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During the past decade, the United States has improved its amphibious capability dramatically. The most impressive improvement has occurred in the Marine Corps’s thunder-and-lightning specialty—the amphibious raid, largely neglected until the terrorism crises of the late 1970s. The Marine Corps rejuvenated the amphibious raid when it implemented the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU [SOC]) program. Its application of technology and its focused training have produced a force capable of precision actions in an objective area. Despite this significant improvement, we have not fully realized the amphibious raid’s potential. It is essentially tactical, but it can also have a strategic impact. It can provide this nation with the capability of discriminate use of force. The amphibious raid will be the military operation of the 1990s and beyond.
The combatant on the ground is the ultimate means of influencing events in a conflict. The ability to place an armed force on another nation’s territory and contest its sovereignty has profound political and psychological effects—far greater than bombardment. Political constraints and the inability to achieve local naval and air superiority over an extended period can preclude a prolonged engagement on foreign soil. Under such circumstances, a force capable of swift armed incursion—and equally rapid retraction—offers great political and military value.
U. S. military forces have successfully used the raid throughout history, as evidenced by the exploits of “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion of the American Revolution, the Confederacy’s John Mosby during the Civil War, and the World War II actions of the Marine Raider battalions. However, the task of raiding has become increasingly complex as new weapons and early-warning systems have made surprise much harder to attain. The Son Tay raid in Vietnam may have failed to achieve its specified mission, but it did have two important results: First, the raid force’s long-range penetration demonstrated that the United States was capable of such operations. Second, our ability to violate North Vietnamese sovereignty had an unsettling effect on them. The Israeli raid at Entebbe in
1976 confirmed the need and value of such a capabi i ^ However, U. S. mastery of the capability has been e sive, as demonstrated by the debacle at Desert One 1980, some ten years after Son Tay. . ^
Today, the United States must wrestle with the pro of how to execute a military strike wherever it is ne the world, from a declining number of U. S. bases, three-quarters of the world’s population in close ProX'nijty to the sea, the answer to these problems lies in the a to launch military strikes from a sea-based posture. the Marine Corps’s perspective, improving the amp ous raid provides a definitive solution to these Pt0°~qC)
The Marine Corps’s announcement of the MEU( ^ program was initially met with skepticism. In 1987. tenant Colonel Hensman, Royal Marines, wrote *n Marine Corps Gazette that “A Marine battalion, trains ^ raiding techniques, is simply not special enough to un ^ take the sort of ‘surgical’ operations normally expect _ a special force.” The skeptics were not aware of the m sity of the program then under way. Since that time' ^ MEU(SOC) program has achieved significant results^ shown by the takedowns of oil platforms in the Per Gulf in 1988. Ma.
Unfortunately, many individuals, including sornerf0vv rines, tend to judge the MEU(SOC) capability by a na j (0 standard—the rescue of hostages in extremis. They ' y recognize the broad utility of the amphibious raid- force launched from the sea for a limited objective aSk°r jU a noncombatant evacuation operation, for example'""' be executing some variation of the amphibious raid-
Sea based Counterinsurgency Operations: Desp'te ,, optimistic belief that world peace may be “breaking o ^ with the warming of superpower relations, 32 con were ongoing at the end of 1988.1 Of these, °n ^OIlS. could be considered a conventional war between natl The remainder were predominantly insurgent in nJ -s. including some forms of ethnic, civil, or religious up^ ings. And 24 of these conflicts were accessible by Insurgent movements may establish their bases ot oP1,
Aslhe use of military force becomes more politically constrained anti is launched more from bases at sea, amphibious raids can provide a discriminating use of force, with high impact for relatively few assets used.
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The use of military force is always an expensive pr°P^ sition. But the cost of using military force in the
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Marines could deliver a coup de main—a sudden attack in force—as a raid on a nation’s capital or other population center, since most lie near coastlines. (Here, Marines descend by rope from a CH-46 during Valiant Usher-88).
tions in lightly populated hinterlands, but they must inevitably move toward the coastal plains to secure the popular support they need for survival.
