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“Reopen the Kimmel Case”
(See M. Gannon, pp. 51-56, December 1994
Proceedings)
Edwin P. Calouro—My first reaction upon seeing yet another feature article concerning Admiral Husband E. Kim- mel’s culpability for the Pearl Harbor disaster was: “Why is this being dealt with again in 1994?” After all, hadn’t the subject received adequate treatment in the 50th anniversary issues of Proceedings and Naval History? But, after twice reading Dr. Gannon’s article, I have changed my mind.
Through the years, I have attempted to keep abreast of the Pearl Harbor historiography. I have carefully read most of the secondary materials, including Gordon Prange’s three books. I was disappointed with Dr. Prange’s historical verdict, but being an historian by avocation, I was not in a position either to review the mountainous primary sources or dispute such an authority as Dr. Prange.
Then along comes Dr. Gannon to set the record straight. He clearly, cohesively, and cogently argued that Admiral Kimmel was judged unfairly on the specific charge that he failed to provide for adequate long-range aerial reconnaissance.
It is indeed unfortunate that two former Chiefs of Naval Operations—Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost—accepted as accurate the historical record as it was presented to them. After they retired—and, therefore, with diminished effect—both men requested that their previous endorsements of damning reports or memorandum be expunged.
I second Admiral Trost’s recommendation to Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton that Admiral Kimmel’s case be reopened. It is seldom too late to make amends for a past injustice. □
“Rethinking the Joint Task Force”
(See T. J. McKearney, pp. 54-57, November 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Joseph Lyons, U.S. Navy (Retired), Principal Systems Analyst, Logicon, Inc.—Commander McKearney uncovers many warts in the “joint" business but none of them more important than communications.
Presently, the Navy is the laughing stock of other services’ communicators who plan, staff, and operate joint-taskforce-communications networks. This attitude in turn reflects a decades-old Navy perspective that terrestrial tactical communications were of little interest to naval forces because of the profound philosophical and technical differences between naval and land combat.
In years past this attitude was both understandable and affordable; it is no longer. As Commander McKearney observed, “the Navy’s communications mindset needs to be changed.” Regardless of their appropriateness in a given situation, joint task forces (JTFs) are here to stay and the Navy must become a full participant in JTF terrestrial communication systems, not just a part-time adjunct to them. This means acknowledging that the land services (to include the Air Force) expect to communicate over digital telephone systems wherein one picks up a handset, hears a dial tone, and dials the desired party’s number exactly as is done in garrison—of course, with the needed security and preemption capabilities. Not just a select few on the afloat staff, but everyone who needs to coordinate with other service counterparts must have access to this communications capability. Commander McKearney’s reference to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) illuminates this problem. As an equal participant in the JTF communications backbone, a naval force commander would be able to participate in drafting the ATO—not just respond to it. Analogies to the dial telephone exist in data communications as well. Unfortunately. merely moving the force commander ashore to a communications van does not eliminate the need to talk to units afloat.
Currently, in an attempt to satisfy the requirement, the Navy is buying small commercial sets of switching equipment to install on major flagships. These switches are supposed to provide entrance into the JTF terrestrial switched systems. However, because they are being procured in a vacuum, successful interoperability is unlikely. The Navy consistently has refused to participate in the joint fora where interoperability issues are identified and resolved. The Navy’s absence from the Joint Publication 6-05 Series (Joint Tactical Communications) Joint Working Group—which controls a series of joint tactical publications (“man-
Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s To Be Learned—20
Exploding the Mine Warfare Myth—20
A True Force in Readiness—22
So You Want to be a Flag Lieutenant?—22
Tell the Selection Board What Counts—23
Upset at Tishomingo—23
Cleansing Maneuver Warfare Doctrine—24
On Your Wing—24
Alone, Unarmed ... and Unavailable—25
Keeping a Cohesive-and-Gender- Integrated-Squadron—25
The Future Is Attack Helicopters—26
Speak Softly and . . .—27
Contents:
Reopen the Kimmel Case—15
Rethinking the Joint Task Force—15
The Tank Is Dead:
But the Cavalry Lives On—16
What Does Surface Fire Support Cost?—18
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uals” in Joint Staff jargon) that define operational standards—and the Joint Tactical Switched Systems Configuration Control Board—which manages the software—guarantees that its switches will not function in the JTF.
Failure to participate in these groups— where Navy seats have been reserved but filled only sporadically—does the Navy little credit. More important, it degrades the capabilities of any JTF in which the Navy takes a part. □
“The Tank Is Dead: But the Cavalry Lives On”
(See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 50-53, November 1994 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Three Dana R. Watson, U.S. Army—If the term “cavalry” were removed from this article, it would be an eloquent—and much more accurate—endorsement of Army aviation in general. As it is, Colonel Kennedy completely misrepresents the role and capabilities of air cavalry. In fact, none of the units he mentions is true cavalry, of either the ground or air variety.
