Countering High-Tech Drug Smugglers
By Lieutenant Christopher Tomney, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Joseph DiRenzo III, U.S. Coast Guard
In less than a decade, the Caribbean war on drugs has undergone a significant transformation both in terms of the adversaries’ capabilities to deliver a product and the capabilities of U.S. law enforcement assets to interdict them. While early ventures by narcotics smugglers were poorly planned and executed events utilizing crude transportation methods, early counternarcotics operations by U.S. forces, although relatively successful, lacked substantial coordination or cooperation. As Vice Admiral James C. Irwin, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), said in a March 1990 Seapower interview, “Rapid advancements in the sophistication of narco-smuggling operations Were countered by similar capital investments of resources and platforms by U.S. law-enforcement agencies and DoD [Department of Defense].”
The drug smugglers’ latest technological escalation is the low-pro- fife vessel (LPV), designed to counter an ever-improving U.S. counternarcotics network. Are the combined efforts of the United States and Caribbean nations capable of meeting this challenge?
Some background is necessary. In the early 1980s, Colombian drug barons relied on a near-limitless supply of coastal freighters and converted fishing boats to fun large quantities of narcotics—primarily marijuana—from South America through the Caribbean and into the United States. These motherships typically were loaded with narcotics in plain view and made little effort to disguise their illegal activity. Random boardings by personnel from U.S. Coast Guard cutters plying the waters of the Caribbean often resulted in several different multi-ton narcotics seizures on a single patrol.
To assist the Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies in combating this growing threat. President Ronald Reagan in February 1982 established the South Florida Task Group under the direction of Vice President George Bush. Composed of federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies, it worked to stem a rising tide of narcotics that was sweeping over the Southeastern United States.
In the mid-1980s, the number of motherships interdicted at sea began to decline. The drug lords, who were organizing themselves into a loose-knit cartel, had shifted their modus operandi away from motherships and toward the use of airdrops and high-speed vessels. It was the era of Carlos Lehder, one of many smugglers who relied on fleets of aircraft; he amassed a sizable drug fortune before being apprehended by law-enforcement agents.
Law-enforcement and Department of Defense operational commanders recognized the change and reacted to it. In 1986, President Reagan issued a National Security Decision authorizing increased Department of Defense involvement, on the grounds that our national security was being undermined by drug use and its associated social problems.
In 1989, military involvement increased again when the Department of Defense was designated the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of suspected maritime and air drug smugglers. The Pentagon established Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) in Key West, Florida, and brought a considerable array of intelligence systems and platforms to bear on the adversary. Soon, smugglers had to run a gantlet of military assets to transport their illicit cargo. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs units, co-leaders in the interdiction phase of the drug war, quickly capitalized on timely intelligence, and the region around South Florida and the Bahamas soon became too risky for the smugglers. They began to move farther east—around Puerto Rico and the northern islands of the Lesser Antilles.
The Controlled Substance Act of 1986, which organized regulated substances into five “schedules” based on their medical uses, potential for abuse, and safety or addiction liabilities, adapted federal law to national priorities. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, often referred to as the “Omnibus Drug Bill,” contained sweeping changes and added teeth to narcotics law.
Despite the strengthening of U.S. narcotics laws and additional resources within the Caribbean, the level of airdrop activity around the Puerto Rican operating area soon equaled and then surpassed previous activity in Florida and the Bahamas.
Joint DoD and law enforcement agencies employ extensive detection and interdiction techniques against today’s primary targets:
- Single or twin-engine airplanes that leave Colombia’s Guajiara Peninsula laden with cocaine for airdrop around Puerto Rico and the northern islands of the Lessen Antilles
- Low-profile vessels (LPVs) and semi- submersibles
The aircraft head for waiting pickup vessels or conduct airdrops over remote land areas. The pickup vessels are usually multi-engine, high-speed boats with at least two occupants; most of the boats were purchased new for this activity. The boat crews communicate with the aircraft through a variety of means; drops are prearranged. Both the boats and the aircraft routinely use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to locate the drop site.
Often, U.S. agencies track the aircraft from the time they enter international air space heading northbound. Initially, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, or Customs aircraft monitor the drug aircraft. Later, U.S. Customs maritime aircraft designed to track small vessels or U.S. Customs air interceptors shadow traffickers near the potential drop location. Coast Guard cutters or patrol boats in concert with either Customs Marine Enforcement officers or foreign Coast Guards/Customs (e.g., St. Kitts, St. Martin, or the British Virgin Islands) converge on the drop site in a coordinated effort to apprehend the crew and seize the cargo. Typically, the drop aircraft is tracked back south for potential prosecution by the country form which it departed.
