The 1898 Treaty of Paris not only ended the Spanish- American War, it brought about the sale of the Philippines from Spain to the United States for $20 million. However, this sum was to be but a small down payment for a war of colonial conquest, the Philippine Insurrection of 1899 to 1902, that would eventually cost $200 million and more American lives than the Spanish- American War.
The Philippines had been a Spanish colony since the 16th century. Because of the great distance between Madrid and Manila, Spain, from the beginning of its insular rule, pursued policies that would lessen the probability of a local rebellion.
The two major results of this philosophy were the failure of the natives to be taught a common language and a lack of national identity accepted by all who lived in the archipelago. The Roman Catholic clergy sent to christianize the people of the islands made sure to maintain many of the tribal distinctions of their flocks. The Spaniards, in effect, prevented the widespread use of their language and religion in creating an atmosphere where ideas of mass revolt could arise. The success of these tactics is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that a mere 7,000 soldiers and clergy were able to completely control seven million people until the end of Spanish rule in 1898.
The primary source of resistance to Madrid’s rule came from wealthy and educated Filipinos who were denied a voice in the local government. Many of these revolutionaries had visited and studied in the more liberal atmosphere of Europe. They protested the absolute rule of the Catholic Church and the governor general in the islands and the lack of representation for the Philippines within the Spanish Government. When the leading spokesman of this group, writer Jose Rizal, was executed in 1896, an organization for armed revolt was created, the Katipunan. The Spaniards had previously faced numerous revolts, especially in the southern islands, but because of their local nature the rebels had always been suppressed. The Katipunan, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, rose against Spain in 1896. Claiming widespread peasant support and communicating throughout the islands in Spanish, the revolt was only barely defeated.1
In 1897 Aguinaldo, temporarily beaten, accepted exile in Hong Kong while still maintaining control of the revolutionary movement. The most important results of the failed insurrection of 1896 were the formation of an insurgent army, the rise of a universally acceptable Filipino leader, and a sense of legitimacy for the Katipunaneros. When Commodore George Dewey’s fleet sailed into Manila Bay in the spring of 1898, an already-tested organization existed for overthrowing 300 years of Spanish rule and declaring an independent national government.
On 1 May 1898, Dewey sank the largest ships of the Spanish fleet assigned to defend the Spanish Far East.2 The Spaniards appealed to the Filipinos to defend their mother country and began issuing weapons to local militias. The Filipinos took the weapons, and under the leadership of the Katipunan started to drive their former masters from all of the islands, outposts, and towns except Manila. Dewey, knowing he could not hope to occupy the Philippines until 5,000 U. S. Army troops arrived, was happy to have the guerrilla army pin the Spanish in Manila. He brought the exiled Aguinaldo back from Hong Kong and gave his army any weapons they could find at the Cavite Naval Station. Soon the 30,000 to 40,000 men of the Filipino insurgent army were deployed and defeating the Spanish in almost every encounter.3
On 24 May 1898 Aguinaldo declared himself dictator until the end of hostilities and the creation of an independent nation. By 18 June the Filipinos felt confident enough to make a formal declaration of independence and accept, as a symbol of what they felt was their new sovereignty, 1,300 Spanish prisoners from Dewey. Thus by the end of June 1898, the people of the Philippines had declared themselves independent, formed a viable government, established a capital city at Malolos, and created, with the help of the U. S. Navy, an army. Spain, with its forces isolated in Manila and several minor garrisons in the archipelago, could only watch as its power forever ebbed away from the Orient. The first troops to come from the United States had not even arrived.4
It appears that Commodore Dewey never expected the United States to take all of the Philippines and establish a colony. He requested only 5,000 soldiers to take Manila, a number sufficient for that task but too small for taking the whole country.5 Regardless of what Dewey thought American policy was going to be, his early support for the rebels gave the U. S. Navy the unfortunate status of being a facilitator, on at least a superficial level, of the Philippine insurrection against Spain and—later—the United States.