Colonel Kennedy attempts to transform cavalry into an independent combat element. He refers to “a two- or three-division air cavalry corps." There is no such animal as a cavalry division, much less an air cavalry division. Cavalry’s mission is to act as the maneuver commander’s eyes on the battlefield. The watchwords of the cavalry are reconnaissance and security. Cavalry is found at the corps level within the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) which consists of three armored squadrons and one air squadron. At division level, cavalry is found in a mixed squadron—i.e., two ground troops and two air troops. At either level, these forces are the most rapid and flexible of the commander’s units. Cavalry units may impede, harass, raid, or attack. They will be used to find and fix the enemy and to develop the battle so that heavy ground forces and attack helicopters can be introduced at the proper time.
Colonel Kennedy centers much of his discussion around the 101st Division and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The 101st Airborne is an air-assault-infantry division, a unique combat organization among armies worldwide. Yes, it has a cavalry element—the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry—but the division is not an air cavalry division. The AH-64 is not found in any true cavalry organization. The 6th Cavalry Brigade-Air Combat (CBAC) of 111 Corps—which did not participate in the Persian Gulf War—is equipped with Apaches; however, it is more precisely an attack helicopter regiment (AHR), similar to the XVIII Airborne Corps’s 229th AHR. During the war, U.S. air cavalry units were equipped with
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As an aeroscout in XVIII Airborne Corps's cavalry,
I know that whenever we led the ground cavalry elements by great distances, it was only for a few brief hours at a time.
AH-IF Cobra and OH-58A/C Kiowa aeroscouts—both of which now are being replaced by OH-58D(I) Kiowa Warriors. Both of the deployed ACRs—VII Corps’s 2nd ACR and XV1I1 Airborne Corps’s 3rd ACR—were supplemented with a six- ship OH-58D target acquisition & reconnaissance platoon. Therefore, while Colonel Kennedy sings the praises of attack helicopters and air-assault operations, he is not talking about air cavalry.
1 have no argument with the colonel about the difficulties of deploying large armored forces to distant theaters. However, I strongly disagree with his assessment of the effectiveness of heavy armor. He refers to the AMX-10RC armored cars of the French 6th Light Armored Division as “fast light-armored cavalry,” and, certainly. they were employed as such in a security mission. But to say that the French unit somehow was superior in mobility and combat power to a heavy U.S. cavalry element is incorrect. The 3rd ACR was among the first heavy elements to go into Saudi Arabia and was ready to fight within days of its arrival. If cavalry elements had had to fight in those early days, I would have preferred to do so in a MI Abrams tank or a M3 Bradley armored fighting vehicle, not a thinskinned reconnaissance car.
Any discussion of air cavalry’s capabilities must recognize the limitations and hazards inherent in combat aviation. Colonel Kennedy asserts that “[ujnlike the tank, air cavalry is relatively independent of terrain.” Wrong. Helicopters rarely get stuck in the sand and mud, but, in open terrain, a helicopter is much more vulnerable than an armored vehicle. All helicopters— even AH-64s—have little tolerance for direct fire. Air cavalry is highly dependent on the use of terrain to survive on the battlefield environment. Bad weather has a greater effect on aviation than ground forces. The reduced visibility caused by a late afternoon shamal may slow down an armored element, but it will shut down all aviation operations.
Air cavalry cannot sustain operation the way ground forces can. During ground maneuver, a tank may be in a “combat profile”—advancing or occupying a defensive position—for 24 continuous hours. During those same 24 hours, an air cavalry helicopter may be in the air for 8 hours or fewer.
THE NAVAL SUBMARINE LEAGUE
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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY
present
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May 10-12, 1995
Technology areas include:
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To submit abstracts or receive more information contact:
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Win $1,500
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 4,000 words.
2. All entries should be directed to: Executive Director (VAMLEC), U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 15 February 1995.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author’s name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, biographical sketch, social security number, address, and office and home phone numbers (if applicable) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the motto. The identity of the essayist will not be known by the judging members of the Editorial Board until they have made their selections.
5. The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors during the graduation awards ceremonies at their respective schools, if appropriate, or at other official ceremonies. Mrs. Astor or her personal representative will be invited to present the first prize each year.
6. Essays must be typewritten, double spaced, on paper approximately 8-1/2 x 11", Submit two complete copies. (If typed on a computer, please also submit the entry on an IBM-compatible disk, indicating word-processing software used.)
7. Essays will be judged by the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board for depth of research, analytical and interpretive qualities, and original thinking on the topic of leadership. Essays should not be merely expositions or personal narratives.
