Commodore Edward Preble, in his cabin on board his flagship, the Constitution (44 guns), was in the throes of planning his campaign for the coming sailing season. He intended to conduct active combat operations against the bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, in response to that individual’s nearly three-year-old declaration of war against the United States. He had decided his campaign ought to include a tight blockade of Tripoli itself; the reduction/ destruction of the smaller Tripolitan settlements at Derne and Benghazi, forcing their populations to evacuate to Tripoli and thereby increasing population pressures there; intercepting Tripolitan corsairs by guarding critical sea-lane choke points; and convoying U.S. merchantmen where possible. How to go about it was the problem, for ever since he had arrived on station five months before, he had known that he did not have the right sorts of ships to do the job. His squadron, in addition to the big frigate, consisted of two 16-gun brigs, three 12-gun schooners, and an unarmed ketch, none of which was suited to the expected inshore work. As of late February 1804, he had yet to receive a response to his requests for more ships.
Complicating Preble’s mission was the presence of three other Ottoman vassal states along the North African coast that had similar histories of preying on infidel shipping as a source of income. En route to the central Mediterranean, he had pacified the Moroccan emperor with some expectation of his continued good behavior. The Algerine dey thus far had been content with his U.S. relations. But the Tunisian bey was making threatening noises and, being adjacent to Tripoli, could affect greatly Preble’s operations. The commodore believed he could keep the lid on Tunis as long as he periodically could dispatch a frigate thence to remind the bey that credible force was at hand.
In March, the U.S. commander left Syracuse for a reconnaissance of his area of operation, a voyage as much to temper his growing impatience as to make good use of this waiting period. At Malta, three agents of the bashaw’s deposed brother, Hamet Karamanli, proposed a joint operation whereby they would take Derne or Benghazi (with the land forces being gathered by Hamet), and thereby put pressure on Yusuf. Shipping for this operation was hired and outfitted before Preble withdrew late in April, apparently because of the continued lack of reinforcement from home. Appearing next off Tripoli, Preble checked on his “small boys,” who had been maintaining a blockade of the port since shortly after the destruction of the Philadelphia in February. He found that the Syren recently had captured a former Maltese privateer, the Transfer, which had been purchased by the Tripolitans. Preble sent her to Syracuse to be outfitted as a unit of his squadron, renamed her the Scourge, and armed her with 16 light long guns. Finally, he paid a call at Tunis, where he found that the U.S. consul had been able to satisfy a gripe of the bey’s relating to actions by the previous squadron, but the Arab remained dissatisfied that the United States would not provide him with a 36-gun frigate. Preble’s assessment of the situation was that the periodic arrival of a U.S. man-o’-war at Tunis would keep the bey at bay, and so on 3 May he sailed for Naples, where he had high confidence of success in gaining gunboats and bomb ketches.
At 1000 on 9 May, immediately on his arrival at Naples, Commodore Preble called on Sir John Acton, prime minister of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. As he had reason to believe, Acton was completely sympathetic to Preble’s request for small vessels, requiring only that it be made in writing before he acceded to it. Preble was back the next day with his written request for eight gunboats, two mortar boats, powder, shot, shells, muskets, sabers, and eight heavy long guns with which to arm two floating batteries. On the 13th, he was informed the King would lend the United States six gunboats, two bomb ketches, six long 24s (long guns that fired 24-pound cannonballs) and the requested small arms and ammunition. At 1300 on the 19th, after loading weapons and ammunition from the local arsenal, the Constitution was under way for Messina, where the small craft to be loaned were maintained.
On his arrival after a tedious voyage, Preble found the gunboats, which were lateen-rigged (whereby a triangular sail was extended by a long spar slung to a low mast), ready to go, along with 96 Sicilians to act as crewmen. To the impatient commodore’s chagrin, the bomb ketches were in a dilapidated state, and it would require three weeks to refurbish them. He sailed for Syracuse on the 30th, using sailors from the Nautilus, then effecting repairs at Messina, to complete manning of the small craft. Somewhere during this period, he decided against chartering ships to be used as floating batteries. Instead, his carpenters erected bulwarks in the waist of his flagship, moved six of the quarterdeck 12-pounders forward, and installed the six Neapolitan 24-pounders on loan in their stead aft. That brought the Constitution's armament to 36 long 24-pounders and 14 long 12-pounders.
