline of the officers and men. The results of the various inspections, imperfect as they are, are lost; no present stimulus of consequence occurs from them, no future permanent improvement can be traced to them.
Lieutenant Rush.—Lieutenant-Commander Hutchins has given us the most valuable paper upon the subject of the Naval Brigade that has yet appeared. In looking over his essay, one or two points have suggested themselves to me, about which I should like to say a few words.
First, as to the matter of organization. The Naval Brigade being composed of the united battalions of two or more vessels, the battalion becomes the basis upon which the brigade is formed, and the efficient organization of the former means, to a great extent, the successful formation of the latter. I take up, therefore, for consideration the question of the organization of the ship's battalion. Mr. Hutchins has given us an excellent sample case in the Atlanta's landing party, and I think he has worked out the organization most admirably, but on one point I would suggest a change, and this is in the matter of primary organization. In stationing the ship's company in station, quarter, and boat bills, I suggest doing it on the basis of the battalion organization; or, to put it more accurately, having divided the ship's company into two watches about equal in strength, intelligence, and activity, make out the other station bills with the battalion organization constantly in view. I am aware that this plan of organization is a radical departure from old time custom, which regards the growing importance of the Naval Brigade as of doubtful expediency, and even our prize essayist himself, I see, stamps such a measure as "probably resulting in disaster." But with due regard for the weight of opposite opinion, I am still of the belief that the organization of the ship's company in its various station bills upon a qualified battalion basis (if I may so express myself) will tend greatly to the solution of one of the most difficult problems which our first lieutenants have to meet, viz., the question how to organize their various formations so that comrades may be kept together, whether on board ship, embarked in boats, or landed on shore, the same men always together and under all circumstances under their own officers; furthermore, I hold that the station bills so arranged will in nowise conflict with the proper organization of the ship's batteries, boats, or fighting establishment, but, on the contrary, will render the "parent ship" more efficient because better organized. To elaborate fully this scheme of organization would be beyond the limits of this discussion, but I think the question one worthy of careful examination and argument. That it will meet much opposition I have no doubt, but that the plan, or something similar, will eventually be adopted, I think highly probable.
In regard to equipment and outfit, Mr. Hutchins has covered the ground so exhaustively that I think there is little left to be said. I would add, however, a few items of comment. Abolish the cutlass and pistol, and substitute the rifle, except in the first six numbers of the artillery sections, the pioneers, the ammunition party, and the hospital service, which arm with revolvers. Reduce the number of men in the artillery sections (light guns) to twelve and a quarter gunner. Do not abolish the drum, but keep it with the bugle as the best possible field music. Do not entirely put the 12-pounder howitzer out of commission, but keep an odd one on board of each ship for occasional service; loaded with shrapnel or canister against a mob, or for close work, as in street fighting, it is second in value to the Galling, and superior for destructive effect to the 3-inch rifle. This last will doubtless be considered heresy by the advanced artillerists; I refer them to the reports upon the first battle of Bull Kun and the comparison drawn between the destructive effect upon bodies of men of the firing of the Napoleon rifles and of the naval howitzers. The ammunition supply and its service, both for infantry and artillery, demand especial attention, organization and drill, especially on the fighting lines, when in action, and should be in charge of officers selected for their capacity for this essential duty. The same may be said for the hospital service, and particularly for the stretchermen and their movements along the fighting lines.
Finally, I beg leave to add a single word upon the subject of the exercise and drill of the Naval Brigade. Upon this point I am in perfect accord with the very able prize essayist; I think that every word he says on the subject should be absorbed and digested. He has struck the right chord when he votes to abolish the "pomp and circumstance" of war, the charming dress parade and review for the edification of the admiring crowd. The precision of the manual, the correct alignment of the columns, the cadence or length of the step, are matters of absolute insignificance to the rank and file of the Naval Brigade, as compared to their accurate marksmanship, to their knowledge of the piece, including its mechanism and care, and above all, to their individuality as fighting men. We do not require exercise in the elaborate tactical movements of battalion drill; on the contrary, confine this part of the drill to the simplest movements in line, in column, and by the flank. The drill we need is a practical exercise in the field of the movement of such a force when actually in presence of the enemy, and this is best found in the skirmish line and its development to the front by successive reinforcement from the main body and reserve into the fighting and supporting lines of battle. This drill should be altogether by bugle and signal, never by oral command. Add to this drill one for landing on the beach in the face of fire, and another for returning to the boats under fire, with some exercises in advancing through an enemy's country, especially in heavy underbrush with the artillery, and a plan (which I have not yet seen well formulated) for street fighting, and I think we have enough food for powder and reflection without the dress parade and review. There should be no limit to the expenditure of blank cartridges. Commanding officers will find the success of such drills depends greatly upon the perfect understanding by each subordinate officer of the program of exercise, which should be copied off in full detail and distributed to the officers before the drill, and never changed even in the most trifling particular.
The exercises of the North Atlantic Fleet at present in progress at Newport is the most important departure in the right direction which the "young navy" has seen. The benefit which will follow to the entire service from these drills afloat and ashore I think is almost beyond estimate. Let us hope the autumnal maneuvers of the Home Squadron will become an established fact, and that all newly commissioned ships will be required to participate in them before leaving for distant stations. It will then indeed become, as it now promises to be, a fleet of application and a school of practice for the whole service.
