"Gender and the Civil-Military Gap"
(See S. Lister, pp. 50-53, January 2000; T. O'Connell, T. Romero, p. 16, February 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Lewis, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—As I finished the part of this article discussing "Women and the Gap," I was reminded of an unusual January 1991 Camp Pendleton encounter with a female Marine officer.
As a reservist, I had just been recalled to active duty with the newly formed V Marine Expeditionary Force. Driving past the almost vacant 1st Marine Division Headquarters, I spotted a captain walking alongside the road whom I had known on Okinawa and who was currently assigned to that command, She was a good officer, and I respected her abilities. I pulled over to the side of the road, greeted her, and asked why she had not deployed with the rest of the command.
She explained that she was "non-deployable" because she was married and her husband's civilian job schedule made it too difficult for him to actively take responsibility for rearing their children in her absence. Presumably there was more to her story than just those facts but she didn't explain further and I didn't ask. I just knew that she had been serving in a critical billet and that her loss would almost certainly have a near-term negative impact upon mission readiness within the intelligence staff, at least until a new officer could be assigned to the command and brought up to speed. For a moment I felt a slight tinge of empathy but that quickly dissipated when she next told me that she had recently been deep-selected for promotion to the grade of major. I didn't blame her personalty for her predicament, and congratulated her on her good fortune with the early promotion, but it certainly didn't seem like much of a way to run a war.
Fortunately, such incidents in my career have been outnumbered by far more positive experiences working with truly remarkable Marines—who also just happened to be women. I've worked for women, and with women, and have had women work for me. Their gender had no impact upon their professional performance. In fact, if I were asked to list some of the best Marines I've known, I would include several women near the top of that list.
Gender is obviously no barrier to superior performance, whether in leadership ability or in tactical and technical proficiency. I recently served for an extended period of time in a joint unit under the command of a female Air Force colonel whom I would rate as a truly remarkable leader. She was a superb officer, well respected and admired by all, and I would have followed her anywhere. This officer knew her tradecraft cold and, more important, knew how to motivate everyone in her command to push themselves to new heights. She was a great role model for everyone in her command, male and female alike. While assigned to her command I also served alongside a large number of very professional women, all of whom were every bit as good as their male counterparts.
Earlier, in late 1998 and during the first few months of 1999, 1 commanded a joint unit in Sarajevo which at one point was 13% female, including an Air Force captain, a Navy ensign, two Army staff sergeants, and a civilian GS-11 intelligence analyst. All were skilled, hardworking, no-nonsense professionals who made unique and vital contributions to our mission in support of Headquarters, Stabilization Force. We all wore the same camouflage uniform, worked under the same marginal conditions, and put in the same grueling hours. Every one of these women—including the civilian who, being a Texas A&M Aggie, was as tough as any of us—exuded the "warrior spirit" described by Mrs. Lister.
Few people would disagree with women having the "right" to serve in the military. Anyone who thinks that way is living in the dark ages. I hope Ms. Lister would agree, however, that women should also have a "duty" to be available to serve in the military, when the nation calls upon them in the time of war or national emergency. At present, women are not subject to the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) and only men have to deal with the threat of being drafted, however remote. Subjecting all eligible persons aged 18-25, both male and female alike, to the registration requirements of the MSSA is the next logical step in what Mrs. Lister accurately describes as an ongoing—and in my opinion generally successful—"social experiment."
If you pick up a copy of the Selective Service System (SSS) Registration Form at the local post office, it lists the various categories of men who must register. Among the multiple categories of 18-25 year old men currently required to register are some which seem a bit unusual: permanent resident aliens; special (seasonal) agricultural workers; refugee, parolee and asylee aliens; undocumented (illegal) aliens; dual-nationality U.S. citizens; physically or mentally handicapped men who are able to function in public with or without public assistance; and—within 30 days of release—confined men who have been incarcerated, hospitalized, or institutionalized for medical reasons.
The SSS pamphlet states elsewhere that "Selective Service registration is required for eligibility for U.S. citizenship and government jobs." Failure to register is a felony. It seems ironic that such diverse categories of men must comply with the MSSA while women in this identical age bracket, some of whom insist upon their right to serve in combat or combat service support units, are intentionally excluded from this aspect of citizenship.
I received my commission in 1981, not long after the MSSA registration requirement was reimposed by President Carter in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The role of women in the military has been greatly expanded in the intervening years. While there still are challenges ahead—especially with respect to the role of women in ground combat units—it's time for lawmakers to readdress the inequality opportunity. My 19-year-old step-granddaughter recently commented after she had been contacted by a local Army Recruiter: "Why would I want to do that [serve in the military]?" The vast majority of women her age probably think along those lines and have never given any thought to the possibilities of military service. And yet she's an extraordinarily talented young woman who I believe would excel in the military. From my point of view, we as a nation continue to lose out when so much talent walks past military recruiting offices without giving it so much as a sideways glance.
Captain Herman T. Voelkner, U.S. Army (Retired)—When Sara Lister was forced to resign her Pentagon position after labeling the Marine Corps as "extremists," there were those among the fair-minded who wondered whether she had been treated too harshly. Perhaps she was quoted out of context, we thought, or was making a sophisticated rhetorical point, inelegantly phrased. It was not necessarily the case that she was yet another social engineer determined to bring the military to heel and force it to conform to fashionable societal trends.
Alas, we need wonder no longer. In this article she shows herself lacking even a basic understanding of the military ethos. She seems as determined as ever to reshape the military along the lines of some fuzzy notions of "fairness." Ms. Lister thus joins a depressingly long list of political appointees who believe that storied notions of "warrior spirit" and so on are merely antiquated "constructs" to be swept into an ignominious comer. She is similar to Duke University professor Madeline Morris, hired by then-Secretary of the Army Togo West to be his special assistant on gender relations. Ms. Morris was chosen on the basis of her law review article suggesting the Army give up its "construct of masculinity" and emphasize instead "compassion and understanding" and the adoption of an "ungendered vision."
