In April 1862, when the city of New Orleans fell to Union forces, the port of Mobile, Alabama, became the Confederacy's most important Gulf Coast city. In addition to calling for the capture of New Orleans, the Department of the Navy's initial orders to Flag Officer David Glasgow Farragut, the commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, had included the seizure of Mobile. For 18 months, however, Farragut would be preoccupied with gaining control of the Mississippi River. The surrender of Port Hudson and Vicksburg in July 1863, however, left Union forces in control of the entire river, allowing Farragut to turn his attention to the Alabama port.
Mobile's importance had never diminished. While Farragut frequently recommended its capture, U.S. Army commanders never committed the necessary troops. In the spring of 1864, however, Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's Atlanta campaign revived interest in capturing Mobile as a U.S. base of operations, or at least as a method to draw Confederate troops away from the battles in northwestern Georgia. That June, Union Major General Edward Canby committed to a plan to land troops on Dauphin Island and capture Fort Gaines, one of the two forts at the mouth of Mobile Bay. The force was to include 1,500 infantrymen and an engineering battalion-a total of 2,400 men. Farragut, who for 2.5 years had anxiously anticipated closing down Mobile, was about to get his chance.
The admiral's diverse and powerful attack force included eight heavily armed screw sloops and six gunboats, but the real punch would come from four monitors. Two of these, the Manhattan and Tecumseh, were third-generation, Canonicus-class monitors, featuring ten-inch turret armor and two 15-inch Dahlgren smoothbore guns. The other two ironclads, the Chickasaw and Winnebago, were twin-turreted Milwaukee-class river monitors, each with four 11-inch Dahlgren smoothbores protected by eight inches of turret armor. Farragut's 18 warships carried a total of 190 guns.1
The Confederate naval force guarding Mobile Bay was completely overmatched. Three side-wheel gunboats, the Selma (four guns), Gaines (six guns), and Morgan (six guns), carried most of its firepower. The ironclad Tennessee, though, was a formidable weapon. She mounted two 6.4-inch Brooke rifles in each broadside and one 7-inch Brooke rifle at each end on pivot carriages. Five- and six-inch-thick iron plate protected the Tennessee's casemate, and she had a wrought-iron-plated beak for ramming.
Weaknesses included her power plant, which made the ironclad slow and unwieldy, and poorly designed armored gun-port shutters that could jam if struck by a projectile. Additionally, the steering mechanism aft of the casemate ran in a deck channel protected by only half-inch sheet iron. Skippered by Commander James D. Johnston, the Tennessee served as the flagship for Admiral Franklin Buchanan, who had commanded the ironclad CSS Virginia in Hampton Roads, Virginia, before being wounded on 8 March 1862 and missing the ironclad's duel with the Monitor the next day. Buchanan now commanded all Confederate naval forces in Mobile Bay.2
Three forts guarded the entrances to the bay. Fort Morgan was a masonry structure built in 1834. By the fall of 1864, it mounted 46 guns, most of them 32-pounders, 10-inch Columbiads, and 7- and 8-inch Brooke rifles. Only seven of the guns, however, directly guarded the channel into the bay. Across the channel on Dauphin Island was Fort Gaines. Mounting 26 guns, it was too far away to protect the main channel. The third strongpoint, Fort Powell, mounted 8 guns and protected Mobile Bay's Mississippi Sound entrance. From his headquarters at Fort Morgan, Brigadier General Richard Lucian Page, an ex-U.S. Navy officer and a cousin of General Robert E. Lee's, commanded the fortifications.3
For the Confederates, static defenses were key. The Southerners needed to slow an attacking force so that their warships and Fort Morgan's guns could attack the enemy vessels more effectively. Pilings stretching from the shallow part of the bay's entrance near Fort Gaines to a point about 500 yards from Fort Morgan, prevented light-draft vessels from bypassing the main channel to enter the bay. Sixty-five feet deep in places, the channel remained unobstructed to allow blockade runners access to Mobile. In the spring of 1863, however, the Confederates began further restricting the entrance by laying torpedoes, and by July 1864, they had sown 180 of the mines in three rows extending from the pilings.4
Farragut meanwhile had decided by 12 July how the West Gulf Blockading Squadron would enter the bay. The 14 wooden vessels in the attack force would be lashed in pairs, an arrangement he had tried at Port Hudson that would allow one vessel to tow her consort past the defenses should she receive a disabling shot. The squadron's larger, more heavily armed sloops-of-war would steam on the side nearer Fort Morgan. The four monitors would pass into the bay in a separate column, in line-ahead formation; lay down a covering fire; and contend with the Tennessee once the wooden ships passed into the bay.5
By 31 July, the Tecumseh still had not joined the fleet. After setting out from Fort Monroe, Virginia, the monitor arrived at Pensacola, Florida, on the 28th needing her engines repaired. Her tardiness increasingly vexed Farragut and became critical when the Army contingent began landing on Dauphin Island on 3 August. The following afternoon, however, the Tecumseh finally joined the squadron off Mobile Bay.
