On 27 January 1942, the Asiatic Fleet became part of the Southwest Pacific Command. Within a month, what was left of that once- proud fighting unit was shattered and running for its life. Will our current fleet, with its drawdown in personnel and outlook for possible shortages in ships and equipment forthcoming, have future units exposed to the same fate as the Asiatic Fleet faced?
One of the survivors of the Asiatic Fleet is Torpedoman’s Mate 1st Class Edward “Andy” Andrade. Andy has lived in the same home since he retired in 1952. He does not talk extensively about his time on the USS Whipple (DD-217), steaming through the Java Sea during the opening months of World War II, but he does relate tales from around the globe and how he played baseball while serving in the military. To a greater extent, he passes 45 years of history on to Andy’s Red Sox, a local Little League team.
Long before Andrade even knew of the Whipple, the Asiatic Fleet’s destiny was being set. In the 1920s, the United States assessed who the next enemy might be. Japan was the most likely candidate, and War Plan Orange was devised to counter this threat. President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet of 1908 laid the framework for the plan. The belief thereafter was that the display of U.S. willpower and naval strength had persuaded the Japanese to shift their intentions away from the Philippines. The U.S. Navy also showed that it could deploy ships in times of crisis.
The Great White Fleet's sail to the Far East apparently helped justify to President Roosevelt and the Navy the stationing of battleships at Pearl Harbor. The fleet was between vital interests—the Philippines and the soon-to-be- completed Panama Canal—and it could exert its might when the need arose. Stationing them in Luzon Harbor in the Philippines was not an option, because ostensibly, that would expose our fleet to a surprise attack as had happened to the Russians at Port Arthur at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.1
Both sides believed that if hostilities between Japan and the United States broke out, the Japanese would attain initial success against U.S. possessions in the Western Pacific. The main body of the U.S. fleet would then fight its way across the Pacific, and the war would end with a Jutland- style battle between the fleets.2 The small size of the Asiatic Fleet supported both sides’ opinions.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart commanded the Asiatic Fleet before the war. He saw storm clouds on the horizon, and started to prepare for the torrent. On 16 October 1940, he withdrew all major units from China to Manila. The Navy Department agreed with Admiral Hart’s assessment—possible Japanese aggression heading south—and all dependents were ordered out by the end of the year. In November, the U.S. Pacific Fleet notified the Asiatic Fleet that it was preparing to deploy an aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers as reenforcements for the Asiatic Fleet. In May, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet passed on notification that help was not forthcoming after all.3 The Japanese occupied French Indochina in July.
As the Asiatic Fleet drilled during 1941, meetings convened among the Americans, British, Dutch, and Australians to discuss their countries’ individual intentions and plans for a break out of hostilities in the Pacific—but not how to work together. In November 1941, the Asiatic Fleet received word that in the event of war, it was to deploy south of the Philippines to protect the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and that the British were sending 1 aircraft carrier, 7 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, and 13 light cruisers. HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse, and HMS Indomitable were en route to the region.4
The Fleet Takes Action
Admiral Hart received his war warning on 29 November and was ordered to deploy his forces into their defensive positions. The Asiatic Fleet had 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 13 destroyers, 23 fleet submarines, 6 small submarines, and several utility ships. The Allies mustered barely an equal amount of fire power, and together they faced a Japanese fleet that had 10 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 18 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, and 113 destroyers.5
On the eve of war, the Asiatic Fleet knew what it was up against. Its men were heroic, as they fought on with odds heavily against them; they fought with tenacity and bravery. The sailors of the Fleet were trained and knew how to maximize their resources. At this point Edward Andrade stood with his shipmates on the deck of the USS Whipple.
The Whipple was a part of Destroyer Squadron 29, Division 57 which, along with 12 other destroyers, the last of a class built from 1917 to 1919. The destroyers were inadequately armed for the warfare of the day and in need of overhaul.6 The Asiatic Fleet spent the first few months of 1943 under constant threat of air attack, submarines, and numerous Japanese surface ships. The Philippines were being overrun, and the Dutch East Indies were next in line. Andrade recounts that there were times that were so busy, he did not have time to be afraid or to worry. He slept at his battle station—the starboard torpedo tubes—in case of battle and to escape unbearable heat below decks.7
Although Japanese pressure was constant, the Americans did try to seize the initiative. On 24 January, four of the old destroyers attacked a Japanese surface fleet in the Battle of Balikpapan. There were no U.S. losses, but the Japanese lost four transports and one patrol boat. The outcome was the exception to the rule. This was the first U.S. surface engagement since the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898.8
In February 1942, the Whipple and the Edsall (DD-219) were escorting the USS Langley (AV-3)—at that point, a submarine tender. The Langley still had a flight deck, from her days as an aircraft carrier. She was ferrying 32 Army P-40s to Java. The destroyers maintained an antisubmarine screen around the Langley because of a possible sub contact. Dutch PBYs also flew overhead, scouring the seas. It was not long before the PBYs departed to escape an incoming Japanese air strike. When the last Japanese plane departed, the Langley was crippled and sinking.