No wonder there is a "gap" in civil-military relations. Naturally, Ms. Lister does not attribute this to the fact that the services have been commandeered by agenda-driven dilettantes, whose military experience can be more or less summarized by their belief that every fighting unit should look pretty much like the bridge of the Starship Enterprise. It is not enough for her that the traditional view of the military as the consummate meritocracy has been expunged, and that an officer's career is now determined as much by gender and minority status as by heroism and leadership ability. I submit that Americans would do better to worry about whether their sons and daughters will be arriving at Dover Air Force Base wrapped in plastic because their leader was judged by standards other than those of competence.
It is an absurd reproach, and a red herring, to say that anyone in uniform questions the constitutional mandate of civilian control. What does worry them is whether decisions about the necessary integration of women into the fighting force will be made by experienced military leaders or by unabashed proponents of a feminist agenda. Lister and her likeminded colleagues make no secret of the fact that they want to break down all barriers to women, including combat exclusion. They are determined to discount any military opinion on this matter. They do so by mastering the first weapon of the politically correct: anathematize the opposition. Warriors who resist her notions are clinging to an outdated "construct" of masculinity.
Women do play a vital role in our national defense. We could not and should not do without their participation. But that is not the same as saying that every barrier to women in the military should be removed. Frequently, there are considerable trade-offs, which military leaders are entitled to take into account. When the Army integrated women into the ranks of its medics, for example, it found that two women, unlike two men, do not possess the upper body strength needed to carry a fully-laden stretcher. Faced with the mandate to assimilate women into these positions, the Army neatly redefined carrying a stretcher as a task that requires four soldiers. Thus the social engineers win another battle, and a new niche is opened for women. Few seemed to notice that, in the process, readiness has just declined by 50%. Extrapolate from that one example, across the length and breadth of the military, and one can see the cost such ill-considered policies can have in terms of our ability to fight.
Lister and her colleagues obfuscate the question of "feminizing" the military, when not actively ridiculing it. But then what are we to make of Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy? The senior intelligence officer in the Army has designed a "Consideration of Others" (COO) program, naturally to be made mandatory. An internal Army memo summarizing this sensitivity offensive cites that every military and civilian member of the Army will undergo training, under the tutelage of the usual legion of "facilitators," to instill in our soldiers "common courtesy, decency, and sensitivity to the feelings of others." One suspects that most women in the ranks, their jobs difficult enough, must cringe when they see policies such as COO being promulgated by their presumed role models. One also wonders how the Army leadership, with its shrinking resources and multiplying imperial burdens, feels it can expend those resources on counselors and "increasing sensitivity" instead of ammunition and combat training.
Meanwhile, training standards have continually been lowered to accommodate women. Men who experience the Army's initial-entry training now wonder what happened to the tough, disciplined basic training of their fathers' and grandfathers' stories. When I commanded a "mixed" (male and female) basic training company, the men did not feel challenged the way they had expected to be. Road marches had to be slowed down so that women could keep up the pace, and physical activity was "gender-normed" into irrelevance. Nowadays, basic training resembles summer camp. The Navy no longer drills its trainees with rifles, and issues them a "blue card" to hand to their trainer if they feel discouraged.
This softness of training has its effects in the areas of recruitment and retention, with every service but one below its minimum personnel requirements. I suspect this has less to do with the vigor of the private sector than with the loss of any feeling of "specialness" which attracts and retains soldiers in the first place. Napoleon's maxim that "the moral is to the physical as three to one" reminds us that there are intangibles more important than material inducements. A military no more special in its ethos than the trendiest high-tech firm will find that its soldiers will see through the sham and desert it for that high-tech firm.
Finally, I mentioned that only one service is successfully meeting its recruitment goals. Instructively, that service is the United States Marine Corps, home of Lister's "extremists." It alone resists the feminist's demands to integrate basic training; it alone cultivates unabashedly a reputation for breeding warriors who don't need to call for a "time out" when things get tough.
Let us hope we never have need to discover, as we did with Task Force Smith in Korea, how dissipated has become that unique chemistry which causes soldiers to cohere when confronted with the sheer wanton brutality and chaos of combat. History, however, teaches us otherwise. It teaches us that it is only a matter of time before somewhere American hostages are taken, or somewhere an American embassy is surrounded by armed fanatics, or somewhere an invader runs rampant over a civilian populace. And when such an event happens, the hopeless and besieged won't be looking anxiously over the horizon for a group of American troops liberated from their masculine constructs, polite and courteous, attentive to the sensitivities of others.
They'll be looking for the Marines.
"Hero and Heretic?"
(See T. Cutler, pp. 10-12, February 2000 Proceedings)
Roger Thompson—I corresponded with Admiral Zumwalt for several years and his passing has had a profound effect on me. His tireless efforts to reform the conservative U.S. Navy in the 1970s were revolutionary and made it a better service, especially for the sailors who are its heart and soul. Few military leaders have had such a positive impact in so many areas. The sailors and the Navy owe him a debt of gratitude for what he did. A few years ago, the admiral endorsed a book I wrote on bureaucratic politics in the Navy, and he told me how he struggled to protect important programs from cancellation. He said that he deliberately kept the early development of the Tomahawk cruise missile low key to avoid the scorn of the aviator's union—which had scuttled the Regulus program and placed political restrictions on the capabilities of the Harpoon missile. I can't help but wonder if we would even have Tomahawk today if it hadn't been for Zumwalt.
The Navy and the nation have lost a great man. Rest in peace, Admiral Zumwalt. You will be missed, sir.
"Searching for EgyptAir Flight 990"
(See J. Howard, pp 78-79, January 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Robert Allee, U.S. Merchant Service, Master, TIV Kings Pointer—Ensign Howard's excellent description of the recovery efforts for EgyptAir Flight 990 highlighted the potentially traumatizing task that the people who participated in the effort had to face. Even the more senior people who had to come to grips with the dimensions of that tragedy were affected by the sights they beheld.
As the article mentioned, the crash site was discovered by the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy training vessel Kings Pointer. The ship was on a routine weeklong training cruise when the Coast Guard broadcast of the missing airliner was received. The Kings Pointer was within 80 miles of the last known position of the plane and proceeded toward the datum. At daybreak on 31 October 1999, while still 40 miles from the last reported position, the Kings Pointer came upon an oil slick about one-half mile in diameter. The overpowering smell and concentration of the oil indicated that the spill was recent, and the officers of the ship correctly surmised that it was coming up from the wrecked plane. The Coast Guard was immediately notified, and dispatched assets toward the location.