ENTRY RULES
The United States Naval Institute and the Vincent Astor Foundation take pleasure in announcing the Twenty First Annual Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest for Junior Officers and Officer Trainees of the U.S, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The contest is designed to promote research, thinking, and writing on topics of leadership in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
FIRST PRIZE: $1,500, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute.
FIRST HONORABLE MENTION: $1,000 and a Naval Institute Silver Medal.
SECOND HONORABLE MENTION: (two to be awarded) $500 and a Naval Institute Bronze Medal. The first prize essay will be published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The Institute’s Editorial Board may elect to publish any or all of the honorable mention essays in any given year, but is not obligated to do so. The Editorial Board may, from time to time, publish collections of the award winning essays and other essays in book or pamphlet form.
The contest is open to:
1. Commissioned officers, regular and reserve, in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in pay graded 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3 (ensign/2nd lieutenant; lieutenant (junior grade)/1st lieutenant; and lieutenant/captain) at the time the essay is submitted.
2. U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officer trainees within one year of receiving their commission.
! 'EssayContest
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Colonel Kennedy should reexamine his statement that “[t]he 24th Mechanized Division . . . never got closer than seven hours to the rear elements of the air cavalry.” As an aeroscout in XVIII Airborne Corps’s cavalry, I know that whenever we led the ground cavalry elements by great distances, it was only for a few brief hours at a time. If the “seven hour” statement refers to an air assault operation up on the Euphrates River, again all I can say is that is not an example of air-cavalry employment. Up front with the armored cavalry
regiment, nobody was in front of me but Iraqi Republican Guards. Behind me were the armored cavalry squadrons moving at awesome speeds, and behind them were the fuel for my aircraft and my unit’s ground support personnel.
There are great cavalry moments to be remembered from the Persian Gulf War— e.g., the recapture of Faylaykah Island by 4th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry—and great tactical lessons to be learned—e.g., from the 2nd ACR’s decisive engagement of Republican Guard armor. Unfortunately, Colonel Kennedy’s article has nothing to do with them. □
“What Does Surface Fire
Support Cost?”
(See C. T. Morgan, pp. 94-95, November 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Stephen B. Surko, U.S. Navy, Ship System Engineering Standards Office, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania—Lieutenant Commander Morgan quite reasonably states that when it comes to the future of surface fire support technologies, affordability is a key consideration. The Affordability Through Commonality (ATC) Program of Naval Sea Systems (NavSea) Command has identified modularity as a means of reducing the life-cycle costs associated with various combat systems. Subsystems and components of a complete weapon or electronic system can be integrated as an easily interchangeable unit or module.
The ATC Program has recently secured funding for a $4.2 million Foreign Comparative Test of a 5-inch/54-cal- iber Mk 45 Modular Gun System (MGS) developed by Blohm+Voss of Germany, which is already at sea on board five MEKO-class frigates. This effort will culminate in high-impact shock testing of the MGS on a floating platform.
The Blohm+Voss MGS mounts the U.S. Navy 5-inch/54-caliber Mk 45 gun in a standard antiaircraft-sized gun equipment room module. The module conforms to the Ship System Engineering Standards—now renamed NATO Installation Interface Control Program—which were developed in the early 1980s with NavSea’s support. A MGS offers significant installation savings by eliminating the laborious shipboard machining of the roller path and preinstalling such outfit items as the sprinkler system. A MGS can be assembled and checked-out in a clean factory environment prior to initial installation and during overhauls. Perhaps most important from Lieutenant Commander Morgan’s perspective, a MGS can be swiftly removed and replaced with a more advanced MGS in the future, without costly design changes to the ship’s structure. □
The War is Over...
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“Tailhook: What Happened,
Why & What’s To Be Learned”
(See W. H. Parks, pp. 89-103, September 1994; N. Hogan, pp. 23-24, November 1994; J. Byron, D. Vander Schaaf, pp. 23-24, December 1994 Proceedings)
Colonel Hays W. Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Mr. Vander Schaaf takes exception to a number of problems I identified with the Tailhook investigation.
1 stand by my conclusions, which are based upon interviews with a number of individuals (including prosecutors and defense counsel who had occasion to deal with investigators from the Department of Defense’s Office of the Inspector General [IG] during the Tailhook investigation), review of most of the documents from the Tailhook investigations, and a reading of opinions by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and the trial judge in the Navy courts-martial cases.
Since publication of my article, the U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, had occasion to review the Inspector General’s investigation into Tailhook ‘91 in conjunction with the suit by Paula Coughlin against the Tailhook Association and the Hilton Hotels. The court disallowed Lieutenant Coughlin’s attempt to introduce the Inspector General’s report on the basis that the report was not “sufficiently trustworthy”—a finding consistent with my conclusions, but inconsistent with Mr. Vander Schaaf’s claims.
