Maritime smuggling of marijuana through the Caribbean into the United States was rampant in the late 1970s. But close cooperation between a Coast Guard cutter and undercover DEA agents resulted in a record-setting bust.
In the 1960s, marijuana emerged as the illegal recreational drug of choice for many Americans. Most of the marijuana smoked in the United States initially was homegrown or imported from Mexico. By the early 1970s, however, the U.S. Customs Service’s successful interdiction efforts along the Mexican land border and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA’s) in-country eradication efforts largely had choked off these sources, creating a shortage in supply. Growers in Jamaica and Colombia quickly moved to fill the gap.
To import the marijuana, entrepreneurial smugglers—mostly Americans—used small, U.S.-registered vessels such as sailboats, sport fishermen, or cabin cruisers to pick up loads in Jamaica, Colombia, or Mexico and bring them to the United States. The first of these to be seized with Coast Guard involvement was the Mercy Wiggins on 3 May 1971 off the entrance to San Francisco Bay. After a short chase by the Coast Guard cutter Point Barrow (WPB-82348), U.S. Customs agents operating from the cutter seized the 57-foot converted shrimp boat carrying 10,100 pounds of Mexican pot and arrested the two persons on board.
The cutter Dauntless (WMEC-624) made the next U.S. maritime seizure, which also was the first Coast Guard–led interdiction. The Dauntless seized the sport fisherman Big L in the Florida Strait in March 1973. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the predecessor of the DEA, had provided intelligence leading to this 1,500-pound marijuana seizure.
But within only a few years of these initial busts, the trickle of vessels smuggling marijuana into the southeastern United States had grown into a flood. The Guajira Peninsula—often referred to simply as “La Guajira”—on Colombia’s northeastern coast quickly emerged as the major on-load site for cargoes of marijuana. Its remote location and lack of government oversight made it perfect for smuggling. Bales of marijuana were transported with virtual impunity from growing fields to the coast and transferred to waiting vessels.
The nationality of the smugglers and the vessels they used had undergone a shift by this time. Crews from criminal organizations in Colombia and other South and Central American countries rapidly displaced independent Americans. In addition, the smaller U.S. vessels previously used as transports mostly had been supplanted by coastal freighters and larger fishing vessels capable of carrying multi-ton cargoes. Concurrently, rumors began to circulate along the East Coast of large mother ships offloading marijuana to smaller “pick-up” boats near the Bahamas. Among the more elusive of the big transports was the former freighter Night Train.
Tracking Down the Night Train
To combat the trafficking, the DEA initiated Operation Stopgap in December 1975. According to the agency’s official history, as part of this operation “DEA pilots flew up and down the coast of La Guajira. They reported suspect vessels to the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], which then relayed the information to U.S. Coast Guard Cutters.” The Coast Guard used this information to plan intercepts of vessels departing Colombia and to prioritize which ones to board. Conducting an “EPIC-check” for all vessels sighted and especially prior to a boarding became standard operating procedure for cutters. The DEA also undertook the recruitment of confidential informants and aggressively placed undercover agents to gather additional intelligence on shipments.
Despite employment of all of these methods, DEA and Coast Guard efforts to find the Night Train were fruitless. According to John E. Van Diver, DEA regional director in Miami at the time, his agents had seized nearly 100 tons of La Guajira marijuana from the Night Train that had been brought ashore to Florida during this period. Yet despite the old ship’s numerous runs, the DEA’s aircraft and the Coast Guard’s cutters remained frustratingly unable to locate her.
Then a Fort Lauderdale–based FBI special agent phoned the Miami DEA office. A walk-in informant had provided what sounded like reliable information about a potential upcoming maritime drug-smuggling event. Since drug smuggling was the DEA’s business, he wanted to know if the agency would be interested running with the case. DEA Special Agent Theodore Weed agreed. He met with the informant and found that a local drug importer was looking for a “pick-up” boat to replace another vessel that had suddenly canceled on him. Special Agents Kevin T. Foley and John D. McCutcheon were detailed to go undercover to be introduced to the smuggler and arrange to take on the job.
McCutcheon and Foley hired an 87-foot charter fishing vessel, the Catchalot II. The boat’s master, a Captain Jones, agreed to participate in the operation. He would pilot his boat, with the DEA agents posing as crew members, to an offshore rendezvous where they would take on a load of marijuana from an unidentified larger vessel and then deliver it to Big Pine Key, west of Marathon, Florida. There the bales would be transferred to waiting motor homes for distribution along the Eastern Seaboard.
The DEA agents were given an approximate at-sea rendezvous location east of Great Abaco Island, on the eastern edge of the Bahamas. The exact position would be passed to them when under way. They were given a radio frequency, a call sign, and codes to communicate with the mother ship to arrange the final meeting. The agents wisely decided to bring the Coast Guard into the operation. Accordingly, the Coast Guard cutter Dauntless was recalled to her Miami Beach homeport from a law enforcement patrol in the Florida Strait.