Early on the 5th, boatswain's pipes began calling Union Sailors and Marines to turn out and "up all hammocks." As the squadron's crews finished preparations on deck, the wooden warships began to gather in loose formation so that crewmen could lash them in pairs. The weather was perfect for the naval assault. The west wind would push the gun smoke toward Fort Morgan, giving Union gunners a clearer target, and the tide, in flood stage, would pull disabled vessels out from under the fort's guns into the bay.
Just before 0530, Farragut and Captain Percival Drayton, the commander of the squadron flagship, the Hartford, finished breakfast. Still sipping his tea, Farragut calmly said, "Well, Drayton, we might as well get under way." The general signal to proceed was quickly hoisted above the flagship, and within a minute, all the warships answered. By 0545, Farragut's squadron was under steam and headed toward the main channel's bar.6
As the ships moved into line, they hoisted an American flag at each masthead. One of the men wrote that the flags made it appear as if they were preparing for a "gala day." A seaman on the Hartford who had a view of the line behind wrote that all "could see the mass of colors grandly unfurled by the strong westerly breeze.7
The first three pairs of ships were screw sloops lashed to double-ender side-wheel gunboats. The sloop Brooklyn and gunboat Octorara were at the head of the line, followed by the Hartford and the Metacomet, and the Richmond and smaller Port Royal. The next two vessels, the Lackawanna and Seminole, were both screw sloops. Following them were the Monongahela and Kennebec, and the Ossippee and Itasca, screw sloops lashed to screw gunboats. At the end of the line were the screw sloop Oneida and gunboat Galena.
By 0635, the Brooklyn was almost halfway up the channel and nearing the Sand Island Lighthouse. The monitors, which had lain on the northern side of the island, crossed in front of the wooden warships and advanced ahead of them, off the Brooklyn's starboard bow. The Tecumseh, at the head of the ironclad column, was followed by the Manhattan, Winnebago, and Chickasaw.
Under Fort Morgan's Guns
At 0645, the lead monitor fired the first ranging shots at Fort Morgan. About 15 minutes later, with the wooden fleet 1.5 miles from Morgan and the monitors still about a mile away, General Page said to one of his officers, "Open the fight, sir." An initial shot from the fort was followed by blasts from all the guns that could bear on the monitors.8
The Union ironclads, meanwhile, were coming into position to take Fort Morgan under fire. The Manhattan fired her first shot at 0705. Before the Chickasaw opened fire five minutes later, a round from the fort struck her after turret. The Winnebago's guns opened up at 0715, about when the Brooklyn's starboard batteries began firing and by which time the action was general.9
On board his flagship, which had begun returning fire from the fort shortly after 0705, Farragut was standing on the batten that served as the first ratline above the deadeyes in the port main rigging. About five feet above the deck, he was level and could speak with Lieutenant Commander James E. Jouett, the captain of the Metacomet, who stood on her paddle box, as well as Captain Drayton. Despite the favorable west wind, smoke from the Hartford's guns soon obscured the admiral's vision. To get a better view of the action, he gradually climbed the rigging until he reached the futtock shrouds just under the main top, about 50 feet above the deck.