The Kings Pointer proceeded into the spill and the bridge watch personnel began to see debris floating up to the surface. The ship was stopped, all hands were turned out to assist, and the ship's rigid-hull inflatable boat was launched. The ship was obviously stopped almost directly over the aircraft's wreckage because debris began to well up all around it at an alarming rate. The ship's boat began to recover items as quickly as the crew could handle them, and before long enough remains of the aircraft and its human cargo had been recovered to remove any doubt that it was from the missing flight.
Coast Guard assets arrived on the scene shortly, and the Kings Pointer continued to assist with collection of debris and remains until released by the on-scene commander later in the day.
The crew of the Kings Pointer consisted of 26 persons, 17 of whom were Academy midshipmen. Like the young Coast Guardsmen described in Ensign Howard's article, these midshipmen participated in a task of the grimmest possible dimensions. Simply being at the scene of an immense loss of life is sobering beyond description. Viewing close-up and handling the debris and human remains is a troubling and potentially traumatizing event.
After departing the wreck site, the Kings Pointer proceeded to Boston where it had the good fortune to dock at the Coast Guard base. Participating in search-and-rescue events with potentially troubling outcomes is not something that the average non-military or Coast Guard ship, training ship or not, is prepared for. Because we were away from the Academy, the school's own medical and counseling assets were not immediately available to ascertain how the midshipmen were responding. Fortunately, the Coast Guard is experienced in dealing with this sort of event and was able to offer some immediate assistance from their local crisis intervention team.
The Academy followed up by sending a chaplain trained to provide critical incident-stress debriefing. The chaplain traveled with the ship back to its Kings Point home port and then conducted a series of comprehensive debriefs and counseling sessions soon after the return.
Probably few of the midshipmen would have asked for the level of counseling provided; in fact, most would probably have considered it a sign of weakness to ask. Nevertheless, Academy officials insisted on the procedure, and at the end of the sessions, the midshipmen expressed much gratitude that they did. It is impossible to state whether most or any of the young people who witnessed the recovery efforts of EgyptAir Flight 990 were emotionally scarred by the experience, but acting quickly to ensure that support and counseling was provided, and even insisted on, was the wisest possible course. L)
"Is the Navy Sending the Right Message?"
(See C. Bonat, p. 96, November 1999; C. Fajardin, p. 8, December 1999; P. McConnell, N. Hogan, p. 16, January 2000; K. Amacker, February 2000 Proceedings)
Intelligence Specialist First Class Richard F. Cook, U.S. Naval Reserve—I think Lieutenant Bonat errs in asking the question "Could the nation and current service member be proud of the Navy as displayed in this advertisement?"
Recruiting ads obviously aim at placing civilians in uniform. From my experience, it seems that the ad agency for the Navy perfectly understands the demographic group it is aiming at. The Marine ad agency also understands its demographic group.
Time after time in conversations with friends, family, and casual acquaintances, military service is just not an option. The amount of money paid to people by corporations, schools that are available to them, and the increasing focus on flexible working hours make military service look like wasted time.
The Navy is fighting for a portion of these same in-demand people, and it needs many more people than the Corps. In this age's "what's-in-in-it-for-me" outlook, the Navy has adopted a "this-is-what's-in-it-for-you" recruiting pitch.
The Marine's recruiting pitch, on the other hand, speaks to a small portion of society. This segment is looking for something other than what society can offer. These people are looking to prove themselves. They are willing and want to become part of a larger whole with a known reputation for toughness and meeting a difficult challenge.
If the Navy adopts Marine recruiting practices, it should be prepared to get by on the same number of recruits the Corps takes in each year. Think deployments are a challenge now, Lieutenant?
"The Tyranny of Moore's Law"
(See J. Calpin, pp. 64-66, February 2000 Proceedings)
EDITOR'S NOTE: Several phrases and ideas presented in this article should have been attributed to "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths" by Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, pp. 27-37, August 1997 Parameters. Our apologies to Colonel Dunlap and Parameters.
"Arms Control Needs Overhaul"
(See L. Sloss, B. Adams, pp. 74-77, February 2000 Proceedings)
Theodore L. Gaillard, Jr., Independent Analyst—Why is there no mention of the need for concurrent rewriting of a NATO Charter which is just as outmoded as the established START procedures the authors seek to replace? NATO's continuing presence and recent expansion are seen in Russia as a palpable threat at a time when Russia is feeling more vulnerable than it has in 50 years. Just how outmoded is the Charter and how should it be replaced in conjunction with an overhaul of extant arms-control procedural machinery? Consider that there has been no modification to NATO's Charter since its founding in 1949, early in the Cold War. Its stated mission and areas of operation remain the same—despite recent shifts in NATO's unofficial strategic outlook. The Preamble to that 1949 document states that "Parties to this Treaty.... seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." In addition, Article 5 invokes the concept of mutual defense in which attack against one member country "in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," possible NATO reactions including "armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Article 10 retains this same regional focus, mandating that applicants seeking membership in NATO "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." Yet NATO has recently operated in both Desert Storm in Kuwait and in Kosovo, not far inland from the waters of the Adriatic-and both rather distant from "the North Atlantic area."
Consider, too, the impact of NATO's invitation to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In Russia's view, their destabilizing admission will buffer NATO's eastern flank with countries that, under the Warsaw Pact, had helped provide the Soviet Union with a protective shield against the West. Russia would feel the potential threat of the forward edge of this newly expanded NATO, its already strong capabilities now augmented by 2,500 additional tanks, 700 combat aircraft, and 2000 pieces of artillery. In the weeks preceding the 1997 signing of the document designed to allay Russia's fears and to redefine her relationship with an evolving NATO (allowing her a voice, but no vote in NATO deliberations), the press cited "repeated U.S. promises that Russia is not being targeted." Yet in August of 1996, a Rand Corporation think tank's mission/cost analysis for an expanded NATO predicted costs of upgrading military infrastructure in the three new member states in addition to (as reported in The Wall Street Journal) expenses of "preparing five NATO divisions and 10 fighter wings (200,000 troops and 540 planes) for swift movement eastward [my emphasis]." Meanwhile, in Congress some representatives in the House have even been urging inclusion of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—ex-members of the Soviet Union with borders directly contiguous to Russia. Little wonder that Russia has reservations about an apparently expansionist—rather than merely growing—NATO.
