Prize Essay for 1887
“In hoc signo vinces.”
I.—Organization.
To be successful in the landing of seamen and marines and in the operations on shore of the naval brigade, much will depend upon the previous system of organization and training of the personnel that will compose the force. The fact must not be lost sight of, that upon the amount of work in the care and preparation of the seaman to meet the requirements of detached service will his efficiency be measured.
To fulfill the demands of a hastily assembled fleet, with battalion organizations sometimes very dissimilar, and to unite the different ships' battalions into a homogeneous military force for landing, must, under the most favorable circumstances, prove a difficult task.
There has been, and probably always will be, some objection by naval men to the naval brigade and the landing of sailors for operations on shore. The legitimate sphere of the seaman being afloat, the landing of a naval force cannot be otherwise than incidental to the service. Any attempt to organize a ship's company with the infantry battalion as a basis would probably result in confusion and disaster; to return to the days of the Invincible Armada and fill our ships with soldiers would be folly.
Under our system of government and the growing opposition to a large standing army, it must be apparent to the most conservative that the naval brigade is a pressing necessity.
The demand for landing parties from our ships and fleets, both at home and abroad, was shown during the labor riots in this country in 1877, at Alexandria, Egypt, in 18S2, and more recently on the Isthmus of Panama in 1885. The organization and transportation to the Isthmus of Panama of a naval force in April of that year demands more than a passing notice. As a measure of quick despatch, economy, and the efficient work performed, the accomplishment of the desired results on this occasion was more than satisfactory, and a progressive and enterprising people like ours will never fail to lend support to a force which with the least expenditure of time and money accomplishes the desired work.
We still find some opposition on shipboard to-day among sailors to being landed as infantry; the growing and constant desire to turn the sailor completely into a soldier at these times, and his invariable opposition to this transformation, is the cause of want of success and lack of interest. But this opposition of the sailor may be easily overcome by judicious treatment, emulation, and a system of competition, not only between companies in ships' battalions, but between different ships; and with this interest once awakened, the regular landing day would be hailed with delight. No valid reason is apparent why the naval brigade should interfere with great guns or the marlinspike, if we stop what is known in the Navy to-day as show drills, theatrical in their effect and forced on the Navy by long custom. The absolute niceties of the soldier should be abolished in the drills of the ship's battalion. The time devoted to these unbusiness-like evolutions should be employed to some useful purpose, and the sailor not subjected to the strait-jacket drill every infantry day. Every ship's battalion should be landed frequently when in port, authorities and weather permitting. Once a week would not be too frequent for a cruising ship, and the brigade should be landed for several days in succession when the Admiral assembles his fleet for drill and inspection.
To land the naval brigade in opposition to well-organized and trained forces of infantry would not be expedient, but that a naval force would prove more than a match for any but regular soldiers none can doubt. For street fighting, the trained seaman may be considered quite equal to the regular soldier. The economy of time in the transportation of a naval brigade along the seaboard or on our large rivers, thus avoiding any opposition a force would meet with in having to pass through cities to destination by rail, and its being ever ready, must make such a force always a desirable one. What sailors can accomplish when landed to co-operate with an army was well illustrated during the Franco-Prussian war, by the French seamen at the siege of Paris as artillerymen, and at Le Bourget as infantrymen. England, with her small standing army, has of late years placed great reliance upon her naval brigade. The conduct of her sailors and marines in the Ashantee war of 1873, and in Egypt and the Soudan in 1884, merits the greatest praise. One of the most brilliant exploits of a naval force was the landing of the naval brigade of the French fleet and taking of Sfax in July, 1881, when the electric light and the 1 -pound Hotchkiss shell gun, mounted in ships' boats, were brought into use.
The Watch, Quarter, and Station Bills now supplied to all our naval vessels, call for a battalion with an officer to command called “Colonel Commanding,” also other necessary officers. The battalion is composed of, first, the artillery, with an officer to command, each piece being in charge of a junior officer with a quarter gunner. Then follows the marine guard, forming the first company; next, the seamen forming the other companies, and last, the pioneers. This arrangement appears to work fairly well in the service, though in some vessels there are ammunition passers and carriers, and stretchermen to care for the wounded.
The term naval brigade is now applied to the battalions of two or more ships brigaded together for the purpose of landing for operations on shore. In uniting the different battalions under one head, each ship's battalion should land and fall in together; no separation of the companies of a battalion should be allowed if it can be avoided. In forming the brigade for exercise and drill, the music should form on the right of the line; then should follow the artillery battalion; next in order the first battalion of infantry, made up of the first company of marines, “Co. A,” the second company of marines, “Co. B,” etc.; then the second battalion of infantry, made up of the first company of sailors, “ No. 1 “ company, the second company of sailors, “No. 2” company; next, the third battalion of infantry, and so on; and, last, pioneers and stretchermen—bearing in mind' that all the artillery of the force are to be kept together, as well as the companies of marines and the companies of sailors. Any division or breaking up of the full companies of marines, or of the companies composed of seamen of a ship's battalion, should not be thought of; men that are known to each other should be allowed to go into battle together and under their own company officers.
The great feeling of pride in one's own ship should be cultivated to the fullest extent, hence the necessity of keeping ships' battalions as intact as possible. In naming the companies, it will be seen that the marines have their companies distinguished by letters and the sailors their companies by numbers, which numbers in a ship's battalion are the same as those of their respective divisions, No. 1 company coming from the first division, and so on. Again, a numbered company would indicate that the company was composed oft seamen.
A company of infantry should be composed of 40 men, with 2 guides, 2 file-closers, and 2 ammunition passers and carriers — in all 46 men. Companies should not be too large and unwieldy; large companies could only be a question of economy of officers, and in this matter no navy to-day can afford to be wanting. A division should, if possible, furnish a company of infantry, except the master's division; and the company should be commanded by the division officer, one of the junior officers of the division being associated with him. In small ships this may not be at all times possible, but when unable to do so, the engineer's division would be merged in the powder division. The high-powered breech-loading rifle and rapid-firing cannon worked by small gun's crews must necessitate an increase in the number of men, and greater intelligence in the powder divisions of our ships, if they are to be efficient; servants and bandsmen will have to be eliminated and better men must take their places: therefore, with a more capable and much larger powder division, one infantry company could be selected from it in large ships. The chief aim must be to have the companies commanded by their own division officers, with whom they are familiar as well as known.
Too much stress cannot be laid upon the fact that the hasty assembling of a naval force for landing, under strange officers to command, can be but ill-advised. Officers should know the men who are to serve under them, and this can only be accomplished by organizing the force under the officers of the ships to which the men belong and to whom they are known. The commander of the naval brigade and his staff could come from any station or ship, but the company officers should come with the men from the same vessel. A writer on the naval expedition to the Isthmus of Panama in April, 1885, complains of the difficulty encountered under the present system of transfer papers in the selection of good men to fill ratings, especially in an emergency such as the hurried fitting out of an expedition. It will be seen that this difficulty can be avoided by landing men under command of the officers of their own ships. For another writer on the same subject, speaking of the landing of the naval brigade of the North Atlantic Squadron at Gardiner's Bay in August, 1884, with officers and men from the same vessels, says: “It was noticeable that the sergeants and corporals chosen from the petty officers and leading men performed their duties with intelligence and force. Another fact was apparent: the men who were most distinguished as seamen were, as a rule, more prompt and exact in their duties on shore.”