The Whipple to the Rescue
The Whipple took on survivors from the stricken ship, then had to try to finish off the Langley. They hit her with two torpedoes and nine 5-inch rounds, and all that appeared to do was right the ship.10 The Whipple soon left the area, not wanting to expend any more valuable ammunition. Andrade watched the Langley dying, a ship that pioneered the techniques of carrier aviation that were to prove so instrumental in the Pacific War. That night the Langley, alone on the sea, slid under the waves.
The survivors were taken to Christmas Island for transfer to the oiler Pecos (AO-6). After entering the harbor, they came under air attack, and one twin-engine bomber singled out the Whipple. Luckily all the bombs missed." The transfer of survivors complete, the ships departed, running for their lives.
The Edsall was never seen again, her fate not learned until after the war. The next day the Pecos also fell victim to the Japanese. For four hours, the overladen Pecos twisted and turned as 50 bombs were targeted on her. Most of them missed, but six near misses and five direct hits sank the oiler. Before she went down, a call for help was sent to the Whipple, and again aid was rendered.
For the second time in as many days, the Whipple pulled some of the survivors of the Langley on board. This time, only 220 of 666 of those on board were pulled from the Java Sea. After two hours a possible submarine contact was found, and the Whipple either had to stay and look for more survivors or take those she could to Australia. The run to Freemantle was chosen, and landfall was made on 4 March." The remnants of the proud Asiatic Fleet were finished. Their actions were not in vain—they gave the Pacific Fleet time to recover from Pearl Harbor and start fighting back across the Pacific.
With the Asiatic Fleet a part of history, how do we ensure that we never place a fleet in their same vulnerable position again? The Asiatic Fleet, by plan, was a speed bump to the Japanese onslaught. It performed its mission superbly, but with war imminent, it should have been reinforced. The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a shock, but we had known that the Asiatic Fleet was under the threat of attack. Forward-deployed units must be adequate to deter aggression. The timely deployment of the fleet from Pearl Harbor might have given Japan cause to hold back on an attack. We should not expose our forces against an overwhelming adversary if we know the threat is there. We risk losing our most valuable asset: not our ships or planes, but our people.
The United States needs to be able to assert its position unilaterally in areas of vital interest. The Asiatic Fleet had willing allies, but the lack of interoperability of the forces left our people exposed. The Asiatic Fleet thought that the British would send reinforcements, but because of reasons beyond our control, that level of commitment was not attained. Joint operation with allies has many positive aspects, but times do come when we must stand alone.
The military has been reducing its manning level and force structure while levels of commitments remain high. The downsizing relates to our estimated needs to protect against perceived future threats. With a high operational tempo and reduction in equipment, systems are more susceptible to fatigue, thus shortening life spans. Our equipment will need replacements, which will take time to procure, in order to maintain force levels—an ongoing process. At this time commitments are many, with fewer available assets, so our deployed forces may be spread too thin. Fewer people, aircraft, and ships means the capability to sustain losses and present a credible force are greatly challenged. If we draw down too far, will we create another Asiatic Fleet, sailing in harm’s way—vulnerable and exposed?
I want to hear those baseball bats every spring, to see the youths take to the field as a part of Andy’s Red Sox. We must remember that we are fortunate to have the gift veterans such as Andy have given. For our Navy and our country, we must not expose our nation’s true bounty— our people—so unnecessarily again. When we commit, we must do so forcefully. In time of peace, we must maintain a force that we—and the world—know is credible and will not be on the run when push comes to shove.
1. John Costello, The Pacific War 1941'1945 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1983), pp. 28-29.
2. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 28-29.
3. W. G. Winslow, The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War 11 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 4-5.
4. Ibid., pp. 5-7.
5. Ibid., pp. 5-8.
6. Ibid., pp. 37.
7. Ibid., pp. 39.
8. Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 315.
9. Winslow, p. 232.
10. Ibid.
11. Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, vol. VIII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 256.
12. Winslow, pp. 238-239.