Coastal interdiction in the Vietnam War, performed in large part by U.S. Coast Guard patrol boats, had a significant effect upon Viet Cong waterborne supply and ultimately forced the enemy to rely upon more difficult overland smuggling. The Coast Guard’s contribution to the war effort, while not large in terms of manpower or equipment, was of notable strategic value.
When the United States entered the Vietnam arena, it inherited the same challenges the French had faced in the Indochina War. The Viet Minh used coastal and riverine supply routes.1 The U.S. discovery of numerous caches along the coasts and riverways of South Vietnam indicated that the Viet Cong’s water routes needed to be dammed.
The U.S. Navy, as a blue-water force, was ill-prepared to counter the enemy in its brown-water element so it called upon the Coast Guard to provide cutters and expertise. In April 1965, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David L. McDonald met with Admiral Edwin J. Roland, Commandant of the Coast Guard. The CNO requested that the Coast Guard turn over operational control of some of its patrol boats to aid the maritime interdiction effort. Admiral Roland quickly complied.2 By the end of May, 17 82-foot Point-class patrol boats were bound for Subic Bay, the Philippines.3
Neither the patrol boats (WPBs) nor their crews were ready for deployment to Vietnam. The boats required additional armament and equipment, and the Coast Guardsmen needed additional training. The cutters received four .50-caliber machine-gun mounts bolted to the fantail deck and, on the bow, another .50-caliber machine gun atop an 81mm direct-fire mortar. Additional modifications included new radios, additional bunks, and spotlights for night boardings.4 The 47 officers and 198 enlisted men selected for Vietnam underwent three weeks of POW training in survival, escape, and evasion and a six-week program for gunnery, language, and hand-to-hand combat.5 Their training complete, the crews boarded their cutters in Subic Bay and set off for Da Nang on 15 July 1965.6
The Navy established Task Force 115, code-named Operation Market Time, on 24 March 1965.7 Market Time’s goal was to end the Viet Cong’s flow of supplies along the thousand miles of South Vietnamese coastline. In addition to coordinating the efforts of aircraft and patrol craft, Market Time also had operational control of the Coast Guard cutters. The WPBs operated under Market Time as Squadron One (RONONE), created on 27 May 1965.8 They were subdivided into two divisions; Division 11 patrolled the Gulf of Thailand west of the Cau Mau Peninsula, while Division 12, based in Da Nang, patrolled near the North Vietnamese border.9 In February 1966, nine more WPBs arrived in Vietnam to form Division 13, which operated between Divisions 11 and 12, on the east side of the Cau Mau Peninsula.10 Each of the 26 patrol boats covered a zone, an area 25 miles out to sea by 12 miles wide. The cutters, together with Navy assets, formed a highly comprehensive surveillance and interdiction system.
First Fights
It did not take long for the first WPBs in Vietnam to see combat. On 24 July 1965, the Point Orient became the first Coast Guard cutter to engage the enemy when she exchanged fire with a Viet Cong shore position. Subsequent firefights between junks and the Point Glover and Point Marone revealed that the cutters’ traditional white paint scheme was highly visible at night under flares. By September, they were camouflaged with deck gray paint.11
The most intense riverine contacts occurred early in the war, typically in the Mekong River Delta, sixty miles southeast of Saigon. WPBs generally avoided moving into the rivers and canals because they were too large and, at times, could not turn around in the narrow channels. Some skippers tried backing into rivers, thus enabling them to speed out bow first should the need arise.12 The cutters’ exposed gun positions, as well as the likelihood of receiving fire from both hanks of the river, made river patrol even more hazardous. Ultimately, Market Time officials decided that riverine warfare was best left to the purpose-built river patrol craft of the Navy, under Task Force 116, Operation Game Warden. Division 13 cutters, however, would occasionally venture into rivers throughout the war.