In every ship's battalion of two companies of infantry and one company of artillery there should be allowed four ammunition passers and carriers, four pioneers—composed of one blacksmith, one armorer, one carpenter, and one fireman—two stretchermen, one bugler, and two signalmen, with a bayman allowed to the medical officer. On drill days two markers and one drummer will land with the battalion; markers and drummers are of no use whatever in actual service, and should not be taken.
The officers of the ship's battalion would be as follows:
An officer (the Executive) to command battalion.
Company officers.
Adjutant.
Commissary, who will also act as Quartermaster.
Surgeon.
Gunner, with large battalions.
A Junior Officer, when Gunner is not allowed.
The commanding officer of the naval brigade should do his utmost to obtain a band; nothing adds so much to the pleasure of the men, nor aids more to make them contented and cheerful. The band should be armed with rifles and drilled; there are too many noncombatants on shipboard at the present day, and the sooner an effort is made to do away with this state of affairs the better for the service.
I unhesitatingly say that the powder division, engineer's force, music, and all servants, except perhaps the stewards and cooks, should be drilled in the use of the rifle; more particularly in the firings, loadings, and facings. A company of artillery should consist of 16 men, and the men selected for the pieces should come from the larger pivot guns or master's division; preferably the first four men from the latter, if they are accustomed to work and fight these guns on shipboard. The divisional officers from the pivot guns command the sections, junior officers the pieces.
The landing of artillery should generally be limited to the 3-inch breech-loading rifle, the Hotchkiss revolving cannon, the single barrel Hotchkiss, and the Gatling. Smooth-bore howitzers have had their day and they should not be landed. The guns should be manned by large crews, capable of taking with them plenty of ammunition. Too many guns should not be landed, as they hinder the movements of a force and are always a heavy burden. A naval brigade that is thoroughly organized and trained needs but few pieces of artillery. It can be said that we have arrived at that state in the Navy when we are unable to say just how many pieces of artillery should be landed. It would seem far better to land a few guns with large crews and plenty of ammunition; care being taken to keep similar guns together, so as to avoid confusion with the ammunition. Ammunition boxes and wagons should be painted the same color as the gun carriages and limbers, and they should also be numbered. It must be remembered in landing artillery that the nature of the service will always be a great consideration, as well as the difficulties to be encountered in transportation of ammunition for the rapid-firing cannon. All the artillery should have limbers, when 7 additional men would be added to each of the gun's crew, making a crew up to 23 men for gun and limber.
By reducing the number of guns and increasing the number of men in the crews, adding limbers to each gun to carry the large amount of ammunition now required, more efficiency will be gained, and about the same number of men would be landed in a ship's battalion. In small ships one piece of artillery should be landed with the battalion, in the larger ones two pieces. In combining the battalions of a fleet and forming the brigade, more guns would be found than necessary; but as the crews of two guns combined form one company, they could be landed as such if desired, from those ships that would under ordinary circumstances land two pieces of artillery with limbers.
The ordnance manual already requires that the crews of the howitzers and machine guns shall be united so as to form an infantry company and be drilled as such. At the present time, vessels in our service do not land men often enough as infantry. More arms should be supplied to vessels, and one company be selected from each of the powder and engineer's divisions in large ships, and in small ships one company from the two divisions combined. Then in a vessel of the Atlanta class we would have from the crew 2 companies, 92 men, and two guns and limbers, 46 men, 4 pioneers, 4 ammunition passers and carriers, 2 stretchermen, 2 signalmen, and 1 bayman, in all 151, out of a complement of 242 men, not including the marine guard, which would probably land 37 men, making a total of 188. After landing so large a number of men from a vessel of the Atlanta class, there would be left on board 3 men belonging to the marine guard, 26 men belonging to the main battery, 13 men belonging to the secondary battery, and 52 men belonging to the powder and engineer's division combined, total 94 men; a force, with the modern improvements on ships, still large enough to fight and work the vessel. One company of infantry would come from the main battery, one company from the powder and engineer's division combined, and two companies of artillery from the secondary battery, the men from the secondary battery being accustomed to work the machine guns.
The landing of so many men may be considered an innovation on the practice of the service, but it will be seen that the circumstances governing the work required of the ship during the absence of the battalion would decide if all of the force or a certain number of companies should be landed. If the artillery is landed without the limbers, large gun's crews would still be required to carry the ammunition for the machine guns. Still the necessity must be apparent to every one that both the howitzer rifles and machine guns should be fitted with limbers. The men selected to work the machine and rapid-firing guns should be carefully and well drilled, noted for their high standard of intelligence, coolness under fire, and specially alert; the first five men of the crew should be good marksmen, equally well trained. They should be armed and able to defend their guns in the event of a jam occurring in the mechanism and the enemy coming to close quarters. Care should be taken that the ammunition is not separated from the guns, and that guns of the same kind are kept together. Some of the machine guns of the English Naval Brigade in the Soudan failed at the most critical moment, and the failure of the machine guns in the French army during the Franco-German war was due to the want of men thoroughly trained in their use. The value of the machine gun cannot be overestimated, when it is properly served; and to serve the gun with any degree of success, constant and frequent drills must be carried on and the rapidity of fire determined by practice. Cartridges sometimes hang fire, and in the presence of an enemy, under excitement, fast firing might be a source of great danger; no pains should be spared in the instruction of the seamen in target firing, the most important of all drills in the Navy.
Combining the units, the ships' battalions, and forming the brigade, we would find, say with a force of twenty companies of infantry: ten pieces of artillery, total infantry 880 men; artillery, 230 men; there would be 40 ammunition passers and carriers, 30 pioneers, 25 stretchermen, 10 buglers, 8 signalmen, 1 master-at-arms or 1 ship's corporal, 15 cooks when in encampment, and 3 apothecaries. It will be seen that 10 pioneers have been eliminated in the combination, also 5 baymen and 12 signalmen. These men could be drawn from to fill vacancies, or be used to carry camp equipage, ammunition, and handling rations and stores, the signalmen leaving their kits behind; or they could be turned over to the beach-master at the landing place of the brigade.
The apothecaries and stretchermen, and they alone, are to care for the sick and wounded; and it must be impressed on the minds of the men that they are never to leave the ranks in battle to assist the wounded. Apothecaries, baymen and stretchermen, with the medical officers, are the non-combatants. Two medical officers should be allowed to the brigade, one being on the staff. An officer should be detailed as signal officer. One gunner would have charge of the ammunition for the infantry, and another of the ammunition for the artillery. A gunner or gunner's mate should be sent with every ship's battalion when landed. The gunner's mates, pack animals, ammunition, and ammunition carts, if provided, should all be under the command of a capable and energetic commissioned officer. Pioneers on the field of battle will assist the ammunition passers, and when the supply of ammunition is exhausted, both they and the ammunition passers and carriers should be ordered to take a rifle and cartridges from any wounded men and join the fighting line. To fill casualties among the ammunition passers and carriers, their places should be filled by men selected from the companies to which they belong. Two carpenters should be detailed with the pioneers.