As NATO openly contravenes the geographically restrictive provisions of its own founding Charter, we need to remember that the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and Russian transition toward democratic rule and a free-market economy has been a painful, often embarrassing, process presided over by the moderate voices of Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But political radicals Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady A. Zyuganov wait in the wings, eager to reimpose centralized communist control; military radicals like Igor Rodionov and Alexandr Lebed, contrasting NATO's intended expansion with the precipitous decline of their own armed forces, stand ready to reassert the influence of the Russian military.
Former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solano tried to calm the waters. When he addressed the Russian Council on Foreign and Security Policy concerning NATO/Russian cooperation, he cited the 1991 adoption of "a new Strategic Concept that emphasized preventing and managing crises rather than preparing for large-scale military operations," depicting a NATO that "has transformed itself fundamentally during the last several years." Case in point: the combined NATO-Russian 60,000-troop peace-keeping mission in Bosnia. Nevertheless, NATO's unofficial 'mission-creep' and looming out-of-area membership expansion create confusion and anxiety.
Instead of rekindling Cold War fears, NATO therefore needs first to invoke Article 12 of its original Charter: ten years from the 1949 signing of the Treaty "or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so request, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty" concerning not only North Atlantic area stability, but also "development of universal as well as regional arrangements. . . for the maintenance of international peace and security" beyond even Kosovo, in a post-Cold-War world brimming with volatile issues of oil and water rights, terrorism, and religious hegemony.
Clearly, there is a legitimate need for a regional or global peace-keeping force. But if NATO, on behalf of the United Nations, is to focus on such missions well outside its original mandate, then it should adopt an officially revised Charter reflecting the panoramic outlook of its 1991 Strategic Concept. Such a profound sea-change would also necessitate a new name for this evolving Treaty Organization whose operational focus is no longer limited to the North Atlantic region. With an officially redefined mission and new identity, this successor to the present NATO could then consider appropriately expanded membership.
While it is too early to broach the concept of possible full membership for a currently unstable Russia, a cap on eastward expansion and a rewritten Charter might go a long way toward creating the atmosphere of mutual reassurance sought by Mr. Sloss and Mr. Adams as the precondition for their bilateral arms control overhaul.
"Keep the Big Guns"
(See J. Lehman, W. Stearman, pp. 43-47, January 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel David W. Szelowski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—Unfortunately, this analysis of our need for the battleship comes too late. The battleship is effective in using old technology (politically incorrect), looks imposing as a warship should (politically incorrect), and harks back to the days of battleship diplomacy (politically incorrect).
I remember in 1995 getting into an argument with Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding the ability to know everything in a 200-by-200-mile battlespace and hitting every target with a 100-mile gun by the year 2001. My response was that I would believe it when the Department of Defense develops the technology to get me a decent combat boot. I'm still waiting for the boot.
"Wei-Chi: The Game of War"
(See G. Capen, pp. 60-64, August 1999 Proceedings)
Dr. Peter Kien-hong Yu, Visiting Associate Professor, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, New Territories, Hongkong—Lieutenant Commander Capen argues that Weiqi "is central to understanding the Eastern perspective of war." For the most part such an application is structurally and logically flawed because many, if not most, Chinese Communist strategists do not play Weiqi. They strictly think and act dialectically.
Thus, Capen cannot say that "Chairman Mao Tse-Tung required all of his officers to study Wei-chi and become proficient" or that Chinese people from childhood play such a game, which, to the lieutenant commander, is an analogue of real-life. The reason is that we definitely see Maoist military dialectics, not Weiqi, being taught at, for example, the National Defense University (NDU) in Beijing. Besides, most Chinese children play Tiaoqi (Chinese Checkers), not Weiqi. Likewise, most Chinese since their early days are gradually being taught to associate or correlate things in terms of Yin, Yang, and the Five Elements, which is another basic version of dialectics and which is couched in terms of harmony.
We can point out some other serious problems. We must understand that most Chinese strategists, Sun Zi included, think and act dialectically. If one thinks and acts in terms of two points/concepts (or two extremes to be more specific), one would be able to understand or dissect what Sun said more deeply. Each point/concept or extreme has a meaning to it. All dialectical Chinese strategists make crabwise (or sideways) moves, be it a word or an action, between the two extremes, if not at this time/space then the next time/space or, for that matter, in this model/framework or another model/framework. (In Weiqi, players cannot do that all the time. They must stick to the same 19-by-19-line grid board.) Sometimes, they are closer to the left extreme at a particular time/space. At other times, they are closer to right extreme at another time/space. Or, they could be in the middle of the two extremes.
Capen wrote that Weiqi pits two opponents against one another. If he applied Weiqi between mainland China and Taiwan, for example, it is appropriate. But he also applied the same game to the complex situation in the Spratlys, which may involve the United States, because it may well be the national interest of the United States to wage an active offense in the Western Pacific.
Something is certainly wrong in this kind of application, because how can the mainland and/or Taiwan play the game against the Philippines and Vietnam at the same time in this boardgame of one against one? The only logical way is for the former to play several Weiqi games at the same time, say China versus Vietnam, China versus the Philippines, etc. But, this kind of arrangement is still flawed, because it could happen that Beijing, for example, is dealing heavy military blows to both Manila and Hanoi at the same time. Yet, in reality, a one-against-one game such as Weiqi, cannot reflect this important phenomenon.
To give one concrete example, China believes that the Spratlys are historically Chinese. Yet, Capen said Beijing is interested in acquiring territories beyond its coastal waters or that Beijing is making efforts to surge into the second echelon. To the dialectical Chinese, this island group has been literally encircled by several Southeast Asian claimants. In other words, China is put at a strategically disadvantageous position, at least since the late 1960s. In order to break out, China is trying to find footholds elsewhere and it is doing it by trying to enter some military relationships with some island states in the Pacific Ocean or the Indian Ocean, so as to counter the encirclement. But, because Capen perceives reality in a nondialectical way, what Beijing is doing becomes expansionist to Capen, which may involve bloodshed in thousands of American sailors and marines.
