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LCDR K. Napier, Royal Navy
The Royal Navy had been operating out of United Arab Emirates ports in the Persian Gulf for ten years prior to Iraq’s invasion °f Kuwait, and was thus well-placed to monitor shipping after [”e U.N. decision to impose sanctions, including an economic
blockade.
British Forces Middle East headquarters was located in Riyadh, close to other allied headquarters. In the United Kingdom, lhe recently completed Strike Command headquarters at High Wycombe, between London and Oxford, quickly became a joint headquarters. The naval team at the joint headquarters was supported by the staff at Northwood. Air Marshal Sir Patrick Hime i in overall command, and Lieutenant General Sir Peter de
LaBilliere was in command in the Gulf. The Royal Air Force IRAF) air staff management aid (ASMA) was widely used by all services for passing all types of information, supplementing the lorrnal message system. The RAF system allows individuals to ask informal questions and pass requirements of all sorts.
By January 1991, the Royal Air Force’s air transport fleet, supplemented by commercial aircraft, was flying in 650 tons daily. VC-lOs, C-130s, and Tristars flew passengers and freight, and the Tristars also provided inflight refueling for RAF tactical aircraft. The transports operated out of Brize Norton and Lyneham in England, and Gutersloh, Wildenrath, and Hanover ln Germany.
Cooperation at all levels was the order of the day and joint use °f the limited number of airheads was vital. Muharraq (in Bahtin), A1 Jubayl, King Khalid International at Riyadh, and Min- bad in the United Arab Emirates were all used jointly. Support Rom Saudi and other authorities was slow at first and, as late as December 1990, customs officials were still causing major decays, not only in Saudi Arabia but also at RAF stations in the United Kingdom.
The RAF was, of course, supporting three services:
^ The British Army was located primarily in Saudi Arabia, with fecial forces occasionally deployed elsewhere.
^ The RAF’s own aircraft were based at Tabuk, Riyadh, Dhah- ran, Muharraq, and Seeb (in Oman).
* The Royal Navy began by using its traditional airheads at Minhad and Dubai in the Emirates; later, it used Muharraq.
The RAF used Riyadh initially, and later added A1 Jubayl, as Primary airheads to support these scattered forces. C-130s moved stores from these hubs to other airfields, an arrangement that worked satisfactorily.
As the focus of operations moved up the Gult after the commencement of hostilities, the Royal Navy shifted its forward airhead to Muharraq, which proved most effective in supporting joint mine hunting operations and as a base for repairing battle- damaged ships.
In-theater spares included main gas turbine engines—Tyne and Olympus—for destroyers and frigates, Deltic main and mine sweeping engines, and diesel generators, the majority of which Were replaced prior to 15 January 1991. All the mine countermeasure vessel engines were nonmagnetic, which meant that they had to be flown in, since the long sea passage would have , given them an unacceptable magnetic signature.
Through 28 February 1991, 137 commercial ships had been chartered, carrying more than 300,000 tons of cargo, including ammunition, vehicles, and helicopters. The Atlantic Conveyor was the largest ship. Four of the fleet auxiliary service’s landing ship logistics (LSLs) carried 4,000 tons of ammunition and freight and remained in theater in a variety of roles. The Portuguese naval ship Sao Miguel made two trips to the Gulf carrying cargo for United Kingdom forces. The Royal Navy was responsible for the security of these ships on passage, and army detachments provided additional on-board security.
The threat from drifting Iraqi mines, “floaters,” in the central and northern Persian Gulf was severe. By 28 February 1991. more than 110 had been detected and blown up by Saudi, U.S., and British explosive-ordnance-disposal teams. At least half of these mines showed no signs of ever having been moored. Eventually, merchant ships were directed to move only during daylight, west of specific limits, while helicopters conducted surface searches. The floaters were difficult to detect, and were easily confused with turtles or floating black plastic bags containing protruding rubbish. Oil slicks compounded the problem.
Chartered civilian cargo planes assisted Royal Air Force airlil'ters in moving high-priority cargo to the Gulf. British forces have long experience in the region and operated from widely dispersed locations.
Most of the chartered ships unloaded at Al Jubayl, which was also a critical port for U.S. forces. To put the scene in perspective, on one day when two British ships were unloading—with one expected the next day—17 U.S. chartered ships were alongside or anchored in the stream. As soon as a berth was free, it was filled by the next ship, a process that continued for months. Despite the sheer volume of stores being unloaded, the organization ashore coped remarkably well, and it was only in the period immediately after 15 January that a small backlog developed.
To provide the army with a reserve of pure water, two merchant water carriers were chartered, and filled with water from
65
Proceedings / June 1991
Desert Storm
the United Arab Emirates free of charge. When the northern Gulf became contaminated with oil, the ships provided an important reserve for warships unable to distill their own water.