Marines.—The legitimate duties of the marine corps being those that pertain to soldiering their organization, equipment and tactics should be all that can be desired. The guards of most vessels being of necessity very small, the combination of two or more is required to form an infantry company, which should be, if possible, numerically the same as a company of seamen. Signal being made, the different guards would be organized into companies with their officers on convenient ships of the assembled fleet, and landed in separate boats pulled by sailors. The companies of marines should be as near like the companies of seamen in their organization as circumstances will permit. Allowing 5 companies of marines in a brigade of total 25 companies of infantry, the 10 pioneers that have been eliminated in the combination could be detailed as ammunition passers and carriers, and 5 baymen as stretchermen.
The total force of marines—5 companies—would be 220 men rank and file, 10 ammunition passers and carriers, 5 stretchermen and 5 buglers.
Officers.—One officer of suitable rank to command battalion.
Adjutant.
One Aide.
Five Captains of companies.
Five Lieutenants of companies.
Intelligence Staff.—Much attention should be given to obtaining information of the movements, plans, and the number of the enemy. To obtain all possible information without the enemy being aware of the fact is a great point gained in actual warfare.
An Intelligence Staff, selected, if desired, from the intelligence officers of the fleet, should land with the brigade. When an expedition is fitted out and sails from the United States, this staff could come from the Naval Intelligence Office, Washington. This staff should be composed of two officers with their outfit and necessary assistants, their strength depending very much upon the mission they are to fulfill. They should come under the immediate command of the Adjutant General of the brigade or Chief of Staff. Their duties must not be confounded with the duties of the signal staff, the work of the latter pertaining more to keeping up constant communication between reconnoitering parties and the main body, or between the main body and fleet. No matter how small the force, an intelligence officer should accompany the landing party. The great necessity for such a Staff was shown at Alexandria, Egypt, during the bombardment of that city by the English fleet, 1882, and more particularly after the landing of the English naval brigade.
The frequent preparation of the English landing force for a threatened attack, and unreliable information as to the movements and whereabouts of the enemy, very much crippled their force thrown on shore there to protect the city, costing loss of life and very considerable loss of property by fire.
The Field and Staff Officers of the naval brigade should be as follows:
An officer of suitable rank to command the brigade.
An officer to command each battalion, and one aide.
Brigade Staff.—One Adjutant General (also Chief of Staff).
One Ordnance Officer, who also acts as Military Engineer.
One Quartermaster and Commissary.
One Signal Officer.
One Surgeon.
Two Aides to commander of brigade.
Intelligence Staff.—Two officers.
Sanitary Precautions.—In spite of science and modern inventions to destroy men in battle, the fact still remains that disease carries off more men than all other causes together. No pains should therefore be spared to provide for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded. When not in the presence of an enemy, the first consideration in pitching a camp should be sanitary conditions of the ground.
A code of instructions guarding against prevalent diseases, and emanating from the senior medical officer of the brigade, should be followed as closely as possible. Men should sleep in their shirts and drawers, their shoes, stockings and outer clothing being removed. In throwing up entrenchments and bivouacking on new-made ground, the health of the officers and men will be greatly increased if they have something to sleep on. The ventilation of tents should be carefully attended to and no crowding be permitted. When in encampment, tents should be struck frequently in fine weather to allow the sun to dry the ground occupied by them. No orders preventing men from committing nuisances in camp can be too strict. In entering on an expedition, if possible, such seasons of the year should be selected as will favor the health of the men: and it would be well to bear in mind the frequent moving of the brigade to new camping grounds. A very liberal supply of medicines and food should be provided for the sick and wounded.
It cannot be doubted for an instant that we are sadly in need of transport vessels for use of both the Army and Navy. After the landing of a naval force from transports, the vessels could be used as a base of supplies and for hospitals.
In the preparation of orders for the brigade the following points should be well considered, the commander of the brigade defining the duties and responsibilities of each officer, and his subordinates:
1st. Object of expedition and probable length of time on shore.
2d. Number of each arm of the service, infantry and artillery, to be landed.
3d. Rendezvous for boats.
4th. Map of “order before landing,” with the position of each boat and covering vessel marked thereon.
5th. Number of covering vessels.
6th. Name of ordnance vessel, hospital ship, provision ship.
7th. Number of artillery boats to assist to clear beach and not to land.
8th. What articles each boat is to carry.
9th. Number of days' provisions men are to carry.
10th. Number of battalions and by whom commanded.
11th. Officer to command at beach.
12th. Number of rounds of ammunition that each man is to carry.
13th. Amount of spare ammunition required.
14th. The distance of objects on shore from the beach, for use of covering vessels and artillery boats.
15th. Order of formation of the line of battle on shore.
16th. What men are to carry, provisions, ammunition, clothing, etc., and what articles are to be left in the boats.
17th. If spare ammunition, water, stoves, etc., are to be landed from covering vessels or to be kept in boats at landing.
18th. If entrenchments are to be thrown up by beach-master, and if he is to have any of the heavy guns landed for armament.
19th. State of tide, depth of water, and the nature of the bottom.
The commanding officer of the brigade should receive his orders in writing from the admiral, or senior officer present, or when an expedition sails from the United States, from the Secretary of the Navy; but he should not be hampered by instructions and petty details in the former case.
The battalion commanders and the beach-master should receive their orders or instructions from the commander of the brigade, through the chief of staff, or adjutant general, and in no other
II.—Equipment.
The equipment of sailors landed from our ships for operations on shore should not be a matter of individual whim or fancy. There should be no sparing of criticism until we have attained uniformity in the combination of the guns' crews and the battalions of a fleet of vessels meeting even for the first time. The breech-loading magazine rifle, with which every naval brigade should now be equipped, brings before us the problem of the supply of ammunition to the fighting line.
Firings will begin at longer distances, and with the continued advance at the most critical moment the men may be without ammunition; to guard against such a catastrophe will be one of the most difficult services required of us. To meet this requirement a considerable force will be wanted to carry and pass ammunition, which can only be attained by reducing the size of the infantry companies. On an extended march horses and wagons would have to be pressed into service, when the ammunition passers and carriers would make up the ammunition train, converting any wagons obtained into ammunition wagons. A small wagon, fitted for one horse, and also with a drag-rope, the wheels being the same as those for the artillery wagons, should be furnished each ship in the service that would land two companies of infantry and one piece of artillery. This wagon would be used for the transportation of extra ammunition, mess gear or camp equipage. Ammunition passers and carriers will always be a necessity, either to carry ammunition on the march or to supply the fighting line in battle. There appears to be a considerable difference of opinion as to how the naval brigade should be armed, but the weight of authority would seem to favor arming every man with a rifle that could carry one. In the artillery companies the first 7 men of the guns' crews should be armed with large-size navy revolvers of the latest pattern. Cutlasses should be discarded, as they are of no earthly use; the remaining men at the gun should be armed with rifles. Should limbers be landed with guns, 1 3 men would go with the gun and 10 men with the limber. In fitting limbers for the artillery the wheels should be exactly the same as those for the gun carriage, being interchangeable; all wheels to have broad treads, that they may be serviceable in sandy and marshy ground. The first 3 men of each limber's crew are to be armed with revolvers and the others with rifles, all rifles to be fitted -with slings to go over men's backs. In case of a jam in the mechanism of a piece which would render it liable to be taken by an enemy, the riflemen would be prepared to prevent a capture. By introducing light shields the fighting power of the artillery might be improved. Shields weighing about 5 pounds to the square foot could be fitted to the gun carriages, and admit of easy transportation. Pioneers will be armed with large-size navy revolvers, and carry implements for entrenching and cutting road-ways. Every man armed with a rifle, except men belonging to the artillery, should carry 80 rounds of ammunition. In the artillery the men armed with rifles will carry 40 rounds, and those armed with revolvers 60 rounds of ammunition.