Review of the IG report by three Federal courts led to criticism by each of both the report and the investigative techniques used to prepare it. □
“Exploding the Mine Warfare Myth”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 36-43, October 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joop H. Kasten, Royal Netherlands Navy—As a mine- warfare officer in the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), I am obliged to explain the figures presented in Table 2: “Multinational Coalition Mine Counts. Percentage of All Mines Swept/Hunted/ Neutralized.”
Many readers may be surprised that the RNLN—a well-equipped navy with highly regarded mine-countermeasures (MCM) capabilities—bagged only 4% of the mines. The facts behind this figure need to be explained—if only to dispel any doubts about MCM prowess of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
From the start of the hostilities during the Persian Gulf War, the RNLN was prepared to send a well-balanced force— frigates, MCM ships, Marines, and support ships—to the theater. However, because of a long and arduous political process, the Navy’s MCM component arrived in the theater after MCM operations had begun.
Insofar as the capabilities of Dutch MCM ships are concerned, all three sent were minehunters of the Tripartite class— which was designed jointly by the navies of France, Belgium, and The Netherlands. These ships joined two French and three Belgian Tripartites in a MCM task group—commanded by a Belgian officer—that was responsible for 49% of the mines swept, hunted, and neutralized by the Coalition. □
Richard Rosenblatt, M.D.—Finally, a recognized expert in the field of mine warfare has refuted once and for all the commonly accepted dictum that the people in the mine-warfare community are inferior to their colleagues in the rest of the Navy. Given the Navy’s historical stinginess toward mine warfare and the consequent paucity of assets, the exemplary performance of these people during the Persian Gulf War is all the more remarkable and warrants commendation. As the noted military historian John Keegan so aptly pointed out in his book The History of Warfare (Random House, 1993), the deciding factor in most battles is the quality of the combatant rather than of the equipment and tactics.
Increased funding will redress many of the deficiencies in operational capabilities that heretofore have plagued the mine-warfare community. Notwithstanding its complexity and comprehensiveness, the Navy’s Mine Warfare Plan still fails to address the core problem: mine warfare remains an unattractive career in the U.S. Navy. Until this is corrected, the maximum potential of the Navy’s mine warfare assets will not be realized. In order to attract the best and brightest men and women to the mine-warfare field, it is evident that the career path must be changed—perhaps radically. Not until many of the top graduates of the Naval Academy select a career in mine warfare will the Navy successfully implement any Mine Warfare Plan. □
“A True Force in Readiness”
(See N. C. Cams and S. S. Coerr, pp. 35-38, August 1994; T. McKearney. p. 20, October 1994 Proceedings)
First Lieutenant Wesley W. Kautzmann, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—Captains Cams and Coerr make a strong argument for the need to deploy our amphibious forces in brigade-sized units. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is far more combat effective than a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); however, the rest of the world remains respectful of the MEU, and, therefore, the United
States continues to achieve its strategic objectives while keeping costs down.
The philosophy of maneuver warfare emphasizes applying surfaces against gaps. The reality is that MEUs—especially given their Special Operations Capable designation—are perceived as surfaces by the rest of the world. There is plenty of historical evidence that whenever the president orders a MEU to a troubled area, it is considered a serious move. People in other countries may not know the difference between a MEB and a MEU, but they do understand the word “Marines.”
While deploying brigade-sized units may be financially feasible, there are a number of factors that cause a MEB to be exponentially more expensive than a MEU. The most important issue is the use of surface combatants as escorts. As Captains Cams and Coerr point out, we would need plenty of additional surface combatants to protect the large target that a MEB would present. Again, the MEU accomplishes the same mission—presence—for much less money.
Finally, as the authors point out, we would have to move Fleet Marine Force units out of Okinawa in order to support such a policy. Okinawa might seem strategically unimportant; but, the United States still has a serious contingency threat in Korea, to say nothing of what the Chinese may present. □
“So You Want to be a Flag
Lieutenant?”
(See B. G. McGrath, pp. 96-97, November 1994
Proceedings)
Howell Arthur Lamar—Having served Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as personal aide when he was a junior rear admiral and Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and, later, as his aide and flag lieutenant throughout World War II, 1 feel qualified to give a few pointers about being a good flag lieutenant.
► Provide the admiral with a card showing the names and rank of the officers he will meet when inspecting a ship or naval station. The officers always enjoyed being called by name.
>• Have the barge or car make a trial run to ensure the admiral arrives exactly when he is expected.
► Get to know the admiral’s personal likes and dislikes in order to anticipate his needs. In one of the 100 letters he exchanged with his biographer Professor E. B. Potter, Admiral Nimitz wrote “Lamar knows my personal preferences better than I do.”
