World War I: A Bibliography of The Great War
By Dr. William N. Still, Jr.
Last year two new books appeared concerning the U.S. Navy in World War I. Anglo-American Naval Relations 1917-1919 is the most recent publication of the Naval Records Society. As with the society’s previous volumes, this is an edited work of more than 450 official documents and personal letters taken from repositories in Great Britain and the United States. Editor Michael Simpson has divided the contents into nine parts (“American Entry into the War,” “Anti- Submarine Warfare,” “The Mediterranean,” etc.), and has included a brief introduction to each one. Together they provide a good analysis of Anglo-American relations during this world war. The origin and evolution of “integrated association” of the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy is the theme of this work, and Mr. Simpson has judiciously selected documents and papers to support that theme.
A second, equally interesting edited work is The Price of Honor: The World War One Letters of Naval Aviator Kenneth MacLeish (Naval Institute Press). Edited by Geoffrey L. Rossano, these letters from a member of the famous First Yale Unit to his fiancée offer a fascinating account of the personal life of a pilot from his initial training to his death in combat shortly before Armistice Day. Dr. Rossano has done an admirable job in editing the letters and tying them together in a most readable fashion. These two volumes relate to a war that is all but forgotten today.
Recently, a staff member of the National Archives referred to World War I as the “neglected war,” especially the naval phase of it. His comment reflects researchers' rare examination of World War I naval records housed in the archives. The paucity during the past quarter-century of published scholarly works—either books or articles—on World War I naval topics suggests that he is right, at least so far as the U.S. Navy’s participation in the war is concerned. In the 1975 supplement to A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History (Archon Books), William Braisted wrote “the last full operational history of the Navy during World War One was completed more than a half-century ago.”
Why have historians “neglected” the U.S. Navy in World War I? First, U.S. involvement was relatively brief, lasting only 18 months. Second, historians have been far more interested in the so-called neutrality period (1914-17), the reasons why the United States became an active participant, and the peacemaking period (1919-20) rather than the period of belligerency. Third, the Navy’s role has been considered minor compared to that of the U.S. Army. After the summer 1917 arrival in France of General John J. Pershing and the initial units of the American Expeditionary Force, war correspondents concentrated on the land war and generally ignored the war at sea. Even Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy during the war, stated in his published memoirs that the war was won on land. Throughout the postwar years, former sailors complained to the magazines of the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars about the neglect of their service in articles about the conflict.
The fact that there were no major engagements involving U.S. warships certainly contributed to this neglect. Few ships were sunk and few men lost in comparison to what happened on the western front. Nonetheless, the Navy successfully carried out its major responsibility to guard the sea-lanes and safely transport the Army to France. A large fleet of more than 400 ships and 50,000 men was gradually deployed in European waters, including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, subchasers, submarines, gunboats, minelayers and minesweepers, converted yachts, auxiliary vessels, and seven Coast Guard cutters.
With the exception of the battleships, U.S. forces in European waters were principally engaged in convoy and antisubmarine work. Naval units in Europe were deployed in hospitals, air squadrons, and even railway batteries. Administratively, this force was under U.S. control; operationally, however, U.S. warships were assimilated with Allied naval units, frequently under British or French command. This policy contrasted with that carried out by General Pershing. He opposed assimilation in favor of a separate U.S. Army. Whereas the naval policy of assimilation was sound, it contributed to the lack of awareness of the Navy’s contributions both during and after the war.
But this paucity of writing about the U.S. Navy in World War I is certainly not due to a lack of adequate primary sources. Although U.S. involvement in the war was brief, it generated a massive amount of documentation. The National Archives houses hundreds of cubic feet of records relating to the war. The Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress has the personal papers of Secretary Josephus Daniels, Chief of Naval Operations William Benson, European Naval Commander William S. Sims, and more than 25 additional collections of World War I naval personnel. Numerous repositories throughout the country contain dozens of other diaries, journals, and the correspondence of naval officers and enlisted men. British and French archives also store a great many records and papers concerning the U.S. Navy in World War I.
Between 1920 and 1923 the Navy Department published eight “official” monographs that highlighted particular aspects of the naval side of the war: German Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada; The Northern Barrage and Other Mining Activities', Digest Catalog of Laws and Joint Resolutions, the Navy and the World War, The Northern Barrage (Taking Up the Mines); History of the Bureau of Engineering', The American Naval Planning Section London; American Ship Casualties of the World War; and The United States Naval Railway Batteries in France (this last volume having been reprinted by the Naval Historical Center in 1988).
