“Bob Larkin: Artist of War”
(See D.J. Zimmerman, pp. 36-40, June 2005 Naval History)
Don Boyer
I am a bit curious as to the “action-packed” cover art.
I find it rather interesting to see an Essex-class CV under attack by at least three aircraft, absolutely none of which are under fire by the ship’s guns. None of the guns are pointing at any of the aircraft, there is no smoke and flame from automatic weapons fire anywhere in evidence, and one of the aircraft doesn’t have a single ding in it.
Somehow, having served on an Essex CV, I find that a completely unrealistic portrait of naval combat, as a look at the photographs in Larry Sowinski’s excellent book of naval combat photos would clearly show any artist who bothered to look before drawing.
I’ll take the combat art of R.G. Smith any day. Mr. Larkin needs to go back to school. A naval history magazine ought to blush over such shallow treatment of some of the scariest possible combat scenarios.
“McNamara Kills the Pilatus Porter”
(See G.E. Miller, pp. 46-51, June 2005 Naval History)
Charles A. Seavey
Admiral Miller mentions that the Porter would take off on the width of an average runway.
While stationed at Tan Son Nhut Airbase from 1969 to 1970, I watched a Porter start down a lateral taxiway heading toward the main runway. Apparently in a bit of a rush, the pilot took off while still on the taxiway, then executed a smart left turn and headed off down the runway, gaining altitude all the time.
I have no idea what the conversation with the tower might have been.
Merlin Dorfman
Admiral Miller’s article raises more questions than it answers. He describes Lynn Bollinger as a “former associate” who wrote a “Dear Bob” letter to McNamara. McNamara said he vaguely remembered meeting somebody by that name at Harvard.
What was the association Miller referred to, and, if something more recent or closer than a vague memory at college, does Miller have any documentation of it?
Miller cites a “personal” letter from Bollinger to McNamara; does he have the letter or a copy of it? Miller then cites a memo from Bollinger to “Bob” McNamara referring to their telephone conversations; does Miller have that memo or a copy? Finally Miller quotes McNamara as saying it was very doubtful that a comparatively small matter like this would come to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.
In all these instances, if Miller can produce documentation of the association between Bollinger and McNamara, or copies of the letter or memo, or proof that this matter did reach the secretary of defense, it would constitute proof either that McNamara’s memory is failing (he is almost 90 years old) or that he is lying.
Miller makes some fairly serious charges against the civilian leadership of the Pentagon during the Vietnam War—-incompetence and/or submission to “pressure politics.” I for one would like to see more substantiation of the charges through evidence such as I have mentioned.
“Salaam Aleikum (Peace Be With You)”
(See T.G. Martin, pp. 42-45, June 2005 Naval History)
George W. Walker
The author made two references to the Chesapeake-Shannon affair of June 1807, which actually was the Chesapeake-Leop- ard [22 June 1807] affair. HMS Shannon defeated USS Chesapeake in a 15-minute engagement during the War of 1812 [1 June 1813]. No doubt this was the engagement the author was thinking of when he composed the article.
“Depth Charges, Rods, and Spuds!”
(See G.M. Hardin and J.W. Grace, pp. 32- 34, June 2005 Naval History)
Lieutenant Commander Eugene R. Fidell, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)
Someone should do a complete history of the use of potatoes in naval operations.
To the tale of USS O’Bannon (DD-450), you might add the late-1960s engagement between a ship of the Royal Navy’s fisheries protection squadron and a Belgian trawler.
Captain Richard Hill, Royal Navy, noted the following in an April 1975 Navy International article: “[T]he clinching move, at the moment of impact, was the firing of a round of Bofors break-up shot in a direction away from the trawler at the same moment as a well-directed top-size King Edward potato went through [the trawler’s] bridge window. This ensured immediate surrender, and the skipper, muttering the Flemish or Walloon for ‘It’s a Fair Cop,’ was fined some princely sum like £50 in an English Court.”