Farragut made this climb so gradually no one initially noticed. When Drayton learned of his location, he sent Quartermaster John H. Knowles to pass a line around the admiral. Knowles grabbed a piece of lead line and climbed the ratlines. Farragut initially declined the offer to secure him to the rigging but then assented. Knowles made the lead line fast to one of the shrouds, passed it loosely two or three times around the admiral's body, and secured it to another shroud.10
At 0722 the Hartford received her first damage when a shot struck the foremast. At about the same time, Farragut's battle plan began to unravel. Coordinating the passage under fire of a double line of vessels-one column of which was composed of ships lashed in pairs-through a narrow channel with a swiftly running current involved many uncontrollable variables. Yet another strong consideration was the Tennessee, which had moved slightly to the west and beyond the torpedo field, where she awaited the Union squadron.
As the Tecumseh neared the entrance to the bay, her pilot, John Collins, warned her commander, Captain Tunis A. M. Craven, of the danger posed by the torpedo field and the orders to stay to the east of it. But the captain, peering through the narrow slits in his ship's pilothouse, was unsure if he was supposed to pass as close to Fort Morgan and its pier, which appeared to jut out in the channel, as his monitor was heading. He reportedly told the pilot that on the Tecumseh's current course, "There was no room," adding, "damn the torpedoes, I am after that fellow [the Tennessee]; take me alongside." The Union vessel then swung across the channel and headed for the Confederate ironclad.11
The monitor's new course, however, cut directly ahead of the line of wooden ships. With the other monitors in the Tecumseh's wake, the wooden ships slowed and drifted westward. As the ironclad passed in front of the Brooklyn, her commander, Captain James Alden, had to slow his vessel. At 0725 Alden had the Army signalman on board signal the Hartford, "The monitors are right ahead; we cannot go in without passing them."12
The Tecumseh, meanwhile, entered the eastern end of the torpedo field. At 0730 nearby men heard a muffled explosion, and a column of water erupted into the air. The monitor shuddered and lurched violently, and then her bow began rapidly settling. One witness wrote, "her stern lifted high in the air with the propeller still revolving, and the ship pitched out of sight like an arrow twanged from the bow."13
Only a few men in the turret and the adjoining compartment managed to escape as the monitor, with little positive buoyancy, quickly sank. Captain Craven and John Collins met at the foot of the ladder that led out of the turret, where the pilot reportedly said to the commander, "Go ahead, Captain!" Replied Craven: "No, sir! After you, pilot! I leave my ship last!" While Collins was one of only 21 of the Tecumseh's 114 officers and men to survive, Craven went down with his ship.14
As soon at the monitor sank, the Brooklyn, resisting the effects of the channel's flood tide, began backing to avoid what Alden reported as being "a row of suspicious looking buoys." At 0730, Farragut had his signalman send a message to Alden to tell the monitors to "go ahead and then take your station." Moments after this message was sent, the flagship received the message from the Brooklyn, "Our best monitor is sunk."15
Approaching from behind, the Hartford stopped her engines but continued to drift down onto the Brooklyn and her consort, the Octorara. The Union Navy's advance into Mobile Bay had reached a critical point, as the Hartford and the other ships in the line bore down on the backing Brooklyn and Octorara. With the lead pair hesitating in the narrow opening to the bay, Farragut's wooden vessels could be halted opposite Fort Morgan's blazing guns-a deadly situation for the squadron.16
As the Hartford and Metacomet slowed, survivors from the Tecumseh were seen struggling in the water. Farragut ordered Commander Jouett to send a boat to save them, and Ensign Henry C. Nields took charge of picking up the men. Under "one of the most galling fires," he took the boat into the channel. General Page observed the rescue attempt and directed, "Pass the order not to fire on that boat; she is saving drowning men."17
Victory in the Balance
Farragut knew that the fate of the battle hinged on actions taken in the next moments. At this point he reportedly shouted, "Damn the torpedoes-full speed ahead!" One of the Hartford's crewmen, however, wrote that the admiral "waved his hand several times, crying go ahead, go ahead." Excited, Farragut was likely telling the signalman the next communication. At 0735, he again signaled the Brooklyn to "Go ahead."18
The admiral's neatly organized plan had unraveled into chaos. The flood tide was running like a sluice into the bay, and enemy guns were blasting away at the squadron's stationary warships, while the other paired vessels were fast approaching. If the ships became entangled, they would be under fire for some time before they could separate themselves.
