Editor's Note: We received numerous responses to our question, "What's Wrong with This Picture?" on page 30 of the June 2002 issue, asking readers to identify the historical inaccuracies contained in the James Dietz painting, "TBDs at Midway" (below, top). How many historical inaccuracies can you find?
Below the Dietz painting is a more truthful rendering of Ensign George Gay's torpedo run at Midway by artist Jim Griffiths. The only complaint from the late George Gay, who saw the Griffiths painting at a 40th anniversary of Midway commemoration in Chicago, was that there was "not enough flak."
Our readers proved they know their stuff. Demonstrations of their knowledge are sampled here. —Ed.
Commander Thomas Buell, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
The entire painting is fantasy. Not one TBD got a torpedo into a carrier. The painting shows a torpedo exploding on the starboard side, as well as flames and explosions presumably from torpedo hits on the port side (while aircraft are on the starboard side). Each TBD attacked individually, not in a swarm as depicted. I wonder how much bum dope will be bandied about in the forthcoming Midway commemorative observances. For example, the fifth footnote on page 31 cites Gordon Prange's Miracle at Midway as a reference, the least authoritative book imaginable on Midway.
Commander James A. Marcely, U.S. Navy (Retired)
At the Battle of Midway, all the U.S. torpedo planes had completed their attacks (without any damage to any of the four Japanese carriers) before the U.S. dive-bombers arrived on the scene. The planes also are too close to the carrier; the closest drop by any TBD (800 yards) was by Ensign George Gay. In addition, the torpedo aircraft generally were dispersed laterally. Never at Midway did five TBDs gather together for a "group portrait." The painting also shows a telescopic aiming scope in front of the pilot of the closest plane; such scopes were used only on dive-bombers.
Jim Griffiths
The answer to your question about what was wrong with James Dietz's painting "TBDs at Midway" is pretty much everything. The planes are approaching the carrier with the speed and agility more like Star War X-wing fighters closing on the Death Star. The Devastator was a slow, lumbering craft that made its torpedo runs with wings level several dozen feet off the wave tops. It also looks as if the planes plan to drop their torpedoes about 100 feet from the carrier, or perhaps they plan to drop them like skip-bombing B-25s. The explosion from a torpedo hit on the starboard side is most impressive; unfortunately, none of the U.S. torpedoes exploded on any of the Japanese carriers. The markings on the planes are totally inaccurate: the squadron markings are from Torpedo Squadron (VT)-5, which was not at that battle (VT-3 flew from the Yorktown [CV-5], VT-6 from the Enterprise [CV-6], and VT-8 from the Hornet [CV-8]).
Then there are the extraordinary number of splashes in the water from shrapnel and bullets—it is a miracle that none of the attacking aircraft have been holed by even the teeniest piece of flying metal. And from where is all this fire originating? That is an awful lot of ammo being pumped into a relatively small space.
It also is fortunate that the two Zeros flying at deck level over the exploding flight deck have not had their lightweight aluminum skin pierced or that the roiling air from the flames has not wobbled them in the least. I would think that the Zeros would have been much farther out from the carriers awaiting the arrival of any enemy aircraft (as actually happened).
The last nit-pick is that the yellow sky color in the upper right-hand corner is wrong. Yellow is all right for dawn or dusk, but the TBDs attacked on a partly cloudy morning with blue sky and white clouds.
Thomas E. Doll
I approached this question with a little trepidation as James Dietz is a 30-year friend and one of the nicest guys one could ever know. He also is one terrific artist, not only when he deals with aviation subjects but with anything he paints.
The TBD-1s' markings are not correct for the period. The red and white tail stripes were ordered removed from all Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard aircraft with the 20 May 1942 all-Navy dispatch #062230. The red disk in the star also was called out for removal in this directive. The bunching of the TBDs is all wrong in the painting. An old friend of mine, A. Walt Winchell, now deceased, flew Bureau No. 0327, 6-T-14, with VT-6 at Midway. He said he dropped his torpedo at 800 yards from approximately 40 feet of altitude. I assume that was the average procedure for torpedo plane pilots.
