Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945
B. Mitchell Simpson, III. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. 326 pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).
Reviewed by Patrick Abbazia
This book is a rather bland and uncritical account of the activities of the man who served as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and then Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, during World War II.
It is ironic that Stark, seemingly the most open, guileless, and straightforward of men, should come down to us through the years as a rather hazy and out of focus historical figure, something of an enigma, and a center of controversy. Clearly, he must have been a bright, ambitious, and able man to have risen through the naval bureaucracy to become Franklin Roosevelt’s chief naval adviser. His warm personality and spirit of compromise caused him to work well with Congress in the task of building the two- ocean U. S. Navy, and his thoughtful, scholarly bent led him to develop the basic U. S. strategy in World War II—the Germany-first decision.
Yet all, including apparently even Stark himself, seem to agree that he was not the man to command the fleets that would carry out his strategy. Why? Was Stark an example of the cynical aphorism that tells us nice guys finish last? Did he lack mental toughness, the salutary ruthlessness necessary to demand, and get, the best efforts of others? Or was his failure not personal at all, but simply a matter of bad luck? Would Roosevelt have replaced him even if he had not been tainted by the Navy’s debacle at Pearl Harbor? After all, some great commanders in history—such as the redoubtable Robert E. Lee and mild Chester Nimitz— led through love and mutual respect; and significantly, Roosevelt did not replace George Marshall, who was much more culpable than Stark for the numerous U. S. errors of omission that abetted the success of the Japanese attack.
Sadly, Simpson does not help us resolve the genial enigma that was Stark. To do so, he would have had to become deeply involved with Stark’s early life and naval career and show us the development of Stark’s personality in response to the challenges and stresses of these. And he would have had to be willing to probe, evaluate, and judge. He would have had to be more truly a biographer, and less simply a chronicler of the main events in his subject’s life. Then we might be better able to appreciate Stark’s merits and understand his failings.
But Simpson is too reticent for this type of close-in work. His Stark is a wonderful yet remote man, kindly, self-effacing, wise, forgiving, dignified, but somehow not quite real. Sadly, we never really get to know Stark.
The chapters in the book on Stark’s role as CNO are rather cursory, lacking in specifics, and present mostly a rehash of familiar material. Occasionally, the chronology seems muddled and there are too many typographical errors in the text. There is a rather serious factual error, too—the author is badly mistaken about the date U. S. merchant ships were allowed to carry Lend-Lease shipments directly to Britain. A startling omission is that in the pages dealing with Stark’s role in alerting the Pacific bases before Pearl Harbor no mention at all is made of MAGIC. This is almost impossible to credit. How can we judge the adequacy of Stark’s precautions if we do not know what information they were based on?
The best chapters in the book are those dealing with Stark’s role as Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Europe. This was an unglamorous administrative command, largely concerned with training and logistics. But in this section the book suddenly comes alive, as the author provides fresh material and relates some anecdotes that give us glimpses into Stark’s warm and generous spirit, and enhances our appreciation of Stark’s professional abilities.
Unfortunately, Simpson finds the Pearl Harbor investigations distasteful, and his handling of them is poor. He simply quotes the section of the congressional investigation that exonerates Stark of any culpability. Here, at last, he mentions MAGIC, but only to state that nothing in the intercepted Japanese messages pointed specifically to an attack on Pearl Harbor, for Japanese agents were gathering tactical intelligence on all U. S. naval bases. But this is not completely true. As Admiral Husband E. Kimmel repeatedly pointed out in his own defense. Pearl Harbor was the only U. S. base for which a Japanese agent was asked to make a bomb grid map.
The issue here is not whether or not Kimmel would have been better prepared for the Japanese attack had Stark provided him with better information—for we can never know this. Nor is it who was to “blame” for Pearl Harbor; since the debacle was a classic example of bureaucracy failing to be flexible in confronting the unexpected, everyone in the defense bureaucracy was to blame, and where everyone is to blame, no one is to blame. At issue, however, is Simpson’s credibility. He does Stark’s reputation no favor by failing to confront controversy and face conflict directly, and thus he undermines the usefulness of his book.
Paradoxically, Admiral Harold R. Stark, that most open and straightforward of men, continues to remain an enigma.