Despite the cutters’ unsuitability for riverine warfare, they met some success during Operation Jackstay in early 1966.13 This operation was to clear the Mekong Delta of all Viet Cong installations along the Soi Rap River. As the WPBs moved inshore, they engaged in firefights with junks, sampans, and ground troops. On 9 March 1966, the Point White, under the command of Lieutenant Eugene Hickey, encountered a junk crossing the river. The enemy immediately opened fire on the cutter. The Point White sank the junk by ramming it, and then rescued four of the VC. Eight others were killed in the engagement, with no U.S. casualties. Hicky later received the Silver Star.14
The majority of combat scenarios were not nearly as exciting as the Soi Rap encounter. Generally, cutters only opened fire for naval gunfire support (NGFS) missions. Typically, such missions did not involve any return fire, and frequently the target was not visible.15 As the war progressed, NGFS missions increased, and by 1968 the Coast Guard had developed a reputation for accurate support bombardment. From 1965 to 1967, cutters averaged only 11 NGFS missions per month, but the number jumped to 242 per month in 1968. In May 1967, five Coast Guard 311-foot high-endurance cutters (WHECs) joined the fray, more than doubling the number of Coast Guardsmen in Vietnam. In a single month, one WHEC fired more than 2,500 rounds at enemy positions.16 Throughout the war, 31 different WHECs served in Vietnam.17
Simple Orders, Difficult Job
The Coast Guard’s most important mission was the interdiction and inspection of the estimated 50,000 junks that sailed the coast of South Vietnam on a daily basis.
The WPBs, manned by crews of twelve, including a Vietnamese Navy liaison officer, had simple orders: inspect every vessel in sight. WPB commanding officers would determine the manner in which they patrolled their area of responsibility.18 Generally, vessels transiting through a patrol area were given highest priority. Most junks were simply a hollow hull, and frequently a WPB needed only to pull alongside to inspect it. Nearly as often, however, the crew would board the junk and search it. Seizures were rare. When a Vietnamese was detained, it was usually for desertion or draft dodging. Most inspections were professional and congenial, with the courteous treatment helping the Coast Guardsmen solicit information about the enemy. Of 80,000 junks detected during the first ten months of WPB operations, 40,000 were boarded or inspected, and only 30 junks and 140 suspects were turned over to the South Vietnamese, all for discrepancies in their identification papers.19
The patrols were grueling, and WPB boarding evolutions required the participation of most of the crew. On patrol for days at a time, with around-the-clock boardings, cutter crews got little sleep. The oppressive heat and humidity, sometimes reaching 120° Fahrenheit and normally remaining above 90°, made the work extremely demanding; fortunately, the WPBs were air-conditioned. The Navy provided Fast Patrol Craft—Swift boats—to alternate patrol zones with the cutters. While the Swifts were comparably armed and faster than the WPBs, they were only 50-feet long and could not withstand heavy seas. During the monsoon season, the Swifts were forced to shelter inland, while the rugged WPBs covered the vacated patrol area.20 The cutters, having only radar and a sextant for navigation, preferred to stay generally within 20 miles of the coast. Junks seldom ventured far beyond sight of land. If and when they did, the Navy or WHECs were present to inspect them. Staying closer inland also allowed the WPBs to react quickly when called for NGFS.
Odd jobs helped break the monotony of patrol. Cutters often evacuated troops, searched for downed pilots, and ferried classified information. Other tasks included keeping fishermen out of restricted areas, reconnaissance, and radio triangulation of Viet Cong positions.21
Bigger Fish
The Coast Guard was very successful in stopping North Vietnamese trawlers. Risking a large load of supplies on a trawler could prove more advantageous than piecemeal smuggling aboard junks. While such attempts were rare, all ended in victories for Market Time forces, which effectively demonstrated that large-scale maritime resupply was an unwise option for the enemy.
The first trawler incident involving Coast Guard forces occurred at midnight on 10 May 1966.22 The Point Grey, on patrol off the Cau Mau Peninsula, discovered a suspicious 120-foot trawler. As the cutter closed, the trawler attempted to flee and ran aground. As Point Grey crewmen attempted to board the vessel, machine-gun fire from the beach forced the cutter away. Realizing that the Viet Cong ashore were attempting to salvage the vessel, the cutter began sweeping the shore with mortar and machine-gun fire. The Point Grey made another attempt to board the stranded trawler, but intense small- arms fire wounded three crewmembers, forcing the cutter back again. Then, joined by the Point Cypress, the duo destroyed the trawler with mortar fire. Divers later discovered a large amount of weapons and ammunition aboard the remains.
The second trawler action occurred one month later, in the early hours of 20 June 1966.23 The Point League spotted a 98-foot trawler near the southern Mekong Delta. After refusing to respond to signals, the trawler answered warning shots fired by the cutter with its own shots. The cutter then closed and exchanged a broadside of machine- gun fire, during which two of her crew were wounded. The trawler was forced aground and Air Force gunships strafed her. After dawn, crews from the Point League, Point Slocum, and Point Hudson put out the fire on the burning trawler. The hulk was refloated, and its hundreds of tons of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies were confiscated.
