This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Comment & Discussion
Contents:
Heavy Helicopter Kings—14
Surface Navy:
Still in Search of Tactics—14
Red Sky in the Morning—16
Reinventing Short-Range Distress Communications—16
Divorce, Military Style—19
A Better Hornet Promises, Promises—20
Pushing Them Out the Back Door—23
Out of the Bull’s Eye—26
Go, NAPS, Go!—19
United Navies—20
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a daytime phone number.
—
“Heavy Helicopter Kings”
(See C. W. Meyer, pp. 87-88, November 1993
Proceedings)
Commander Dan Hartwell, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14)— Captain Meyer’s article is so far off base and factually incorrect that it should have been published in a supermarket tabloid.
The CH-53E and MH-53E are not the same helicopter. Among many other differences, the MH-53E has a separate hydraulic system and numerous “black-box” systems directly associated with airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) operations which could not be retrofitted easily (read: inexpensively) into the CH-53E.
The MH-53E tows more than just the “mine detonation sled.” In addition to the MK-105, we also stream, tow, operate, and maintain the MK-103, MK-104, MK-106, MK-2G, and AN/SPU-1W sweep systems, AN/AQS-14 sonar, and the AN/ALQ-141 countermeasures system. The maintenance, operation, and towing of the systems are not easy tasks, as suggested by the author. A great deal of continuous training is required, about 650 flight hours per quarter for an eight- aircraft squadron to maintain basic minimum proficiency. Captain Meyer also makes no mention of the five crewmen in the back of the helicopter who must learn to deploy and recover the equipment and carefully operate the systems.
The idea that Marine pilots absorb the minesweeping mission has been tried—and it failed. True, Marines saw AMCM action during Vietnam, but it was extremely limited. Certain Marine CH-53Ds were configured to provide contingency operations; however, the pilots and aircrew were never trained—with the exception of limited “blue-green” mixes in the late 1970s. Furthermore, while the operational flight trainer/sim- ulator is an excellent pilot/copilot coordination. instrument, emergency, and cockpit-familiarization trainer, it cannot provide the training required for the seven crewmen of the MH-53E to conduct effective AMCM operations.
Disbanding the active and reserve AMCM squadrons will not eliminate 2,600 positions. Even if the squadrons were disestablished, the transferred equipment would have to be maintained by the Marines—not an easy task with their existing manpower.
Captain Meyer mistakenly contends that the USS Inchon (LPH-12) can op
erate only six MH-53Es. On page 93 of the November 1993 Proceedings, there is a photograph of the Inchon during Exercise Blue Harrier—with eight MH-53B and two HH-lNs on deck.
If Captain Meyer—or anyone who supports his notion—wants to get the facts on AMCM, I invite them to pay a visit to HM-14. That should clear up any misconceptions. □
“Surface Navy: Still in
Search of Tactics”
(See C. H. Johnson, pp. 92-95, September 1993:
K. Brown, p. 20, December 1993 Proceedings) I
Lieutenant Jon P. Walman, U.S. Navy. Military Editor, Surface Warfare Magazine—During an awards ceremony at the Surface Navy Association's 1993 National Symposium, Captain Johnson was formally recognized for his very stimulating article concerning the need to resurrect surface Navy tactics and tacticians.
It was a testament to the surface warfare community’s realization of a "weak spot' that requires close attention.
During a recent interview with a group of students at the Naval Postgraduate School on tactics in joint littoral warfare, every surface-warfare officer I spoke to expressed frustration and concern over a lack of shipboard tactical training.
Captain Johnson’s statement that “Tactics are more vital now to the U.S. Navy than at any time in the past 20 years” reflects the dangers and uncertainties of operating in the littoral. With the rapid response required to counter the myriad ot growing shore-based threats, surface warriors must be not only technically prepared, but also capable of thinking tacti- ' cally about more than just how best to employ their combat systems. Moreover. ^ by placing more emphasis on tactics, the surface Navy will better align itself with * the focused tactical mentality of the Marine Corps and improve interoperability among joint forces.
Captain Johnson accurately observes that “modem technology makes greater. « not lesser, demands for superb tacti' cians.” The rapid developments in warfare and information technology require today’s tacticians to be more focused oH | the “big picture” instead of the “procedural checklist”—without having to compromise correct procedures, of course.
This vitally important requirement will | never be met as long as we continue to
Proceedings/January 199*
be managers, administrators, and engineers first and tacticians second, as Cap- r tain Johnson suggests.
