There is but little doubt of the fact that it is utterly impossible to-day to reconcile the ideas of different naval officers as to the size, rig, number, or types of vessels which we require, and that there is really no safe rule for a Congressional committee to be guided by in recommending the adoption of any type of ships, or the appropriation of money to pay for them.
The first Advisory Board recommended a large number of ships, the plans and calculations of which were scarcely worked out before it ruined itself by a minority report. The second Advisory Board proposed ships differing entirely from those recommended by either the majority or minority of the first board; and, finally, the third (or Walker Board so-called) has recommended ships differing in most features from those recommended by the second board; and, lastly, Mr. Whitney has procured some entirely new plans from abroad. These differences naturally arise: 1st. From the immense variety of ideas that modern mechanical ingenuity admits of being made practical; 2d. From the confusion arising from the Vapid advance in ordnance, steam engineering and ship construction; and 3d. From the variety of duties that a single man-of-war must be considered capable of discharging. Such difficulties will always arise until the subject of a new Navy is considered by a different body of men, and from a different standpoint.
Happily, within the last four years a number of very troublesome topics pertaining to the Navy have been reasonably well settled.
- It is generally conceded that, for all purposes, steel and composite- built ships are the best.
- The Gun Foundry Board has made a definite report on the subject of guns.
- The Fortification Board has made a definite report on the subject of coast-defense vessels heavily plated with steel. The types of these vessels have been carefully worked out by competent people, and also the types of some small coast-defense gunboats, and gun and torpedo boats.
This much, then, of the road is clear, and coast-defense vessels could be built ad libitum on plans already thought out, and no man could justly say that the money was ill-spent, for no country in the world is so defenseless as ours; but, in order that a definite policy of expenditure for a seagoing Navy should be arrived at, a competent board is absolutely necessary. It is not a mere matter of choice whether we shall have a 3000-ton ship or full sail power, or two-thirds sail power, or no sail power, or a superstructure deck, or a poop and forecastle, or forty ironclads, or four ironclads, or turret ships or barbette ships, or dispatch boats or gunboats. These matters are important, it is true, but they are entirely secondary to, and many of them would be utterly wiped out by, the more important matters which affect the very existence of the seagoing Navy, and which should be thoroughly discussed by a competent board before the secondary matters are thought of.
All the boards that have been heretofore organized for recommending and designing ships have been either wrongly constituted, or else so hampered by the law creating them as to be worthless. These boards have been either composed of officers alone, or of officers and civilian experts. Both plans are wrong. Any board, to be efficient, should possess three qualities: 1st. It should not be too large (this was one trouble with the first Advisory Board); 2d. It should consist (with its president) of an odd number of members; 3d. It should be composed of men capable of discussing among themselves every subject that the duties of the board may give rise to.
Officers alone should not constitute a board: they are all (like myself) professionally anxious for a larger Navy than Congress and the country would deem necessary. Civilian shipbuilding and engineering experts are not necessary: there is better talent for men-of-war-designing among our constructors and engineers in the Navy than can be found anywhere else in the United States. No civilian in the United States has ever built a modern man-of-war or its engine on his own design: these things cannot be originated or invented by anybody in a moment; and our officers have devoted more study to foreign plans than civilians have. The civilian element that is required on the board is that which is most readily found in Congress—men who by their habit of thought and national views are capable of studying the first and most important question which will come before this board—viz.: the political and geographical position of the United States with reference to the other nations of the world; its commerce, its future, and the corresponding seagoing Navy which is requisite. A second and most important duty of these members would be to so shape the final conclusions of the board that a sensible bill could be drawn up (based upon the report of the board to the President) for presentation to Congress, in which that body could find something tangible and definite to discuss. A third duty of these members would be to present this bill to both Houses of Congress and defend it.
This board should consist of a president and eight members, to be
composed as follows: One member of the Senate Naval Committee of long standing, one member of the House Naval Committee of long standing, one Captain in the Navy, one Lieutenant-Commander or Lieutenant, one Naval Constructor, one Assistant Naval Constructor, one Chief Engineer, one Past-Assistant or Assistant Engineer. The president of the board to be the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the secretary of the board to be an Assistant Naval Constructor. This arrangement would combine experience, practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge of all subjects which would come within the province of the board.
Should such a board be organized, the following results are quite possible
The first duty would be to study, as I have indicated, the position of the United States and its commerce, present and future, in different parts of the world, together with the number of its citizens residing and in business abroad, and the amount of protection deemed necessary to be within easy call at any time. This would lead to a close study of the number of miles of coast that come within the jurisdiction of our several squadrons and the relative importance of our interests there; also to an estimate of the powers of offense and defense of the countries owning the territory. These considerations, together with the peculiar conditions of each locality, its degree of civilization, belligerency, etc., would fix approximately the number of ships required; and to this number at least 25 per cent, must be added to provide for relief vessels going to and coming from home.