Preble was under way again on 4 June, determined to make another round of Malta, Tripoli, and Tunis. At Malta, he heard unofficially that four frigates and two brigs were on their way from home. Perhaps when the bashaw learned of the U.S. squadron’s increased strength, he would negotiate. But Tripoli looked even stronger on 12 June than it had on 26 March, when the commodore last had seen it. Visible were 17 gunboats, as well as an armed brig and schooner. Negotiations, predictably, went nowhere. Preble sailed off northward on the 15th, announcing that he hoped to be back bombarding Tripoli on the 4th of July. A two- day stop at Tunis en route to Syracuse found the bey still blustering, but not actually threatening.
Preble had resolved to wait no longer for the reinforcements. At least two months of the sailing season already had been lost. On 29 June, he sailed from Syracuse and arrived at Messina the next day. Much to his displeasure, the bomb ketches still were not ready, and it required another week to accomplish the job. On 8 July, he shepherded these last units to Syracuse for three days of provisioning. The 13th of July saw the squadron under way for Tripoli at last: the Constitution, Nautilus, Enterprise, six gunboats, and two bomb ketches. Progress was so slow that the next day the Constitution took four of the gunboats and both bombs in tow, while the Nautilus and Enterprise each took one of the remainder. A stop at Malta permitted the commodore to take on board additional supplies he had accumulated there.
The Constitution, his only large ship, had to double as supply ship, and so was encumbered with 10 tons of canister and 12 tons of mortar shells, as well as a mountain of provisions. Preble headed south again on the 21st, and on the 24th lay to and topped off the smaller units, which could carry only a six-day supply, with food and water, while his carpenters busied themselves mounting light carriage guns in the frigate’s boats.
Tripoli came in sight early on the 25th, together with his blockaders, the Syren, Scourge, Vixen, Nautilus, and Argus, the latter newly recalled from her patrol station at the Strait of Gibraltar specifically for the forthcoming operations. Only the unarmed Intrepid was absent, left in the care of the midshipman storeskeeper at Syracuse. It was not an ideal force for the work at hand. Only the frigate bore heavy long guns; the others, in the main, had lighter cannonades, and all the Neapolitan craft proved to be cumbersome and ill-suited to coastal operations. There were some 1,060 men in the squadron, facing an estimated 25,000 Tripolitans and more than a hundred heavy guns guarding the port. But anxious as Prehle was to get on with it, a strong northeast wind and heavy sea made inshore work impossible.
Two days later, conditions seemed right, and the squadron stood to the southwest, closing with the port. The Tripolitan gunboats, now 19 in number, were sighted moving out beyond the reefs, and Preble prepared to cast off the towed gunboats and accept combat. Once again, however, a sudden wind shift hazarded the operation and the U.S. craft anchored about 2Vi miles north of the town. Preble, ever active, used the time to top off the supplies of his lesser units and to direct the reassignment of key personnel from the Constitution and others to command and direct the gunboats and bomb ketches.
Propelled by a fresh breeze from slightly north of east, on the morning of 3 August Preble advanced his squadron on Tripoli. At noon, the port was seen, its defenders at sea and ashore ready and waiting. The U.S. sailors paused as the signal “Prepare for battle” was hoisted. The ketches were to anchor about 1,000 yards north of the port and open the bombardment. The gunboats, in two divisions of three each and under the commands of Richard Somers and Stephen Decatur, were to advance and engage their Tripolitan counterparts, the ensuing battle taking them where it would. The Constitution and the brigs and schooners would provide gunfire support, especially seeking to suppress the fire of the nearest enemy shore batteries. At 1400, despite the fact the fickle wind had played hob with the formation, the signal was hoisted for the gunboats to be cast off and the attack to commence. The ketches opened fire first at 1445, and the Tripolitans responded immediately.