Confederate gunners meanwhile turned the Hartford's deck into a field of death. A "deadly rain of shot and shell was falling on her," killing and wounding dozens, one of the flagship's officers recalled. An Army signal officer on board wrote that the decks were deluged with blood and "mangled fragments of humanity. . . ."19
Farragut, always ready to keep the initiative, decided to pass the Brooklyn. The Hartford and Metacomet could not back up because the Richmond and Port Royal were pressing close behind them. The flagship's helm was put hard astarboard, and the Metacomet backed her paddlewheels, turning the pair to the west. Once the two ships were reoriented, the pilot held up four fingers as a signal to Jouett to give his ship four bells, or full power ahead. At the order to take the lead, the Hartford's crew cheered, and the pair of ships headed straight across the torpedo field. Farragut was taking a huge risk; the loss of the flagship could change the battle's outcome. The Hartford and Metacomet, however, safely steamed through the torpedo field and into the bay. The torpedoes' long immersion underwater had evidently waterlogged many of the explosives.20
Getting Past the Tennessee
The flagship now faced another danger just as deadly-the enemy fleet. The Morgan, Selma, and Gaines took station so their guns would bear on the channel. The ironclad Tennessee, which had stopped directly in the channel to contend closely with vessels passing through, got under way to ram and sink the Hartford. The flagship and the Metacomet, which could make 13 knots, were more than a match for the slow, unwieldy ironclad, and with a slight course correction, they avoided her.
The pair of Union warships, however, received fire from Confederate shore batteries and the three Southern gunboats. The latter were in perfect position to damage the flagship and her consort as they passed, and the Morgan fired a shot that killed or wounded 15 men at the Hartford's bow guns. The Selma, the next gunboat ahead, also raked the pair. The Gaines meanwhile positioned herself nearer the fort and attacked the Hartford with her port battery.21
The confusion at the edge of the torpedo field delayed the other paired ships from closely following the Hartford and Metacomet. Finally, Alden got the Brooklyn under way again. She, the Richmond, and their consorts followed the same course as the Hartford and also safely crossed the torpedo field. Spotting their approach, the Tennessee ended her pursuit of the Hartford and unsuccessfully tried to ram the Brooklyn, passing clear of her stern by less than 100 yards. Coming up behind the Brooklyn, the Richmond suffered light damage from the Confederate flotilla's gunfire.22
The sloops Lackawanna and Seminole were the next pair in line. They had backed up to avoid colliding with the Richmond and Port Royal, and after starting and stopping until the ships ahead were clear, passed into the bay. Behind the two sloops were the Monongahela and the 90-day gunboat Kennebec. The Tennessee avoided a direct blow from the Monongahela, which had an iron prow, but the sloop struck her on the port quarter. In turn, the ironclad slid around and struck the bow of the Kennebec and then rasped down her side firing two shells, one of which exploded on the berth deck, wounding five men. The Monongahela then swung around and fired a broadside at the Tennessee with no effect, as the ironclad steamed away looking for her next target.23
When the Tennessee passed astern of the Kennebec and Monongahela, the next pair of vessels, the sloop Ossippee and gunboat Itasca, emerged from the smoke. The ironclad approached on the sloop's starboard bow but managed to inflict only little damage on the pair before continuing toward the final two Union warships, the sloop Oneida and gunboat Galena. Last in line, they had suffered the undivided attention of all the Confederate guns that could fire on them as they passed Fort Morgan. Passing astern of them, the Tennessee turned her broadside on the pair and delivered two highly destructive, raking fires.24
The Hartford and Metacomet, still lashed together and well ahead of the rest of the fleet, had meanwhile reached a point in the bay where they were not under fire from any of the Rebel forts; however, the Confederate gunboats were harassing the flagship from water too shallow for the pair of Union ships to approach. Jouett pleaded with Admiral Farragut to let him cast his shallower-draft vessel loose from the Hartford and pursue the gunboats. Farragut assented, signaling, "Gunboats chase enemy's gunboats."25