Like all wars in modern history. World War I resulted in the publication of memoirs and personal accounts. Most of these appeared in the years immediately after Armistice Day. The most useful on the naval side are: William S. Sims, The Victory at Sea (J. Murray, 1920, reprinted in 1984 by the Naval Institute Press); Albert Gleaves, A History of the Transport Service (George H. Doran Co., 1921); and Reginald R. Belknap, The Yankee Mining Squadron: or Laying the North Sea Mine Barrage (Naval Institute Press, 1920).
Periodically, personal accounts would continue to appear. Some of the better ones include: Prosper Buranelli, Maggie of the Suicide Fleet (Doubleday, 1930); Mack R. Murane, Ground Swells: Of Sailors, Ships, and Shells (Exposition Press, 1949); Lawrence B. Murdock, They Also Served (Carleton Press, 1967); Charles Blackford, Torpedoboat Sailor (Naval Institute Press, 1968); and Alexander W. Moffat, Maverick Navy (Wesleyan University Press, 1976). In 1946 Secretary Daniels published his memoirs of the war years, The Wilson Era, Years of War and After, 1917-1922 (University of North Carolina Press). His diary was edited by David E. Cronon and published as The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (University of Nebraska Press, 1963).
In the interwar years a few specialized works also appeared. The best of these were: Ray Millholland, The Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage (Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), an account of U.S. subchasers during the war; Harold W. Rose, Brittany Patrol: The Story of the Suicide Fleet (W. W. Norton, 1937), which relates the activities of the converted yachts along the French coast; William B. Clark, When the U-boats Came to America (Little, Brown, 1927); and Ralph D. Paine, The First Yale Unit: A Story of Naval Aviation, 1916-19 (two volumes, Yale University Press, 1925).
The only general “history,” or “story,” of note from the interwar period was written by Thomas G. Frothington. Volume III of the Naval History of the World War (three volumes, Harvard University Press, 1924-26) concerns the activities of the U.S. Navy in the war. The author made use of official naval records as well as the editorial assistance of Dudley Knox, a member of Admiral Sims’ staff in London and later director of naval history.
In 1942 Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Houghton Mifflin) was published. This volume by Dr. Elting E. Morison—a historian and Sims’ son-in- law—was the most scholarly work on the naval side of U.S. participation in World War I up to that date. Although somewhat partial to Sims, it continues to be an important study.
The dearth of published studies on the U.S. Navy in World War I continued after World War II. In fact, it was 1969 before one appeared. History of the Naval Overseas Transportation Service in World War I (Government Printing Office) by Lewis P. Clephane was published by the Naval History Division of the Navy Department in that year, although it was actually an official history written immediately after the war ended. Three years later, David F. Trask’s Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations 1917-1918 (University of Missouri Press, 1972) was published. This brilliant study, based on an extensive examination of sources in the United States, Great Britain, and France, emphasizes the forging of strong cooperation during the war, especially by the U.S. and British navies. This was done despite the attitude of naval officials in both countries who were suspicious of the postwar intent of the other, particularly in terms of relative size of their respective fleets. Although Captains & Cabinets generally ignores operations, it is the most scholarly study of the U.S. Navy in World War I.
Naval administration in World War I has been especially well addressed since the end of World War II. Frank Friedel has written a multivolume study on Franklin D. Roosevelt, the first two volumes of which—Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Little, Brown, 1952), and The Ordeal (Little, Brown, 1954)— discuss his role as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I. Dr. Gerald E. Wheeler wrote an impressive biography of an influential naval officer who was assigned to the Office of Naval Operations during the war and later became Chief of Naval Operations himself. Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life (Government Printing Office) was published by the Naval Historical Division in 1974. Five years ago the Naval Institute Press published Admiral William Shepherd Benson: The First Chief of Naval Operations by Mary Klachko and David F. Trask. Secretary Daniels still needs a good study. Although Joseph L. Morrison, Josephus Daniels: The Small-d Democrat (University of North Carolina Press, 1966), is good on politics, it is weak on naval affairs.
William Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1900-1922 (University of Texas Press, 1971) is a masterful study of this part of the world that was of little importance so far as naval operations were concerned, but quite important diplomatically. Edward Parsons’ Wilsonian Diplomacy (Forum Press, 1978) also stresses naval diplomacy.