Two orders of marching will be used in this paper, Light Marching Order and Heavy Marching Order. I have given the amount of ammunition to be carried by the latter; the former would carry half of this amount, as seen in the accompanying tables. These two “marching orders” should be used throughout the service, and the articles to be carried in each should be specified in the orders of the fleet, that it may be known on each ship how her battalion is to be equipped on receiving a signal to land.
Officers should be armed with a sword and revolver—large size—though it may be a question open to discussion if the days of the former are not numbered. The sword as a badge of office may serve its purpose, but for actual war it is a useless appendage. An improved magazine gun fitted with slings, and not too heavy, would be very useful for all officers of companies.
The sword bayonet is too heavy and clumsy; a light, well-made bayonet should be supplied. Cartridge boxes, belts, and pouches for carrying ammunition should have straps to support them from the shoulders; when not supplied, the straps can be made on shipboard of canvas, crossed at the back like suspenders. The handiest belt now in use for carrying cartridges is the Mills web belt, which seems to answer every purpose in the Army, when the one that is worn around the waist is fitted with shoulder straps. Extra belts can be filled with cartridges and packed away in canvas bags to be served out in an emergency. The emergency having passed, they would be turned in again. These extra belts should be worn over the left shoulder. Every officer and man should carry a blanket; the men's blankets should be rolled in a canvas or waterproof sheet strapped together and slung over the left shoulder and retained there by a loop. Rolled in the blanket should be a woolen shirt, a pair of woolen stockings, and a towel.
There is no reason why men should not be furnished with light canvas knapsacks for carrying blankets and clothing; experience teaches us that without them there is little comfort either in the camp or on the march. Canteens should be carried by every one; if unable to obtain them, common bottles covered with canvas and fitted with slings will carry sufficient drinking water. Every man will carry a mess pan, pot and spoon slung to his belt or in his knapsack.
Ships' sails and the boats' sails make very good tents; capstan bars, boats' masts and oars being used for tent poles. For a prolonged stay on shore, application for tents to be supplied from the Army would be better; though there is no reason why each vessel in the Navy should not carry several tents instead of so many useless and spare sails.
The ammunition passers and carriers should be equipped each with two canvas bags, one worn over each shoulder; the bags containing 100 rounds of ammunition each, and weighing 11 pounds; this would give 22 pounds weight to each carrier. Should no pack animals or carts be available for the spare ammunition, large ammunition bags would be required, each one capable of holding two of the smaller bags—200 rounds. These large bags will be strapped with leather, each strap having two loops or rings, through which should be run poles; the poles should also have wide straps a short distance from the ends to go over the carriers' shoulders, and of the proper length to permit them to be grasped by the hands. The total weight for two men to carry would be 46 pounds (400 rounds of ammunition). Ammunition passers and carriers are not armed. Buglers and signalmen will be armed with rifles fitted with leather slings. Signalmen will also carry kits. All the medical force should wear the red Geneva cross and carry a flag (white with red cross), to be displayed from any field hospital or building that may be in use. None of the force will be armed except the medical officers, who will wear their swords only. The master-at-arms and ship's corporal will be armed with the navy revolver and carry 20 rounds of ammunition each.
Dress.—Officers' dress should be the uniform blouse; underneath the blouse a strap should cross the body, passing over the right shoulder to support the sword; woolen shirt, blue trousers, and brown leggings fitted with a lacing—buckles are a nuisance.
The head-dress for both officers and men should be the uniform cap, and in hot climates the helmet and canvas hat; a curtain to shade the back of the neck would also be useful. Every one should wear brown leggings that come well above the calf of the leg so that they cannot slip down. White short leggings may look well on drill, but in active service they are liable to slip down when wet, and they also make a good target for the enemy.
The new white canvas hat now issued to the men should be dyed brown for active service on shore. Everybody should have two undershirts and two pairs of socks—underclothing and stockings should be of wool—woolen stockings are indispensable on the march. If necessary, officers should provide themselves with overcoats and the men with pea-coats; and each should have a piece of painted canvas or waterproof sheet to sleep on. When tents are carried, a ship's tarpaulin thrown on the ground makes an admirable bed. When transportation can be obtained, officers' and men's effects could be carried in ship's bags that will keep out the water; one bag to an officer, and one to every three men, the latter messing and sleeping together.
Officers and men should bear in mind that any white articles of dress are conspicuous marks and are sure to draw the fire of an enemy's riflemen.
The brigade commander and staff should be mounted, if horses are obtainable, as also the commanding officers of battalions and staff. When the brigade is under fire all mounted officers would dismount.
Gun-cotton or some kindred explosive should be supplied to ships, and issued to the landing force for the purpose of blowing up buildings, furnished in 20 or 25 pound kegs, with outfit for firing. In the defense of buildings, or of an entrenched position hastily taken on landing—anticipating an attack—by placing several kegs of explosive material at the points most likely to be assailed, great assistance would be given to the defense. Gun-cotton was used with good effect at Alexandria, Egypt, by the English naval brigade to destroy buildings and prevent the spread of the terrible conflagration that raged after the bombardment of that city in July, 1882; while the attempt of the American fleet to land powder in tanks and carry it through the streets with burning buildings on either side was not a success—in point of fact, the attempt was abandoned.
Armed Cars.—It may frequently occur that armed railroad cars can be made use of by landing parties, such as flat cars fitted for carrying light guns, with boiler plates and sand bags for the protection of the crews.
When a force is landed to occupy a city, or no march is contemplated, 100 rounds of ammunition should be carried by the infantry, and 80 rounds of revolver ammunition by the artillery.
Marines.
The arms and ammunition of the marines should be the same as furnished to the seamen—the latest improved magazine gun. The arm now furnished to the Marine Corps is a pattern of bygone days, also the cartridge box. Why this well-trained corps should be so armed and equipped ought to be a question for immediate consideration. The marines should wear brown leggings, and their helmets should be brown or dark gray in color, for service in the field; white belts should be discarded for active service. The arms for the marines should have dark leather slings attached, and each man should carry 80 rounds of ammunition, except when landed for short service, when 100 rounds per man should be carried and the Mills web belt used.
Here I want to emphasize the importance of frequently landing the brigade fully equipped. When the brigade is encamped for drill and instruction, cooks will be sent from ships, and they will be under charge of the master-at-arms or the ship's corporal.
Rations.
The quality of the U. S. Navy regulation ration as now served out on ships is excellent. It frequently happens that there is not time to cook food on shipboard when the landing party is called away, and once on shore it may not be possible to go into camp at meal times. Some form of food like the Bologna sausage should therefore be added to the ration, and put up in packages for landing parties. The Navy ration as now put up is in too large packages which are not easily handled. When articles are served out to a small number of men there is great waste.
