The Battle of the Java Sea was fought and lost by the Allied Combined Striking Force in a single day- and-night action with the Japanese fleet on 27 February 1942. It was the first surface-to-surface action of the Pacific war and brought into action for the first time the Imperial Japanese Navy’s secret weapon: a long-range oxygen-fueled torpedo whose maximum speed was 50 knots. This formidable weapon was used in the Java Sea combat with liberal abundance.
The Allies lost the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and Java, the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer, and the British destroyers Electra and Jupiter. In addition, the British cruiser Exeter was badly damaged.
The action that followed only 24 hours after the Battle of the Java Sea—and was a direct consequence of it—is known to the Allies as the Battle of Sunda Strait. The Japanese call it the Battle of Banten Bay, however, because the action took place to the north of this bay, where their transports were about to land troops for the occupation of Java. The first phase of the action was the engagement near Surabaya.
The Java Sea action virtually ended with the De Ruyter and Java blowing up at about 2300 on the 27th. The Perth only just escaped collision with the former by violent helm- and-engine maneuvers. Rear Admiral Karel Doorman went down with the Dutch cruiser. Captain Hector M. L. Waller, in command of the Australian light cruiser Perth, took the Houston (CA-30) under his orders as the senior officer. He feinted to the southeast, then turned directly into Tan- jong Priok—the port of Batavia (now Djakarta)—at high speed.
The Allies had not been defeated so much by superior forces as by a highly trained homogeneous force with a unified system of communications and, above all, superb air reconnaissance. The Allies, on the other hand, had never before operated as a combined force and had no proper means of communication. In addition, some Allied ships were obsolete, or at least obsolescent, as were the old U.S. destroyers.
Waller’s decision to withdraw was later criticized by Admiral Conrad Helfrich, who had ordered: “You must continue attacks till the enemy is destroyed.” The admiral’s desire for the combined striking force to fight on to the bitter end was an unrealistic one that disregarded a major point in all warfare: when is it right to disengage? Military suicide rarely achieves anything, but a fighting withdrawal frequently has been crowned with later victory.
The deserted port of Tanjong Priok was strangely quiet as the Perth and Houston secured alongside at about 1430 on Saturday, 28 February, for refueling. Unfortunately, only 300 tons of fuel were available for the Perth, bringing her total up to a little more than 50% capacity. The oil tanks bombed just three days before were still smoldering. The smell of defeat permeated the whole port. Preparations were being made to destroy harbor installations and warehouses. The opportunity was taken to embark stores addressed to the Victualling Officer, Singapore, and anything else that might prove useful. About two dozen wooden life rafts were found and wisely taken on board. A few hours later they were to prove invaluable, saving many lives.
Shortly before 1800 the air raid warning sounded, and all native labor took shelter. The aircraft were a Dutch plane and a Japanese Zero. Guns opened fire at the latter, which flew off.
Captain Waller had sent for the navigator, Lieutenant John Harper, RN, and in the company of the Houston's Captain Albert H. Rooks, informed Harper that orders had been received to sail in company with the Houston and Evertsen through Sunda Strait to Tjilatjap—on the southern coast of Java—to pick up a convoy. Because it was vital to economize on fuel, the cruisers would have to proceed at a moderate speed, planning to arrive on Monday morning. Waller informed Harper that it was quite likely that wireless orders might be received later, changing the destination to either Fremantle or Colombo.
The two cruisers finally got under way in the early evening, preceded by the Evertsen. An hour after leaving the harbor, Captain Waller addressed the ship’s company in the Perh:
“We are sailing for Sunda Strait for Tjilatjap and will shortly close up to the first degree of readiness relaxed. Dutch air reconnaissance reports that Sunda Strait is free of enemy shipping. But I have a report that a large enemy convoy is about five miles northeast of Batavia moving east. I do not expect, however, to meet enemy forces.”
Unfortunately, Waller’s belief that he would not encounter enemy forces in Sunda Strait was unfounded, mainly because the Dutch air reconnaissance was out of date. Only a few miles ahead off Banten Bay, near the northwest extremity of Java, the enemy lay in great strength across his path.
At about 2200 that night, General Hitoshi Imamura’s invasion fleet entered Banten Bay, escorted by the light cruisers Natori and Yura, the destroyers Asakaze, Fubuki, Harukaze, Hatakaze, Hatsuyuki, Murakumo, Shirayuki, and Shirakumo, and the minelayer Shirataka. Screening to seaward were the heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, and the 2nd Division of Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Seventh Cruiser Squadron with the destroyer Shikinami. Distant cover was also provided by the First Division of the cruiser squadron: Suzuya and Kumano, the aircraft carrier Ryujo, and a number of other destroyers farther north.