On 30 June, General Thomas Anderson arrived with the lead elements of 15,000—three times Dewey’s requested number—U. S. Army troops to assist the insurgent army in taking Manila. Once the U. S. Army had landed in full force the Spaniards arranged to surrender to them instead of Aguinaldo.6 The Filipinos were kept out of the conquered city, but as Aguinaldo received reports from his contacts in Hong Kong that Spain was about to sell the Philippines to the United States, the insurgent army remained mobilized, encircling the American Army in Manila. Aguinaldo attempted to start negotiations for the full recognition of his nation by the United States with General Elwell Otis, commander of the American expeditionary force. General Otis, reflecting a shift in U. S. policy, ignored the Filipino demands and carefully avoided any actions that could be construed as legitimizing the Aguinaldo regime.
In December, General Otis began to expand his perimeter around Manila. On 4 February 1899, four Filipino soldiers refused to answer the challenge of an American sentry. Shots were fired and soon the U. S. Army, acting on prearranged plans, began to attack rebel positions encircling the capital city. The Philippine insurrection had started. The war can be analyzed in two distinct phases: the destruction of the standing insurgent army in pitched battles and the guerrilla war carried on by the survivors of the broken rebel army.
The mission of the U. S. Navy in this colonial war was “to cooperate with the Army and to maintain a blockade.”7 The Navy started to do its job from the beginning of military operations against the Filipinos. During the breakout from Manila by the Army, the 10-inch guns of the USS Monadnock shelled enemy positions south of Manila, and the USS Charleston pounded rebel troops to the north.8 Outfitting 16 captured Spanish gunboats, the U. S. Navy was also prepared to patrol the shallow coasts of the archipelago. But for all the success gained, the Fighting of February 1899 had been premature in that the U. S. Army still did not have enough troop strength present to subdue the islands. General Otis recalled his hard- charging columns to wait for another day.
By 1 June, Otis had the men to destroy the insurgent army, and for the second time U. S. soldiers began to march out of Manila. By then Cavite Naval Station was cut off from Manila by insurgent lines. One of the first priorities for the Americans was to open a path between the Army in Manila and the Navy in Cavite. The major obstacle between the two American enclaves was the Zapote River and a combined operation, the first of the war, was planned. U. S. Marines, present as guards at Cavite since 9 March 1899 when Dewey had asked for them, were to storm the town of Novaleta, directly in front of the naval station. The warships USS Monterey and USS Princeton were to defend Cavite while the assault took place. The flagship USS New York would protect the city of Manila while Army units marched and fought their way to the town of Las Pinas, crossed the Zapote River, and entered into Novaleta. The Marines were to receive fire support from the gunboat Petrel, and the Army was to get the help of the Navy ships Monadnock, Manila, Callao, and Helena. The Helena took General Henry Lawton and General Lloyd Wheaton, organizers of the operation, on a reconnaissance mission prior to the attack. The results of the cruise showed the insurgents to have installed three 6-inch guns in their defense lines. These weapons were quickly destroyed at the start of the offensive by the combined fire of the USS Monterey (which had 12-inch guns), the USS Princeton, and the USS Callao. The attack started on 13 June 1899 with the Navy ships opening up and the Army and Marine forces moving out.9
Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elliot, 356 Marines took the town of Novaleta, suffering two officers and nine enlisted men wounded from enemy fire and 50 casualties from heat prostration. The lead Army element ran into heavy opposition near the Zapote River and had to ask the nearby ships for assistance. The Monterey, Princeton, and Callao quickly put several launches in the water with Colt machine guns placed in the bow and 90 sailors serving as infantry. Hitting the rebels from an unexpected direction, the bluejackets were able to help save the Army van and to breach the Zapote River. Searchlights were used during the night of 13 June to direct naval gunfire at the retreating insurgents.10 The most significant Navy casualty was Captain Henry Nichols, who died of heat prostration while directing ships in softening up enemy lines on 10 June.11 Also on 10 June 1899, the battleship USS Oregon left Manila Bay to start a blockade of Lingayen Gulf.
Once he had secured Cavite with Manila, General Otis began driving the insurgent army to the north of Luzon. While the U. S. Army was steadily pushing Aguinaldo, the Navy continued to prepare for an insular campaign and blockade. So many ships were kept on station that plans for reestablishing the European Station of pre-Spanish- American War days had to be postponed. The Navy raised three sunken Spanish gunboats, the Don Juan de Austria, the Isla de Cuba, and the Isla de Luzon, and repaired them in Hong Kong for $305,000. The Navy then activated 14 other Spanish ships which had been captured intact. The task of these vessels and other warships of similar size was to cut all inter-island communications and strike incessantly against exposed land targets.