Does that mean China wants to use these newly arranged footholds to militarily attack those Southeast Asian claimants someday? Certainly not, unless China has been fired upon first by those claimants and/or their allies. China, to Capen, is constructing power. To others, China is a potential maritime threat. But, from a dialectical point of view, the Chinese intention is peaceful or defensive. As such, it is not necessary for the non-dialectical United States Navy to have a base in India, as mentioned in Capen's piece, because the Chinese only wants peace of mind, unless the United States is again thinking of breaking the Chinese planned counter-encirclement by again encircling the Chinese counter-encirclement ring.
So, it is wrong for Capen to imply that, after getting back Hong Kong and Macao, the People's Republic of China—which would likely acquire a blue-water capability including aircraft carriers within the next generation—will conquer the Spratly Island Group, which is part of the second echelon in the Chinese strategy. The Spratlys belong to China in the first place and, therefore, China does not have to conquer it.
I also agree with Capen that the Chinese plan has less to do with armed confrontation. That is because dialectics is mainly political and it can help a player to rationalize all phenomena over a long period of time, say five decades or centuries. Dialectics can also protect the dialectician from internal or external criticisms by saying that what he or she had done is within the safe zone, which, like danger zone, should always be understood in terms of a spectrum and which is closely related to the left extreme in each model/framework, for, in dialectics, there also exist a danger zone, again closely related to the right extreme.
"On Kosovo"
(See B. Smith, p. 2, January 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Hitchens, U.S. Air Force Reserve (Retired), and Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hutton, U.S. Air Force Reserve—Once again, Proceedings gives pride of place to those in denial of airpower. Lieutenant Colonel Smith stated that, "Ho Chi Minh's disciples were not impressed with U.S. strategic or tactical bombing efforts." This is demonstrably wrong.
In January 1973, after several months of bombing with very few U.S. combat troops remaining in South Vietnam, Hanoi agreed to peace terms that included the continued existence of the Saigon government—something Ho Chi Minh himself had sworn never to countenance. Did we "break their will," persuading them to drop their ambition to unite Vietnam under communist rule? Of course not. But we very definitely broke their will to continue hostilities in the face of U.S. airpower. The lesson seems clear enough: within the limits of our stated policy goals, airpower did win the war in Vietnam. That victory held as long as the unstated threat of reengagement—with airpower—existed. Only after President Nixon resigned to avoid impeachment, and after the U.S. Congress had passed the War Powers resolution and slashed military aid to Saigon, did we "lose" the war. These are the lessons we need to apply to our thinking about Kosovo and future conflicts.
Rather than misuse history to advance parochial goals, military analysts ought to first determine what the discussion is all about. Are Lieutenant Colonel Smith and the other airpower denialists arguing that we should bring in ground troops right at the beginning of a conflict? Or should our military goals conform first and foremost to whatever policy objectives are laid down by the National Command Authority? Is there anything intrinsically wrong with using airpower first? After all, it worked in Vietnam, it worked in the Persian Gulf, and it worked in Bosnia and Kosovo. It might work in our next crisis as well. Today, doctrine and capabilities are synthesized. It's fairly obvious that in the yin-yang of warfare, offensive airpower has a decisive edge over air defense. Is there anything on the immediate horizon that will change this equation?
So long as offensive airpower relies mainly on passive and remote sensing technology for precise targeting, and air defense relies mainly on vulnerable, active emitters, airpower will be in the driver's seat. And it's fair to say that whatever technological advances might be emerging in air defense, they are more than matched by the sea change underway on the offensive side, with UAVs such as the Tomahawk rivaling, if not eclipsing, the F-15E and the B-2.
This is what we ought to be discussing in lieu of rehashing discredited arguments about the limits of air power.
"Sub Problems Down Under Continue"
(See N. Friedman, pp 121-123, September 1999 Proceedings)
Commodore M. T. Dunne Royal Australian Navy (Retired), and Captain W. L. Owen Royal Australian Navy (Retired)—We feel that the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Collins-class submarine project has become something of a national embarrassment and that the proposed "fixes," announced by the new Submarine Capability Team since July 1999, give us little confidence that the major performance shortcomings of this submarine will ever be rectified.
Despite the expenditure of around A$7 billion (US$4.5 billion) since 1985, not one of the Collins class has yet been fully accepted into naval service—nor can they meet many of their originally specified performance requirements and ship characteristics. As recently as 1994, the Navy confidently expected the Collins to participate in RIMPAC 96 exercises and to fire a salvo of Harpoon missiles as a final test of the combat system. Now the question is being asked: How could such a high profile and generously-funded venture go so disastrously wrong?
The fundamental answer to this question is embedded in the initial tender evaluation process that resulted in the selection of the Kockums-471 platform design proposal. But the authors of the recent Prescott/MacIntosh Report, referred to in Dr. Friedman's article, deliberately overlooked the initial selection issue, arguing that their brief was to chart the way ahead—and not to look back over their shoulder.
One of the original requirements for a new submarine to replace the RAN's six Oberons was that submarines of the selected class would also have to be in service in the navy of the country of design. This requirement was rightly seen as essential, in order to minimize design risk and to provide design and logistic support throughout the new submarine's life. The newly created submarine project team in Defense (administratively separated from the RAN's operational staff) decided to disregard this fundamental criterion from the start of the evaluation process—as the project director had a strong preference for a platform design from HDW/IKL which was not on order for the German (or any other) Navy.
In 1985, after two years of evaluating five platform design proposals, the project team selected a short list of two proposals for the award of contracts for project definition studies. The choice of HDW/IKL (Germany) and Kockums (Sweden) caused considerable surprise as neither company had ever designed and built long-range, deep-diving submarines of even half the size of the Collins. Both proposed designs were at a very preliminary stage of development and neither design was on order for the "host" navy. Furthermore, the RAN's own design directorate had assessed the Kockums proposal as fifth, due to its high level of technical and financial risk.