Articles like pork, beef, beans, sugar, rice, etc., should be put up in ¼ and ½ barrels. Other articles of the ration should be put up in small boxes that one man could handle easily, marked “Landing Party,” and kept ready for issue. The greatest care must be given to the drinking water, and when the water is bad, weak cold tea or coffee should be carried in the canteen. At these times an extra allowance of tea or coffee should be served out to the brigade, the former being preferable in hot climates.
III.—Tactics.
The conditions of modern warfare having changed the movements of troops in actual battle, we must eliminate from the infantry tactics everything that is not suited to these modern conditions. There is a great cry at the present time for an immediate change in our tactics. It would appear that there are not so many changes demanded by the modern conditions of war, but that a confusion of ter.ms has arisen in the application of the words tactics and science. Infantry tacticians seem to be of one accord that extended formations are necessary, and that night attacks will be more common, if we would provide against the destructive effects of an enemy's magazine rifles. Instead of masses marching in close formation, a loose order of fighting will have to be adopted, the aim being individual action, with all working to gain a common end. The axioms of the day are that “troops once engaged they cannot be relieved, and they must always be rallied to the front.” I will not attempt to go into the much-vexed question of the hour, how to close with your enemy without being so badly cut to pieces or so depleted by losses that any attempts to charge him would be idiotic; the greatest military writers of the day have failed to solve this question, and it is one that pertains more to the science of war. The first line of battle being formed by the skirmishers pushing forward, the supports would be gradually absorbed by this first line, when the main body of infantry and artillery would advance.
It is questionable if much is gained, except when advancing on a strongly entrenched position, by what has been so frequently advocated in the past few years, advancing by rushes. Running heats the blood and makes the nerves unsteady; firing under these conditions is a waste of ammunition and encourages the enemy. When advancing on the enemy, good marksmanship is sought after, and with running the conditions are unfavorable.
At Tel-el-Kebir the English Royal Marines advanced by rushes, and, as a result, were beaten into the enemy's works by another battalion that never stopped after once taking up the rapid advance, carrying everything with them. It is impossible to lay down a positive rule; we must be governed by circumstances and the capabilities of the enemy.
The sailor possesses some of the highest of the qualities required by the tactics of the present day, and we should train him to develop these qualities to the utmost degree. Stiffness and regularity of movement are in direct contrast with his every-day life, and only that part of the manual of arms which would be required on the field of battle should be taught to him. Of what use is “Present arms,” “Reverse arms,” “Rest on arms,” etc.? It is a waste of valuable time to teach these movements to the seaman. The “Position of the soldier” and “Setting up” drill, found in Upton's Tactics—and this would probably apply to any tactics—should not be imposed upon the seaman. It is simply absurd to talk to the sailor about “the little finger behind the seam of the trousers “; too great precision and uniformity of movement should not be required. When not marching, pieces should be invariably at an “order,” and any order for a forward movement would be the signal to bring them to a “carry.” All facings should be done with pieces at an “order,” and thus avoid tiring the men with their constant weight. In moving to the attack, pieces should be brought to the position of “Arms port,” a convenient position to take the “Ready” from, the piece and arms at the same time affording a considerable protection to the body. The position of the piece at “Arms port,” in company or platoon front for clearing streets and forcing back a mob, is in common use; but it is a mistaken idea to use gentle measures when dealing with mobs. Nothing takes the nerve out of the proverbially cowardly mob so quick as the bayonet. The “Level trail” with the arms hanging naturally, so much used in England, is a very convenient way to carry the rifle while marching in column. Marching in line, the rear rank will open out one pace.
It is almost impossible for a sailor to learn so many bugle calls in the short time devoted to infantry drill; even the officers do not acquire them. “Advance,” “Retreat,” “Halt,” “Fire,” “Load,” “Cease firing,” “ Assemble,” “Charge,” are all that are required; and they should be sounded frequently, that the men may be made accustomed to them. Ships' boats might be named “Advance,” “Retreat,” etc., and called away by bugle with these names. Should a boat be wanted while at general quarters, the boatswain's whistle would be used and the boat called away by name.
I am an advocate of the whistle for company officers. On the skirmish line it would be indispensable; and as the calls are very easily acquired and familiar to the sailor, the whistle or boatswain's call would serve the purpose better than the bugle. All pieces should have dark leather slings and the men should be accustomed to their use when firing.
In Upton's Tactics we should do away in the manual with “Present arms,” “Secure arms,” “Rest on arms,” “Reverse arms,” and “Support arms.” “Carry arms” should take the place of “Present arms” in saluting. The heavy infantry “support” should be used, as it is adapted to the bolt-gun, which has no projecting hammer. At the order “Halt,” when marching under arms, pieces should be brought to an “order arms” without further delay.
The strict drill of the soldier has for its object the disciplining of the men, that implicit obedience to orders may at all times be expected and obtained. The sailor having therefore been educated up to this implicit obedience on that most excellent parade-ground, the quarterdeck, why devote further time to his discipline at the risk of breaking his spirit of independence, which is now so much sought after in the new school of fighting men demanded by the open fighting formation. Better to teach men to be marksmen with no instruction in tactics, than to have a dress-parade sailor with no idea how to load and fire his piece, not to mention sighting at an object 500 yards away.
I have attempted to enumerate some of the changes in the manual of arms that would benefit the brigade under our present system of training. The adoption by the Navy of the U. S. Army Tactics, of whatever system it may be, will always be a necessary consequence; but the manual for the Navy must be suited to the arm, as well as to the sailor; the tactics for both Army and Navy being the same. Slight changes in the manual as at present given us in Upton's Tactics could be made with much good resulting there from; but these changes should be closely followed by every ship in the service, all adhering to the same drill. Marching in company front and the attempt to imitate the solid wall may receive the applause of the public; but to gain such results, what a sacrifice of valuable time that should have been devoted first to the loadings and firings, and second to the skirmish drill
Constant drilling of the company with small intervals between files, sighting and firing the piece, with the expenditure of plenty of small arm ammunition at target practice, is a necessity that must be apparent to all.
In deploying the modern fighting line, Upton's Tactics under the head of “To deploy the battalion as skirmishers by numbers,” the battalion being in line, commends itself. To deploy from column, a certain number (specified) of companies would move to the right front into line, and a certain number (specified) to the left front into line. The deployment of infantry on the march from column should of course be carried out before the fire of the enemy's artillery has begun to tell on the ranks.
Under the present system of musketry instruction, the Navy has no field-firing to speak of, particularly when men are attached to seagoing ships. The time has come for an immediate change, not only that the naval brigade may be efficient, but that riflemen stationed in the tops and about ships' decks in battle may fire with accuracy. In this particular we could take pattern from the Army and have more rifle-range firing. Seamen are supplied with as good fire-arms as science can produce; but however excellent these arms may be, in the hands of unskilled marksmen no effective work can be performed. The men should be taught at the different Receiving Ships, both in rifle and machine gun firing.
If the time devoted to cleaning bright-work on shipboard were taken up in teaching the crew aiming drill and file-firing exercise, we would have more efficient marksmen in the service, and necessarily more effective crews. Bright-work should be painted out, covered with canvas, or anything to get rid of it in a ship—its cost is not a subject for this paper.