! | However, I don’t agree with Captain
Johnson’s idea of establishing a tactical research-and-development institution. Although it is an interesting concept, there are existing organizations—e.g., the Surface Warfare Development Group—that serve the same purpose. A new facility would create another level of bureaucracy and increase costs at a time the Navy is getting smaller. What the Navy needs to do is streamline its approach to tactical development—as is being done at the Naval Doctrine Command.
Finally, the readers of Proceedings might be interested to know that in its September/October issue, Surface Warfare Magazine initiated an open forum in order to create a broad-based dialogue on various aspects of surface warfare—including tactics and tactical development. We invite those interested to participate in this forum. □
It appeared that one of our shells had gone in a gun port and exploded inside.
“Red Sky in the Morning”
(See J. H. Alexander, pp. 39-45, November
1993 Proceedings)
Commander H. A. I. Sugg, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Colonel Alexander’s article was of special interest to me, because it was my ship, the USS Meade (DD-602), that provided the fire support to Major Michael Ryan’s outfit on Green Beach. The captain, Commander John Munhol- land, kept the ship as close to the reef as possible. As the executive officer and navigator, I piloted by looking over the bridge wing at the color of the water alongside the reef.
Commander Munholland held the ship just off the front line, keeping just steerage way or stopping to stay abreast of the line. Stationed in the director, the gunnery officer. Lieutenant E. R. Meyer, was able to see the Marine front lines. The Meade was able, therefore, to lay down very accurate fire whenever gunfire was requested by the shore fire control officer. We used both full battery 5-inch and 40-mm guns and, occasionally, took targets of opportunity under fire well ahead of the line with our 20-mm guns.
As we moved along the beach, a Japanese gun emplacement suddenly came to life; a salvo from it passed just overhead. Apparently, we were so close that the gunners were unable to depress their guns enough to hit us. The captain ordered engines ahead emergency, executed a 180° turn, and settled the ship down on the reverse course. The gunnery officer then ordered all guns to fire with direct aim. Shortly, there was an explosion in the emplacement and it fell silent.
Less than five months after her commissioning, the USS Meade (DD-602) was . providing close-in fire support for the Marines fighting on Tarawa.
coordinator: identifying Coast Guar
A major concern developed when, after heeling sharply to starboard in the violent turn, the ship remained at about a 30° list after straightening out. Our first thought was that we had been hit by the Japanese guns. However, a quick check showed no damage. It turned out that the engineering “oil king” had picked that time to shift oil from port to starboard tanks, and the open valves permitted a large amount of oil to surge into the starboard tanks. The tanks were quickly trimmed, and the Meade continued her fire support. □
“Reinventing Short-Range Distress Communications”
(See D. E. Ware, pp. 90-91, October 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Steven M. Sheridan, U.S. Coast Guard, Deputy Group Commander, Group Upper Mississippi River— While Lieutenant Commander Ware’s proposal to reduce and eventually eliminate the large amount of traffic on Channel 16 (156.8 Mhz), and VHF-FM in its entirety, was thought-provoking and provided interesting alternatives, an important use of the frequency—the Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB)— was overlooked.
When distress calls are received, the Coast Guard often immediately broadcasts UMIBs over Channel 16 to notify potential rescuers in the area. A vessel’s initial distress call may be heard by vessels in the immediate area, but the UMIB—transmitted from a Coast Guard high-level transmission site—covers a larger area, exponentially increasing the odds of timely assistance from a fellow mariner—and often saving the Coast Guard from committing further resources.
The UMIB is especially important in remote areas where Coast Guard search- and-rescue (SAR) assets may take hours to respond to the scene—if they are available at all. This is particularly true on the 7,000 miles of the Western Rivers System where the Coast Guard has the role of SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) but
virtually no SAR resources. Buoy tenders' and marine-safety boats respond only if they are in the immediate area. The Coa; Guard’s role on the rivers is that of a tnu
lS
Auxiliary (civilian volunteers), state! local, or commercial resources, and good] Samaritans, and soliciting their assistance. Many times, it is a vessel that has responded to the UMIB.
Alternative methods—e.g., cellular telephones or the International Maritime Satellite—either cannot perform these general broadcast functions, or cannot do! so without some form of operator interaction. The boater or commercial operator must key up the broadcast, instead of having it blared over Channel 16 without any user interaction.