These trends in conflict have certain implications for the United States, which must respond when its interests overseas are threatened. One promising course of action was proposed by former Commandant Robert H. Barrow in a paper entitled “Seabased Counterinsurgency,” which he wrote as a student at the National War College in 1968. He advocated a counterinsurgency concept in which strikes could be launched against insurgent forces from a sea- based posture. (This concept is also applicable to the support of an insurgent movement.) Some 20 years after General Barrow wrote this paper, the concept is beginning to receive the attention it deserves.
The use of a -sea-base from which discriminating strikes can be launched against insurgents (or counterinsurgents) provides a number of advantages over land-based efforts. Overland movement in most Third World countries is inhibited by poor roads and restrictive terrain. In such an environment, a sea-based force relying on the mobility of amphibious ships and on-board assault aircraft, can readily outmaneuver indigenous forces. It also becomes increasingly difficult for opposing forces to respond in kind to this threat from the sea. Most Third World insurgent groups lack a credible antiship capability, which offers an amphibious task force the ability to operate at sea with relative impunity. In the event that political constraints or opposing military capabilities prevent shipping from operating close to the shore, an amphibious task force can find sanctuary and still operate beyond the range of a nation’s coastal defense systems.
Third World conflict situations may sometimes require an amphibious force to operate ashore for prolonged periods of time, in order to provide military training to local forces or to conduct civil affairs operations. By basing most of the logistical effort at sea, we can limit the support infrastructure ashore. Large shore facilities present vulnerable, high-profile targets, and they can also create entanglements. Withdrawing from overseas commitments is often more difficult than maintaining them, after a certain point.
General Barrow’s concept is particularly applicable in today’s security environment and most notably in the Philippines. This country consists of about 7,000 islands in an area of roughly 116,000 square miles. This region is essentially a maritime theater, and counterinsurgency operations would require the use of the seas for mobility and logistical support.
The Coup de Main: As the threat of conflict increases in the Third World, so can the impact of the amphibious raid. The amphibious raid can produce decisive results against maverick nations. Raids can secure the seat of political
authority in a nation’s capital or in other economic or litical centers, in addition to striking purely military ta gets. This use of force for such a purpose traditionally a been termed the coup de main.
The coup de main can succeed against those Tlj1^. World nations in which the ruling elite dictates the will the nation. By targeting military force against those a thorities whose policies are detrimental to the fnlte States, its allies, or even the people of the target nati°n' we can paralyze or even cause the collapse of the g°ver^ ment. In such nations, the economic and political power generally concentrated in the capital city. Poor commun cations usually keeps these nations from being able to e tend political authority effectively over the countrys1 ' Therefore, the political target, the seat of policy-maklllr authority, has greater value than the military targets- being used for this purpose should recognize that the corf de main is a less costly but more effective course of actl , than engaging opposing military forces in outlying are The proliferation of weapons in the Third World has ma ^ the task of achieving victory over military forces tn particularly formidable. As Army Chief of Staff Gene ^ Carl E. Vuono pointed out in a recent article in the Ar,,u Forces Journal, each of six developing countries has m j tanks than the U. S. Army has in Europe. Moreover, countries outside the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances believed to possess a chemical warfare capability-
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World in terms of men and material may be higher than United States may be able to tolerate. At the same tin1 •
'^e United States may have little choice but to use military 0rce. When a Third World despot is involved, the coup de ntain may be the only reasonable alternative.
Using the amphibious raid for such a purpose is not In the early 1980s, the Advanced Amphibious Study roup examined the coup de main by an amphibious ,Jrt'e. Their study recognized the impact of previous c°ups de main, such as Copenhagen (1940), Norway (1940), Prague (1968), and Kabul (1980). It cites the examPle of Copenhagen; in 1940, a German battleship sailed P^t the harbor defenses and disembarked an infantry bat- ta*i°n that quickly secured the palace and the Danish military high command.
Naval forces are well suited for the coup de main. Most °P the world’s urban centers are within ten miles of a c°astline. The centers beyond that distance will also be- c°tne accessible when the MV-22 Osprey enters the Ma- ririe Corps inventory. This aircraft’s speed and range will also enhance the ability to achieve surprise. Historically, CaPital cities have often been vulnerable to surprise at- j,acks. In addition, the spearhead of the Marine Corps’s lorcible entry capability has been sharpened with the fUU(SOC)’s improved capabilities in house-to-house l8hting.