The Chairman.—That subject was the very thing I was thinking about on my way down here. The necessity for uniformity is something that is most essential, and we can never get it until we have some home in the Department for the personnel. The attempt that was made two years ago to have a Bureau of Personnel was one which it seems to me must be carried out eventually if we are ever going to get anything in the shape that we want it. Now take this very question of the battalion on board ship, it is the nucleus of the Naval Brigade. Every ship that you go on board of has a different organization, according to the best lights of the executive officer and commanding officer together, and the result of the thing is, that where there are so many different people to do the thinking, of course you are going to have differences. Those differences ought to be reconciled.
I have long been thinking over the idea that the battalion organization of every ship should be like that of every other, of course within certain limits. The small ship and the big ship could not be made exactly alike, but they could be made nearly enough alike, so that of half a dozen vessels every one could put men on shore who would know right away where they were going and all about it. There is no reason, it seems to me, why here in the Department there should not be knowledge existing of the force on board every ship and the force that ship could throw on shore. Take at this present time the case of the Adams going to Samoa. I venture to say there is not an officer in the Department, from the Secretary down, who knows what force the Adams can put on shore when she gets there, how long they could stay there, or anything about it. If they do, they must have heard it from a private letter from there; certainly there is no official way of getting it.
It has occurred to me that, possibly, by adding to the Board of Inspection a number of officers, junior in rank to those now -there, men called upon to make and officer the organizations on board ships—in other words, lieutenant-commanders and lieutenants—that it would be practicable to get some sort of uniformity in regard to drill. Now the Board of Inspection require, as I understand, certain things to be done when they go to inspect—where they get the authority from I do not know, but they adhere pretty closely to the two that Mr. Stockton referred to, with occasional deviations. Agreeing very largely with what the senior officer thinks ought to be done. Therefore it seems to me of the first necessity that these matters should be straightened out, and it would very materially aid in the reorganization of the Department, or at least diminish in some measure the evils under which we are now laboring, till we can get some different way of managing things. I do not suppose there is an officer in the Navy, from the highest to the lowest, that would not gladly hail anything of that kind; I mean of course on our own side of the establishment. But there are some things that, in reading this essay very hastily, strike me as very good; here is one, "the absolute niceties of the service should be abolished in the drill of the battalion." It is a mystery to me why so much attention should be given to the seams of the trousers and all that sort of thing. There is another point that Mr. Hutchins refers to two or three times, and that is regarding the necessity of drilling the marines as boatmen. It seems to me absolutely necessary not only that the marines should pull their boats, but that every man on board the ship should know how to shoot a rifle and hit a target and also to pull an oar.
Lieutenant Staunton:—That is called for by existing regulations—not the oar part, but the other part—the small-arm drill and target practice.
The Chairman:—It has been now some three and a half years since I have been at sea and the material we had to deal with was pretty hard material to get any results from.
Lieutenant Staunton:—I believe you can teach any man to shoot fairly well if he can see. A man may be careless, or he may be nervous because he does not shoot enough to get over his nervousness; but he can be taught to shoot fairly well if sufficient time and attention are given to the subject.
The Chairman:—It seems to me that we have got to have a revolution in regard to the duties of the people on board ship. Servants are there now primarily to attend to the wants of the officers. Now, my theory is that that should be a secondary consideration, and the wants of the ship of primary importance. In the first place, there are entirely too many of them. The commanding officer has a staff of three. Why in the world one man wants three others to wait on him is a mystery to me; in the ward room, also, it seems to me there are altogether too many; it certainly takes four times as many as there would be on shore to do the same amount of work.
Ensign Rodgers:—Well, the work is different to a certain extent; you can't organize the work as you can on shore; it has all got to be done at once in a limited time.
The Chairman:—There is a certain amount of force in that objection.
Ensign Rodgers:—You don't get the same class of servants on board ship; it takes two or three times as many to do the work that a good servant would do on shore—the more you make sailors out of them the less use they are as servants. I would rather have one man in the ward room as a first class servant than two that could go aloft, perhaps, and furl a sail in a pinch, and pull an oar, and hit a target once in a while, but are of no use as servants.
The Chairman:—-That is quite right, it was the very point I was coming to. By reducing the number of servants and using them for nothing else, it would require a very small number to do the work ; it would not be necessary to have so many.
Ensign Rodgers:—The ships would not require so many if they were not called away so much. They are liable to be called away in the middle of their work for ship's routine, drills, etc. The cook is likely to be called on deck and leave his galley half a dozen times a day to send down royal yards, when he may not be of the slightest use and when the whole dinner may be depending upon him. I thing it is better to reduce the number of servants and have them for that service and no other.
The Chairman:—I don't see why one steward and two cooks could not run the galley for all the officers. But they should have nothing else to do. That should be their business, and then the number of servants who attend to the rooms could be very much less than it is now. If I am not mistaken, that is what they do in the English Navy; they have mess men and a cook, and their servants are generally marines who come in and clean up the rooms.
Ensign Rodgers:—I do not believe in that. I think it is bad for the men to occupy these positions. The essay speaks of the desirability of having a change in the drill. Unless I have been misinformed, when we sent the expeditionary force down to Panama, two years ago, the drill all went to pieces and the officers got up a little drill of their own on the mail steamers going down. It did very well while down there. I think this itself is a criticism on the whole business, that we have a drill which is more or less legalized, yet call half a hundred men together and they get up a little arrangement of their own altogether different.