The motherships of the 1980s have evolved through three distinct phases into today’s more sophisticated low-profile and semi-submersible vehicles. Initially, the LPVs were simply low-freeboard vessels with scanty electronics and communications. Often, the smugglers were literally one with their product; the vessels were poorly constructed and occasionally sank, taking the crew and the load with them.
The next generation of LPVs began appearing in the early 1990s. The vessels were better constructed, less beamy, with smoother lines and better control systems and communications. The crew often controlled the vessels from an enclosed pilot house, isolated from the contraband.
Today’s third-generation LPVs are built with radar evasion and non-detectability as primary considerations. They have fiberglass hulls, distinct pilot houses—sometimes air-conditioned—and sophisticated navigation systems. They also are camouflaged to blend into the sea and further hamper visual detection.
A massive array of detection, monitoring, and interdiction platforms are targeted against the narcotraffickers. U.S. Coast Guard, Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy, Air Force, the National Guard, the Puerto Rican National Police (Forces United For Rapid Action—FURA), and maritime police are working together more closely than ever before to present a united front against a common foe. Weekly meetings coordinated by the Coast Guard offer opportunities to share intelligence; joint operations are the rule rather than the exception.
The Coast Guard brings air and surface platforms to the campaign. C-130s and HU-25s plus HH-60/HH-65 helicopters embarked on high- and medium-endurance cutters deploy from Air Station Borinquen on Puerto Rico's west coast. The aircraft fly scheduled patterns and also respond to developing law-enforcement scenarios.
Coast Guard surface forces in the region include four 110-foot Island-Class patrol boats (three homeported at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and one in Old San Juan). The USCGC Point Ledge (WPB-82334), an 82-foot patrol boat, normally is homeported at Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, but is in Louisiana undergoing repairs for damage caused by Hurricane Marilyn. Typically, several Coast Guard surface vessels augment this group, patrolling the Mona Passage and Anegada Pass, both frequented by drug smugglers.
The U.S. Customs Service has several interceptor and patrol aircraft based at the former Ramey Air Force Base base on Puerto Rico’s west coast. The Customs Service also has several large multiengine 25-30 foot vessels based in Fajardo, Ponce, and Mayaguez on Puerto Rico, and on St. Thomas, to assist in interdiction. Customs also has four counternarcotic Enforcement Teams (CETs), a joint operation with the Puerto Rican National Guard, based in Ponce, San Juan, Fajardo, and Mayaguez. These concentrate on pierside boardings and searches at airports. Numerous Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents operate in coordination with these organizations.
The U.S. Navy also brings a sizable force of air and maritime assets to the area. A variety of airborne sensors are available to operational commanders including squadrons of P-3Cs, E-2Cs, and S-3s. Many deploy to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads on Puerto Rico’s east coast for up to six months.
The Navy operates Task Group 4.1, a Joint Task Force composed of Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters. The number of naval combatants varies and will be directly affected by the Navy’s new ship distribution plan. This organizational realignment within the Navy’s surface community created a ‘‘Western hemisphere" force homeported in Mayport, Florida, which will support drug interdiction— among other major missions. In addition, a reserve E-2 squadron is being formed to support narcotics operations.
Nations with regional interests contribute assets on occasion. These include the Royal Navy’s West Indies guard ship (usually a frigate) and the Netherlands guard ship.
Normally, both of these vessels and all the vessels in TG 4.1 have U.S, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) embarked, to conduct actual hoardings. Smaller countries in the Antilles chain also participate in combined operations. The showcase for this enhanced interoperability is Operation Caribe Storm—recently renamed Caribe Venture—which has included U.S., Dutch, British, and many islands operating jointly under a single Bag ship. The group, which began operations last year, has upset a number of attempted surface and air drug transfers.
Such operations highlight the importance of the Coast Guard LEDETs. Under Federal law (Posse Comitatus 18 USC 1385), DoD land forces (U.S. Army and Air Force) are prohibited from actual participation in civilian law-enforcement activities, and DoD policy precludes Navy or Marine Corps participation as well. The Department of Defense, however— with regard to the drug war—is responsible for detection and monitoring, and for providing high-technology platforms to conduct interdiction. When conducting an actual boarding U.S. Navy ships hoist a Coast Guard ensign, and the boarding is then conducted under the operational control of the Coast Guard.
With such a formidable array of agencies and assets available, it would seem that narco-traffickers stand little chance of success. Nevertheless, they succeed. Can we do better? What additional steps should be considered?
The United States and its partners should continue the campaign against the drug trade—and one area that holds great promise is electronic intelligence.
The United States is one of the world leaders in the field. For many years, government efforts concentrated on exploiting Warsaw Pact intercepts; with this threat diminished, capabilities have been redirected towards the narcotraffickers. Given the narcotraffickers’ level of sophistication, the threat requires advanced technological exploitation. Directing such exploitation, however, must be a larger vision.
The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1995) details present policy: "The administration has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce both the demand and supply of drugs... . The U.S. has shifted its strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organization and stop supplies.”