These gunboats and light-draft vessels like them were armed with 6-inch guns, 4.7-inch guns, rapid fire four- pounder and six-pounder guns, Gatling guns, and Colt machine guns. The only gunboat to fall into enemy hands was the Urdaneta, under the command of Midshipman W.C. Wood when she was stranded in shallow water and attacked.12 On 17 September 1899, Commander C.C. Cornwell of the Petrel recaptured the Urdaneta and avenged the deaths of Midshipman Wood and four men in his command who were also killed.13
By late 1899 the U. S. Navy was patrolling throughout the Philippine Islands and helping to bring creature comforts to the U. S. Army. The Celtic, the Glacier, and the Culgoa were refrigeration ships that brought beef, mutton, and ice from Australia. The USS Solace, a hospital ship, served both Army and Navy needs.14
By 1 November General Otis had captured the insurgent capital and pushed Aguinaldo deep into Luzon. Otis was becoming desperate to stop driving into the insurgents, only to have them run away; he wanted to contain and then annihilate them. The rough terrain, however, kept allowing the insurgent army to escape. Because Aguinaldo’s force was deployed just below the Gulf of Lingayen and U. S. Army troops were deployed below the Filipinos, General Otis saw an excellent opportunity to catch his enemy from two directions, from the land and from the sea.
On 6 November, General Wheaton left Manila for Lingayen Gulf with 2,500 men in the Princeton, Helena, Bennington, Samar, and various smaller gunboats. General Wheaton faced an opposed landing on the beaches of Lingayen Gulf, but when an ensign drove the Samar aground at a point 75 yards from rebel positions and let loose with all his weapons, Wheaton was able to land. Once deployed, the Army force was in a position to attack the Filipinos from behind and so delay any retreat that the main army force could destroy it. The only criticism of this tactical amphibious assault was a failure by Wheaton’s officers to patrol forward vigorously enough. Aguinaldo could have been captured on 14 November 1899 and the insurgency perhaps stopped if one of Wheaton’s battalion commanders had not retreated from a chance encounter with a strong Filipino force that included the enemy leader. The Lingayen operation was followed by a second expedition to clean up the last pocket of resistance in the south of Luzon. Two regiments were embarked in Manila in January of 1900 to strike at Albay province. The troops sailed on board the gunboats Helena and Mariveles, with the cruiser Nashville for gunfire support. Again resistance was encountered on the beach but was overcome with generous naval shelling.15 The province was secured, but the rebel leader, General Vincente Lucban, escaped to Samar, where he would continue fighting for two more years.16 The insurgents in the provinces of Cogayen and Isabella surrendered to the USS Nashville in 1899 in a spectacular coup for the Navy.17 The area was then turned over to the 16th Infantry.
Thus in 11 months the Filipino insurgent army had been defeated with the U. S. Navy playing a significant part in many major actions. But the war was not over and the U. S. death toll of 371 was to more than double as resistance went underground and spread to almost all the islands. The U. S. Army divided the Philippines into four sections—North Luzon, South Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao—to combat the new phase of warfare. Manila constituted an independent command. The Navy followed the Army example and sent its gunboats to wherever the Army called for them.18
Aguinaldo gave orders for intensified attacks against American garrisons and patrols as the U. S. presidential elections approached. The results of Aguinaldo’s politically motivated decision were three to six clashes with the enemy each day. Most of these fights were in the southern islands, and they again demonstrated the strong base of support Aguinaldo and his party had all over the archipelago. General Otis relinquished his command to General Arthur MacArthur, whose son Douglas would become closely involved with these islands during World War II. MacArthur swamped the islands with 70,000 troops in 502 separate garrisons, continued the tight grip of the naval blockade, and set about to capture the man who had been behind the insurrection from the beginning, Emilio Aguinaldo.
