This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Slack Programs Threaten Budget
The Soviet pressure for arms limitation comes at a time of increasing udget pressure in the United States. There are forecasts of at least five years of real budget decline beginning in fiscal year 1989. This problem complicated by the emergence of numerous new procurement pro- ®rams, many of them developed secretly during the Reagan administra- - The effect of such “black-” development was to conceal the extent 0 which entirely new programs would emerge in the 1990s, partly beCause black programs were not subject to the usual series of acquisition ev'ews early in their lives.
*ne most public example is the new B-2 strategic bomber, the an- ounced cost of which is about $512 million. The budgetary effect of B-2 Production would be greatly to increase the relatively low fraction of the • o. budget devoted to strategic nuclear systems. In addition, because
, e B-2 has a limited internal bomb load, the character of the strategic mber force would change: The force would no longer be a useful ans of quickly delivering large quantities of conventional bombs to jj. lrd World battlefields. It might be argued that this nonstrategic role is, Pranything, more important now that strategic warfare is improbable.
°m the U. S. Navy’s point of view, the loss of Air Force long-range • Pability inherent in production of the'B-2 might be used to justify a rger carrier force.
1 bis situation is not as novel as it might appear at first blush. Through early- to mid-1950s, all three U. S. military services struggled to
exploit ons
a series of radical new technologies: jet aircraft, nuclear weap- computers, and missiles. Research programs were conducted on a basis, and there was no central review process to determine e<her they were affordable. The Navy’s crisis came in about 1957 en overruns in the shipbuilding and conversion account could not be . e any longer. The overruns were a natural consequence of aggres- ely exploiting new technology; they could not have been avoided. The fe Was a series of painful project cancellations, many associated partly b the decision to deploy the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic mis- 1 ® °n a crash basis.
1 he consequence of the projects during the 1950s was the decision that ense procurement had to be managed more tightly, an initiative assorted with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, whose Sacy includes the series of planning and programming techniques now planned in the acquisition review process and in the rolling five-year
These techniques are best suited to a situation in which technology is ature enough to be predictable. Requirements can be written and spe- 'p technological choices made to meet them. By way of contrast, in a I n°B °f rapid technological change it is impossible to know in advance or!' W^at a 8*ven technology can do. The requirements and review pro- acts as a dangerous straitjacket. It is also a bureaucratic straitjacket
By Norman Friedman
Blackness was a solution. Programs could be begun without much external review and they could emerge so mature as to be difficult to cancel. Without knowledge of the new technologies developed in the black, it is impossible to say how many programs have evaded bureaucratic control and how many represent advances so dramatic as to change the rules of the game. It is clear that something like the McNamara program purge is at hand; no realistic budget can support production of all the new systems.
Now there are two key differences from the early 1960s. One is the much greater power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, numerous news reports suggest that General Larry D. Welch, the Air Force Chief, will likely succeed Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., as Chairman. Because the Air Force has been the chief exponent of blackness in development, it seems unlikely that General Welch will cheerfully recommend the death of black programs. The other key difference may be Mikhail Gorbachev. If the immediate Soviet threat actually declines, it may be wise to cut the U. S. defense budget by reducing U. S. standing forces and by cutting the production of current systems in favor of futuristic systems now in development.
Spain to Break Up Soviet Warships
For the first time, the Soviet Union is using a foreign ship-breaker for its warships. In November 1988, two Kanin-class destroyers, the Boikiy (“Valiant”) and Zhguchiy (“Ardent”), were towed out of the Northern Fleet toward Ferrol, Spain, where they were to have been broken up by the Mata Company. The Boikiy ran aground off Norway, near where a floating dock intended for the Northern Fleet ran aground some years ago. The destroyer is apparently a total loss, lying on her side. Fler sister ship reached Spain, and may be the first of at least 14 ships, reportedly including diesel submarines, to be broken up there.
The Kanins are not the oldest surviving Soviet destroyers; the Soviets still operate numerous Kotlins and even some Skoryys. The two ships now discarded are the ones that visited Boston in 1975.
For many years it has been suggested that the Soviet naval fleet includes a substantial number of obsolete, and essentially inoperable, units. It is possible that the decision to break up ships now, and to do so publicly in the West, is intended to reinforce claims that actual Soviet naval strength is more limited than the figures published in the West suggest. That in turn would be consistent with a Soviet drive toward some form of naval arms limitation.
In another push for arms limitation, Mikhail Gorbachev announced in December at the United Nations that during the next two years (1989-
cess
that
'vhich
t restrains the development of systems that are not really new, and
are likely to have costly consequences.
l>
r°ceedings/ February 1989
119
91) the Soviet Army is to be reduced by 500,000 combat troops—i.e., by about 10%—and that Soviet armored forces would be substantially reduced—scrapping about 10,000 tanks. In addition, the bridging equipment now held in Eastern Europe for offensive operations would be moved back into the Soviet Union. Troop reductions would be made in Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Gorbachev also called for a ceasefire in place in Afghanistan. Perhaps most important, he appeared to call for an abandonment of the ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy.
The troop cut is dramatic, but smaller than had been predicted; demographic factors may be forcing Gorbachev’s hand. The Soviets are finding it difficult to meet draft quotas, and reportedly there is pressure to reduce the current term of service. There have also been reports that draft deferments will have to be curtailed. That in turn must concern that Soviet ruling and professional classes, who are the main constituents of the ruling Party and whose support Gorbachev requires. Western reports of the troop cut emphasized the controversy it was causing within the Soviet Union.