There has been a significant attitudinal change and awareness in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly as producer and transit nations themselves become plagued with the ill effects of consumption. Previous Republican administrations emphasized interdiction over education. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), the Republican presidential candidate, also advocates greater emphasis on interdiction.
Whatever presidential strategy is adopted, it is clear that new detection and monitoring technologies must undergo continuous refinement by U.S. interdiction forces to counter the significant threat posed by the drug mafia. The following steps offer promise:
- Emphasize air- and surface-sensor development. Standard law-enforcement tactics and sensor equipment, geared toward intercepting traditional surface crafts succeeded against the threat in the 1980s and early 1990s. More recent threats, however, such as the third-generation LPVs, dictate enhanced use of the latest radar and infrared systems. Future exploitation of this technology should include radar image enhancement and deployments of additional relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) sites, such as the one proposed for the Lajas Valley of Puerto Rico.
- Concentrate on the core components of command, control, communications and intelligence. Increased interaction and coordination with the Coast Guards and marine police in the Greater and Lesser Antilles is central to this recommendation. The process should include mutual high-frequency, ultra-high frequency, and satellite communications networks. All participants must be trained in all aspects of communications and operational security.
- Share intelligence, foster professional exchanges, and emphasize interoperability. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Greater Antilles Section has taken the lead in this by involving all islands in the Antilles chain in monthly law-enforcement meetings, ship-rider agreements, and professional exchanges. Operations such as Caribe Storm and Halcon (a joint U.S.-Dominican Republic exercise) have been excellent vehicles and should be continued.
The department of Defense and law- enforcement agencies would be well advised to heed the advice of investigative reporter and novelist Brian Freemantle, who almost a decade ago observed in The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade: "To invoke the familiar cliché of the subject, many battles have been mounted against drugs. Few—far too few—have been won. In a war, when battles aren’t won, fresh strategies are devised and introduced.”
Lieutenant Tomney is Head, Coast Guard Intelligence School, Reserve Training Center. Yorktown Virginia. He was the officer-in-charge of a LEDET deployed to Operation Desert Storm, and later commanded the Ocracoke (WPB-1307) and the Point Monroe (WPB- 82353). Lieutenant DiRenzo presently is a Greater Antilles Section Command Center Controller in San Juan, Puerto Rico. A graduate of the United States Naval Academy, he transferred to the Coast Guard in 1991 after a tour as a Staff Action Officer at OP-642 (Navy Countemarcotics). He has served in the Gallatin (WHEC-721) and as executive officer on the Vashon (WPB-1308). As the Vashon's primary boarding officer, he conducted eight narcotics interdictions.
Naval Aviation Cannot Escape History
By Commander Daniel E. Moore, Jr., U.S. Navy
Naval aviation today has a golden opportunity to expand its relevance and significance, for it is a natural supplier to a niche market of unlimited growth potential. Already, careful observers can discern increasing calls for a human-centered, high-initiative naval air force that can provide responsive, decentralized reconnaissance and fire support to surface forces on land or sea.
As our surface forces close with the enemy in a complex, cluttered chaos where confusion and conflicting information confound commanders, naval aviation could provide the human web essential to rapid military success. Friction and confusion abound in the confined and messy waters and shorelines of the Persian Gulf and between the overcast skies and snowy peaks of Bosnia. As an enabling force capable of decreasing friction for our side-while pumping it up for the enemy—naval aviation would be high on any theater CINC’s list of expeditionary force essential elements.
Evolution tells us that only one system can provide repeated success in the face of overwhelming speed, unpredictable change, and conflicting information. The system has two eyeballs, which are connected to the right and left hemispheres of a human brain. No other system can combine analysis and intuition to make the difficult decisions required in an environment filled with neutrals, friendlies, the enemy, urban sprawl, marginal weather, and rugged terrain.
Naval aviators operating in such an environment would fly the latest high-technology, small, lightweight, moderate- cost aircraft using passive sensors. Instead of spending $400 million to buy ten large, complex aircraft, why not spend $400 million to buy 40 smaller ones? The lessons and insights of the commercial electronics industry can be brought to bear in tactical aviation as well. We find ourselves in a position similar to that of the computer industry 20 years ago—obsessed with high-cost, complex, heavy systems so costly that we can buy only a few—when the future calls for exactly the opposite: large numbers of moderate-cost units that expand and enhance a single human being’s ability to connect and move rapidly in a decentralized manner. Going the moderate-cost route would help reverse two disturbing trends that threaten our very existence: fewer—and increasingly outdated—aircraft.