Robert A. Maher
I enjoyed the story of the USS O’Bannon (DD-450). This was of particular interest to me as I was involved in a similar incident aboard USS Borie (DD-215) during World War II. On the night of 1 November 1943, in the North Atlantic, we brought U-405 to the surface with depth charges. Their damage so great they were unable to stay submerged. We fired at and hit her with 4-inch shells before a dog and catfight began with Borie chasing U-405 in circles. The U-boat had a tighter turning radius than our destroyer. After a number of circles, Borie attempted to ram the submarine. Just as the collision was about to happen, a wave raised Borie's bow. It came down on the U-boat’s bow and stuck there. There was a calm for the first minute or two. Then hell broke loose on both ships. The 4-inch battery could not depress far enough to fire so the gun crew started throwing and hitting U-405 with empty shell cases. Other men, not members of a gun crew, threw more material. Some men had small arms and fired those. From my battle station on the flying bridge I saw a gun captain raise an empty shell casing over his head and throw it, and a signalman fire a Very pistol down at men on the conning tower, hitting one in the chest.
After about fifteen minutes, Borie broke away and finally sank the U-boat with a straddle of depth charges.
[Ed. Note: Borie sank the next day because of damage from this encounter.]
“Historic Fleets”
(See A.D. Baker III, pp. 12-13, June 2005 Naval History)
Captain Robert C. Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired)
I was pleased to read about the presidential yacht USS Williamsburg (AGC- 369). I served in the ship from April 1951 to December 1952 as navigator.
It was always a puzzle to me why the ship carried hull number AGC-369 because AGC type vessels had hull numbers in single or low double figures.
This mystery was resolved to my satisfaction when I read in Truman, by David McCullough, that 369 was Mr. Truman’s favorite number.
I concur that the ship was a very uncomfortable ride, especially in pitch. Her roll was no fun either.
After decommissioning, the ship’s life has been one not befitting such a prestigious vessel. I remember seeing a photograph in National Geographic depicting fish tanks behind the green glass windows in the presidential sitting room. Later, Mr. Kim Nielsen took a photograph of the ship in Washington, D.C., with a tree growing out of a crack in the teak deck on the forecastle—a sign of ignominy. But her condition is probably even worse now inasmuch as she is moored in the backwash of an Italian shipyard. She deserves a better fate—consign her to the deep!
“Historic Aircraft”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 14-15, June 2005 Naval History)
Martin A. Snyder
The article brought back a wartime memory, that of the rivalry between the B- 24 Liberator and the B-17 Flying Fortress. The B-17 was credited with being more photogenic and looking more like a fighting machine. The B-24 was described as “the crate in which the B-17 was delivered."
“Force Rules the World Still”
(See H.W. Brands, pp. 26-31, April 2005 Naval History)
Michael F. Fitzpatrick
The author quotes President Theodore Roosevelt as saying, “I shall tolerate no control by an individual Senator or Congressman of the movements of the fleet.”
Roosevelt may have been forceful in his dealings with meddlesome politicians, but there was one man who did manage to influence Roosevelt to reroute the fleet. That man was the unassuming veteran of the Civil War who dedicated more that half his life as a lay missionary to the leper settlement on Molokai. Ira B. Dutton went to the Hawaiian Islands to serve as an assistant to the leper priest Father Damien and stayed for 44 years.
During his self-imposed exile on Molokai, Dutton gained a national reputation as a true servant of humanity. He had earlier written to Theodore Roosevelt telling the president about the leper colony and expressing his hope that the patients might one day witness a visit from a ship of the United States Navy.
With typical enthusiasm, Roosevelt responded. He sent orders to [Rear] Admiral [Charles] Sperry on board the flagship USS Connecticut (BB-18) that read, “Divert from course. Pass Molokai Island in battle formation. Show naval power to Brother Dutton. Dip colors. Then continue Japan.”