A few minutes past 0800 Sailors with boarding hatchets severed the last lines that held the flagship to the Metacomet. The fastest vessel in the bay, the Union warship sped away, as the pursuit of the Confederate gunboats began like a hound after a trio of slower foxes.26
The Morgan escaped into shallow water, and the wounded Gaines took herself out of the fight by steaming under the guns of Fort Morgan, where she later sank. The Selma meanwhile steamed toward Mobile, and a running gunfight began between her and the Metacomet. The Union gunboat's superior speed, however, allowed her to forge beside her quarry, and a blast from one of her 9-inch guns killed or wounded 13 men at a single gun on the Rebel ship. At 0910 the Selma struck her colors.27
The Climactic Confrontation
With the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, minus the Tecumseh, in the bay, the Hartford anchored, and as the smoke cleared, the wooden vessels came up piecemeal to anchor near the flagship. The three remaining monitors were still proceeding slowly toward the center of the bay. It would be some time before they would join the squadron. After the last Union ships had entered the Mobile Bay, Admiral Buchanan instructed the Tennessee's captain, "Follow them up, Johnston; we can't let 'em off that way!" The ironclad then set off for the warships gathering four miles away. Like Buchanan, Farragut was still full of fight, having told his pilot to "find the elephant." At about 0845, lookouts on board the Hartford spotted the Tennessee steaming toward the Union ships. Five minutes later, with the Rebel ironclad heading toward the Hartford, Buchanan's intention to sink her clear, Farragut signaled the Monongahela to "run down the ram." The flagship then hoisted the general signal "Attack the enemies." All the Union vessels seemed to race each other to be the first warship to reach the Tennessee.28
The iron-prowed Monongahela, whose top speed was 13 knots, had not anchored and was the first to head toward the ironclad. The sloop's engineers crowded all the steam they could, and about 0930, as she closed on the ram, Captain Johnston ordered the Tennessee's helm aport. This maneuver caused the Monongahela to strike the ironclad just abaft the center at an oblique angle rather than straight on. The sloop's bow was smashed in the collision, and her prow was torn off as she slid down the ironclad's hull. At the same time, the Monogahela's momentum spun the Tennessee around "as upon a pivot." The ironclad had fired two shells into the sloop just before the collision, and soon afterward, when the ships were about ten yards apart, the Yankee gunners returned fire with a broadside of 11-inch shot into the Tennessee's stern. The rounds, however, bounced off the ironclad's armor "like peas from a shovel," and in trying to turn around and again run at the Confederate ship, the sloop grounded.29
The Lackawanna, just behind the Monongahela, also intended to ram the Tennessee and was in a good position to damage the ironclad. At 0945 the sloop "butted him fair," striking the after end of Rebel ship's casemate. The collision pushed the Tennessee over, giving her a list. On board the Lackawanna, the collision "prostrated every man on deck," and the sloop's stem was crushed three feet above the waterline and five feet below, causing a serious leak.30
Just as the Tennessee cleared the Lackawanna, the monitor Manhattan arrived and opened fire, her initial shot striking her opponent's casemate. Although the round did not penetrate the armored enclosure, it splintered two feet of solid wood. Fortunately for Confederate crewmen, netting inside the casemate caught the wooden projectiles, preventing any casualties.31
The Hartford meanwhile maneuvered into position to ram the ironclad, and Farragut again ascended the rigging to get a better view of the fight. The flagship managed to strike the Tennessee a glancing blow, and the sloop rasped down the ironclad's side. As the ships passed, the Hartford fired seven of her 9-inch guns at her opponent, and the Tennessee replied with two of her Brooke rifles.32
With the arrival of the monitors, the Tennessee became the target of the entire squadron. One eyewitness claimed that Buchanan's flagship looked like an "infuriated bear, worried by a pack of hounds." The Lackawanna again steamed into position to ram the Confederate ironclad, as did the Hartford. In the confusion, the flagship cut directly in front of the Lackawanna. As he saw the sloop bearing down on his flagship, Farragut became "a trifle excited." Turning to his Army signal officer, he asked, "Can you say For God's Sake by signal?" Acknowledging he could, the admiral told him, "Then say to the Lackawanna, For God's Sake, get out of our way and anchor!"33