Any student of U.S. naval involvement in World War 1 will need to examine general works on the sea war. Between 1926 and 1931 the official British naval history was published in five volumes. The initial volumes were written by the distinguished historian Sir Julian S. Corbett, and when he died, the work was completed by Henry J. Newbolt. Like Frothington’s work mentioned previously, they were written too soon after the war to have benefited from the bulk of official records and personal papers. Nevertheless, they do contain important information on U.S. naval activities. By far, the best account of the Royal Navy in World War I (and to date the best general account on the naval side of that war) is Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era (five volumes, Oxford University Press, 1961-70). The last two volumes include the U.S. Navy’s participation.
Two single-volume general histories published in recent years are also worthy of note. A. A. Hoehling, The Great War at Sea: The Dramatic Story of Naval Warfare 1914-1918 (Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1965), is an excellent popular history. Paolo E. Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I (University Press of America, 1989), is more limited, but is a thoughtful commentary, especially on the Mediterranean. Both Coletta’s work and Paul G. Halpem’s outstanding study. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918 (Naval Institute Press, 1989), include information on U.S. naval operations in that sea.
Unquestionably, convoying and antisubmarine warfare were the greatest contributions that the U.S. Navy made in World War I. Whereas convoying has attracted some U.S. writers, their emphasis has been on the controversy surrounding its adoption and the results. Several British studies, however, have examined convoying in detail. The best are: Robert M. Grant, U-Boats Destroyed: The Effects of Anti-submarine Warfare, 1914-1918 (Putnam, 1964); John Terraine, The U-Boat Wars 1916-1945 (Putnam, 1989); and John Winton, Convoy: The Defense of Sea Trade 1890-1990 (Michael Joseph, 1983). A detailed analysis of antisubmarine warfare is still needed.
The same is true of naval aviation in World War I. No study of U.S. naval aviation in that conflict has been written. The best account is Archibald D. Turn- ball and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (Yale University Press, 1946). This book is somewhat of a condensation of a massive (1,439 pages) unpublished study prepared by Lord during World War II, and is available in the Naval Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard. Both the published and unpublished works are heavily documented.
The 75th anniversary of the beginning of U.S. participation in World War I occurs in 1992. Perhaps this anniversary will generate studies on the naval side of U.S. involvement in the “War to End All Wars.”
Lonely Girls with Burning Eyes: A Wife Recalls Her Husband's Journey Home from Vietnam
Marian Faye Novak. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991. 278 pp. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Kathleen P. O'Beirne
Marian Faye Novak has taken her title from Yvan Goll's Requiem for the Dead of Europe: “At every window stand lonely girls whose burning eyes are bright with tears. . . .” Her use of poignant quotations from others' works to introduce each chapter heightens what could be viewed as a singular experience of the metaphorical. Ms. Novak, in a style that is almost Hemingwayesque, has transported her personal experience as a Marine Corps officer's wife in the mid-1960s Vietnam era to symbolize that of thousands of others married to young men of all of the armed services.
Her descriptions of meeting, courting, and marrying the youth who became Second Lieutenant William D. Novak throw light on this private, sensitive math major at Washington State University who was also a member of the Naval ROTC unit. Somehow, they never connected his involvement with war. Descriptions of their growing up and their gradual identification with the U.S. Marine Corps set the stage for the strengths and weaknesses they later brought to coping with Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, deployment in Vietnam, and Dave's eventual return.
Ms. Novak has written their story because, “I am the wife of a man who went to war. I watched my husband train for war; I waited thirteen months for him to return from it; and then I waited another fifteen years for him truly to come home. . . Many of us are still married to the men we sent off, but often we are so consumed with holding our men and our families together, there is not time or energy left to tell the story. . . . There must be thousands of women like me—wives who waited, who in some sense are still waiting. But we have been silent.”
The Novaks' ordeal reminds us how far we have come since the Vietnam War in terms of formal family support services. This nation saw military families up close during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and heard how family service/sup- port centers and unit support groups provided critical information and emotional support for spouses and parents whose eyes were “bright with tears.” Ms. Novak knew no such formal support. She, like many, “went home” to his parents and hers, but found them lacking in social and emotional understanding. Familiar themes of loneliness (“a part and yet apart”) echo throughout her section on waiting for her husband to return. She kept busy, went to college, prepared for the birth of their first daughter—but few in her and Dave's families or hometowns could identify with her needs.