i
When lives are in danger, fast action is essential. The UMIB system, in conjunction with land line communications, from a SMC to local authorities, does this in a way current telephone technology) cannot. The vision of John Q. Boater^ his cellular telephone pressed to his ear-^ going down for the third time, while 3 SMC tries to set up a conference call with a potential rescuer who is just over the horizon or around the next river bend, is) a daunting one. Guaranteed, he won'1 be singing our praises for effectively! managing risk and saving his tax dollars'
This proposal is also a concern in re-| gards to the Marine Assistance Request Broadcasts (MARBs) and the Broadcast Notice to Mariners (BNM) systems tha' give advice to mariners on such things as those in need of assistance, danger areas' safety zones, and marine events. Whilei some interaction is required—i.e., shifting from VHF channel 16 to 22 to monitor these longer broadcasts—other concerns arise. For instance, many users may avoid interacting with this important system out of cost consciousness (charge*) for cellular or satellite use), thus con-] tributing to a reduction in safety because of a lack of up-to-date local knowledge-
Proceedings / January 199*1
VHF provides an open line of communications that allows free and instant access to all parties so equipped, without a need for operators and phone books' Until cellular telephone and other systems can provide instant access to the
SAR network for all concerned, we should keep the current system intact, and find other ways to exercise fiscal restraint.
Saving lives is the Coast Guard’s bread and butter—perhaps the primary thing that distinguishes us from other armed forces and regulatory agencies. It is also a mission that’s typically hard for the bean counters and risk managers to quantify. As it should be! It is far better to be accused of conservatism than to be accused of not using every means available when lives are in danger. □
“Go, NAPS, Go!”
(See A. B. Myslinski, pp. 33-36, October 1993;
T, C. Lynch, pp. 14-16, November 1993; B. J.
Black, E. F. Palm, p. 17, December 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Richard T. Bro- phy, Jr., U.S. Navy—As a former instructor at the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS) and the Naval Academy, Commander Myslinski undoubtedly is in a unique position to comment on the need for NAPS. However, as a 1987 NAPS graduate—and the brother of a current NAPS student—I can respond to some of his criticisms.
Commander Myslinski says that few of NAPS instructors have first-hand knowledge of the Naval Academy. However, two of the current instructors are former instructors at the Naval Academy and at least eight are graduates of the Naval Academy. Short of having midshipmen assigned to NAPS, I can’t think of a better arrangement.
While it may be cheaper to send students to elite prep schools—as Commander Myslinski suggests—it would not do nearly as much to ensure their success at the Academy. My brother and I attended a prep school and college before we were selected to attend NAPS. While the prep school certainly helped us strengthen our academic performances, its ability to prepare us for the many aspects of Academy life was lacking. At NAPS, I was able to develop a strong sense of honor, leadership, and self-discipline. It is no secret that many of the leaders who emerge during plebe summer and plebe year are NAPS alumni.
Regarding the physical standards at NAPS, Commander Myslinski states: “Ironically, many NAPS students—including prospective athletes—are unable to pass the Academy’s physical-fitness test.” I know of no one from my NAPS class who had such a problem. His use of the word “many” is vague and suggests that his assertion wasn't based on hard data.
Finally, he asserts that a double standard exists at NAPS in regard to punishment; that former enlisted students are
treated more harshly than ones from a civilian background. I am anxious to know where the commander found his information because, during my time at NAPS, I never knew this to be true and my brother cannot think of a single case at NAPS today. If there were, I’m sure we could testify to the grumbling that would go on.
Although a loyal alumnus of NAPS, I recognize that in the current “do more with less” atmosphere that every program must be examined closely with an eye toward economy. It is important, however, to make certain that any examination is based on hard facts—not broad generalizations. □
“Divorce, Military Style”
(See F. W. Ault, pp. 61-64, September 1993
Proceedings)
Shirley Taft, Member of the Board of Directors, Ex-Partners of Servicemen (Women) for Equality (EX-POSE)— Everyone must sympathize with Staff Sergeant James J. LeCorto who, though abandoned by his wife, must now pay her 47.5% of his pension for life. But they also should consider Mrs. Dorothy Kisser who was divorced in 1976 by her husband—a senior noncommissioned officer-after a 30-year military marriage. She received no part of her husband’s pension and no alimony. She worked for 15 years, earning enough to support herself but not enough to save for her future. Today, at age 65, she is living on $309 a month from Social Security plus $47 worth of food stamps. Her former husband, who has remarried, enjoys his entire pension plus other benefits he earned working since his retirement in 1975.
Numerous studies have reinforced Lenore Weitzman’s 1985 ground-breaking research that found that after divorce, the woman’s income drops precipitously—as much as 73%—while the man’s increases by as much as 42%.
Captain Ault manipulates some facts and misstates others. For instance, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) does not insert the federal government into the legal process of divorce. It allows the states to treat military retired pay as they treat civilian pensions: as marital property to be divided in divorce.