The sloop, however, struck the Hartford forward of her mizzenmast, just below where Farragut was perched. The damage to the flagship was critical; the Lackawanna's stem cut into the Hartford's hull to within two feet of the waterline. Farragut quickly climbed down from the rigging to inspect the wound. The Hartford's crew thought their ship would sink, and above the noise of the battle their anxious voices cried: "The Admiral! The Admiral! Save the Admiral! Get the Admiral out of the ship!" Always calm, Farragut appraised the damage, and when he realized it was not fatal, he immediately ordered Drayton to strike the Tennessee again.34
The Union monitors, however, then took charge of the battle. The Manhattan's twin 15-inch guns damaged the Tennessee, although none of their shots penetrated the ironclad's armor. One contemporary said that "an ordinary water bucket" could be placed in each dent made by these rounds.35
The Chickasaw came up next and maneuvered under the Tennessee's stern. Lieutenant Commander George Perkins managed to keep his monitor within 50 yards of the ironclad and was often in contact with her as his ship's two 11-inch guns in the forward turret kept up a continuous fire against the after part of the ironclad's casemate, severely damaging the iron plates. The shots jammed the Tennessee's after gun-port shutter, preventing her gunners there from responding to the Chickasaw. During the battle, Perkins and his crew would fire 52 rounds at the Confederate flagship.36
By this time, the Tennessee's forward shutters were also stuck in the closed position. Determined to continue the fight, Buchanan sent for a machinist to try and unjam the stern shutter. While the crewman was trying to free it, a shot from the Chickasaw struck the gun-port cover, killing him. The hit caused several iron splinters to fly through the air, one of which killed a second Sailor while another struck the admiral, breaking his right leg below the knee. Believing that Buchanan was mortally wounded, a surgeon carefully carried him below.37
Another shot from the Chickasaw, meanwhile, struck the thin iron plates above the steering chains, pinching them in the channel. Johnston had relieving tackles rigged, but they were shot away in "only a few moments." At that point, the Tennessee had little means to defend herself, could not maneuver, and was nothing more than a target for the Union warships.38
Receiving word that Buchanan was wounded, Johnston went below to make a report. As the captain walked up to him, the admiral said, "Well Johnston, they have got me again," a reference to his earlier wounding in the Virginia. "You'll have to look out for her now; it is your fight." Johnston replied, "I'll do the best I know how." The battle continued for another 15 minutes with the Tennessee "lying like a log in the water." The captain again went below to communicate the situation to Buchanan, including the fact he was unable to bring a gun to bear on the Union ships. The admiral replied, "if that is the case you had better surrender."39
Johnston returned to the deck, climbed to the top of the casemate, took down the Confederate flag, and ordered the ironclad's engines stopped. The captain later wrote, "I then decided . . . with almost a bursting heart, to hoist the white flag." At 1000, he raised the surrender flag to where the Confederate banner had proudly flown.40
The Battle's Aftermath
The next day, Farragut officially thanked the West Gulf Blockading Squadron's officers and men for their "gallant conduct," noting their "courage and cheerfulness" against a well-prepared enemy. Including the men lost when the Tecumseh went down, Union casualties were 315 dead or wounded, while the Confederates suffered only 31 killed or wounded.41
During the night of 5 August, the Confederates evacuated Fort Powell, and on the 8th Fort Gaines surrendered. After more than two weeks of bombardment and siege by Union troops, Fort Morgan surrendered on 23 August. With Mobile Bay in Union hands, the port of Mobile was closed to blockade runners. The city would not fall until April 1865, a few days after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court House and long after it had ceased to be useful as a Confederate entrepot.