I think I did a good job, because when Admiral Nimitz was relieved by Admiral Raymond Spruance as Commander- in-Chief, Pacific Fleet in November 1945, he presented me with a photograph of himself inscribed: “To the Dean of Flag Lieutenants.” □
THE WAR IS OVER... BUT NOT FORGOTTEN.
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“Tell the Selection Board What
Counts”
(See C. V. Bloom, pp. 70-71, July 1994
Proceedings)
Chief Personnelman (Surface Warfare) Scott Laplante, U.S. Naval Reserve— Lieutenant Commander Bloom addresses a problem that constantly plagues naval careers—i.e., poorly written evaluations. Having typed and reviewed several hundred evaluations over the past decade, I agree with Commander Bloom that poor use of key blocks on the Enlisted Performance Evaluation keeps personnel who are qualified and ready for promotion from being advanced.
Too much repetition is the single greatest mistake that people make when writing evaluations. A selection board will see entries such as damage-control qualifications or course completions in Block 55 (Special Achievements). Therefore, they need not be repeated in Block 56 (Evaluation Comments). An entry should be repeated only if it warrants special recognition—e.g., if the sailor finishes first in his or her class at Auxiliary Boiler Feed Water School.
Evaluators also must scrutinize the performance marks from the front of the evaluation and make sure that they are justified by the evaluation comments. Strong leadership, organizational, and professional skills should be highlighted in clearly written, to-the-point “bullet” comments.
For those who have trouble writing evaluations, I offer a few suggestions:
>• Talk to the senior enlisted personnel of your command. These experienced people can provide invaluable advice about expressing your comments in a way that will help the person you are evaluating. >■ Talk to your local personnelmen or yeomen. Chances are one at your command is a whiz at evaluations. Ask him or her to review your rough drafts and give you suggestions.
>■ Read—and reread—the Evaluation Manual and the Guide to Naval Writing (Naval Institute Press. 1990). These are two of the greatest reference tools you can find.
>■ Read Commander Bloom’s article. I keep it with me at all times and distribute it to anyone who is writing evaluations. If anything, it will remind you that you hold another shipmate’s career in your hands. □
“Upset at Tishomingo”
(See W. A. Philbeck, pp. 78-79, October 1994 Proceedings)
Captain Roy C. Smith III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Philbeck presented a grand picture of one of the greatest cavalry leaders of all time and one of my personal heroes: General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Let me add the most impressive evaluation of General Forrest’s greatness by General Robert E. Lee. When asked who he considered to have been his greatest commander, General Lee did not choose Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson or James Longstreet. Robert E. Lee instead replied, “My greatest general was a man I never met. His name was Nathan Bedford Forrest.”
One of my father’s favorite stories concerned General Forrest’s desire for a good Latin motto to express the attitude of his first major command. Not knowing the language himself, he asked for volunteers who did and one of his young troopers responded. Given the mission, the young man reported back next day with Nunquam animus sed ignis via. That sounded just fine to General Forrest and he adopted it.
Dad also told me that translating that motto into English would stump most Latin scholars, which has won me a good many drinks over the years. The trooper remembered the response Forrest had made to a junior officer worried about being outnumbered in a skirmish, “Never mind but fire away,” and decided that would be the perfect motto. He simply translated it word for word from his Latin-English dictionary: never=nun- quam; mmd=animus: but=sed; fire=ignis; a way=via. □
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“Cleansing Maneuver Warfare
Doctrine”
(See R. J. Muise, pp. 47-49, November 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Thomas J. Martin, U.S. Army— Captain Muise tries to write off the concept of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). But what he actually is rejecting is the ineffective execution of intelligence preparation of the battlefield—something that all too many of us have witnessed all too many times.
Captain Muise recognizes that “IPB causes the commander and his staff to focus on the enemy—an essential aspect of a maneuver command style.” That is exactly what IPB is supposed to do; therefore, it belongs in maneuver-warfare doctrine. So what’s the problem? Most of the IPB in the field today misses the mark because too many in intelligence look at the manuals, instead of seeing the battlefield. Many intelligence officers rely totally on the methodical approach—an unimaginative, plodding, by-the-book process that by its very nature ensures a sterile product.
There are excellent intelligence officers who know how and when to break out of the routine. They don't leave the manuals at home or turn the process upside down, however. They absorb the commander’s intent, realize what he needs, and find simple, speedy, imaginative ways to portray it. The decision-making cycle does not slow down—to the contrary, it moves rapidly and sensibly in the right direction. Watching officers and staff who deliver this support do their jobs is an educational experience. I hope that Captain Muise will have the opportunity to witness this kind of excellence at work, because as soon as he sees intelligence preparation of the battlefield properly delivered, his faith in the concept will be restored. □
“On Your Wing”
(See J. Nichols and B. Tillman, pp, 64-68,
September 1994 Proceedings)
Commander John B. Nichols III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The response to the article describing the missing-in-action (MIA) case of Lieutenant Commander Michael Estocin was beyond my expectations. Many of the phone calls came from active-duty aviators who recognized the potential for similarly tragic handling of MIA cases in the present or near future.