Anthony Morse Jr.
I do not believe any of the Japanese carrier-based planes had black chevron-type stripes on their wings, as depicted in the center of the painting on one of the Japanese planes about to be blown off the carrier. I am not sure, but something looks strange about the way the torpedo is mounted on the plane in the foreground.
Commander Harry H. Ferrier, U.S. Navy (Retired)
No Japanese carriers were hit by torpedoes, although there were attempts by 51 aircraft (41 TBDs, 6 TBFs, and 4 B-26s). All torpedo attacks were over before any dive-bombers attacked (which were the planes that did all the damage to the Japanese ships). I was going to state the squadron side numbers all had been eliminated, but that was not true of our TBFs. The plane I flew in had 8-T-1 on it. We arrived at Pearl Harbor and flew to Midway Atoll on 1 June before the number could be painted out. I was a radioman/tunnel gunner in Torpedo Squadron Eight; my plane was the only TBF to survive the battle. Five TBFs and 15 TBDs from my squadron were shot down that day.
Robert D. Young
The carrier is engulfed in flames—which was the result of attacks by dive-bombers, not torpedo planes. By the way, where is the carrier's island? Is it obscured by the eruption of white water from the torpedoing, or is the island on the port side as it was on the Hiryu and Akagi? In addition, what is the black object near the stern and to the left of the Japanese plane on the flight deck? Is it possible the bow is to the left, that the flames obscure the island, and the black object is the elevator that was blown up against the island?
Richard F. Lupi
The number of TBDs shown (I counted seven) is more than those that made it through the Japanese screening force and reached their drop points at any one time. Since the torpedo squadrons attacked separately (VT-8 first, then VT-6, and finally VT-3), there could not have been seven at one time. Walter Lord in Incredible Victory (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) credits only one plane from VT-8, four from VT-6, and five from VT-3 as having reached release points. Of these planes, only six made it back to the U.S. carriers.
Senior Chief Gunner's Mate Edward T. Forbes, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Could the photo on page 26 be incorrect? The photo of the Yorktown shows several arresting wires in the foreground. If correct, this gives her a portside island. My ship, the Anderson (DD-411), guarded the Yorktown at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.
Editor's Note: The photo is correct. All ships of the Yorktown class, and some of the first Essex (CV-9)-class carriers, were equipped with arresting gear both fore and aft to accommodate landings on either end of the ship.
Chief Marine Science Technician David Mauldin, U.S. Coast Guard
Torpedo tactics of the time required the torpedo to be dropped about 1,000 yards from the target. The planes in the painting appear to be about 200-300 yards from the ship, and they have not dropped their torpedoes. Japanese planes are shown attacking the U.S. planes head on. The tactics used then would have had them attacking the torpedo planes from above and behind.
Eric K. Falk
The TBDs are identified as belonging to Torpedo Squadron Five. Although Air Group Five nominally was assigned to the Yorktown, this group had sustained severe losses at the Battle of the Coral Sea. Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor for repairs prior to Midway, the Yorktown took on Air Group Three, normally assigned to the Saratoga (CV-3). The Saratoga had sustained torpedo damage previously and her air group was available for combat. I also believe the paint scheme on the TBDs is wrong for June 1942. Planes by then had had the red and white stripes removed from their tails, as well as the red dots in the middle of the white stars on the fuselage.
James F. Jeckel
Because of the high deck, the carrier depicted is either the Akagi or Kaga. Unless the starboard-side island of Kaga is hidden behind the waterspout, the carrier must be the Akagi, which had a portside island. The strikes on the Akagi were on the middle elevator and on the port quarter; therefore, the fire seems too far forward for this to be the Akagi, particularly because she kept up a good speed for quite a while, pushing the fires aft. The location and severity of the flames are more consistent with the descriptions of the attack on the Kaga (particularly because of her ruptured gasoline cart, which stood beside her small island). Despite this confusion, this painting is one of the most vivid in showing the undoubted horror of the holocaust on board the first three carriers attacked.