In his final brief as head of the Air Board—and in an official 7 December 1995 report—Vice Admiral Robert J. Spane, U.S. Navy, Commander Naval Air Force Pacific, highlighted charts produced by Franklin C. Spinney, a Pentagon engineer (see Figures 1 and 2). These revealed that from 1996 to 2013—18 years—we plan to buy 1,020 new combat jets for $74 billion, which is less than half the 2,080 planes we bought with $79 billion during the last 18 years of the Cold War. Even with this influx of new aircraft, however, average aircraft age will increase 54% between 1996 and 2007. Wall Street has a name for this kind of business plan: “Betting the company on a high-risk portfolio.”
Why high-risk? Because it is predicated on two unrealistic assumptions:
- That unit costs will decline precipitously as production increases
- That our acquisition budget will rise rapidly to Cold War levels
In the last 40 years, combat aircraft unit costs have never plummeted as predicted; on the contrary, they have consistently come in above planned unit costs. The 400th F/A-18, for example, cost 68% more than predicted, and there is no evidence indicating present procurement programs will be any different.
The bold horizontal line in Figure 1 extending from 1995 to 2010 indicates the number of combat aircraft necessary to support existing plans for 10 active/l reserve carrier air wings and 3.5 Marine aircraft wings. Existing F/A-18E/F and Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) procurement plans fall well short of filling these requirements—even if the plans are executed flawlessly. As an interim solution. however, we could increase F/A-18C production numbers drastically while base-lining F/A-18C Lot 10-Lot 18 aircraft. (Already, low numbers of F/A-18Cs have forced planners to project carrier air wings deployed with mixed Lots of aircraft—which brings its own set of unplanned and hidden repair and maintenance costs.)
Simply ramping up production and base-lining our F/A-18Cs would almost immediately increase the numbers of aircraft on our flight decks and improve overall F/A-18 material readiness without the enormous cost-per-unit increase and risk associated with attempting to execute present procurement plans for the F/A-18E/F and JAST.
The Navy today is spending somewhat less than $2 billion per year on acquisition, yet the existing combat aircraft procurement plan envisions spending some $74 billion over the next 18 years—roughly $4 billion per year. Anthony Lewis’s 22 January 1996 column in The New York Times reveals that journalists, at least, are well aware of these unrealistic plans: “The military services are embarked on enormous acquisitions of weapons, and before long the costs are going to run way beyond what budget forecasts have calculated.” Balancing the federal budget inevitably will place enormous pressure on the Pentagon to reduce expenditures.
A tactical air force, by definition, has large numbers of aircraft. American technology and existing manufacturing techniques in both the computer and auto industries have demonstrated that we can drastically reduce procurement-cycle times and unit costs while maintaining a clear technological and qualitative advantage. Tactical aviation finds itself in a situation similar to that of the computer industry 20 years ago, when visionaries realized that the future lay in creating thousands of moderate-cost, decentralized, lightweight units (personal computers) instead of a few, high-cost centralized units (main frames). Tactical aviation’s vitality and military relevance lie in exploiting the manufacturing and funding lessons of the last 20 years to reproduce that success.
A naval air force with large numbers of capable aircraft could set and control the tempo on the modem battlefield.
Probing the environment in widely dispersed and decentralized elements, some of our pilots would uncover not only the enemy but also gaps in his forces. A single call would mass dozens of aircraft capable of pinning or destroying enemy forces on the spot... or they could shoot the gap and attack from the rear. Confronted with repeated dispersals and concentrations, the enemy’s ability to operate as an organic whole would rapidly disintegrate.
Conversely, our naval air force would help ease, speed, guide, and coordinate the movement and offensive actions of friendly surface forces. Capable of filling in the missing pieces and providing answers in the face of contradictory information, naval aviation could become the human glue essential to holding together effective, fast-paced combined arms operations.
If we make the tough decisions now, our future could be bright. To paraphrase President Abraham Lincoln’s annual message to Congress in 1862: Fellow naval aviators, we cannot escape history. We of this generation will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will write us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.
Commander Moore is Air Operations Officer for the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) Battle Group. He commanded VFA-81, flying missions over Bosnia from the USS Saratoga (CV-60) early in 1994, and wrote “Bosnia, Tanks and . . . From the Sea," Proceedings, December 1994, pp. 42-45.
Fielding a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
By Lieutenant Commander John M. Pollin, U.S. Navy
Discussions on the application of the Aegis combat system to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) focus primarily on hardware and hard kill. Although this should be the primary focus, as we begin to think about the role of Aegis in future warfare, we should address more subtle—perhaps secondary— issues. Five key points not specifically related to hardware or hard-kill—the radar itself, training, ship positioning, joint data-link operations, and doctrine— must be addressed.
The Aegis system’s AN/SPY-1 radar was designed to accomplish two major missions:
- To defend against saturation cruise- missile attacks—which would overwhelm other combat systems—by combining high-speed, high-volume search, automatic target tracking, and missile fire-control guidance
- To defend against very low altitude sea-skimmers, especially those detected are in the attack phase. (The radar was designed to conduct an extremely high-speed search in low elevation out to the limits of the radar horizon.)