Federal statutes and case law have repeatedly characterized military retired pay as pensions. For example, the Internal Revenue Service states that “fully taxable pensions and annuities also include military retirement pay.” Furthermore, retired pay is not subject to Social Security payroll taxes, because it is not earned income.
When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
Elegant 6-oz. Glass for
CAPTAIN’S MARTINI
Thirsty Captains will deeply appreciate this 6 " tall fine Martini Glass. Trimmed with satin-finish pewter anchor. Great Gift idea for a boat-loving friend. Only $19.95 each (plus $3 s&h). Major Credit Cards, Order TOLL-FREE: 1-800-836-1165 FREE CATALOG of hundreds of nautical-motif furnishings for Lovers of Ships and Sea. Sent with Glass, or order direct:
PRESTON’S
188E Main St. Wharf, Greenport, NY 11944 NYS residents add sales tax
Let us introduce you to membership in your professional organization with 3 FREE issues of Proceedings.
All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible.
For information and sign up, contact:
WW11 warships and great ocean liners in stock.
Hundreds of other ships, including freighters, tankers, ferries and tugs. WWII naval aircraft.
We purchase or consign collections.
Send $2 for catalogue. Visa & Mastercard accepted.
Vintage Limited USA
29761 Weatherwood, Laguna Niguel, CA 92677 Phone (714) 249-8687 FAX (714) 248-7120
SUPER DETAILED SHIP MODELS
UNBELIEVABLY DETAILED METAL WATERLINE MODELS FROM EUROPE.
SCALE- 1:1250 (1 "-104.2") FULLY ASSEMBLED AND PAINTED
tL Miras' -k
Membership Services • U.S. Naval Institute 118 Maryland Ave. • Annapolis, MD 21402-5035 410-268-611019
Proceedings / January 1994. RUSSIAN MILITARY v f HISTORY TOUR >
Moscow • St. Petersburg • Kursk
BdEPEA! HA3MAA! With visits to...
Stalingrad • Murmansk • Kronstadt
¥ St.Petersburg Naval & Artillery Museums
• Monino Air Museum • MoscowTank Museum • Battlefields/War Museums/Memorials Also...
¥ Meet Russian Vets & Military Historians
• Home Visits For Those Interested Escorted by:
Professor John M. Thompson September 5-221994
From: NewYork..$3,730/L.A..$3,890
Tour Prk»» All Induvv*
© Lufthansa
For more info, call or write:
East-West International Tours
1248 Montevideo Ave. Placentia, CA. 92670
1-800-359-6719
in Davis vs. Michigan (28 March 1989) that “states cannot tax federal pensions if they exempt state and local government retirees,” it implicitly included military retired pay. Proceeds from a pension cannot be used to purchase an individual retirement account and neither can proceeds from military retired pay.
Federal courts have decided repeatedly that the USFSPA does not constitute an “unjust taking” in violation of rights provided by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as Captain Ault claims. For example, in the 1990 Fern vs. U.S., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that military retirees are not entitled to compensation from the United States for pension payments that retirees must divide with former spouses in accordance with state divorce decrees.
In the mid-1960s, the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) was the test ship for NATO's Mixed Manning Demonstration. Here, some of the ship’s officers— including two Royal Navy lieutenants, Bill Kelly (left) and Bob Dibble (third from left)—speak with Admiral Sir John Hamilton, Royal Navy.
Contrary to what Captain Ault claims, military spouses have not always “had the same full range of remedies in divorce court as any other spouses in America.” Before the USFSPA, military spouses could not be awarded a share of the military pay, whereas, in most states, civilian spouses could be awarded a share of civilian retirement. Military spouses could not garnish retirement pay for nonpayment of child or spousal support as could
civilians. Military members could not name a former spouse as beneficiary of the Survivor Benefit Plan, even if they wished to, whereas, civilians were always free to designate a beneficiary of choice for any similar type of annuity.
Captain Ault advocates “terminating the USFSPA payment upon remarriage of the benefiting spouse.” EX-POSE, a non-profit volunteer organization, thinks USFSPA is a good law, because it allows state courts to treat the military pension as they treat any other pension. In all cases, judges should be able to divide assets on a fair and equitable basis, taking into consideration all relevant factors. □
“United Navies”
(See A. W. Forsyth, pp. 47-51, September 1993
Proceedings)
H. D. Huffman—This article came right to my heart, as it was my privilege to serve on board the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) during the Mixed Manning Demonstration during 1964 and 1965. At the time, there was a proposal to create a Multilateral Force—composed of a number of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles and manned by NATO crews— to counter the Warsaw Pact. Some questioned the ability of a NATO crew (full NATO representation on each ship) to work together efficiently; others questioned the wisdom of putting a non-U.S. captain in charge of nuclear weapons.