I also learned some facts of which I was ignorant for a quarter century. It turned out that aerial photography of Mike Estocin’s crash site was available before the USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) left the Tonkin Gulf in April 1967—material which would be invaluable to those Americans and Vietnamese seeking crash sites today. Even more outrageous was word that, by 1970, the Navy knew that Mike Estocin was not alive in Hanoi, but that word was not passed on to any of his shipmates.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel put Mrs. Estocin in touch with me. During an emotional phone call, we were able to help one another over the rough spots and fill in more of the blanks in a 25-year- old riddle. Most dramatic was her explanation of the situation surrounding a prisoner’s covert report that Mike was “alive in the camps.” In truth, the handlers of that case seized upon the downed aviator’s mention of “Mike” and “school” in a 1968 communication. For whatever reason, they decided that it meant that Mike Estocin was being held near a school in Hanoi when in fact it alluded to the pilot’s son (also named Michael) who would have been starting school at that time. Therefore, contrary to what Barrett Tillman and I reported, the flier did not actually “recant” his story, but merely explained the seeming reference to Mike Estocin. Again, however, those who knew Mike and flew with him received no consideration in the matter.
It has taken a lot of years, but gradually all of us who were involved in this tragedy are learning the facts. I hope that the Navy realizes that there remains enormous room for improvement in its handling of cases like this. □
Colin L. Powell
JOINT WARFIGHTING ESSAY CONTEST
The U.S. Naval Institute is pleased to announce the second annual Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest. The first contest winners were published in the September 1994 Proceedings.
In the words of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the competition seeks "those who are motivated to enter this contest not by a need to 'toe the policy line,' but who are devoted to the security of this great Nation."
Essays should be about combat readiness in a joint context—persuasive discussions of tactics, strategy, weaponry, combat training, or other issues involving two or more services.
Entries may be heavy in uniservice detail, but must have joint application in terms of force structure, doctrine, operations, or organization for combat. Interoperability of hardware and procedures may be discussed within the context of combat readiness. Essays are welcome from military professionals and civilians alike.
The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $2,500, $2,000, and $1,000 to the authors of the three best essays entered. Maximum length is 3,000 words, but shorter opinion pieces or "professional notes" (typically 2,000-word technical arguments) may also be competitive.
Entry Rules
■■■■■■
1. Essays must be original, must not exceed 3,000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Colin Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Ave., Annapolis, MD 21402-5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 April 1995.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of
the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name, address, telephone number, social security number, and short biography of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Naval Institute has made its final selections.
5. All essays must be typewritten and doublespaced, on paper approximately 8-1/2” x 11”. Submit two complete copies. (If typed on a computer, please also submit an IBM-compatible disk and specify work-processing software used.)
6. The essays will be screened by a panel composed of officers from the five armed services
who will recommend 10 essays to the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board. The Editorial Board will award the three prizes.
7. The awards will be presented to the winning essayists at a special ceremony. The award winners will be notified by phone on or about 22 June 1995. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by mid-July.
8. The three prize-winning essays will be published in Proceedings, the Naval Institute’s 121-year heritage. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in Proceedings. The authors of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
“Alone, Unarmed . . . and
Unavailable”
(See G. Leygraaf, pp. 37-39, September 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Raymond E. Moses, Jr., U.S. Navy, Fighter Squadron-111—Commander Leygraaf s premise that military planners and the Congress need to be educated on the need for tactical reconnaissance is absolutely correct. However, although new tactical-reconnaissance programs languish in different congressional committees because of funding and development problems, there is a readily available, flexible reconnaissance asset on board every deployed aircraft carrier: the F-14 Reconnaissance Tomcat.
The F-14 can carry the Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), a film-based system capable of low- and high-altitude stand-off reconnaissance. The system can produce images with a resolution comparable to that of the electro-optic-long-range oblique- photography system (EO-LOROPS). Customarily, of the 15 to 18 Tomcats of a carrier air wing, four are reconnaissance- capable; therefore, availability seldom is a problem. And why should it be? After all, the F-14 has its own airfield, film processing, and intelligence support. Furthermore, all F-14D Super Tomcats are TARPS-capable.
Admittedly, TARPS is not a real-time data-link system; it takes time to develop film. Nevertheless, using TARPS, Tomcats were able to deliver timely, same- day imagery in Lebanon, Grenada, the Persian Gulf, and Bosnia. In fact, images can be delivered to analysts about 20 minutes after the aircraft lands.