It was a small diversion to be sure—negligible in its effect on the round-the-world tour—but it was a big deal to the poor unfortunates isolated in the leper colony on Molokai, and it showed a softer side to the often gruff and brusque president.
“Painting Plagiarism?”
(See Cover, April 2005 Naval History)
Ernest C. Reock Jr.
When is a painting of a photograph plagiarism? Your April cover—credited to an Arthur Beaumont painting—is a direct copy of a photograph copyrighted in 1907 by T.C. [sic] [Enrique Robert] Muller. I have had a 15 x 20 print of the photo hanging in my office since I found it in an antique shop in Lambertville, New Jersey about 15 years ago. It is far more exciting than the painting, even though it omits the fake sailing ship inserted by the painter. At least the photographer should get a credit line, if for nothing more than braving that bow wave from the USS Connecticut (BB-18).
“All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor”
(See M. Gannon, p. 16, April 2005 Naval History)
John W. Lambert
Gannon is correct that the Martin- Bellinger joint estimate of 31 March 1941 did not specify north or northwest as the likely route of a Japanese attack force. However, Martin’s subsequent study of the Air Situation in Hawaii (the one in which he sought 180 B-17 bombers) qualified the Martin-Bellinger report by stating, “The most probable avenue of approach [of an enemy task force] is the hemisphere from 0 degrees counterclockwise to 180 degrees around Oahu.” (PH Hearings Part 1, Page 393.)
In later testimony before the Navy Pearl Harbor Board (PH Hearings Part 32, page 452) Captain Logan Ramsey stated that in accordance with our estimate and preconceived ideas of a probable route of attack: “We always selected that sector, 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was 315 to around 270. We placed the other sectors in their relative idea of importance.”
“All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor”
(See E.B. Canfield, pp. 42-46, December 2004 Naval History)
Colonel H. Larry Elman, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
The photo caption on page 44 is historically inaccurate and quite misleading.
Billy Mitchell was not punished in any of the manners mentioned for “not obeying Navy rules” in the Ostfreisland case. The so-called "Navy rules” were an agreement between the two services at the CSA/CNO level. The Navy protested the non-observance of the agreed rules; the Army refused to officially punish any of the offenders.
Mitchell was not demoted to colonel in connection with any item in the article. During World War I, Mitchell commanded a very large contingent of aircraft from several nations (particularly on the St. Mihiel Sector of the Western Front), and served as a temporary brigadier general. With the end of the war, almost all such appointments ceased and officers returned to their permanent grades. In Mitchell’s case, he was at that point chosen for the position of Assistant Chief of the Air Service, a one-star slot. He served there—again as a temporary brigadier general. His many actions giving offense to persons throughout Washington, D.C., resulted in his not being reappointed, and thus his returning to the grade of colonel and his reassignment to Texas.
His court-martial and conviction was for publicly accusing the secretaries of war and Navy and the president of treasonous malfeasance in their duties. He in fact made exactly that charge, and his defense that only he (and a few others) saw defense issues clearly with regard to airpower was insufficient to exonerate him.
The Air Force, as an institution, repeatedly makes a grave mistake in effectively canonizing “Saint William of Mitchell.”
Was he an early airpower advocate? Clearly. Did he do a superb job in World War I combat command? Very definitely. But his actions in the years leading to his court-martial did as much harm to airpower as good. A much better role model would be Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, who assured the Navy of proper airpower while not alienating half of Washington. Mitchell’s writings are wrong about as often as they are right, and usually contradict themselves.
Major Elliott Stoffregen III, U.S. Air Force Reserve
Although the text accurately describes Ostfriesland as a battleship, the caption [p-441 incorrectly identifies her as a battlecruiser. With regard to the last sentence in that same caption and some of the text on pages 44-45, Mr. Canfield repeats the same misleading information the world has been forced to endure over the last 80+ years. Billy Mitchell proved nothing. Sinking an unmanned, non-maneuvering ship unable to dodge (check the statistics on the effectiveness of high level bombing against ships), fight back (even with only two 88mm anti-aircraft guns), or conduct damage control (vital even if “very well compartmented”) with painfully slow and short-ranged (given the size of the bomb required to inflict fatal damage on such a heavily armored target) aircraft was nobody’s “historic accomplishment.”