We had a U.S. ship with a U.S. captain and executive officer; half of the wardroom and crew were U.S. personnel with the other half composed of personnel from England, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, and Turkey. It was a success and proved the concept. Since the article did not mention the Mixed Manning Demonstration (I realize that it took place almost 30 years
ago), perhaps Commander Forsyth wouK like to contact two Royal Navy lieutenant who participated in the experiment: Bil Kelly and Bob Dibble. □
“A Better Hornet: Promises, Promises”
(See J. Stevenson, pp. 104-107, October 1993; C. F. Weideman, G. E. Hakanson, pp. 18-20, December 1993 Proceedings)
Editors Note:
Mr. Hakanson’s comment that Mr. Steven son erred when he said that the Nav failed for 15 years to procure a laser spi tracker for the F/A-18 is correct, but tit- fault lies with Proceedings rather that with Mr. Stevenson.
The caption for the accompanying pho tograph of the Marine Corps F/A-18P states correctly that it was not until th- summer of 1993 that F/A-18s with last spot trackers also were equipped will laser designators—the crucial ingredien in the system that permits the aircraft a deliver laser-guided weapons an tonomously without any requirement f<’' another aircraft or ground-based syster to designate the target for them. Pro ceedings made the typographical error th- omitted the word designator from the locked by Mr. Hakanson.
One of the lessons from the Vietnai War—where laser-guided weapons fir' saw combat—was that aircraft deliverin;- laser-guided weapons in high-threat area' normally should designate the targe themselves, because coordinating tw* platforms—the designator and the drop per—was very difficult and very risk) especially for the designator. It was tla Navy’s long delay in equipping it' F/A-18s with a complete laser designa tor-tracker system that Mr. Stevensoi wished to criticize. □
U.8. NAVY (T. MABO^'Proceedings / January 1 ^“Pushing Them Out the Back Door”
(See J.G. Burton, pp. 37-42, June 1993; J.H. Cushman, p. 17, July 1993; S.E. Dietrich, R.M. Swain, R.H. Griffith, pp. 59-65, August 1993; P.E. Funk, M.T. Davis, B.B.G. Clarke, pp. 22- 26, September 1993; W.B. McDaniel, C.D. McFetridge, p. 24, October 1993; J.G. Burton, pp. 19-25, November 1993; W.S. Lind, pp. 23- 24, December 1993 Proceedings)
Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps—Hell hath no fury like a theorist peddling revealed truth. So it is with Mr. Lind, arguing that the Gulf War “was indecisive strategically and a failure operationally.”
Where is the evidence to support this breathtaking assertion? Certainly not in Mr. Lind’s letter, which provides little support for his proposition that the Coalition forces failed “operationally.” True, some of the campaign’s stated objectives were not fully attained. The Republican Guard was not completely destroyed. Instead, it was merely mauled—with three of its divisions obliterated while some shocked remnants succeeded in slipping away to regroup around their fearless leader. It is a very long step, however, to claim that routing 200,000 Iraqis in less than 100 hours, in the most one-sided military campaign in modern times, represents failure “operationally.” Lind’s solution is maneuver warfare. The only unit to attempt this approach to war fighting, he claims, was the 1st Marine Division. Even then, according to Lind, it took the heroic efforts of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers to save the division from an apparently paralyzed field-grade leadership unable to cope with the fluidity and uncertainty of the situation. If this is true, then the Marine Corps’ mid-grade field officers—the generals of tomorrow— must be largely tactically inept.
Lind’s view that the enemy “did not fight” comes from hindsight. Iraqi unwillingness to fight certainly was not evident to Coalition Forces as they prepared to breach the fortified belts and drive deep into the enemy’s rear area, in the face of a potentially devastating chemical threat. In any event, Iraqi refusal to engage was not experienced across the board. Unfortunately, Lind offers precious little in the way of specific evidence for such broad assessments, which are so categorically damning. For credibility, he must come forward with documentation.
Without question, the Gulf War revealed failures at all levels of command and in every formation. This is an inevitable aspect of every major war, and should not surprise or shock anyone. After its lightning victory over Poland in 1939, for example, Germany’s Wehrma- cht engaged in a scorching performance
review; many of their prewar “best and brightest” fared poorly. To suggest today, however, that the vast majority of the U.S. land forces were led by incompetents—who could not cope with the modern battlefield—strains credibility and serves little purpose beyond Lind’s self- aggrandizement.
