The United States got a wake-up call in late summer 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ravaged the Gulf of Mexico coast from Texas to Alabama. "The devastation was so complete, so comprehensive," Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, U.S. Northern Command, said, "We couldn't figure out how bad it was. . . . On [a] list of things we need to . . . analyze very carefully, communications is at the top."
There are lessons here for the U.S. Navy as it grapples with the metaphysics of the joint global information grid and the Sea Power 21-FORCEnet glue that someday might bind Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing into a coherent whole. A chronic lack of attention to the individual nodes in the net poses great challenges to future operations-notwithstanding the promise of the Information Technology for the 21st-century (IT-21) program.
At the tactical level, a plethora of platform-specific, legacy, and stove-piped communications systems compete for scarce resources and offer significantly fewer capabilities at greater acquisition, installation, and operational costs than more modern systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Navy often settles for second best in communications as sexier warfighting programs siphon off constrained resources-this despite the higher return on investment from communications systems in use around the globe, around the clock.
Bureaucratic rice-bowls, "not-invented here" mindsets, and an unwillingness to look outside the communications box, however, stand in the way of affordable and effective internal and external communications systems for the Fleet.
Critical Nodes in the Global Net
During the early 1990s, the Navy began to investigate a novel concept called network-centric warfare championed by the late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. Rather than an approach to naval warfare focused on individual submarines, surface warships, aircraft carriers, aircraft, ground units, and shore facilities, network-centric operations focused on a net that would link sensors-to-shooters and fundamentally transform the American way of war.
The concept profoundly influenced the Navy's planning for a force structure that would be inherently joint and increasingly combined. In October 2002, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark published "Sea Power 21," his view of naval operations founded on a FORCEnet of ". . . revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders." Although FORCEnet and network-centric warfare focus on the net rather than individual platforms, the communications capabilities of the various nodes from the bottom up comprise the wherewithal that supports Sea Power 21's vision of "revolutionary information superiority." As one naval communications specialist put it, "If you cannot communicate effectively in the FORCEnet world of 21stcentury joint operations, at best you will be irrelevant; at worst, you will die."
Admiral Mike Mullen, Admiral Clark's successor, clearly embraces Sea Power 21. During his change of command ceremony on 22 July 2005, he noted that the ". . . acceleration of communications, command, and control capabilities makes possible, for the first time in the history of the world, a contiguous ocean that has no dark corner." Real-time, broad-spectrum total situational awareness may be on the horizon, but significant challenges remain-particularly in the business of naval communications.
Communications Challenges
"Our military is still struggling [with] how to do communications on the battlefield," Rear Admiral Andrew M. Singer, then-Commander Naval security Group Command and Director Information Operations, noted in a mid-2004 white paper. "A lot of energy and resources are being spent in the private sector on assured access, chat, and fast communications. We in the military have not freed ourselves up to let these capabilities loose in our own communications capabilities .... We have to 'leap-frog' the commercial availability of software-driven, smaller, lighter, and faster communications systems."
Nowhere is that need more evident than in the Navy's programs for communication systems in its warships-the critical shipboard nodes in the naval net. A 2005 survey of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, for example, identified 17 different voice systems-11 of which were completely stove-piped and had no connections to any other systems on board; tactical action officers had from 5 to 20 terminals, each for the various systems. Remarkably, more modern but still stovepiped communications systems were being considered for installation on board the carrier.
Certainly, specific communications nodes must be addressed within the context of broader service goals, as has been championed by the Navy's 21st-century information technology initiative. These goals include interoperability, the use of open-systems architecture and commercial off-the-shelf technologies and components, commonality where it makes good sense, and optimal manning-no more or no fewer people than are needed to accomplish the mission. For today's nascent ship programs, the cradleto-grave perspective spans 85 years or more. Given that about 60% of a warship's total ownership cost can be attributed to her crew, any program that offers reduced manning with significantly increased capabilities demands top-level attention.
Some recognize the problem. The goal of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class communication center modernization initiative, for example, is ". . . tangible manning reductions through automation, common hardware and software solutions, and the infusion of transformational technologies, simplifying . . .operation and maintenance. . . . The solutions must be [compliant with] FORCEnet, open architecture, and human systems integration, employ internet protocol and multi-level security based systems, provide for dynamic bandwidth management, and a common infrastructure." The DDG-51 initiative has outlined system improvements-control and management, merged network, integrated switching, information security, and advanced radio systems-that could contribute greatly to reduced communications manpower requirements and total costs while increasing capabilities. A modern, integrated system of two consoles could replace the 20 or more operator stations and controllers in the current DDG-51 system architecture.
Unfortunately, the bucks are not there: the DDG-51 initiative is unfunded, at least through fiscal year 2006.
Even if sufficient funding were available, however, it would still be easier to continue to acquire legacy stovepiped systems-with their higher costs and constrained capabilities-than to embark on a new program with its numerous acquisition wickets, a fact-of-life made more complex by the existence of three separate program acquisition resource managers for communications systems on Aegis warships such as the Arleigh Burkes.