By spring of 1901 the U. S. military had gained information on the location of the key rebel leader. General Fredrick Funston formulated a plan whereby he and a small group of soldiers, disguised as prisoners of friendly Filipinos posing as insurgents, would walk right into Aguinaldo’s camp and take him dead or alive, preferably the latter. On 9 March 1901 the USS Vicksburg loaded Funston and his mixed group and sailed to Palanan Bay, where the unit was let off, six sailing days from Manila. By 18 March the Vicksburg had recovered the special squad and the prize of their successful mission, Aguinaldo, and was returning to headquarters. The pivotal role of the Navy in capturing President Aguinaldo is laden with irony since it was in another U. S. Navy ship that he had returned to the Philippines to start his fight for independence three years earlier.19
The capture of Aguinaldo marked the end of any reasonable hope for a Filipino victory. He announced his allegiance, for the present, to the United States and urged his followers to surrender. General Malvar, who initially refused to heed Aguinaldo, fought until 16 April 1902. General Lucban surrendered in February of 1902. Commissioner William Taft entered into an agreement with the Pope on 5 June 1902 whereby all Spanish friars, long hated by the peasants, were removed and 400,000 acres of church land were purchased for $7,200,000 and returned to 60,000 Philippine farmers. These actions destroyed much of the popular support for resistance and garnered respect for the American regime. The many victories, political and military, of early 1902 allowed President Theodore Roosevelt to declare the Philippine insurrection over on 4 July 1902.20
The long insurrection had, from the start, involved the U. S. Navy. The Army joined soon after with its dispatch of occupation troops. The U. S. Marines, excluding the many who were on Navy ships and were rotated ashore to pull guard duty, came to the Philippines in 1899 in answer to Commodore Dewey’s call for help in defending Cavite. The First Battalion was made of 15 officers and 260 enlisted men who mustered on the East Coast, were given the best equipment, and sent across the continent by rail to Army transports which sailed them across the Pacific in a month. Rear Admiral Watson, replacing Dewey, quickly called for another battalion of 16 officers and 362 men. who were shipped over like the first. These Marines soon (the ones they had could not be safely used because the heat they radiated would kill the cooks in the tropics) and better racks. It was this original group of Marines who participated in the Battle of Novaleta and helped the gunboats Callao and Samar take the island of Vigan. Most importantly, this first group of leathernecks took and secured Olongapo, Subic Bay, now the largest overseas U. S. naval base.
Because of all these Marine activities. Admiral Watson’s successor. Rear Admiral George Remey, requested even more Marines for Philippine service. Remey had made an agreement with General Otis that the Navy would defend and hold all former Spanish naval installations. Unfortunately, before Remey could completely accomplish this task—and the Marines at Olongapo were there for that reason—the Boxer Rebellion broke out in China- The U. S. Marines were ordered to defend American interests in China for most of 1900 and thus left the Army to defend the sites the Navy had wanted to hold exclusively. By the time the Marines returned, all of the intense fighting near their assigned areas had finished and the Marines came back to a job of pacification rather than active combat except in one instance.21
All during the Boxer Rebellion the Navy kept requesting more Marines to make up for those sent to China, so that by 1901, when the China Marines had returned, there were 64 officers and 1,934 U. S. Marines ashore. The Marine Corps at this time in its history had only 6,062 men, so the strength allotted to the Philippine garrisons was an amazing 33%.22 The primary purpose of the Marines was to defend Navy sites, although as noted they took part in several significant but short offensive operations. They were carrying out this mission when a new Army commander started asserting U. S. control of islands such as Cebu, Mindanao, and Samar in 1901. The Marines were soon to get an opportunity to join in the combat they had had to leave for the Army in 1900.
General Adna Chaffee, MacArthur’s replacement, had decided to finish off the insurrection by sending troops to garrison almost every inhabited island. On the island of Samar one of his companies was massacred in a surprise Sunday morning attack that created a small military emergency. The Marines were asked to send a battalion to the southern portion of that island in the latter part of 1901. A veteran of China, Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller was given command of the Marines and placed under the authority of U. S. Army General Jacob Smith. This was to be the only time the Marines actively operated in a hostile environment as a maneuver battalion for any length of time.