In the aftermath of victory, it always takes time to achieve a balanced understanding of just what went right and what went wrong. The give-and-take correspondence of Colonel Burton and a squad of senior soldiers in Proceedings is a healthy process; however painful, it contributes in the end to a more professional, capable force. On the other hand, overblown rhetoric and unsubstantiated assertions of professional bankruptcy are unhealthy, and Mr. Lind’s hyperbole only undercuts the useful parts of his message. □
David C. Nilsen—In his original article, Colonel Burton used weak and contradictory arguments to create a polemic rather than a careful analysis of the Persian Gulf War. In his reply to his critics, he concentrated on buttressing his minor quibbles—thereby weakening, not strengthening, his case.
For example, in the irrelevant cause of “proving” that the Persian Gulf War had
the highest fratricide rate in history. Colonel Burton cites a sentence from page 589 of the Title V Report (page M- 2 in the ring-bound edition). He neglected to quote the immediately following sentences, which describe the first of the “three factors” alluded to in the cited sentence: “First, a more thorough investigation of these incidents was possible in Operation Desert Storm. The war was short, the number of incidents few, and more sophisticated investigations were conducted.” The meaning of the full quotation is clear: there were necessarily not more actual fratricide casualties, only more documented ones. Therefore, comparisons of the fratricide rates of the Gulf War and previous wars are statistically impossible.
The Marine Policy Center, a multidisciplinary social science research group, seeks applicants for economists and international lawyers at the Assistant and Associate levels to conduct research on problems relating to marine resources, ocean uses and role of scientific information in policy process. With center resources, will help develop research programs and raise supporting funds. PhD, JD or equivalent degree and demonstrated ability to devise and complete high-quality independent research required. Fields of law, international relations, law and economics, economics of technological change, natural resources, and/or conservation/environmental management are preferred, but strong application from other relevant fields are welcome. Statement of interest, vitae, and names of three references should be forwarded to: Human Resources Office, Box 54PM, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA 02543. WHOI is a smoke free workplace.
An equal opportunity-affirmative action employer M/F/D/V
WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION
Economics and Law
23
Proceedings / January 1994
Colonel Burton takes issue with Colonel Swain’s report that Schwarzkopf and Franks did not speak until the third day of the war and also misinterprets General Griffith’s remark that there was no intention to turn VII Corps south, but only to use the British 1st Armored Division to clear the border area. Colonel Burton should reread his “primary source”: General Schwarzkopf’s memoirs. In them, it is clear that this conversation took place on the third day of the war—26 February. Furthermore, on that day the main body of VII Corps was committed to an eastward attack. The
U.S.S. LEXINGTON
BUILT BY BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION QUINCY. MASSACHUSETTS KEEL LAID 15 JUL.1941
LAUNCHED 26 SEP. 1942
J
OWN A BEAUTIFUL DATA PLAQUE OF THAT SPECIAL SHIP OF THE FLEET
A WWI FLUSH DECK FOUR STACKER- OR A SUPER CARRIER..
...Ship data plaques are also available for other ships of the Fleet and Coast Guard Cutters.. .from WWI to the present.
These beautiful plaques make ideal gifts and are striking additions to anv den or office. Ship Data Plaques are 10"x16" and are made of polished, non-tarnishing brass, mounted on a rich walnut grained base.
Ship Data Plaques are only $49.00 plus a $3.50 shipping charge (California residents add $3.80 sales tax).
For a plaque of your ship - call toll free:
800-327-9137
SPRITE INDUSTRIES 1827 Capital Street Corona, California 91720
only corps element that could have attacked south was the British division. Perhaps if both General Schwarzkopf and Colonel Burton had looked at a map they would not have misinterpreted General Franks’ intentions.
Because of this selective use of material of questionable relevance and his emphasis on minutiae. Colonel Burton fails to conduct a proper and consistent analysis. For example, he blames the slow pace of operations on General Franks’ adherence to synchronization and the M1A1 Abrams tank’s fuel consumption. He says General Franks was too slow. Then he says the tanks used too much fuel, requiring General Franks to protect his supply lines. Then he says Franks was too cautious.
A serious examination of fuel-consumption issue would start by asking how much it slowed down operations—as distinct from synchronization. Colonel Burton wants to have it both ways-—he wants to knock General Franks and the Ml. It cannot be both and neither. One of them must have been the limiting factor. If General Franks drove VII Corps too slowly, why did the tanks run out of fuel? If the tanks kept running out of fuel, how much faster could VII Corps have moved? If the Mis were indeed fuel hogs, then was it not logical to use synchronization? There is an extremely important question here for military thinkers: Should equipment drive doctrine or vice versa? Colonel Burton does not even recognize it.