It took naval aviation to show the world how to sink true fighting ships at sea.
“Librarian Finds Calling In Merchant Marine”
(See B. Bleyer, pp. 65-66, April 2005 Naval History)
Donald G. Kloenne
It was with pleasure that I came across Bill Bleyer’s mention of Merchant Marine historian Gerald Reminick as I have met Mr. Reminick several times at monthly meetings of the Long Island Chapter of The U.S. Naval Armed Guard World War II Veterans. At the time he was gathering material (including some of my experiences) for his anthology, No Surrender— True Stories of the U.S. Navy Armed Guard in World War II.
Not to take anything away from the Merchant Marine, but the “We Aim To Deliver” efforts of the Naval Armed guard were (and are) even more unknown than the part the merchant sailors played in getting the food, fuel, men, and munitions to the war zones. We shared every single bit of their risk and did it for a fraction of their pay.
I must admit I was a bit put out when Mr. Bleyer’s only mention of the Armed Guard was to say No Surrender was about “Navy sailors stationed on merchant vessels to man the deck guns.” Although the vast majority of the Naval Armed Guard consisted of gunners, there were also Navy radiomen and signalmen aboard and we weren’t there just for the ride. While I was officially a radioman, I was also trained as a quasi-signalman to fill in if one of the signalmen was killed or incapacitated.
In any case, it is good to see Mr. Reminick get credit for calling attention to largely neglected bits of WWII history.
“In a Far More Thorough Manner”
(See J.B. Hattendorf, pp. 38-43, April 2005 Naval History)
Chief Yeoman A.F. Sue Fischer, U.S. Navy (Retired)
On page 40, Mr. Hattendorf states: “Eventually transferred ashore at the Naval Station at Newport, Rhode Island, these activities grew to become what is today the Navy’s Recruit Training Command, now located in California, Florida, and Illinois.”
As there is no indication as to the date Mr. Hattendorf wrote this article, I have presumed it to mean it must have been in the last two to three years.
Recruit Training Command has been at NTC Great Lakes, Illinois, for the past five years or more. I do not have at hand when Orlando and San Diego were closed, but I do know from personal experience, it was all at NTC Great Lakes in 2000.
[Ed. Note: NTC Orlando graduated its last company of 459 recruits on 2 December 1994. The command closed officially 31 March 1995. NTC San Diego officially closed on 30 April 1997.]
“What Motivated the Kamikazes”
(See G. M. Hayden, pp.22-24, April 2005 Naval History)
Captain Akihiko Yoshida, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (Retired)
The young officer saluting on page 23 is Lieutenant Katori (I have forgotten his first name) of the Japanese Naval Academy class of 1940. He was a classmate of Lieutenant Ikuo Seki, the first Kamikaze aviator at Leyte. The photo was taken in April 1945, sixty years ago, at Yatabe Naval Air Station, Ibaragi, at the completion of training for Zero aviators. They were next moved to a base in Southern Kyushu expecting their final sortie as a Kamikaze. Happily for him, Lieutenant Katori was not given a chance for a sortie. Later he entered the new navy, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and was eventually promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral.
When he was superintendent of the midshipman school at Eta-Jima in 1972, I was a lieutenant commander serving as an instructor under him.
“Understanding Kurita’s ‘Mysterious Retreat’”
(See E. Thomas, pp. 22-26, October 2004 Naval History)
AC3 William R. Amberg, U.S. Naval Reserve
On the magazine’s cover you ask whether Kurita was a coward; that’s an interesting question.