On 14 March 1967, Market Time forces, including the Point Ellis, intercepted another 120-foot trawler near the demilitarized zone.24 The trawler’s crew drove her aground and attempted to destroy its cargo. Before a boarding team could deploy, she exploded with terrific force, leaving no recoverable supplies.25
The enemy attempted to run the Market Time blockade again on the night of 15 July 196 7.26 Patrol craft had been shadowing a trawler for days as she attempted to move out to sea. The Point Orient and an accompanying Swift boat hailed the 120-foot ship with no response. After multiple attempts with illumination rounds and warning shots, all with no response, the cutter and Swift, along with two Navy patrol gunboats, began to shell the trawler, and she returned fire. The Vietnamese, however, were forced to ground their ship. Heli copter gunships joined the four patrol craft in pounding the beached vessel. The Point Orient, out of ammunition, was relieved by a Swift boat. Surprisingly, a salvage team later discovered the cargo intact. Enough arms and ammunition were recovered to supply a Viet Cong regiment for several months.
Persistence began to appear more like foolhardiness when the North Vietnamese launched four trawlers during the Tet Offensive, all on the same day. This action resulted in three trawlers being destroyed and one fleeing back to North Vietnamese waters.27 The first was destroyed after being forced aground by the Point Grey, Point Welcome, two Swift boats, and the cutter Androscoggin during the night of 1 March 1968. Although the Market Time craft crippled the trawler, it was her crew who ultimately destroyed the vessel. A scuttling charge blew the trawler to pieces, showering the U.S. ships with shrapnel and blowing out the windows on the Point Welcome.
The second Tet trawler engaged that night met her fate at the hands of the cutter Winona, assisted by Swift boats, and the WPBs Point Grace, Point Marone, and Point Hudson.28 The Winona pursued the trawler, while the other Market Time vessels waited at its suspected destination. The trawler, pummeled by her pursuer, exploded leaving almost no trace. Of the two remaining Tet trawlers, other Market Time forces destroyed one and the cutter Minnetonka drove the other off. Later in the war, Coast Guard WHECs would destroy two more trawlers.
Friendly Fire Incidents
The Coast Guard was fortunate that its casualties in these and other operations were light. Ironically, the single most costly incident involving cutters under fire occurred when the Point Welcome came under attack from U.S. Air Force jets on the night of 11 August 1966.29 The “friendly fire” incident was the result of poor communication and procedural knowledge on behalf of all parties involved. In the end, nobody was held accountable for the tragedy. The Point Welcome’s commanding officer and a crewman were killed, and five others were wounded. Despite the helm being shot away, Chief Richard Patterson managed to steer the cutter to the nearest land and beach her. The crew abandoned the cutter, only to come under fire from Viet Cong in the jungle. The Point Caution moved in to rescue survivors, followed closely by the Point Lomas, Point Orient, USS Haverfield, and a Swift boat to protect the cutter. The Point Welcome took the strafing surprisingly well; although she had been riddled with holes and beached, the engines were running and the vessel was operable. She sailed to Da Nang for repairs just 12 hours after the attack.
The friendly fire incident, while tragic, could have been worse. Miraculously, only two crewmembers were killed and the vessel survived the onslaught. Reaction to the incident resulted in improved communication between the services to prevent further such incidents. Coast Guard WPBs began carrying parachute flares on their bridges and had identification markings painted atop their pilothouses. Other cutters came under friendly fire. The Point Lomas received warning shots from a Navy harbor patrol craft, and the Point Dume was attacked by an unidentified allied aircraft.30 Neither action resulted in casualties.
Seven Coast Guardsmen, six in WPBs, were killed in Vietnam. Of those, only two were from enemy action.31 The wounded total was 53, not excessive given that 8,000 Coast Guardsmen served in Vietnam throughout the war. At any given time the total strength of Coast Guard personnel in Vietnam ranged from 1,400 to 1,500 men.