The ties that bound her were long-distance friendships maintained by phone with the wives of classmates at Quantico. They provided the reality check that those geographically close by could not. They were experiencing the same emotional rhythms, as if they were members of the same unit. How these women coped with the death of friends from the unit reflected the nationwide spectrum of emotion found in spouses of survivors and prisoners of war: nightmares, incessant weeping, and use of tranquilizers. One spouse became an alcoholic. Another's husband left her after his return. The Novaks took 15 years to work through the aftermath of Dave's wartime exposure; his pain was internalized, never debriefed. His grief cycle—about which we know a great deal more today—was delayed and intensified.
Ms. Novak has given a great gift to military families and policymakers. The lessons learned from the Novaks and many others like them have led Congress to offer family support services and counseling to the Persian Gulf War veterans for an extended period of time. By assisting them to find their “new normal” after participation in life-changing events, the support services hope to alleviate the prolonged loss, pain, and malfunction experienced not only by the military members themselves, but, as the author's dedication notes, by those who also served: the families who waited at home.
As John Ruskins wrote in The Crown of Wild Olive: “Wives and maidens, who are the souls of soldiers ... if you fail to do your part they cannot fulfil theirs.” Ms. Novak has given wisely and bravely. Denial at a personal or a policy level is one of the early stages of the grief-and- loss cycle. She has brought us to a new level of understanding and has pointed the way for enlightened support.
Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (Volume 2: The Pacific War 1942-1945)
Arthur J. Marder, Mark Jacobsen, and John Horsfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 620 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Maps. Photos. $69.00 ($62.10).
Reviewed by Commander Michael Ellis, Royal Navy (Retired)
This book’s own history is of interest. Arthur Marder intended it as the second volume in his history of the Royal Navy (RN) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from 1931 to 1945. Sadly, Marder died early in its writing and the task was taken up by two of his former students: Mark Jacobsen, assisted by John Hors- field. Marder left no guidelines; thus, Jacobsen decided to settle for a history of RN operations in the Indian and Pacific oceans 1942-45, set against a background of Anglo-American politico-military relations, with a few reflections on the officers and men of the IJN in the closing chapters.
I admire Jacobsen in pulling it all together, but I feel additional work by an editor more independent of Marder’s influence would have tightened up the book considerably. Two examples come to mind. First, we are told three times in the first 30 pages why the British had to use the difficult Banka Strait to supply Singapore after the fall of Penang. Second, while Marder always referred to RN gunnery officers as such, Jacobsen (or Horsfield) uses the solecism (to RN eyes) “gunner.”
The hero of the book is Admiral Sir James Somerville, appointed Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet in early 1942. His unglamorous success is summarized by the title of the second section—“Holding the Ring.” By a combination of luck and leadership, Somerville avoided a battle with Admiral Nagumo Chiuchi’s fleet off Ceylon in April 1942. Nagumo’s operation in the Bay of Bengal was a success but not the decisive fleet action he had hoped for. Somerville spent the next two years conducting a classic “fleet-inbeing” strategy. This did not mean being idle, however. Contrariwise, he was constantly training his motley fleet and conducting minor operations to keep the Japanese guessing. These included the first successful amphibious operation of the war—the capture of Diego Suarez, Madagascar, from the Vichy French; trade protection against Japanese and German submarines and raiders; diversionary operations to coincide with significant U.S. Navy operations in the South Pacific; and, as strength returned, raids on Japanese bases in the East Indies.
Winston Churchill had good reasons to propose Acting Vice Admiral (substantive Captain) Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander, South East Asia Command, in August 1943, but this appointment dismayed many senior naval officers. Mountbatten’s command authority was a political compromise, and this soon led to misunderstandings between him and Somerville. This part of the book gives useful insights into inter- Allied politics, pointing out how many commanders who operated on the interfaces needed skills normally unexpected of military officers. Somerville handed over command of the Eastern Fleet to Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser in August 1944 and became head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, D.C. There Somerville began a new series of rows with Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations. Reading some of the stories about Somerville’s problems with Churchill, Mountbatten, and King, I wondered if the book could be retitled “With These Friends, Who Needs Enemies?”