Robert C. Vandenbusch
Torpedo bombers attacked from as low as 40 feet and about 1,500 yards out, and released their torpedoes about 800 yards from the target. The painting shows them swarming in as strafing fighters might, starting from hundreds of feet up. In addition, sometime between the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the red circle at the center of the white star on U.S. aircraft insignia was painted over in white. This was done to reduce losses from friendly fire by gunners who, seeing red, assumed the target was Japanese.
Master Chief Quartermaster Robert B. McIntyre, U.S. Navy (Retired)
During the attack on the Shoho at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the U.S. Navy lost three planes. At Midway, the first U.S. air attack consisted of 93 bombers and torpedo planes. Not one of them scored a hit. Of the 41 Devastators, only 6 managed to return to their carriers: 2 to the Yorktown, 4 to the Enterprise, and none to the Hornet. It was the coup de grâce for the Devastator.
"Men of Annapolis: Good Show?"
(See S. Alexander, pp. 31-35, April 2002; L. Clemens, p. 62, June 2002 Naval History)
Commander Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
As a young boy of 12, I watched Men of Annapolis and its running mate, West Point, regularly. Of course, at that age I had no idea of the Navy show's gestational trials and tribulations. I can say that as a fan of movie music, I recall both programs had great title themes. The Navy and Marine Corps have not always enjoyed successful outings in television fiction, especially when it was supposed to be dramatic and not comedic. One show from the 1950s that didn't make it was Blue Angels, a half-hour program featuring fictional stories about the young men of the team, which then was flying Grumman F11F Tigers. A show from the same decade that did have some success was Navy Log, another half-hour show that seemed to be reasonably accurate in its depiction of real events.
"Security Isn't Free"
(See C. Kroll, pp. 40-43, February 2002; C. Bourke, pp. 10, 60, June 2002 Naval History)
C. Douglas Kroll
In the June 2002 issue, Cal Bourke states that I made a "dastardly inference" about the patriotism of U.S. civilian maritime workers. I think he missed the point of my article. While I stated that the purpose of the screening program was to "eliminate risks from suspected communist merchant seamen and waterfront workers," I was careful not to make a sweeping comment about all maritime workers. I focused only on two specific maritime unions, the Marine Cooks and Stewards and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's unions. Mr. Bourke, on the other hand, claimed that all maritime workers in the 1950s (including those such as Hugh Bryson and Harry Bridges) were the same patriots as the World War II merchant seamen.
My article stated that the security-screening program was controversial and seen by some as a union-busting tool of management. In addition, I noted that even in these two most radical maritime unions there never had been an act of sabotage. My point was not to repeat "derogatory remarks about maritime workers" but to discuss a little-known and controversial security program of the 1950s.
"'Everybody Sick with the Flu'"
(See W. Still, pp. 36-40, April 2002; P. Roth, pp. 63-64, June 2002 Naval History)
Hugh Ware
Dr. Still's article on the Spanish flu reminded me of stories my late mother told about her nursing experiences in World War I. She was a Red Cross nurse (the American Red Cross supplied nurses to the Army in those days) and was stationed at Camp Devens outside Boston. When the flu became epidemic there, she was assigned to a barracks full of sick men. She said a flu-stricken patient had two phases of high temperatures and associated symptoms that were separated by a brief period of normal temperature. Each day, a doctor inspected the charts of the sick and, when a man's chart showed a temperature in the normal range, he was returned to duty. It was then, during the strenuous basic training being done at the camp at that time, that the patient would become sick again and frequently die.
Her basic technique was to ensure that a patient's chart never showed a normal temperature until after he had passed the second phase of high temperatures. I suspect that the old hold-the-thermometer-on-the-hotwater-bottle trick and other schemes were used. Her secondary technique involved alcohol, which seemed to have a therapeutic effect. She would gather all the spare money in her barracks each night and go into the nearby town of Ayer with two empty suitcases. Both of these were heavy and clinked when she returned, and they were empty again by morning. Her techniques may have been unorthodox, but she didn't lose a single patient.