The smallest of the nation’s armed services achieved impressive statistics. Despite the dubious nature of body counts, official totals credit the Coast Guard with 1,961 enemy killed or wounded. The service was also responsible for 6,000 NGFS missions, 10,000 enemy fortifications destroyed, and 3,000 junks sunk. Between 1965 and 1970, Coast Guardsmen sailed more than five million miles of combat patrol in the coastal and inland waters of South Vietnam.32 The WPBs were underway an average of 75% of the time, an increase of 20% to 25% over time spent underway in peacetime.33 When not underway, the cutters were ready at a moment’s notice 90% of the time. Coast Guard forces in Market Time, consisting of 57 different cutters throughout the war, boarded or inspected 510,000 vessels, and Coast Guardsmen returned to the United States with 500 personal decorations.
Typical of the Coast Guard operations tempo is the Point Lomas. In one-year, under the command of Lieutenant James Loy, she sailed 39,270 miles and spent 5,337 hours underway. The cutter detected 7,231 junks, inspected 2,607 and boarded 2,368 of them.34
The Coast Guard’s contribution to Market Time interdiction efforts was clearly significant. The fact that the boardings rarely resulted in the seizure of Viet Cong contraband is irrelevant. The number of boardings conducted by the 26 WPBs, 84 Swiff boats, and other Navy craft, suggests that the Market Time deterrent to small-craft smuggling was effective. This is supported by the enemy’s fruitless attempts to ferry supplies in large trawlers. The North Vietnamese found it all but impossible to supply the insurgency in the South through coastal transportation largely because of the efforts of the Coast Guard. As a result, the enemy invested heavily into moving supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail—which was far more difficult, costly, and inefficient than maritime resupply.
Throughout the war the Coast Guard maintained its tradition of providing an inordinately large contribution for a service so small. In Vietnam, the Coast Guard patrol boat crews eagerly responded to all that they were called to do, from shore bombardment to ship-to-ship firefights to millions of miles and thousands of thankless hours on patrol. The Coast Guard proved that it was ready to do its share, and indeed, lived up to its motto Semper Paratus—Always Ready.
1. Victor C. Croizat, The Brown Water Navy (New York: Blandford Publishing, 1984).
2. Alex Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 7.
3. Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 331; Jim Mesko, Riverine (Carrolton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1985), p. 21.
4. Robert Nelson and Douglas Currier, “Operation of Coast Guard Patrol Boats in Southeast Asia,” Naval Engineers Journal, June 1966, p. 405.
5. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, p. 332.
6. Mesko, Riverine, p. 22.
7. Croizat, The Brown Water Navy, p. 114.
8. Nelson and Currier, “Operation of Coast Guard Patrol Boats,” p. 405.
9. Paul Blaney, “Coast Guard Patrol Boats In Vietnam,” Dimick Hall lecture, U. S. Coast Guard Academy, New London, CT, 15 February 1996.
10. Mesko, Riverine, p. 22.
11. Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War, p. 31, 54.
12. Mike Ballard, personal telephone interview, 8 February 1999.
13. Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War, p. 81.
14. Hugh F. Lusk, ed., Traditions of Gallantry: Graduates of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1993, p. 109.
15. Ballard, telephone interview.
16. Adrian Lonsdale, “Fourth Coastal Zone, Vietnam,” US Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association Bulletin, November/December 1968, p. 21.
17. “Vietnam Wrap-Up,” U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumi Association Bulletin, March/April 1973, p. 35.
18. Blaney, “Coast Guard Patrol Boats.”
19. Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War, p. 66.
20. H.R. Kaplan, “Coast Guard Played Vital Role in Vietnam,” Navy Magazine, November 1970, pp. 31-34; Blaney, “Coast Guard Patrol Boats.”
21. Ballard, telephone interview.
22. 23. 24. Mesko, Riverine, p. 22; Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War, p. 64, 68; Blaney, “Coast Guard Patrol Boats.”
25. 26. Charles Stephan, “Trawler!,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1968, p. 62, 64.
27. Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War, p. 129.
28. Mesko, Riverine, p. 23.
29. Bill Wells, “Friendly Target,” Naval History, May/June 1998, p. 33.
30. Ballard, telephone interview; Wells, “Friendly Target,” p. 34.
31. U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Bulletin, “U.S. Coast Guard Vietnam Casualties,” 6 December 1982, p. 39; Wells, “Friendly Target,” p. 34.
32. Kaplan, “Coast Guard Played Vital Role,” p. 32.
33. Nelson and Currier, “Operation of Coast Guard Patrol Boats,” p. 407.
34. Ballard, telephone interview.