Having reached this approximation, the attention of the board would next be called to the number of men available to man these ships. We have but 8000 men in the Navy, and it would be a matter of serious consideration for the legislative members of the board whether it would be wise to go before Congress and advocate an increase of that number. This matter is seldom discussed, and yet it lies at the bottom of the whole fabric of a peace Navy. Of what use is it to advocate the building of 40 large ironclads, as some do, when a dozen of them would take all the men we have and not leave a man for anything else? I doubt, however, if any one in Congress would advocate a much greater number of men than 8000. Supposing that the number be limited to 8000, our naval coat must be cut according to this cloth, and, before utilizing it, there must be deducted the total number necessary at our numerous navy yards for taking care of laid-up coast-defense vessels and receiving ships, running tugs and steam launches, etc., etc. With the remainder, whatever it may be, an estimate must be made of the size of crews that can be allotted to the vessels for foreign service, the number of which has been previously approximately estimated.
In spite of all the labor saving appliances that ever have been invented, the crew of every man-of-war should be relatively large, to supply landing parties—a matter of growing importance in naval warfare. Hence, taking all these things into consideration, if the majority of this board were men of my way of thinking, the greater number of the vessels required by the United States in foreign waters would be small (from 400 to 1000 tons), in order to secure the greatest good by the greatest dispersion of our small total number of men. This dispersion is absolutely necessary to secure promptitude in affording that show of physical force at any point in a station which is so necessary to give confidence to the people requiring protection, and so essential to inspire respect among parties liable to give offense. It carries with it the necessity of having vessels in as many different ports as possible at the same time; that they should always be, so far as possible, within telegraphic communication with the admiral; that when changing stations the utmost expedition should be used from port to port; for a man-of-war out of telegraphic communication is useless in time of peace.
Allowing 100 men to each vessel, which is a very small number, it can readily be seen that in order to have seven or eight very small vessels actually on each of our stations, with their reliefs going and coming, we shall only have enough men left for seven or eight vessels carrying 300 men each, which would only give one of these vessels to a squadron. If this train of reasoning is correct, or only approximately correct, does it not at once simplify a great number of these minor questions of type, rig, etc., which are now so constantly thrust to the front?
If we can only have eight small vessels and one large one on the Pacific Coast, or in China, for example, can there be any question in this day but that the large one ought to be an ironclad? And, if the little ones cannot carry coal enough to steam across the Atlantic Ocean, is there any question but that they ought to have large sail power? This latter will diminish their steaming speed, to be sure, but not their general usefulness, and if the large vessel by not having sail power could carry seventy-five tons more coal or an inch more armor and make a knot more speed, ought she to be obliged to have it? And if the larger vessel, by reason of her excellent fighting qualities, has limited accommodations (as is sure to be the case), would it not be reasonable and economical to have a dispatch boat for a flagship?
It would appear that many of these other difficulties that we are now struggling with could be made to disappear by the same method of reasoning. By the system that I have adopted we do away with any discussion of relative merits, of Boston type or Chicago type, etc., etc., because we would have neither. If the board should decide that we wanted these types, and were willing to forego the obvious advantage of great dispersion of our small total of 8000 men, then the small classes of vessels would largely disappear and there would be no use in wasting breath in discussing their types.
Since the United States is eminently a nation of peace, its defenses should be made invulnerable, for its powers of offense will never be great, except possibly towards the end of a long war, if we should ever be so unfortunate as to become involved in one; therefore, the question of a seagoing Navy for a general war should be kept almost entirely separate from that of a peace Navy. Of course, such ships as are built at any time should have good guns and good engines; but the advance of modern science in every direction is so great, that it is simply impossible to construct a ship that might be able to meet all the contingencies of a war with a nation like England, for example. No nation now-a-days, not even England, could protect its commerce in a great war, and it will probably have no occasion to do so after the first two weeks, as few steamers now-a-days are out from port longer than that, and no insurance could be obtained on cargoes under belligerent flags: ownership would be transferred to neutral flags at once; and, in any event, the very best commerce protector or commerce destroyer is a first-class merchant steamer bought out of hand, filled with Hotchkiss rapid-firing guns, and sent to sea full of coal.
General usefulness in time of war, for a man-of-war or any other vessel, is a question of coal-piles and not of canvas, and this question of coal-piles will be one of the most serious that our hypothetical board would have to consider; not that it would have any effect on the rig of our vessels, for no man-of-war would dare to go to sea in time of war under sail with any expectation of reaching port, let alone of capturing or protecting anything; but it would be the board's duty in its report to make the country alive to the importance of this vital point, and, if we are to have no coal-piles, to outline to Congress what our men-of-war must be almost obliged to do if they are away from home when a war breaks out and coal is still contraband of war—viz.: Stay in port, and in case of a long war dismantle ships and send crew and officers home.
Having fixed approximately the number and size of ships, the total cost could be estimated with a reasonable degree of precision, and an annual appropriation calculated which would finish all the ships at the end of a determined number of years; and in this way let Congress see what it has before it, in the same logical manner as has been done by the Gun Foundry Board and the Fortification Board.
As a conclusion, the board would be called upon to investigate how these ships are to be built and where, by contract or in the navy yards, or both; secondly, if all the navy yards are not to be employed, recommend what should be done with the unemployed ones; and lastly, if it is deemed wise that the unemployed yards be not abolished, make some suggestion in the direction of an appropriation for their maintenance which will be separate and distinct from the Navy Appropriation Bill proper, so that there may be a final ending of the continual reproach to the naval administration "that the Navy consumes annually fifteen millions of dollars and has not a ship to show for it." How can we have any ships when it takes fifteen millions for one gigantic organization merely to "mark time"?