Nonetheless, the Chief of Naval Staff announced he would be happy to accept either of the two short-listed platforms—and the Defense Minister told a press conference that the two lowest-cost platform proposals had been short-listed, thereby ensuring that the total project cost for the six submarines could be kept inside the budgeted A$2.6 billion.
During the first year of the project team's evaluation of the short-listed platform and combat system tenders, HDW/IKL was the firm favorite to win the platform contract. But in 1986, following the unexpected replacement and subsequent resignation of the project director, there were rumors that the winner would be Kockums.
The rumors proved to be well founded. In June 1987, a prime contract was awarded to the Kockums consortium, the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASQ, valued at A$4 billion, for the construction of six submarines at a yet-to-be-built shipyard in Adelaide, to the (still incomplete!) Kockums-471 platform design. At the same time the Rockwell tender for the combat system was selected; a separate sub-contract for this was to be negotiated by ASC within the terms of the prime contract.
After the first of the new submarines (HMAS Collins) was commissioned in 1996 and began sea trials, it soon became clear that there were problems with excessive propeller cavitation and flow noise. Reliability problems also arose with the Hedamora diesels and there were safety concerns about the submarine's surface stability under certain conditions. Extensive media coverage of these problems eventually caused the Defense Minister to initiate the Prescott/MacIntosh review of the project in early 1999.
We believe that some aspects of the Kockums-471 design would not have been acceptable to either British or American submarine design authorities. These include the flat bulkhead at the forward end of the pressure hull, the positioning of the main battery and weapon stowage compartments, the internal main ballast arrangements, the small reserve of buoyancy, and the small metacentric height when surface running. We are surprised to discover that little or no model tank testing of the hull form or the propeller was undertaken during the design process at Kockums. We further understand that there are also problems with the stealth characteristics and the operating profile, but appreciate that the sensitivity of these aspects would preclude discussion of them here.
Recently the RAN announced that, with three Collins-class boats at sea on trials, the remaining three nearing completion and with the last remaining Oberon (HMAS Otama) still in commission, the manpower of the submarine force was 60% below strength. It seems that submarine sailors are leaving the service at an unprecedented rate and that experienced men from the Otama are reluctant to undergo cross training for the Collins. This has led the Navy to introduce a $35,000 incentive payment for submariners who sign on for a further two years service.
The combat system also has failed to perform to specification. The system was designed and manufactured by the Rockwell consortium to meet specifications written by the RAN's Submarine Warfare Systems Center in Sydney. It was a conceptual model with an integrated architecture and centralized processing system, taking raw data from the many sonars and above-water sensors and distributing the processed information to a bank of eight multi-functional displays.
Before the contract was signed with the consortium, there had been warnings from both the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy against this type of architecture. In our opinion it is most unfortunate that the RAN did not specify for the Collins project a logical development of the successful combat system known as SFCS. This had been installed in the six RAN Oberons as an element of their mid-life modernization over the period 1975-85. The system had been produced by Singer Librascope to meet an RAN design concept using an "open" architecture.
The present situation is that Revision 2 of the Rockwell-Boeing combat system—with some non-essential capability removed—is now under evaluation at sea in one of the Collins. A further proposal to acquire a completely new combat system for later installation in all six submarines—at a cost understood to be in the region of A$1.5 billion—is under consideration by Cabinet in the context of the forthcoming federal budget.
How it came about that the unproven Kockums-471 platform design rose from last to first between 1985 and 1987 has never been adequately explained—and we find it astonishing that no provision was made for the construction, sea trials, and acceptance of the first-of-class, before giving approval to proceed with construction of the remaining five vessels. These strange decisions have had an enormous cost in dollar terms and also have cost Australia a fully capable submarine force for at least ten, and probably twenty, years.
There are now growing demands in the media for a judicial inquiry into the whole selection and contracting process, to help ensure that the mistakes made in the early stages of this project can be avoided in the management of future major Defense acquisitions.
"We're Not Ready for the Javelin"
(See J. Hatala, pp. 74-75, December 1999 Proceedings)
Gerhadt B. Thamm—Captain Hatala makes a number of valid points in his defense of the Javelin anti-tank missile. It is my opinion that the Javelin actually exceeds the needs of the rifleman in many respects. In days past, a number of us who have faced enemy armor have pleaded in vain with the U. S. Army and before the U. S. Congress to give the rifleman an effective weapon to defend himself against enemy armor. We were opposed by high-ranking military officers who had never had to face one of those angry, roaring monsters—and we lost.
Captain Hatala mentioned among others the U. S. Army guideline to strive for flank shots. This is a ridiculous suggestion obviously made by someone sitting behind a desk in the Pentagon. By the time the rifleman is in position to fire a flank shot at a tank, he is surrounded by tanks. Mounted infantry will most likely kill him before he even has a chance to bring his launcher into firing position. But to strive for a flank shot? Ridiculous.
The Javelin is close to what the rifleman needs. The front-line soldier must have what an old sergeant in the World War It German 100th Riger Division called the Hallelujah Weapon—a weapon of last resort that can kill a tank. In those days it was the "Panzerfaust," a one-man, throw-away antitank rocket. The old sergeant called the rocket his hallelujah weapon because "if you don't have one, it's hallelujah."
It was hallelujah for Task Force Smith, Korea, July 1950, when then-Lieutenant Carl Bernard went into battle with the World War 11 U.S. Army 2.36 antitank rocket launcher, the bazooka, that could not stop North Korean tanks, Soviet-built T-34s. The Korean episode was an especially sad one because the U. S. Army had access to an antitank weapon that could penetrate the frontal glacis of the T-34: the aforementioned German "Panzerfaust." The weapon was "field tested" on all fronts, came highly recommended, and was very inexpensive. Alas, it was not invented by U.S. industry.