The Battle of Mobile Bay, Farragut's crowning achievement, illustrated the admiral's capacity to maintain the initiative by coolly making critical decisions under fire. His boldness earned the West Gulf Blockading Squadron commander his first victory at New Orleans and his last at Mobile Bay. At the former, he decided to advance upriver even though his mortar flotilla had failed to materially damage Fort Jackson. And at Mobile Bay, he ordered the Hartford across the torpedo field when the battle hung in the balance. Farragut was a careful tactician who devoted enormous time to planning his battles. At New Orleans and Mobile Bay, however, that was not enough. The outcome of each of those battles was directly due to his willingness to take risks. The admiral's one-time fleet captain Thornton Jenkins summed it up best. He claimed that Farragut was "truly a man of action" and a "knight errant [who] always covered the cost."42
2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Navy in the Civil War: The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898), pp. 220-22.
3. National Register Nomination of Fort Morgan, National Register of Historic Places, National Parks Service, Parker, Mobile Bay, p. 212.
4. Victor Von Sheliha, Treatise on Coast Defenses (London: E & F. N. Spon, 1868), pp. 104-05; Von Sheliha to Page, 3 August 1864, Richard Lucian Page Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
5. Farragut, General Order #10, eds. Richard Rush et. al., Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 31 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894-1927), (hereafter cited as ORN), ser. 1, vol. 21, pp. 397-98.
6. Loyall Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut: First Admiral of the United States Navy (Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2006), p. 413; Abstract Log of Hartford, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 799.
7. Foxhall A. Parker, The Battle of Mobile Bay and the Capture of Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell (Boston: Boston Stereotype Foundry, 1878), p. 21; William F. Hutchinson, "The Bay Fight: A Sketch of the Battle of Mobile Bay," Personal Narratives of the Battle of the Rebellion Being Papers Read Before the Rhode Island Soldiers and Sailors Historical Society, No. 8 (Providence, RI: Sidney S. Rider, 1879), p. 13; Bartholomew Diggins, "Recollections of the Cruise of the USS Hartford," unpublished manuscript, New York Public Library (hereinafter cited as NYPL), p. 254.
8. Benjamin B. Cox, "Mobile in the War Between the States," Confederate Veteran, vol. 24 no. 5 (May 1916) p. 212; The Daily Picayune (New Orleans), 9 August 1864.
9. Abstract Log of Brooklyn, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 783; Abstract Log of Hartford, ibid., p. 799; Abstract Log of Manhattan, ibid., p. 824, Abstract Log of Chickasaw, 5 August 1864, ibid., p. 786.
10. John H. Knowles to I. B. Miller, 15 November 1894, Roosevelt Collection of Naval and Maritime Manuscripts, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; Knowles to Loyal Farragut, 18 December 1878, David Glasgow Farragut Papers, University of Tennessee.
11. Jenkins to Unknown, 8 November 1864, Area 6, Entry 563, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, Record Group 45, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. (hereinafter cited as RG 45, NARA).
12. Copy of Messages Received and Sent on 5 August 1864, by LT J. C. Kinney, Subentry E46, Entry 395, Letter Books of Officers of the United States Navy at Sea, RG 45, NARA.
13. Harrie Webster, "The Battle of Mobile Bay in a Monitor," War Papers No 14, Commandery of the State of California Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States (San Francisco: The Commandery, 1894), p. 12.
14. David B. Conrad, "With Buchanan on the Tennessee," Under Both Flags: A Panorama of the Great Civil War (Chicago: C. R. Graham, 1896), p. 64.
15. Report of Captain Alden, 6 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 445; copy of Messages Received and Sent on August 5th 1864, by LT J. C. Kinney, Subentry 46, Entry 395, RG 45, NARA.
16. Thornton Jenkins to Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 May 1883, Operations of Fleets, Squadrons, Flotillas and Divisions, Subject File OO, RG 45, NARA.
17. Farragut to Welles, 12 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 419; Page, "Defense of Fort Morgan," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols., Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel eds., (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956) (hereinafter cited as Battles & Leaders) vol. 4, p. 408.
18. John C. Kinney, "Farragut at Mobile Bay," Battles & Leaders, 4, p. 391; Diggins, "Recollections," NYPL.
19. Tyson to Kimberly, 6 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 430; Kinney, "Farragut at Mobile Bay," Battles and Leaders, vol. 4, pp. 389-90.