The Coast Guard Joins the Hunt
The Dauntless, a Reliance-class, 210-foot medium-endurance cutter, was manned by 12 officers and 63 enlisted personnel and armed with a Mark 22 3-inch/50-caliber deck gun and two Browning .50-caliber machine guns. Her twin Cooper-Bessemer FVBM-12 turbocharged diesel engines could push her at more than 18 knots. Originally designed for the search-and-rescue and general law enforcement missions, the cutter already had become a seasoned drug interceptor. In addition to having made the Coast Guard’s first drug bust in 1973, she had seized another four smuggling boats since then—more than any other Coast Guard unit at the time.
Her captain, Commander Jon C. Uithol, was no stranger to the interdiction mission. He had commanded the Coast Guard cutter Point Clear, an 82-foot patrol boat, in the Vietnam War’s Operation Market Time. During his tour, the Point Clear came to the rescue of a beleaguered South Vietnamese outpost south of Ha Tien. Supporting fire from his cutter’s .50-caliber machine guns and Mk 2 Mod 1 81-mm mortar (see “Armaments & Innovations,” pp. 11–12) was a major factor in driving off the attacking Viet Cong force before it was able to overrun the post. He also had gained valuable experience stopping vessels suspected of smuggling and searching them for contraband. While under his command, the Point Clear stopped and searched numerous small craft without a single casualty. Uithol earned a Bronze Star with combat “V” for his service.
After picking up several DEA and Customs Service agents in Miami, Captain Uithol headed his cutter east toward the Bahama Islands. To avoid detection by boats or aircraft potentially working with the smugglers, the Dauntless waited well to the southwest of the rendezvous position, in the vicinity of the Berry Islands and the Northeast Providence Channel. The cutter would move from this location only upon notification by the DEA agents on board the Catchalot II.
This part of the plan was critical to successful legal prosecution. Under 1970s laws, merely catching a vessel with a cargo of drugs on board was insufficient to prosecute her master and crew. While the illicit cargo and vessel could be seized, the persons on board would have to be released unless intent to import the drugs into the United States could be proven. In this case, the DEA’s evidence of conspiracy ashore and an actual offload of drugs to its chartered vessel would be needed.
The Catchalot II got under way from West Palm Beach on the evening of 27 January 1977. Special Agent McCutcheon and three other agents were on board with Captain Jones. Special Agent Foley remained behind to coordinate the arrest of the conspirators ashore. The boat worked her way eastward through the Bahamas, stopping to refuel at Marsh Harbour, Great Abaco Island. The vessel then motored offshore and waited east of the island. Finally, around noon on 1 February, an aircraft buzzed the Catchalot II, dropping two plastic water bottles nearby. The bottles contained instructions and the final rendezvous location. As the fishing boat headed to the spot, DEA agents on board her radioed the information to the Coast Guard.
The Dauntless, which had been loitering about 75 nautical miles (nm) southwest of the position, headed east at 16 knots to close the distance. Three hours later, she received an updated position report and a description of the mother ship—a 185-foot, dark green–hulled coastal freighter with pilot house aft and a boom amidships. The name Labrador and homeport of Newfoundland were painted on her stern. With this information, the cutter kicked up her speed to 18 knots and set a northwest course of 050° T.
At 1738, a Coast Guard HU16-B Albatross reconnaissance plane reported that it was on site covertly monitoring the suspect vessel. It seemed that all bases were covered.
As the Dauntless raced to the rendezvous site, the Catchalot II met the Labrador. During the approach, the DEA agents were able to read the name Night Train spelled out in raised letters that had been painted over beneath Labrador on the freighter’s stern. This caused a surge of excitement as the agents began on-loading bales of marijuana. When 150 bales, each weighing about 50 pounds, had been transferred, the Catchalot II withdrew to stow them below deck. The transfer was to resume that night. The weather for an off-load—or an intercept—could hardly have been better. Although the sky was overcast, visibility was unrestricted at 10nm.
End of the Line
Shortly after sunset, the Dauntless detected the suspect vessel “dead in the water,” or stopped, at a range of just beyond 12nm. Six minutes later her lookout identified the vessel. As the cutter charged in, the Labrador, aka Night Train, got under way and attempted to flee. The Dauntless swooped in close on the mother ship’s port side. Using an international distress frequency, she radioed the vessel in both English and Spanish to heave to for boarding. The order was repeated using flashing light, flag hoist, and loud hailer. In response, the Night Train made a radical course change, crossing the Dauntless’s bow close aboard from starboard to port, missing the cutter by less than 50 yards. Had the Dauntless’s conning officer not anticipated the move and quickly ordered “back full” on both engines, a collision surely would have resulted.
The Night Train’s master, Colombian national Nino Rinsi Cadena, would later claim that he had been confused by the sudden appearance of the cutter, the searchlight being trained on his ship, and the barrage of communications directed at him. His course change was merely an attempt to avoid a collision, not to cause one. This claim would not hold much sway with a jury.
After another 10 minutes of fruitless attempts to establish communications, the Dauntless warned that she would fire on the vessel if she did not stop. Shortly thereafter, under orders from Captain Uithol, Gunner’s Mate First Class Mike Rogers opened fire with his .50-caliber machine gun, which was mounted on the cutter’s starboard bridge wing.