Any unseemly haste to rush through the small-arm target practice in cruising ships is absolutely indefensible. And though we are much in want of a system of rifle range practice with small arms, still it lies in the power of a commander of a fleet to send his battalions ashore to compete for prizes and medals at the range when he assembles the vessels for their annual drills and inspections. At these contests, individual competition should be paramount and the marksmen be encouraged in their work.
In seagoing ships the officer of the deck in the afternoon watch should be relieved by a junior, when he would drill his company in the loadings and firings with the dummy cartridges. Cartridge boxes or belts should be filled and several rounds fired, to ascertain just what the men are capable of doing. On an examination of the pieces and the boxes or belts after each ten or fifteen rounds fired, and before the dummies are gathered from the deck by the quartergunner, the effectiveness of the firing drill would be known. This would not only accustom the men to be expert in the loadings and firings, but familiarize them with the breech mechanism of the piece. The rough usage to which the mechanism of all breechloading firearms is subjected in service on shore calls for special attention to its care if the arms are to be kept in a serviceable condition. Arms and ammunition should be examined very frequently. Officers and men should be made familiar with all the parts of the magazine guns, and understand which parts are most likely to be rendered unserviceable. The men should be thoroughly taught the working of the breech mechanism, and when landed in the brigade, should frequently examine the gun and ammunition to see if the parts of the former are in good working order and that the ammunition is clean and fit for use. On fitting out an expedition, great pains should be taken to examine the ammunition, to see that it will fit the arms for which it is supplied. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the minds of drill officers that all drills not fitting the seaman for battle should be abolished, the manual should be the simplest possible and adapted to the requirements of the service.
When we realize it is claimed that the modern arm in the hands of fairly drilled men requires the discharge from it of nearly twice the mean weight of a man in lead before it effects his death, we cannot be too careful in our firing instructions. In firing, if any control is to be obtained over a command, the order “five rounds “ or “ten rounds rapid fire “ should be used. Under the head of fire discipline, I quote from General Von Kraft of the German army, who is authority on this important subject: “I have often remarked how much fire discipline is weakened in action when the element of danger makes itself sensible. Troops imperfectly trained do not aim, they do not even fire, they only let off their pieces. But how much more trouble is required before we can train the infantry soldier to pay attention to orders and signals during all the excitement of battle, to observe the object to be aimed at, the sight and mode of firing to be used, and to cease firing when the specified number of rounds has been expended But if, as we have remarked, soldiers must already attain to a certain pitch of fire discipline before you can be sure of getting them even to bring their rifles to the shoulder in battle, how much greater pains must be taken before you can get them to take aim When firing once begins men get easily out of hand unless restrained by an iron discipline It is but human nature that a soldier should derive some comfort from the noise made by his own gun when it goes off. The more raw the soldier the more will he be inclined to 'shoot himself into courage.’.... Taking such facts into consideration, we cannot help doubting whether the order ' Five rounds rapid fire ' when given at close quarters, say 300 yards, will be attended to.”
The Elementary Light Artillery Tactics as now taught at the Naval School, Annapolis, and generally throughout the service, appear to be all that is desired. The men should not carry bayonets and cutlasses, and the drill should be completed for the gun with limber, and the crew increased to 23 men, if we would guard against the new dangers to which artillery is exposed by the development of rifle fire and the difficulties encountered in the supply of ammunition. In the Elementary Tactics we must confine ourselves to one system of drills—and there are many good systems—for all the service, eliminating everything not tending to efficiency on the field of battle. The modern conditions of war demand that for Grand Tactics the movements of guns in battle must be at a “double.” This fact is supported by the field movements in action of European artillery, which require the guns to be moved by horses at a run. By doing away with cutlasses and bayonets, the former being liable to get between the men's legs, not to speak of the extra weight and general uselessness of both, the guns' crews are as near flying-light as it is possible to make them, and at the same time they retain their efficiency, care being taken not to bring guns into action without infantry supports in advance.
Wishing to emphasize what has been said before, I would again call attention to the necessity of simple and effective drills in both the artillery and infantry, and the avoidance of ceremonies that belong to the parade-soldier. As little time as possible should be devoted to dress parades.
The Disembarkation and Landing of the Naval Brigade.
In the disembarkation of the brigade great care and attention should be given to the boat organization. Each company of infantry (seamen) should land in the two ships' boats belonging to the division of which the company forms a part; being at all times accustomed to go in these boats, there will be no confusion. The larger boat will be in charge of the captain of the company—the lieutenant of the division—a junior officer of the division being in charge of the smaller boat. These two boats must always keep together, the larger one being on the right, and in forming the “order before landing,” must take the same relative position in the line as the company holds in the brigade when formed on the beach.
The rifle howitzers and machine guns will go in the heavy boats. Three or four hammocks placed in the bows of boats, about the pedestal for the revolving cannon, would be a great protection to the crews of the guns in action. The marines will land in separate boats pulled by sailors, the latter being detailed from companies belonging to the reserve; though, with a system of boat drill in this corps, the marines could in a short time manage their own boats. A company of marines with their officers should be assigned to two boats, the boats keeping together.
The boat divisions in the “order before landing “will be commanded by the battalion commanders, each battalion forming one division of boats. The senior officer's boat of each division should have a mast, from which signals should be made and repeated ; and should also carry signal books, spyglass, and a box containing medical supplies and outfit. Each boat must be provided with a signal book and answering pennant.
Each division of boats should have a distinguishing flag, and each boat should be numbered in the “ order before landing” from right to left consecutive, 1, 2, 3, etc., commencing on the right of the skirmishing boats down the line, then to the right of the main body down that line, and the same way with the reserve and hospital boats. The artillery boats should be lettered from right to left, A, B, C, etc., to distinguish them from the other boats. Boats should have their numbers and letters painted on canvas, large size, and nailed to the stern and both bows; if possible, the numbers of the same color as the divisional flags. Each boat must carry an anchor and chain or rope, and in landing the boats must anchor by the stern, going ashore bows first.
It adds considerably to the comfort of a landing party if they can get on shore dry-shod, and to do this gang-boards could be carried slung over the gunwales of the boats underneath the oars; spare pieces of lumber found on shipboard and the carpenter's bench could be utilized for this purpose. Each boat should carry a bucket for bailing, materials for stopping shot holes, and a breaker of water. Intrenching tools, rope ladders, etc., should also be distributed among boats. Boats will carry their own ammunition. Spare ammunition and extra belts for the infantry will be carried in boxes—it might be more convenient to carry the latter in canvas bags. Empty powder tanks carried in boats make good magazines for the storage of ammunition when it is put up in canvas bags. The amount of ammunition will depend upon the nature of the service.
Before undertaking an expedition, proper means for the transportation of ammunition supplies, camp equipage, etc., should be provided by the quartermaster. Improvised means of transportation with carts made on shipboard should be the last resort, for they seldom answer the purpose required of them. Life rafts, or temporary rafts, are very convenient for landing, and a great assistance in getting ammunition and supplies on shore. No pains should be spared to land men and outfit dry.
If transportation is to be obtained and a lengthened stay on shore is to be made in encampment, boats should carry stoves, one for every two companies of infantry or four companies of artillery ; also two scouse kettles and four mess kettles, sails and spars for tents, provisions and water.