The radar and its fire-control system function superbly in these tactical roles, but the detection, tracking, and fire-control functions associated with TBMD may slow down these exceptional capabilities. Shipboard tacticians and SPY-1 radar operators may face conflicting requirements: to optimize radar performance at the high elevations required for TBMD without sacrificing the performance required to defeat conventional sea skimmers.
The Aegis Combat Training System (ACTS) is a good one; other ship classes have similar systems, but none matches ACTS capability to provide the entire Combat information Center (CIC) team a realistic scenario on which to train. ACTS, in addition to simulating realistic tracks and targets, also can simulate sensors such as the SPY-1 radar—and the ship’s captain and combat systems officer therefore can be relatively confident about the radar’s day-to-day performance.
CIC watch standers must be provided scenarios requiring defense against simulated ballistic missile profiles, just as they now are faced with simulated cruise missile profiles. Although creating ACTS scenarios is a very deliberate, time-consuming process, the product generally represents real-world situations and reflects threat profiles accurately. The same realism is necessary if crews are to gain and maintain proficiency against theater ballistic missiles.
Typically, Aegis cruisers and destroyers are positioned for best use of their defenses against cruise missiles. In 1994, the Surface Warfare Development Group published a Tactical Memorandum addressing numerous aspects of Aegis- unique air-defense capabilities, including Aegis ship positioning relative to a defended target. At last, the fleet has doctrinal guidance on the subject, derived from detailed reviews of exercises and actual missile engagements. Undoubtedly, the TBMD mission will require Aegis ships to be repositioned within battle groups. It could mean detaching them entirely from the battle group. Battle group planners will be confronted with intricate choices as they attempt to synchronize the battle group’s firepower against tactical and strategic missile threats.
Since the nature of TBMD requires sister-service participation and national sensor surveillance, the Navy will need to expand its data-link operations. Any additional participants may slow data exchange rates and increase net cycle time. New tactics must be developed to maximize sensor coverage for strategic use, while minimizing this cycle time. Additional participants and new strategic objectives for link operations must not be allowed to drive up the net cycle time to the point where it is unusable tactically. One alternative—available now—may be the use of a dual-net data link. Used in conjunction with multiple frequencies, this would give participants the ability to dedicate one net to TBMD and one to battle group tactical antiair warfare. A deployed battle group has employed the concept successfully in joint and multinational exercises.
Navy doctrine is the most critical issue that must be addressed, for our views of the way an Aegis ship should be employed are changing. Many questions must be resolved:
- Will TBMD be incorporated as part of existing tactical or operational level AAW doctrine, or will it generate new requirements for separate strategic AAW doctrine?
- If so, will TBMD and strategic AAW doctrine complement current Navy or Joint tactical air defense doctrine?
- What role will the Composite Warfare Commander’s Force Antiair Warfare Commander or the Joint Force’s Area Air Defense Commander have in TBMD doctrine?
- Will Naval Warfare Publication 32, a thoughtful and coherent guide for fleet AAW operations, require mere updating—or will it take a complete revision to accommodate TBMD concepts?
- How will TBMD be incorporated into classic Operational Tasking (OpTask) AAW, OpTask Link, or joint OpTask Air Defense guidance? And, if revised Joint doctrine calls for changing operational control of Aegis warships for single-mission TBMD tasking, how will a battle-group commander assess the impact on operations? We should not think of Aegis as just a floating, 360° Patriot battery, for we expect these warships to conduct simultaneous antisubmarine, antisurface, AAW, and strike warfare mission. What command-and-control relationships will permit national- or international-level TBMD tasking without compromising battle-group level naval warfighting? Finally, in view of the Navy’s evolving role in TBMD, what role will Navy air-defense planners play in modifying Joint air-defense doctrine?
Aegis warships offer the military the unusual option of using existing air-defense technology for strategic defense, and the Navy’s participation in TBMD is vital. The service should discuss carefully the way it defines TBMD doctrine, and the way it will use Aegis combat systems in tactical and strategic air defense.
Lieutenant Commander Pollin is attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. He served as precommissioning CIC officer on the USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55). officer-in-charge Aegis Training Unit, Moorestown. New Jersey, and as combat systems officer on the USS Vincennes (CG-49).
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance: Forward . . . From the Sea
By Lieutenant Commander Sean A. Bergesen, U.S. Navy
In December 1995, the Nimitz (CVN-68) Battle Group departed for the Arabian Gulf with two ES-3A Shadows from Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ)-5 Detachment Charlie— marking a significant milestone—not only for the VQ community and the battle group, but also for carrier aviation as a whole. Finally, all active air wings are cruising with this new, capable weapon system, and experiencing the dramatic impact it has had on tactical electronic reconnaissance “Forward . . . From the Sea.”