Industry is investing internal research-and-development resources to improve the Navy's internal and external communications. The Navy is replacing legacy systems initially planned for the Aegis guided-missile destroyer Truxtun (DDG-103) with the secure voice system for command-and-control operators. Built by DRS Technologies Canada, the system provides two more voice channels than the older ON-21 system it replaces as well as enhanced user features. Other surface ships are replacing the decades-old SA-2112 secure audio switch with more advanced products from Cornet Technology-the MTX, MR, and MTX-R switches. These and similar systems are highly capable replacements for aging switching systems, but they provide dedicated, focused capabilities, rather than fully integrated systems.
Alternatives to Business as Usual
Fortunately, the Navy is pursuing the MarCom hybrid router and switching system, an integrated initiative developed by L-3 Communications-East. A fully digital, open architecture, commercial off-the-shelf-based integrated interior and exterior communications system, MarCom supports two primary applications:
* Integrated voice communications to replace or integrate legacy, stove-piped telephone, intercom, and existing as well as future radio systems, e.g., the joint tactical radio system.
* Base-band circuit switching to automate switching and routing of radio circuits.
MarCom offers the potential for dramatically enhanced operational capabilities at significant levels of interoperability among submarines, surface ships and carriers, large multi-crewed aircraft, ground forces, and land-based command-and-control facilities.
The Automated Communications Resource Manager-a software-based system providing automated control of radios, switches, radio-frequency distribution, and cryptographic equipment-is a key component. It stores all possible configurations of the ship's communications plan in a database that can be called up as the situation dictates. Not only can a single terminal provide all of the voice communications an individual operator needs, from sound-powered phones to satellite communication, the different audio services can also be labeled and prioritized for each position. MarCom can route itself around faults and damage.
Optimal manning depends on systems that are easy to operate, and the resource manager uses software that allows a relatively inexperienced operator to configure a radio room far more rapidly-and without error-than experienced operators on legacy systems, according to an L-3 official.
The cost-savings are real. A single, fully integrated and highly automated MarCom system will cost approximately 50% less than the hardware costs of the separate systems it replaces. There are other installation cost savings, particularly in terms of cable pulls, not to mention the life-cycle savings associated with such a system. Moreover, the radio-room "footprint" of the MarCom system is about half that of the legacy systems-an additional benefit where space, weight, and volume are at a premium.
Following a formal software test in June 2005, the Navy is integrating the MarCom system-albeit an interior communications suite only-into a new-construction Arleigh Burke destroyer, the Forrest Sherman (DDG-98). The system is also slated for installation on 15 additional Arleigh Burkes as a replacement for the legacy STC-2 interior voice communications system (also manufactured by L-3 Communications). Systems could be fitted to other Aegis warships, but only if the several program acquisition resource managers decide it is worthwhile.
The Navy had already selected the system for the USS San Antonio (LPD-17)-class amphibious warship program. That installation-which completely eliminated the need for the ON-201 tactical switch-comprises four MarCom nodes and 830 terminals, providing more than 1,200 ports throughout the ship; the acquisition and installation cost was about 60% that of a legacy system. The Navy also reduced the number of equivalent equipment racks from seven to one and saved more than $3 million in cable installation costs in addition to the material cost of 12 tons of cable that did not have to be installed on the lead ship.
Looking ahead, General Dynamics has proposed the MarCom solution as the integrated internal and external communication system for the Flight O littoral combat ship, an indication that industry, at least, considers it important.
The Coast Guard has also selected MarCom for its Deepwater National security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and Fast Response Cutters-nearly 100 systems. The Deepwater Program has identified a potential 13-crewmember savings accruing from this decision: the USCGC Hamilton (WHEC-378) high-endurance cutter requires 24 Coast Guardsmen for her radio/communications suite, while the Deepwater National security Cutter will require only 11. The total savings will ripple throughout recruiting, training, and retention pipelines. Moreover, variants will be installed in the Coast Guard's shore-side operations.
Sea Trials
The MarCom system has been employed during three deployments (2000-2005) of the Abraham Lincoln battle group; it was also tested on the USS Annapolis (SSN-760) in 1996-98, generating enthusiastic recommendations to install the system on all aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. Retired Navy Captain Dan Farson, Annapolis' commanding office] during her deployment with MarCom, rated it "the most useful of six temporary installations on Annapolis during that period," during a 3 August 2005 e-mail interview. "The size of the envelope on where and to whom various channels of information were available was expanded by at least a factor of ten, and this extra capability proved much more powerful than I had expected."
Annapolis's experience has been underscored by the system installed in Abraham Lincoln. In a 7 August 2000 memo, then-Rear Admiral Phillip Balisle, Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, explained how the battle group staff tested the system in a variety of tactical and non-tactical situations, including the six-week Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2000 exercise. Admiral Balisle pointed out a "... significant number of advantages of the system over existing communications equipment:
* A single MarCom terminal integrated all tactical and operational voice nets and a number of internal tactical and non-tactical voice nets.
* User access to five radio circuits and private branch exchange terminal from any MarCom terminal location. Better access for TFCC (Tactical Flag Command Center) watch slanders than that achieved by five or more Red Phone terminals/user devices scattered throughout the space.