As ships and material became available from the reduced intensity of the sea war with Germany, Admiral Fraser’s task was to build up the Eastern Fleet so that the RN could contribute to the defeat of Japan. A new British Pacific Fleet (BPF) was formed with modern ships and U.S.-built naval aircraft and based in Sydney, Australia, from November 1944. Again, politics intervened. King initially resisted British help in the Central Pacific; General Douglas MacArthur wanted the BPF to strengthen his forces in the Southwest Pacific; and Churchill kept hankering after a Southeast Asia strategy. The matter was finally resolved through meetings and growing mutual confidence, first between Fraser and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief Pacific, and later between their seagoing commanders, Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings and admirals Raymond Spruance and William Halsey. This was a new type of war for the RN, epitomized by a discussion between Nimitz and Fraser on how many days a month the BPF would be maintained at sea. Fraser proposed eight days, but as Nimitz laconically reported: “We compromised on twenty.”
Although always hindered by an inadequate fleet train, the BPF rapidly grew in effectiveness. With new tactics, determination, and the vital benefit of its carriers’ armored decks, the BPF proved to be an essential addition to Nimitz’s forces. It distinguished itself during the capture of Okinawa, dealing with many Special Attack Unit aircraft (dubbed kamikazes by English speakers) that otherwise would have made deeper, more dangerous depredations in the U.S. fleets.
The closing chapters of Old Friends, New Enemies include a discussion of the officers who led the IJN toward the end of the war and the personalities—including naval officers—who formed the government of Japan as it faced defeat. Jacobsen makes an admirable effort to explain the mindset that led to the operations of the Special Attack Units and shows how this almost led to all of Japan becoming a kamikaze. In a brief discussion of RN and IJN philosophies, Jacobsen concludes that the IJN fatally adopted the Nelsonic tradition of the decisive grand fleet battle. This prevented them from exploiting the full range of sea power, notably submarine and antisubmarine warfare.
This book succeeds in its detailed treatment of the history of the relatively limited RN operations in the Indian and Pacific oceans between 1941 and 1945, and sets this in the context of Allied strategic cooperation through those years. It fails, however, to throw much light on what I assumed was Marder’s original intention: to examine the philosophical relationship between the British and Japanese navies as old friends, new enemies.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Battle of the Bismarck Sea
Lex McAulay. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. 232 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $19.95 ($17.95).
In March 1943 a three-day battle between U.S. and Australian combined forces and a Japanese naval convoy saved Australia from invasion by superior Japanese forces. The story of that little-known but pivotal battle is here recounted in vivid detail. McAulay, a retired Australian soldier, successfully reveals the details of battle not only from the Australian point of view but from the Japanese and U.S. perspectives as well.
The Final Campaign of the American Revolution: Rise and Fall of the Spanish Bahamas
James A. Lewis. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 160 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes. $24.95 ($22.45).
The perception that all fighting in the American Revolution stopped after the Battle of Yorktown is mistaken. Combat continued, but its focus became the Caribbean, and a newcomer to the conflict, Spain, became a significant participant. This book recounts the fall of the British Bahamas to Spain and the subsequent recapture of the islands.
The French Navy in Indochina: Riverine and Coastal Forces, 1945-54
Charles W. Koburger, Jr., Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1991. 160 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $39.95 ($35.95).
Drawing on recently published French documents, Koburger has compiled a detailed but readable history of the French naval experience in Vietnam in the years between the end of World War II and their defeat by the Viet Minh in 1954.
New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium
William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, editors. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 390 pp. Illus. Notes. $26.95 ($21.96).
These 23 papers and commentaries were presented by notable naval historians at the U.S. Naval Academy’s Ninth Naval History Symposium in October 1989. Topics covered included “The Rhodian Navy in the Hellenistic Age,” “The U.S. Navy and the Persian Gulf,” “The Buck Rogers of the Navy,” and “The Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” to name but a few.
Nipsic to Nimitz: A Centennial History of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Louise M. Reh and Helen Lou Ross. Bremerton, Wash.: Federal Managers' Association, 1991. 307 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $50.00.
When the 30-year-old USS Nipsic sailed into Puget Sound in 1892 to serve as headquarters ship for the newly established naval station there, it marked the beginning of a significant chapter in the history of naval shipbuilding and maintenance. The story of the shipyard’s first 100 years is told through hundreds of photographs and a well-researched narrative.