As the official successor to the venerable EA-3B “Whale,” the Shadow was conceived with an eye to extensive automation, and powerful navigation, communication, and data-management capabilities. To support its electronic- and communications-intelligence sensors, the aircraft has an integrated system composed of:
- Inertial navigation
- Omega and Global Positioning System (GPS)
- VHF, UHF, and HF radios
- Satellite communications
- Single-channel ground-and-air radio system
- Link-11
- Forward-looking infrared
- Inverse-synthetic-aperture radar
Ironically, it is not the advanced technology of the new platform that has garnered so much positive attention, but rather the manner in which it is being employed. Specifically, current Shadow detachments have achieved a level of integration within their respective carrier air wings that was missing in the carrier-based VQ community only a few years ago.
As seen in their long-range counterparts, the EP-3Es, this new-found integration sets current Shadow detachments apart from their predecessors, and has provided the key to expanding the real-time tactical impact of VQ’s signals-intelligence product. In the words of one veteran strike leader, “The air wing now knows what VQ does, and how they do it. And that knowledge has Proven crucial to keeping us one step ahead of the threat both at Fallon and in the real-world tactical environments.”
Three significant developments have driven this:
Opening the special intelligence world of VQ operations to more and more air wing personnel
Basing ES-3A squadrons in the continental United States
Making a concerted effort by the VQ community to exert a more direct and real-time impact on the central core of air wing and battle group operations
Throughout its existence, VQ operations have been shrouded in a cloak of secrecy and compartmentalization. Only senior air wing aviators—generally the air wing commander, squadron commanders, and executive officers—were cleared to the level required for access. Recently, however, a growing percentage of the air wing has been cleared—in particular, the strike leaders and airborne mission commanders responsible for getting the most out of all assigned assets on a real-time basis.
Armed with a more complete understanding of the VQ mission, those who lead the air wing’s day-to-day operations are better equipped to exploit the ES-3A’s full potential and ensure that signals-intelligence collection is tailored to the specific requirements of each individual air wing evolution.
Stateside homeporting also has helped. The Whales always had been forward- based in Guam and Spain; now, all but Air Wing Five’s two ES-3As are homeported at Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California, and Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. Bringing VQ home was done largely because of fiscal considerations, but it has produced tremendous operational and training benefits. In particular, ES-3A detachments—unlike their EA-3B predecessors—now can participate in virtually every phase of an air wing’s pre-deployment work-up cycle, from training at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, all the way through Joint Fleet-exercises.
As a result, important VQ collection considerations—such as stationing, launch timing and communications—are exercised from day one, and fused directly into real-world contingency strike plans and standing battle force defense tactics. While this sort of pre-cruise integration and coordination has long been a given for other communities, it is truly a watershed for VQ. Most important, actual ES-3A aircraft are flown during workups, providing air wing crews and battle group warfare commanders with first-hand exposure to the contribution to situational awareness that real-time signals intelligence makes. Without a doubt, stateside homeporting has allowed the ES-3A—and the electronic reconnaissance mission—to “train like we fight.”
It is likely, however, that the most significant factor in the ES-3A’s course toward full integration has been the determination of the Shadow community itself to become more central to the day-to-day planning and execution of core air wing and battle group missions. This mind-set was a function not only of the attitudes of former EA-3B and EP-3E air crews—who were never satisfied with a seemingly sideline support role in carrier aviation—but also of the tactical experience of transitioned A-6E, E-2C, S-3B, and helicopter aviators, who brought a different perspective and renewed enthusiasm to the task of applying VQ signals intelligence to the air wing’s most pressing operational challenges.
Together, these old and new VQ personnel have navigated the ES-3A to where it needs to be—fully integrated into the pointy end of naval aviation.
Lieutenant Commander Bergesen is the Officer-in- Charge of VQ-5 Detachment 3 on board the USS Nimitz (CVN-68).
Sub Force’s Reserves See Action
By Lieutenant Kevin G. Aandahl, U.S. Naval Reserve
Every winning team has a strong bench with depth. We can’t win without the kind of support the reserves are providing on a daily basis to SubLant and SubPac [Submarine Force Atlantic and Pacific],” Vice Admiral Dennis Jones, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, said. [He is the former Director of Submarine Warfare, N- 87], “Our reservists are getting more opportunities to get some serious court time with their active-duty shipmates.”