Development and procurement of realtime data-linked tactical-reconnaissance systems like EO-LOROPS and the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System are too important to be lost to congressional gridlock. Until these important systems are broken loose, however, the F-14-TARPS package is on the flight deck ready to deliver excellent imagery—today. □
“Keeping a Cohesive and Gender-Integrated Squadron”
(See W. J. Davis, p. 105, September 1994;
N. Hogan, pp. 23-24, November 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Marion H. Klin- gler, U.S. Navy—By terming the integration of women into shipboard and combat aviation assignments as unexecutable, Rear Admiral Hogan would doom the implementation of gender integration in those units to failure from the outset.
Consider extending his argument to its logical conclusion: if establishing a viable mixed-gender squadron is unexecutable, so is integrating women into ships’ crews. This is where Admiral Hogan's argument fails, as there are already examples of highly successful mixed-gender crews and women commanding officers.
Practically speaking, advancement in the Navy requires that officers drive ships
The key word here is opportunity.
or fly aircraft. Admiral Hogan’s assertions to the contrary, until women are allowed to perform these tasks, they never will have equal opportunity to reach the highest levels of Navy leadership. Admiral Hogan’s proposal to relegate women to roles as executive assistants would not give them the necessary experience or skills to command at sea— which should be the goal of every officer in the Navy. It also deprives the Navy of the services of some very fine officers. Moreover, society now demands that military women have the same opportunities as their male counterparts.
The key word here is opportunity. Women should be allowed to succeed or fail in the Navy on their own merits and abilities, and not be held back by outdated sociological attitudes. □
^sJFaces of the NavaL^’lffcA‘e>emy
Anyone is eligible to enter and win this 150th birthday contest
☆ First prize wins $2,000 ☆ First Honorable Mention wins $1,500 'w'
☆ Second Honorable Mention wins $1,000 ☆ Submission Deadline: 31 March 1995 ☆
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Entry Rules for Faces of the Naval Academy Essay Contest:
1. Essay must relate to the Naval Academy. “Faces" include architectural, philosophical, and human (staff, faculty, friends, future, etc).
2. Essay must be original, must not exceed 2,500 words, and must not have been previously published. (An exact word count must
I appear on the title page.)
3. Essay must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 1/2x11”. Submit two complete copies. If the essay is typed on an IBM-compatible computer, please send a disk and specify word processing software used.
4. Each submission must include full name, rank (if applicable), biographical sketch, social security number, address, and office and home phone numbers.
5. Essay must be postmarked on or before 31 March 1995.
6. Send essay to: Faces of the Naval Academy Essay Contest • U.S. Naval Institute •118 Maryland Ave • Annapolis, MD 21402-5035
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“The Future Is Attack
Helicopters”
(See B. M. Ford, pp. 54-55, September 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Gary Frey, U.S. Marine Corps, Tactical Air Control Party Instructor, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific—Lieutenant Colonel Ford presents some valid and substantiated points about attack helicopters; however, his conclusion that fixed-wing aircraft have no place in close air support (CAS) is unwarranted. Attack helicopters are an outstanding CAS asset that offer unbeatable flexibility and coordination for the ground commander. During the two years I served in a light armored reconnaissance battalion—as an air officer, operations officer, and company commander—our planned employment of attack helicopters was extensive indeed. Nevertheless, the supposition that the inherent strengths of helicopters make fixed-wing close air support obsolescent is incorrect.
The premise that the ultimate future of warfare is in places such as Bosnia and Somalia is valid. Certainly, many consider the Persian Gulf War as an anomaly in the evolution of warfare. However, there is no guarantee that another such anomaly will not present itself within the next 50 years or so.
It has been said that the greatest enemy of an army is a victory. With that in mind, we must be careful of—in fact, we should resist outright—the tendency to use the Persian Gulf War as the model for future conflicts and the basis of policy decisions. As much as the terrain and situation were well suited for our technology (especially the standoff capability), it was well suited for the enemy’s antiaircraft artillery, especially the visually targeted, lead-shooting guns. This in turn forced fixed-wing aircraft to higher altitudes. While attack helicopters can hide in micro terrain, fixed-wing aircraft can hide in larger terrain—as long as it exists. After all, the whole world is not a sandbox, as anyone who has been to Korea or Bosnia can attest. Terrain is only one factor in the equation; there are other reasons that fixed-wing aircraft sometimes will fly at relatively high altitudes. Inarguably, fixed-wing CAS loses a measure of its effectiveness—perhaps accuracy is a better word—whenever aircraft fly higher. Every CAS mission does do not require a direct hit in order to be effective, however. Cluster munitions, for example, do not need to hit the bull’s eye
Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters ... have their inherent strengths and weaknesses, but... the strengths of one compensate for the weaknesses of the other
when used against many different targets. Furthermore, close air support can do more than just destroy enemy assets on the battlefield. A fixed-wing punch in the gut can add a significant exclamation point in a tempo-driven battle. An air strike also can produce an intense shock effect and open a gap.
