Nelson’s Purse: The Mystery of Lord Nelson’s Lost Treasures
Martyn Downer. Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2004. 424 pp. Illus. Appens. Notes. Bib. Index. $32.50.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Joseph F. Callo, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
Nelson’s Purse is about much more than artifacts. It is a special perspective on the man who changed history from the quarterdeck of HMS Victory on 21 October 1805 and three people whose lives were most intimately intertwined with his: his wife, his paramour, and the man who was probably his closest friend outside of the naval service.
The basic vehicle for the story—a combination of fact and fiction—is an astonishing, recently discovered collection of letters and other items. These historical treasures, known as the Davison Collection, include letters, jewelry, plate, china, swords, firearms, paintings, and other objects—such as the purse featured in the book’s title. Following two centuries during which there were only hints of the existence of the Davison Collection items, they came to light and were auctioned in London by Sotheby’s on 21 October 2002. The author of Nebon’s Purse was Head of Jewelry for Sotheby’s from 1999 to 2003 and he brought the collection to public light, validated its authenticity, and supervised the auction.
The event generated £2.1 million, more than triple the presale estimates. That surprising amount was a unique demonstration of the accelerating interest in the life of Admiral Lord Nelson, as the bicentennial of his brilliant victory and violent death at the Battle of Trafalgar approaches.
One of the most important contributions of this work is its illumination of Alexander Davison as a more important figure in Nelson’s life than previously recognized. The author dramatically makes that point in his first chapter, when he describes his reaction to discovering a scrap of paper listing the contents of Nelson’s purse on the day he died. “The fragment of paper had barely survived its 200- year journey to me in the darkness of the purse. . . . Why was the purse with Davison? . . . Everything pointed towards a far deeper relationship between him and Nelson than had ever been hinted at.”
As the narrative proceeds, it emerges that Davison was not only a prize agent for ships captured by Nelson, he also was a financial advisor, creditor, and close friend. In the latter role, Davison arguably was the primary personal linkage among Nelson and the two principal women in Nelson’s life: his wife Fanny, and his paramour Lady Emma Hamilton.
Martyn Downer’s special perspective also contributes to the rehabilitation of Fanny, who for many years was a minor sidebar to Nelson’s life story—and a not very attractive one at that. Following the recent movement toward treating Fanny less dis- missively, the letters that Downer cites from the collection show her as a person of patience and loyalty. Although there is no way to know all of the details of why Nelson turned away from his marriage, Fanny emerges from this book as a more significant and more sympathetic character than that described over the years by many of Nelson’s biographers.
On the other hand, Nebon’s Purse probably does little to change the valuation of Lady Hamilton; it does, however, add to the understanding of her character. In the collection’s correspondence, we see more convincingly her efforts to turn Nelson’s family against Fanny, as well as the depth of her own attachment to him. Regarding that attachment, there is a startlingly personal passage from a letter of October 1804 from Lady Hamilton to Davison: “I am anxious and agitated to see him . . . and I must sin on and love him more than ever. It is a crime worth going to Hell for.”
As the Trafalgar bicentennial approaches, the number of books about Nelson will increase significantly. Two noteworthy examples already have been announced: Nebon—The New Letters, by Colin White, which will include more than 500 previously unknown letters from Nelson; and Trafalgar, by Nicholas Best, which describes the event of 21 October 1805 in detail. Among the numerous coming books. Nelson’s Purse has positioned itself early as a special item of interest for navalists and biography enthusiasts.
Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916
George H. Cassar. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004. 368 pp. Maps. Photos. Notes. Bib. Index. $35.00.
Reviewed by Andrew G. Wilson
The sheer volume of manuscripts and books written addressing the Great War could easily fill up a good-sized library. Only a select group of these publications written in English, however, would make it into the “special collections” room; George H. Cassar’s work on Horatio Herbert Kitchener deserves to be among them. In less than 400 pages Cassar has produced a masterful study of one of the conflict’s key figures—a professional soldier burdened with keeping Great Britain’s hopes for empire and eventual success alive in the war’s early stages.
As an academic scholar focusing on World War I, Cassar is eminently qualified to craft this excellent study reexamining Kitchener’s role as British Secretary of State for War. Marshalling information from sources ranging from state papers (including many previously unpublished) to the private papers of politicians and military figures who were Kitchener’s contemporaries, Cassar traces the role played by this impressive figure in the myriad issues the British Empire faced in those uncertain times. The book dissects issues ranging from the proper role of the British Army in France and the conflict in Africa and the Middle East, to the arming of Russia and the tragedy of the Dardanelles/ Gallipoli campaign.
Contrary to the views of many, George Cassar contends that Kitchener’s “experience as an administrator and soldier abroad gave him a much wider frame of reference for viewing the Great War than that of any other leading British official.” According to Cassar, Kitchener was one of the few senior British officers to recognize immediately that it would not be a brief conflict, and that such a global war would be extremely complex and severely test the British Empire’s resolve.
Realizing that it would not be a petite guerre, Kitchener spent a great deal of time, energy, and British resources attempting to keep the Russian armies armed and in the field, for he knew that in a war of attrition Russian pressure on the Central Powers in the east would be essential. Tracing the nature of the armaments issue between Russia and her various military representatives and Kitchener, Cassar illustrates the corruption, inefficiency, suspicion, and antiquated nature of the Russian supply system, and the Russian high command (Stavka) in general.