Decision-makers who have never seen serious combat are today's biggest problem. It is the responsibility of those of us who have faced armor in major campaigns to remind those who have not that our riflemen face annihilation when attacked by armor. War produces situations that can not be programmed even in the most modem computers. No computer is programmed to inject the sheer terror of a rifleman who faces a swift, ruthless tank attack. If he is without an antitank weapon, his terror will be short. In real war, all too often the rifleman stands alone. All the great multi-arms support teams, programmed by wellmeaning planners, have vanished. Mud will trap tanks, drifting snow will blind optics, fires will fool sensors. There will be confusion, disorientation, at times chaos. The rifle platoon or company will be cut off from all friendly forces. Artillery will fire on the wrong coordinates, helicopters will lose blades and crash. Supporting tanks will be stuck in a ravine 200 meters behind the Company command post, and the Air Force will have higher priority targets. Roads will be blocked by terrified civilians. At one time or other the rifleman will have to fight without a high-tech support system. Should war happen tomorrow this rifleman does not have an effective antitank weapon that he trusts.
The Javelin, from Captain Hatala's description, appears to be the new Hallelujah weapon for the modem rifleman. One of the weapon's important aspects is the fire-and-forget feature. I believe the range of the weapon to be excessive. The hallelujah weapon is one of last resort. The rifleman considers anything beyond 500 meters "somebody else's business." When the enemy tank, however, is within 100 meters of the rifleman's position, everything else has already gone wrong. The tank closes at a terrifying speed spraying the ground with its machine guns and firing its main armament on suspected hiding places. At a range of 100 meters, the rifleman has but one chance to destroy that tank. He launches his antitank round. It penetrates the heavy armor plate and in the tank compartment molten steel and explosives set off secondary explosions. The frightening monster is now an iron coffin.
As a weapon of last resort, the antitank rocket must be simple, without wire guidance or laser illuminators. Captain Hatala mentioned the limitations of wireguidance, and anyone who thinks a rifleman can fire a weapon and then stand exposed to enemy fire for about 10 seconds guiding the warhead to the target has never seen combat. The ideal weapon is a one-shot, throw-away rocket launcher, preferably without an infrared signature. The weapon must have a large, powerful warhead. Since it is predominantly a defensive weapon, the size of the warhead should not be sacrificed to weight reduction. Of course the system must be light enough to be handled in addition to the rifleman's basic weapon.
The weapon should be relatively inexpensive so that the rifleman can hone skill and build confidence by firing it repeatedly on hard, moving targets. In war, there should be an abundance of launchers available so that when headquarters "shortens the front line," retreating logistic vehicles can drop off these launchers at potential defensive positions. An effective antitank weapon in the rifle squad will save lives and buy time needed to organize the counterattack. The rifleman's antitank weapon, not all the high-tech systems that are burdening our defense budget, may be the single ingredient that can tip the balance of power.
"Navy Bogeys One"
(See W. Carroll, pp. 69-70, January 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Brian Banks, U.S. Navy, 8-handicapper—Commander Carroll is right on in his criticism of Recruiting Command's mishandling of Payne Stewart as a potential spokesperson for the Navy. The Navy recently made the news in its decision to discontinue television commercial advertisements during the WWF (World Wrestling Federation) "Smackdown" series because the behavior of the actors on the show glamorized mistreatment of women. My friends and 1, like Commander Carroll, are merely pilots who spend most of our careers at sea and know little of the advertising business. We were still shocked and appalled, however, to find that our organization ever ran commercials during WWF events in the first place.
This further highlights the need to examine just what kind of young people we are trying to recruit to join the ranks of our Navy. Does the Recruiting Command actually think that the young people glued to the television for the professional wrestling freak shows represent a higher quality demographic than those young people who watch professional golf? Are young role models like Tiger Woods and Sergio Garcia not household names that have brought literally millions of young and old fans to the game of golf? I'm sure it's not easy to get all of the young men and women we need into the Navy, but it seems as though we could be a little smarter about where we look for them. J
"Human-Centric Warfare"
(See A. Zimm, pp. 28-31, May 1999; S. Rowe, pp. 18-20, July 1999; R. Charles, W. Brooks, pp. 22-23, August 1999; M. Agresti, pp. 22-24, November 1999; K. Amacker, pp. 18-20, December 1999 Proceedings)
Reuben S. Pitts III, Head of the Data Analysis Team that supported Admiral Fogarty's formal investigation—The dialogue initiated by Commander Zimm's reference to the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes (CG49) is healthy and useful, but must be based on fact if the lessons learned are to be of value to current and future warfighters. The situation as summarized by Commander Zimm is correct as supported by the record. Unlike most prior incidents at sea, reconstruction was not solely dependent on the recollection of the participants, but was aided by digitally recorded system data and voice recordings of several internal and external communication nets. As with most reconstructions, there were charts, documents, record message traffic, and other evidence typically available to a reconstruction effort. Any analysis of the events of 3 July 1988 must be done with these "hard data" as a starting point.
It is disappointing, but not surprising, that Mr. Roger Charles accuses Commander Zimm of failure to conduct "careful research of primary-source documents." Mr. Charles, in the 1992 Newsweek article, committed that sin, and he continues to propagate errors of fact in his comments. The 1992 article, "Sea of Lies," in the 13 July issue of Newsweek, was so error-filled that Admiral William Crowe made a special appearance before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), on 21 July of that year, to rebut significant portions of the article, point by point.
Mr. Charles provides his own interpretation of the events prior to the detection of the Airbus. The definitive source for information concerning this event is the report of the formal investigation, led by Rear Admiral William Fogarty, U.S. Navy. The events and time line occurring prior to detection of the ill-fated Airbus are well documented in the Fogarty Report and in Admiral Crowe's 1992 HASC testimony. The person who wishes to understand the events leading to the shootdown would be well advised to read these documents, then compare Captain Rogers' account with the characterization provided by Mr. Charles.
The student does not have to depend on the Rogers book to find the record of warnings of "more aggressive behavior" expected of Iran over the Fourth of July weekend. It is recorded in the Fogarty Report. While in Bahrain in July 1988, 1 saw the record traffic that included such warnings. Mr. Charles' characterization of a benign threat environment just does not square with the record.