On the subject of sychronization, does Colonel Burton really believe that VII Corps would have had better results and suffered fewer casualties if General Franks had thrown it piecemeal at the Republican Guard? What about fratricide? How would units racing across the desert have been supplied?
However, these analytical lapses are overshadowed by Colonel Burton’s failure to recognize the real framework of the campaign. I hate to have to bring up Clausewitz, but, as he wrote, war is a po
litical act, and the Persian Gulf War should be examined as such.
Colonel Burton’s benchmark, however, is a purely military one: total destruction of the Republican Guard. By setting this goal, he assumes that it was achievable or desirable within the circumstances, that the explicit goal of U.S. policy was to bring down Saddam Hussein, and that success did not depend upon other criteria which are not measured.
Like World War II, the Persian Gulf War was fought by a coalition. However, the Gulf War coalition was far shakier than the Grand Alliance. The coalition’s overall goal was to defang Hussein so he could no longer threaten the region—not to destroy him. In fact, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were wary of weakening Iraq too much because it had acted as a buffer against Shiite Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, U.S. leadership did not want to take on the thankless—and open- ended—task of building a new Iraqi government or risk rupturing the coalition by reaching for too extreme an objective.
This political goal is evident in the fact that the primary ground operations were limited to areas related to destroying Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait. It would have been impossible to not push much of the Republican Guard out of the back door without greatly widening the war. Three Republican Guard infantry divisions were deployed well north of the Kuwaiti border, very close to the escape route through Basra, which they began using as early as the second day of the ground offensive. To prevent that, U.S. forces would have had to cut the Basra- Baghdad road which would have demanded a swing north of the Euphrates Valley and the swamps of the Hawr al Hammar. This swing would have been logistically insupportable—and a land grab that probably would not have received coalition support.
In his letter. Colonel Clarke correctly points out that the U.S. center of gravity was public reaction to U.S. casualties. The need to limit casualties was under
stood at all levels to be an objective ever bit as important as destroying the Ri publican Guard. Not destroying the R publican Guard would mean an open tional failure: losing public support f1 the war could have ended popular suf port for internationalist policies for at other generation.
Much of Colonel Burton’s criticist appears to center on the decision to ei* the war. Perhaps President Bush did efl1 the war a day too soon, but by critici ing Franks, Colonel Burton is attackinl the wrong target. If he needs an in-tltf| ater culprit, it can only be General No' man Schwarzkopf. After all, as Colors] Burton states, Schwarzkopf agreed to eni the war when he knew that the “gate wasn’t closed. It was his responsibility 11 have full knowledge of the locations a the ground forces and a complete pictui of the strategic situation.
Ultimately, it comes down to this: ho' many more U.S. lives would have bee1 worth the destruction of a few more Re| publican Guard units? VII Corps coul' have moved faster, but not all in on1 piece. Synchronization and the applied' tion of overwhelming firepower also af means of protecting the force. The actio at Modinah Ridge—where 166 MlAl of the 1st Armored Division destroy^
137 enemy vehicles in mere minute1 without any U.S. casualties—proves th<:
The coalition victory was not the foi gone conclusion that Colonel BurtO seems to imagine. Moving hundreds °] thousands of troops across hundreds 11 kilometers against a hostile force wh keeping them supplied the entire time1 H a task that demands a lot of work aa1^^ no small amount of luck. Those who wi; to analyze this effort properly must dosl within the context of the entire situatin'1 taking into account the war’s politic* framework and its many uncertaintie? Unfortunately, Colonel Burton is so m# merized by the idea of antiseptic laboF tory perfection that he misses the bigg11 pS picture. And, by doing so, he risks coming irrelevant. □
“Out of the Bull’s Eye”
(See J. A. Gattuso, pp. 31-36, October 1993;
J. F. Ellingson, p. 14, December 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William J. Davis, Jr., U.S. Navy—Commander Gattuso missed the bull’s eye completely. His position that the product of naval aviation’s culture has been “inflexibility, poor leadership, lack of objective standards, lack of integrity, and lack of accountability” is the antithesis of its true strengths. Undoubtedly, the examples of corruption that he cites have occurred, but they do not indicate that all of naval aviation is morally bankrupt.
Consider this, maybe the new carriertraining plan isn’t so hot; maybe the aviators who “share” NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedure Standardization) information are exchanging facts that are trivial. (We get paid to make decisions like that.) Perhaps the squadron commander who had trouble making the transition to a new aircraft has been such a superb leader that it’s worthwhile to allow him the additional training time. It could be that the squadron commander who pads the readiness reports does so because the system is faulty and, in his estimation, his unit is combat-ready. (Again, he gets paid to make decisions like that.) Finally, the admiral who died in a crash more than likely was qualified—but there is a great difference between qualified and proficient.