Raid on America: The Dutch Naval Campaign of 1672-1674
Donald G. Shomette and Robert D. Haslach. Columbia. SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988. 386 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind. $32.95 ($29.65).
Reviewed by Captain George Hagerman, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Between 1652 and 1674 England and the Netherlands fought three wars, popularly known as the “Dutch Wars.” During the second Dutch War, England captured the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam and renamed it New York. It included much of what is now New York, New Jersey, and Delaware.
Raid on America is the story of a Dutch expedition in the third Dutch War whose primary mission was to intercept English East Indian convoys to secure prize money for its native Zeeland. If the expedition’s members failed in this objective, they had orders to raid English and French colonies in America.
A small Dutch squadron consisting of six ships, commanded by Cornelius Everstcn, carried only 586 men and 115 guns when it departed Vlissengen, Zeeland, on 3 November 1672. It did not return until 570 days later. The squadron sailed first to the Canary Islands, then to the Cape Verde Islands, and then on to the wild coast of South America. It then proceeded north through the West Indies en route to Virginia, where it captured or destroyed ships of the annual tobacco convoy. Pressing on to New York, it easily recaptured that colony. From there a smaller squadron went to Newfoundland to destroy the English fishing fleet and raze the shore-based fish-drying facilities. It returned home by way of Cadiz and was in that port when the war ended on 8 March 1674, finally returning to Vlissingen on 22 June of that year.
Always in the background was the Raden and Admiralty of Zeeland and the States General of the Netherlands. The Dutch were a nation of seven independent provinces, unified only by the States General who carried out the foreign policies of the Netherlands. Each province fielded its own navy. The Raden of Zeeland prepared Eversten’s secret orders, which were meticulous and provided for every contingency. They were based on a maxim of military strategy, “Strike the enemy where he is weakest and least expects it.” To this they added their own corollary, “Make it profitable.” They practiced what they preached. Fearing that New Orange (New York) would be a drain on their resources, they returned it to England in the Treaty of Westminster that ended the war.
The authors also discuss the problems of Charles II of England, his bickering with Parliament, the need for money to fill the empty government coffers, and his secret treaty with Louis XIV of France. The political situation in France and Spain vis-a-vis the Netherlands is woven into the narrative and adds much to the understanding of war and politics in the 17th century.
The account of Eversten’s voyage is much more than a description of his travels. It is an atlas of the places he visits. These include the Canary Islands, the Cape Verde Islands, Suriname, Barbados, Martinique, Dominica, Guadeloupe, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Christopher, and St. Eustatius in the Caribbean. For each of these places the authors provide detailed geographic information and historical background. There follows a detailed account of the Dutch raid on Virginia, which preceded the attack on New York. The history and geography of both these colonies is discussed in detail. Likewise, the description of the Newfoundland fisheries provides a clear picture of the importance of the fishing banks of the 17th century.
In addition, the authors include biographical information on important personages, including William Lord Willoughby of Barbados, Sir William Berkley of Virginia, and Governor Francis Lovelace of New York.
I have one small criticism of this book. Understandably, the authors use many Dutch terms, e.g., “bus,” “caper,” "English Terre Neuf fleet,” “Raden,” “Schepen,” “Schout,” “Snaauw,” “trumpeter,” etc. A concise glossary of these terms would be helpful to the reader.
Raid on America gives a clear picture of the maritime and political situation on both sides of the Atlantic, 100 years before the American Revolution.
Maritime America: Art and Artifacts from America’s Great Nautical Collections
Peter Neill, editor. New York: Balsam Press, Inc., and Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1988. 255 pp. Photos. Append. Ind. $45.00 ($40.50).
Reviewed by James W. Cheevers
Americans renewed their interest in their maritime heritage with the advent of the 1976 bicentennial celebration and the beautifully orchestrated Operation Sail in New York Harbor. Wanting to respond to this enthusiasm. Congress at the same time faced huge budget deficits that forced it to prioritize expenditures. Therefore, it directed that a survey be made of the nation’s historic maritime resources, that standards and priorities for the preservation of those resources be established, and that the appropriate federal and private sectors direct and fund those priorities. Under the aegis of the National Park Service and with the cooperation of other organizations and institutions within the maritime community, the National Maritime Initiative, as directed by Congress, has kept alive the spirit of 1976 and Operation Sail.