Mr. Charles characterizes tagging the Airbus as "unknown, assumed enemy" as an improper act based on the location of the aircraft in Iranian airspace. Those familiar with manual identification doctrine know that an ID assignment may be independent of territorial considerations. In this instance, the track was tagged as it went "feet wet" in accordance with guidance whose reference was redacted from the unclassified version of the Fogarty Report. Such guidance existed and was in force at the time of the incident. This routine tagging was performed on other tracks which were not engaged, including the Iranian P-3 to the west of the Vincennes and an Iranian military aircraft which departed Bandar Abbas about seven minutes behind the Airbus along the same flight path.
Mr. Charles is correct that ships' crews should fight like they train. He is also correct that the personnel who manned many positions during normal steaming were not the same as those who manned them at General Quarters. There is surely some lesson to be learned there. One officer did have difficulty pointing one of the ship's illumination radars at the aircraft as a form of warning, as he had been directed. Ultimately the track was illuminated. This procedure requires a button action sequence that is in some ways similar to launching a missile, and apparent reluctance to complete the sequence in the absence of a "take" order is understandable when under extreme stress. However, when the order to launch missiles was given the correct sequence immediately was executed.
Mr. Charles' assertion that placing the system in automatic would have prevented that accident is unsupported. There was significant radar clutter on that day, a condition which makes automated performance of the Aegis weapon system less predictable. The automated responses of the system are dependent on the doctrines entered by the crew, and no one knows what they would have entered. There were no automatic firing doctrines active at the time of the incident. For instance, if the Vincennes had doctrine activated to allow no overflights under 25,000 feet with a closest point of approach of five miles, the Airbus would have been automatically engaged by the system.
Storm Center (Naval Institute Press, 1992) represents one view of the incident as recalled by a key participant. The Fogarty Report contains the facts as the Navy, in a formal inquiry immediately after the event, could determine them. The report on the incident of the International Civil Aviation Organization, published in November 1988, provides additional facts that were unavailable to the Fogarty team. It is therefore another useful resource in the determination of any lessons learned. Mr. Charles is correct that students of the incident should not rely on misleading and false versions of the events, but should rely on "primary source documents." Unfortunately, his writings on the subject fail to meet that mark.
Commander Brooks does not cite his references, but also misinterprets the environment in the Vincennes' combat information center (CIC) on that fateful day. Loss of Mount 51 did require a hard turn to unmask Mount 52, but people were not "sliding around" during the turn. They were seated in chairs designed to provide stability under just such circumstances. Interviews with the crew indicated that the gun failure and gear adrift during the turn did increase the tension level in the CIC, but both digital and voice records indicate that the crew went about their tasks uninterrupted and with no significant change in their patterns of behavior just before or after this part of the incident. Without citing a source, he also says, "We now know that fire control radar had a picture that varied totally from the Aegis system." There is no indication that any radar in the Vincennes held a different picture than the SPY-1A. In fact, comparison of all voice recordings with the recorded digital data indicated that the crew consistently read the correct information from their displays. They repeatedly called correct altitude, speed, and heading information. Admiral Crowe's endorsement of the Fogarty Report to Secretary of Defense Carlucci is probably the best extant statement on the decision to fire missiles given this correct, available information.
Two additional letters from Lieutenant Commander Agresti and Captain Amacker address additional issues that should be clarified. The first indication that the aircraft might be hostile was the "assumed enemy" ID assigned to the aircraft 13 seconds after detection as discussed above. This was in accordance with doctrine, and the Vincennes reported "unknown, assumed enemy" over Link 11. Approximately one minute later, the USS Sides (FFG-14) reported the track over the link (as track number 4131) with an ID of "unknown, pending." The Vincennes correlated the tracks and accepted the Sides' track number. This correlation and track number change are common and seldom confusing to a well-trained crew. It appears that the antiair warfare (AAW) team in the Vincennes was not confused because they continued to "hook" the correct track and to refer to the track as 4131 in their recorded net traffic. At least one crewman (across the CIC from "air alley" and not an active player in the engagement) did attempt to hook track 4474 by entering the number in the system. For a short period of time, there was a 4474 to the south, clearly identified as "friend, strike support," but its presence on the Link was brief and only the one crewman (the one across the CIC) successfully "hooked" it, for a period of five seconds. He also "hooked" the Airbus track, 4131, just before and after—an indication he knew which track was to the south and which was considered a threat. There was never any evidence that anyone operating a console in air alley or anyone talking on the internal or external AAW nets confused the tracks. They all consistently had the correct track hooked throughout the time period.
The second point of discussion in these letters involves the use of a fire-control radar by the Sides to obtain altitude data on the track. This was not necessary, as the Airbus transmitted accurate "Mode C" altitudes from the time it left Bandar Abbas until it was struck by the Vincennes' missiles. Because the Sides had used a fire control radar to track the target, it transmitted "weapons assigned" over Link 11 with its track information. This resulted in an alert in the Vincennes' system of "engagement initiated." It also resulted in the placement of an "assigned" bar above the "unknown, assumed enemy" hat on the track symbol displayed on the screens. This is a half bar—a full bar representing "engaged." This bar remained in place throughout the incident, as the Sides continued to track with her fire control radar. Despite this, the voice recordings never indicated that anyone in the Vincennes thought the Sides was firing missiles or was intending to fire missiles. All of this was known and considered at the time of the investigation, not "a decade later."
Captain Amacker refers to the Airbus as a "cooperative" target. Although it was transmitting valid IFF codes, its failure to respond to multiple warnings from both the Vincennes and the Sides casts a cloud on that characterization. He also refers to the Vincennes' "bumbling efforts to splash the Airbus" which "finally succeeded at near-minimum range." As discussed above, although the attempts to illuminate the target with a fire control radar were clumsy and unnecessary, the missile engagement was executed with reasonable skill. The final engagement was well beyond the minimum engagement range.
As with any tragedy, we must examine the contributing factors and do all in our power to preclude any future such occurrences. In this instance, we have the benefit of a significant body of digitally recorded data. Our dialogue should not ignore it.
"Combat Fleets"
(See A. Baker, p. 92, January 200 Proceedings)
EDITOR's NOTE: In the December 1999 "Combat Fleets" column, the photograph of the French Navy dock landing ship Bougainville is incorrectly credited. The photo should be credited to Bernard Prezelin.