On clearing the minefields, night action stations were assumed. Captain Waller then ordered a reversion to second degree of readiness. Babi Island was one-and-a-half miles away to starboard beam at 2245. ‘The sea was calm, with little or no wind, a clear sky and a full moon, giving an extreme visibility of six or seven miles,” recorded Harper. Nothing so far had been sighted.
Apparently, the destroyer Fubuki had sighted the two cruisers about 2240 and, after making an enemy report, had shadowed them for some time. Neither cruiser had radar and both ships’ companies were very tired after the previous action. It is therefore not surprising that the lookouts failed to spot a trailing destroyer.
According to one surviving officer:
“I was on the bridge as officer of the watch that night. HOUSTON was half a mile astern. We were making 22 knots and, at that rate, would be through the vital stretch of Sunda Strait before dawn....The hope ended at 2305 when the yeoman of the watch sighted a destroyer fine on the starboard bow....The enemy answered [the Perth's challenge] with a series of meaningless flashes and turned away at full speed, making smoke.
PERTH altered course and went after the Japanese destroyer, making a signal to HOUSTON: ‘Follow me.’ This was an unusual order for cruisers and showed the whole action was fought on destroyer lines.”
The Perth's guns and directors swung round toward the enemy destroyer and soon opened fire. Through the action Captain Waller stood at the pelorus, handling the ship himself, altering course repeatedly so as to keep the guns bearing on the most suitable targets. During this period an officer on the bridge reported sighting a large number of vessels in close formation, probably transports.
While trying to escape through Sunda Strait, the Allied cruisers had run smack into a Japanese landing force. “Whether Captain Waller appreciated that we had run into a force of transports landing troops I don’t know,” recorded Harper. “I know that I hadn’t appreciated it until we were taken into Banten Bay in a Jap destroyer in the evening and next day transferred to a transport. I don’t remember seeing any transports during the action.”
There will always be some doubt as to whether Captain Waller was actually aware of the Japanese transports, but Lieutenant Gay of the Perth is specific about it: “Still following our quarry and with HOUSTON keeping station astern, we discovered within a very short time that we were right in the middle of the main Jap landing force—about 60 fully loaded transports with an escort of one aircraft carrier, seven cruisers and at least 20 destroyers.”
The official Japanese account of the action is known to contain several errors, but this was quite natural under the circumstances of a mad melee during a night action. It does, however, confirm Gay’s account regarding the Allied cruisers engaging the transports.
According to the Japanese account, the first phase of the Battle of Sunda Strait, after the initial sighting by the Fubuki, began when the destroyer Harukaze sighted the two cruisers southeast of Babi Island at 2305. Two minutes later the Allied cruiser commenced firing at what turned out to be transports on the eastern side of St. Nicholas Point. The Harukaze promptly laid an effective smoke screen to cover the transports.
The official Japanese account states that the Fubuki observed the Allied cruisers alter their course to starboard at 2313. Within minutes the destroyer fired torpedoes at the Houston from a distance of 2,500 meters. The Houston was hit and reduced her speed. In the meantime the Perth opened fire on the Japanese destroyer, but to no avail.
It is evident from the official U.S. account of the action, prepared by the Houston's gunnery officer after the war, that the Allied cruisers soon lost contact with each other as they fought independently for their lives. The U.S. account states that during the engagement, 5 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 35 transports were positively observed. Aircraft and motor torpedo boats were also operating in the area. No reference to either is made in the Japanese or Australian accounts. In a masterly piece of understatement, the Houston's gunnery officer. Commander Arthur L. Maher, wrote: “Due to flashes of gunfire difficulty was experienced in following the movements of PERTH until she was observed to be in a sinking condition about 2345.” The Perth actually sank 40 minutes later than the time quoted, which clearly indicates that the two ships were completely out of contact, although the Australians were well aware of the time that the U.S. cruiser later sank.
In the plot below the Perth's bridge, "Schoolmaster" Lyons was on duty. Immediately after Captain Waller’s report of sighting the Japanese destroyer, Lyons broke radio silence for an enemy report. As Lyons plotted the Perth's erratic course, he found that the ship was turning in a circle with a diameter of about five miles. Changes of course were both violent and frequent. Clearly, Waller was doing everything to avoid torpedo tracks and also to protect the Houston's stem, her turret rendered useless by an earlier bomb hit. The plot had indicated 13 Japanese destroyers and 2 cruisers, the closest one less than a mile away.
Lyons heard somebody on the bridge shout: “There are four to starboard,” and another voice, “There are five on our port side,” followed by, “By God, they’re all around us.” At 2326 Lyons noted that the Perth had received her first hit—on the forward funnel—and then another near the flag deck aft of the bridge at 2332. At 2350 a shell hit near the waterline, which burst in the seamen’s mess. At this time both the Perth and Houston were still firing at every available target and both were relatively undamaged.