* Watch standers from different locations were better able to communicate and share tactical planning information while also monitoring transmission from the same handset.
* Reliability. The MarCom system did not fail once during operational use."
He concluded that the "MarCom system combines the best attributes of existing systems into a low-cost, low-maintenance, operationally effective unit." He strongly endorsed the "full implementation of the MarCom . . . system as an effective replacement for the existing TFCC voice terminal switch and end-user equipment," and recommended that the system remain in Abraham Lincoln for continued use and evaluation.
The carrier has continued to make good use of the same TFCC MarCom system equipment installed in 2000. "I can't recall any time that our MarCom system was down," lieutenant Scan Clevenger, Abraham Lincoln's TFCC officer during the last deployment, commented during a 7 October 2005 telephone interview. "The ability to listen to multiple paths of information at the same time significantly increased TFCC situational awareness and contributed immensely to making the right decisions." Compared to a legacy system, which at best could support only one or two simultaneous circuits, "our ability to monitor multiple circuits and a dynamic tactical picture was greatly enhanced. Tactical communications throughout the strike group," he continued, "are critically important, linking the strike group warfare commanders and the strike group commander in a web of information that is vital to accomplishing the mission."
While these experiences were clear successes, earlier systems' capabilities have already been surpassed by those on the USS Greeneville (SSN-772). Greeneville is being used as a guided-missile nuclear-powered submarine (SSGN)/advanced SSN communications prototype, with a more integrated and capable communications suite expanded to support the embarked advanced SEAL delivery system. The Navy is installing MarCom interfaces with the submarine's and the SEAL delivery system's underwater telephones and also with Greeneville's, alarm and announcing system. With MarCom's inherent cross-banding capabilities, the SEALs on board the delivery system will be able to access the Greeneville's ultrahigh frequency satellite communications or high-frequency voice circuits and underwater telephone to communicate with shore or carrier/expeditionary strike group commanders. Once ashore, the SEALs will be able to use their secure very-high frequency portable radios to talk directly to commanders-worldwide, should the need arise-by tapping into Greeneville'& MarCom and satellite systems.
Lieutenant Jason Neal, U.S. Navy, the submarine's navigator, noted in a 28 October 2005 e-mail exchange that
Greeneville and MarCom were a perfect match. The ship needed a communication system that was user-friendly and capable of processing every communication circuit. MarCom is infinitely more 'robust' than the pre-existing communications suite. Prior to MarCom, there were basically two separate sets of comm suites, an internal and an external. Each separate circuit was routed to its own handset box. The user then had to go to another handset box to relay the information they just received. MarCom takes all of these circuits, internal and external, and patches them to the same handset box. Now with MarCom, instead of having two or three handsets to monitor, a watch slander can monitor every circuit through one centralized communication box.
MarCom has provided Greeneville with tremendous communications flexibility. Greeneville will be able to receive and disseminate real-time mission data and intelligence information in situ. . . . While conducting SOF missions with ASDS, Greeneville will have direct communications with the [SEAL delivery system] using the ranging and acoustic communication system. Off ship, mission planners will have direct voice communications with [special operations] personnel onboard Greeneville, whether they are in the torpedo room or onboard the [SEAL delivery system] while it is mated to the ship. These capabilities were extremely limited prior to the implementation of MarCom.
The Navy completed the installation on Greeneville in the fall 2005, with extensive sea-trial experiments to be scheduled.
Staying Out of the Box
Despite these success stories, the Navy is not pursuing any common or interoperable solution for integrated internal and external naval communications systems. The greatest need seems to be for a single vision, direction, or roadmap that drives commonality or at least interoperability-in design, engineering, installation, training, operations, and maintenance-throughout the fleet.
Instead, different requirements and resource sponsors, different commands, different program executive officers, different ship programs, different funding streams, numerous program acquisition resource managers, and diverse suppliers are building a Tower of Babel. The increasing reliance on full-service contractors, large-scale systems integrators, and contractor-furnished equipment makes it more likely, not less, that integrated systems interoperability will be frustrated. What is lacking is command guidance. The present approach will multiply cost burdens just when greater total operating cost efficiency, not less, is the hallmark of the Navy's Sea Enterprise philosophy,
"To achieve and maximize the return on the nation's investment in our Navy," Vice Admiral Justin D. McCarthy and Commander David Nystrom wrote in Proceedings (October 2005), "We must collectively seek new opportunities for improved effectiveness and efficiencies to reduce costs and manpower requirements across the enterprise." In a future enterprise of some 313 ships or so, interoperability and cost savings from a common communications solution are an opportunity that cannot be ignored. But, as McCarthy and Nystrom recognize, the biggest challenge is "... changing the way most of us think, thus changing the way we behave."
That will not be easy. Indeed, President Franklin DeIano Roosevelt once lamented, "To change anything in the Navy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching."
Naval communications is the lifeblood of the nation's ships; the service must do better. As Pogo Possum understood so well, "We have met the enemy and he is us."
Dr. Truver, a vice president of Anteon Corporation, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in national security, defense, and naval/maritime strategies, policies, plans, programs, and operations.