Was the character of Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague ever questioned? His destroyers and destroyer escorts attacked the largest battleship in the world. What did Sprague do to arrange for the rescue of the crews of the destroyers and destroyer escorts who were bleeding to death and drowning in his wake after their heroic attack?
“Special Report: Civil War Sub Found off Panama”
(See J.R Delgado, pp. 55-56, December 2004 Naval History)
Marc J. Cohen
This article contains some incorrect information regarding the history of decompression sickness. The closed dress deep- sea diving helmet and suit was invented in the late 1830s or early 1840s and within the three decades before the “caisson disease” death of the unfortunate worker on the St. Louis Bridge in 1870, a large number of divers were “bent.” There were also deaths as well as crippling incidents in those years before Julius Kroehl died in 1867.
In his 1859 autobiography, Diving With & Without Armor: Containing The Submarine Exploits of J.B. Green, The Celebrated Submarine Diver (Buffalo, 1859: Faxon’s Steam Power Press), John B. Green relates how he was bent after two consecutive dives to the wreck of the Atlantic in 152 feet of water in Lake Erie in August 1855. Of course Green had no idea that it was something that would one day be identified as expanded nitrogen bubbles in the blood stream, or decompression sickness. All he knew was that it left him as a cripple and his theory was that it was from bad air.
What is amazing is that the Sub Marine Explorer was lying undiscovered on a beach for almost 140 years. Please do not detract from that remarkable fact by claiming that it was a “Civil War submarine” (actually 1867) and by claiming that the first deaths from decompression sickness were as a result of crewing it.
“Historic Fleets”
(See A.D. Baker III, p. 12, February 2005 Naval History)
John A. Pritzlaff
After the Antietam (CV-36) completed the angled deck modification in December 1952, she underwent testing and Air Ops training in early 1953 to see how well the angled deck performed. With considerable success in the operation of the deck, it was decided that in the course of future evaluation and operational procedure development that the Antietam should make a quick trip to England for demonstration to the Royal Navy and the Fleet Air Arm. After all, it was their idea along with the mirror landing system and the steam catapult. The latter two items would later be introduced on U.S. carriers and would greatly improve at-sea air operations.
The Antietam departed Norfolk, Virginia, on 11 June in company with the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB-42) and the plane guard destroyers of Newport, Rhode Island-based DesDiv 341 consisting of Hazelwood (DD-531), Heerman (DD- 532), Stockham (DD-683), and the Charles J. Badger (DD-657). On the trip across the Atlantic (11 June to 23 June), both carriers conducted daily air operations. With the higher launch speeds required by the jets and into-the-wind maneuvering, the destroyers used a lot of fuel. Every three days we had to be refueled by the carriers. The Roosevelt detached from the group on 20 June and headed to the Mediterranean Sea for her next duty station.
The Antietam and the destroyers operated out of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, from 24 June to 14 July. Air operations were conducted on weekdays, weather permitting, with U.S. pilots and planes flying in the morning and U.K. pilots and planes working in the afternoon. Only two destroyers were needed as plane guards during these operations, the other two remained in port.
We left the U.K. on 15 July for a quick five-day return to Norfolk where a 22 July flight demonstration was scheduled for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. To make the deadline with time for repair and clean up, we started back at 25 knots. On the second day out heavy weather caused the destroyers to take such a beating that speed was reduced to 20 knots. The demonstration was successfully performed on the 22nd with the destroyers arriving back in Newport the next day.
“Looking Back”
(See P. Stillwell, p. 2, February 2005 Naval History)
Rebecca M. Jackson
Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely’s cameo teaches us all—Navy and non-Navy alike—something about why we are put on this earth and what we can do with our lives when we choose to rise above adversity. In addition to his obvious leadership qualities and fine mind, he also looks like he would have been a really good guy to know.
Because we have his oral history, we can hear him in his own words and not have to rely on associates or letters—all too often hastily written—for insight into what really made him tick. One of the things I appreciate most about Thomas Buell was his inability to do everything “the Navy way” and yet he was able to write about extraordinarily complicated people with a flow of words that my non- Navy mind could grasp. Without his oral history I might have known that from a bio-blurb, but I would not have understood it.