The coup de main can be executed as a raid, with several variations. The size of the force required may deterge its time on the ground. The larger the force, the °nger the time required for extraction. While most raids are characterized by violence in the objective area, the use 0f force in the coup de main can be constrained to avoid e]vilian casualties. However, offshore fire support, in- c,uding the use of missiles, may be necessary to intimidate
Military and political leadership, as well as to isolate the City
, Whether or not a coup de main is required, amphibious °rces will need to consider the amphibious raid for urban "Uervention in the future. U. S. embassies, airfields, and j?0rt facilities necessary for the introduction of follow-on °rces, as well as other U. S. interests, are usually located lri °r near population centers.
■4 Peripheral Raiding Strategy in General War: Am- Pkibious raids may serve two broad purposes in general 'Var: to support a continental or maritime major campaign °r to aid a nation with no other recourse in its effort to Co,ttinue a stalemated war. In a major campaign, raids . ay force an enemy to disperse his forces, divert his atten- ‘0l>, or deny use of vital facilities, equipment, or an area, ke use of amphibious raids to break open a stalemate ^'ght be considered a strategy of weakness and is of mar- ^ltlal military value, but it can have tremendous political Usefulness. It can remind an opponent—as well as one’s civilian populace—that the war is still on. More im- P0rtant, raids of any kind may encourage allies either to er,ter or to remain in the war.
The Napoleonic War illustrated the value of brief am- UUibious incursions into an enemy-occupied continental andmass. After 1795, the French essentially pushed the ^r'tish off the continent. Until they reestablished a firm °°thold in Portugal in 1808, the British attempted a number of amphibious operations on the continent. These landings occurred on the periphery of French military power, and they failed to achieve any worthwhile military objectives, largely because the technology necessary to build up combat power rapidly did not exist. Each of the landings ended in a withdrawal. The far greater political significance of these relatively brief incursions was noted by naval historian Piers Mackesy.2 These operations favorably influenced the conduct of Austria and the German powers, and encouraged Russia to enter the war. In conjunction with other aspects of British maritime power, the landings contributed to the formulation of a successful coalition against the French and subsequently the opening of a second front on the continent.
Amphibious raids could contribute to a similar result in the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this scenario, it would logically be to the Soviet Union’s advantage to wage a one-front war in Europe. The Soviets would seek this objective by isolating and/or neutralizing their peripheral opponents outside Europe. However, in his writings on the relationship of the Pacific to global strategy, Colin Gray described the efforts that could create a second front in the Soviets’ strategic rear.3 He points to the value of a peripheral raiding strategy in the Pacific and notes that amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset a sea-based power possesses. While the United States could not expect to establish its military forces on Soviet territory in Asia, the use of raids in conjunction with other diplomatic and military initiatives could encourage another continental ally to enter the war. These attacks on the Soviets’ strategic rear would deny them a war confined to a single front and alter the balance of power.
Summary: Too many individuals subscribe to the false belief that the Marine Corps is only a bit player in national security. They are focusing on the size of the Marine Corps relative to other services as well as the tactical nature of the Corps’s employment. But these people fail to understand the strategic context in which the Marine Corps can play. The use of military force will become increasingly politically constrained and primarily confined to bases at sea. In such an environment, the amphibious raid will provide a discriminating use of force that can have a disproportionate value compared to its small size. These strikes from the sea will be the Marine Corps’s mainstay in tomorrow’s world.
'Robert Sollen, “The World at War,” The Nation, 9 January 1989, p. 46.
2Piers Mackesy, “The Problems of an Amphibious Power,” The Naval War College Review, Spring 1978, pp. 16-25.
-’Colin Gray, “Western Security and the Pacific—A Geopolitical Perspective,” NATO Sixteen Nations, April 1987, pp. 42-47.
Major Linn is currently serving with 1st Bn, 2nd Marines. Prior to that, he served in the service plans division at Headquarters Marine Corps- He was a platoon commander during the evacuation of Saigon and Phnom Penh, a recon company commander, and an operations officer with the 9th MAB. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Airborne and Ranger schools, and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, where he was also an instructor in terrorism counteraction and counterinsurgency.