The Tripolitan gunboats were deployed outside the rocks delimiting the harbor, with 5 anchored in the entrance, just off the Molehead Battery; 2 farther east under sail, standing off and on the shore; and 11 others anchored in a crescent to the west of the entrance but still under its coverage. Thanks to the wind, Somers in Gunboat 1 found himself totally out of position to the east. As a result, Gunboats 2 (Lieutenant James Decatur) and 3 (Lieutenant Joshua Blake) sought to join Gunboats 4 (Stephen Decatur), 5 (Midshipman Joseph Bainbridge), and 6 (Sailing Master John Trippe).
First to be attacked were the two Tripolitans under sail, but they quickly retreated behind the rocks after a few shots were fired at them. Next, Gunboats 2, 4, 5, and 6 ran down toward the anchored quintet. At about 20 yards, combined blasts of round shot and canister drove them back into the harbor. Gunboat 3 remained out of any ensuing action, and Lieutenant Blake subsequently was suspected of cowardice.
Decatur and company swept toward the eastern end of the “crescent,” firing round shot as they closed. They again fired canister at close range, hut withheld their small-arms fire, which their foe did not do. As a result, the U.S. sailors smashed in with unanswered musket and pistol fire as they boarded. Decatur and 19 men took on three dozen defenders on the first craft. The battle was bloody, and Decatur very nearly was killed by the opposing commander, but the craft was taken with 16 Tripolitans killed, 15 wounded, and 5 captured. James Decatur went for the next Tripolitan, who falsely hauled down his colors. Decatur was hit as he leapt on board, and fell into the sea, mortally wounded. His midshipman second- in-command backed off to retrieve his stricken commander. John Trippe took Gunboat 6 against the third Tripolitan in line and leapt on board with Midshipman John D. Henley and 9 men before the two craft drifted apart. Although unsupported, the attackers were successful, killing 14 Tripolitans and wounding 7 of the 22 who surrendered. Trippe himself had been wounded 11 times. Bainbridge’s Gunboat 5 had the misfortune of having the upper third of her lateen yard shot away and her rigging cut. Unable to close with his foe, Bain- bridge could do no more than maintain a harassing fire in support of his comrades. His craft drifted under the Mole- head Battery and was briefly aground, but he managed to clear off.
Somers, meanwhile, finally got his ungainly Gunboat 1 into action against the Tripolitan craft at the western end of the crescent. Outnumbered though he was, Somers advanced, waiting until at point-blank range to fire round shot and grapeshot at an enemy who returned the compliment. When nearly muzzle to muzzle, the Tripolitans suddenly ceased fire and fled for the shelter of the rocks.
From his position in the Constitution, some 600 yards off the Molehead Battery, Preble saw some previously uncommitted units of the bashaw’s flotilla appear to move toward the harbor entrance. Ordering his brigs and schooners to “cover the boats,” he directed the big frigate to the scene. As he did so, he divided her first broadside, the First Division aiming at the Molehead Battery and the crescent gunboats, Second Division at the bashaw’s palace, and the Third Division at the raiding craft. For the second, the guns were triple-shotted with two round shot and a stand of grape, all directed at the battery and raiding craft. With Somers’s fire from the west, and bombs from the ketches bursting overhead, the Tripolitans soon were milling about in confusion.
Preble had to end his close support because he was being driven on a lee shore. While he took the Constitution to seaward for another run, some of the Tripolitans regrouped, with three moving on Decatur and Trippe, and four seeking to surround Somers. Seeing the big frigate making a return changed their minds, and there was a scramble for the rocks. Decatur took advantage of the situation to board a second gunboat. He, Midshipman Thomas Macdonough, and 9 seamen killed or wounded 21 and took 3 prisoners. His two assaults had succeeded at the cost of just 4 wounded, including himself.
At 1630, Preble signaled a recall, ordering the brigs and schooners to assist the gunboats clear, together with their three prizes. The Constitution closed in to bring her heavy guns to bear. One spectacular shot brought down a mosque’s minaret. By 1645, all were clear and were assembling several miles north of Tripoli. The first assault was over. For the next several days, repairs were made and the three prizes became Gunboats 7, 8, and 9.