At about 2340 Torpedo Gunner L. C. Smith fired the starboard tubes on orders from the torpedo officer on the bridge. The targets were reported to be three cruisers. Later, the port tubes were fired, but it is not known at what targets. By 2350 some destroyers were close enough to illuminate the Perth with their searchlights from a range of about 3,000 yards.
“Little damage was caused to PERTH until the very end of the action,” recorded Harper. “It was not until after the order to abandon ship had been given that many shell hits were received.” About midnight the Perth's gunnery officer reported to Captain Waller that very little 6-inch ammunition was left. The captain then decided to force a passage through Sunda Strait and ordered full speed.
Disaster struck as the cruiser was moving at 28 knots, having just begun to steady on her new course for Toppers Island.
The first torpedo struck on the starboard side between the forward engine room and the boiler room at 0005 (1 March). Captain Waller gave the order to prepare to abandon ship. A few minutes later a torpedo hit the starboard side abreast of a turret, and he gave the order to abandon ship.
The Japanese account differs somewhat in respect to times. The short period before the Perth was torpedoed gives a good idea of the action from the Japanese point of view:
“MOGAMI and MIKUMA each fired six torpedoes at 2349 at a range of 11,200 metres while on a parallel course 110° to the PERTH and HOUSTON. This was near Babi Island. At this time PERTH and HOUSTON were firing furiously at the 11th Destroyer Squadron. From 2348 [on] the 5th Squadron, second group, was also under fire. HARUKAZE (of 5th DS) started a torpedo attack at 2349, but because of near misses this had to be aborted.”
In the third phase of the action the Japanese account referred to the two heavy cruisers firing at the Houston'.
“MOGAMI and MIKUMA began firing at HOUSTON at a range of 11,200 metres at 2352. The heavy cruisers scored hits and set HOUSTON on fire. Her turrets exploded and there was a further reduction in speed. Allied cruisers began to return fire at the heavy cruisers at the same time, but Allied searchlights were very weak and their guns ineffective.”
Unknown to the Allies, the Mogami-class cruisers— originally fitted with 6-inch guns—had been rearmed with 8-inch guns. It is interesting to note that while the two Japanese cruisers carried a total of 20 8-inch guns and 24 24-inch torpedo tubes, the Allies had only eight 6-inch guns and six 8-inch guns and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes; the Houston had no torpedo tubes at all.
The Japanese reference to the Houston's turrets exploding is not quite correct. Number two turret received a direct hit and blew up, but the other turret was not hit. Because of the shortage of 8-inch shells, both turrets used the same magazine. When it was flooded to prevent explosion, both turrets were put out of action.
It is almost certain that Captain Waller of the Perth was killed by a shell burst on the bridge while his crew was abandoning ship.
Waller would certainly have appreciated the double irony of his last action. Not only had his force run into the Japanese invasion fleet, but several transports had also been sunk by the Perth and Houston and these included the headquarters ship of General Imamura. To add to the irony, it is certain that several transports were hit by Japanese torpedoes in the cross fire. It would have been remarkable if this had not happened, because the Japanese launched a total of 85 torpedoes in the action.
The Perth's end was now imminent. About ten minutes after the second torpedo, a third struck well aft on the starboard side. “This was followed shortly afterwards by a fourth torpedo, which hit on the port side,” recorded Harper.
“The ship then righted herself, heeled over to port and sank about 0025....HOUSTON was still fighting although badly on fire. She was hit by torpedoes and sank shortly afterward rather closer inshore.
Most people abandoned ship between the second and third torpedoes. I do not think that any boats were successfully launched, but I did observe that the 2nd cutters had been lowered; this boat must have capsized due to the way of the ship. Many Carley rafts and the wood merchant ships’ life rafts were launched. While abandoning ship PERTH was under fire from several destroyers at close range and many hits were scored and casualties caused due to this. The pom pom ready use locker on the flag deck was hit and exploded, killing several of the flag deck and bridge personnel, who were descending from the bridge at the time. A hit was also received on the 4-inch gun deck. Many others were killed or wounded in the water by the explosion of the third and fourth torpedoes and by shells exploding in the water.”
During the time that the Perth was being abandoned, the ship was under heavy enemy fire, which caused many casualties. All told, 23 officers and 329 ratings were killed in action or in the water, or were missing, many having been driven out to sea with the strong current. Out of the total complement of 686 officers and ratings, only 218 men returned to their homes in Australia after the war. Many survivors died in the prison camps as a result of starvation and the lack of medical care.