It must be borne in mind that the nature of the service to be performed governs the preparations of the naval brigade. The more distant the service from the base of supplies, and the longer the Stay, the more the brigade must be governed in its movements by the rules laid down for a brigade of infantry; and those who would study this interesting subject are referred to that admirable work, “ The Soldier's Pocket-Book,” by Lieutenant General Sir G. J. Wolseley.
The light-draft vessels should anchor near beach to protect the landing, and also act as a base for supplies. They should keep as near to landing party during the time the force is on shore as the depth of water will permit, one vessel being used for the ordnance boat and another for provisions and hospital. Several of the vessels that are to cover landing should be provided with electric search lights. Should the landing be made in the night time it would be well to have three covering vessels with search lights, one on either flank and the other behind the centre of the “order before landing.” These vessels would keep out of the effective range of shore batteries, or move about, altering their range and position frequently. They would light up the beach with their electric lights, and the landing force would approach the shore in the dark zones between the lights, so as not to be seen by the enemy. The brigade once landed, the search lights would be used to light up the country in the direction of the enemy, and good lookouts stationed aloft would report any suspicious movements, when signal would be made to the force on shore.
In forming the “order before landing” (see Plate I.) each boat should take the station assigned it in the organization; the presumption is that every officer has been made acquainted with all the details of the organization both before and after landing. When the distance to the shore is great, boats should be towed to a convenient place from the landing and out of range. The boats mounting the heavier guns of the artillery will be on the extreme flanks of the “order before landing,” and next to them the light guns; all the artillery boats in echelon formation, with the main body of the infantry between. Two boats' length in advance of the centre of the main body of infantry, the skirmishers in light fast boats should be massed, with a few machine guns on the flanks, if desired.
The skirmishers, generally speaking, would be taken from the companies of marines. The reserve will be in the third line in rear of main body, and it would consist of about one-sixth of whole force; they are not to land until main body is well established on shore and has moved back from the beach. The hospital boats will be three boats' lengths in rear of centre of main body of infantry. These boats will be pulled by the stretchermen, and they should be light single banked boats, containing medical officers and outfit, flying the hospital flag. Hospital boats will land with the main body of infantry, under charge of the medical officers and under orders of the chief of staff. The first line—skirmishers—should be two boats' lengths apart. The second line, main body, two boats' lengths in rear of skirmishers and one boat's length apart. The third line, reserve, three boats' lengths in rear of main body and one boat's length apart. The hospital boats in rear of centre of main body three boats' lengths, and in pairs one boat's length apart. If there should be opposition to the landing of the brigade, the beach would be cleared by the covering vessels and artillery, and in the event of a heavy fire being directed on the boats it may be necessary to open out the “order before landing “ and land on a more extended front. Signal being made by the commander of the brigade, the skirmishers will pull in and land, deploying as soon as landed, taking advantage of such shelter as the ground may offer, after which, signal would be made for main body to land with light machine guns, followed by rest of artillery. The main body having advanced from the beach, the reserve would land.
If it be not the intention that the brigade should remain on shore, any length of time, the landing once effected, to the larger boats with artillery four boat-keepers will be allowed, and to the smaller ones two boat-keepers. The boat-keepers will have their boats out to their anchors after landing, turning the boats' bows out with stern lines to the beach, one man remaining in each boat to veer in when ordered. The boat-keepers are in excess of the number of men allowed to each company. All the artillery boats should be prepared to mount and fight their guns in the sterns of boats, though this might not be possible with the steam launches.
Each division of boats should be careful to keep together in their assigned places with the division flag displayed, one of the boats in each division displaying the flag from its mast. Always being prepared to embark under fire of an enemy, each division of boats will be under charge of an officer, with an officer selected to command on the beach, styled beach-master. The beach-master will have charge of all the boats and force left at the beach, and he will see that the boats are in readiness to embark all the brigade at a moment's notice. He will keep up communication by signal or otherwise with the covering vessels, and if possible with the main force. Such precautions as seizing any commanding position and throwing up breastworks would be performed by the beach-master. To prevent surprise, he should throw out a picket, and when circumstances require it, a squad of petty officers should be added to his force.
The preparations for embarking having been carefully attended to, on the approach of the brigade the boats will drop in near the beach. If the brigade is pursued by the enemy, entrenchments thrown up by the beach party will be manned, and a few pieces of artillery will be left with the infantry to keep back the enemy. While the main portion of the brigade is embarking, the covering vessels and artillery will keep up a cross fire on the beach until all the force has embarked, the skirmishers being the last to leave the beach.
In the disembarkation, many points come under consideration which require much thought and experience; such as the amount of opposition to be met with from the enemy on landing, the nature of the country, length and character of beach, depth of water and state of the tide. A low, broad, convex beach affords the safest place for the brigade to land, if opposition is to be met with from the enemy. If possible to obtain a chart of the landing place, no disembarkation should be made without one. This chart should show depth of water, character of bottom, and time of high and low water. Each commanding officer of a division or battalion and the beach-master should have a copy of this chart, with the state of the tide marked on it for the time of landing. It should also show the “order before landing” of the boats and the position of the covering vessels.
Marines.—The tactics of the marine corps being the tactics adopted for the United States army, the marines would assemble with the seamen in the brigade, with no confusion to the latter. The manual of the corps should be the same as that taught to the seamen in all their drills and service with the naval brigade; uniformity in the brigade must be sought after and obtained, and the smaller factor must give way.
All the officers and men of the marine corps should be instructed in the handling of machine guns both afloat and ashore. At the present time the marines suffer for want of experience at the rifle range. They are not landed as often as they should be for instruction in tai-get practice and open-order fighting. If capable of pulling their own boats, they would be independent in their transportation to and from ships.
Marches.—When no opposition has been made to the landing of the naval brigade, a reconnaissance must be made to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, the nature of the reconnaissance depending on the kind of information desired.
If proper care has been taken in fitting out the expedition, charts of the country will have been supplied, with cities, towns, villages, direction of roads, streams, etc., and any high land marked on them, also a weather map and almanac to date. These charts would, if it were possible, have been prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence at Washington, otherwise by the commander of the expedition. Some idea of the country, its inhabitants, the wet and dry seasons, food, animals, etc., must first be obtained before an advance is made into the interior. The commander of the expedition will decide how the march is to be taken up, bearing in mind that a large force divided into two columns will march faster than in single column and with less fatigue to the men. It is also more easily deployed into line of battle; the maxim is, “separate for marching, unite for battle.” In the formation of the order of march, guns and ammunition should be so placed in the column or columns that, upon falling in with the enemy, they would be in such position where most likely to be wanted. The time required to come up with the enemy would determine the formation of the order of march. Assuming that you are within striking distance of the enemy, and that a fight with him may take place at any-time, care must be taken that each column has an advance guard and is in constant readiness for battle, and that the columns are strong enough to take care of themselves, and are within supporting distance. Artillery must never march alone, nor be left unsupported by infantry. Signalmen must accompany the advance guard. A flank patrol would also be necessary, and communication must be kept up between it and the main column. See Plate II., Figs, 1, 2.
At night, the advance guard, unexpectedly falling in with the enemy, must attack him immediately; there is nothing else left to do if the main column is to gain time for preparation. If necessary, the men and officers must sacrifice their lives, for upon the stand that the advance guard makes, the fate of the main column may depend. If forced back, under no circumstances must they retreat on the main column, but must retire on either side, unmasking its front.