Commander Gattuso expends a great deal of energy lamenting problems that are no longer problems in naval aviation. He perceives a “flying club mentality” and suggests that we should be more like the Air Force. However, the Air Force officers among my fellow students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College have expressed their envy of naval aviation’s flexibility. I also call attention to South Carolina Air National Guard Captain Jeff Smiley’s article “I Had the Time of My Life” in the August 1993 Proceedings in which he praised naval aviation’s combat readiness and professionalism. There always will be room for improvement in naval aviation, but the “flying club mentality” has faded from existence.
Commander Gattuso centers his argument on the lack of moral character in naval aviation. The 10% rule—which states that in any profession or organization, one tenth of its people, products, and decisions will be below standards— notwithstanding, the officers I have served with have had high integrity and sterling character. As a F-14 radar-intercept officer, I have put my life in the hands of many young and not-so-young aviators. Without hesitation, I would fly into battle with any of them—and trust them in any situation on the ground. To suggest that
a traveling selection team could assess someone’s character during a relatively short visit is ludicrous. Character can be evaluated only over time and under circumstances that cannot be simulated. The current system in which the rigors of the commissioning programs, flight school, the fleet replacement squadrons, and the fleet comb out those who lack character has worked. I have never seen or heard of a successful officer who had a reputation for lack of integrity.
Furthermore, where does Commander Gattuso suggest we draw the line on what constitutes good moral character? Must officers go to church regularly? Can we never lose our tempers or get drunk? Do we have to read the articles, as well as look at the pictures, in Playboy?
Commander Gattuso proposes that officers need to be taught humility, modesty, and simplicity. As shocking as it may seem, none of those traits is required for leading men into battle. Neither the U.S. Marine Corps—which is the best in the leadership business—nor the U.S. Army teaches those traits to its leaders. Unless we want our combat leaders to be Dali Lama clones, we should stick with the traditional leadership principles.
The most confusing part of the article was Commander Gattuso’s analysis of what naval aviation needs to do to groom its leadership. In one paragraph, he states that only the best aviators should be given command; in the next, he recommends training them in everything from foreign languages to diplomatic protocol. How can they master complex systems—that he says aviators are not given the time to master—and be trained in the other skills?
Furthermore, I have spoken to or been briefed by the F-14 East Coast representative to the aviation command screen board for the last six boards. Not once was I advised to get “as many tickets punched as possible.” Instead, job performance or “breaking out” was stressed. Only in the last two boards has it been said that because of the Goldwater- Nichols Act that a promising young officer must fit in an “out of community” tour—preferably joint. I was never told that this should be the focus of my career, only that in the future we will fight joint; therefore, the Navy needs officers with joint experience.
The fitness-report problem has been discussed thoroughly in Proceedings. My suggested solution would be to rank— from top to bottom—all officers of a certain grade in your command. Currently, this is required for officers who hold the rank of lieutenant commander and above. Why not extend the practice to junior officers as well? Commander Gattuso wants pages written on an officer’s character. In the meetings I attended
in which junior officers were rated, theif character has been integral portion of ho* they were evaluated. Therefore, the ranking of an individual among his peers is 2 good indicator of his character.
I wonder in what navy Commands Gattuso has been for the past ten years, because it certainly isn’t the one I have been in. The integrity of the officers 1 have known has been impeccable. The) have been thoroughly professional in their official and unofficial conduct. One of the reason 1 have stayed in the Nav) was that the men I served with have been honorable, trustworthy, dedicated, and great fun to work and live with.
To thrive in the future, naval aviation doesn’t need to reinvent itself. It onl) needs to recommit itself to the time-tested values and culture that have produced some of the finest men this country has ever known. □
Commander G. Pat Tierney, U.S. Nav} (Retired)—Well done to Commander Gattuso for getting the truth out on tltf flight deck. It took a lot of courage. Tltf aviation community has lost its moral compass and Tailhook is just one small symptom. As a LAMPS pilot, I spent many years in small-boy wardrooms listening to what the surface Navy thought about “aviator arrogance” and what aviators had done to the Navy. It’s tough to build a team under those terms.
At the Pentagon level, the aviation community has fought selfishly for narrow ideals, the most influential positions, and the biggest part of the budget We have taken more than our share in stead of setting the example and doini what’s best for the whole Navy. Therefore, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that we had few friends during the Tailhook fallout. Commander Gattuso is watching the horizon, and the opportunities no* before the next generation of naval aviators. Let’s pray that his vision gets * green deck. □ IProceedings / January 1^