We must take care not to make false comparisons between the results of deep air support (DAS) missions with those of CAS missions. Colonel Ford referred to a 1993 attack on 33 Iraqi targets that resulted in 16 hits. However, that strike was clearly a DAS mission; therefore, the results are irrelevant to a discussion about close air support.
Colonel Ford's assertion that pilot error combined with high-speed deliveries can result in misses by a “wide margin”—and thus present a danger to friendly forces— is invalid. A one-second delay in a 45°, 500-knot delivery released at 5,000 feet results in a margin of error of only 65 feet. To a fixed-wing aviator, a second is a relative lifetime. In fact, the ordnance charts are tabulated in tenths of seconds.
Fixed-wing aircraft are not immune to fratricide, but fratricide hardly is exclusive to them. During the Persian Gulf War, two light armored vehicles (LAVs) were lost in fratricide incidents: one to a U.S. Air Force A-10 (a slow fixed-wing aircraft); the other to an antitank LAV. Colonel Ford seems to think that helicopter aircrew are able to identify targets more easily than fixed-wing aircrew. However, an AH-64 Apache—which has one of the world’s best helicopter weapon systems—destroyed a friendly vehicle. The best fratricide-preventive measure is to have aircraft under the positive control of forward air controllers, who have their eyes on the target.
Under the right logistic conditions, attack helicopters can stay on station for extended periods—a significant advantage. However, Colonel Ford failed to mentioned that during the Persian Gulf War ground campaign a section of fixed- wing aircraft checked in for on-call CAS every two and a half minutes. Time-on- station limitations were more than compensated for by a rapid cycling of sorties.
Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are effective platforms for close air support. Both have their inherent strengths and weaknesses, but, as in any good partnership, the strengths of one compensate for the weaknesses of the other. War game after war game—and hard-won experience as well—demonstrate the power that fixed-wing aviation brings to the battlefield. Its shock value and flexibility makes it an integral and important part of the Marine Corps. It also is essential to remember that, compared to the Army, the Marine Corps is lightly armored and lightly supported. Therefore, the power and responsiveness of Marine aviation— both rotary-wing and fixed wing—are crucial in maintaining the Marine Corps’ fighting efficiency on the battlefield. □
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“Speak Softly and . .
(See W. Locke and K. P. Werrell, pp. 30-35, October 1994; L. Warrenfeltz, p. 20, December 1994 Proceedings)
Robert A. Lynch, Engineering Director, Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program, General Dynamics Corporation, 1972-1980— Rear Admiral Locke speaks too softly about the unfair cost comparisons between the Tomahawk and aircraft-delivered bombs made by some defense “experts.” It is well known that the Navy must pay not only for the weapons that hit targets but also for the systems that deploy and deliver them. Neither the aircraft, aircrews, and aircraft carriers are free—nor are the ships that protect the carriers. Ships that are back in the United States for maintenance and training must be included in the cost. The ships’ crews and the air wings’ personnel—mechanics as well as pilots—must be trained and replaced. All of the personnel associated with the delivery of any weapon must be paid and provided medical care—on active duty and in retirement.
Most of the Tomahawks used in the Persian Gulf War were fired from cruisers and destroyers. These ships are a lot less expensive to acquire, maintain, and deploy than aircraft carriers. The Tomahawks they carry stay in their launchers until needed. They are not worn out by training nights; they do not eat, get sick, or retire. Certainly, cruisers and destroyers have some of the same costs as an aircraft carrier and her air wing, but their magnitude is significantly less.
What is considered part of the delivery system is subject to variation but if applied consistently, the result is a valid relative-cost comparison. Presently, comparisons of the relative total systems show that the costs of a surface-ship task force are 4% of those of an aircraft carrier group. Furthermore, the former requires 16,000 fewer personnel to perform the same missions.
The plans of the naval aviation lend credibility to the idea of using cruise missiles more often. The Navy plans to acquire stand-off missiles for its attack aircraft. However, because the Tomahawk already can go from ship to target, this approach is difficult to understand in operational and budgetary terms. The aircraft are still exposed to enemy action and the weapon's range is limited by the line-of-sight data link necessary to take advantage of the aircrews’ eyes and brains. A costly aircraft carrier group is required and the short-range missile costs about as much as a long-range Tomahawk. It is an approach that has all the high-cost features of cruise missiles and aircraft and few—if any—operational advantages of the cruise missile. □
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