Maritime America is a beautifully illustrated volume. It documents 13 of the most important maritime resources in the United States; 11 are museums in the traditional sense, and two are more exclusively educational organizations. The institutions included are as follows: The Peabody Museum of Salem, the Kendall Whaling Museum, Mystic Seaport Museum, South Street Seaport Museum. Thousand Islands Shipyard Museum. Philadelphia Maritime Museum, Calvert Marine Museum, Mariners’ Museum. North Carolina Maritime Museum, Manitowoc Maritime Museum, Woodward Riverboat Museum, Galveston Historical j Foundation, and the Rockport Apprenticeshop.
The book’s editor, Peter Neill, president of the South Street Seaport Museum- and recently elected as chairman of the National Maritime Alliance and secretary of the Council of American Maritime Museums, sets the stage with an inspirational essay recounting the nation’s many associations with the sea. Besides flaunting our glorious and heroic maritime episodes, Neill offers a frank assessment of dilapidated waterfronts, decaying and forgotten piers and shipyards, and the despair and pessimism found in our marine-oriented trades. But he concludes on a note of hope that a nation born by peoples crossing vast oceans, oriented to its water resources for recreation and educated about its maritime history, will remain joined to the sea.
Each chapter presents a cogent and well-illustrated statement, ranging from the story of one of our nation’s oldest museums, the Peabody at Salem (1799). and its fantastic ethnographic collections, to the intense and stirring account by Lance Lee of his innovative Maine apprentice program. Galveston’s restoration and operation of the three-masted barque Elissa and the Rockport Apprenticeshop may seem incongruous in the same book with the account of preceding institutions, but their scarce and little-known programs are solving an important problem—the loss of maritime skills. Lee wonderfully describes his workshop where youths build wooden boats using traditional tools and skills as “an active, not passive, response to the magnificence of our maritime patrimony.”
Although none of our exclusively naval museums are represented in this volume, sections and illustrations are of interest to the naval buff. Our warship sailors traveled on the same seas as the Charles W. Morgan, preserved at Mystic Museum, and the Peking, at South Street Seaport Museum; used many instruments and tools identical to those shown in the collections; made many of the same artifacts, such as scrimshaw and wood carvings; collected and preserved similar souvenirs from distant shores; and experienced the same challenges upon the water as related and interpreted in these institutions. Moreover, the Peabody Museum has the earliest model of the USS Constitution, received from Commodore Isaac Hull himself. The Philadelphia Maritime Museum contains many important naval artifacts and has exhibitions on such subjects as John Ericsson’s USS Monitor. The Mariners’ Museum devotes a hall to U. S. naval history and is the official repository for items recovered from the wreck of the USS Monitor. The Manitowoc Maritime Museum, located in the Wisconsin city that built 28 submarines for the U. S. Navy in World War II, exhibits the USS Cobia (SS-245) and other submarine memorabilia.
This book is not without glitches. In his introduction Neill places the historic battleship Texas (BB-35) at Corpus Christi rather than in its port at the San Jacinto State Historical park near Houston. The appendix places the National Liberty Ship Memorial in the Washington Navy Yard and is missing the National Maritime Historical Park at San Francisco, among others. However, the appendix contains an extensive list of additional maritime museums, which includes many of the historic naval ships on exhibit around the country; this makes the volume even more valuable.
Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu
Lloyd C. Gardner. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1988. 440 pp. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).
Reviewed by Colonel Wendell N. Vest, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
“‘Indo-China should not go back to France,’ Franklin D. Roosevelt admonished Secretary of State Cordell Hull in mid-October 1944. ‘France has had the country ... for nearly one hundred years and the people are worse off than they were in the beginning. . . . The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.’”
This passage from Secretary Hull’s memoirs illustrates the feelings of President Roosevelt and many other Americans at the time. It signifies a dream of the postwar world where the principles of the Atlantic Charter would apply to everyone. The French Empire, particularly that in Indochina, was subject to severe scrutiny because Vichy France had accepted, without resistance, occupation by the Japanese.