Like the rest of the Navy, today’s submarine force is coping with the challenge of doing more with less—which is where their experienced Naval Reserve counterparts come in. “With the active duty submarine force drawing down, the recognition for the skills and talents we bring to the table continues to rise,” Rear Admiral John Till, U.S. Naval Reserve, Deputy Director, Submarine Reserve Affairs (N-87R), said. “We’re known for our ability to accomplish diverse and complex tasks and doing them right.” The submarine reserve program totals 4,340 Selected Reservists in 115 units. Despite their limited numbers, reserve submariners provided an impressive 22,000 man-days of work to their gaining commands during fiscal year 1994—and the demand for reserve submariners continues to increase. By taking on more and more responsibilities, they are reinforcing their reputation for providing essential operational, maintenance, and headquarters staff support for the submarine force’s evolving global missions.
Commander Submarine Force Mediterranean’s Operational Control Center provides a vital command-and-control link between U.S. and NATO submarines and theater commanders enforcing U.N. sanctions against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. When the active-duty staff needed assistance to maintain round-the- clock support of NATO Operation Sharp Guard, Naval Reserves from Submarine Group Eight Detachment 108 in Orlando, Florida, answered the call.
Three-member teams deployed on 17-day annual training orders and were integrated into the control center’s watch bill. “This thrust me into a real-world crisis environment and put my experience to the test, it was one of the most personally satisfying career experiences I’ve had,” according to Petty Officer Second Class Heman Rivera. In addition to standing watches, he volunteered to repair key security equipment and saved the Navy an estimated $6,000.
Providing long-term support required a larger pool of skilled submarine-qualified reservists, and Detachment 108 played a lead role in identifying, training, and scheduling personnel nationwide. “By year’s end 203 selected reservists from over 50 units will have provided over two thousand man-days in support of Operation Sharp Guard,” Lieutenant Commander Robert Sigrist, the detachment commander, said. Vice Admiral George W. Emery, formerly Commander Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet recognized the superb support, characterizing it as “ . . . one of the true success stories of the submarine reserve program.” Vice Admiral Jones echoed that sentiment: “I could not have lived without the reserve support I received when I was ComSubMed. They kept my NATO command center running 24 hours a day.”
Reservists also are playing increasingly visible roles in environmental training, providing their gaining commands environmental expertise from the private sector. Commander Richard Guida, assigned to OPNAV N-87(R) in Washington, D.C., provided a wealth of legislative affairs and environmental experience in helping develop the Navy’s environmental impact statement required for the home porting plans for the new Seawolf submarines.
At the Submarine Base, San Diego, California, a Naval reservist is providing active-duty sailors training and certification required by federal and state environmental laws. In a course he developed, Petty Officer First Class Larry Aandahl, of Commander Submarine Pacific’s Detachment 219, has trained and certified 145 active duty sailors to meet the recovery, recycling, and reclaiming of ozone-depletion substances that is required under the Federal Clean Air Act. I Compliance requires sailors working on air conditioning and refrigeration equipment to be trained and certified, and sailors can lose their naval enlisted classification job code without the training.
With nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines integrated into carrier battle groups, amphibious readiness groups, and multinational NATO task forces, qualified submarine officers and enlisted advisers are a necessity. Submarines Atlantic reservists played a lead role in proving the viability of the Submarine Advisory Team (SAT) concept, training and qualifying members of three submarine reserve units in the command’s Operational Control Center center to perform this mission.
“Submarines offer the battle group commander tremendous versatility,” Captain Wes Rowley, U.S. Naval Reserve, Director of SubLant’s reserve Battle Group Staff, said. "They can be employed to perform ASW, strike, intelligence and special warfare missions. A SAT team's job is to advise the senior afloat commanders on the capabilities and limitations of the submarine, we also provide the command-and-control expertise they need to plan and execute much more sophisticated exercises.”
Command-and-control expertise provided by SAT teams includes: operational and tactical control of the submarine, antisubmarine warfare, waterspace management, and prevention of mutual interference. Fleet commanders cannot assume operational control of the submarine without embarked SAT teams. Integrated reserve and active-duty SATs include a senior submarine qualified officer who acts as the Submarine Element Coordinator advising the battle group commanders in tactical development planning' Other members include submarine-qualified officers, radiomen, and quartermasters to provide communications and navigation expertise.
“The reserve Battle Group Staff has become a premier program within the submarine Reserve Program,” says Captain Jack Roe, U.S. Naval Reserve, SubLant’s Reserve Program Deputy Commander. "To operate a submarine close-in with surface task forces requires people with a unique blend of navigation and communication skills. Reserve submarine officers obtained these skills from years of standing OpCon [operational control) watches and exercise support experience, so we have almost an exclusive talent in this regard.”
Requests for support continue to rise as submarines routinely deploy to support afloat exercises. Commander, Submarines Pacific, is evaluating the SAT concept as a model and developing a similar program using qualified submarine reservists attached to Pacific Fleet units.
“Reservists have always played a very strong traditional role in submarine maintenance,” Vice Admiral Jones said. Skilled reservists provide hands-on support as they perform maintenance at Naval Submarine Support Facility, New London, Connecticut, and Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, Georgia; Atlantic and Pacific Fleet submarine tenders; and intermediate maintenance facilities.