Through oral histories we have the good, the bad, the ugly, and most importantly, the survivors.
“Looking Back”
(See P. Stillwell, p. 2, April 2005 Naval History)
Captain J. Robert Lunney, Judge Advocate’s General Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)
I compliment Naval History on publishing a remembrance of the USS Utah (AG-16) and the heroism of Chief Watertender Peter Tomich at Pearl Harbor, who was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. The Navy kept the medal because it failed to locate any next of kin and did not take any steps to locate his family in his hometown of Prolog (now in Bosnia). The medal was delivered to various Navy facilities and on each occasion the delivery was conditioned to its being returned in the event of a claim by a next of kin.
During 1997, I traveled to Prolog and located Tomich’s family. The regularly kept records of the Franciscan Order were readily made available and confirmed the identity of Tomich’s next of kin. The Navy never communicated with church officials, nor did it seek to obtain any genealogical or church records. No Navy representative visited Prolog to locate a next of kin.
I submitted documentation to the Navy, but it ordered that custody of the medal shall continue under its control until more definitive evidence is submitted. The Navy refused my request to appear before its board, and its proceedings have not been disclosed. A subsequent court proceeding upheld the Navy’s discretion to retain the medal. The Navy has never conducted any investigation in Prolog to locate a next of kin, but intends to keep the medal for its own display purposes.
It finally is time for the United States Navy to right this wrong and ensure Tomich’s medal gets to his kin.
“Pearl Harbor: A Midget Sub in the Picture?”
(See A. Biache Jr., P. Hsu, and J. Rodgaard, pp. 18-22, December 2004, Naval History)
Allan T. Ames
Why is so much being made of this? The fact is that some 40 torpedoes were launched by aircraft while one, or at most two, might have been fired by a midget sub. The West Virginia and Oklahoma were hit by five and seven torpedoes respectively, which was more than enough to sink both vessels. If one or two hits came from a sub (and it is by no means certain that any hits were made in this way) what difference would it make? The two ships were doomed in the event, sub or no sub.
The question of a midget sub penetrating the harbor is of some academic interest, hut the small impact this would have compared to the air assault renders it of minor importance.
“So Beautifully and Bravely Fought”
(See The Editors, pp. 20-21, October 2004 Naval History)
Captain Robert C. Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired)
I believe your statement that Admiral Halsey’s decision on the night of 24 October 1944 to order his fleet carriers to pursue Ozawa’s Northern Force is a bit misleading. This implies that taking the carriers after Ozawa was the reason Kurita’s force cleared San Bernardino Strait undetected. The reason that his force was not detected was that Task Force 34 under the command of Vice Admiral Willis Augustus “Ching” Lee Jr. remained with the carriers rather than guarding the Strait. Had TF 34 been left at the Strait, it is most likely that the battle off Samar would have never been fought because Kurita would have been engaged by Lee’s formidable force.
“Historic Aircraft”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 14-15, October 2004 Naval History)
Captain Jim Helsper, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
The author states that the PBY-6A was retired in 1949, however, I rode a Navy commanded PBY-6A from Amchitka to Adak and back in February or March 1951. I saw many more until June 1951.
“More Ships Should Be Named For Women”
Alexander V. Mandel
In December 1942, a Liberty-class ship named SS Amelia Earhart was completed, and served successfully throughout World War II. In postwar years she was transferred to China. No ship has borne the name Earhart since. Today, with thousands of American women serving in the U.S. Navy, it seems appropriate to honor the Earhart name and provide great inspiration for these serving women.
Earhart contributed a great deal to a positive image of America abroad. In all the countries she visited as an ambassador of good will, her appearance generated a wave of interest and sympathy for America and the American people. She was a great example of the best in her nation and deserves to be remembered today.