Considering today’s global war on terrorism and conflict in Iraq, the book’s sections concerning the strategic role of the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the European colonies in East and West Africa, are quite absorbing. Africa and the Middle East were sweltering, perilous theaters of operations in 1914-1915, just as they are today; nonetheless, both regions were important from the standpoint of empire status and postwar negotiating positions. Today, these regions are again front-page news, and Cassar offers those interested a very readable accounting of the military and diplomatic confusion and collusion during the period, which is the root of much of today’s regional instability.
Regarding the Ottoman Empire, Cassar does not shy away from discussing the Dardanelles campaign. In fact, Cassar admits that this tragedy was one of Kitchener’s few leadership failures, and argues that Kitchener was drawn into the plan against his better judgment and under the influence of First Sea Lord Winston S. Churchill’s operational optimism.
In the end, the reader is left with the impression that Kitchener—whose service to the Empire was cut short prematurely when he was killed after the ship carrying him to Russia in 1916 struck a mine—was a multifaceted and highly capable war leader hounded by critical (and often ill- informed) politicians and military subordinates of limited professional breadth and imagination—some of whom were apparently more concerned with personal reputations and legacies than winning the war. Cassar’s final assessment is that “Kitchener’s contribution to the war was not merely significant, it was decisive.”
If this book has a fault it is the practically nonexistent discussion of the part played by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in this story, especially as so much effort is spent illuminating the importance of Russia and the Eastern Front in Kitchener’s thinking and strategy. This aside, the book ranks among the best on the subject.
Perhaps the most enduring and familiar image of Kitchener is the famous English recruiting poster featuring his finger-pointing likeness, telling Britons that “Your Country Needs You.” Should a second edition of Cassar’s work be released, I recommend using the same image for the dust jacket, though with the script, “This work is a must read.” For serious scholars and casual readers alike, this volume merits a place on the shelf of the special collection.
Hell on a Hill Top: America’s Last Major Battle in Vietnam
MGen. Benjamin L. Harrison, USA (Ret.). Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2004. 298 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $29.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired)
In the February 2001 Proceedings, I reviewed Keith Nolan’s Ripcord: Screaming Eagles under Siege, Vietnam 1970 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), calling it “a searing narrative of soldiers and small units in battle.” In this new book, the commander of the 101st Airborne Division’s 3d Brigade, the unit that endured the Ripcord fight, has written a more complete account of how both sides fought. It is a classic.
Under the U.S. policy of Vietnamization and withdrawal, by the summer of 1970 the 1st and 3d U.S. Marine Divisions had been withdrawn, and the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division had been redeployed from the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. Only the 101st Airborne remained to assist the Republic of Vietnam’s 1st ARVN Division in holding against North Vietnamese attack. Near Laos, strategic hilltops overlooked the Ashau Valley route through which the North Vietnamese supported and reinforced its forces in those provinces. On one of these hilltops would be Fire Support Base Ripcord.
In March 1970, the lOlst’s 3d Brigade began operations to seize those hilltops; it would use them for operations to interdict the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) effort. On 19 May 1970, the local NVA command ordered: “324B Division [will] concentrate its main forces to attack and destroy Operating Base 935 [Ripcord] and block and attack enemy elements stationed around the hill and forces sent to relieve the base.” The clash between the 324B Division and the 3d Brigade was the last major U.S. battle in Vietnam.
General Harrison tells how for four years he sought the North Vietnamese Army’s side of that story. Persevering, in time he gained full access to Hanoi’s military archives, then finally met to exchange memories with the 324B Division commander himself, Chu Phuong Doi, at his remote home near the Chinese border. General Harrison has crafted his narrative of the battle using the official records of both sides in a side-by-side comparison.
In this compelling drama, the North Vietnamese Army comes across as an ably led, motivated, and disciplined force willing to endure horrific casualties, with first- class military hardware and formidable combat and logistics expertise. Although prone to exaggerate its combat results (perhaps to motivate its troops), the NVA operated with accurate intelligence of its U.S. and South Vietnamese enemies and was realistic in its strategic and tactical perceptions. The 324B Division fought well. The losses it inflicted on the 101st Airborne Division (250 killed in the entire Ripcord operation) eventually became too much for high command to bear and the 3d Brigade was told to pull its troops out, leaving the Ashau Valley to the enemy.
The 101st Airborne Division set a high standard of performance throughout the Vietnam War, and the 3d Brigade at Ripcord was one of the very best, displaying in 1970 none of the morale problems and reluctance to engage that afflicted many units toward the end of the Vietnam War. General Harrison’s story is replete with examples of leadership, tactical skill, fighting heart, and soldierly heroism from brigade down to squad and trooper level. An experienced aviator himself, he relates stirring accounts of the lOlst’s aviators who flew with daring the heavy-lifting Chinooks, troop-carrying Hueys, and rocketfiring Cobras on which the survival of the troops of Ripcord depended.
Seeded with his terse and pungent comments on war, leadership, and strategy, General Harrison’s unique and valuable book tells the full story of a battle of surpassing interest, unheralded at the time and almost forgotten today.