20. "The Mobile Bay Combat," New York Times, 30 May 1887; Alfred Pirtle, "Rear Admiral James Edward Jouett," United Service, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 17; Diggins, "Recollections," p. 258.
21. Farragut to Welles, 12 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 417.
22. Waterman to Payne, 6 August 1864, Engagement with Enemy War Vessels, Subject File HA, RG 45, NARA.
23. Abstract Log of Monongahela, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, pp. 830-31; Abstract Log of Kennebec, 5 August 1864, ibid., p. 806; Strong to Farragut, 6 August 1864, ibid., p. 472; Strong to Farragut, 6 August 1864, ibid., p. 472; Batcheller to Strong, 5 August 1864, ibid., p. 473.
24. Mullany to Farragut, 15 December 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 486; "Passage of the Forts," New York Daily Tribune, 2 September 1864.
25. Clark, Prince and Boatswain: Some Tales from the Recollections of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Clark, James Morris Morgan and John Philip Marquard (Greenfield, MA: E. A. Hall & Company, 1915), p. 103; Parker, Mobile Bay, p. 48.
26. Clark, Ibid.; Diggins, "Recollections," p. 266; Parker, Mobile Bay, pp. 48-49; Pirtle, "Rear Admiral James Edward Jouett," p. 20.
27. Murphy to Buchanan, 15 August 1864, ibid., pp. 587-88; Jouett to Farragut, 8 August 1864, ibid., p. 443.
28. Conrad, "What the Fleet Surgeon Saw," The United Service 8 (September 1892):263-64; J. D. Johnston, "Admiral Buchanan and the Confederate States Ram Tennessee," The United Service vol. 7 no. 2 (August 1882):208; Watson, "Farragut and Mobile Bay," p. 482; Copy of Messages Received and Sent on August 5th, Correspondence of David G. Farragut, Letterbooks of Officers of the United States at Sea, Entry 395, RG 45, NARA.
29. Parker, Mobile Bay, pp. 34-35; Batcheller to Strong, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 473.
30. Marchand to Farragut, 5 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, pp. 465-66; Hutchinson, "Bay Fight," p. 20.
31. Wharton, "Battle of Mobile Bay," The Daily American (Nashville), 13 September 1877.
32. John C. Watson, "Farragut and Mobile Bay?Personal Reminiscences," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1927), p. 556; Diggins, "Recollections," p. 274.
33. Kinney, "An August Morning with Farragut," Scribners Monthly vol. 22, no. 2 (June 1880): 208; Henry St. Paul, "The Attack on Mobile," The Daily Picayune (New Orleans), 14 August 1864.
34. Army and Navy Journal, 24 September 1864, p. 70.
35. Nicholson to Farragut, 8 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 495; Diggins, "Recollections," p. 276, NYPL.
36. McDonald to Perkins, 7 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, 501.
37. Johnston, "Buchanan and the Tennessee," United Service, vol. 7, no. 2 (August 1882), p. 210; James D. Johnston, "The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay," Battles and Leaders, vol. 4, p. 404; Conrad, "What the Fleet Surgeon Saw," pp. 265-66.
38. Parker, The Battle of Mobile Bay, pp. 76-77.
39. Johnston, "Buchanan and the Tennessee," United Service, p. 211.
40. Johnston, ibid.; Johnston to Buchanan, 13 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 581.
41. Farragut, General Order No. 12, 6 August 1864, Farragut Papers, University of Tennessee; See Table, ORN, 1, 21, p. 407; J. Thomas Scharf, The History of the Confederate States Navy (New York: Rogers and Sherwood, 1887), p. 573; Farragut to Welles, 8 August 1864, ORN, 1, 21, p. 407; Jack Friend, West Wind, Flood Tide: The Battle of Mobile Bay (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004, p. 244, each have a slightly different number for the casualties.
42. Jenkins to Mahan, 3 May 1883, Operations of Fleets, Squadrons, Flotillas and Divisions, Subject File OO, RG 45, NARA.