Marches in retreat.—In retreat, the order of march is the reverse of that in advance, the rear guard being much stronger, and from one-fourth to one-third of the whole force, depending upon circumstances.
Streetfighting.—In the occupation of towns and cities, street fighting will always play a prominent part in the work required of the naval brigade, and too much time and attention cannot be devoted to its study. A map of the place to be occupied, showing principal streets, squares and public buildings, should be obtained. Having determined upon a plan of operation, move in two or three columns toward the central portion of the place, and occupy a prominent square where the people are in the habit of congregating. Columns should keep up lateral communication with each other, and a body of pioneers should precede each, supplied with gun-cotton or other portable explosive for blowing down doors, buildings and barricades. A column meeting with barricades should not attempt to carry them in front if time will permit of their being turned by working to their: rear through adjoining buildings. Advantage should be taken of any flat-roofed houses in working a column through a city. The advancing columns should be closely followed by the supports; surrounded by burning and falling buildings, with firing in every direction, men become bewildered and hesitating if they are not well supported.
In the advance, do not leave burning buildings in your rear if they threaten to cut off your line of retreat. Your forces once established, look to the water supply, and seize any fire engines. The engines should be overhauled and put in order by the force of firemen from the pioneers that accompany the expedition.
If you are fighting to obtain possession of a city, seize all food supplies; all the inhabitants that remain in the city should be enrolled and set to work, and everybody put on the same allowance of food. Arrest any one found on the streets between sunset and sunrise. Establish a signal station on highest building near to headquarters, or at headquarters if within signal distance of fleet. No officer or man should be allowed on the streets without arms or equipments. Keep open your line of retreat, but do not forget that a small force of determined men can keep at bay, in a well-barricaded building, many times their number; in fact, do not allow yourself to be burnt out and you can stay until relief comes, provided your food holds out. Remember the history of the Pittsburg labor riots of 1877 and the cooped-up militia in the engine-house of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
Should your object be to quell a riot or insurrection, establish your headquarters at the town or city hall; place yourself in communication with the civil authorities; organize a police force, or lend all aid in your power to the regular force of the place. Barricade and be prepared to defend building or buildings in which your forces are located; two buildings commanding each other are better than one. Never, under any circumstances, permit more than two-thirds of your force to be absent from headquarters on patrol or other duty. If you take any prisoners, do not confine them in your headquarters. Never permit any strangers to inspect your preparations for defense. Arrest any one found looting; impress upon the minds of your officers and men that no property of any kind must be taken; everything that is found must be turned in to the quartermaster. There is nothing so demoralizing to a naval force as to allow men to appropriate articles; the very severest punishment must be inflicted for looting, if any discipline is to be maintained. Sentries should be placed over all buildings near to headquarters where liquors are stored; and above all things, never locate a command in any building without first making a careful inspection to ascertain if there are any spirituous liquors stored therein.
Bivouac.—Plate III. illustrates the general principles of bivouacking with outposts thrown out in the direction of the enemy; when necessary, the flanks and rear would also be protected. The general rule is that about one-sixth of the whole force should be employed on outpost work—the most important duty devolving upon the brigade.
As it takes a very considerable time to break out of tents and strike them, they would not be used in the presence of an enemy or when anticipating an attack.
The German system of outposts is probably the best and most simple. Some 400 paces to the front of the first line, double sentries are placed—this is the only distance given; the other distances, the reserve from the first line, also from main column, are at the option of the commanding officer of the outposts, he being governed by the “general state of affairs and the time the main body requires to get ready for action.” In locating the outposts it would be well to remember that one officer should command on each front of the camp; by this means any confusion in the location of the outposts is avoided. The officer commanding the outpost should belong to the command to which the detail for outpost duty also belongs.
Camping (Encampment, Plate IV.).—In selecting a site for laying out a camp, when not in the presence of an enemy, we must consider sanitary conditions, nature of the ground with regard to the comfort of the men, and the supply of wood and water. An abundance of fire-wood and plenty of fresh water near at hand make any locality a desirable one. The form of the camp will generally be suited to the ground, both artillery and infantry camping on ground best suited to them. In going into camp, each battalion of the brigade would encamp in column of divisions, the tents of each division facing each other, being arranged in two lines and trenched. As far as practicable a general alignment should be preserved, though regularity should not be sought after over more important considerations. The commanding officer of the brigade, also the battalion commanders, should have distinguishing flags on flagstaff's to indicate their headquarters.
In encampment the routine is established by the commander of the brigade, due regard being given to the season of the year.
Camp routine, when brigade is landed for drill and instruction:
A. M.—4.00—Call cooks.
5.00—Call bugler of guard.
5.10—Assembly of buglers.
5.15—Bugles and drum march through camp.
5.25—Reveille, assembly, coffee.
6.30—Breakfast.
7.15—Sick call, fatigue call, police camp.
8.00—First sergeant's call, morning reports.
8.30—Drill call.
11.00—Recall from drill.
11.30—Assembly, guard mounting.
12.00—Dinner.
P. M.—1.00—Drill call.
2.00—Serve out provisions.
3.00—Recall from drill.
5.00—Battalions form.
5.15— Brigade forms for dress parade.
5.45—Supper, sundown retreat, orders, details for day following.
8.45—Assembly of buglers.
8.50—Bugles and drum march through camp.
9.00—Tattoo, assembly.
9.15—Bugles, lights out.
To Arms is the signal of alarm, when the brigade will turn out under arms. The general is the signal to break camp, preparatory to marching.
Base.—The base of operations of the naval brigade is an important consideration that presents itself to us. Under most circumstances the fleet would be the base, but in operating on rivers and streams, some of the fighting vessels of the fleet with a dispatch boat should accompany the boats to be used as a base, if the depth of water will allow. Should the water be shallow, steam launches, armed with Hotchkiss revolving cannon and the single barrel Hotchkiss, with temporary protection for their crews, should accompany the landing force. These launches would not land, and should have large crews, every man in the boat being armed with the magazine rifle, which should be kept at hand ready for use when occasion demanded. Vessels and steam launches accompanying the brigade should, if possible, keep up communication with the force and be prepared to furnish anything necessity required. Accompanying vessels should have large supplies of provisions, ammunition and medical outfit.
In conclusion, the essayist has endeavored to avoid the common fault of the day, when treating of a professional subject, of dealing in generalities. In making suggestions he has attempted to name something better, and solve, with useful details, where he has condemned. To condemn the practices of the service without working out and presenting in detailed form something more worthy of trial, is to remain at a standstill and fail of the purpose sought.
There is nothing in this essay that the writer claims as new and untried; were he to do so, it might detract from its value. Having consulted every work within his reach published on the subject of Naval Brigades, and they are not many, he has summarized and placed the information obtained, with his own experience added, in such shape that he hopes it may supply a long and growing want, benefit the service at large, and be of practical use to the brigade commander. Taking hold of a practical subject, the essayist has attempted a practical solution, avoiding any digressions to new-hatched thoughts which would add length to the essay with no beneficial results. Being a great believer in the naval brigade and its valuable work, he would at the same time jealously guard the seaman from the machinations of the infantry- crank and toy-soldier, always keeping in mind the materia circa quam of a navy.