The Perth sank a few miles to the northeast of St. Nicholas Point at around 0025 on 1 March. The time was confirmed by Lieutenant L. T. Burgess, who noted the exact time on his watch, which was still working. The time of sinking given by Professor Samuel Eliot Mori- son in his history of the action (namely, 0005) is definitely incorrect, as is also the track chart, which shows the action as having taken place mainly inside Banten Bay. Both the Japanese and Australian official histories are positive that the action took place to the north of Banten Bay. In fairness it must be stated that the track chart was prepared after the war by Rear Admiral A. Soji, who obviously had no clear idea of what had happened during the action. Why the Japanese admiral’s version should have been accepted by Professor Morison will never be known, but a glance at the chart of Banten Bay shows it to be decidedly shallow and an impossible location for a high-speed night action.
At 0025, the same time as the Perth sank, Captain Rooks ordered abandon ship on board the Houston. Now the full fury of the Japanese fleet was concentrated on the stricken cruiser. A few minutes later Captain Rooks, with several others, was killed by a shrapnel burst. Because the ship still had too much way on her to abandon ship safely. Commander David Roberts, the executive officer, canceled the order. Meanwhile, the men stood by their guns and fired off their remaining ammunition, including star shells. As the Houston slowed down, Japanese destroyers swarmed around her and poured in shells. They were so close that they machine gunned the quarterdeck where many survivors had congregated.
Commander Roberts ordered abandon ship at 0033. About 12 minutes later the gallant fighting cruiser rolled over and sank. As the survivors struggled in the water, they saw the ship’s ensign still flying as the Houston dipped below the calm waters of Sunda Strait. Of the 1,008 officers and men in the Houston, only about 370 survived the action, and only 266 eventually returned to the United States.
What is so incredible about this whole action is that neither cruiser was hit until after 2330, and the shell fire did relatively little damage at first. This must be put down almost entirely to the magnificent manner in which the two cruisers were fought and handled. Great credit is obviously due to the two cruiser captains.
The third phase of the action is briefly described in the official Japanese account and is quoted in full:
“At 0005 Admiral Hara had requested the time required for the Japanese destroyers to re-load their torpedo tubes. But at this time PERTH was already sinking. . . . she was sighted by the Japanese heavy cruisers on course 090° who opened fire at 7300 metres. PERTH sank at 0012 and the Japanese ceased fire. HOUSTON was sinking at 0016. The Japanese cruisers closed the range and opened fire at her at 0020, illuminating the target. HOUSTON was now helpless and her main armament silent. The destroyer SHIKINAMI was then ordered to finish off the American cruiser. At 0029 the destroyer fired one torpedo at HOUSTON, which sank at 0036.”
It will be noted from the above that the Japanese considered that the Perth had sunk at 0012, about 13 minutes before the actual time, and that the Houston sank earlier than she did (official U.S. records state it was 0045).
The Evertsen nearly escaped from the Japanese net. After leaving Tanjong Priok two hours after the cruisers, she reported seeing an engagement off St. Nicholas Point around midnight. She made Sunda Strait successfully, but was intercepted by two enemy destroyers before dawn and was driven ashore in a sinking condition on Selriku Island off the southern coast of Sumatra. So ended the Battle of Sunda Strait, a total victory for the Japanese. No warships of any size had been sunk, but the Allies were responsible for sinking the headquarters ship Sakura Maru, the minesweeper W-2, and two more transports. In addition, a cruiser and four destroyers were damaged.
The Australian light cruiser Perth and the U.S. heavy cruiser Houston were sunk. The Japanese bombarded the damaged British heavy cruiser Exeter and her two escorting destroyers, HMS Encounter and the USS Pope (DD-225). All three Allied ships were sunk as they attempted to escape on 1 March.
These are only subtotals, however, of the sum total of Allied warships lost as a consequence of these actions. After the Perth and Houston were sunk, the Dutch destroyer Evertsen was driven ashore, and the Dutch also scuttled two destroyers, two submarines, and four minelayers at Surabaya as a direct consequence of the Japanese victories.
These battles were fought against hopeless odds. In the end only four old U.S. destroyers survived to fight again, managing to escape because their shallow draft enabled them to pass through Bali Strait on the night of 28 February. Although they were sighted by three enemy destroyers, they escaped by simulating torpedo fire with dummy flashes.
Nothing was known of the fate of the Perth and Houston by the outside world until the end of 1944. Then the fog of war was lifted a little when U.S. submarines picked up large numbers of Allied survivors from Japanese transports they had sunk. Among them were four ratings from the Perth. These survivors of the battle gave a good account of what had happened to the two Allied ships and also the inhuman treatment they had received as prisoners of war on the Burma-Siam railway.
The great fight put up by the Perth and Houston was one of the most gallant in their navies’ histories, and certainly the only time in history that the White Ensign and the Stars and Stripes have fought together in a surface action and gone down, fighting to the end.