This vital support comes from units based around the United States. For example, Detachment 618 from St. Louis, Missouri, provided 1,500 man-hours of support to the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility at Pearl Harbor during their 1995 16-day Annual Training. Unit members worked alongside their active duty counterparts on maintenance tasks on board several fast attack submarines. In addition to conducting scheduled maintenance activities, members rebuilt a diesel engine, tested computer network systems, installed fiber-optic cables, and removed and disposed of hazardous materials. “This kind of work is one of the most valuable things we do,” according to Petty Officer Melany Wainwright.
Reservists also are actively involved in making Navy submarines quieter. At the Trident Refit Facility at Kings Bay, Georgia, sound-silencing teams have been installing sound-absorbing mounts on selected submarine equipment.
Reservists share the never-ending maintenance burden on board tenders on drill weekends. The 51 reservists assigned to the USS L.Y. Spear (AS-36) Detachment 106 in Norfolk, Virginia, provide one thousand man-days of support annually for their active duty shipmates. Reserves like Petty Officer Second Class Murray Miller say there’s no such thing as a typical drill weekend. “For me, the biggest personal satisfaction I get from a drill weekend is finishing an important Job and seeing it being used by the fleet.”
On any given weekend highly trained reservists are standing Operational Control (OpCon) watches around the world. Enlisted reservists also are standing important watches as Communications and Petty Officer Of The Day. “You can’t beat the feeling of starting a drill weekend by relieving your active duty counterpart’s watch. I step right into a real- world environment,” said Lieutenant Commander Rick Driessleim, U.S. Naval Reserve, with Submarine Group 10’s Detachment 208.
“We’ve assigned our reservists to increasingly relevant day-to-day responsibilities, and have upgraded their warfighting capabilities. Reservists are viewed as much more than just mobilization assets, they’re critical to our operation,” Rear Admiral Jerry Ellis, former Commander Submarine Group 10, said.
Physical security is one of the most vital, and visible, requirements of the submarine force. Playing increasingly important and expanding roles in maintaining and enhancing submarine base security are reservists like those assigned to Submarine Base San Diego’s Reserve Support Unit. “We have a great deal of civilian law enforcement talent, which our gaining command has tapped into,” observed Lieutenant Commander Mark Schwartzel, U.S. Naval Reserve, the unit’s operations officer. “We’ve earned a reputation for providing law enforcement training," he said. Petty Officer Michael Lambert, a San Diego Police Officer, trains and certifies the base’s security force in the use of the PR24 police baton, and has been instrumental in helping to establish a base bike patrol. Petty Officer Michael Gonzales, also a police officer, trains security unit personnel on urban terrorist tactics at Camp Pendleton’s Urban Terrorism facility.
Reservists also protect nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) homeported at Kings Bay and Bangor, Washington. These reservists also provide security and remote replenishment facilities for SSBNs at locations around the world—an eventuality necessary should a natural disaster or attack block access to home ports. “Close the channel, and you’ve effectively impaired the Navy’s strategic deterrent,” says Lieutenant Commander Timothy Goulding, U.S. Naval Reserve, who manages this important reserve mission at Kings Bay.
Identifying and locating Naval Reservists with specialized skills to fill unanticipated gaps will receive a high-technology boost with the introduction of a civilian skills computer database currently being designed and monitored by the submarine reserve program. It can also be used by gaining commands to review the skills of reservists reporting to perform Annual Training. "We’ve assigned a very talented group of database experts from our program to develop and field this project,” Rear Admiral John Till said.
With more nations deploying diesel submarines, reservists are helping monitor this emergent threat by standing watches at Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) centers. These watch centers operate around the clock, and reservists are standing watches on drill weekends and during annual training periods.
While geographical proximity is a challenge for reserve submarine program units far removed from their gaining commands, meaningful contributory support is still possible. “We have to change our mindset about being too far away to contribute. Innovative COs both active duty and reservists should be looking for long-term analysis, accounting, exercise planning, and administrative projects which don’t require a physical presence to accomplish them. These projects can be worked on during drill weekends and delivered upon completion. That’s the mentality we must have to be truly effective in providing meaningful peacetime contributory mission support,” Rear Admiral Till said.
Regardless of the challenges ahead, times have definitely changed for Naval Reserve submariners, concluded Vice Admiral Jones: "Reservists better keep their seabags packed because wherever the Navy’s submarine force deploys, they now expect to have their strong bench supporting them.”
Lieutenant Aandahl. a reserve Public Affairs officer assigned to the U.S. Strategic Command, is the public relations manager for the Dekalb Genetics Corporation. He was recalled to serve on board the USS Missouri (BB-63) during Operation Desert Storm and the USS Wasp (LHD-1) during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.