The Afghan guerrillas have rejected the ceasefire in place on the ground that it would preserve a collapsing Afghan government. Despite this rejection, talks between the Soviets and the Afghan guerrillas have continued, aimed at the repatriation of Soviet troops held by the Afghans. It may be that the Soviet proposal was intended mainly to show that the Soviets would make a reasonable (but not excessive) effort to stand behind their Afghan allies.
Rejection of the status quo has been the central fact of Soviet foreign policy since 1917. The Soviet Union sees itself as a revolutionary state, the center of an ongoing (and inevitable) world revolution. That point of view is inconvenient for any Soviet government seeking trade relations with non-communist states, which may legitimately wonder whether they are not merely assisting in their own downfall. Soviet governments have, therefore, periodically renounced world revolution, the most blatant example being Joseph Stalin’s support of a series of popular fronts (and then of the wartime alliance) before and during World War II. One might see Leonid Brezhnev’s detente in a similar cynical light. Certainly Soviet subversion in the Third World continued in parallel with approaches to the West.
Gorbachev may be somewhat different, if only because he has told his people that the West is not weakening as predicted, i.e., that the old revolutionary theory of future history is not quite proceeding as the Marxist prophecy would have it. However, such a policy carries significant dangers for Gorbachev himself; Soviet leadership can be precarious. In particular, one might see the past and current excesses of the Soviet state officially justified by the vision of world revolution—a better future world at the expense of a miserable present. If any Soviet leader admits that the vision is (and, by extension, always was) flawed, then the system itself is inevitably brought into question. Many in the Soviet Union have paid heavily for, or have benefited heavily from, the current political system. They may not find radical change particularly attractive.
Gorbachev can show little if any material improvement for his years in office. He can show internal unrest on an unprecedented scale, and his domestic enemies can point to that unrest as evidence of his unfitness for office. He can argue that it takes a long time to reverse the unfavorable trends developed during years of incompetent government (i.e., under Brezhnev), and that he inherited the 1986-1990 five-year plan too late to change it very much. Thus the period from 1990 on must be crucial to his success, and possibly to his survival. Given these considerations, Gorbachev almost certainly needs to avoid foreign problems; hence his willingness to abandon an overtly antagonistic foreign policy.
The question is whether Gorbachev can easily reverse, having once abandoned that policy as a tactical move tied to internal Soviet considerations. For example, if he really needs to rebuild Soviet industry and infrastructure, and if the armed forces are the only available source of the required capital, then he needs a long period of peace. If the price of greater industrial efficiency is dispersed responsibility, then it may no longer be so easy for the Kremlin of the future to shift gears back toward greater military confrontation. Most important, it appears that the drive for more individual initiative ultimately requires a guarantee that those exercising that responsibility will not be subject to later arbitrary penalties. That in turn requires a degree of self-limitation on the part of the Soviet government, something unprecedented in Russian/Soviet history. The degree to which the Soviet Union becomes a government of laws rather than one of men would in turn suggest the degree to which Gorbachev’s new foreign policy is likely to be permanent.
Armilla Patrol Ceases Escort Duties
Britain has announced that with the end of the Iran-Iraq War. the British Armilla Patrol in the Persian Gulf would cease escorting merchant ships through the Gulf, and that its minesweepers there wou begin to try to clear the remaining mines in the Gulf. The Armilla Patro , in place since 1980, has escorted l ,026 ships since that practice began in 1987, including 621 in 1988. The patrol now consists of three frigates (two Type-22s and the modernized Leander-class frigate Jupiter) arme with Seawolf point-defense missiles. Although escort operations have ended, the patrol will remain on station as one of the more pressing British out-of-area responsibilities.
This operation is important to the Royal Navy as a reminder to the British government of a continuing requirement for naval forces outside of the NATO area. Although the British defense budget for 1989-9 shows a modest increase, British naval forces have been under intense pressure, particularly as the costs of the new Trident nuclear-powere ballistic-missile submarine program have come due.
The minesweeping operation is being conducted under the aegis of the Western European Union (WEU), of which Britain is now chairman. The WEU was formed in 1948 by Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg). Italy and West Germany joined in 1954, and both countries rearmed under WEU auspices. Even so, the Union had little practical significance, and was considered Prl" marily a precursor to the NATO alliance. Since 1984, however, it has been much more active. A recent British official statement described it as “a politically conscious ‘ginger group’ designed to develop a European defence identity and to strengthen the Alliance’s European pillar. It also has a treaty basis for cooperation on out of area issues.”
That might be translated to mean that the WEU is a potential basis for a future West European political/defense community operating more or less integrated naval forces. Some have suggested that the revival of the WEU was a consequence of European surprise at the more activist U. S. foreign policy of the 1980s, including the decision to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It might also be suggested that Western Europe will want to pursue a more independent (of the United States), and more unified (among the members), policy after the Common Market’s integration, scheduled for 1992. The WEU was apparently important enough for Spain and Portugal to join this year. Of the West European NATO members, only Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Turkey have not joined the WEU; Norway and Turkey are not Common Market members.
The Soviet KGB Border Guard Muravey-class patrol boat 094, one of four or more in service, was photographed in the Baltic in 1988. The 230-ton Muravey is hydrofoil-equipped, though no sign of the foils is visible, and is powered by two 12,000- horsepower gas turbines. Armament includes a 76.2-inm. dual-purpose gun forward, a 30-mm. Gatling antiaircraft gun aft, two 400-mm. ASW torpedo tubes, and two depth-charge racks. A helicopter-type dipping sonar is mounted centerline at the stern.
Rare Shot of KGB Patrol Boat
120
Proceedings / February 1989