Preble’s second attack was made on 7 August, and consisted of moving gunboats and bomb ketches to an inlet west of Tripoli from whence the city could he bombarded from outside the range of its defending batteries. In addition, it was hoped the enemy gunboats would be drawn out and might be cut off from their base by the brigs and schooners. Closing with the coast at around 2200, the U.S. ships ran into an unexpected current that drove them westward and disrupted their formation. A fickle wind complicated matters. As the gunboats gradually came into range some four hours later, they were greeted by heavy fire from two previously unknown gun positions, together mounting 13 guns. About 0300, 15 enemy gunboats were seen slipping out of the harbor entrance to move toward the U.S. craft. Preble promptly signaled some of his units to move to positions from which they might he cut off, but his signals were misunderstood, and the Tripolitans, ever alert to their danger, returned to port. During the course of this activity, a huge explosion inshore marked the destruction of Gunboat 9, the smallest of the three recently captured craft, her magazine apparently struck by shot from a shore battery. Ten of the 28 sailors on board died in the blast, including Lieutenant James R. Caldwell and Midshipman John S. Dorsey. At 0550, a wind shift led Preble to call off the operation and to order the brigs and schooners in to hasten the gunboats’ withdrawal. They had little to show for their exertions.
As this operation proceeded, a ship was sighted to the northwest. It proved to be the first of Preble’s reinforcements, the light frigate John Adams, with three letters on board for Preble from Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith. Four more frigates were on the way, unavoidably under the command of an officer senior to Preble, Captain Samuel Barron. Smith’s assurances that he could not send that many large ships and provide them commanders all junior to Preble did little to assuage the commodore. He seems to have voiced his hurt only to his wife, however, and resolved in the meantime to press operations against Tripoli.
The John Adams also brought official notice of promotions. Stephen Decatur was promoted to captain, to date from the date he burned the Philadelphia (see ‘“A Most Bold and Daring Act,”’ Naval History, February 2004, pp. 20-23), and at 25 the youngest ever in the U.S. Navy. Also promoted, to master commandant, were Charles Stewart (commanding the Syren), Richard Somers (commanding the Nautilus), and Isaac Hull (commanding the Argus).
Thinking that the appearance of the John Adams, coming as it did coincident with the second attack, might induce the bashaw to parley, Preble spent the next four days trying to reopen negotiations. When that failed, he resumed planning further attacks, but was frustrated by repeated bouts of bad weather. In the small hours of 24 August, a bombardment by the ketches drew no return fire or sortie by the Tripolitan gunboats. At dawn, the U.S. ships drew off, the commodore completely frustrated in his hope to bring the war to a conclusion before being superceded. Worse, he recognized in the weather problems the imminent end of the sailing season and the suspension of all operations.
Before dawn four days later, Preble sent the gunboats to bombard the bashaw’s installations and ships. (The ketches were withheld, their hulls having been found damaged by the recoil of their mortars.) The shelling lasted for about two hours, toward the end of which Tripolitan gunboats began to sortie. Seeing this, Preble ordered his boats out and brought in the Constitution to cover their withdrawal. Wrote one observer, “The Commodore’s ship, when standing in and during the engagement, was the most elegant sight that I ever saw. She had her tompions out, matches lit, and batteries lighted up, all hands at quarters, standing right in under the fort, and receiving a heavy cannonading from their battery.” The big frigate pulled to within 400 yards of the Molehead Battery and, laying to, fired nine broadsides at her foes, visibly chewing up fortifications and silencing guns. In return, only 19 round shot struck her, and some rigging was damaged.
So ended the climactic month of the Barbary War. The bashaw had been shaken by the more successful of Preble’s attacks and heartened by those that failed. Preble was increasingly frustrated by the worsening weather and his inability to gain a successful conclusion, faced, as he was, by the imminent succession in command and an appearance of failure. But the game was yet afoot, and the final card yet to be played.
Sources:
Martin, Tyrone G., A Most Fortunate Ship (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), 1997.
McKee, Christopher, Edward Preble (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), 1972. Tucker, Glenn, Dawn Like Thunder (New York: Bobbs Merrill Co.), 1963.