He sent three bursts of rounds across the Night Train’s bow. The vessel ignored this and maintained her flight. Rogers fired another three bursts, again with no response. At that point, Captain Uithol ordered the gunner’s mate down to the forecastle to take charge of the cutter’s 3-inch gun mount. Rogers and his gun crew then sent three non-explosive training rounds skipping across the fleeing vessel’s bow. Still the Night Train refused to stop. His patience exhausted, Uithol ordered his gun trained on the pilothouse and signaled that the next round would be fired into the vessel if she did not stop. The freighter quickly hove to.
Rogers rushed to the boat deck to join the gathering eight-man boarding party led by Lieutenant Robert Council, the cutter’s operations officer. Once they were on board the Dauntless’s number one 26-foot motor surfboat, it was lowered to the waters’ edge and departed for the freighter. By this time, ten of the Night Train’s crewmen were standing at the vessel’s rail. Using a loudhailer and speaking in Spanish, a DEA agent on board the cutter ordered the freighter’s crew to muster and raise their hands.
When the surfboat pulled alongside the freighter, the boarding party discovered that its boarding ladder was too short to reach the ship’s gunwale. As the craft returned to the cutter pick up a longer ladder, a shaft coupling broke, disabling the boat. Within eight minutes, the Dauntless had launched her second motor surfboat. The boarding party quickly cross-decked between the craft and headed to the Night Train, this time carrying a longer ladder. At 2046, the first member of the boarding party was on board. By this time the number of mustered smugglers had increased to 13.
Gunner’s Mate Rogers detected the unmistakable odor of marijuana almost immediately after getting on deck. Minutes later, Captain Uithol ordered the seizure of the vessel and the arrest of her crew. Because the Night Train already had off-loaded 7,500 pounds of marijuana to federal agents on board the Catchalot II, Uithol had sufficient legal basis for arrest and seizure even before any bales were actually found. After the smugglers were arrested and cuffed, they were transferred to the Dauntless. Once on board, the prisoners were shackled and kept under guard on the fantail.
The subsequent search of the vessel by the boarding party revealed holds stuffed with bales of marijuana. In addition, both Colombian registry papers for the Night Train and Canadian papers for the Labrador were discovered in the pilot house.
Lieutenant Council and Gunner’s Mate Rogers remained as part of the custody crew on board the freighter to navigate the vessel to Base Miami Beach.
Conspirators Ashore
Meanwhile, back in Miami Special Agent Foley was notified of the seizure. He then raided the South Dade motel room where the chief conspirators, Ed Rodriguez and Thomas J. Albernaz, and two others were holed up. The four suspects were arrested without incident.
After Lieutenant Council and his custody crew moored the Night Train at Base Miami Beach, the U.S. Customs Service determined the total amount of marijuana seized to be 104,000 pounds—the largest maritime drug seizure at the time and the first to top 100,000 pounds. Some sources credit the Coast Guard cutter Sherman’s (WHEC-720) October 1976 seizure of the Don Emilio with this honor. However, while initial estimates for that seizure exceeded 100,000 pounds, the final count was just shy of 70,000 pounds.
The master of the Night Train, Nino Rinsi Cadena, and his 12 Colombian crewmen would be convicted of both counts of a two-count indictment charging a conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States and a conspiracy to distribute the drug within the country. Oddly enough, on appeal, Cadena’s conviction was reversed on the second count, while that of his crew was sustained. As master, Cadena was sentenced to three years while each of his crewmen received two for their roles in the conspiracy.
The Dauntless would go on to make another ten drug seizures under Captain Uithol’s command. More than 40 years after her historic bust, she continues to patrol the Caribbean.
“2 Year Coast Guard Hunt Nets Ghostly Drug Ship,” Nashua (New Hampshire) Telegraph, 7 February 1977.
Audio recording made aboard the Dauntless during the approach and seizure of the Night Train on 1 February 1977.
LCDR Robert Council, USCG (Ret.), emails to the author, 19 and 23 August 2016.
“DEA History in Depth, 1975–1980” (Washington, DC: Drug Enforcement Administration), www.dea.gov/about/history/1975-1980%20p%2039-49.pdf.
Digest of Law Enforcement Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 1991).
Hank Messick, Of Grass and Snow: The Secret Criminal Elite (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979).
GMCS Michael Rogers, USCG (Ret.), email to the author, 9 August 2016.
Michael P. Sullivan, assistant U.S. attorney, prepared statement, “Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, First Session, on HR 2538, Serial no. 96-20” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).
CAPT Jon Uithol, USCG (Ret.), emails to the author, 30 November and 1 December 2016.
USCGC Dauntless logs, 28 January–1 February 1977, Record Group 26, National Archives and Records Administration, Atlanta, GA.
“U.S. Coast Guard Drug/Smuggling Related Interdictions (By Calendar Year),” Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC, March 1992.
U.S. v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979), https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-cadena-11.
U.S. v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), https://casetext.com/case/us-v-rodriguez-37.