Recent legislation limits the movement of explosives through both military airports and licensed sea ports, and the flow of explosives of all kinds had to be carefully controlled to preclude exceeding the net explosive quantity (NEQ) limits. Arriving loads had to be cleared before the next incoming ammunition load again raised the NEQ to its limit. Merchant shipping of all sorts was used, some with portable bulkheads, to allow simultaneous carriage of different types of dangerous cargo.
During the winter of 1990—91, airfields in Great Britain were occasionally closed by snow, which also slowed movement of stores by road and rail to the airfield. This caused havoc with priority cargo, positioned to catch aircraft returning from the Gulf, only to miss the aircraft as they were diverted to the few
Royal Navy Sea King helicopters (hovering) were usually the final link in getting priority cargo to ships on patrol in the Gulf. Royal Navy Lynxes (foreground) disabled Iraqi boats with Sea Skua missiles.
airports that remained open. At one stage, a convoy of ammunition lorries was briefly lost in a snowstorm in a small residential community, much to the bewilderment of the residents.
The Royal Navy traditionally uses commercially contracted companies in the United Arab Emirates to supply fuel for both visiting warships and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) tankers. By Christmas, the declining availability of refined fuel was causing concern; although much Saudi support was offered, continuity could not be guaranteed in an emergency. The very large volumes forecast to be used by both allied armies and aircraft meant that a suitable source was required to avoid potential naval embarrassment.
A Kuwaiti tanker was contracted, at no cost, and filled with free Saudi fuel from Yanbu and Jiddah. She was positioned in the eastern Gulf and acted as a floating reserve for the RFA oilers.
At the same time it was confirmed that naval fuel could potentially be used by both army vehicles and all helicopters in theater, if the need arose. Seaborne aviation fuel has a higher flashpoint-" but gives the same performance as shore-side aviation fuel—and naval gas turbine diesel fuel works perfectly in tank gas turbines and other diesel-powered vehicles.
Joint use of oilers was achieved early. Both international and national underway replenishment group operating areas were established between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Roya1 Fleet Auxiliaries refueled ships from virtually every nation in the Gulf, including Argentina, and the Royal Navy in turn used tankers from other nations. Connections proved no problem f°r ordinary diesel fuel, but aviation fuel caused problems. At one stage it seemed that East Coast U.S. ships actually used different connections from West Coast ships, both of which were represented in strength in the Gulf.
Sustainability was carefully calculated, starting from existing NATO expenditure figures, and taking into consideration the Iraqi threat, the anticipated effectiveness of our own weapons, and the expected types of operations. Antisubmarine weapons were turned in, and the spaces filled with additional chaff and other antiaircraft decoys.
Naval gunfire support and mine countermeasure requirements were especially important. Even with subtle planning, operational developments and changing intelligence necessitated last- minute provision of new equipment by air and sea. In particular, the effectiveness of the Royal Navy’s Lynx helicopters armed with standoff Sea Skua missiles required that additional missiles be provided by priority air shipment. Two LSLs and an RFA ammunition ship carried thousands of tons of ammunition as floating reserves in support of army operations.
The RFA Argus was reconfigured from her normal role as a helicopter training ship, and fitted with a 400-bed hospital, operating rooms, and provisions to care for chemical-warfare casualties. She also carried Sea King helicopters.
The Argus and her escorts were initially positioned off Qatar, but soon moved farther north to support operations. She was not officially designated as a hospital ship. Early wartime casualties treated on the Argus included sailors from the USS Tripoli (LPH- 10), which struck a mine off Kuwait.The Dutch support ship RNLMS Zuiderkruis had a small hospital, and was most supportive of all nations in the eastern Gulf.
Thousands of service personnel were moved to and from the Gulf. Specialist trouble shooters were regularly flown out, along with the ubiquitous staff officers. The requirement to carry individual equipment and personal weapons, plus injections against the various chemical and biological threats, complicated normal movement procedures, as did the civilian status of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary crews.
The Royal Navy was directed to provide two squadrons of Sea King helicopters—minus their Royal Marines—to support operations ashore. The squadrons were in the Gulf ready for service five weeks after the decision to move was made. This included three weeks transit time in the Atlantic Conveyor. A U.S. Air Force C-5 later ferried two more helicopters.
The rapid collapse of the Iraqis left United Kingdom forces largely intact. While much of the war establishment is going home, British mine-clearing forces will no doubt remain in the area for some time.
Commander Napier is a supply officer on the staff of Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland. During the Gulf War he served with the joint headquarters at High Wycombe. He has served as supply officer on frigates and destroyers.
Proceedings/June 1991