America’s maritime heritage is kept alive in a very practical way at the Rock- port Apprenticeship. Here, apprentices work on the interior joinery of a Fenwick Williams 18-foot catboat.
Indeed, the postwar world fell short of Roosevelt’s expectations. Soon afterward the Allies of the war were divided into two opposing camps. By the end of the decade, the United States and its principal ally, Great Britain, were at odds, almost to the point of war, with the other major powers in the grand Alliance: the Soviet Union and China. This cold war guided the United States to support a policy of containing international communism. Eventually this policy led to the U. S. involvement in Indochina.
Dr. Gardner, the Charles and Mary Beard Professor of History at Rutgers University, has written a meticulously researched account of the events and decisions that led to this involvement. While the subject has been written about extensively in the past few years, most of those histories cover the U. S. involvement by describing events in Vietnam. Dr. Gardner puts the events in Indochina within the context of the cold war as well as with the attempts by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to stem what was seen at the time to be a monolithic international communist movement.
Dr. Gardner’s book is primarily a diplomatic and political history of the period from the last year of World War II until the defeat of the French at Dienbienphu. The focus of the book is on U. S. involvement in Indochina, first as a lukewarm supporter of the French struggle against the Viet Minh. This support increased tenfold as the Viet Minh were identified as part of international communism and as the cold war increased in intensity with the 1949 revolution in China and the direct involvement of the United States in Korea. Eventually, after the French withdrew, the United States became the principal benefactor of the newly established Republic of Vietnam.
Dr. Gardner has done extensive research in writing this book as evidenced by the vast number of end notes and bibliography, which span more than 60 pages. Approaching Vietnam is an excellent accompaniment to the many other histories of the Vietnam War.
Other Titles of Interest
Allies: Great U. S. and Russian World War II Photographs
New York: Macmillan, 1989. 199 pp. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50).
The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia, 1918-1919: A Diplomatic and Military Tragicomedy
Benjamin D. Rhodes. New York: Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. 156 pp. Photos. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).
The Berlin Airlift
Robert Jackson. Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Sterling Publishers, 1988. 160 pp. Photos. Maps. Tables. Append. Gloss. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operation, Volume 3, Part 2
F. H. Hinsley with E. E. Thomas, C. A. G. Simkins, and C. F. G. Ransom, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 1,038 pp. Maps. Tables, Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $75.00 ($67.50).
The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century
Jeremy Black and Philip Woodftne, editors. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989. 273 pp. Maps. Key. Notes. Bib. Ind. $39.95 ($35.95).
Dunkirk: The Complete Story of the First Step in the Defeat of Hitler
Norman Gelb. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989. 352 pp. Photos. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.65).
From War to Cold War: The Education of Harry S. Truman
Robert James Maddox. Boulder, CO: West- view Press, 1988. 192 pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. $32.95 ($29.65).
The GI’s War: The Story of American Soldiers in Europe in World War II
Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1988. 620 pp. Photos. Illus. Notes Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).
Heartbreak Ridge: Korea, 1951
Amed L. Hinshaw. New York: Praeger, 1989.
146 pp. Photos. Maps. Key. Notes. Bib. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).
Journal of a Combat Tanker: Vietnam, 1969
Toby L. Brant. New York: Vantage Press, 1988. 134 pp. Gloss. $10.95 ($9.85).
The Lighter Side of the Battle: 22 Funny Stories About World War II
John W. Hazard, compiler. Newington, VA: Patmos Press, 1988. 212 pp. Illus. $17.50 ($15.75).
One of a Kind: The Story of Grumman
Bill Gunston. Bethpage, NY: Grumman Corporation, 1988. 160 pp. Photos. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
State Papers Relating to the Defeat of The Spanish Armada Anno 1588, Volumes I and II, Second Edition
John Knox Laughton, editor. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co., 1987. 365 pp./418 pp- Tables. Figs. Append. Notes. Ind. $93.95 ($84.55).
Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice
Colin Mclnnes and G. D. Sheffield, editors. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 239 pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. $49.95 ($44.95) hardcover, $16.95 ($15.25) paper.