Incredibly, General Smith gave orders to “kill and burn, kill and burn, the more you kill the more you please me” and to “make the interior a howling wilderness.” The Marines thus started on a series of search-and-destroy operations that burned hundreds of houses and killed dozens of suspected rebels. The Marines did not obey General Smith’s most odious order, which was to kill every native over ten who had not sworn allegiance to the United States. A quick discussion between Major Waller and his officers found that order as being morally wrong. One of the most spectacular operations of the war was carried out when the Marines assaulted General Lucban’s headquarters on the Sohoton cliffs of Samar. The two lieutenants who led the charge were later given the Medal of Honor for their reckless scaling of the enemy-held cliffs protected by, among other things, bamboo cages filled with rocks positioned to crush any attacker.
The most significant occurrence of the Marines’ stay on Samar resulted from an incredible and hellish forced march across the island by Major Waller and 50 of his men. Only Waller and five men completed the entire trip. Ten died of malnutrition and exhaustion, and the remainder were compelled to turn around and rejoin Waller by being lifted around the island in a gunboat. The most important event in the march was a mutiny of the Filipino porters after Waller had left the main group to try and get help for his men. Upon hearing of the mutiny, which occurred when the Filipinos attacked the lieutenant left in charge, and of the treacherous manner in which the natives had acted, Major Waller ordered eleven of them executed or, to use his own word, “expended.” By the time this relatively minor incident had occurred, reports of so much brutality had reached Congress that someone was going to have to be punished. Major Waller was accused of murder and put before a court-martial in what amounted to trying to make a scapegoat out of a Marine for the excesses of the Army and General Smith. During his court-martial. Waller told of his orders from Smith and was eventually acquitted with General Smith finally taking the blame and being forced into retirement.23
The U. S. Marines and the U. S. Navy had played a significant role in the Philippine Insurrection from its distinct beginning to its hazy finish. A brief review of some of the major events will be perhaps beneficial in highlighting some of the more relevant and timely lessons of the war. The U. S. Navy discovered that it needed a flotilla of small gunboats with men ready to go ashore and fight in order to maintain an effective blockade. The Navy established a system to move men out of the war zone after they had completed a tour of specified time and was still able to maintain efficient ship operations. Perhaps of greatest value, in light of World War II and Korea, U. S. naval operations in the Philippines gave the Army, Navy, and Marines a chance to learn and practice amphibious assault against a determined opponent. The U. S. Marines learned about jungle fighting and search and destroy. They discovered the inadequacies of much of their equipment, including tents and uniforms, for the tropics. Significantly, the Marine Corps began to increase in size after the insurrection as the Philippine operations showed the U. S. Congress that the Navy needed a Corps able to secure and defend its yards worldwide.
1. John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, (Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Inc., 1973), pages 10-13.
2. A. S. Crowninshield, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1898), pages 50-60.
3. F. D. Millet, The Expedition to the Philippines, (New York and London: Harper and Brother’s Publishers, 1899).
4. James Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, (New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1913).
5. George Dewey, Autobiography of Admiral George Dewey, (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1913).
6. Oscar Davis, Our Conquests in the Pacific, (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes Company, 1899).
7. Secretary of the Navy John Long, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), page 1.
8. Uldarico Baclagan, Philippine Campaigns, (Manila: Graphic House, 1952).
9. Edward Eberle, “The Navy’s Cooperation in the Zapote River Campaign,’’ U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1900, pages 105-112.
10. Ibid.
11. Secretary of the Navy John Long, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1899, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899).
12. Ibid.
13. Secretary of the Navy John Long, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900).
14. Secretary of the Navy John Long. Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1899, (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1899).
15. Uldarico Baclagan, Philippine Campaigns, (Manila: Graphic House, 1952).
16. Jules Archer, The Philippines Fight for Freedom, (London: Crowell-Collier Press, 1970).
17. Secretary of the Navy John Long, Annual Reports of the Navy for the Year of 1901, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. James Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1913).
21. Reports of Marine Corps Commandants, Annual Reports of the Department of the Navy for the Years 1899-1903, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899- 1903).
22. Secretary of the Navy William Moody, Annual Reports of the Department of the Navy for the Year 1903, (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1903).
23. John L. Schott, The Ordeal of Samar. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.. Inc., 1964). See also Captain Paul Mclshen, USMCR, “He Served on Samar,” Proceedings. November 1979, pages 43-48.